In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
Somalia’s President offered US “exclusive control” over Berbera port and airbase, assets firmly under Somaliland’s control since 1991.
Somaliland’s President responded: “No one has authority to broker Somaliland’s territory, and Hassan Sheikh cannot even govern Mogadishu.”
The offered facilities are partially operated by UAE’s DP World, which has invested $442 million in Berbera Port.
Somaliland officials called the offer “patently ridiculous” and “a badly done SNL sketch.”
Somalia receives approximately $1 billion yearly in US aid while being unable to deliver on its promises.
AFRICOM is already in direct talks with Somaliland about Berbera’s strategic facilities, completely bypassing Mogadishu.
This diplomatic overreach may accelerate US recognition of Somaliland’s de facto independence.
In a move that would make even the boldest con artists blush, Somalia has just attempted what might be the most audacious diplomatic swindle of the century – trying to gift America control over territories it hasn’t governed since George H.W. Bush was president.
In what might be the most brazen diplomatic fraud in recent memory, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has penned a letter to President Donald Trump offering “exclusive control” of strategic ports and airbases that Somalia hasn’t controlled since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.
Somaliland’s President Responds
The President of the Republic of Somaliland Dr. Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro” has issued a direct and unequivocal response to this diplomatic fraud:
“No one has the authority to broker Somaliland’s territory, and Hassan Sheikh [Somalia’s President] does not even rule or control Mogadishu.”
This powerful statement from Somaliland’s highest office underscores the absolute rejection of Somalia’s presumption to offer territory it neither controls nor has any right to negotiate over, while pointedly highlighting Somalia’s failure to effectively control even its own capital.
The Deception: Promising Trump What Somalia Can’t Deliver
Reuters and Semafor have now confirmed the existence of this extraordinary March 16 letter, in which Somalia attempts to mislead the United States with “exclusive operational control” over Berbera port and airbase in Somaliland, and Bosaso port in Puntland – facilities where Somalia’s writ hasn’t run for over three decades.
The sheer audacity of this maneuver can’t be overstated: Somalia is offering President Trump exclusive control of facilities it doesn’t control, can’t access, and that are already partially operated by one of Trump’s strongest Middle Eastern allies, the UAE, through its DP World port operator.
A Brief History: Somaliland’s Independence
To understand the true absurdity of Somalia’s offer, one must remember that Somaliland reclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of dictator Siad Barre’s regime. Since then, Somaliland has built a functioning democracy with its own currency, military, government institutions, and regular democratic elections. Meanwhile, Somalia has struggled to control even its own capital city without foreign peacekeepers.
No Somali official has set foot in Somaliland. Somalia has no administrative presence, security forces, or operational capability in the territory it now casually offers to the United States.
Somaliland Exposes the Charade
From the highest office to key ministries, Somaliland’s government has responded with a unified voice exposing Somalia’s deceptive ploy. After the President’s blunt assessment of Somalia’s inability to govern even Mogadishu, let alone broker Somaliland territory, other government officials have added their equally forceful rejections.
Somaliland’s US Representative Bashir Goth thoroughly dismantled Somalia’s fraudulent offer:
“The Republic of Somaliland strongly rejects Somalia’s impertinent offer of access and control of the Port of Berbera to the United States,” Goth declared before stating plainly that, “The Port of Berbera is unequivocally within the sovereign territory of the Republic of Somaliland.”
Goth revealed that Somaliland “has welcomed several AFRICOM delegations to assess how the U.S. can best utilize the Port of Berbera” and that the 2023 NDAA requires “U.S. secretaries of State and Defense are obligated to regularly update Congress on efforts to deepen defense, diplomatic, and development ties with Somaliland.”
Most devastatingly, Goth characterized Somalia’s attempted deception as an action that “would barely pass as a badly done SNL sketch and is patently ridiculous,” adding that President Trump “is wise enough to see through such a charade, which insults both him and the people of the U.S.”
Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Aden was equally direct when speaking to Reuters:
“The USA is not stupid. They know who they need to deal with when it comes to Berbera port.”
Expert Analysis: A Desperate Ploy
“Who are they to offer that access?” said Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They are offering this as a way of getting the US to recognize the legitimacy of the Somali state over these breakaway regions.”
Editor’s Note: While Hudson’s quote refers to “breakaway regions” plural, it’s important to clarify that Puntland and Somaliland have significantly different statuses. Puntland is a federal member state of Somalia that, despite periodic disagreements with Mogadishu, remains part of Somalia’s federal structure. Somaliland, on the other hand, withdrew from its union with Somalia, and fully restored its independence in 1991 and has held widely-acclaimed democratic elections for over three decades.
Former US Special Envoy Dr. Peter Pham exposed Somalia’s desperation: “It’s not enough that his PM & FM insult @POTUS & Mog is a $1 billion yearly drain on #USA taxpayers, but rump #Somalia’s @HassanSMohamud thinks Americans are so dumb that he can offer us key #Somaliland & #Puntland ports that he doesn’t even control!”
With President Trump’s “America First” doctrine threatening to shut off the financial spigot that has kept Somalia’s government afloat, Mogadishu is frantically trying to pull off yet another deception by promising military access it has absolutely no means to deliver.
The UAE Factor: Trying to Swindle Trump Out of His Ally’s Investment
Perhaps the most reckless aspect of Somalia’s scheme is that it casually offers control of facilities already operated by DP World – the flagship port operator owned by the United Arab Emirates, one of President Trump’s most valued international partners.
Does Mogadishu seriously believe it can trick America into disrupting a major UAE commercial operation? Does Somalia’s President think he can simply brush aside multi-million-dollar development agreements between Somaliland, Puntland, and the UAE?
Berbera Port, far from being some derelict backwater, has undergone a $442 million transformation under DP World’s stewardship. This includes a deep-sea terminal, a 17-meter draft, a 400-meter quay, and state-of-the-art gantry cranes. Expansion plans will push its capacity to 2 million TEUs annually. And yet, in some backroom fantasy, Mogadishu imagines it can override UAE-backed contracts with an empty letter to Washington.
The Facade Crumbles Under Basic Scrutiny
The fundamental question that exposes this entire diplomatic charade remains breathtakingly simple: How exactly does Somalia plan to deliver on this offer when it controls absolutely nothing in Berbera?
Somalia cannot secure its own capital without foreign forces, yet somehow believes it can deceive the Trump administration into thinking it can deliver operational control of territory where its officials would be arrested if they attempted to enter without Somaliland’s permission.
While Hassan Sheikh Mohamud daydreams about leasing out ports he has never seen, Al-Shabaab continues its stranglehold over key supply routes around Mogadishu. The terror group’s recent attacks on Beledweyne and the outskirts of the capital underscore just how little control the Somali government actually wields. It’s no surprise that Somalia’s leaders would rather fabricate foreign policy victories than deal with the grim reality that Mogadishu itself is on borrowed time.
The Bottom Line
Somalia’s letter represents not diplomacy but a desperate deception – a transparent attempt to maintain the flow of American taxpayer dollars as the Trump administration reassesses foreign aid that produces little return on investment.
Somalia’s Washington lobbyists – paid millions to orchestrate this scheme – undoubtedly promised that this fraudulent letter would not only reach the Oval Office but generate favorable press coverage painting Somalia as a crucial strategic partner.
What they couldn’t promise was that anyone – from President Trump to the UAE to AFRICOM – would fall for the obvious ploy that Somalia can offer exclusive control of ports it doesn’t own, can’t access, and where it has exercised zero authority for over 30 years.
As Goth suggested, President Trump is wise enough to recognize a deception when he sees one – especially when the scheme involves one of America’s strongest Middle Eastern allies and territory Somalia cannot possibly deliver.
