In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
In a dramatic shift of regional power dynamics that has gone largely unnoticed by Western media, Somalia has effectively ceded significant control over its security apparatus and governance to Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni. The handover wasn’t marked by ceremony or treaty but rather through a bureaucratic sleight-of-hand executed at last week’s extraordinary summit in Kampala. There, a new “TCCs Plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism” was quietly established under Museveni’s chairmanship, placing him at the helm of an oversight structure with sweeping authority over Somalia’s security, military operations, and international military funding.
Quietly approved by Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud during the April 25 summit, the mechanism comes as Al-Shabaab tightens its grip around Mogadishu in what may be the terrorist group’s most successful offensive in over a decade.
Trading Sovereignty for Survival
The arrangement is a desperate gambit from Mogadishu — a trade of sovereignty for survival. Since February, Al-Shabaab has increased its attacks by over 50% compared to 2024, cutting supply routes and overrunning federal outposts. The capital is increasingly encircled by Al-Shabaab forces.
“With our collective efforts towards securing Somalia, we have been able to have the space to further our state-building efforts,” President Mohamud claimed at the summit. But on the ground, it’s a different story: one of federal disintegration, military collapse, and the slow fragmentation of what little remains of centralized Somali authority.
The summit concluded with Somalia authorizing an additional 8,000 foreign troops under the AUSSOM banner, bringing the total foreign military presence to roughly 20,000. The majority of these forces are not under Somali command.
Foreign Deals, Foreign Rule
The President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has defended his country's recent oil and gas deal with Türkiye, saying it is based on ''mutual interests'' pic.twitter.com/rDgf0k2m3t
Somalia’s sovereignty has been parceled out through a series of desperate security arrangements that trade long-term national interests for short-term security promises. In March 2024, Mogadishu granted Turkey rights to recover up to 90% of petroleum production from major oil and gas deposits in exchange for vague security assurances and naval protection.
Turkey already controls Somalia’s last major state revenue sources, including the strategic port and international airport — the country’s primary revenue generators and gateways to the outside world. Despite this economic stranglehold, the Turkish military presence — anchored at Turkey’s only foreign base in Mogadishu — has remained focused on force protection, not counterinsurgency. Turkey denies accusations that it is deploying SADAT, its controversial paramilitary firm often likened to Russia’s Wagner Group.
Somalia also signed a defense pact with Egypt, formalized during Mohamud’s Cairo visit in August 2024. The agreement included military protocols and Egyptian troop contributions to AUSSOM. Despite a flurry of announcements — including the trilateral Somalia-Egypt-Eritrea summit in Asmara — none of these partnerships have produced meaningful battlefield results.
The NATO Illusion and Buyer’s Remorse
Somali elites who triumphantly celebrated the Turkish security pact last year are now experiencing severe buyer’s remorse as details of the hydrocarbon agreement have emerged. When the defense agreement was first signed, Somalia’s political class boasted that the deal effectively placed them under NATO’s protective umbrella, given Turkey’s membership in the alliance.
Across social media and in parliamentary debates, Somali officials boasted about their newfound security umbrella, with one prominent lawmaker suggesting that Ethiopia should reconsider any confrontational stance now that Somalia had allied with a NATO member. The prevailing sentiment was that Turkey’s military alliance would transform regional power dynamics in Somalia’s favor.
This wishful thinking reflected a fundamental misreading of NATO’s collective defense principles. The ink had barely dried before Ankara began laying the groundwork for its real objective: privileged access to Somalia’s estimated 30 billion barrels of oil reserves and 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas.
“Even colonial extraction agreements rarely exceeded 50% resource claims,” noted a Somali analyst. “We’ve managed to negotiate terms worse than those imposed on defeated nations after wars.”
The Federal System Collapse
Somalia’s federal structure, once envisioned as a solution to state-building challenges, has become another vector of disintegration. Ironically, the very federal system that was partly designed to counterbalance Somaliland — through the creation of various “…land” states like Puntland, Jubaland, and others — has now undermined the central government it was meant to strengthen.
Puntland formally severed ties with Mogadishu in March 2024, declaring its own path forward after years of deteriorating relations with the federal government. Meanwhile, vast swathes of territory in Hirshabelle and other regions have fallen under Al-Shabaab control, creating governance voids the federal government cannot fill.
This fragmentation creates a paradox: as Somalia authorizes more foreign troops on its soil, it exercises effective control over less of its own territory. What began as political fiction — federal member states created partly to dilute Somaliland’s unique status — has evolved into a political reality where these entities often function more effectively than the federal government itself.
“The federal project is collapsing under its own contradictions,” noted one Somali political analyst. “We’re witnessing the slow-motion disintegration of whatever unified governance remained.”
Yet even amid fragmentation, Somalia’s deeper crisis is not geography — it’s the absence of national will.
The Heart of the Problem: Will, Not Weapons
Somalia’s security crisis isn’t primarily a matter of insufficient armaments or inadequate training. The country has received billions in security assistance since 2007, with tens of thousands of soldiers ostensibly trained by foreign partners. Yet these forces consistently underperform against Al-Shabaab.
The fundamental problem is the absence of will to fight. Somalia’s clan-based society has never fully embraced the concept of a national army fighting for a unitary state. Soldiers’ primary loyalties remain with their clans, not with abstract notions of the Somali nation. When military units are organized along clan lines, their willingness to fight often depends on whether the battle serves their clan’s interests — not the national strategic objectives set in Mogadishu.
The Kampala summit produced recommendations that read like a recycled script from the past decade of failed interventions, emphasizing “enhancing Somali National Armed Forces training” and establishing “mechanisms for countering extremist narratives.” Notably absent was any serious reckoning with the root causes of Somalia’s security collapse: endemic corruption, predatory governance, and the absence of political will to reform.
Museveni: Somalia’s New Security Overlord
President Museveni, 80, has ruled Uganda since 1986. Now, he holds unprecedented sway over Somali security policy. The Peer Review Mechanism gives him formal oversight of military operations, federal-state coordination, and international troop contributions. The summit also empowered Museveni to speak directly to the UN Security Council on Somalia’s behalf — a stunning diplomatic concession.
Uganda already contributes the largest foreign troop contingent in Somalia (4,500), followed by Ethiopia (2,500), Djibouti (1,520), Kenya (1,410), and Egypt (1,091). The Kampala mechanism effectively turns this military weight into political leverage.
Political oversight is only one piece of the puzzle; the financial levers of power are shifting as well.
Somalia’s Foreign Backers Cut and Run
AUSSOM faces a $73.7 million funding shortfall for the first half of 2025, with urgent needs totaling $92.1 million. The Kampala summit tasked Museveni with designing a “Resource Mobilization Strategy and Financing Plan,” placing Somalia’s defense budget under foreign supervision.
As Western attention drifts elsewhere, Somalia’s backers are losing patience. China has pledged only $17 million to the AUSSOM mission — a token sum that reflects its preference for maximum strategic leverage at minimum cost. The European Union, still the largest financial backer of Somali security, has voiced escalating frustration, warning: “We cannot carry this burden alone.”
The United States has drastically scaled back its aid footprint, with USAID operations slashed by 83%. Somalia’s once heavily fortified U.S. embassy compound inside Mogadishu’s “green zone” now operates with minimal staff. Talk of permanent closure is no longer hypothetical.
Ethiopia’s Red Sea Dilemma
Ethiopia’s bold January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland—offering potential recognition in exchange for port access—was a strategic gambit that continues to reverberate throughout the region. This assertive move triggered the very dynamics that led to today’s Kampala arrangement, as Somalia scrambled to shore up international support against what it perceived as an existential threat. The MoU effectively forced Somalia into deeper dependency on foreign partners, accelerating the security outsourcing that culminated in Uganda’s oversight role.
Yet despite triggering these tectonic shifts, Ethiopia has failed to capitalize on its initial advantage. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s subsequent retreat from the MoU’s commitments has left Ethiopia in a paradoxical position: contributing 2,500 troops to AUSSOM to stabilize a Somali government actively undermining Ethiopia’s core strategic interests. The diplomatic pressure that caused Addis Ababa to pull back has not resolved Ethiopia’s fundamental dilemma—a landlocked nation of 120 million people with no sovereign access to maritime trade routes.
For Ethiopia, the geographic reality remains both unchanged and unforgiving. Viable Red Sea access runs either through Somaliland’s territory or via Eritrea—requiring renewed engagement with Isaias Afwerki, the mercurial strongman in Asmara. Abiy previously navigated this difficult relationship during his early peace offensive, but the rapprochement has cooled significantly. Somalia’s ports remain under Turkish control and its governance increasingly fragmented among competing foreign interests, rendering that route strategically compromised.
Addis Ababa now faces the challenge of rebuilding a strategic partnership with Hargeisa under more difficult circumstances, having demonstrated hesitancy in its previous commitment. As the region’s strategic chessboard continues to evolve, Ethiopia’s initial boldness followed by diplomatic wavering has resulted in the worst of both scenarios: antagonizing Somalia without securing the Red Sea access that motivated the original MoU. Meanwhile, Somaliland retains the singular asset—functioning Red Sea ports and the territory connecting them to Ethiopia—that keeps it central to the region’s geopolitical calculations regardless of formal recognition status.
