The GAO Report on 1988 Atrocity in Somaliland: A Crucial Knowledge for the Young to Know & Reminder to the Elders

May 7, 2024

This interim report focuses on some of the consequences of the conflict in Somalia: specifically, the causes for the flight of refugees from Somalia, the extent of destruction that occurred in Hargeisa, the use of US. assistance during the conflict, and the role of the UNHCR in distributing U.S. assistance and its reaction to the arming of Ogadeni refugees. In addition, we attempted to determine under what conditions the Somali refugees would return to their homes. We will address all of the objectives of the review in a later report.

In Somalia, we met with U.S. government officials, high-level current and former Somali ministry officials, and informed Somalis to discuss the situation in Somalia. We interviewed staff of UNHCR, the World Food Program, the National Refugee Commission, and private voluntary organizations. We also visited Mogadishu and the military facilities at Berbera and toured Hargeisa to assess the extent of destruction.

In Ethiopia, we interviewed 60 refugees residing at all five refugee camps of Hartashiek, Harshin, Daror, Rabasso, and Kam Abokar. These camps are located along the Ethiopia-Somalia border. At each camp we interviewed approximately 12 randomly selected heads of household in hour-long sessions. Forty-two of the respondents were former residents of Hargeisa, 16 were residents of Burao, and 2 were residents of Shiekh (a village 40 miles northwest of Burao). In addition, at each of the camps we held discussions with UNHCR expatriates and Ethiopian staff, refugee committee officials, and bilateral donor and private voluntary organization relief workers.

Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards between September 1988 and March 1989.

May 4,1989

We are examining the US. role in assisting Somalia in light of recent reports of increased human rights violations in the northern part of the country. As part of our review, we visited Somalia and Ethiopia between February 25 and March 10, 1989.

In this report we focus on the causes for the flight of Isaak refugees to Ethiopia and the conditions for their return to Somalia, the extent of destruction that occurred in the northern city of Hargeisa, the use of U.S. assistance during the conflict, and the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for efugees (UNHCR) in distributing U.S. assistance and its reaction to the arming of Ogadeni refugees.’ In addition, we have provided information on the Somali government’s response to the conflict.

The Ogaden a territory m Ethiopia to which Somalia has made irredentist claims. It IS populated largely by ethnic Somalis During the 1977-78 Ogaden War, Ethiopm retook the Ogaden. and Somalia became the host to over 800,000 refugees who fled the territory Over the years. voluntary repatriation has reduced the refugee population by more than half. This group of people as referred to as Ogadeni refugees throughout the report.

Background:

Somalia is strategically located on the east coast of Africa and, along with Ethiopia and Djibouti, is often referred to as the Horn of Africa. Since a 1969 coup, President Siyad Barre has ruled Somalia with the strong support of the military. Those viewed as opponents of the government have been subjected to arrest and imprisonment and on occasion to torture and execution, In the mid-1980% the State Department and various human rights groups reported increased human rights abuses by the Somali government against civilians, particularly the civilian population in the north.

For years, the more affluent and independent Isaak clan (the largest clan in northern Somalia) has been the target of a wide range of abuses by the government, due in part to its support for the anti-regime Somali National Movement (S&M). The abuses have ranged from imprisonment and detainment without charge or trial to summary executions of suspected SNM members and sympathizers. Many civilians were forced to make payments to gain their release from jail.

In late May 1988, the SNM, in retaliation against the government for these abuses, launched attacks on government officials in the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burao. The Somali army reportedly responded to the SNM attacks in May 1988 with extreme force, inflicting heavy civilian casualties and damage to Hargeisa and Burao. As a result, 350,000 Isaaks fled to Ethiopia, and others fled to neighboring countries and other parts of Somalia. Also during the conflict, Ogadenis fought against the SNM alongside the Somali army. Some Ogadeni refugees, who were settled in camps on Isaak land after their unsuccessful attempt to reclaim the Ogaden desert in 1978, were armed. thereby becoming party to the conflict and ineligible for continued international assistance under U.N. rules