What’s Next: The Diplomatic Fallout
This diplomatic fiasco may actually accelerate American recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. With the letter exposing Somalia’s tenuous claims to territory it clearly doesn’t control, and AFRICOM already engaged in direct discussions with Somaliland officials, Trump’s administration has even more reason to reassess America’s one-Somalia policy.
For AFRICOM and the Pentagon, which prioritize strategic access and reliable partners over diplomatic fictions, Somalia’s overreach makes a stronger case for direct engagement with Hargeisa than any Somaliland diplomat could have made.
As President Trump reviews this diplomatic charade, the most likely outcome isn’t increased American engagement with Somalia – but rather, accelerated recognition of the reality on the ground: that Somaliland, not Somalia, controls Berbera, and any serious strategic partnership must be negotiated with Hargeisa, not Mogadishu.
Somaliland’s biometric registration of security personnel aims to eliminate payroll fraud but raises security concerns
Kenya-based company Innovii, which has operations in Somalia, reportedly secured the implementation contract
Multiple sources indicate personal connections between Innovii executives and Minister Khadar Hussein Loge
No competitive bidding process was conducted despite the system’s national security implications
National Electoral Commission’s equipment and personnel are being used, but their implementation expertise is being sidelined
Recent security lapses raise questions about Somaliland’s capacity to protect sensitive military personnel data
Somaliland stands at the threshold of a military transformation that could redefine its security capabilities for decades to come. President Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro”‘s ambitious biometric registration initiative represents the most significant modernization of defense infrastructure in years—a digital evolution that promises to create a more efficient, transparent, and data-driven security apparatus. By eliminating ghost soldiers, optimizing resource allocation, and enabling evidence-based strategic planning, the system holds the potential to make Somaliland’s security forces a model of 21st-century military management in the region. Yet as this transformation unfolds, evidence suggests a rushed implementation approach may inadvertently introduce new vulnerabilities to the very institution it aims to strengthen. The balance between modernization benefits and security considerations will determine whether this initiative ultimately enhances or compromises national security.
Beyond Compensation: The Context and Legitimate Goals
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi commenced his tenure with a bold fiscal initiative, authorizing an immediate 50% increase in security personnel compensation effective January 22nd. This substantial enhancement—the first installment of a promised 250% increase over his administration—addresses longstanding grievances within Somaliland’s security establishment and signals a commitment to military welfare previously absent from governance priorities.
Accompanying these salary reforms is the introduction of the IRIS Biometric Registration System, designed to modernize personnel management and eliminate payroll fraud. The registration process officially launched in March 2025, with Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge speaking at the ceremony. According to Horn Diplomat’s reporting, the initiative has been characterized as a “historic modernization” of Somaliland’s security forces.
The administration’s initiative addresses a recognized problem: ‘ghost soldiers’—non-existent personnel whose salaries are misappropriated, typically by high-ranking officers. These fictitious payroll entries not only drain millions from military resources but create misleading assessments of actual force strength and readiness.
While Somaliland Chronicle has not independently verified the scale of this practice, multiple sources within the security sector characterize the problem as ‘substantial.’ A senior defense ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, estimated that addressing this issue could recover ‘millions of dollars annually’ for legitimate operations. “This has been a systemic problem for years,” the official stated. “Accurate personnel records are fundamental to both fiscal responsibility and operational readiness.”
The initiative will likely face resistance from entrenched interests who have benefited from the current system’s lack of transparency. “Any reform that threatens established financial channels will encounter pushback,” noted a former military finance officer. “The administration deserves credit for tackling this issue despite the political risks involved.”
Official Statements vs. Implementation Reality
While the goals of the biometric registration initiative are commendable, an examination of its implementation raises several concerns that merit careful scrutiny.
Somaliland Chronicle has learned that Innovii (also operating as Vivacom), a Kenya-based telecom and digital solutions provider, has reportedly been selected to implement the biometric registration system. The company, headed by Mohamed Barre as Director and co-founder, has limited documented experience with military-grade security systems. Their primary expertise lies in healthcare platforms and telecom solutions, raising questions about their qualifications for handling sensitive security data.
At the March 2025 launch event, Minister Khadar Hussein Loge explicitly stated that “No outsiders are involved in this process,” adding that technical committees consisting of multiple government agencies and military personnel are overseeing the implementation. However, the Minister did not specify which entities are handling which aspects of the system, and notably did not address reports about Innovii’s role or the concerns raised about the company’s Somalia connections.
Sources close to the process indicate that Innovii may have secured this critical security infrastructure project without an open, competitive bidding process. This approach stands in contrast to international best practices for critical security systems, which typically involve rigorous vendor evaluation and competitive selection.
Multiple sources with direct knowledge of the registration initiative have revealed to Somaliland Chronicle that Innovii’s CEO and several senior executives maintain longstanding personal and professional relationships with Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge—a prominent member of the committee overseeing the security personnel registration. With no public procurement process to require disclosure of such connections, these relationships have remained largely unscrutinized.
The Somalia Connection: Documented Business Ties
Further investigation reveals that Innovii maintains an extensive operational footprint in Somalia. The company has successfully implemented “Baano,” a healthcare platform in Mogadishu, while simultaneously operating a similar platform called “Shaafi” in Somaliland. This dual presence establishes the company’s business activities in both territories.
Somalia represents a clear and present danger to Somaliland’s security, having repeatedly demonstrated both the will and capability to destabilize the country through military, intelligence, and proxy operations. Beyond its territorial claims, Somalia appears intent on Somaliland’s reincorporation by any means necessary. The Somali government has consistently opposed Somaliland’s independence while seeking to undermine its sovereignty through diplomatic, economic, and occasionally military pressure.
Given this context, entrusting Somaliland’s comprehensive security personnel data to a company with substantial business interests in Somalia raises legitimate national security questions. If compromised, this biometric database would deliver unprecedented strategic intelligence—revealing force distribution, command structures, specialized unit compositions, and individual identities of security personnel.
The vulnerability extends beyond regional threats. International actors with advanced offensive cyber capabilities—particularly China, which has demonstrated sophisticated data exfiltration techniques against military targets worldwide—could potentially access this information through direct intrusion or via partnerships with regional actors. China’s documented interest in Horn of Africa security infrastructure creates an additional layer of risk.
When approached for comment about these business connections, neither Minister Khadar Hussein Loge nor Innovii executives responded to our inquiries.
Security Clearance Gaps and Technical Vulnerabilities
An examination of the implementation process reveals significant structural gaps in security protocols. Unlike established military and intelligence institutions where clearance levels dictate access to classified information, Somaliland has yet to implement a formal vetting framework for individuals involved in key security projects. This absence of a structured security clearance process means that external contractors and government officials—whose ultimate loyalties and interests remain unexamined—are granted access to sensitive military data without the rigorous background scrutiny standard in comparable security environments.
Recent events highlight existing vulnerabilities in Somaliland’s information security practices. A classified document detailing the reassignment of intelligence officers from Somaliland’s National Intelligence Directorate to military units has surfaced in various circles, effectively exposing these operatives. Somaliland Chronicle has not independently authenticated this document, but security experts consulted about its contents expressed alarm.
“This leak compromises these intelligence officers’ operational security,” explained a former intelligence official who reviewed the document. It should be noted that in some political circles, the reassignment and potential “burn notice” of these intelligence operatives has been lauded due to longstanding misgivings about the intelligence agency’s politicized nature and inward-looking focus rather than addressing external threats, particularly under former President Bihi’s administration.
However, security professionals maintain that regardless of the merits of restructuring intelligence services, the public exposure of operative identities through unsecured documents represents a fundamental security lapse that raises broader concerns about information protection capabilities.
