In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
Somaliland is a thriving democracy that has demonstrated a successful bottom-up approach to governance rooted in the will and aspirations of its people. In 2001, Somalilanders overwhelmingly voted in favour of a constitution that firmly established sovereignty as residing with the people. This constitution mandates that the president, members of the bicameral parliament, regional councils, and district representatives be elected through free and fair elections.
Two decades later, while Somaliland’s democratic journey offers many successes, there are valuable lessons to build upon and areas requiring meaningful reforms to ensure continued progress.
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the constitution states that “the political system of the Republic of Somaliland shall be based on peace, co-operation, democracy and plurality of political parties.” However, Article 2 contradicts this plurality and states that “the number of political parties in the Republic of Somaliland shall not exceed three (3).”
The Act for the Registration of Political Associations and Certification of Political Parties, known as Law Number 14, was enacted to regulate the formation of political parties. The Act has undergone several changes, but its foundation remains: the number of political parties shall not exceed three. With limited guidance in the constitution, determining how parties should be formed (while not exceeding three) and avoiding parties based on regionalism and clannism became a challenge. To address these issues, the drafters of Law No. 14 proposed two solutions:
Political associations would be formed initially, and only three of these associations, after a competitive process, would qualify as political parties.
In 2012, the Act introduced a ten-year license for political parties, limiting the registration of political associations or parties to once every ten years.
In 2022, Somaliland faced political instability and violence due to these restrictions. The former president, Muse Bihi Abdi, sought an extension of his expired term and proposed opening new political associations to compete for the three-party slots. The opposition rejected this move, perceiving it as a threat to their existence. Given that clans back political parties, the disagreement quickly escalated into clan violence. A rebel group clashed with security forces, resulting in the deaths of nine police officers and numerous injuries. The dispute was eventually resolved when clan leaders intervened, proposing that political party elections and the presidential election be held on the same day. The then-president reluctantly accepted this compromise, having no other viable options as he faced multiple challenges, including defeat in Las Anod and the presence of a rebel group stationed near the capital.
The crises of 2022 and 2023 exposed the vulnerabilities of Somaliland’s political system. Factors contributing to this fragility include a weak judiciary, clan-based political parties, poverty, and a polarised society. The closed political system, with its restrictions, exacerbates tensions and hinders political stability.
Reform the System
The new president has pledged to reform the political system and propose constitutional amendments. Such reforms could lead to a dialogue on lifting the restrictions on the number of political parties. However, the slow progress of the new administration and the poor quality of its ministers indicate that constitutional amendments are not an immediate priority.
To address Somaliland’s flawed political system, the government could reduce the licensing cycle for political associations from ten years to five. This change would allow citizens to organise and challenge existing parties more frequently, revitalising the political landscape without requiring constitutional amendments.
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi’s recent announcement that he may not seek re-election may weaken his leadership, as many politicians, including his cabinet members, are likely to align themselves with potential presidential candidates. This unexpected position could also provide an incentive for him to push for systemic reforms, potentially shaping his legacy.
Politicised Electoral Body
Another destabilising factor is the composition of the National Electoral Commission, which is dominated by political appointees. Since 2008, the commission has lacked neutrality, with most members being politicians appointed by the president. To address this, Somaliland should conduct a comparative study of electoral bodies in other countries and adopt a model suited to its unique needs. This would help depoliticise the commission and build a strong, functional, and independent electoral body.
Conclusion
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi is not known as a reformist, as evidenced by his track record as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, his experience as an opposition leader has likely provided him with insights into the fragility of Somaliland’s political system. If the president wants to leave a lasting legacy, he must prioritise reforming the political system. Resistance will likely come not from the public but from party leaders and opposition figures who supported his election and expect rewards at the expense of national stability. Ultimately, the president must choose between securing his legacy and yielding to the political ambitions of others, which could undermine Somaliland’s stability and progress.
About the Author
Guleid Ahmed Jama is a Lawyer and political analyst based in Hargeisa, Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
In what has become a familiar scene in Somaliland’s corridors of power, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently played host to yet another dubious diplomatic visitor. The reception of Amb. Dr. Hajj Alhousseni E. B. Banao – whose credentials crumble under basic scrutiny – marks the latest chapter in a long-running saga that raises fundamental questions about the nation’s diplomatic protocols and institutional safeguards.
A Somaliland Chronicle investigation reveals Dr. Banao’s organizations – AGIC Foundation, Africa Gulf International Corporation, and Salone International Airlines – exist primarily as hastily assembled websites sharing identical templates and stock photos, some so carelessly deployed that male executives appear with female names. His claimed airline shows no evidence of aircraft or aviation licenses, while his supposed humanitarian commission lacks any verifiable operations. This digital Potemkin village extends to his carefully curated social media presence, where Dr. Banao presents himself as the epitome of diplomatic grandeur through staged videos titled “Leaving my residence” and “Entering my residence,” featuring luxury vehicles and security details – calculated displays meant to reinforce his claims of influence and wealth.
“Arriving Home”
The facade becomes more elaborate on LinkedIn, where Dr. Banao claims an astonishing array of simultaneous high-level positions: Chairman of Endora Digital Solutions (since 2007), CEO of ENDORA HOLDINGS GROUP INTERNATIONAL (since 2008), Founder-President of International Aviation Services for Africa (since 2008), Board Member of ZHONG JIA ELECTRONICS LTD HONG KONG (since 2002), and Chairman of Salone International Airlines Corporation (since 2020). Each organization, under scrutiny, proves as substantial as a desert mirage.