Results in Brief

Of the Isaak refugees we interviewed in Ethiopia, a majority said that their homes had been destroyed and family members killed by government forces during the conflict between May and June 1988. It is not likely that the Isaak refugees will return until they are confident it is safe to do so. Most of those we interviewed indicated that the military would have to be removed from northern Somalia before the area would be secure.
Most of Hargeisa, the second largest city in Somalia, was destroyed or damaged during the conflict from artillery and aerial shelling. Basic infrastructure, such as electricity and water, is still inoperable. Although the Somali government has not begun repairs in the cities, government officials are actively soliciting donors for reconstruction assistance
A shipment of U.S. arms and ammunition, which had been authorized more than 18 months prior to the conflict, arrived in late June 1988 and was used by the government during the conflict. The shipment, valued at about $1.4 million, was distributed to Somali troops in the northern region.
Following the outbreak of fighting in May 1988, the UNHCR was unable to restore monitoring over the distribution of food commodities. The NHCR has continued to distribute food aid, albeit with reduced frequency and quantities, to all refugee camps in the north even though, in July 1988. UKHCR and others noted that some of the Ogadeni refugees were armed. UNHCR halted food deliveries to Ogadeni refugees for a short period, preceding an agreement with the government of Somalia to resolve the armed Ogadeni refugee situation. In February 1989, the UNHCR reached an agreement with the Somali government on disarming the refugees and began the process of relocating the Ogadeni refugees from the conflict area.

Prelude to the Conflict

The refugees from northern Somalia that we interviewed in Ethiopia recounted stories of harassment by the army-looting, jailing, beating, and rape-dating back to 1982. While the refugees could not point to specific events that led to a government crackdown on the Isaak community, the majority of the refugees interviewed furnished detailed accounts of abuses that they or their immediate families had experienced at the hands of the Somali army. Many of the Isaak refugees we interviewed who had worked as merchants or professionals and were therefore more prosperous than other Somalis said that they were frequent victims of human rights abuses. Many of them said that the Somali army had jailed them and that beatings of the men and rape of the women were common occurrences. Families of the detainees were forced to pay for their release. In none of these cases had the army brought charges against the detainees. Merchants complained that soldiers helped themselves to their shops’ wares and cash. Confiscation of goats, sheep, and other domestic livestock was also a common occurrence.

Many of the Isaak refugees we interviewed also mentioned the radicalization of the student community around 1984 and the brutal response of the army to students’ periodic demonstrations. According to the refugees, government harassment intensified in 1986, reaching its apex in 1987 when the army instituted a dusk-to-dawn curfew.

Conclusion of Peace Accord with Ethiopia

On April 3, 1988, the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia concluded a peace accord that resulted in, among other things, troops being withdrawn from the borders, cessation of assistance for each other’s rebels, prisoners of war exchanged, and diplomatic relations resumed. The peace accord was designed to ease relations between Somalia and Ethiopia and promote economic development by redirecting resources. Some observers believe it exacerbated the conflict. With peace between the countries, the Isaak community saw little hope of removing Ogadeni refugees from its territory. Furthermore, the demilitarization of the borders enabled the SKM to infiltrate Somalia unimpeded.

Somali National Movement

The SNM, which had its base of operations in Ethiopia, started fighting against the government’s mistreatment of the Isaak community in the early 1980s. However, the SNM’S political agenda remains unclear. Some observers believe that the SNM wants increased autonomy for the northern Isaak clan; others believe that it simply wants President Siyad Barre out of power.

None of the Isaak refugees we interviewed said that they had direct contact with the SNM prior to the fighting in 1988, and only a few actually knew SNM members. Many of the refugees from Burao knew of SNM attacks on military outposts but generally were not aware of its activities. These refugees stated, however, that the army’s response to these attacks was one of swift and brutal retribution against the entire Isaak community. The Burao refugees stated that the government shut off utilities, randomly beat Isaak clansmen, and jailed and sometimes executed those who the army believed to be SNM members or who were suspected of supporting the SNM.

The Conflict

The SNM launched armed attacks in northern Somalia in late May 1988, assassinating government officials and suspected opponents. The SNM had control of the northern town of Burao until Somali forces retook it on May 30 and forced the SNM to evacuate the city. The SNM attacked Hargeisa on May 31, which it controlled until July 13 when the Somali military recaptured the city. A map in appendix I shows the locations of these towns, the Ogadeni refugee camps in Somalia, and the Isaak refugee camps in Ethiopia.