The 2018 incident in the Ministry of Finance’s Financial Management Information System provides another example, where sensitive financial data was exposed due to a critical security hole in the system’s architecture. These incidents raise questions about whether Somaliland currently possesses the institutional capacity to secure a comprehensive database of all security personnel.
The Technical Implementation: Questions Without Answers
Sources close to the implementation have indicated that the biometric system will be housed at military headquarters and operate on an offline network—a positive initial security measure. However, security experts caution that this offline status creates a new dimension of concern: ongoing maintenance and system updates. Contractors will almost certainly need to maintain access for maintenance, patches, and technical support, creating what security professionals call a “privileged access dilemma“.
“Military-grade systems require military-grade access protocols,” explained a former cybersecurity officer with experience in defense systems. “Each maintenance session should be supervised, all update code should be scanned for malware, and contractor personnel should never be left alone with the system.”
“Even with proper encryption, the human element remains the greatest vulnerability,” noted a security consultant who requested anonymity due to ongoing work with regional governments. “Without proper clearance protocols and continuous monitoring, systems can be compromised from within.”
Security experts note that modern military biometric systems typically employ advanced encryption standards with sophisticated key management systems. Yet when asked about specific security protocols, government officials provided only general assurances about “taking all necessary precautions,” without detailing specific technical safeguards.
A robust approach to mitigating these risks would involve adopting a Zero-Trust Security Model, a framework widely used in sensitive military and governmental systems. This model operates on the principle of “never trust, always verify,” ensuring that no user, system, or network is inherently trusted—whether inside or outside the organization.
The NEC Paradox: A Positive but Partial Engagement
The involvement of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) represents one of the few positive aspects of the implementation process. The NEC has demonstrated impressive technical capability by successfully deploying biometric systems during recent elections—establishing a proven track record of managing sensitive data securely within Somaliland’s specific context.
President Cirro’s formal request for the NEC to transfer 50 complete IRIS Biometric registration kits and 50 of their highest-level trainers shows recognition of this indigenous expertise. However, this engagement appears to be only a half-measure. While leveraging the NEC’s equipment and trained operators, the administration has inexplicably stopped short of consulting the Commission on implementation strategy and security architecture—areas where the NEC has demonstrated considerable competence.
Instead, the central implementation role has apparently been given to Innovii, despite the NEC’s proven experience with these exact systems in Somaliland. This partial engagement creates a puzzling situation: Why tap the NEC for hardware and personnel but not their implementation expertise?
The decision to utilize NEC resources while apparently sidelining them from the overall security design and implementation strategy represents a missed opportunity to fully leverage Somaliland’s own proven capabilities. Given the previously noted personal relationships between Minister Khadar Hussein Loge and senior Innovii executives, one must question whether these connections, rather than technical merit, are influencing the implementation approach.
International Lessons: Learning from Others’ Mistakes
The risks associated with compromised biometric systems are not theoretical. When Taliban forces captured biometric devices containing Afghan security personnel data in 2021, the information enabled systematic identification and targeting of former government employees—many of whom faced brutal retribution. As documented by Human Rights Watch and the MIT Technology Review, these captured databases contained detailed personal and occupational information that put thousands of lives at risk.
Somalia’s own biometric infrastructure has become a cautionary tale. Despite international oversight and claimed safeguards, Somalia’s government has admitted Al-Shabaab has infiltrated its institutions at virtually every level, likely giving terrorists access to sensitive personnel data. Somalia’s military systems—built with millions from US, EU, and UK taxpayers—have become a security liability rather than an asset. Somaliland should carefully consider these precedents as it implements its own system.
The Path Forward: Differing Perspectives on Security and Reform
The government’s initiative to modernize security personnel records and eliminate payroll fraud represents a significant shift in Somaliland’s approach to security management. Various security experts and defense analysts consulted by Somaliland Chronicle offered divergent perspectives on how such systems might be implemented.
Some security professionals emphasized the importance of independent security audits, noting that in other contexts, such assessments have helped identify vulnerabilities before they could be exploited. Others pointed to clearance frameworks as an established practice in military contexts worldwide, with proponents arguing they create necessary accountability for those accessing sensitive data.
“The biometric system presents both opportunities and challenges,” observed a retired senior military commander. “While eliminating ghost soldiers addresses a legitimate administrative problem, the handling of personnel data has broader implications for national security. These considerations will need to be balanced carefully as the process unfolds.”
Military technology experts noted that the specific technical approaches adopted in similar systems internationally vary widely. In some countries, heightened security measures prioritize compartmentalized access, while others focus on system hardening and encryption. The specific balance Somaliland strikes between administrative efficiency and security protocols will likely emerge as implementation progresses.
The military biometric registration initiative undoubtedly represents a significant change in Somaliland’s security administration. Stakeholders across the security establishment will continue to debate the merits of different implementation approaches as the system develops. The ultimate impact on both administrative efficiency and national security will only become clear as the initiative moves forward in the coming months.## Security Reform vs. Security Risk: Weighing the Implications of Somaliland’s Military Biometric System
We reached out to key figures involved in the biometric registration implementation for responses. Questions were sent to Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge regarding the procurement process, his alleged personal connections to Innovii executives, security vetting procedures, and technical safeguards for the system. Similar inquiries were directed to Innovii CEO Mohamed Barre concerning his company’s qualifications for handling sensitive military data and its extensive operations in Somalia. However, neither the Minister nor Innovii’s executives responded to our inquiries.
In a blunt rebuke that has reverberated across diplomatic channels, Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has issued a pointed message on X, declaring: “China has no right to dictate who we have relationships with, as we have no right to dictate who they have relationships with.”
The statement comes as the Taiwan Representative Office in Hargeisa has also fired back at Beijing’s increasingly aggressive posturing with a statement that leaves little room for misinterpretation: “Neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other, and China has never governed Taiwan for a second.”
This unified front marks the latest chapter in the ongoing diplomatic tug-of-war that has intensified since Somaliland and Taiwan formalized relations in 2020, much to Beijing’s consternation.
Rejecting Beijing’s Pressure Tactics
Somaliland’s firm stance comes after Chinese Ambassador to Somalia, Wang Yu, escalated tensions by stating in an interview with a local Somali news outlet: “I strongly condemn Somaliland for strengthening its ties with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a country; it is a part of China. We have taken countermeasures against Hargeisa. There is significant cooperation between China and Somalia.”
The Ambassador’s explicit mention of “countermeasures” represents an unusually direct threat from Chinese diplomacy, which typically shrouds punitive actions in more ambiguous language. The statement also underscores Beijing’s strategy of leveraging its relationship with Mogadishu as a counterweight to Somaliland’s independent foreign policy.
This diplomatic confrontation follows the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu issuing yet another condemnation in May 2024, labeling Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan a “violation” of the increasingly threadbare “One-China Principle.”
Sources close to the Somaliland government revealed to Somaliland Chronicle that Chinese officials had attempted to sweeten the deal by dangling the prospect of a liaison office in Hargeisa and vague promises of development assistance—if only Somaliland would abandon Taiwan. The offer was promptly rebuffed.
“The ‘One-China Principle’ and the ‘One-Somalia Principle’ are outdated clichés that bear no resemblance to ground realities,” a senior official at Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told this newspaper on condition of anonymity. “Neither Taiwan nor Somaliland is subordinate to China or Somalia. That era is finished.”
China has intensified its pressure campaign against Somaliland, employing political, economic, and diplomatic tactics. Chinese officials have issued explicit warnings regarding Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan, with Ambassador Wang Yu emphasizing that “there is only one China in the world; Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.”