His supposed airline in Sierra Leone lacks any aviation authority registration, while the International Aviation Services for Africa (IASA), which he claims to have led since 2008 from Bamako, Mali, shows no trace in regional aviation records. His “World Humanity Commission” appears in no international NGO databases, and even his educational credentials from “Academy Royale des Armees” (2000-2005) prove untraceable.
Dr. Banao’s path to Somaliland’s corridors of power appears to have been paved through Eswatini, where he has been photographed meeting officials. This connection coincides with former Somaliland Foreign Minister Dr. Essa Kayd’s diplomatic efforts in the country as part of Somaliland’s alliance with Taiwan. While this might explain his access to Somaliland’s institutions, efforts to reach Dr. Kayd to verify any previous encounters with Dr. Banao were unsuccessful. This pattern of exploiting legitimate diplomatic channels to gain credibility has become a recurring theme in Somaliland’s international relations.
When confronted about the meeting, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Mr. Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal offered a defense that inadvertently highlighted the very problem at hand. “We are not gullible,” the Minister insisted to the Somaliland Chronicle. “Our doors are open, and we will meet with everyone, but at the end of the day, people will need to prove what they claim they can do. The burden of proof is on the visitors to show us what they can do.” He emphasized that the ministry has not signed any agreements with Dr. Banao, adding that “our doors are open to everyone.”
This response reveals a profound misunderstanding of diplomatic protocol. The Minister’s stance – that verification should follow rather than precede high-level meetings – inverts basic diplomatic practice. The controversy has already claimed its first casualties within the ministry, with all ministerial advisors reportedly dismissed following a heated internal debate about Dr. Banao’s credentials. Notably, Director General Ahmed Abokor, who defended Dr. Banao’s credentials much like he insisted that Maxtor Bank was all too real, is no stranger to such controversies.
During his tenure at the Ministry of Investment in 2018, Abokor orchestrated the infamous Maxtor Bank affair – embracing a phantom Chinese financial institution promising billion-dollar investments. Even after Chinese officials confirmed they had never heard of the bank, his ministry attempted to justify their due diligence by presenting a three-month-old Colorado company registration for an entity operating from a parking lot. His current defense of Dr. Banao suggests a troubling continuity in institutional judgment.
The implications extend far beyond mere embarrassment. Each fraudulent engagement creates potential “squatters” – individuals or entities with dubious claims that could later complicate or litigate against legitimate investors. Several potential European investors have already cited concerns about competing claims from unverified actors who previously secured ministerial audiences and photo opportunities. While Somaliland’s diplomats chase phantoms, genuine diplomatic and investment opportunities wither.
The institutional vulnerability to fraudsters has manifested across multiple administrations. The 2019 Singapore New Silk Oil Refinery project saw multiple ministers, including Vice President Abdirahman Saylici, preside over elaborate ceremonies for a purported multi-billion dollar investment without basic verification of the proponents’ capabilities. Similarly, Swedish citizen Mikael Thorstensson, despite running failing businesses and being evicted from his Hargeisa residence, managed to orchestrate a massive “marine conservation project” that would have handed control of 35% of Somaliland’s coastline to a tombstone seller and his associates.
For a nation seeking international recognition, Somaliland’s inability to perform even rudimentary verification of diplomatic contacts isn’t just embarrassing—it’s suicidal. While officials defend their “open door” policy as showcasing diplomatic accessibility, they’ve instead transformed government offices into a carousel of con artists, where anyone with a template website and stock photos can secure ministerial audiences. The real cost isn’t just wasted time and resources—it’s the growing perception of Somaliland as an easy mark on the international stage, driving away legitimate partners while attracting an endless parade of fraudsters.
President Cirro’s administration now faces a choice that will define its legacy: Will it continue the ruinous tradition of embracing anyone brandishing an impressive business card and flashy social media presence, or will it finally install the basic verification procedures that every functioning state maintains? Somaliland’s diplomatic future hangs in the balance – between continued exploitation by international fraudsters and the professional credibility required of a nation seeking its rightful place in the world. The cost of maintaining “open doors” to obvious confidence tricksters may ultimately be the closing of doors to legitimate international partners.
In a significant political move that has sparked intense discussion across Somaliland’s political landscape, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” has appointed Mr. Ahmed Abdirahman Sheikh Bashir as Special Envoy. The scope of his appointment remains unclear—particularly whether it mirrors the position previously held by Dr. Edna Adan under former President Muse Bihi Abdi as Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks.
President Irro’s early diplomatic appointments have established a pattern that is drawing attention from political observers. While his decision to bypass Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar for the Foreign Affairs portfolio initially suggested responsiveness to public concerns, subsequent appointments have complicated this narrative.
The appointment of Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal as Foreign Affairs Minister raised questions after videos surfaced showing his strong opposition to the Ethiopia MOU prior to taking office—a stance that contrasts with the delicate diplomatic balance many see as necessary in the current regional context.
Now, the appointment of Sheikh Bashir as Special Envoy introduces new questions about the administration’s vetting process and strategic intentions.
According to government officials and business leaders who have known Sheikh Bashir for years, speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the matter, he is a close friend of Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and has played a pivotal role in securing financial support throughout the Somali President’s political career.
This relationship extends beyond personal ties: Sheikh Bashir was previously offered a cabinet position in Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s current government. While he declined the role, his brother, Ismail Abdirahman Sheikh Bashir, subsequently served as Somalia’s Minister of Public Works and Housing. The younger Bashir now holds a seat in Somalia’s Parliament—a position that sources say was orchestrated through his brother’s influential relationship with President Mohamoud and Somalia’s political landscape.