Also during this period, the SNM attacked several Ogadeni refugee camps, which forced the inhabitants of one refugee camp to flee farther north. For more than 10 years, the Isaaks and Ogadeni refugees have been competing for the same scarce agricultural and grazing land. During this period, the government has not reached a durable solution to the Ogadeni refugee situation, such as repatriating the refugees to Ethiopia or settling them permanently. The presence of armed Ogadeni refugees on the Isaaks’ land has added to the tension in the region.

During the relatively short period of conventional warfare (May 27 to July 13), the S&M succeeded in attracting a significant number of supporters and sympathizers, making it more difficult for the government to retake Hargeisa. Although the Somali army used its regular forces during the conflict, a bulk of the fighting force consisted of Ogadenis. The Somali military resorted to using artillery and aerial shelling in heavily populated urban centers in its effort to retake Burao and Hargeisa. A majority of the refugees we interviewed stated that their homes were destroyed by shelling despite the absence of SKM combatants from their neighborhoods. They also reported that Somali aircraft bombed several settlements inside Ethiopia, south of Harshin, in mid July.

The refugees stated that they were caught by surprise by the scope and intensity of the fighting in both Hargeisa and Burao. Although a majority of them stated that SNM forces were never in their neighborhoods during the battle, those refugees who saw SNM forces in their neighborhoods during the fighting supported the SNM combatants with food, water. and shelter.

The refugees told similar stories of bombings, strafings, and artillery shelling in both cities and, in Burao, the use of armored tanks. The majority saw their houses either damaged or destroyed by the shelling. Many reported seeing members of their families killed in the barrage. A few of the refugees were quite specific in their recollections; they mentioned that the military aircraft would start shelling at 8 a.m. and stop at 5 p.m.

Flight to Ethiopia

The Isaak refugees began evacuating the cities of Hargeisa and Burao by the end of the first week of fighting (early June), and it appears that the evacuation was completed by the end of the month. UNHCR estimates the refugee population at 350,000. The refugees reported remaining in Hargeisa and Burao until the last possible moment and then fleeing in a panic with only those possessions they could carry on their backs. The refugees gathered by the thousands on the outskirts of the cities, assembling their families and relatives. A number of the refugees we interviewed indicated that, while gathering their families and deciding what course to follow, they were strafed by Somali military aircraft.

Breaking into smaller groups of 300 to 500 the refugees began a 10- to 40-day trek to Ethiopia. Shortly after they reached the outskirts of the cities, the refugee columns were stopped by the Somali army, which had formed a ring around the cities. Refugees reported that at military checkpoints and ambushes, they were robbed and men suspected of being SNM members were summarily executed. The refugees from Hargeisa and Burao said they walked by night and hid by day to avoid aircraft strafing, carrying what remained of their belongings with them.

The Fighting Continues

The SNM has prevented stabilization of the northern region as fighting continues. Transportation through the region is risky and is usually accomplished in convoys with the assistance of armed escorts. The Somali army has retained effective control of Hargeisa and Burao, while the SNM operates freely throughout the countryside.

The SNM has continued its attacks on Ogadeni refugees. During our visit to Somalia in early March 1989, 11 Ogadeni refugees (5 men, 3 women, 3 children) were killed and 16 were wounded during an SNM attack on a truck carrying Ogadeni refugees. We were told that incidents of this type were characteristic of an emerging SNM pattern of terrorizing the Ogadeni refugees to force their removal from traditional Isaak territory.

Conditions in Hargeisa

Hargeisa, the second largest city in Somalia, has suffered extensive damage from artillery and aerial shelling. The most extensive damage appeared to be in the residential areas where the concentration of civilians was highest, in the marketplace, and in public buildings in the downtown area. During a tour of the city, we noted that whole sections of residential areas were still full of rubble and debris. The U.S.

Embassy estimated that 70 percent of the city has been damaged or destroyed. Our rough visual inspection confirms this estimate. Much of Hargeisa appears to be a “ghost town,” and many homes and buildings are virtually empty. Extensive looting has taken place even though the military has controlled the city since late July 1988. We were told that private property was taken from homes by the military in Hargeisa. Homes are devoid of doors, window frames, appliances, clothes, and furniture. The looting has resulted in the opening of what are called “Hargeisa markets” throughout the region, including Mogadishu and Ethiopia, where former residents have spotted their possessions. One observer remarked that Hargeisa is being dismantled piece by piece. We were told that long lines of trucks heavily laden with Hargeisa goods could be seen leaving the city, heading south towards Mogadishu after the heavy fighting had stopped.