As Somalia surrenders control to multiple foreign powers — security to Uganda, economic resources to Turkey — Somaliland’s stable self-governance stands in striking contrast. While Mogadishu struggles to maintain even the appearance of sovereignty, Hargeisa continues to exercise effective control over its territory, security forces, and governmental functions without foreign oversight. More remarkably, in a region where democratic governance is rare, Somaliland has demonstrated a consistent commitment to electoral democracy that puts it ahead of most of its neighbors.
This divergence creates a historic opening for Somaliland to strengthen its case for recognition. In a region where volatility is the norm, Somaliland’s consistent governance stands as a rare strategic asset — one Washington cannot afford to ignore under a pragmatic foreign policy approach. The strategic implications have never been clearer, particularly as the reality of Somalia’s fragmentation catches up with international partners who have clung to the fiction of a unified Somalia despite mounting evidence that this model may be unworkable.
Somalia’s obsession with destabilizing Somaliland, even amid its own crises, reveals the threat that Somaliland’s success poses to Mogadishu’s legitimacy. The Somali Prime Minister’s provocative visit to Las Anod amid active hostilities at his doorstep represents a calculated effort to undermine Somaliland’s territorial integrity. Somaliland responded by suspending dialogue with Somalia — a proportionate measure against a bad-faith actor.
For the United States, this moment presents a strategic imperative aligned perfectly with the pragmatic foreign policy championed by Secretary of State Rubio, who emphasizes decisions based on whether they “make us stronger, safer, and more prosperous.” Washington, hamstrung by decades of misguided adherence to the “One Somalia” fiction, risks squandering a natural partnership with Somaliland precisely when pragmatism should prevail over ideological rigidity. Somaliland’s vast, untapped reserves of critical minerals, including rare earth elements and lithium, represent resources the United States urgently needs to secure its technological future and reduce dependence on adversarial supply chains — a clear case where strategic interest aligns with Secretary Rubio’s emphasis on “concrete shared interests, not vague platitudes or utopian ideologies.”
As Somalia fragments under the weight of its own contradictions and foreign entanglements, Somaliland has a unique opportunity to project coherence and purpose through expanded bilateral engagements with countries willing to understand its unique position.
A Shadow Administration
The Kampala agreement creates a shadow administration over Somalia’s most vital state function: security. Museveni now chairs the body that manages foreign troops, allocates international funds, and liaises with the UN — all roles that traditionally belong to a sovereign state.
The arrangement recalls the mechanisms of a colonial protectorate: Somalia retains formal independence, but critical levers of control now sit in Kampala. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is still technically in office — but power is elsewhere.
This is the culmination of years of strategic decay. Somalia has surrendered its economic sovereignty to Turkey and now its security architecture to Uganda. The fiction of Somali self-rule grows thinner by the day.
Whatever the next chapter holds, one thing is clear: Somalia’s path to stability no longer runs through Mogadishu. It runs through Kampala — and it’s Museveni holding the map.
The political choices of the Khatumo community have long perplexed many observers, myself included. Their decision to pursue a federal arrangement with the Federal Government of Somalia—rather than aligning with either Somaliland or Puntland—raises significant questions about historical memory, political calculations, and perceived benefits. After engaging with three seminal works written by esteemed Somali scholars on the country’s tumultuous political history, I have come to the conclusion that the people of Khatumo are not driven purely by ideological or national considerations. Rather, they appear to be seeking to reclaim a perceived lost entitlement: the disproportionate share of political power and public resources they enjoyed under the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.
However, this aspiration is deeply problematic. The assumption that reintegration with Mogadishu will lead to the restoration of these privileges is, at best, wishful thinking. As the Somali proverb wisely puts it, “Meesha ay dacawo macal uga baratay bay macaluul ugu bakhtidaa”—”The place where the fox once learned to find food is the same place where it ultimately dies of hunger.” This metaphor poignantly captures the futility of looking to a failed center of power to deliver the same benefits it once promised but can no longer sustain.
To better understand the dangers and long-term consequences of clan-dominated governance, it is instructive to revisit a pivotal episode in Somali political history involving two prominent members of the Somali Revolutionary Council’s politburo: General Ismail Ali Abokor and General Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla (commonly known as Dafle). Their interaction offers a window into how clan hegemony, once institutionalized within the state apparatus, not only alienated key national actors but also contributed to the eventual unraveling of the Somali state.
In Politics of Cain, Professor Hussein Bulhan recounts a revealing incident that marked a turning point in General Abokor’s political evolution. Though Abokor was Isaaq and Dafle a Darod (Dhulbahante), the two men had been schoolmates in both Somaliland and the United Kingdom, developing a friendship that transcended clan divisions. However, Abokor’s trust and belief in the ideals of the Somali revolution began to erode during a visit to Dafle’s office. While waiting in the adjoining room, Abokor overheard his long-time colleague urging a group of Marehan officials to consolidate Darod hegemony in Somalia. Dafle reportedly told them that “every country in the region is ruled by a clan or tribe,” and therefore, the Darod needed to ensure that power remained in their hands.
For Abokor, this moment was a revelation—deeply personal and politically disillusioning. That such a divisive call for clan dominance could come from a friend whose own mother was an Isaaq woman deeply unsettled him. It confirmed his growing suspicions that the revolution had been hijacked by clannish ambitions. By the late 1970s, Abokor had become openly critical of the regime. Alienated and spiritually disillusioned, he withdrew from public life, retreating into private religious practice. Nevertheless, he remained an influential figure behind the scenes, quietly encouraging Isaaq officers in the Somali armed forces to align with the Somali National Movement (SNM), the very group that would lead the armed resistance against Barre’s dictatorship in the northwest.
This story of personal betrayal and political awakening is emblematic of a broader systemic crisis. What began as a revolutionary project aimed at building a unified, socialist Somali state quickly degenerated into a vehicle for clan-based authoritarianism. As recorded in Waaya-Arag by Faarax Qaaray, the first decade of the revolution saw the consolidation of power in the hands of a narrow coalition known as the M.O.D. alliance—comprising the Marehan (Barre’s paternal clan), the Ogaden (his maternal clan), and the Dhulbahante (his son-in-law’s clan). This alliance excluded other major clans and communities, thereby sowing the seeds of discontent and rebellion.
Abdulqadir Aroma, in Sababihii Burburka Soomaaliya, offers further insight into the transformation of this alliance. Initially disguised as a revolutionary partnership, the M.O.D. coalition eventually became a naked expression of tribal favoritism. Barre, fearing loss of control, undermined constitutional governance and centralized power within his own kinship networks. According to Aroma, among the 76 founding members of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (XHKS), 38 were selected purely on the basis of clannish loyalty, all belonging to the Darod clan. The constitutional framework was subordinated to tribal dictates, as exemplified by the infamous rallying cry of Darod delegates: “O Daarood Ismaaciil, you have disgraced the family.”
This corruption of the revolutionary ideal culminated in systemic exclusion and militarized repression. Bulhan explains that even before Barre’s military defeat by Ethiopia in 1977-78, he had already begun arming loyalists and militarizing clan networks. The ideological facade of socialism and nationalism disintegrated under the weight of authoritarian paranoia and tribal patronage. The myth of Barre’s invincibility collapsed, and with it, the very foundations of the Somali state.
The Khatumo community’s nostalgia for the Barre era must be viewed within this historical context. While it is understandable that certain constituencies may seek to restore what they see as lost entitlements, the reality is that those privileges were granted under a system built on exclusion, coercion, and eventual collapse. Attempts to revive such a system—whether through federal alignment with Mogadishu or through other forms of political restoration—are not only misguided but potentially dangerous.
In contrast, Somaliland offers a radically different political experiment. Since declaring its independence in 1991, Somaliland has rejected the legacy of Barre’s rule and instead embarked on a path of indigenous reconciliation, democratic institution-building, and relative stability. Though unrecognized internationally, Somaliland has demonstrated a commitment to peace, self-governance, and pluralism that stands in stark contrast to the tumultuous politics of Mogadishu.
By choosing to align with a federal government in Mogadishu that is itself struggling with legitimacy, plagued by corruption, and infiltrated by terrorist threats, Khatumo risks repeating the mistakes of the past. The pursuit of federalism under the illusion of regained influence may in fact lead to deeper marginalization, especially in a context where centralized power remains weak and volatile.
Ultimately, the lessons of Somali political history should not be forgotten. The tragedy of the Somali state collapse was not merely the result of external interventions or ideological failures, but of the internal corrosion caused by clan hegemony, exclusionary politics, and personal ambition disguised as national interest. The story of Abokor and Dafle is not just a cautionary tale—it is a mirror reflecting the dangers that lie ahead for any community that seeks power at the expense of pluralism, equity, and justice.
Khatumo, and other regions like it, would do well to critically reassess the legacy they are seeking to restore. Instead of clinging to the ghost of a regime that prioritized clan over country, they could chart a new course rooted in inclusive governance, historical reconciliation, and meaningful self-determination. The past should inform the future—not imprison it.
About the Author
Mr. Abdillahi Hussein is PhD Candidate in Peace & Development Studies and visiting Prof. of Public Policy as well as Ethics in Government at the Civil Service Institute, Hargeisa, Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Turkey’s recent energy agreements with Somalia raise serious concerns about neo-colonial exploitation, masking a power grab under the veneer of economic cooperation. While Turkey frames its involvement as a win-win partnership, a closer examination reveals a deeply unbalanced arrangement that leaves Somalia vulnerable and significantly disadvantaged.