In contrast to the region’s other business leaders who regularly appear at public forums and business conferences, Sheikh Bashir maintains a distinctly private profile, with his rare public appearances typically limited to essential Premier Bank functions.
Sheikh Bashir’s regional influence was significantly enhanced in March 2023 when Premier Bank, under his leadership, acquired a 62.5% controlling stake in Kenya’s First Community Bank Limited. This strategic acquisition granted Premier Bank access to the SWIFT international banking system through First Community Bank’s existing credentials.
The deal established a powerful financial footprint across the Horn of Africa. Unconfirmed reports suggest Somalia’s President maintains a shareholding position in Premier Bank, further intertwining political and financial interests across the region.
Those who have worked closely with Sheikh Bashir characterize him as “a businessman first, whose strategic vision extends beyond national boundaries.” His approach to regional politics, described as “pragmatic unionism,” stems from his extensive business operations across Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan.
Former colleagues from his time overseeing Dahabshiil’s operations in Sudan describe him as a reserved yet astute technocrat who favors analytical depth over rhetoric. However, his apparent alignment with Somalia’s federalist aspirations has emerged as a contentious issue.
The timing of the appointment has drawn particular scrutiny, coinciding with widespread speculation about potential renewed talks between Somaliland and Somalia. These discussions have gained momentum following recent diplomatic movements in the region, including a visit to Djibouti by ruling party Chairman Mr. Hersi Haji Hassan that overlapped with Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s presence in the country.
Sources within Somaliland’s government circles indicate that while Sheikh Bashir’s financial acumen was a significant factor in his potential role in the administration, the implications of his close ties to Somalia’s presidency remain unclear. “His technical credentials are impressive, and perhaps he should have been advising the President on financial and monetary policies, but I am not sure about the envoy part,” noted one senior official speaking on condition of anonymity. “In matters of sovereignty, personal relationships and political leanings carry significant weight.” Against this backdrop of diplomatic uncertainty, political observers in Hargeisa are scrutinizing both the timing and implications of the appointment. As one veteran diplomat noted, speaking on condition of anonymity, “In diplomatic negotiations, the choice of envoy itself can signal strategic intent. Selecting someone known for unionist sympathies raises questions about the administration’s approach to any potential future talks.
Attempts to reach Sheikh Bashir and Somaliland Presidency for comment were unsuccessful at the time of publication.
In his 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics lecture titled “Paths towards the Periphery,” delivered in Stockholm on December 8, Professor James A. Robinson presented Somaliland as a compelling example of successful indigenous state-building. While the world often focuses on state failures in the Horn of Africa, Professor Robinson, who holds dual appointments at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science, and the University of Nigeria-Nsukka’s Institute of African Studies, highlighted how Somaliland’s innovative use of traditional institutions offers a powerful counter-narrative.
The Stockholm lecture elevated Somaliland’s governance system to the global academic discourse. Professor Robinson, co-author of “Why Nations Fail,” demonstrated how Somaliland’s blend of traditional and modern governance structures challenges conventional wisdom about democratic development, particularly in regions where Western models have struggled to take root.
Central to Professor Robinson’s analysis was the Guurti, Somaliland’s council of elders serving as the upper house of parliament. Since its formation during the 1993 Borama Conference, the Guurti has proven instrumental in stabilizing Somaliland during its formative years. Its effectiveness was particularly evident in 2003 when President Dahir Riyale Kahin’s razor-thin victory margin of 80 votes was peacefully accepted—a defining moment for Somaliland’s democracy.
The institution’s success in conflict mediation exemplifies how traditional mechanisms can effectively address contemporary challenges. In 2021, Somaliland held parliamentary and local elections praised by international observers for their transparency and inclusivity. This adaptability has been key to Somaliland’s stability in a region often characterized by political turbulence.
Professor Robinson explained that normative orders—the underlying societal norms and values—are critical to shaping governance systems. While many African states struggle with post-colonial systems that clash with local traditions, Somaliland avoided this pitfall by weaving its clan-based norms into state institutions. The Guurti, representing 82 clans, institutionalizes community harmony and consensus-building, though this sometimes creates economic trade-offs between stability and reform.
Bashir Goth, Somaliland’s Representative to the United States with Professor Robinson at the Pearson Institute of the Chicago University.
Bashir Goth, Somaliland’s representative to the United States, contextualized the Guurti’s role for international audiences by drawing parallels with the U.S. Senate. “This analogy helps foreigners understand the Guurti’s function,” Goth explained, “but its unique origin in pastoral democracy and continued role in peace-building has become a subject of scholarly interest, now recognized in the annals of Nobel Prize history.”
Professor Robinson drew parallels between Somaliland and Botswana’s successful integration of the kgotla system, challenging the notion that poorer nations must mimic Western systems to succeed. Even more remarkable is Somaliland’s success in scaling traditional governance principles to the national level—a feat many African states have failed to achieve.
The absence of international recognition, often seen as a handicap, may have been advantageous. Without foreign interference dictating its political systems, Somalilanders crafted governance structures tailored to their needs, resulting in a democracy that is participatory, resilient, and accountable.