The Governor of Hargeisa estimates the present population to be around 70,000, down from a pre-conflict population figure of 370,000. However, the current residents of Hargeisa are not believed to be the former Isaak residents. Observers believe that Hargeisa is now composed largely of dependents of the military, which has a substantial, visible presence in Hargeisa, a significant number of Ogadeni refugees, and squatters who are using the properties of those who fled.

Presently, Hargeisa is without electricity and a functioning water system. The water system’s pumping station (installed and operated by the Chinese) is out of commission. Spare parts are nonexistent, and the Chinese refuse to send technicians due to the insecure environment still existing in Hargeisa and its surroundings. One of the Chinese crew members was killed during the fighting.

There are no indications that the Somali government has taken any steps to restore services or to clean the city of debris. However, Somali government officials are actively soliciting multilateral and bilateral donors for reconstruction assistance.

US Assistance Provided During the Conflict

Starting in August 1988, the U.S. government responded to the emergency with $1.9 million in disaster assistance to help the victims of the conflict. This assistance included $1 million for a field hospital unit and $350,000 for food for displaced persons and refugees. In March 1989, the Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance approved an additional $630,000 for 10 tanker trucks to supplement Hargeisa’s water supply system.

As part of the administration’s ongoing military assistance program, $1.4 million worth of small arms and ammunition was provided to the government of Somalia during the height of the conflict. Since July 1988, the administration has voluntarily limited the military assistance program to nonlethal items, including spare parts for previously supplied weapons.

US-Donated Hospital Unit

The most expensive item of emergency assistance was the $1 million disaster hospital unit, which was set up in Berbera. The hospital unit was donated from the Defense Department’s Humanitarian Affairs Office to assist the victims of the conflict. The government of Somalia provided the building, and the Defense Department provided the medicines, medical equipment, cots, linens, and basic hospital supplies. The hospital is located in Berbera because it was considered a secure area to which supplies and patients could be quickly transported, if necessary. More serious injuries are treated at Somalia’s main hospital in Mogadishu. During our visit to the hospital, we noted that the hospital was providing assistance to military personnel, Ogadeni refugees, and local townspeople.

Emergency Relief Assistance

In addition to the hospital, other U.S. support included plastic sheeting, blankets, vegetable oil, wheat, and sugar for displaced persons and, Ogadeni refugees. All of this assistance is distributed through the Somali government and is intended for the displaced population in Somalia. Detailed information about displaced persons who are to receive this assistance, such as location and estimated population, was unavailable. U.S. Embassy officials estimated that 10,000 former residents of Hargeisa and Burao now live in northwest Somalia. Another large population of displaced persons is believed to be living with relatives throughout Somalia. As indicated earlier, approximately 350,000 Isaaks are currently residing in refugee camps inside Ethiopia

Lethal Assistance

Lethal U.S. military assistance consisting of 1,200 Ml6 automatic rifles and 2 million rounds of Ml6 ammunition, plus 300,000 rounds of 30 caliber and 500,000 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition, valued at about $1.4 million, was shipped on June 9, 1988, with approval of the Departments of State and Defense, to the Somali army under the Foreign Military Sales program. The shipment, initially authorized in November 1986, was repeatedly delayed due to the reluctance of carriers to transport small quantities of low-density ammunition to Somalia. It finally arrived on June 28 at the port of Berbera and was used by the government at a critical point in the conflict. From Berbera. the city of Hargeisa is typically less than a 3-hour trip by car. The fighting was heaviest in this relatively small area. During this period, the Somali government supplied arms to an undetermined number of refugees to fight the SNM insurgents in the north. A senior Somali military official confirmed that the U.S. equipment was distributed to troops in the north and was used during the conflict.

UN Response to the Emergency

The UNHCR assistance program in northwest Somalia was seriously disrupted following the outbreak of the conflict. When the fighting broke out in late May, the UNHCR initially halted deliveries of food in northern Somalia but resumed them on a reduced scale by the end of June. The United States contributes about 40 percent of the food aid through the World Food Program, which is distributed by the UNHCR. U.S. assistance amounted to about $18 million in 1988. The fighting caused severe damage to UKHCR’S operation. Trucks, trailers, commodities, office equipment, and buildings worth about $10 million were destroyed or confiscated by the Somali military and the SNM.

