The curve of the coronavirus pandemic started to bend upwards in Africa only recently – just as the curve in the 10 most-affected countries around the world was flattening.
Policymakers in Africa must now absorb lessons from the experiences of other countries and avoid policy mistakes. Most importantly they need to implement a COVID-19 policy manifesto that is capable of inoculating African economies from the crisis and reignitng economic activities after the pandemic.
Such a manifesto would have to assemble all available levers of policy. This would require public health, fiscal, monetary, financial, labour market, environmental, industrial, regional integration, and social welfare policies.
Public health policy is the first place to start. The Global Health Security Index shows that only 21 out of 54 African countries are somewhat prepared from a clinical perspective to deal with epidemic threats. The other 33 are completely ill-equipped.
Public spending
“The pandemic is no time for fiscal distancing,” the president of the African Development Bank, Akinwumi Adesina, recently noted. In other words, this is not the time to hold back government expenditure.
Fiscal policy needs to respond from both the expenditure and revenue sides. It can be used to cushion the impact of the shock and minimise economic dislocation – a dual objective of saving lives and livelihoods.
The pandemic offers policymakers an opportunity to build resilient health systems capable of withstanding the pressure from the pandemic and broaden access to health care. This can be achieved by:
boosting surveillance and assessment through upgrading laboratory capacity required for testing and detection;
efficient clinical management so that first responders do not become patients themselves, and
maintaining essential services such as food and agriculture, energy, law enforcement and public works to speed up recovery.
Assistance should also be targeted at the most vulnerable groups.
Vulnerable groups
Women and young people are among the most vulnerable groups to suffer the impact of the crisis. Policymakers should therefore extend direct financial payments to informal sector and insecure women and young workers with families.
In addition, small and medium-sized enterprises should be helped to stay afloat. In Africa, more than 80% of economic activity is in the informal sector. Small and medium-sized enterprises are much more vulnerable to both demand and supply-side shocks from lockdowns. Hence governments need to use specific policies that target formal and informal sector enterprises.
Since a significant number of small enterprises in the informal sector avoid or do not pay taxes, more general policies beyond tax relief, such as deferrals on rent and utility payments, can be used to target this group. This was done in Côte d’Ivoire. Lump-sum subsidies in the form of monthly one-off allowances can also be used to support small enterprises and keep them afloat.
These additional expenditures will likely exceed revenues during the crisis. Governments must therefore have a fiscal recovery plan that would seek a careful balance between fiscal stimulus and fiscal consolidation: that is, tightly cutting back spending after the crisis.
Managing debt
Debt sustainability should continue to be the priority. Without a post-crisis fiscal consolidation plan, sovereign debt defaults – a situation where governments are not able to pay back their debt – might be the next pandemic.
COVID-19 will add to the debt burden of African economies and heightens the likelihood of a widespread and far-reaching sovereign debt crisis, if not properly managed.
On top of increased expenditure and collapsing tax, non-tax, and foreign exchange earnings, countries are also experiencing disorderly capital flight because of extreme risk aversion by investors. In turn this is fuelling volatile market movements and widening spreads on African sovereign bond yields, making African debt instruments riskier and pricier to investors.
This leaves governments unable to refinance maturing debt.
Although they have already sought debt repayment moratoriums from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, African policymakers need to actively seek debt repayment moratoriums from private, bilateral and multilateral creditors.
The crisis forcefully supports the case for including state-contingent clauses that stipulate actions to be taken when a catastrophic event occurs in sovereign debt contracts. Crisis-contingent clauses in the debt contracts would have meant automatic debt relief for affected countries without the need to actively seek debt rescheduling by creditors. This model is already working well for Haiti whenever an earthquake occurs.
Financial lifelines
Institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank have announced financial packages tailored to the COVID-19 pandemic. These facilities provide a lifeline to implement the COVID-19 policy manifesto and inoculate African economies from the devastating effects of the pandemic.
Policymakers should act quickly to save African lives and livelihoods.
Chuku Chuku, OIC-Manager for Macroeconomic Policy, Debt Sustainability and Forecasting at the African Development Bank and Lecturer (on leave of public service) at the Department of Economics, The University of Uyo
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.
Covid-19 and Sub-Saharan disease response and readiness?