The economic pressure has been equally direct. In response to Somaliland’s diplomatic shift towards Taiwan, Chinese businesses that had previously established a presence in Somaliland abruptly withdrew, leaving gaps in various sectors of the economy. This move is perceived as an attempt by Beijing to exert economic pressure on Hargeisa.
China’s actions form part of a broader strategy to isolate Taiwan internationally and deter other nations from establishing formal relations with Taipei. The pressure exerted on Somaliland serves as a cautionary example to other countries considering similar diplomatic engagements.
Political Pragmatism and Mutual Benefits
While Somaliland’s current government expressed reservations about the choice of Taiwan over China when they were in opposition and during the presidential campaign, it has since fully embraced the bilateral relationship established under former President Muse Bihi Abdi’s administration. This pragmatic shift suggests a recognition of the tangible benefits the Taiwan partnership has delivered to Somaliland, overriding any previous political hesitations.
Similarly, political transitions in Taipei have done little to disturb the foundations of the relationship, with Taiwan maintaining consistent support despite its own complex domestic politics. “We appreciated G7 Foreign Ministers recently supported Taiwan by opposing any unilateral attempts to change the status quo of the Taiwan Strait whether by force or by coercion,” the Taiwan Representative Office stated, signaling growing international discomfort with Beijing’s military posturing.
The relationship, initially endorsed by the Trump White House in 2020, appears positioned for continued support as President Trump returns to office. U.S. Congressman Mike Smith has described China’s attempts to isolate Taiwan and pressure Somaliland as “counterproductive and alarming”—diplomatic speak for strong disapproval.
“Under the Trump administration, the White House National Security Council openly acknowledged and praised the new relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan in 2020,” the Taiwan Representative Office reminded observers, strategically emphasizing the continuity with the incoming administration.
While the diplomatic gamesmanship captures headlines, the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership has delivered concrete benefits that transcend symbolic gestures. Taiwan’s investments in Hargeisa’s healthcare infrastructure have significantly improved medical capacity, while educational exchanges have provided Somalilanders with technical training opportunities previously unavailable.
The establishment of a vegetable farm demonstration project in Arabsiyo has introduced advanced agricultural technologies that boost local food production capabilities—practical advantages that underscore why Somaliland continues to resist Beijing’s pressure campaign.
For Taiwan, Somaliland’s strategic position near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints—offers significant geopolitical value as China continues its military expansion throughout the Indian Ocean region.
Looking Ahead: Regional Stability and International Recognition
The Taiwan Representative Office raised particular alarm about what it described as the “weaponization” of humanitarian assistance “to fuel internal conflicts and cognitive warfare to further destabilize the region.” The statement concluded with an appeal: “We urge China to cease its provocation and truly uphold the values of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.”
As Somaliland’s democratic credentials continue to impress international observers following the 2024 Presidential Election, both Taiwan and Somaliland see their partnership as a potential catalyst for broader international recognition.
“We are glad to see more and more democratic like-minded partners endorsing the values of Taiwan-Somaliland relationship,” the Taiwan Representative Office noted. “We believe that Taiwan-Somaliland relationship can catalyze more international support for both nations.”
Despite formidable opposition from Beijing and Mogadishu, the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship has evolved into something more significant than a mere diplomatic arrangement between two unrecognized states. It represents a defiant statement that even smaller nations can chart independent courses when fundamental interests are at stake—regardless of how loudly larger powers might protest.
China’s President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan stand for a group photo together with leaders from African countries before a welcome dinner of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, 04 September 2024. ANDRES MARTINEZ CASARES/Pool via REUTERS
Beijing is increasingly assertive in Africa, aiming to expand its influence. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has invested billions of dollars to establish a Chinese-centric trade route in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland, the only country in the region to resist Chinese investments, has instead allowed pro-Western firms to invest in connectivity projects as an alternative to BRI. In 2016, Somaliland struck a landmark deal with DP World, a Dubai-based port operator, to develop and manage Berbera Port. DP World’s investment has been instrumental in transforming Berbera Port into a major trade hub, providing an alternative to Djibouti for accessing the vast hinterland in the region, including Ethiopia. The transformation of Berbera Port is already taking shape, attracting Western firms like the UK investment arm CDC and Trafigura, which won concessions in the port and energy infrastructure. Similar to the Lobito Corridor, Berbera Corridor is a substitute to China-centric trader routes in East Africa.
In January, Rep. John Moolenaar, Chair of the US-China House Select Committee on the CCP, wrote a letter to then Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging the US to establish a representative office in Somaliland. He stressed that this move is vital for advancing US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and countering China’s growing influence. In 2018, China took control of a port terminal in Djibouti, which US lawmakers viewed as a significant gift to China. Sen Chris Coons warned that without US engagement, China could shift Somaliland’s interests in its favour, consolidating its influence in the Red Sea. Then-Sen Marco Rubio also stressed the need to work on “countering Chinese influence in Djibouti”, describing the takeover as “even more alarming.” General Thomas Waldhauser, the then US military commander for Africa, stated in a congressional hearing that the US military could face “significant” consequences if China gains control of the port. In an effort to gain influence in Somaliland, China proposed a tempting conditional development package aimed at persuading Somaliland to expel Taiwan and prevent aligning with the US. However, Somaliland government rejected the offer. A move Rep John Moolenaar had warned.
As Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi group threatens seaborne trade in the Red Sea, forcing shipping companies to reroute their vessels and disrupting the delicate fabric of global commerce. Djibouti has allowed Iranian ships to dock at China’s military base, facilitating the flow of critical intelligence to the Houthis as they mount attacks on maritime trade. Djibouti has also rejected the US request to use its territory for attacks against the Houthis. The Houthi also established implicit cooperation with Djibouti, enabling the country to benefit from the Red Sea conflict for higher port traffic and turn the crisis into a profitable opportunity, in return Djibouti rejects to condemn Houthi attacks in the crucial shipping lines.
Somaliland, a crucial gateway to the Indo-Pacific, overlooking the Gulf of Aden positions a vital conduit for nearly 15% of global seaborne trade. If its quest for international recognition is accommodated, its geographic position offers a distinct advantage to the U.S., Israel, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in securing the security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea while counterbalancing China and Iran in this critical region. The use Berbera military airfield, would strengthen US deterrence against the Houthis and provide crucial operational support to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel in monitoring Houthi activities and Iranian manoeuvres in the Red Sea. It also promote collaborative efforts in combating piracy, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing. In this dynamic partnership, Somaliland is determined to align itself with the US axis in exchange for recognition.
About the Author
Abdinasser Ahmed is a developmental economics practitioner and political commentator based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. He can be reached through Twitter @Abdinasserahm or abdinasserahm[at]gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud spends lavishly on international travel and Washington lobbying firms while soldiers go unpaid
Al-Shabaab now controls more territory than any time since 2011, following Taliban’s successful playbook
African Union peacekeeping mission (AUSSOM) faces financial collapse as donors withdraw support
Trump administration unlikely to continue funding a government with no accountability or results
When Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways suspended flights to Somalia’s capital last week, few outside the region noticed. They should have. This development, alongside American diplomats fleeing Mogadishu’s airport after militant attacks, isn’t just another security hiccup – it’s the beginning of the end for a Western experiment that has swallowed billions with nothing to show for it.
A Corruption Network with a Government Problem
Somalia’s corruption isn’t just bad – it’s historic. Ranking 179th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 index with a pathetic score of 9/100, Somalia has actually managed to get worse, dropping 2 points since 2023. This isn’t corruption within a system; this is corruption as the system.