For Somaliland’s ongoing quest for international recognition, Professor Robinson’s academic validation carries particular weight. It strengthens the argument that Somaliland’s unique path to statehood, while unconventional, has produced a stable, functioning democracy worthy of global acknowledgment. Highlighting how the west can help less developed people, Professor Robinson said: “we have to take seriously and study more intensively the nature of their societies.” Somaliland’s success demonstrates this principle, showing how indigenous institutions like the Guurti can be effectively adapted for modern democratic governance while maintaining cultural continuity
Republic of Somaliland’s First Post-Election Transition Brings Focus on Governance Reform
Key Points:
Two-day cabinet orientation emphasizes unity but lacks concrete performance metrics
Notable shift from NGO-heavy recruitment to private sector appointments raises questions about conflict of interest protocols
Key ministries remain heavily dependent on UN agencies and international NGOs
Parliament’s oversight role uncertain despite President’s extensive experience as former Chairman
Financial disclosure requirements and ministerial performance benchmarks absent from agenda
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” of the Republic of Somaliland’s newly minted cabinet concluded a two-day orientation, wrestling with the age-old question of how to turn campaign promises into reality. The sessions, wrapped in the fresh motto “Wadajir iyo Wax-Qabad” (Unity and Action), remained notably light on details about the ‘action’ part. According to a source familiar with the proceedings, the orientation was largely administrative in nature, focusing on procedural matters rather than substantive policy discussions or governance reforms.
Institutional independence – or the lack thereof – lies at the heart of the Republic of Somaliland’s governance challenges. Key ministries, particularly Health Development and Education, have long operated as de facto extensions of UN agencies and international NGOs. UNICEF, WHO, and Save the Children maintain such a grip on these institutions that distinguishing between donor guidance and ministry independence requires a magnifying glass. This dependency presents an immediate challenge to the new administration’s promise of effective governance.
The new cabinet marks a departure from the NGO-heavy recruitment pool favored by former President Muse Bihi Abdi. Instead, President Cirro has appointed several business executives to key positions, including Minister of Civil Aviation Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur and Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi Looge, both with ties to major companies like Dahabshiil and Telesom. The newly appointed National Intelligence Director Jama Mahamoud Egal similarly brings private sector experience to his role.
While private sector experience might bring fresh perspectives to government operations, the orientation sessions conveniently sidestepped the thorny issue of conflict of interest protocols – a policy that quietly vanished under the previous administration. In countries where government actually functions, ministers with extensive business ties are required to file detailed financial disclosures to prevent them from tipping the scales for former employers or business associates. The Republic of Somaliland’s new administration has yet to indicate whether it will implement such basic safeguards.
Equally absent was any discussion of how ministries will measure success beyond feel-good pronouncements. Modern governments track concrete metrics: emergency room wait times, student graduation rates, road project completion timelines. For instance, a functioning Health Development Ministry might set specific targets for reducing maternal mortality rates or increasing vaccination coverage – metrics that could demonstrate real progress beyond donor-driven initiatives. Yet the orientation’s agenda suggested no such performance benchmarks for the incoming cabinet.
After years of opposition critiques about healthcare delivery, education quality, and public sector performance, the Waddani Party now faces the sobering reality of governance. The administration’s emphasis on “Unity and Action” comes as the Republic of Somaliland grapples with political fissures and the Las Anod conflict, but unity without concrete action risks becoming another empty political slogan.
While the business-oriented cabinet concludes its orientation with promises of efficiency and action, one critical oversight mechanism remains conspicuously undiscussed: Parliament’s role in ensuring ministerial accountability. The irony couldn’t be sharper – President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi “Cirro”, who spent years as Chairman of Parliament watching it devolve into a rubber-stamping auxiliary of the executive branch, now sits on the other side of that equation. Under his chairmanship, Parliament’s various subcommittees, theoretically tasked with rigorous legislative oversight, instead became a conveyor belt for executive branch bills.
Now, as the head of an administration that includes several business executives and lacks clear conflict of interest guidelines, President Cirro faces a pivotal choice: Will he leverage his intimate knowledge of Parliament’s weaknesses to perpetuate its ceremonial role, or will he break with tradition and empower genuine legislative oversight? The question is particularly pressing given his cabinet’s business ties and the absence of concrete performance metrics. A robust parliament, through its subcommittees, could demand the very financial disclosures and performance benchmarks missing from this week’s orientation agenda.
The shift from NGO veterans to private sector experience signals a potentially different approach to governance – if properly managed. Business executives are accustomed to measuring results; the question is whether this administration will apply that same results-driven mindset to government operations, establishing clear performance metrics and maintaining transparency in both personal finances and ministerial achievements.
But old habits die hard in Somaliland politics. The transformation from parliamentary chairman who witnessed the erosion of legislative power to a president willing to submit his administration to genuine parliamentary scrutiny would require a rare type of political evolution. For a government promising ‘action,’ restoring Parliament’s oversight muscle would be the most consequential action of all. Citizens of the Republic of Somaliland will be watching to see if corporate efficiency can triumph where NGO expertise fell short, and whether the administration can finally assert real independence from its international benefactors while maintaining the accountability standards expected of a modern government.
The Ankara Declaration has a primary goal and a secondary, more opportunistic aim. The primary objective is to address the deadline for transitioning from ATMIS to AUSSOM by the end of the year. By signing this declaration without cancelling the MoU, it gives Somalia and Ethiopia a diplomatic ceasefire until the AU mission is resumed.
Our focus, and the secondary aim of the declaration, is to test the waters with the new Somaliland administration to see if they would sign the MoU under Somalia’s sovereignty and drop the recognition condition. This latter goal isn’t far-fetched, considering Waddani Party leader Hersi Ali’s initial reaction to the MoU, where he objected to signing it without first consulting Somalia.
The good news for Somaliland is that, after the aftershocks of the initial MoU and the dozens of counter-MoUs, all parties have arrived at one conclusion: the only feasible access to the sea for Ethiopia is via Somaliland’s Guban (a coastal plain running parallel to the Gulf of Aden). Somalia could theoretically grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden by traversing 2,078 kilometres of desert land—an utterly impractical proposition. Even the Indian Ocean, at 1,662 kilometres, is closer.