Malnutrition and disease means COVID-19 could be more deadly in Africa than elsewhere in the world.
Health systems in Africa have limited capacity to absorb the pandemic.
The strategic approach should focus on containment and aggressive preventive measures.
Continents case detection, case management disease surveillance systems is too low and most areas none existing.
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been significantly impacted by the ongoing corona virus outbreak and is forecast to fall sharply from 2.4% in 2019 to -2.1 to -5.1% in 2020, the first recession in the region over the past 25 years, according to the latest Africa’s Pulse, the World Bank’s twice-yearly economic update for the region.
Uniqueness of Africa in general- The continent’s population and health systems make it different from other regions that have experienced COVID-19 to date. Three factors are important at the population level.
Clean running water and soap are in such short supply that only 15 percent of sub-Saharan Africans had access to basic hand-washing facilities in 2015, according to the United Nations. In Liberia, it is even worse — 97 percent of homes did not have clean water and soap in 2017, the U.N. says
Experiences in Asia and Europe showed that people over 60, and those with significant health problems are most vulnerable to severe cases of COVID-19. Although Africa’s youth may be considered a significant protective factor in the pandemic, how the virus will evolve and manifest itself on the continent remains unknown.
The second factor within the population is the high prevalence of malnutrition, anemia, malaria, HIV/AIDs, and tuberculosis. Liberia, for example, has one of the highest rates of stunting in the world: one in three children under five years old are stunted. In recent weeks, we have witnessed an increase in the incidence of malnutrition. Moreover, the rainy season has come early this year, which means that malaria cases will rise rapidly and peak malaria cases in 2020 may coincide with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
We should therefore anticipate that in Africa a higher incidence of severe forms of COVID-19 will occur in younger patients because of the demographics and associated endemic conditions that affect the immune system. Malnutrition, anemia, malaria, HIV/AIDs, and tuberculosis are likely to increase the severity of COVID-19. Africa may not see the same narrative of “most people who get it will be fine” play out.
Third, social cohesion and social gatherings are of great importance in Africa. For example, weekly attendance of a religious service is highest in Africa with rates as high as 82% in Uganda and Ethiopia. As a result, measures to impose social and physical distancing may prove to be more challenging, as demonstrated by the protests that broke out on 20 March 2020 in Senegal after public gatherings, including gatherings at mosques were banned as cases of COVID-19 rose. Earlier this week, Tanzania came under scrutiny when it was announced that the country will not close places of worship
Health systems Factors.
Double disease Burden and lacking the capacity for treating the critically ill care.
There are two major health system factors that will make the COVID-19 response in Africa more challenging.
First, the continent is experiencing the double burden of diseases: in addition to dealing with these endemic infectious diseases, health systems in Africa are facing non-communicable diseases, including injury, and cancer. As a result, the health systems are stretched thin to begin with, and there is very little room to absorb the COVID-19 pandemic.
Less than 1,000 a thousand Ventilator machines in 1.3 billion African population.
Report by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) finds that fragile and conflict-affected countries face a double emergency: the arrival and impact of COVID-19, and the secondary humanitarian, economic and political havoc this outbreak will wreak While there is so many African countries are dealing with civil wars at the moment.
10 African Countries Have No Ventilators
Report shows South Sudan only has four ventilators for the entire country; Northeast Syria has 11; Sierra Leone has 13; in Venezuela, 90% of hospitals lack critical supplies.
In South Sudan, where less than half the country’s health facilities are functioning, there are 24 ICU beds and four ventilators. With life-saving humanitarian programs globally facing unprecedented disruption and suspension, countries like South Sudan which are already gripped by high levels of malnutrition may face famine.
Second, the capacity to provide critical care is the lowest in the world. Severe forms of COVID-19 lead to respiratory failure requiring ventilation support. The ability to treat severe forms of COVID-19 will depend on the availability of ventilators, electricity, and oxygen. A recent analysis of countries with the highest numbers of intensive care beds per capita does not include any country from Africa. In Liberia for example, there are no intensive care units (ICU) with ventilators. Uganda has 0.1 ICU bed/100,000 population. In contrast, the United States has 34.7 beds/100,000 populations.