While Finance Minister Bihi Egeh bemoans the potential loss of $1.5 billion in U.S. aid, he conveniently forgets to mention where previous billions vanished. Military commanders pocket salaries for non-existent “ghost soldiers,” leaving actual units undermanned. Weapons purchased with Western funding routinely disappear from government armories, only to resurface in Al-Shabaab attacks. Intelligence leaks so consistently that security analysts assume Al-Shabaab has penetrated every level of government. Even judicial positions are bought and sold openly, driving desperate citizens to seek justice from Al-Shabaab’s harsh but predictable courts.
Patrons Head for the Exit
The suspension of flights by Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways isn’t merely a business decision – it’s a devastating vote of no confidence from Somalia’s most committed international backers. Unlike Western powers who engage from embassy compounds, Turkey manages Mogadishu’s port and airport while maintaining its largest overseas military base in the country. Qatar has bankrolled government operations during funding gaps, while simultaneously keeping communications open with Al-Shabaab – much as it does with Taliban, Hamas, and other terrorist networks.
Will these patron states simply work with Al-Shabaab if militants eventually take Mogadishu? Their pragmatism knows no bounds, and it’s entirely possible they don’t care who rules Somalia as long as they maintain their prime position in the country’s economy. Turkey’s infrastructure investments and Qatar’s relationships across the political spectrum practically guarantee they’ll be among the first to recognize any new power reality.
“When your closest friends start heading for the exits, it’s time to acknowledge the building is on fire,” notes a Gulf diplomatic source familiar with Qatar’s decision-making.
The $50 Billion Experiment That Failed
Let’s be brutally honest: Somalia has absorbed over $50 billion in international aid since 1991 with minimal sustainable improvements in governance or security. The Danab Brigade – Somalia’s elite U.S.-trained counter-terrorism unit – remains somewhat effective only because Americans bypassed government structures entirely, maintaining direct oversight of recruitment, payment, and operations.
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has become infamous as one of the world’s most frequent-flying heads of state, jetting off to international conferences and photo opportunities nearly weekly while his country burns. As Al-Shabaab consolidates control over increasing territory, Mohamud and his inner circle have funneled millions into glitzy Washington lobbying firms to keep American money flowing. These lavish expenditures – paid for ultimately by American taxpayers – represent the perfect microcosm of Somalia’s dysfunction: U.S. aid creates a bloated class of government kleptocrats whose primary skills lie not in governance or security provision, but in separating gullible Western donors from their money. While Mogadishu’s political elites wine and dine at five-star hotels in Western capitals and maintain luxury residences abroad, soldiers on the front lines go unpaid, and Al-Shabaab’s shadow government expands its reach. American billions haven’t brought stability to Somalia – they’ve created a parasitic political class with no incentive to actually defeat the insurgency that justifies their continued international support.
The evidence is inescapable: Somalia’s problems aren’t about funding levels but legitimacy, accountability, and trust. More money doesn’t build state capacity; it merely enables more sophisticated corruption networks. As one Western official put it, “We’re not funding a government. We’re funding a money laundering operation with a flag.”
Adding to this complex picture, Somalia has increasingly strengthened ties with China, signing onto Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative while accepting infrastructure deals with limited transparency requirements. This diplomatic balancing act raises questions about whether China might become Somalia’s next financial backer as Western donors reconsider their investments. The challenge for Beijing, should it step into this role, would be avoiding the same patterns of ineffective aid that have characterized Western engagement for decades.
Al-Shabaab Executes the Taliban Playbook
For anyone who watched Afghanistan’s collapse, Somalia’s trajectory is disturbingly familiar. Al-Shabaab has methodically followed the Taliban’s successful blueprint: focus on rural control while launching just enough urban attacks to demonstrate government weakness; patiently wait out Western resolve; weaponize public resentment against corruption; infiltrate government security structures; and establish shadow governance that, while brutal, appears more competent than the internationally-backed government.
Intelligence reports confirm Al-Shabaab now controls more territory than at any point since 2011, collects taxes more efficiently than the government, and dispenses predictable justice in areas under its control. “The reality Western policymakers refuse to accept is that insurgencies don’t need to be loved by the population—they just need to be seen as more competent and less predatory than the government,” notes a former Western counterinsurgency advisor with extensive experience in both Afghanistan and Somalia. “By that measure, Al-Shabaab is winning.”
AUSSOM: Peacekeeping Without Peace or Funding
Somalia’s last security bulwark, the newly rebranded African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), teeters on the brink of financial collapse. Despite diplomatic platitudes about “sustainable funding mechanisms,” donor fatigue has set in. The European Union’s willingness to cover troop stipends is waning, while United Nations logistical support grows increasingly tenuous.
This financial uncertainty couldn’t come at a worse moment. Ethiopia – AUSSOM’s backbone – is distracted by internal conflicts and maritime disputes with Somalia. Uganda has made it clear that continued troop contributions depend entirely on reliable international funding that isn’t materializing.
Without a robust AUSSOM presence, intelligence assessments suggest Al-Shabaab would likely expand control to most population centers outside Mogadishu within months. The bitter irony: Western nations, having spent billions on Somalia’s stability, now appear unwilling to fund the one mechanism that has somewhat contained Al-Shabaab.
Trump Administration: No More Blank Checks
The Trump administration represents the final nail in Somalia’s financial coffin. President Trump’s “America First” approach and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s hawkish stance make additional funding for Somalia virtually unthinkable. The White House team sees Somalia’s corruption rankings, territorial losses to Al-Shabaab, and decades of squandered aid as textbook examples of failed investment.
“The days of writing blank checks to failing states are over,” a Republican foreign policy advisor remarked privately. “The President wants concrete returns on American taxpayer dollars, and Somalia has consistently proven it cannot deliver.”
This policy shift comes exactly when Somalia’s government is most desperate for support, creating a perfect storm where years of mismanagement, corruption, and security failures are finally coming due. The chickens, as the saying goes, are coming home to roost.
The Next Kabul Awaits
Somalia’s internationally-backed government is approaching a point of no return. The combination of endemic corruption, resurgent Al-Shabaab, wavering international support, and AUSSOM’s precarious funding creates conditions eerily similar to pre-collapse Afghanistan.
For Western nations that have poured billions into this failed experiment, it’s time to acknowledge reality rather than writing more checks. Additional money without addressing core governance failures will simply disappear into the same corrupt systems that have swallowed previous investments.
The fall of Kabul shocked the world in 2021. The fall of Mogadishu – when it comes – should surprise no one.
HARGEISA—Somaliland government have detained Rashid Nur Absiye, commonly known as Rashid Garuf, without announcing formal charges. Multiple sources confirm that Garuf, who holds U.S. citizenship, remains in custody.
Garuf served as Somaliland’s Ambassador to the United States during President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo’s administration. His time in office was characterized by confrontational social media engagement, including frequent clashes with opposition figures and vigorous responses to Somalia’s political claims. Despite his active online presence, the mission struggled with limited community engagement and failed to advance Somaliland’s interests in the United States, with the office characterized as largely shuttered. In August 2018, President Muse Bihi Abdi replaced him with Bashir Goth as part of a limited reorganization of Somaliland’s foreign missions.
The arrest continues a pattern of detentions that has drawn international criticism. Under the previous government, security forces frequently detained opposition figures and critics without due process, often dropping charges without explanation and rarely taking cases to trial. The practice became particularly pronounced during election periods and times of political tension, when social media activists and opposition supporters faced increased scrutiny. International observers documented dozens of such cases between 2020 and 2023, noting that the pattern of arrest-and-release without judicial process created a chilling effect on political discourse.