In stark contrast, the Berbera Corridor spans only 950 kilometers and passes through densely populated regions, making it the most practical and efficient route. Ignoring this reality defies fundamental principles of mathematics, geography, economics, social science and history. I say history since the issue of access to the sea was called the Hawd-Zeila exchange and was negotiated between Britain and Ethiopia even before independence.
The bad news is that this declaration, mediated by Turkey, underscores a troubling trend: Somaliland’s strategic assets are repeatedly compromised in international negotiations. Much like the airspace sell-off of 2014, the Ankara process risks repeating history, leveraging Somaliland’s position without guaranteeing recognition or safeguarding sovereignty. The Ankara Declaration reportedly involves leasing Somaliland ports to Ethiopia, echoing past missteps. This article explores how pro-talks politicians surrendered Somaliland’s airspace and examines the implications of the Ankara Declaration for Somaliland’s sovereignty.
The Airspace Sell-Off: A Case Study in Miscalculation
Somaliland’s loss of airspace control didn’t happen through open consensus—Somalilanders would never have allowed it. Instead, it was a case of being outmaneuvered by Somalia.
Here’s how it unfolded:
Egal and Riyale’s Leadership: Former presidents Egal and Riyale maintained a strict “no talks without mutual recognition” policy, ensuring all negotiations upheld Somaliland’s sovereignty.
Policy Shift by Pro-Talks Politicians: Leaders like Hersi and Hashi deviated from this policy, engaging in unconditional talks with Somalia.
The 2014 Agreement: Held in Ankara, Somaliland signed an agreement allowing Somalia to reclaim airspace control from international organizations (INGOs), with a promise that the operational office would be based in Hargeisa.
-Unilateral Action by Somalia: By 2019, Somalia unilaterally relocated airspace control to Mogadishu.
-ICAO’s Response: Somaliland’s protests were met with a definitive statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization: “We only recognize Somalia.”
The outcome: Pro-talks politicians inadvertently ceded control of Somaliland’s airspace to Somalia, proving that without international recognition, any agreements with Somalia inherently undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty. Alarmingly, some factions, like the Waddani Party, seem oblivious to this lesson, clinging to the belief that a Ciro-Hassan Sheikh partnership could succeed where others failed.
Strategic Missteps: Arrogance of Pro-Talks Leaders
Sovereign states possess the ultimate authority over their territories and can withdraw from agreements, especially those made with entities they consider part of themselves. While such actions carry consequences, sovereignty provides the agency to act decisively. Somalia, viewing Somaliland as a “secessionist region,” faces negligible fallout from reneging on agreements.
Yet Somaliland’s pro-talks politicians continue to place faith in external guarantors or vague notions of “Somalinimo” (Somali solidarity). When questioned about these assumptions, Waddani leaders sidestep accountability, proposing national conferences instead of concrete strategies. This evasiveness weakens Somaliland’s position. The foundation of Somaliland’s claims lies in its 1960 independence and legal arguments rooted in state continuity—not in empty rhetoric or misplaced negotiation tactics.
Worse still, some pro-talks figures appear to actively collaborate with Somalian interests advocating unification. Symbolic gestures, such as opening offices in Hargeisa, subtly undermine Somaliland’s independence. The 2014 establishment of the airspace office in Hargeisa exemplifies this, setting the stage for portraying Hargeisa as the capital of a unified Somaliland and Somalia.
Muse Bihi’s Legacy
Former President Muse Bihi adopted a pragmatic stance on negotiations. While he participated in summits, he firmly insisted that recognition remain the sole agenda item. His unwavering “You shall not pass” approach avoided compromises that could jeopardise Somaliland’s sovereignty. Instead, Bihi emphasised alternative agreements and MoU that bolstered Somaliland’s position.
What is next?
Putting aside the high possibility of Trump recognizing Somaliland, how can Somalilanders trust pro-talks leaders like Hersi Haji Hassan to manage access to Guban when they handed over our airspace and failed to learn from past mistakes?
For Somaliland to secure its sovereignty and capitalise on its strategic assets, it must prioritise recognition, legal continuity, and strategic foresight over the infamous talks with Somalia.
About the Author:
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
A recent New York Times article and a statement from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicate significant potential shifts in U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa, with particular implications for Somaliland’s bid for international recognition.
“The Biden Administration should not be approving new U.S. taxpayer dollars for @UNpeacekeeping. The Trump Administration will not be supportive of this new open-ended mandate for Somalia & I’m glad to be part of the change and reform coming to the @UN,” stated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a recent post on X.
Dr. J. Peter Pham, Trump’s former U.S. envoy to the Sahel and a key voice in African policy, reinforced this position, describing it as a “strong warning” from the incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair. “The times they are a-changin’ — and not a moment too soon,” Pham noted, highlighting the significance of this policy shift regarding Somalia.
Strong warning from incoming @SenateForeign Chair @SenatorRisch on #UN🇺🇳 Security Council vote today on the endless mission in rump #Somalia🇸🇴: the new #USA🇺🇲 admin “will not be supportive of this new open-ended mandate.” The times they are a-changin’ — and not a moment too soon. https://t.co/iDV96Ryexw
This statement, combined with reporting from the Times, suggests a broader realignment of U.S. policy in the region. “There is a general belief that Somaliland will be better off under the Trump administration,” Bashir Goth, who leads the Somaliland mission to the United States, told the Times. This optimism appears well-founded, as officials who previously served under Trump indicate he could recognize Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991.