The analysis shows that COVID-19 will cost the region between $37 billion and $79 billion in output losses for 2020 due to a combination of effects. They include trade and value chain disruption, which impacts commodity exporters and countries with strong value chain participation; reduced foreign financing flows from remittances, tourism, foreign direct investment, foreign aid, combined with capital flight; and through direct impacts on health systems, and disruptions caused by containment measures and the public response.
While most countries in the region have been affected to different degrees by the pandemic, real gross domestic product growth is projected to fall sharply particularly in the region’s three largest economies – Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa— as a result of persistently weak growth and investment. In general, oil exporting-countries will also be hard-hit; while growth is also expected to weaken substantially in the two fastest growing areas—the West African Economic and Monetary Union and the East African Community—due to weak external demand, disruptions to supply chains and domestic production. The region’s tourism sector is expected to contract sharply due to severe disruption to travel.
The COVID-19 crisis also has the potential to spark a food security crisis in Africa, with agricultural production potentially contracting between 2.6% in an optimistic scenario and up to 7% if there are trade blockages. Food imports would decline substantially (as much as 25% or as little as 13%) due to a combination of higher transaction costs and reduced domestic demand.
Several African countries have reacted quickly and decisively to curb the potential influx and spread of the corona virus, very much in line with international guidelines. However, the report points out several factors that pose challenges to the containment and mitigation measures, in particular the large and densely populated urban informal settlements, poor access to safe water and sanitation facilities, and fragile health systems. Ultimately, the magnitude of the impact will depend on the public’s reaction within respective countries, the spread of the disease, and the policy response. And these factors together could lead to reduced labor market participation, capital under utilization, lower human capital accumulation, and long-term productivity effects.
Recent study from Yale University-Should Low-Income Countries Impose the Same Social Distancing Guidelines as Europe and North America to Halt the Spread of COVID-19? by Zachary Barnett-Howell, Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak
The much lower estimated benefits of social distancing and social suppression in low-income countries are driven by three critical factors:
(a) Developing countries have smaller proportions of elderly people to save via social distancing compared to low-fertility rich nations.
(b) Social distancing saves lives in rich countries by flattening the curve of infections, to reduce pressure on health systems. Delaying infections is not as useful in countries where the limited number of hospital beds and ventilators are already overwhelmed and not accessible to most.
(c) Social distancing lowers disease risk by limiting people’s economic opportunities. Poorer people are naturally less willing to make those economic sacrifices. They place relatively greater value on their livelihood concerns compared to concerns about contracting coronavirus.
Not only are the epidemiological and economic benefits of social distancing much smaller in poorer countries, such policies may also exact a heavy toll on the poorest and most vulnerable
In Africa, social distancing is a privilege few can afford?
The myth of self-isolation
Knowing the realities on the ground, it is curious that the WHO and ministries of health in different African countries are recommending that people self-quarantine if they could have been exposed to the coronavirus. In Rwanda, for example, a man travelling from the US has potentially infected his wife and brother, accounting for three of the seven cases. Which raises the question: how are people in shared accommodation expected to self isolate?
Ugandan police hit vendors who refused to clear the streets
Slums and informal settlements are also part of the physical infrastructures of many African cities. All of them were overcrowded and lacked services even before the threat of a global health crisis emerged.
Think of Alexandra in Johannesburg, where over 700,000 people are estimated to live in less than 5 square kilometres (1.9 square miles), Mbare in Harare with some 800,000 people, Kibera in Nairobi with at least 250,000, and Makoko in Lagos with over 300,000 whose homes are built on stilts in a lagoon.
No choice to ‘work from home’
It is more practical for people who work in offices to “work from home” but if your only means of livelihood is selling tomatoes or second-hand clothes at an informal market in a big city, how do you begin to do this “online”?
The choice before you is often to stay home and fail to provide the evening meal for your family, or to brave it out into the city and try and fend for your family. If I was that person selling at a market, I know what choice I would make. It is not social distancing.
For those concerned about the risk of exposure to the virus, the WHO recommends self-quarantining. This has so far included advice for people not to share bathrooms, living space and even bedrooms, if they can. But what if you live in a house where the bedroom doubles as a kitchen and living space – all shared with your (sometimes extended) family?
Struggling health systems
A lot has been said about the health systems of many African countries and how they would struggle to cope with a fast-spreading virus like the coronavirus. Indeed, after many years of conflict, in countries like South Sudan and Somalia, the health system has almost collapsed.