The arrest highlights a striking dichotomy within the new administration’s approach to political discourse. While President Cirro has consistently called for restraint and measured debate, his Minister of Presidency, Khadar Hussein Abdi, has adopted an increasingly combative stance on social media, often engaging in aggressive exchanges with critics. This disconnect between the president’s calls for moderation and his senior minister’s confrontational style raises fundamental questions about the administration’s true commitment to political dialogue.
The detention of Garuf comes just weeks into the new government’s tenure and follows his social media commentary questioning the administration’s response to a senior police official’s death in Hargeisa. Garuf’s posts, which called for public demonstration of disapproval during the president’s planned visit to Gabiley, touched on rather sensitive subject involving the death of a police officer and ongoing investigation. While government officials have historically cited national security concerns or public incitement to justify such detentions, critics argue that using state power against political expression undermines Somaliland’s democratic institutions and reform promises.
Despite multiple inquiries, the Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to obtain official comment from the Ministry of Interior or Police command regarding specific charges against Garuf. The case has reopened debate about the balance between security interests and freedom of speech—a persistent challenge that continues to test Somaliland’s democratic aspirations across successive administrations
In a notable turn of events, the Kulmiye opposition party, whose previous administration oversaw the highest number of such detentions, has condemned Garuf’s arrest. Garuf, a member of Kulmiye’s Executive Committee, now finds his party advocating against the same practices they once employed—highlighting the fluid nature of political principles when parties transition from power to opposition.
The handling of Garuf’s case has broader implications for Somaliland’s political landscape. As the new administration navigates its early months in power, its response to criticism and dissent will likely set the tone for state-society relations in the years ahead. The tension between maintaining security and protecting civil liberties remains a critical challenge for Somaliland’s democracy, particularly as the region continues to seek international recognition and support. Whether this case represents an isolated incident or signals a continuation of previous practices may prove pivotal for the government’s credibility both domestically and abroad.
The January 2024 memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, promising maritime access in exchange for potential recognition, sent shockwaves through the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s response was swift and calculated: rather than acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereign right to make such agreements, Ankara immediately positioned itself to mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia. The resulting Ankara Declaration effectively nullified the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU by promoting direct Ethiopia-Somalia maritime arrangements—a clear demonstration of Turkey’s true agenda.
This calculated intervention fits Turkey’s established playbook. Since appointing former Ambassador Olgan Bekar as Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks in 2018, Ankara has masqueraded as an impartial broker while methodically reinforcing Somalia’s territorial claims. Each round of Turkish-led dialogue follows the same script: Somaliland receives empty rhetoric while Somalia’s position strengthens.
The charade dropped all pretense in February 2024, when Turkey and Somalia signed a sweeping Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The deal—inked mere weeks after the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU—granted Turkey a 30% cut of Somalia’s maritime revenues in exchange for naval reconstruction and training. The message wasn’t just clear; it was intentionally brutal: Turkey considers Somaliland’s waters to be Somalia’s property.
Turkey’s footprint in Somalia renders any claim of neutrality absurd. It maintains its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, trains Somalia’s forces, controls 45% of the capital’s port revenues, and runs the airport. Ankara’s largest embassy worldwide isn’t in Washington or Brussels—it’s in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Somaliland receives a pittance: 216 donated medical machines and a portfolio of unfulfilled promises.
By continuing to entertain Turkey’s overtures, Hargeisa is not just repeating past mistakes—it is actively legitimizing a foreign agenda designed to erase its sovereignty. For decades, Somaliland governments have eagerly welcomed foreign emissaries whose primary credentials are their postings to Mogadishu, with “and Somaliland” ceremoniously tacked onto their titles. This persistent acceptance of diplomatic table scraps exposes a fundamental contradiction: while claiming to seek international recognition, Somaliland routinely undermines its own sovereignty by accepting diplomatic arrangements that explicitly deny it.
The Turkey-Qatar alliance has emerged as the primary architect of Somaliland’s diplomatic marginalization. As regional expert Michael Rubin bluntly puts it, “Turkey does not have a track record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan’s ideological agenda does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security.” This agenda was laid bare when Turkey’s latest delegation to Hargeisa included both its Ambassador to Somalia and its intelligence chief—a composition that treats Somaliland not as a sovereign entity, but as a troublesome province to be investigated.
The timing of Turkey’s outreach is calculated to maximize damage. Their delegation arrived shortly after President Cirro’s high-profile second visit to the UAE, where Somaliland was showcased alongside DP World at the World Governments Summit. The contrast is devastating: while Abu Dhabi delivers billion-dollar port investments and strategic partnerships, Turkey dispatches intelligence operatives and diplomatic illusions.
Turkey and Qatar’s aggressive push in Somalia represents a direct challenge to UAE-Saudi influence in the region. Ankara has systematically worked to undermine UAE-backed projects in Berbera, mobilizing Somalia’s opposition while methodically spreading anti-UAE sentiment within Somaliland. More insidiously, Turkish-backed talking points—questioning UAE partnerships and pushing for renewed Somalia talks—have infected Somaliland’s opposition circles and civil society organizations.
For Cirro’s administration, this presents an existential challenge. His Waddani party’s campaign pledge to restart talks with Somalia already left him vulnerable to unionist accusations. Now, entertaining Turkey’s transparent duplicity risks not only validating these concerns but jeopardizing Somaliland’s most crucial economic partnerships. The UAE, as Somalia painfully learned, does not forget betrayal.
Somaliland’s diplomacy isn’t pragmatic—it’s spineless. Instead of shaping its own fate, it passively absorbs the agendas of foreign players who refuse to recognize its independence. While Mogadishu wallows in chronic instability and terrorism, Somaliland’s willingness to accommodate powers that insist on its eventual reintegration with this chaos betrays a devastating lack of conviction in its separate destiny. Perhaps this diplomatic spinelessness reveals an even more troubling reality: Somaliland’s elected officials might be simply waiting for Somalia to stabilize—a delusional strategy that trades real independence for imaginary reconciliation.
The presence of Turkey’s intelligence chief in the recent delegation should have triggered immediate rejection. Instead, Somaliland’s welcome mat response reveals a leadership void at the heart of its independence project. President Bihi’s calls for broader international mediation and balanced Turkish investment acknowledge the problem, but words ring hollow when actions continue to legitimize those who fund Somaliland’s diplomatic suffocation.
For Somaliland to be taken seriously as an independent state, it must abandon its role as a diplomatic doormat. Real sovereignty demands more than declarations—it requires the courage to reject overtures from powers that fundamentally deny its right to exist. The path to international recognition cannot be paved with endless accommodation of those who question its very legitimacy.
If Somaliland’s leaders cannot muster the resolve to reject Turkey’s sham neutrality, they might as well admit it: independence is not a serious pursuit—merely a convenient slogan masking an endless cycle of submission. The time has come to decide: will Somaliland stand firm as a sovereign state, or remain what Turkey already considers it—a provincial afterthought in an international power play?
Somaliland has strategically leveraged infrastructure diplomacy to position Berbera as a pivotal regional logistics hub, enhancing trade and economic growth. A cornerstone of this strategy is the partnership with DP World, which has led to significant developments in Berbera’s port and associated economic zones.
To capitalize on the developments in Berbera and foster Somaliland United States trade relations, the following strategies are suggested.
Promoting the Berbera Economic Zone to US Investors
The Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ) offers a strategic gateway for trade and investment, providing numerous incentives for international businesses. To attack US investors. Somaliland should actively market the BEZ’s advantages, such as its strategic location along vital maritime routes, tax incentives, and well-developed infrastructure. A comprehensive promotional campaign targeting American companies in key industries could highlight these benefits through trade fairs, Business forums, and diplomatic engagements. Additionally, leveraging digital marketing and strategic partnerships with US trade organizations can increase visibility and interest in the BEZ.