Turkey’s Energy Crisis and Strategic Ambitions:
Turkey’s energy dependence, coupled with a weakened lira and soaring inflation, has driven its pursuit of alternative energy sources and transit routes. This pursuit has led to strategic partnerships, some questionable, across the globe. Somalia, a nation grappling with instability and weak governance, has become an attractive target.
Somalia: A Vulnerable Target:
Somalia’s fragile state presents an opportunity for Turkey to secure access to its oil and gas reserves with minimal oversight and accountability. The agreement’s terms are heavily skewed in Turkey’s favor, granting it:
Predatory Cost Recovery: A 90% upfront cost recovery clause allows Turkey to effectively claim the lion’s share of the revenue, leaving Somalia with minimal returns. This is far beyond the norm for even conflict-ridden nations, where cost recovery typically caps around 70-80%.
Unilateral Control: Legal disputes are to be arbitrated in Istanbul, giving Turkey a significant advantage and potentially stifling any challenge to the deal’s terms.
Minimal Local Investment: Turkey’s lack of commitment to establishing local offices or contributing to local development further highlights the exploitative nature of the agreement. This means no local job creation and no significant revenue for the Somali people.
A Façade of Partnership:
The agreement is presented as a mutually beneficial partnership, but the reality is far different. Somalia receives minimal financial benefits while Turkey gains substantial access to resources and strengthens its geopolitical position. The lack of transparency and the one-sided terms raise concerns about corruption and the potential for long-term exploitation.
Challenging the Narrative:
Several arguments put forth to justify the agreement’s terms are demonstrably false:
The “Fair Royalty” Claim: The 5% royalty offered to Somalia is significantly below the standard for new oil-producing nations, indicating a blatant disregard for equitable resource sharing.
The “Normal Cost Recovery” Claim: The 90% cost recovery is far above the norm, even in unstable regions, showcasing the deal’s inherent imbalance.
The “International Arbitration” Claim: Arbitration in Istanbul provides Turkey with an unfair advantage, undermining Somalia’s ability to challenge unfavorable decisions.
The “Efficiency” Claim: The lack of a local office translates to a lack of local investment and economic benefits for Somalia.
Geopolitical Implications:
Turkey’s actions in Somalia are not merely about energy; they are about asserting geopolitical influence in Africa and the Middle East. This move could destabilize the region further and undermine Western efforts to support Somalia’s development. The deal casts a shadow on Turkey’s international reputation and raises questions about its commitment to fair and equitable partnerships.
Conclusion:
Turkey’s deal with Somalia is a stark example of neo-colonial exploitation. It underscores the need for greater transparency and accountability in international resource agreements and highlights the vulnerability of weak states in the face of powerful actors pursuing their own economic and geopolitical interests.
About the Author:
Mariam Robly is an independent journalist and political analyst based out of the MENA region.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Dr. Chiu Tai-yuan Minister of Health and Welfare ROC (Taiwan)
Health is a fundamental human right and a universal value. Improved health results in greater well-being for the people and has ramifications for the survival and development of a country and even the world. At the 77th World Health Assembly, members adopted the World Health Organization (WHO) Fourteenth General Programme of Work for 2025-2028. The program includes such strategic objectives as improving health service coverage and bolstering financial protections to ensure universal health coverage. WHO has called on all countries to take action on these issues.
As concerns universal health coverage, Taiwan launched the National Health Insurance (NHI) system in 1995. The scheme, which brought together already existing occupational insurance schemes, has reached its 30th year and now covers 99.9 percent of the population. The NHI system provides equitable, accessible, and efficient healthcare to all people in Taiwan. It is also an important pillar and guarantor of Taiwan’s social stability as well as people’s health and safety. It has, moreover, become a global benchmark for achieving universal health coverage. In an annual survey carried out by Numbeo, Taiwan has been ranked first in the Health Care Index category for seven consecutive years.
The NHI operates on a pay-as-you-go, self-sustaining model capable of addressing the financial challenges posed by an aging population and rising healthcare costs. By reforming premium rates and adding additional funding sources, such as the tobacco health and welfare surcharge, the system is on a sound, sustainable footing.
To promote the health of our people, President Lai Ching-te articulated a vision of a healthy Taiwan in 2024. This aims to ensure that people are healthy, the nation is strong, and the world is more ready to embrace Taiwan. Remaining focused on people, families, and communities, we are expanding health promotion operations and preventive healthcare. Moreover, we are implementing a family physician plan, offering comprehensive care to patients with chronic diseases, and utilizing telemedicine to improve healthcare accessibility in rural areas. By promoting integrated long-term care, palliative care, and aging in place, we ensure holistic, lifelong, and dignified care for all people, realizing health equity.
In 2021, WHO released the Global Strategy on Digital Health for 2020-2025. Under this plan, the global health body is seeking the development and adoption of person-centric digital health solutions to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. It is also overseeing development of infrastructure and applications to use health data to promote health and well-being. Taiwan continues to utilize its prowess in information and communications technology to build effective, high-ROI health systems and services. The NHI cloud facilitates the more efficient exchange of medical records, while the adoption of international standards such as Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources enhances international medical data sharing. Additionally, the incorporation of AI-assisted technologies is advancing the development of smart healthcare. And the introduction of a virtual health insurance card and the My Health Bank app, which enables real-time management of personal health data, empowers people to make health-enabling choices.
In 2008, Taiwan introduced the Health Technology Assessment to facilitate evidence-based policymaking. It also accelerated the inclusion of new treatments under the NHI system. For example, in 2023, gene and cell therapies were covered for the first time, marking a new era for precision medicine and offering patients enhanced treatment options. Taiwan also continues to leverage innovative technologies to improve the working environment for the medical workforce and to bolster the overall quality of medical service.
What’s more, despite facing political challenges, Taiwan has continuously participated in international health affairs and has been dedicated to supporting the global health system. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan played a crucial role in sharing supplies, strategies, and experiences, and proved to be a reliable partner of countries worldwide. Separately, Taiwan’s success story in implementing universal health coverage offers valuable lessons for countries worldwide. As we continue to share our experiences in universal coverage, financial management, and digital health, we hope to facilitate other nations in reaching WHO’s goal of universal health coverage.
In this rapidly changing era, health challenges transcend borders, and global cooperation has become essential to addressing various health crises. However, Taiwan has been prevented from participating in WHO—the foremost global health cooperation body—due to China’s continued distortion of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and World Health Assembly Resolution 25.1. Neither of these resolutions mentions Taiwan or declares that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, these resolutions have no power to confer upon the PRC any right to represent Taiwan in WHO.
In light of this, and to uphold the core UN values of inclusiveness and universality, we urge WHO and all relevant parties to recognize Taiwan’s considerable contributions to global public health and the human right to health. It is imperative that WHO adopt a more open-minded approach and demonstrate flexibility, adhering to the principles of professionalism and inclusivity. Taiwan should be included, as a matter of pragmatism, in the World Health Assembly and all WHO meetings, activities, and mechanisms, particularly those concerned with the WHO pandemic agreement. Taiwan earnestly hopes to work with the international community to create a future of borderless healthcare that realizes the fundamental human right to health stipulated in the WHO Constitution and the vision of leaving no one behind espoused in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Hargeisa, April 20, 2025 – President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” delivered his first address to a joint session of Parliament today, offering his most detailed blueprint yet for Somaliland’s national security, economic policy, and foreign affairs agenda. In a speech that stretched nearly two hours, the President announced the formation of the Somaliland National Reserve Forces and outlined his administration’s achievements during its first 100 days in office.
The joint session, attended by members of both houses, Supreme Court justices, political party leaders, cabinet ministers, and military brass, was notably stripped of the ceremonial fanfare that characterized prior administrations. Attendees described the mood as businesslike, reflecting President Abdirahman Cirro’s emerging governance style: heavy on policy, light on theatrics.
National Reserve Forces
The establishment of the Somaliland National Reserve Forces emerged as the headline announcement of the day—a significant shift in the republic’s military doctrine. The President, however, provided no operational details, leaving open questions about the force’s size, recruitment model, and legal framework.
Global models for reserve forces present contrasting approaches: countries like Finland, Israel, and Singapore maintain mandatory reserve service following compulsory military training, while others such as the United States operate volunteer-based systems where citizens balance civilian careers with part-time military service. Which path Somaliland intends to pursue remains unclear, though security experts acknowledge that each option carries vastly different implications for cost, readiness, and public support.
This new force represents one component of a broader security reform package introduced since President Abdirahman Cirro’s administration took office. Other elements include the nationalization of clan militias, comprehensive biometric registration to eliminate “ghost soldiers” from payrolls, and enhanced Coast Guard capabilities—which the President claimed have “tripled” without specifying whether this refers to vessels, manpower, or funding allocations.
Peace in Erigavo and Vice President’s Role
The President celebrated what he characterized as one of the administration’s crowning achievements: brokering an end to a nine-year clan conflict in Erigavo that had resulted in significant bloodshed and regional instability. The complex peace agreement involved the disarmament of clan militias and their formal integration into national forces.
In a notable moment of public recognition, the President credited the success to a high-level delegation led by Vice President Mohamed Ali Aw Abdi, comprising military commanders, cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and traditional leaders. He singled out the Vice President’s diplomatic efforts for special praise, requesting the assembly to recognize him with applause—a rare display of executive collegiality in Somaliland’s often competitive political landscape.