In some countries around the Sahel – Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali – people continue to be displaced by conflict and live in squalid conditions in displaced peoples’ camps. Even in countries not in conflict, like Uganda and Zimbabwe, structural adjustment programmes proffered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have seen a continuous decrease in funding available for healthcare. The Abuja declaration of 2001, requiring each country to set aside at least 15 percent of its national budget for healthcare, is still gathering dust in health authorities’ offices. None of the parties to the declaration has managed to achieve its goals.
It clearly does not require a pandemic to expose the gaps in the health system. If developed systems like in northern Italy can buckle under pressure from COVID-19, one can only imagine the impact this will have on front-line health staff who are without adequate training, protective equipment and even basic drugs.
No one knows how the pandemic will spread across Africa. But we know it is a matter of time. One can not help but wonder if it is not time for African governments, with support from the WHO, to develop recommendations that take all these environmental conditions into account.
Social distancing could probably work in China and in Europe – but in many African countries, it is a privilege only a minority can afford.
The WHO has done well since the onset of the outbreak to provide leadership and access to information about a virus that virtually nothing was known about just several weeks ago. But now, more must be done to reimagine our governance systems, especially because healthcare is intrinsically linked to everything else.
And in Africa – likely the next battlefield for the virus – tackling COVID-19 will need more imagination and alternative solutions from all of us.
Poorer countries such as sub Saharan Africa. also have limited capacity to enforce distancing guidelines, and lock-downs may have counterproductive effects if it forces informal sector workers and migrants to reverse-migrate from densely-populated urban areas and spread the disease to remote rural areas of poor countries. It is imperative that the source code for influential epidemiological models (on which the widely-adopted social distancing guidelines are based) are made publicly accessible, so that social scientists can explore the sensitivity of benefit estimates to changes in assumptions about compliance with distancing guidelines or the baseline prevalence of co-morbidities, chronic illnesses or malnutrition that make COVID-19 infections more deadly.
Recommendations.
1. Masks and home-made face coverings are comparatively cheap. A universal mask wearing requirement when workers leave their homes is likely feasible for almost all countries to implement.
2. Targeted social isolation of the elderly and other at-risk groups, while permitting productive individuals with lower risk profiles to continue working. Given the prevalence of multi-generational households, this would likely require us to rely on families to make decisions to protect vulnerable members within each household.
3. Improving access to clean water, hand-washing and sanitation, and other policies to decrease the viral load.
4. Widespread social influence and information campaigns to encourage behaviors that slow the spread of disease, but do not undermine economic livelihoods. This could include restrictions on the size of religious and social congregations, or programs to encourage community and religious leaders to endorse safer behaviors and communicate them clearly.
The Questions for the public
Does Covid-19 drives sub-Saharan Africa to 30 years recession?
Is there other methods to flatten the curve beyond lock-down and social distancing forgot about the vaccination?
About the Author Dr Essa Abdi Jama was one of the first medical students ever to graduate as a doctor in Somaliland. He as served in a number of senior civil service roles, including serving as the Somaliland Internship Programme Coordinator, and the Director of Human Resources at the Somaliland Ministry of Health. He is currently based out of Port Moresby, Papua New Guine.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle and it’s staff.
In a report issued by the Ministry of Finance Development titled Fiscal and Economic Implication of COVID-19, Somaliland government is predicting a 30% drop in revenue in 2nd quarter and has put the total resources required to deal with the cost of COVID-19 at a whopping $110,805,000.00.
According to the report, Somaliland’s economy will shrink by 5% due to COVID-19 pandemic impact instead of the previously expected 2% growth.
The report by the Ministry of Finance Development includes a COVID-19 budget deficit support of 36 million dollars. And although, itt does not show if the government has so far solicited funds from any donors, sources say there are early stage talks with a major donor to help Somaliland with COVID-19 budget deficit support.
Additionally, there is a 54 million dollars for Humanitarian assistance to families affected. According to the report, this amount is needed to help 60,000 families with basic necessities for the rest of the year.
It is not entirely clear who the audience of this report are but the conclusion seems to indicate that it may be intended for the donar community.
Somaliland government has taken a number of economic steps due to COVID-19 pandemic including tax reduction on basic food commodities, an austerity measure that froze much of the development related expenditure prior to issuing this dire report.