A robust legal framework ensuring business security and contract enforcement will further enhance investor confidence. The government should work on improving regulatory transparency, offering clear guidelines on business operations, and ensuring the protection of intellectual property rights. Engaging with US Chambers of Commerce and trade bodies will facilitate direct communication between Somaliland officials and potential investors. The integration of technology-driven business solutions, such as streamlining customs processing and efficient logistics services, will make BEZ an attractive investment destination.
Encouraging Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can also boost investor confidence. Joint ventures between Somaliland and US firms in key sectors like logistics, manufacturing, and services can create a mutually beneficial business environment. Furthermore, the establishment of investment promotion agencies and liaison offices in the US will enable continuous engagement with American business communities. These measures will not only attract investment but also lay the foundation for long-term economic cooperation between Somaliland and the US.
Establishing Bilateral Trade Agreements
To facilitate smooth trade relations, Somaliland must pursue formal trade agreements with the US. Bilateral agreements can help remove trade barriers, reduce tariffs, and establish clear guidelines for commercial exchanges. Engaging in diplomatic negotiations to secure preferential trade agreements will give Somaliland-based businesses easier access to US markets. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) presents an opportunity for Somaliland to gain duty-free access to certain goods, and lobbying for inclusion in AGOA should be a key priority.
A structured dialogue between Somaliland trade representatives and US policymakers can help bridge policy gaps and foster a cooperative trade environment.
Establishing a dedicated task force to focus on US-Somaliland trade relations will provide a clear roadmap for achieving mutually beneficial agreements. Working with US-based think tanks and trade policy experts can help Somaliland navigate complex international trade regulations.
Developing Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with US trade agencies can further strengthen ties and create opportunities for collaboration. These agreements should focus on key industries where both countries can benefit, such as agriculture, livestock, and renewable energy. Through structured negotiations, Somaliland can Position itself as a reliable trade partner, enhancing its economic prospects while fostering stronger diplomatic relations with the US.
Enhancing Connectivity
A well-developed infrastructure network is essential for sustaining trade growth. Somaliland should invest in both digital and physical connectivity to facilitate smooth trade relations with the US. Improving port facilities in Berbera, expanding road networks, and establishing reliable logistics solutions will enhance trade efficiency. Digital infrastructure, including secure e-commerce platforms and electronic customs systems, will further streamline trade operations.
Strengthening telecommunications and internet services will improve communication between Somaliland businesses and their US counterparts. Establishing online trade platforms that connect Somaliland exporters with American buyers can facilitate transactions and foster business relationships. Additionally, adopting smart technologies in logistics. Such as real-time tracking systems and automated warehousing, can optimize supply chain efficiency and reduce trade costs.
Partnerships with international logistics firms can enhance Somaliland’s transportation capabilities. Attracting investment in air freight and shipping services will create direct trade routes between Berbera and key US ports. Furthermore, modernizing financial systems to support secure and swift international transactions will increase trust and encourage more trade between the two Nations. By prioritizing infrastructure development, Somaliland can Position itself as a competitive player in global trade.
Focusing on Niche Markets
To effectively compete in the US market, Somaliland should focus on industries where it holds a unique advantage. Key sectors such as livestock, agriculture, and textiles have significant potential for expansion. Establishing quality control measures and certification processes will ensure that Somaliland’s products meet US import standards, making them more competitive in American markets.
The livestock sector, for example, can benefit from better disease control programs and adherence to international veterinary standards. Somaliland should also invest in sustainable farming practices and value-added agricultural processing to increase product appeal. Developing organic farming initiatives can further differentiate Somaliland’s agriculture Products in Niche US markets.
The textile industry offers another avenue for growth. Somaliland can explore partnerships with US-based apparel brands interested in ethical and sustainable sourcing. Implementing training programs for textile workers and investing in modern production facilities can boost exports. Additionally, promoting Somaliland’s cultural heritage through unique handmade crafts and artisanal goods can attract niche US consumers looking for authentic, high-quality products.
Capacity Building Initiatives
Sustainableeconomic growth requires a skilled workforce capable of meeting international trade demands. Somaliland should invest in education and vocational training programs to equip its workforce with the necessary skills for engaging in global commerce. Collaborations with US universities and trade institutions can provide specialized training in business management, logistics, and technical fields relevant to trade and investment.
Scholarship programs and exchange initiatives will foster knowledge transfer between Somaliland and the US. Establishing trade-focused incubation centers can support local entrepreneurs in developing export-ready businesses. Encouraging innovation and research in key industries will enable Somaliland to maintain a competitive edge in international trade.
Building strong institutions to support business development is also crucial. Establishing trade advisory services, investment support agencies, and financial assistance programs for local entrepreneurs will enhance business readiness. These efforts will create an environment where businesses can thrive and successfully engage in international trade. By prioritizing capacity building, Somaliland can ensure long-term economic resilience and strengthen its trade partnership with the US.
Conclusion
By implementing these strategic recommendations, Somaliland can maximize the potential of the Berbera Economic Zone and solidify its trade relationship with the United States. Targeted efforts in investment promotion, trade agreements, infrastructure development, niche market focus, and capacity building will contribute to sustainable economic growth. As Somaliland Continues to enhance its trade strategies, it will position itself as a key regional logistics hub and a reliable partner for international commerce. Strengthening US-Somaliland trade relations will not only benefit the two nations but also contribute to broader economic development in the Horn of Africa region.
About the Author
Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali is a Somaliland–based Infrastructure Analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa, with a particular Focus on Somaliland’s infrastructure. With over a decade of experience in leading and developing infrastructure projects, he is also a dedicated researcher and senior lecturer. Eng. Mouktar Yusuf holds an MSc in PPM and Construction Management.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Somaliland’s recently elected president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi ‘’Irro’’, made another visit to the United Arab Emirates for the second time in less than a month. His choice of UAE as the first foreign trip signaled the new government’s prioritization of economic development and leveraging existing agreements for deeper economic and strategic collaboration. One of the highlights of yesterday’s visit was his participation in the World Government Summit 2025 held in Dubai, a key global forum attended by world leaders, policymakers, business leaders, and civil society actors. Unlike his previous trip shrouded in controversy and absence of any media coverage, this one was televised from the conference venue where Irro made the case for Somaliland’s strategic and economic potential.
UAE – Somaliland Relations
Relations with the Arab Gulf States, particularly the UAE, have strengthened for the past decade, primarily centered on economic agreements, infrastructure investments, and security cooperation. President Silanyo engaged in high-level discussions with senior leadership of Kuwait and UAE which paved the way for major collaboration in various sectors. Under Bihi’s government, relations grew even stronger with the commencement of the port project. This contrasts with what some officials in Irro’s government termed as Somaliland’s ‘’getting back to global stages’’.
The UAE views Somaliland as a critical actor in its African strategy, particularly in securing trade routes and enhancing its geopolitical influence in the Horn, a region marked by geopolitical contestation by regional and global powers. Somaliland’s geostrategic location makes it an active partner for the UAE particularly in the context of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security architecture. By securing access to Berbera, the UAE ensures a crucial alternative trade route to Djibouti while counterbalancing the influence of Turkey and Qatar which increased their footprint in Somalia. Currently, Turkey maintains a military presence in Somalia and Turkish companies operate the port of Mogadishu and the city’s airport.