State of the Nation and Security Reforms
President Abdirahman Cirro used substantial portions of his address to frame Somaliland as emerging from a period characterized by economic stagnation, security deterioration, and democratic paralysis driven by electoral delays and political fragmentation. His administration’s early interventions, he asserted, have stabilized the republic and established foundations for comprehensive institutional reform.
Among the security achievements highlighted was the implementation of biometric registration across the armed forces to curb payroll fraud—a long-standing challenge that has diverted defense resources from operational needs. The President also noted the introduction of direct salary payments from the treasury to service members, expanded training programs for more than 700 officers—some of whom have received specialized instruction abroad—and technological upgrades to both Immigration services and airport security protocols nationwide.
Economic Development Strategy
The President articulated a three-pronged economic strategy centered on enhancing domestic production, diversifying revenue streams, and investing in critical infrastructure. In concrete terms, he announced that Berbera’s electricity rate will drop to $0.20 per kilowatt-hour by July 2025—positioning it as the most affordable power supply in the country—and highlighted seven road construction projects designed to connect agricultural and livestock-producing regions to urban centers and port facilities.
The President reported that Lughaya port has completed its evaluation phase and is poised for commercial expansion, potentially diversifying Somaliland’s maritime trade capacity beyond Berbera. His administration has overseen the completion of 32 wells, reservoirs, and water catchment systems to address chronic water shortages in rural regions and support agricultural development.
Foreign investment has played a central role in the administration’s economic approach. The President highlighted a $20 million commitment from the Pharo Foundation and $22 million from Germany targeted toward agricultural modernization. Additionally, the World Bank has allocated $30 million for solar energy projects in Berbera and Borama, potentially transforming the energy landscape in these strategic urban centers.
Environmental and Social Programs
Environmental sustainability featured prominently in the address, with the President pledging to plant three million trees during his term—approximately 600,000 annually. He noted that 300,000 seedlings have already been planted during the National Tree Planting Day commemorated on April 15th, suggesting an institutional approach to environmental conservation in a region increasingly vulnerable to climate change impacts.
On social development, the President cited the rehabilitation of 77 health centers with particular emphasis on expanding maternal healthcare access in underserved regions. Educational reform initiatives currently underway aim to promote national identity formation, ethical development, environmental consciousness, and social inclusion. Additional programs include correctional education designed to reduce recidivism, educational scholarships for children of fallen security personnel, and modernization of civil service systems including pension reform.
Foreign Affairs: UAE, United States, and Regional Relations
The President devoted significant attention to Somaliland’s evolving diplomatic position, highlighting strengthened ties with the United Arab Emirates as a cornerstone of his foreign policy. In January 2025, he conducted a formal state visit to the UAE, holding substantive closed-door talks with Vice President Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. He returned to Dubai in February to participate in the World Government Summit, which hosted delegations from over 140 countries.
These high-level engagements, according to the President, have advanced Somaliland’s international standing while securing commitments for development assistance and investment in health infrastructure, educational institutions, water resources, and transportation networks.
The President specifically highlighted strengthened relations with the United States, noting ongoing efforts to encourage American interest in Somaliland. He also mentioned security assistance and various collaborative initiatives received from the United Kingdom, demonstrating Somaliland’s broadening international partnerships beyond regional actors.
Notably absent from the President’s remarks was any reference to the now-defunct Memorandum of Understanding signed with Ethiopia on January 1, 2024, which had granted Ethiopia access to the Port of Berbera and envisioned formal diplomatic recognition. Ethiopia has since pivoted toward engagement with Somalia through Turkish-brokered talks, prioritizing its role as a troop-contributing country to Somalia’s peacekeeping missions to maintain regional influence against growing Egyptian ambitions. This diplomatic realignment culminated in the Ankara Declaration of December 2024—an agreement emphasizing respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity—which effectively leaves Ethiopia without the coveted access to the Red Sea through Somaliland that the original MoU had promised.
The fallout from the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU triggered a pronounced deterioration in relations with Djibouti, which closed Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills—a move widely interpreted as politically motivated. Somaliland subsequently accused Djibouti of providing tacit support to separatist elements in the Awdal region.
Despite these challenges, the President emphasized that “the Government of Somaliland will strengthen the historical relationship based on good neighborliness, brotherhood, and cooperation that we have with Ethiopia and Djibouti.” He specifically announced that his administration “is planning trips that we will make to those countries,” signaling a diplomatic initiative to improve regional relationships.
Somalia Relations and Sovereignty
In his remarks, President Cirro reaffirmed Somaliland’s position on Somalia’s repeated provocations, most notably Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s unsanctioned visit to Las Anod on April 16, 2025. The visit, which included meetings with SSC-Khatumo leaders and the transfer of prisoners from Las Anod to Mogadishu for a staged display before Somalia’s media, was condemned by Somaliland as a flagrant violation of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
The President confirmed the cancellation of bilateral talks with Somalia following Barre’s visit, calling it a destabilizing move designed to undermine hard-won peace in the Sool region. The government maintained that no negotiation had occurred regarding the prisoner releases, accusing Somalia of using the incident for political theater.
Democratic Values and Parliamentary Oversight
The President concluded his address by reaffirming his administration’s commitment to democratic governance, institutional integrity, and constitutional order. He emphasized the centrality of rule of law and national unity to Somaliland’s development trajectory and acknowledged Parliament’s essential oversight function in ensuring accountable governance.
While government-aligned lawmakers responded to the address with expressions of support, opposition representatives raised substantive concerns regarding the lack of specificity on legislative timelines, budgetary transparency, and the constitutional procedures required for implementing the sweeping initiatives announced in the speech. They particularly emphasized the constitutional requirement for parliamentary approval of major security and financial commitments, including the establishment of the National Reserve Forces.
As Somaliland navigates this critical period of institutional development, the relationship between executive vision and legislative oversight will likely define the practical implementation of the ambitious agenda outlined in the President’s landmark address.
I cautioned: “If a new tribal state infringing on Somaliland sovereignty is created with the support of Somalia, this will be a point of no return for Somaliland and Somalia talks.”
This week, those very warnings became reality.
Somalia’s Prime Minister’s recent visit to Las Anod marked a blatant violation of Somaliland’s territorial integrity—a move Somaliland’s government rightly deemed as both provocative and a departure from the path of efforts towards stability. Las Anod has long been a contested area between SSC and Somaliland, and this latest escalation only exacerbates the conflict.
The timing of the visit revealed a calculated strategy. While Somalia’s PM stirred tensions in Las Anod, Somalia’s Ambassador to the US, Dahir Hassan, brazenly announced on X: “Proud to announce Somalia is officially open for oil drilling. SSC Khatumo is now recognized as a Federal Member State…” He went on to pinpoint the Nugaal Valley Basin as the drilling site, underscoring a poorly coordinated yet deliberate attempt to escalate the conflict Somalia is waging on Somaliland’s territories. At the time of writing this article, clashes are unfolding in the rural areas near Erigavo, Somaliland. This fresh offensive by SSC militias further underscores the ongoing, highly volatile nature of this conflict, which continues to be actively fuelled by Somalia.
Somalia’s aggressive posturing is also a desperate smokescreen, distracting from its own dire situation. The country grapples with a looming threat from violent extremists, a reality underlined by the recent overrun of Aden Yabal military base, the largest military base outside Mogadishu. The attack forced Somalia’s Army Chief and other senior officials to flee the military camp, laying bare the fragility of Somalia’s security infrastructure.
Strategic towns such as Yaasoman and Aboorey, along with regions like the Shabelle Valley and Hiraan, are under siege— all the way to Afgooye.This raises questions about Somalia’s ability to counter Al-Shabaab’s relentless advance into the capital city Mogadishu.
At this critical juncture, concerns among Somalia’s citizens about the nation’s trajectory are growing louder. While some blame the security failures on the lack of political progress, others point to the absence of a coherent security policy as the root cause. It almost feels like a futile attempt to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Could Hassan Sheikh Mohamud be Somalia’s final president? Is the international community in Mogadishu prepared with contingency plans on how to get out as quick as possible? The global fallout could be catastrophic if images of kidnapped or murdered embassy personnel from Mogadishu begin circulating on screens worldwide.
While Somalia battles conflicts on multiple fronts, it is astonishing that it can still divert aid funding to actively provoke conflict with Somaliland. One thing is certain: the region is approaching a breaking point. This reality highlights one of the international community’s most glaring failures—its persistent refusal to recognize Somaliland’s rightful sovereignty. A nation acknowledged long before many other African states gained independence, but which continuous to be overlooked. Yet an even greater indictment lies in the international community’s neglect of Somaliland, while at the same time they are funnelling billions into Somalia, how unfortunate then, that Somalia consistently demonstrated an unparalleled ability to squander resources through corruption and cede territory to violent extremism.
Under the leadership of the Kulmiye Party and former President Bihi, Somaliland achieved remarkable strides in advancing its global recognition. The signing of the MOU with Ethiopia marked a pivotal moment, creating undeniable momentum for Somaliland’s sovereignty. In response, Somalia’s president embarked on a desperate world tour, urging nations to renew support for the ‘One Somalia’ policy—a concept akin to a black hole, consuming everything while giving nothing in return.