UNHCR continued food shipments based on humanitarian concerns. However, the UNHCR was unable to effectively monitor the distribution of commodities largely due to the security situation in the north. Officials in charge of food distribution and other observers stated that some food was misappropriated by Ogadeni refugees and diverted by the Somali military. In addition, as a result of the reduced number of trucks available for deliveries, some food spoiled at the Berbera port.

Armed Ogadeni Ruled Ineligible Assistance Refugees for

**Map Showing Ogadeni Refugee Camps in Somalia and Isaak Refugee Camps in Ethiopia**

A triangle section encompassing Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao formed the area where the heaviest concentration of fighting occurred. Within this area and to the northwest, the UNHCR managed 14 Ogadeni refugee camps. In July 1988, UNHCR and others noticed that some of the refugees at six of the 14 refugee camps in Somalia were carrying arms. The six-armed refugee camps are Gallikar, Bihm. Adi Addeys, Daam, Sabad, and Arabsiyo. The government of Somalia told the UNHCR that the refugees were armed for their own protection. While acknowledging that Ogadeni refugees and refugee camps had been attacked by the SNM and lives had been lost, the UNHCR believed that the Ogadeni refugees had become a party to the conflict and thus were ineligible to receive international humanitarian assistance.

UN and Somali Government Agreement

On October 5, 1988, and again on December 23, 1988, the UNHCR wrote the government of Somalia to express serious concerns about the lack of monitoring over the use of humanitarian assistance and about the arming of the refugees. Considering UKHCR’S strictly humanitarian and nonpolitical mandate, the High Commissioner noted that in these circumstances it could continue to assist only those refugees who had not taken part in the conflict. (UNHCR estimated that population to be 140,000.) For humanitarian reasons, however, relief assistance continued at the original planning levels of 370,000 refugees, albeit with reduced quantities and frequency, until an agreement could be reached between the Somali government and UNHCR. It was not until February 23, 1989, after the UNHCR had halted deliveries of food assistance in northern Somalia, that the government of Somalia and the UNHCR reached an agreement in principle to resolve the armed Ogadeni refugee situation. The government of Somalia and the UHCR agreed to:

Remove refugees from the six-armed camps to locations in Borama in northwest Somalia,
Require the Somali government to disarm the Ogadeni refugees of weapons acquired during the disturbance, and
Re-register them in the northwest camps. UKHCR agreed to resume food deliveries to all camps for a period of 3 months.

The agreement also mentioned that emphasis would be placed on voluntary repatriation.

In March 1989, the process of re-registering and removing the refugees from the conflict zone began. Plans were underway to move refugees from two of the six camps near Berbera to an existing camp, Darbi Hor, located near Borama. The population of Darbi Hor is estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000, which is considerably less than its full capacity of 36,000. Merging the refugee settlements should be possible, since the total camp population to be moved is estimated to be around 12,000.

The United Nations will not likely provide assistance to help rebuild the cities in the north until:

The security conditions are adequate for international representatives to monitor the program and
A screening process is established to certify that the persons living in these cities are former residents.

A rebuilding program without resettlement controls could result in former residents being replaced by people in the area who have been friendly to the government during the conflict and could hinder the return of former residents.

Isaak Refugee Repatriation Unlikely

The Issak refugees we interviewed in Ethiopia expressed a clear reluctance to return to Somalia in the near future. The majority indicated that a precondition for their return would be the removal of the army from northern Somalia. A smaller number of respondents stated that they would accept SKM assurances that it was safe to return. Most refugees expressed their willingness to stay in the camps, despite the harsh conditions, for the indefinite future. Indeed, many of the refugees expect to remain in Ethiopia for several years. The refugees exhibited alarm when questioned about returning home; fear remains the single largest factor in their decision to stay.

We saw no evidence that any repatriation had started. All the respondents indicated that they knew of no one who had returned to Burao or Hargeisa. Both the UNHCR and Ethiopian staff confirmed that repatriation had not begun. The only movement to northern Somalia, apart from SNM members returning from visiting relatives in the camps and smugglers, was from women trying to retrieve belongings left behind.