The Times article reveals a significant shift in U.S. diplomatic approach under the incoming administration. While current U.S. policy maintains a “one Somalia” stance, former Trump administration officials suggest a more pragmatic approach is forthcoming. The potential recognition would be part of a broader strategy to strengthen American presence in strategically vital regions of Africa.
According to the Times article, the U.S. is particularly interested in securing “an airfield and a seaport on the strategic route along the Gulf of Aden” as part of any recognition agreement. This strategic interest aligns with broader American efforts to counter China’s growing influence in Africa, where U.S. influence has notably declined in recent years. The report highlights that African exports to the United States have dropped dramatically, from over 20 percent in 2000 to less than 5 percent in 2022, according to World Bank data.
The timing of these developments is particularly significant given shifting global dynamics in Africa. The Times notes that China has emerged as the most popular foreign power in Africa, according to recent Gallup polls, while American influence has waned. Recognition of Somaliland could serve as a strategic counter to this trend, particularly given Somaliland’s strategic location and the growing importance of the Gulf of Aden shipping route.
The incoming administration’s approach to Africa is expected to be “pragmatic and transactional,” focusing on strategic interests and economic opportunities. This new direction, coupled with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s statement opposing UN peacekeeping funding in Somalia, suggests a broader shift in U.S. policy that could benefit Somaliland’s quest for recognition.
This potential policy shift comes at a time when the U.S. is reassessing its strategic partnerships in Africa. The Times reports that American embassies in Africa are understaffed, and the country has lost security access to parts of the jihadist-affected Sahel region. In this context, Somaliland’s stable governance and strategic location make it an increasingly attractive partner for U.S. interests in the region.
However, the path forward requires careful diplomatic navigation. Questions remain about how Somaliland’s new government under President Abdirahman M. Cirro will position itself regarding these potential developments. While President Cirro brings diplomatic experience to his role, having long touted his diplomatic credentials, some of his early appointments have raised eyebrows among political observers. Most notably, his choice of Foreign Affairs Minister, whose fiery rhetoric against the now defunct Ethiopia MoU preceded his appointment, has drawn quiet scrutiny at a time when nuanced diplomacy is crucial. The current moment demands more than traditional diplomacy or political pronouncements – it requires careful statecraft to navigate these unprecedented opportunities for recognition.
Adding complexity to this diplomatic landscape is Somalia’s continued push for fruitless talks with Somaliland. Somalia’s government has consistently marketed these discussions to the international community as a “reconciliation process” that would ultimately lead to reunification – a narrative that fundamentally contradicts Somaliland’s three-decade pursuit of recognition. Previous rounds of talks, spanning multiple years and international venues, have all collapsed due to Somalia’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge the possibility of a two-state solution as the final outcome. Despite numerous international mediation efforts, Somalia’s negotiating position has remained unchanged: treating dialogue as a path to reunification rather than addressing the fundamental question of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
This situation bears striking parallels to Sudan’s historical attempts to prevent South Sudan’s independence by promoting dialogue as an alternative to separation. Like South Sudan before its independence, Somaliland faces the challenge of maintaining its sovereign aspirations while managing international pressure for talks that Somalia frames as a path to reunification. The historical record of failed negotiations underscores the futility of dialogue without Somalia’s willingness to discuss a two-state solution.
The timing of any renewed participation in such talks could prove disastrous for Somaliland given the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s clear stance on reducing support for UN operations in Somalia. While the opportunity for recognition appears more tangible than ever, success may hinge on President Cirro’s ability to pivot from his traditional diplomatic approach to match the Trump administration’s more transactional style. The effectiveness of Somaliland’s newly appointed foreign affairs team in navigating these waters will be crucial, particularly in resisting pressure for talks that Somalia could use to undermine Somaliland’s push for recognition.
Former U.S. officials quoted in the Times article suggest that the Trump administration’s transactional approach could lead to more concrete outcomes in African relations. While previous administrations focused on democracy promotion and human rights, the incoming administration is expected to prioritize strategic partnerships and economic opportunities, potentially accelerating decision-making on issues like Somaliland’s recognition.
For Somaliland, these developments represent a potential breakthrough in its independence journey. The convergence of U.S. strategic interests, changing regional dynamics, and the incoming administration’s practical approach to foreign policy could create unprecedented opportunities for advancing Somaliland’s sovereign aspirations. The coming months will test Somaliland’s diplomatic capabilities as its leadership navigates these emerging opportunities.
Scores of civilians were laid to rest in a mass grave in Dacawaley village following a brutal attack by the Liyuu Police, a predominantly Ogaden paramilitary force. The massacre threatens to unravel decades of carefully cultivated relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland, just weeks after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s December 11 pivot away from a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland in favor of negotiations with Mogadishu for access to sea.
The death toll continues to mount as survivors, many with severe injuries from gunshots and burns, seek treatment both at Hargeisa Group Hospital across the border in Somaliland and at medical facilities throughout Ethiopia’s Somali Region, particularly in the regional capital Jigjiga. Medical staff at multiple hospitals report being overwhelmed by the scale of casualties, with new victims arriving hourly.
The targeted community, part of the broader Isaaq tribe that forms the majority in neighboring Somaliland, has historically inhabited both sides of the Ethiopia-Somaliland border. These pastoral communities have maintained their traditional grazing patterns and social ties despite the formal international boundary, contributing to the historically strong relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
Somaliland’s Minister of Internal Security, Abdalle Mohamed Arab, condemned the massacre as “a gross violation of human rights,” emphasizing the targeting of pastoralist communities. Minister Arab led a high-level delegation to Jigjiga for urgent talks with Ethiopian federal and regional officials, including General Afgado, Commander of the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s Eastern Command. The discussions yielded a comprehensive agreement to cease hostilities, with unconfirmed reports suggesting Ethiopia’s federal government plans to deploy federal troops to the area while redeploying Liyuu Police forces elsewhere.