It is important to emphasize that Somalilanders deeply oppose Al-Shabaab and everything it represents, this is precisely why the group has never gained a foothold in Somaliland. Our traditions of fostering peace and democracy in the region stand as a testament to our values. While Somalilanders’ greatest wish is to live in harmony with Somalia, as we will always remain neighbours, let there be no doubt: Somalilanders are unwavering in their readiness to defend their land and their people.
What’s next?
The international community plays a crucial role in preventing the war Somalia is waging on Somaliland, from escalating into a broader regional crisis. If aid funding to Somalia is misused to ignite and sustain conflicts in Somaliland – a pattern for which evidence already exists. Somaliland is justified in seeking international legal counsel against any external actors found responsible for fuelling such conflicts.
Considering these concerns, I strongly urge Somaliland’s government to demand the following measures from the international community moving forward:
Aid allocated to Somalia must, under no circumstances, be utilized to wage conflicts, whether directly or indirectly, that undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.
Shortly, before the appointment of the Chiefs of the Somaliland National Army and the Police forces. The newly elected president of Abdirahman Abdullahi Irro has paid a visit and inspected the headquarters of Somaliland’s various security institutions and promised several reforms and initiatives intending to improve the Somaliland Security Apparatus’ overall quality and efficiency. To this effect, the president has established a ministerial committee, including the ministries of Defense, the Interior, the director of the national intelligence agency, and the national security advisor among others, to reform and modernize Somaliland’s national forces[1]. Fulfilling his campaign promise, President Abdirahman Irro has issued a presidential decree for increasing the salaries of the national security forces by 50% per year, making it a 250% raise during his five-year tenure at the office, the biggest salary raise of the security forces ever[2]. The president has ordered the biometric registration of all security forces personnel and their proper registration to eliminate ghost soldiers. During his visit to the National Military headquarters, the president of Somaliland promised the army under his term would establish the air forces of the national army, if succeeded, this would be the first time that the military would have an air service since their formation in 1994, although the army have to yet establish a navy force. The president in his inspection of the army headquarters mentioned the development of the first national security strategy in the country [3].
The reform and the modernization of Somaliland security forces, including the national army, are coming at a time when the country has seen a series of security challenges and witnessed, the violent conflict in Las Anod; the provisional capital city of Sool region, the inauguration of rival administration in the country, the formation of the clan militias groups like the Sool, Sanaag, Buhodle (SSB) and G36 that stems from the army’s performance in Las Anod and the perceived sense of insecurity by the communities. The 2018 formation of militia by Arre, then a general of Somaliland national army forces has underlined the problems that the national army forces are confronting. It exposed the lack of professionalism of the officer corps of the military and its involvement in politics. For decades, although the institution has only recently in 2023, seen the passing of the Somaliland National Military Act by the country’s parliament, to define the proper role of the national army and enhance the development of norms, rules, and procedures, that are expected to contribute to improving the professionalism of the military. The national army has been grappling with challenges of professionalism, organizational development, and the regularization of entry, promotion, and retirement procedures of the army services.
The particulars of these reforms and their targeted outcomes remain a fact to be seen yet. These initiatives and reform calls are steps in the right direction, but the need for their rigors and areas of priority cannot be stressed enough. This article will essentially focus on, the Somaliland National Army forces. It will particularly emphasize the aspects that the proposed reforms and expected initiatives to enhance the army forces’ efficiencies ought to highlight. Considering the foundational responsibility of this institution for state survival and the preeminent role of these responsibilities, it is incumbent on the new administration of Abdirahman Irro and the new government to put forward a comprehensive plan to reform and modernize the Somaliland army with the long-term aims of laying the ground foundation for the development of a force that fit the purpose. To avoid a haphazard reform the government should priorities the issues that are pressing and distinguish from areas that can wait later by being realistic, practical, and focusing on what is urgent.
The Areas for The National Army Reform
From their establishment on 2 February 1994, with the first two regiments that were drawn out of the civilian and clan milia disarmament and reintegration process during the late President Mohammed H. Ibrahim Egal’s administration, and the remanent of Somali military officers; in which some of them belong to Somali National Movement fighters, that fought against Siad Barre regime. Ever since their formation, the Somaliland National Army forces have played an instrumental role in solidifying Somaliland’s control of its territory particularly in the peripheries where government presence was not as effective as it was in the center. Until May 1997, with the move of the 17th regiment of the national army from Darer-Wayne military school to their new post in Oog town the Somaliland National Army forces particularly in eastern regions, their presences were confined to Buroa, the capital city of the Togdheer region and the country’s second capital. These have paved the way for consolidating Somaliland’s state authority in the rest of the country, it saw the establishment of Somaliland authority in localities like Yagoori, Waa-dhako, Sama-kaab, Adhi-cadeye, Af-madow, Fiqi fuliye, and Yube of the Togdher, Sanaag, and Sool regions, among other places. Somaliland National Army has aided the national police forces and other security apparatus when needed in upholding law and order in the country and was deployed in various clan and communal conflicts, it was mobilized to participate in securing the overall security of the elections, as the last year’s elections in Somaliland elucidates.
Organizationally, the national army has formed divisions in all of the country’s provinces. With the inception of the first division of 31st based on Hargeisa, it has expanded to the rest of the country. The army has set out two commands; the Eastern command based in Burao, and the Western command located in Borama in Awdal region. The education and training of its officers and recruits have seen expansion and growth. Despite the quality of the curriculums and the contents of its education. Assuming the helm of the training division, Major General Ismail Shaqalle, after the formation of the Somaliland National Army has inaugurated the three military training schools of the Sheikh, Darer-Wayne, and Goroyo-awl military schools[4], with the purpose of training and disciplining of the new forces. Later four more schools, including the only military college of Abdullahi Askar, which was constituted on September 14, 2013, were added, making the total of the military schools of the Somaliland National Army Forces seven[5]. The national army forces have yet to have the complete institutions of professional military education including staff and command colleges and war and defense universities[6]. The absence of such institutions hampers the force’s professionalization and limits it is education and learning.
War and violence are human features, that can be deterred by preparedness and improve the margins of success in the event of it is occurrence through a lifetime dedication to learning and experience. It is a profession like law or medicine. Light, mobile, and joint units are the direction that military organizations are heading underpinned by it is sutibility of the nature of threats they tackling. As a patient or client will not trust his case by an untrained lawyer, so should an institution be trusted with the responsibility of state’s military security policy for an institution that does not have the capability and required skills to discharge this task?
According to the seminal work of The State and the Soldier, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has remarked that the modern national military officers and their institution have the three primary responsibilities of representation, advisory, and execution. This organ, which is subordinate to the civilian statesmen that are in charge of state affairs has the functional responsibility of representing this institution on matters that relate to resource allocations, they also provide advice from their military vantage point on the matters that concern the area of the military and share the president the military options of the policy issues that the administration is contemplating and their suitability considering the capability of the army to fulfill it and lastly they execute orders once the statesmen decree it[7]. The current state of affairs of the army following it is pushback from Las Anod and their performance, which subsequently saw the formation of clan militias, the pervasive use of social media platforms by the army members; that compromise army positions and make it vulnerable for easy identifications, and other cases that predate those episodes, include the military’s former officers that involved the establishment of militia like general Aare in 2018 and the arrest and trial of colonel Doolal in which the during Muse Bihi’s administration was accused to have contact with Somalia and sentenced in two-year prison by military court in 2021, though the president have pardoned him shortly. Those issues have underscored the army’s extent of political involvement and its ill-preparedness to discharge its military responsibility. The army is an institution with the essential duty to defend the state’s existence from internal and external threats including other armies. It is an institution that is in charge of managing violence.
Somaliland National Army forces have come a long way with meager resources and institutional constraints and have a long journey to go to become forces that fit the purpose of it is duties. Taking into consideration the magnitude of the challenges that Somaliland National Army forces are confronting, this reform proposal could not have come any better time. The education of the officer corps of the army must be given a particular place. It can start by creating strong civil-military relations, developing the professionalism of the military troops and allocating the necessary resources for these matters, and subordinating of military to civilians and statesmen who are representative of the state. This organ serves the leadership of the organization and the connecting tissues that link the civilian statesmen and the ranks, and the files of the army. The investment of their educations will instill in the army an ethos of military professionalism and discipline. The new administration can focus its reforms on education that emphasizes the essential skills of military science, history, and the art of war, strategy, tactics, and operations which are the prerequisites for the development of the skills that are paramount for the military profession. Where it is possible it should include foreign languages, with particular attention being given to the ones that are widely spoken in the region.
The Somaliland National Army forces have for decades grappled with the challenges that relate to force entry, promotion, and retirement. The proposals for reforms must tackle these problems. Emphasis must be placed on the recruitment and enlisting of officers who possess the necessary skills. Currently, literacy and formal education are not requirements for entry into the services, an understandable situation considering the institution’s formation after the Somali state collapse and Somaliland’s unilateral withdrawal of Somali unity and it is reclamation of sovereignty. The situation has changed, and the army needs to adjust and reflect. Making a concerted effort to attract a pool of talented skills that can contribute to the effectiveness of the institution. The reforms should target strengthening and regularizing the promotion of officers. Since the introduction of the ranks in 2013, officer promotion has been an area that needs further development, the Abdullahi Askar military college, shortly instituted after the introduction of ranks with the mandate for evaluating the quality of the officers should be empowered, placing more emphasis on merit, service time and exams as the basis for promotion. Retirement and pension system is another dimension the reform initiatives must focus on, the Somaliland National Army Act was adopted in 2023, and its implementation will be a good start. The reforms should overhaul the army’s entry, recruitment, promotion, and retirement procedures. The introduction of the age limit of the army service is paramount for injecting new blood into the army equipped with important skills and pensioning officers who are no longer capable of serving in the army and therefore retired.