The existence of this report was first reported by Geeska. Read the full report here.
The rise of China in Africa has triggered an ongoing debate about whether Chinese capital is a barrier that entraps African governments in practices that hinder poverty reduction.
The most recent contribution to these debates is a book by a professor of sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, Ching Kwan Lee. The book is based on Lee’s ethnographic study in the copper and construction industries in Zambia. It interrogates Chinese state capital in relation to global private capital.
She argues that the terms frequently used in the discussion about Chinese capital in Africa – such as empire building, colonialism and hegemony – are limiting. They don’t allow for the interrogation of the actual behaviour, practices and possibilities of Chinese capital.
How then does Lee help us to re-frame the Chinese narratives in Africa? Rather than focus on migrant entrepreneurs or private companies, Lee argues that the uniqueness of Chinese investment has to do with state capital. And, she argues, China’s growing power and influence has been accompanied by misleading
aggregate, continent-wide statistics on trade, investment and migration.
There has hardly been any critical examination of the different sorts of capital traversing Africa, related behaviour, and the actual trends and patterns of foreign direct investment stocks.
Negative messages
Coverage of Chinese presence in Africa has been somewhat misleading. Media as well as policy and academic experts provide inaccurate data about China’s expanding investment patterns. For example, they overestimate Chinese loans.
This misleading coverage conceals the fact that Chinese capital is just one instance of capital still contending on the continent. In fact, Chinese capital is far from being the leading source of foreign direct investment. UK and French investment into Africa remain larger.
Lee draws from the negative portrayals of Chinese capital to shed light on the practices in Zambia. She uses three historical frames: the 2008 global financial crisis, policy developments of windfall tax and value addition.
She shows how Chinese capital is shaped by two imperatives: accommodating national demands and development strategies in Zambia. Development strategies include, for example, Zambia’s policies on adding value to mineral resources before they are exported.
This behaviour of Chinese capital contradicts the extractive nature of western capital. Western capital is driven by a profit motive. It pays little attention to national development goals including labour, taxation and value addition.
Lee also examines the question of Chinese capital from the perspective of African states. She notes that national states have been amenable to Chinese capital under a mandated south-to-south relationship.
As with other African countries, Zambia’s resource dependency limits value added products being made from copper and other minerals. But, as Lee shows, cooperation from Chinese capital has helped change this trajectory. She points to the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone project. This project has involved an investment of more than $900 million and potential to generate about 7,000 local employment opportunities and up to $300 million local procurement contracts.
But there have been problems too. Lee shows that Chinese capital hardly behaves differently in employment practices from those prevailing in the rest of the private sector in Zambia. Subordination and exploitation remain the order of the day.
This shows that key political and economic instruments as well as policies should be strengthened to address the negative social implications of Chinese capital on the continent.
What’s missing
The book’s narrative is limited in explaining why Chinese capital remains controversial in Zambia and across Africa. Nor does it sufficiently address why a negative perception of “Chinese investors” persists often alongside the failure of countries to manage natural resources better.
Nevertheless, Lee’s book is important because it departs from generalisation to interrogate actual practices of Chinese capital.
Rather than attempts to find strategies to regulate and manage the influence of China on the continent, probably the focus should be on how China’s presence can be made to respond more to national and regional development aspirations than is the case currently – a feature for national policy and development actors.
While the battle for political and economic influence between the West and East is playing out across the continent of Africa, the behaviour of capital will greatly influence current and future narratives.
Lee shows that China seems to hit the right note in many countries and in crucial economic sectors. But perils remain in areas such as those related to labour relations.
She also shows that characterisations of Chinese capital in Africa should not rely on a set of implications and generalisations about the ways in which Chinese capital works, and the ways in which national states change as a result of Chinese engagements. Rather it should depend on actual practices and realities and what they mean for national development.
Currently, however controversial, China appears to have been set apart as a partner of choice. And Lee shows the reasons why.
In efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19, governments are imposing stringent restrictions on movement, including social distancing and a national lockdown. They are also finding efficient ways of tracing and tracking contact once an infection has been verified.
The ability to track and trace infections for public health has emerged as one of the single most important interventions. The first such app, TraceTogether, has just gone live in Singapore and tracks users’ whereabouts using locational data.