Ethiopia is the other main actor in the UAE – Somaliland relations, particularly concerning port infrastructure. As the largest landlocked nation in the world, Ethiopia’s positive relations with Somaliland and its quest for alternative sea access than Djibouti made Berbera a good choice for consideration. Previously, a port development proposal by the French company Bollore considered engaging the Ethiopian government for partnership in the project. Moreover, China expressed interest in developing the port of Berbera and the natural gas pipelines connecting Ethiopia to the Berbera port refinery. The proposal which came in the early days of Silanyo’s administration sought to export Ethiopia’s natural gas through Somaliland.
The rise of Abiy Ahmed as the prime minister of Ethiopia also solidified Addis Ababa’s relations with Abu Dhabi. UAE supported Abiy’s major domestic and foreign policy objectives; rapprochement with Eritrea, Tigray conflict, and saving Ethiopia’s ailing economy. In his book on the Ethiopian premier, The Economist’s Tom Gardener describes the close personal relationship between Abiy Ahmed and Emirati crown prince Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In May 2021, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Transport and Dp World signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to develop the Ethiopian side of the Berbera corridor costing around $1 billion in a decade.
New Government, New Momentum
President Bihi’s last two year’s tenure in Somaliland was marked by political deadlock and a slow pace of foreign relations with the UAE and with other states as well. The recent visit by President Irro following an official invitation from Abu Dhabi signals a shift in momentum. Irro has been critical of President Silanyo and Bihi’s handling of agreements with the UAE, particularly concerning transparency and due process. As the speaker of parliament, Irro opposed passing the legislation for the military base. Additionally, he opposed the concession of the port of Berbera citing corruption and lack of transparency in the process. How this vocal opposition to UAE affairs in Somaliland will impact the new relationship is yet to be seen. But one thing is certain; in a region where unpredictability reigns, pragmatism is the preferred course of action.
In this new administration, a couple of areas of mutual interest remain crucial. Berbera port development yielded positive results in terms of operational capacity. However, making sure the bigger client, Ethiopia, effectively utilizes the port remains a challenge. President Irro remarked in Dubai that Somaliland is committed to securing a trade route to Ethiopia. The Berbera Corridor connecting Berbera to mainland Ethiopia is constructed. The new government should speed up the legal framework underpinning these cooperations. These include passing the transporting and logistics laws, insurance laws, banking, and other laws creating a cohesive political and legal environment for future investments to pour in. Last year, unconfirmed reports emerged of Dp World about to inaugurate the second phase of expansion and development of the Berbera port which will double the capacity and the services the port can provide.
Security cooperation remains a key area of UAE-Somaliland relations. Under the Bihi government, reports emerged of UAE training security forces for Somaliland. Although Bihi allegedly turned down this proposal, UAE support for Somaliland’s intelligence existed. During last month’s trip to Abu Dhabi, Somaliland’s head of intelligence accompanied the president. Since the war in Gaza started, maritime security in the Red Sea has become a source of concern. It will be crucial to witness the evolving security partnership between Abu Dhabi and Hargeisa especially since the latter is prioritizing economic growth.
New Trump administration in the White House is reshaping geopolitical dynamics in the region. Experts have explained that a new Trump administration will likely allow the regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to play a prominent role in the Horn of Africa. Despite growing frustration in Washington in Abu Dhabi’s role in the conflict ravaging Sudan, Somaliland’s Berbera could serve as an alignment in their regional policy. The United States has expressed an interest in utilizing Berbera’s airport as a base, a project started by the UAE before it was abandoned in 2019 as calculations in the Yemen war changed policies. With the Houthi posture increasingly assertive, would Berbera’s airport resurface in Emirati’s interest and what would this mean for Washington’s plans most importantly, how Somaliland would navigate such complex dynamics?
Moving forward, the Somaliland government could build on this growing momentum for its benefit. Foremost, the government could expand its mission in the UAE. Recently, President Irro appointed a new representative to the UAE demonstrating prioritizing relations with the arab state, despite the representative did not serve in any diplomatic role in the past nor the government. This could be bolstered by promoting the office’s network with Somaliland’s business elites and acquiring influential friends in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This week, the foreign ministry launched the Somaliland Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs to train a cadre of diplomats for the country. Forging partnerships and collaboration with leading Emirati diplomatic institutes, such as Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, could be a good start for a small yet tangible collaboration.
Somaliland – UAE relations are entering a new phase under President Irro. With shifting regional dynamics, ongoing security threats, and increasing external interests from global superpowers such as the U.S. and China, Somaliland must strategically position itself to capitalize on emerging opportunities while mitigating potential threats. Irro’s ability to navigate these complexities will define the next chapter of Somaliland’s foreign policy.
About the Author
Moustafa Ahmad is a researcher who writes on the politics and security of Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. Reach him on X (@Mustafe_Ahmad) or moustafa.ahmadn@gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
HARGEISA, Somaliland—Civil servants across Somaliland’s government institutions are facing an increasingly dire financial predicament as salary payments continue to be withheld without explanation. More than six weeks since January’s wages first became due, thousands of government employees remain unpaid, with February’s salaries now 11 days overdue. Despite mounting concerns, the government has yet to provide any official justification for the prolonged delays.
The salary crisis unfolds against the backdrop of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro’s” administration’s ambitious fiscal reforms. On January 25, 2025, the president approved a national budget of 3.89 trillion Somaliland Shillings (approximately $406 million USD) for fiscal year 2025, signaling intentions for comprehensive financial restructuring.
In recent testimony before parliament’s oversight committee, Minister of Finance Abdillahi Hassan Adan revealed that discretionary tax exemptions and forgiveness arrangements granted to major businesses have been costing the treasury approximately $40 million annually—nearly 10% of the newly approved budget. In response, President Cirro has issued an immediate directive to end these preferential tax treatments, marking a fundamental shift in the government’s approach to revenue collection.
On February 1, the administration announced sweeping new taxation measures targeting the country’s digital economy. These measures extend to mobile money transactions, digital banking, telecommunications, and utility payments—sectors that have long operated with minimal taxation but now face increased government scrutiny.
While civilian salaries remain unpaid, the administration has prioritized security sector personnel, ensuring uninterrupted payments to military and police forces. In what appears to be a strategic effort to bolster the security establishment, President Cirro has not only maintained timely salary disbursements for the armed forces but has also announced a substantial 50% immediate increase in their wages, with plans to raise them by up to 250% during his term. The reform package requires all security personnel to complete IRIS Biometric Registration by February 2025. Its unclear how the registration effort is progressing or if the armed forces latest payments include the 50% raise.
“Each passing day without payment deepens our hardships,” a senior civil servant told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “We recognize the government’s need to ensure security forces are well-compensated, but civilian institutions are the backbone of government operations. If we are left unpaid indefinitely, essential services will inevitably suffer.”
Compounding the uncertainty, the Bank of Somaliland issued an unprecedented directive on January 30th, freezing all advance payments until July 31st, 2025. Additionally, internal government documents indicate an ongoing civil service restructuring process, at least within the Ministry of Livestock and Rural Development, in coordination with the Civil Service Commission and a private consulting firm identified as PSG.
The silence from the government on the cause of the payment delays raises further questions. While the financial reforms—including ending preferential tax arrangements and implementing new digital economy taxes—may suggest a broader effort to stabilize Somaliland’s economy, the immediate impact on thousands of unpaid civil servants cannot be ignored. Whether the delays stem from liquidity constraints, bureaucratic inefficiencies, or undisclosed fiscal restructuring efforts remains unclear, as officials have so far refrained from offering any public clarification.
Repeated attempts by Somaliland Chronicle to obtain a response from the Ministry of Finance regarding the timeline for resolving the current salary crisis have gone unanswered. Meanwhile, the absence of government communication continues to fuel speculation and anxiety among public sector employees, many of whom now struggle to meet their financial obligations as they await their long-overdue wages.