Somaliland’s military is also operating in a volatile security landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea arena. The return of great power competitions between the United States and China, in which the latter started engaging with Somaliland on security matters and eyeing to have a military installation in Somaliland’s Berbera city[8], Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan that puts on the radar of China, which draws to Somaliland into broader US and China competitions situates Somaliland in a very security complex environment. The improvement of the army’s officer corps overall education is necessary for mitigating the potential security risks that Somaliland faces. The threats of the terrorist militant groups and the persistent problems of terrorism, which in decades have proven resilient and potent are aspects that call for close cooperation with other states and constant investment in know-how and training of the armed forces to deal swiftly if needed. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group of Al–Shabab that is active in the region poses a threat to Somaliland as have been proved by their attack of 2008. The growing security role of Gulf monarchies, Türkiye, and other extra-regional powers in the Horn of Africa’s security and defense matters as far as national military security is concerned requires attention. The Türkiye’s security and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia, which promised the development, training, and equipping Somalia’s navy capability, and the growing Egyptian role in Somalia’s security and defense field and the former’s military agreement with Somalia are potential concerns for Somaliland’s security considering Somalia’s claim of Somaliland as part of it.
In conclusion, the reforms should prioritize the areas of professionalism of the military and their education, regularization of the recruitment, promotion, and retirement, and development of the necessary skills for the initiation of mitigation strategies for managing the adverse effects of the Horn of Africa security developments. The meager resource limitations and the vast areas for reform and improvement precipitate that the government must be selective in it is reform, guided by the long-term objectives of having a force that fits its mission. It is prudent that reforms should be realistic, and tailored to the force’s needs and what is possible in this conjunction. For decades, Somaliland has enjoyed close cooperation with neighboring states like Ethiopia; many leaders of the army have acquired advanced military training in command, staff, and war colleges of Ethiopia, Djibouti which units of Somaliland security have gone for training, and the new ties that Somaliland has established with Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates with the promise to contribute to the army’s capability needs to materialize and strengthened. The development of the Red Sea arena, the growing interests of many states in this area, and their involvement in the matters of the Red Sea arena call for attention. The potential negative effects this entails also make the national army reform initiatives a call at the right moment. The army and the modernization efforts need to make strives to acquire essential knowledge to develop the necessary mitigating strategies to lessen its advent effects that concern military security.
Sacad Muhumed is a researcher specializing in critical security studies, focusing on governance and security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. He holds an MA from Addis Ababa University and is pursuing a second master’s degree at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.
The government of Somaliland has officially withdrawn from all talks with Somalia, following Somalia Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s unauthorized visit to Las Anod last week. The Council of Ministers, meeting in emergency session in Hargeisa today, condemned Barre’s April 12-15 visit as “a direct violation of international law and Somaliland’s territorial integrity.“
“Somalia has clearly departed from the path of peaceful coexistence and dialogue,” the statement declared, characterizing the Prime Minister’s visit as “political intimidation and conflict incitement that directly threatens stability in the Horn of Africa.”
After regaining its independence from the brutal Siad Barre dictatorship that massacred over 200,000 of its citizens and reduced its major cities to rubble, Somaliland withdrew from its union with Somalia in May 1991 — a decision that effectively reversed an unratified merger and restored Somaliland to its original status as a sovereign nation. Prior to voluntarily joining with Italian Somalia in 1960, Somaliland had existed as the independent State of Somaliland, recognized by 35 countries including permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The subsequent three decades have seen Somaliland build a functioning democratic state while Somalia collapsed into prolonged civil war and territorial fragmentation. This fundamental reality—two distinct nations with separate colonial histories that briefly attempted an ill-fated political union—has been deliberately obscured by Somalia in its diplomatic messaging, where it persistently mischaracterizes Somaliland as a “breakaway region” rather than a sovereign state that briefly joined and then withdrew from a failed political merger.
Today’s decision to withdraw from talks marks the culmination of what many observers have long considered a diplomatic charade. After more than a decade of intermittent and ultimately fruitless negotiations, Somaliland has concluded that Somalia has been using the dialogue process not as a path to resolution but as a tactic to forestall Somaliland’s international recognition.
“Somalia has strategically exploited these talks to blunt Somaliland’s quest for international recognition,” explained a senior diplomatic source speaking on condition of anonymity. “By presenting itself to the world as engaged in dialogue, Mogadishu has effectively convinced international partners to withhold recognition of Somaliland pending an ‘internal’ Somali resolution that Somalia has no intention of ever reaching.”
The architect of the original dialogue format during the Silanyo administration, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, has been criticized for allowing a process that effectively reduced “Somaliland’s international standing from an aspiring sovereign state to essentially a federal member of Somalia” in international perception.
Barre’s visit to Las Anod represents the most flagrant violation yet in Somalia’s campaign to undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty. During his visit, Barre met with individuals Somalia refers to as the “SSC-Khatumo Administration,” a move that directly challenges Somaliland’s territorial claims. According to an official communique from the Prime Minister’s office, Barre conducted meetings with Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-ali (Firdhiye) and various local leaders, framing his visit as an effort to promote “peace and national unity.” Somaliland authorities view this as a calculated political maneuver designed to legitimize an entity Somalia unilaterally recognized in October 2023 following military confrontations in the region.
A particularly contentious element of Barre’s visit involves prisoners transported to Mogadishu during his stay in Las Anood. Eyewitnesses reported these individuals being dressed in Somalia flag-branded tracksuits and paraded before media cameras as they were marched onto a plane bound for Mogadishu – a choreographed display clearly designed for political propaganda rather than humanitarian concerns.
Somaliland prisoners being transferred to Mogadishu from Las Anod at the request of the Somali Prime Minister following his visit to Las Anod, Sool.
The Council of Ministers’ statement explicitly rejects Somalia’s characterization of these individuals, stating: “The prisoners that Somalia’s Prime Minister took to Mogadishu are not prisoners of war. Somaliland views this action as an attempt to cover up the political failures facing Somalia’s government.”
The statement further clarifies that “no negotiations with Somalia have taken place regarding prisoner releases.” Instead, Somaliland has been engaged in proper diplomatic channels with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several international partners including the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates regarding prisoner exchanges through internationally recognized protocols.
This unilateral action has created a significant diplomatic quandary for Mogadishu, which now finds itself in the untenable position of having to address the status of individuals effectively removed from Somaliland territory without any legal framework or international oversight.
Somalia’s provocative actions in Las Anod represent a marked escalation in its campaign against Somaliland’s sovereignty, coming in the wake of the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia. That historic agreement, which would have granted Ethiopia access to a naval base and sea access in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland, triggered an immediate and hostile response from Mogadishu.
Since the announcement of the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement, Somalia has systematically intensified its destabilization efforts across multiple fronts—diplomatic, economic, and now territorial. The prisoner transfer stunt exemplifies the increasingly theatrical nature of Somalia’s attempts to reassert authority over territory it has not effectively controlled in more than three decades.
“Somalia’s willingness to manipulate humanitarian issues for political theater demonstrates how threatened Mogadishu feels by Somaliland’s growing international engagement,” noted a regional analyst who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.
Despite withdrawing from talks with Somalia, Somaliland’s government reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to peace in the eastern Sool region. The statement references the comprehensive peace initiative announced during President Abdirahman Irro’s inauguration on December 12, 2024, declaring: “The government of Somaliland, based on its peace plan for Eastern Sool, had previously announced a peace initiative on December 12, 2024, when the President took office.”
The Council of Ministers emphasized that “Somaliland reaffirms that peace remains its top priority, while also emphasizing that the defense of Somaliland’s nationhood is non-negotiable.” This stance reflects Somaliland’s consistent governance approach throughout its three decades of restored independence: maintaining firm boundaries regarding sovereignty while pursuing peaceful resolutions to regional conflicts through dialogue and reconciliation.
Somaliland has issued a formal appeal to global partners to “urgently respond to Somalia’s violations in Eastern Sool” and to support efforts to restore peace to the region. The statement warns that “Somalia’s planned offensive against Somaliland endangers stability in the Horn of Africa and provides opportunities for extremist groups and terrorists, posing a significant threat to peace and development across the entire region.”
Given Somalia’s persistent inability to control substantial portions of its claimed territory and its ongoing struggle to contain the Al-Shabaab insurgency, the government’s provocative actions in Las Anod appear particularly reckless, potentially creating security vacuums that could be exploited by terrorist organizations that already operate with near impunity across large swaths of Somalia proper.
The Council of Ministers concluded with a definitive statement: “Due to Somalia’s continuous violations against the Republic of Somaliland and the principles of previous dialogues between the two countries, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Somaliland has decided to withdraw from the ongoing talks with Somalia, effective today, April 16, 2025.”
For the full government statement and ongoing coverage, follow the Somaliland Chronicle.
Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s recent visit to Las Anod represents a calculated provocation against the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty rather than legitimate diplomatic or piece-building engagement. This unprecedented incursion—the first by a sitting Somali Prime Minister into territory within Somaliland’s internationally recognized colonial borders—reveals Mogadishu’s increasingly desperate strategy after failing to reclaim territory through conventional means. With Somalia’s government facing financial collapse and security deterioration, Barre’s flag-waving expedition emerges as political misdirection: “Look at our authority in Las Anod,” the performance suggests, “and perhaps you’ll forget we can’t secure our own capital.”
The Incoherence of Somalia’s “Throw Everything at the Wall” Approach
Somalia’s Las Anod gambit exposes a fundamentally contradictory approach to Somaliland that borders on political schizophrenia. For years, Somalia has maintained the fiction that Somaliland is represented in its federal institutions through hand-picked “Somaliland” parliamentarians in Mogadishu—a cornerstone of Somalia’s constitutional claim that Somaliland remains an integral federal member.
Yet dangling Federal Member State status to SSC-Khatumo fundamentally undermines this narrative. If Somaliland is already represented in Somalia’s federal structure, what exactly is Somalia offering Las Anod? Are we witnessing a government so confused about its own constitutional framework that it doesn’t realize it’s contradicting itself? Or is this a cynical ploy to maintain multiple, mutually exclusive claims depending on which audience it’s addressing?
Most telling is that these very “Somaliland” MPs in Mogadishu have now issued a statement condemning Barre’s visit—a remarkable spectacle of Somalia’s puppet representatives rejecting their puppetmaster’s actions. How does Mogadishu explain this theatrical absurdity to its international backers?
The conspicuous absence of Somalia’s own Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks from the entire Las Anod affair speaks volumes. This diplomatic position, created ostensibly to facilitate reconciliation and dialogue with Somaliland, has been completely sidelined during what Somalia characterizes internationally as a peace-building visit. Instead, Somalia deployed its Prime Minister, much of the cabinet, and an unusually large security contingent—a military-political operation that bypassed the very diplomatic channel allegedly established for Somaliland engagement.
These parallel and contradictory approaches reveal a government desperately throwing anything at the wall to see what might stick—a haphazard collection of mutually exclusive initiatives unified only by their anti-Somaliland orientation.
Political Theater on Borrowed Money
Barre’s ceremonial activities centered around inaugurating a National Identification Registration Agency office and breaking ground on infrastructure projects that Somalia lacks both the means and capacity to complete. The ceremony featuring SSC-Khatumo figurehead Cabdulqaadir Firdhiye receiving the first Somali National ID was transparently symbolic—a plastic card representing phantom citizenship from a state that struggles to provide basic security across its claimed territory.
One must wonder: Is there anything more emblematic of Somalia’s approach than distributing ID cards for a nation-state that exists more in fantasy than reality? When Somalia can’t deliver basic services to neighborhoods of Mogadishu, what value does a Somali national ID carry in Las Anod? It’s the governance equivalent of a child placing a “KEEP OUT” sign on a treehouse they neither built nor own.
The promised hospitals, vocational centers, and government complexes require resources that Somalia simply does not possess. These aren’t development initiatives but territorial markers—flags planted in contested soil without the backing of actual governance capacity. Somalia’s officials are essentially playing a real-world version of the board game Risk, placing plastic game pieces on territories without the means to defend or develop them.
The Dragon’s Footprint: China’s Role in Somalia’s Financial Crisis
Increasingly credible allegations suggest that China may have financed Barre’s provocative Las Anod visit—transforming this regional incursion into a proxy for wider geopolitical competition. China’s growing frustration with Somaliland, particularly following Somaliland’s deepening ties with Taiwan, has reportedly escalated to direct threats against Hargeisa.
The context becomes clearer in light of recent developments reported by The New York Times, which detailed Somaliland’s strategic alignment with the United States and Taiwan, particularly through its offer to host a U.S. military base in Berbera. This strategic port represents exactly the kind of regional influence China seeks to counter, especially given its own military base in neighboring Djibouti.
Somalia’s desperate financial reality makes it particularly susceptible to such foreign influence operations. Official data from ForeignAssistance.gov reveals U.S. aid to Somalia plummeting from $850 million in 2024 to a mere $180 million in 2025—a financial cliff that leaves Somalia’s institutions teetering on the edge of collapse. This dramatic reduction in American support has created a vacuum that actors like China appear eager to exploit.
The FMS Carrot: Empty Promises to SSC-Khatumo
What Somalia offers SSC-Khatumo isn’t development but the mirage of recognition as a Federal Member State—a status deliberately kept just out of reach. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has mastered this political balancing act, providing enough encouragement to keep SSC-Khatumo aligned against Somaliland without committing to formal recognition that would require actual resource allocation.
The invitation to Firdhiye to participate in the National Consultation Forum exemplifies this strategy—visibility without substantive authority. This isn’t state-building; it’s conflict outsourcing. For the price of ceremonial recognition and vague promises, Somalia gains a proxy force engaged in undermining Somaliland’s territorial integrity without committing its own limited military resources.
How long will SSC-Khatumo leaders allow themselves to be used as pawns in Somalia’s territorial chess game? At what point do they recognize that the promised FMS status is like a carrot dangled before a donkey—always visible, never attainable, but effective at keeping the animal moving in the desired direction?
The Fragile Alliance: Las Anod’s Reaction to Mogadishu’s Doublespeak
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s attempt to characterize Barre’s Las Anod visit as a reconciliation effort has backfired, exposing the fragility of Somalia’s alliance with SSC-Khatumo factions. A prominent Garaad in Las Anod publicly condemned Mohamoud’s characterization as a betrayal of the Prime Minister’s actual mission, creating the unusual spectacle of Somalia’s proxy allies openly challenging Somalia’s own diplomatic narrative.
This rupture reveals Somalia’s contradictory messaging: one narrative for international consumption (reconciliation) and another for proxy allies (territorial reclamation). When these messages collide, the result is an alliance fracture exposing the fundamental incoherence of Somalia’s strategy.
Misplaced Priorities: Focusing on Las Anod While Al-Shabaab Encircles Mogadishu
The most revealing aspect of Barre’s visit is Somalia’s strategic priorities. While Al-Shabaab demonstrates operational capacity within striking distance of Mogadishu itself, Somalia’s leadership expends precious political capital on symbolic gestures in a city far from the existential threats facing the state.
This reveals a government more concerned with performative sovereignty than practical security. The National Consultation Forum further illustrates this selective approach: Firdhiye receives an invitation while the President of Jubaland is excluded and Puntland contests the process. This isn’t comprehensive national reconciliation but the cultivation of allies useful for specific territorial aims.
Shouldn’t a government facing terrorist control of significant portions of its claimed territory focus on securing those areas first? What does it say about Somalia’s governance priorities that it would rather plant flags in contested border regions than secure its own capital’s perimeter? One must ask: Is this a serious national government or a theatrical troupe performing sovereignty while actual governance remains beyond its grasp?
Somaliland’s Institutional Response: Strong Words, But Is It Enough?
Somaliland’s response came swiftly and decisively. On April 11, 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement characterizing the planned visit as a “blatant violation of Somaliland’s sovereignty” and “a serious threat to regional peace and stability.” The following day, Somaliland’s House of Representatives convened an extraordinary session that produced a unanimous resolution suspending all dialogue with Somalia.
The Parliament’s resolution methodically invoked Somaliland’s historical timeline—from its independence from Great Britain on June 26, 1960, through its voluntary union with Somalia in July 1960, to its reclamation of independence on May 18, 1991—reinforcing the legal basis for its sovereignty claims.
But is this enough? How many times will Somaliland issue strongly worded statements and temporarily suspend dialogue only to return to the negotiating table months later? At what point does Somaliland recognize that Somalia’s actions constitute a pattern of deliberate provocation rather than isolated incidents? When will Somaliland’s leadership abandon its perpetual hope that Somalia can be dealt with as a “brotherly” nation and acknowledge the existential threat Somalia’s territorial ambitions represent?
Somalia’s Phantom Gifts: The Diplomatic Squatter in Berbera
Somalia’s territorial overreach reached new heights when President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud offered the United States military access to Berbera’s strategic port and airport—facilities that Somalia has not controlled since 1991. This bizarre spectacle of a diplomatic squatter offering foreign powers access to another country’s infrastructure reveals Mogadishu’s increasingly desperate calculations.
The sheer audacity of this move deserves appreciation for its comedic value if nothing else—it’s the geopolitical equivalent of your neighbor inviting guests to tour your living room. “Please, come in! Don’t mind that we haven’t lived here for three decades. The furniture isn’t ours, we don’t have keys to the front door, and the actual residents might object, but please consider yourself invited!”
It demonstrates Somalia’s recognition that Berbera’s facilities represent strategic assets of genuine international interest—assets beyond their reach. It also suggests a calculated gambit to create a false narrative wherein any U.S. engagement with Somaliland could be framed as occurring with Somalia’s “permission”—the same tactic Somalia played when it failed to stop DP World from developing Berbera port years ago.
Security analysts describe this as classic “sovereignty theater”—making grand claims over territories to establish paper rights that can later be leveraged in international forums. It’s governance by assertion: if you claim something loudly enough and often enough, perhaps someone will eventually believe you.
Diplomatic Doublespeak at Antalya
President Mohamoud’s characterization of Barre’s Las Anod visit at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum further demonstrates Somalia’s commitment to parallel realities. Speaking before an international audience, Mohamoud described the visit as “aimed at fostering unity and understanding” and promoting “reconciliation”—a description bearing no resemblance to the actual events.