But track and trace presents an unprecedented challenge to people’s privacy. Apps such as TraceTogether pose a nightmare from a privacy perspective.
It doesn’t have to be that way. Blockchain and modern cryptographic methods allow for the same functionality while protecting users’ privacy. Some innovations on this front also allow users to remain in control of access to their data.
Why track and trace?
Most of what we know about COVID-19 comes from recent research. Some of it is contentious and as new data becomes available perspectives change. Nevertheless, with this caveat, some lessons are emerging.
First, the crisis will be with us for the foreseeable future. It is paramount that, to slow the spread of the virus, we “flatten the curve” now, by practising good hygiene, engaging in social distancing, and strictly obeying the guidance from public health officials if and when a national lockdown is enacted.
Second, it will take months before a vaccine is available. And once it is, it will take more months before it is available at scale. Only with an effective vaccine available will we be able to ease on the stringent containment measures currently in place. Because, as researchers from Imperial College London write in their landmark study on the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes COVID-19:
We predict that transmission will quickly rebound if interventions are relaxed.
Third, the virus is likely to mutate and return in a new guise, rendering existing vaccines less effective. Every time a new variant of the virus emerges, we will have to find ways to stop it in its tracks. And yes, the best way to do this is through trace and track apps that allow targeted interventions.
Given these choices, it is quite clear which way governments will go. Even more, it is tempting for citizens to sacrifice their privacy during a national emergency. But there are serious drawbacks of doing so.
First, the data collected is incredibly sensitive. Imagine a world where the government can trace where you were and who you met. Or worse, imagine that Facebook or WhatsApp could do that and then allow the government to send a warning message to all your friends if you test positive for COVID-19.
How long do you think it will take your friends to piece together who got infected? This is known as a re-identification attack in cryptography, a problem without an easy solution. The potential for stigma, in particular in vulnerable communities, is enormous.
Second, and as a consequence, there will be serious challenges to adoption. If such an application were to be built on WhatsApp, for example, people might simply switch from WhatsApp to Threema, or worse, try to fake the data. It would be only days or weeks before any such system was hacked.
We have learned from the Equifax hack, where four members of the Chinese military have now been indicted over hacking the credit bureau Equifax, resulting in the breach of 150 million credit records, that no centralised database is perfectly secure. Collecting the incredibly valuable geolocation information will create a focal point for hackers to attack, a risk that further limits adoption.
Third, privacy is a human right. It is not simply a privilege to enjoy when times are good. It is a fundamental right and any government that violates this right opens itself up to potential court challenges, further delaying roll-out and adoption.
The combination of these reasons means that any system which does not respect privacy defies its purpose. The data collected will be biased, making it more difficult for epidemiologists to model and understand emerging outbreaks.
In addition, the system could lead to false positives where a policy action is taken based on faulty data. Or the system could miss the outbreak of a new strain of the virus because of limits in adoption. In social networks, even weak ties are important for transmission, as the sociologist Mark S. Granovetter pointed out in his 1976 paperThe Strength of Weak Ties.
But it doesn’t have to be this way. Two years ago, blockchain was the hot topic on everybody’s mind, from large venture capitalists to the inevitable discussion about Bitcoin at a party. In part because of this hype, we have made tremendous strides towards privacy-preserving distributed systems.
One particularly promising approach in the current crisis is what is called self-sovereign identity. The idea is that every user stores their private data and is in full control of when and under what circumstances it’s shared with third parties. Proponents of this system include banks, activists around the globe and the “father of the internet”, Tim Berners-Lee, who launched a self-sovereign identity startup.
Maintaining privacy
The main difference in a self-sovereign identity system is that users are in control of access to their data. An app that would maintain privacy, while allowing the same functionality as any centralised app, for example based on WhatsApp, would overcome problems prompted by a system open to data abuse. It would therefore be much easier to get adoption, increase the quality of the data, and ensure that one human right isn’t traded off for another.
Countries around the world face the choice of building infrastructure that has serious security issues or infrastructure that ensures the privacy of citizens and solves the challenge at hand more efficiently.
It is clear that tackling the COVID-19 crisis has to involve efficient track and trace. But it is equally clear that this should be done using the best available information and research.
Co-Pierre Georg, Associate Professor, UCT School of Economics; South African Reserve Bank Research Chair in Financial Stability Studies, University of Cape Town
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.