The fate of nearly sixty traditional elders from Somaliland, who had entered Ethiopia to mediate a grazing dispute with Ogaden pastoralists, remained unclear in the immediate aftermath of the violence. Images emerged of the delegation being transported in pickup trucks, and hours later they appeared in Jigjiga, the regional capital, in what appeared to be a carefully staged media event. The circumstances of their detention and transportation by the same forces responsible for the massacre raised serious concerns about their welfare and the coercive nature of their public appearance.
Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, former Foreign Minister of Somaliland and Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks, has issued an urgent appeal to the international community. Her intervention highlights the destruction of homes and mosques, and the tragic loss of innocent lives, including mothers and children, while calling for immediate protection of vulnerable communities and accountability for the perpetrators.
The Liyuu Police, operating as President Mustafe’s personal militia rather than a legitimate security force, has a documented history of extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian displacement. Under Mustafe’s leadership, the force has increasingly been accused of using its state mandate to advance Ogaden clan interests, continuing a long-standing pattern of Ogaden dominance in the region’s governance structure that has historically excluded Isaaq representation. This entrenched political monopoly has allowed the force to operate with particular brutality against Isaaq communities.
Ethiopia’s federal government’s recent intervention marks a significant shift from its initial silence, suggesting growing concern over the destabilizing effects of the violence. The deployment of federal troops, if confirmed, would represent the first direct challenge to the Liyuu Police’s unrestricted operations in the region.
The assault appears designed not just to kill and maim, but to make the area uninhabitable for its Isaaq residents – a strategy that threatens to destabilize the intricate web of cross-border relations that have historically helped maintain regional stability. The systematic targeting of these communities risks undermining decades of diplomatic work between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa.
For the residents of Dacawaley, the attack represents more than just another incident of violence – it stands as evidence of state-sponsored terror orchestrated by President Mustafe’s administration to advance tribal interests under the guise of regional security. As casualty numbers continue to rise, the massacre adds to a growing list of atrocities for which the regional president and his paramilitary force must be held accountable.
The targeting of civilians by the Ogaden-dominated Liyuu Police threatens to destabilize an already fragile regional balance, where colonial boundaries have failed to erase centuries-old tribal bonds and rivalries. As international attention focuses on the massacre, the incident highlights not only the dangerous intersection of state power and tribal politics but also the potential unraveling of strategic partnerships that have long underpinned stability in the Horn of Africa.
As Somaliland ushers in a new era under the leadership of President Abdirman Mohammed Abdilahi, I believe the nation stands at a critical juncture. The path forward is filled with both significant challenges and promising opportunities. To navigate these effectively, the new administration must prioritize strategic initiatives that foster stability, economic growth, and national unity. In this article, I will outline what I see as the essential priorities that President Abdillahi and his government must address to secure a prosperous future for all Somaliland citizens.
Nationalisation of Civilian Forces (SSB & G36)
In recent years, Somaliland has witnessed the emergence of various civilian forces that operate independently of the formal military structure. These groups, often formed in response to local security needs or community pressures, play an important role in maintaining order. However, it is becoming increasingly essential for the new government to take proactive steps to nationalize these forces. Prompt integration into the official military framework is critical to mitigate the risks of potential social unrest and ensure stability.
If these civilian forces are not effectively integrated and regulated, there is a danger of a fragmented security landscape that could exacerbate existing tensions and lead to social conflict. The lack of a cohesive security strategy may create power vacuums in certain areas of the country that various factions could exploit, ultimately undermining social harmony.
Therefore, the establishment of a unified, professional national army under centralized command is paramount. This military structure must be free from tribal affiliations or external influences, which can hinder its effectiveness and credibility. A well-organized national army would not only serve as a deterrent to internal and external threats but also foster a sense of national identity and unity among the populace.
Addressing this challenge should be a top priority for the new administration. The government’s ability to integrate these civilian forces effectively will play a vital role in determining the future stability and well-being of our society. By prioritizing the integration of these forces into the national army, the government will enhance security and harmony among the people of Somaliland.
Security and Development in the Eastern Regions
The security and stability of Somaliland’s eastern regions are not just important; they are crucial pillars upon which the future of the entire nation rests. These areas, rich in potential yet burdened by chronic underfunding, years of conflict, and economic neglect, have encountered a myriad of challenges that hinder their development. To truly transform these regions, a comprehensive and long-term strategy is essential—one that holistically addresses the intertwined issues of security, infrastructure, education, and healthcare.
A robust plan must prioritize the restoration of peace, fostering an environment where citizens can thrive without the shadow of violence. Simultaneously, investment in infrastructure—such as roads, communication networks, and public services—will ignite economic opportunities and connect communities, ensuring that no region feels isolated. Education is another cornerstone of this vision; by empowering the next generation with knowledge and skills, we can cultivate a workforce capable of driving sustainable development. Furthermore, access to quality healthcare is vital to improve the overall well-being of citizens, which in turn contributes to a more productive society.
The successful development of these regions is not merely a local endeavor but a crucial step toward national unity, where every citizen, regardless of their geography, can partake in the fruits of national progress. While it may be daunting to envision rapid change in the short term, establishing a strong foundation for enduring peace and development is imperative. With strategic foresight and unwavering determination, the eastern regions can emerge from their challenges and embrace a future filled with stability and growth.