We also noticed that the camps were virtually devoid of young men, especially Daror, Rabasso, and Kam Abokar. Many of the respondents indicated that most of the men had returned to Somalia to join the SNM in the fight. The interviewees also indicated that a majority of the young men immediately took up arms with the SNM when the refugees were assembling outside of Hargeisa and Burao for the trek to Ethiopia. The SNM is very popular among the camp population. The respondents stated that they trust the SKM. It appears that most of the information within the camps on the status of the war originates with the SNM and works its way through “the grapevine.” When asked if government assurances of safety and gestures of goodwill (such as cross-border food or water deliveries) would convince the Isaak population that it is safe to return, the universal response was incredulity. The refugees emphasized that

President Siyad Barre could not be trusted and that any cosmetic steps at rapprochement were meaningless in light of the trauma they had endured.

Somali Government’s Response to the Conflict

During meetings with high level Somali officials, the U.S. Ambassador has continually urged the government to undertake political reforms and seek reconciliation in the north. At the time of our visit, the Somali government had announced several measures that it planned to take in this regard; however, only limited steps had been taken toward reconciliation. As of March 1989, the Somali government had provided amnesty to those involved in the northern conflict and had released some 300 of an

estimated 1,000 political prisoners.’ Of the released prisoners, many were among the most prominent, as identified by some members of Congress and the National Academy of Sciences. The other prisoners. however, have not yet been affected by the President’s amnesty.

In August 1988, the President appointed a committee to investigate the problems in the northern region, probe its causes, and find peaceful solutions. In December 1988, the committee released its report, which recommended, among other things, that the government undertake a major, organized, and concerted reconstruction program for the war torn north with the help of friendly donors; allow regions and localities a greater voice and role in local government; release from detention all persons arrested with or without formal charges in connection with the northern insurgency; and restore constitutional guarantees against arbitrary arrest and unlimited detention by state security forces.

On March 6, 1989, the government announced the formation of a three-person committee, composed of government officials, to deal with the problems in the northern region. This includes rehabilitating the destroyed properties “caused by the bandits,” restoring security and stability, revitalizing livestock export, and opening a dialogue with intellectuals, elders, and religious leaders in these areas at an opportune moment. The committee has implied powers, including authority over army commanders in the region. Some observers have criticized the committee’s membership as being too closely aligned with the government. In addition, implementing these measures will likely be a slow process.

National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 20548 United States.

Guest Article

Somaliland: Retreating From the Edge

Editor II

May 2, 2024

Somaliland’s move towards violence has reached the level of a political crisis. Indeed, a successful electoral record has not resulted in resilient formal institutions that can mediate inter-party disputes.

Somaliland is facing consequential party and presidential elections in 2024. While past elections have been hailed both locally and internationally as a cornerstone of the country’s nascent democracy, a recent dispute over the timing of elections and concerns over the possibility of political violence threaten Somaliland’s much-heralded stability.

This commentary sets out to examine the recent political crisis in Somaliland, which gradually transitioned from political disagreements over elections to episodes of political violence that have called into question Somaliland’sstability. The political violence is underpinned by the gradual erosion of consensus-based solutions to political disputes among the ruling elite. In the place of this consensual approach, new informal political norms have emerged as a legacy of the contentious 2017 presidential polls that have further entrenched the political deadlock.

As the third wave of democratisation was sweeping through the African continent in the 1990s, Somaliland quietly pursued a multiparty system embedded in local context and culture. The evolution and the subsequent development of Somaliland political parties were a way of preventing clan and regional division. However, they were less the embrace of new principles than a novel expression of traditional clan identity. The country has held nine elections (three presidential, two parliamentary and four local council elections), solidifying the democratic gains and fostering the public participation of citizens, civil society and political actors. The ruling party, Kulmiye, is facing a strong challenge from two opposition parties: Wadani and Ucid.

The dispute centres around the term extension granted to Somaliland’s president, Musa Bihi, and the need for an electoral roadmap that is acceptable to all political stakeholders. Under the country’s constitution, Somaliland’s three political parties are required to renew their licence every 10 years; the licences of the three current political parties expired in December 2022 and a number of political associations will compete in a popular vote to replace these parties. The opposition parties see the replacement of political parties as an attempt by the government to weaken their position prior to the presidential elections, especially since some of the registered political associations draw their supporters from the same constituencies as the opposition parties. The government, on the other hand, has adopted the language of the rule of law to solidify its position, arguing that the opening of political associations will give the people a chance to choose their political parties.