The National Preparedness Committee for COVID19 chaired by the Vice President of Somaliland HE Abdirahman Abdallahi Ismail Saylici have announced a temporary moratorium on khat import into the country.
The ban starts from Sunday April 26 and will last until May 21st two days ahead of Eid al-Fitr depending on changes on the status of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Khat and the possibility that it may spread COVID-19 has been the subject of intense public debate, where prominent politicians, including Dr. Gabose have recently appealed to the President to stop khat import at once.
From 26th of April till 21st of May, The Republic of #Somaliland halts Khat importation from abroad as well as both it's local trade and consumption. pic.twitter.com/qhjPxxkQc5
— National Preparedness Committee for COVID19 (@NPCCOVID19) April 23, 2020
The statement from National Preparedness Committee for COVID19 instructed various provincial administrations and law enforcement agencies to cease apprehend any khat shipped into the country and incinerate it and to also ordered the seizure of any transport carrying khat and to bring to justice anyone caught bringing in the country.
Although members of the COVID-19 committee previously explained why the government was unable to ban khat imports, today’s decision of a temporary moratorium was not expected.
Khat is a Cathinone narcotic consumed in Eastern Africa and parts of the middle east is widely used in Somaliland and is the most widely imported commodity costing Somaliland tens of millions of dollars.
No economic impact assessment has been issued by the government that the khat moratorium may cause.
Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation issued a strong statement warning Somalia’s Federal Government to refrain from interfering in its sovereignty.
The statement also informed the United Nations, African Union and the European Union that the Bahnaano social welfare program recently unveiled to be a direct threat to Somaliland’s security and a deception of the international community.
The Statement asked the World Bank to pay extra attention to the grants given to Somalia’s irresponsible government which has used aid and humanitarian assistance for political purposes to undermine security and stability in Somaliland.
As a government, we believe in a #Somalia where the most vulnerable in our society access the required support for their prosperity and sustenance. I firmly believe our nation shall overcome uncertainties at critical times such as now during this #COVID19. pic.twitter.com/7w9t2oAdFb
A statement from Somalia’s Minister of Labour at the unveiling event stated “The project will grant $ 4 million each month to 200,000 poor households throughout this year. and will target 1>million families in the next years. This is the beginning of a ministry-led plan to reduce poverty”
"The project will grant $ 4 million each month to 200,000 poor households throughout this year. and will target 1>million families in the next years. This is the beginning of a ministry-led plan to reduce poverty" said Minister @HonWarfa at the historic #BaxnaanoLaunch. pic.twitter.com/m0X5fbzVeO
— Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 🇸🇴 (@SomaliaMolsa) April 18, 2020
— Carlos Felipe Jaramillo (@CF_Jaramillo) April 20, 2020
The districts of Gabiley, Lughaya and Saylac in West of Somaliland are among the 21 locations the project is set to be implemented.
The statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned against the participation of this project in it’s territory. The Ministry did not specify of any consequences for either local or international NGOs who participate in this project.
Critics have accused President Mohamed Abdillahi Farmajo of using the World Bank funding to boost his reelection chance. Although it is not entirely clear if elections will take place or delayed due to COVID-19. Somalia is scheduled to hold its first ever 1 person 1 vote elections in late 2020 or early 2021.
Ethiopian Airlines flights into Somaliland has been the subject of public debate recently where some including this outlet have suggested banning passengers coming into Somaliland to prevent the spread of COVID-19 pandemic.
Government officials who spoke on condition of anonymity reiterated a directive issued by the government a while ago that airlines are prohibited from bringing in passengers from countries worst affected by COVID-19 such as the United States and some European destinations and that Ethiopian Airlines has been compliant.
He added that legally, no one can prevent a citizen from returning home and although Somaliland government cannot afford to charter flights to ferry its citizens’ home, Ethiopian Airlines through limited routes such as Addis Ababa is their only way back in the country.
Although Somaliland government has struggled to articulate this clearly, Sources from Somaliland Civil Aviation and the Ministry of Health based at Egal International Airport, Ethiopian Airlines has severely limited its flights and all passengers are tested and quarantined upon arrival. Despite these measures, there have been complaints about the condition quarantine premise, an arrangement made by the government.