These priorities outline a roadmap for a prosperous and secure future for Somaliland. The new government must confront these challenges with not only courage and political will but also with an unwavering commitment to fostering a stronger, more unified nation that embraces every citizen’s potential.
Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding Between Somaliland and Ethiopia
The memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia holds considerable strategic significance for both countries, marking a pivotal moment in their diplomatic and economic relations. This memorandum lays the groundwork for a multifaceted partnership that can enhance regional cooperation and support lasting peace.
To achieve the full benefits of this agreement, it is crucial for the new government in Somaliland to prioritize its effective implementation and follow-up actions. Successful execution of this understanding can dramatically influence Somaliland’s international standing, providing opportunities to strengthen its foreign policy initiatives.
Moreover, a well-implemented agreement could lead to improved diplomatic relations, not only between Somaliland and Ethiopia but also with other countries in the region. As the partnership develops, it is likely to yield significant economic prospects, potentially spurring trade, investment, and infrastructure development.
Ultimately, the realization of this agreement contributes to reinforcing regional stability, which is essential for the prosperity of Somaliland and its neighbors. The commitment to uphold such agreements can create a positive ripple effect, fostering a secure environment conducive to growth and collaboration across the region.
About the Author
Dariq Madar is a professional based in the United Kingdom, with a strong focus on the political and economic trends shaping Africa, particularly in the diverse and rapidly evolving countries of East Africa. His dedication to understanding the complex dynamics of the region motivates him to remain well-informed on its developments and relationships.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
General Michael E. Langley, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), is set to visit Somaliland in the coming days, according to sources familiar with the matter. This significant development comes amid a notable shift in U.S. foreign policy dynamics and escalating Chinese pressure in the Horn of Africa. With Republican control of both houses of Congress and growing bipartisan support for a shift in U.S. policy, Washington’s long-held “One-Somalia” policy appears increasingly unsustainable. This high-level visit, following U.S. Ambassador Richard Riley’s attendance at President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro’s” inauguration, suggests the traditionally rigid U.S. foreign policy establishment may be adapting to new political realities that favor a more independent Somaliland.
The strategic recalibration takes on added urgency as Somaliland stands as the only African nation that has resisted Chinese overtures despite lacking international recognition, maintaining its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the face of mounting pressure from Beijing. China’s Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, recently issued a stark warning, declaring, “We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.” This threatening stance, following the attendance of Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister at President Cirro’s inauguration, has only heightened the strategic importance of U.S.-Somaliland relations. These developments, coupled with strong Republican congressional backing for Somaliland recognition, signal a potential seismic shift in U.S. engagement with the Horn of Africa.
Recent reports suggest renovation work is already underway at former military facilities in Berbera, with satellite imagery showing a major renovation ongoing at Berbera Airport. The timing of these developments, alongside strategic recommendations and Republican control of Congress, suggests a coordinated effort to establish facts on the ground ahead of possible policy changes. The modernized Berbera Port and its adjacent international airport represent crucial strategic assets as the U.S. seeks to secure its interests near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint where Chinese influence has been steadily growing.
With Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti facing increasing operational constraints and strategic competition from China’s first overseas military installation in its immediate vicinity, Berbera’s infrastructure complex emerges as a critical force multiplier for U.S. power projection in the Horn of Africa. The deep-water port and airfield configuration offer an optimal forward operating base for rapid deployment capabilities, with strategic reach extending across multiple areas of operation (AOs) – from Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia to Houthi positions threatening maritime chokepoints. This dual-use facility provides essential strategic depth for counterterrorism operations, offering reduced time-on-target for kinetic responses and enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage across the theater of operations. Berbera’s geographic positioning enables both over-the-horizon strike capabilities and sustained forward presence in the contested Red Sea corridor, while its modernized port infrastructure supports the full spectrum of maritime interdiction operations. As a potential joint operating base, Berbera would significantly enhance AFRICOM’s operational flexibility and combat power distribution across the region’s most volatile flashpoints.
Langley’s diplomatic mission follows a carefully orchestrated series of U.S. military visits and assessments in Somaliland, now perhaps accelerated by shifting political winds in Washington. His predecessor, General Stephen Townsend, conducted a detailed evaluation of Berbera’s facilities in May 2022, accompanied by then-Ambassador Larry André. Their inspection of the port and airport infrastructure suggested growing U.S. interest in establishing a military footprint in the region. Subsequently, in January 2023, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) dispatched a delegation to evaluate Berbera’s capabilities for the U.S.-led Justified Accord military exercise.
The evolving dynamics in Somaliland’s international relationships add another layer of significance to Langley’s visit. President Cirro, who had initially questioned the wisdom of prioritizing bilateral ties with Taiwan over potential relations with China during his campaign, has since demonstrated a firm commitment to Somaliland’s existing partnerships. This evolution from campaign rhetoric to governance pragmatism reflects a growing recognition of fundamental incompatibilities between Somaliland’s democratic aspirations and Beijing’s regional ambitions.
Somaliland government officials have in the past, shown enthusiasm for hosting U.S. military facilities. While formal diplomatic recognition remains a key objective for Somaliland, the convergence of military strategic interests, Republican control of Congress, and growing bipartisan support for a stronger stance against Chinese expansion creates conditions for a historic shift in U.S. policy. The potential establishment of a U.S. military presence in Berbera, coupled with possible recognition under a new administration, could fundamentally reshape the balance of power in one of the world’s most strategically contested maritime corridors.
When reached for comment regarding General Langley’s reported visit, AFRICOM did not respond to requests for comment.