Eroding the political culture of consensus

The recent electoral crisis reflects both continuity and change in Somaliland’s electoral politics. The democratic process in Somaliland has always been plagued by delays that have incited controversy after controversy, something which is in part an inevitable part of the democratic learning process. The fact that since Somaliland’s democratic transition each president has afforded himself a term extension has transformed this measure, which typically should be reserved for exceptional situations, into an informal norm. (This is, in fact, a sentiment pro-government people share to justify the two-year extension the Guurti has given President Bihi.) Somaliland’s first democratically elected president, Dahir Rayale, added two years to his 2008 term limit, with his successor, Ahmed Silanyo, granting himself the same license in 2015. Indeed, all told, there have been 29 delays in the local council, parliamentary and presidential elections since Somaliland adopted party politics in 2002.

In the first two instances, political volatility increased, but a negotiated consensus among the political stakeholders was eventually reached, which avoided further escalation. However, over time, electoral disputes have become increasingly controversial and partisan as the stakes are raised, pushing opposition politicians to adopt a zero-sum game approach to oppose the incumbent’s clinging onto power, in some instances by resisting these decisions violently.

For its part, the government has increased its dominance over the other branches of government. For instance, the country’s presidential system gives the executive significant powers to appoint key figures, such as members of the judicial commission, and to override certain decisions made by parliament. Somaliland’s House of Elders (or Guurti), which, as a legislative body, has the power to sanction term extensions, has used this power to its advantage, trading presidential extensions for protection against limits to their own terms in office. This close relationship has often resulted in the Guurti extending presidential terms at the expense of the opposition parties. Most recently, on 1 October 2022, the House of Elders extended President Bihi’s term for two years, overruling the announcement by the National Electoral Commission (NEC), which had called for elections to be held within nine months.

Despite Somaliland’s successful electoral record, past experience has not resulted in resilient formal institutions that can mediate inter-party disputes. Laws stipulating the formation and recognition of political associations, and the processes for selecting the Guurti and NEC, have not yet been adopted. This has resulted in the inability of state institutions, particularly the judiciary, to adjudicate and resolve electoral disputes. Instead, disputes have been solved by pragmatic, consensus-based means whereby parties concede their positions for the sake of maintaining stability and democratic order, often mediated by traditional elders and independent politicians. These processes have continued with the support of international partners, who have provided funding for voter registration and other technical aspects of conducting elections.

The 2017 presidential elections: Unhealed wounds

Somaliland’s electoral system combines clan identity politics and party politics, with elections revolving around an intricate interplay of clan calculations, alliances, and political grievances. During the most recent presidential elections, held on 13 November 2017, both the ruling party Kulmiye and the main opposition party Waddani departed from the more moderate, flexible and subtle politics of clan that had defined previous eras, instead instrumentalizing tribal sentiment in ways that were highly divisive and polarizing. For example, with the two main parties split along a rough opposition between their core supporters in the Somaliland’ clan landscape of the enormous one, both presidential candidates chose to exacerbate and harden these clan divisions through divisive rhetoric that revived memories of previous bouts of inter-clan conflict in the 1990s. For the core clan of the opposition, this election came to symbolize an attempt to solidify the political and economic exclusion that had led to violent conflicts in the past.

Following polls that were largely peaceful, Waddani rejected the results announced by the NEC over allegations of electoral fraud and manipulation, even as the third, more marginal party, UCID, accepted them. While Waddani’s opposition leader would later accept the results “for the country’s sake’’, this challenge to the integrity of the voting process would have far-reaching repercussions.The first signs of disquiet came in the immediate aftermath of the elections, where the controversy over the outcome resulted in protests in the capital, Hargeisa, as well as in the country’s second-largest city, Burao. Later, in August 2018, a group of army officers based in Somaliland’s eastern Sanaag region mutinied against the Bihi government on the grounds of a perceived lack of equality and justice in governmental power-sharing arrangements, as well as accusations that the 2017 elections had been rigged. The rebellion, led by the mercurial Colonel Caare, ended in January 2020 after clan elders intervened and brokered a deal between defecting forces and the government.

In Somaliland, elections do not end with the announcement of a winner – political contest carries over into the leader’s selection of his cabinet. In fact, for most of its history as a state, both the victors and the defeated negotiate an inclusive cabinet that represents all clan constituencies of the country. In July 2018, opposition constituencies of Ciro’s base, angered by newly elected President Bihi’s breach of these informal procedures, met in the Ga’an Libah mountains where they set out a list of grievances and established a clan committee to pursue their resolution. The committee later played a significant role in mobilizing clan opposition against the government. As will be discussed below, sentiments of exclusion were also shared by the clans in other regions, with violent consequences.