There is, however, another less visible but important role that Ethiopian Airlines has played recently and that is being an indispensable lifeline that has been bringing in medical and other necessities in Somaliland.
According to sources, Somaliland’s Diplomatic Mission in Ethiopia is working with the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Health, Customs and Ethiopian Airlines to ship two tons of critical supplies purchased by Hargeisa Group Hospital from Dubai and facilitated shipment from Dubai to Addis Ababa by Somaliland’s Liaison Office in the UAE.
Because of the urgent need for these supplies by dialysis patients and at a time when no country is allowing medical supplies to leave its territory, sources say, the work of Somaliland’s Mission in Addis and specially the Deputy Ambassador Mr. Barkhad M Kaariye has been instrumental in ensuring the expeditious delivery of these vital supplies by ground. Ethiopian Airlines’ Hargeisa office has declined to comment on the matter.
Sources also point to the 1.4 million worth of medical supplies donated to Somaliland by Mr. Ismail Ahmed, the founder and the Chairman of the World Remit financial services company was delivered by Ethiopian Airlines on Friday, April 17th. A government official said, “without Ethiopian Airlines, it would be impossible to get these supplies on time”.
Other governments are workings with Ethiopian Airlines to help deliver critical aid for COVID-19 into Somaliland. A source close to the Airlines Hargeisa office stated that many companies that work in Somaliland have approached them about bringing in medical cargo from as far away as South East Asia, South Africa, and United Arab Emirates.
Asked about the ongoing debate to shut down the airline’s operation in Somaliland, the official stated that Ethiopian Airlines’ work in Somaliland has not been commercially viable since the COVID-19 pandemic and added that it is important for Ethiopian Airlines to ensure that Somaliland can receive critical supplies in this difficult time.
Ethiopian Airlines has been delivering COVID-19 aid from various sources including a large shipment from the Founder and CEO of Alibaba Group Mr. Jack Ma to many African countries
President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi addressed the nation this afternoon on renewed hostilities in Sanaag region and spoke at length on various measures his administration is currently working on to prevent the spread of COVID-19 pandemic.
President Bihi has spoken on the government’s initial three million dollar funding for the COVID-19 prevention fund and appealed to businesses and the public in general to give contribute.
Mr. Ismail Ahmed addressing the TechCrunch Disrupt London at the Copper Box on December 5, 2016 in London, England.
President Bihi thanked Mr. Ismail Ahmed, the founder and the Chairman of World Remit financial services company and a native son of Somaliland who has donated 1.4 million dollars worth of medical goods to help combat the spread of COVID-19. The President added that Mr. Ahmed has also imported more products that he will be selling back to the public at cost.
President Bihi also spoke on austerity measures that will curb spending due to anticipated economic impact of COVID-19. Austerity measures were first reported by Geeska newspaper.
On the khat import, a subject of Dr. Gabose’s recent appeal to the President to halt its import, the President addressed the difficulties of trying to ban khat in a country with porous borders but added that there are still ongoing discussions with khat traders and that he expects some good results from those negotiations soon.
One of Somaliland’s most respected doctors, Dr. Mohamed Abdi Gabose who spoke to the media a short while ago made an impassioned plea directly to the public and the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi to stop Khat imports to prevent the possible spread of COVID-19 in Somaliland.
Dr. Gabose who spoke candidly about the dangers of COVID-19 pandemic and the possible life long complications that one may encounter even if they recover from the virus. He added that so far there is no solution to these complication which may effect multiple organs.
Dr. Gabose reminded the public that khat is not packaged or prepared for human consumption as one expects of other consumables but is handled directly by hand in the most unsanitary conditions possible and is a perfect vehicle to spread COVID-19 from its consumer to anyone they get in contact with.
Speaking directly to the President, Dr. Gabose spoke of his unique qualification and training on prevention of infectious diseases and implored President Bihi accept council from someone with his breadth of expertise and stop khat imports at once.
Dr. Gabose with Somaliland VP and former Minister of Health on the opening of Haldoor Hospital
Dr. Gabose, a renowned neurologist who has held cabinet position in President Egal’s government who currently runs Haldoor private hospital in Hargeisa is a high ranking member of the Waddani opposition party and has in the past leveled withering criticism against the President. He is not on the National Preparedness Committee for COVID19.