While Mohamoud called for “continued engagement with Somaliland leaders to resolve differences through constructive dialogue,” Barre’s activities directly undermined any foundation for such dialogue. The cognitive dissonance is striking: one cannot simultaneously respect a dialogue partner while actively challenging their fundamental sovereignty.
This is diplomacy as practiced by Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” In Somalia’s diplomatic dictionary, “reconciliation” apparently means unilateral territorial incursions, and “dialogue” means talking while simultaneously undermining your counterpart’s very existence.
Strategic Analysis: A Regime Running Out of Options
Barre’s Las Anod visit represents a significant escalation in Somalia’s approach to undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somalia’s increasingly desperate maneuvers—from phantom infrastructure promises to offering facilities it doesn’t control—reflect a weakening position rather than growing strength.
The critical strategic question now facing Somaliland isn’t whether Somalia will follow through on its Las Anod promises—both history and fiscal reality answer that question definitively. The real question is whether Somaliland’s leadership will respond by doubling down on failed dialogue or pursuing a more assertive strategy for international recognition based on its three-decade record of stability, democratic governance, and territorial control.
Will Somaliland finally recognize that Somalia’s actions reveal not a partner in dialogue but an existential threat to Somaliland’s very existence? How many more provocations will it take before Somaliland abandons its naive hope for brotherly reconciliation and pursues a more realistic approach to securing its sovereignty?
Time to Abandon the Somalia Fiction Before Mogadishu Becomes Kabul 2.0
Somalia’s Las Anod gambit ultimately reveals more about Mogadishu’s weaknesses than its strengths. Like the kicks of a dying horse, these desperate territorial assertions may be dangerous in the short term but signal a regime running out of both options and time.
The international community can no longer afford the luxury of diplomatic fiction. The pretense that Somalia and Somaliland are equal parties in a potential reunification dialogue has moved beyond wishful thinking into the realm of dangerous delusion. Thirty-three years of separate development have produced two fundamentally different entities: one a functioning democracy with established institutions and territorial control, the other a fragile state dependent on foreign forces for basic security functions.
What happens when—not if—Mogadishu follows Kabul’s trajectory? When Al-Shabaab eventually overwhelms Somalia’s paper-thin security apparatus, will the international community once again evacuate their embassies in panic only to relocate to Hargeisa while bizarrely maintaining they still represent “Somalia”? Will diplomats flee to the safety of Somaliland’s streets while continuing to deny its existence? The absurdity of such a scenario seems lost on international policymakers who continue treating the stable, functioning democracy as equivalent to its collapsing neighbor.
Western powers must make a choice: continue propping up the sovereignty theater in Mogadishu while ignoring the democratic reality in Hargeisa, or embrace a pragmatic approach that rewards stability, democratic governance, and regional security cooperation. The current approach—financing Somalia’s territorial ambitions while ignoring Somaliland’s democratic achievements—has produced neither peace nor development.
It’s time for a new paradigm that acknowledges realities on the ground rather than colonial-era borders on maps. Somaliland’s case for recognition stands on its own merits—three decades of peace, democratic transitions, and institutional development in a region where such achievements remain rare. The international community must ask itself: If not Somaliland, then who? If not now, then when?
The Las Anod provocation should serve as a wake-up call. Somalia’s territorial claims have evolved from diplomatic irritants into active threats to regional stability. The fiction of dialogue between fundamentally unequal parties has been exposed as the empty performance it always was. The time has come for the international community to abandon diplomatic pretense and embrace diplomatic reality—recognizing Somaliland as the independent state it has been since 1991, before they’re forced to acknowledge it from the safety of its territory while fleeing a Mogadishu in flames.
The Republic of Somaliland, a sovereign and democratic state that gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, remains unrecognised by the international community. Yet despite its diplomatic limbo—stemming from a void and unratified union with Somalia—Somaliland continues to attract serious interest from global players. Every 2 years or so, international observers monitor its elections to ensure fairness—something Somalia has failed to achieve in decades. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has invested over $442 million in redeveloping the Port of Berbera, transforming it into a rising trade hub. Other countries—including Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Ethiopia—have established varying levels of engagement with Hargeisa.
In stark contrast, the United States has remained largely absent, despite rising geopolitical stakes in the Horn of Africa. With the return of the Trump administration, there is an opportunity to move beyond the failed “single Somalia” policy long championed by figures such as Hillary Clinton and Ilhan Omar.
According to insider reports, the Biden administration even blocked a proposed military cooperation agreement between Somaliland and Taiwan. Such a position has not only undermined stability in the Horn but also side-lined Somaliland’s democratic credentials and geostrategic value.
The Case for Naval Access: Why Somaliland Matters Now
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are fast becoming chokepoints of chaos. Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have surged, causing maritime insurance premiums and freight costs to skyrocket—some by over 300%. Vessels are now rerouting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to delivery times and billions in extra fuel and logistics costs. In early 2024, the Suez Canal saw a 50% drop in trade volume, threatening global supply chains and economic recovery.
Djibouti is already overstretched—hosting seven foreign military bases, including those of the United States, China, and France. Meanwhile, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline offers the next logical site for a network of naval logistics and surveillance bases. Unlike Somalia, which remains plagued by insecurity, Somaliland offers stability, democratic governance, and a deep-water port with room to expand.
For nations whose trade depends on secure Red Sea shipping routes, the need for viable alternatives is no longer theoretical—it’s urgent. The goal isn’t necessarily to wage war against the Houthis, but to fill the growing power vacuum in these waters—one that is consistently exploited by non-state actors such as the Houthis, Somalia piracy, and terrorist organisations.
Hypocrisy at Sea: Double Standards in Media
While Djibouti’s foreign naval presence is praised as prudent statecraft, Somaliland’s similar aspirations are met with condescension and bias. In January 2024, Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would grant Ethiopia naval access via Berbera—a move some media labelled “coercive” or “neo-colonial.”
This is hypocrisy at best.
Berbera has long held geostrategic value, coveted by global powers for its proximity to key shipping routes. It is no more “coercive” than Djibouti leasing land to China or France. No one calls for China’s expulsion from Djibouti on the basis of its ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Uyghurs, for example. The criticism is not rooted in principle—it’s rooted in politics.
A Global Line-Up: Who Will Step Up?
Somaliland is not short on potential partners. With global shipping routes under threat and maritime logistics capacity in high demand, Hargeisa is uniquely positioned to host new regional and international partnerships. Key candidates include:
Taiwan: With one of the world’s top 15 navies and over 40 warships, Taiwan could share training, weapons systems, and maritime intelligence in exchange for a strategic foothold on the Red Sea. Taiwan, already a diplomatic leader with Somaliland, is best placed to act first. Taiwan’s military presence in Somaliland should be seen as diplomatic security partnership, not a full-scale military base like China’s base in Djibouti. It strengthens Somaliland’s partnership, fosters regional ties, and aligns with Taiwan’s broader strategic interests without shifting focus from its primary defence at home. With such a balanced security architecture, Taiwan will not divert resources or focus from defending its territories across the Taiwan Strait.
Ethiopia: Landlocked and home to over 120 million people, Ethiopia has already signed an MoU for port access—a vital step for its trade and military mobility. A robust African partner in the Gulf enhances regional balance and strengthens defence ties.
Indonesia: With a navy of over 200 vessels and 10% of its trade affected by Red Sea disruptions, Jakarta offers a moderate Muslim partner eager to balance power in the Indo-Pacific.
United States: Although late to the game, Washington still has a chance to counter rising BRICS influence by supporting a democratic, strategically located partner. Recognising Somaliland could reset its credibility in the Horn.
Australia: With over $80 billion in trade passing through the Suez and Red Sea, and a recent quiet exit from Operation Prosperity Guardian, Canberra has a golden opportunity to reassert its regional leadership by backing Somaliland.
India: After conducting over 100 anti-piracy missions since 2008, New Delhi would benefit immensely from a logistics base in eastern Somaliland—strengthening its western maritime arc.
United Kingdom: Spending $100 million annually on base operations in Qatar, Britain could cut costs and gain better strategic reach by shifting to Berbera. The 1990s are over—there’s no war in Iraq or Afghanistan to justify outdated posturing.
Greece: With 40% of its trade moving through the Red Sea and a top-20 navy, Athens could fill the void left by Turkey’s Somalia-focused policy and bolster its role in maritime security.
South Korea: With $200 billion in trade with Europe and expanding commercial interests across Africa, Seoul would find both strategic and economic sense in a Somaliland partnership.
The Red Sea Can’t Wait
As shipping lanes turn into battlegrounds and global supply chains unravel, Somaliland offers something rare in the region: predictability. With stable governance, peaceful elections, and geographic centrality, it is more than just a strategic opportunity—it’s a ready-made solution.
The real question is: who will act first?
For Taiwan and other like-minded nations, the time to engage isn’t some future date—it’s now. There’s no need to wait for the United States to lead or for Trump to officially recognise Somaliland. The opportunity already exists—because Trump, unlike Biden, is unlikely to block Somaliland’s rise.
In a world fractured by war, tariffs, and protectionist politics—from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific—the safeguarding of international maritime routes could be the issue that unites instead of divides. Here lies Somaliland: a rare chance to rebuild trust, foster cooperation, and address a shared global challenge head-on.
About the Author:
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