The 2017 election has haunted Bihi’s presidency ever since. He spent the bulk of his time in office firefighting various disputes, from disagreements over the subsequent electoral roadmap to political polarization of clan relations. This has paved the way for the decline of consensus-based politics in Somaliland, and increased recourse to political violence.

Limits of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms

The recent electoral disputes demonstrate the limitations of consensus-based politics in Somaliland. For, when political ends are not achieved through consensus-based channels, there is no legal or bureaucratic mechanism of appeal to fall back on, and political violence becomes the only recourse. As state power has increased as a result of state development, Somaliland’s rulers have increasingly strayed from the path of dialogue and repeatedly used excessive force, resulting in the opposition taking a hard stance on all issues of contention.

This failure of consensus and move towards violence has currently reached the level of a political crisis, which has been compounded by several factors. First, thanks to an accumulation of inter-party disagreements, the tumultuous relationship between the government and the opposition has reached a point of no return, with each party viewing the other with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, the actors who used to drive the consensus-based settlements in the past (traditional elders and business leaders) have proven unsuccessful in brokering an agreement, with the government calling into question their very authority.Furthermore, the election dispute has increasingly become an existential issue for political elites. In the current dispute between the government and opposition parties, the former is apprehensive about facing a powerful opposition during elections, particularly after the latter won decisively in the 2021 parliamentary elections. For the opposition parties, there is concern that the government might use the legal and legislative instruments it controls to weaken or disqualify them.

While there has been sporadic violence related to elections in Somaliland in the past, what Somaliland has faced in the past few years is unique in its scale. For example, in August 2022, after stakeholder-wide negotiations over elections broke down, protests erupted in cities across Somaliland. The government’s response to these protests, which involved the excessive use of force to dismantle the gatherings and which led to the death of six people, prompted criticism from both opposition politicians and international and local human rights groups.In response, in July 2023, members of the Garhajis clan, who were disproportionately targeted by the government’s heavy-handed interventions, formed a militia in the Ga’an Libah mountains and demanded the resignation of the incumbent president. When the president chose to deal with this mobilization by use of force rather than negotiation, tensions only escalated, with an ambush by the clan militia on Somaliland police forces leading to dozens of police deaths, an act of violence of unprecedented proportions.

These violent clashes have fed an increasing cycle of contest, victim-hood and retribution, which is exacerbated by several factors. While the deployment of the police force at moments of political crisis has been used by successive Somaliland administrations, under Bihi’s leadership, the highly polarized environment makes it harder to cool down tensions through mediation, as each act is fed into an increasingly existential narrative of competition. This has all been exacerbated by the proliferation of social media throughout the society, with widely shared images and narratives triggering extreme responses from all sides.

For Somaliland, holding democratic elections and demonstrating viability as a self-governing entity are vital elements in the country’s quest for international recognition. This helps explain why political stakeholders continue to appeal to international legitimacy and engagement, even as internal challenges become more intractable. Somaliland’s successive elections since 2002 have been regularly monitored and often funded by governments such as the United Kingdom and the United States, and also by the European Union, granting them disproportionate legitimacy in a region where the holding of elections is not a given. Using the leverage provided to the governance, security and humanitarian sectors, international partners have at times exerted influence over the political process by pressing parties to come together to defuse tensions.

More recently, however, politicians and analysts have warned of increased disengagement among Western partners in terms of diplomatic mediation and project funding, caused by dissatisfaction with recurrent election delays, regular political deadlock and the increase in political violence. The recent conflict in the eastern region of Las Anod, where the Somaliland military has fought against a minority clan-based separatist movement, has been especially damaging to the government’s reputation. Following the assassination of a local Somaliland politician (a routine occurrence orchestrated in Las Anod targeting Somaliland government officials and local politicians), protests demanding justice for the murder spiraled into clan mobilization and conflict when the police inflicted casualties while dispersing crowds in December 2022. While, on the hand, this disengagement serves to voice concerns over the direction in which Somaliland is headed, at the same time, the absence of substantial Western-funded projects means international partners have less leverage to push parties towards consensus.

The new electoral roadmap: a potential opening of hope?

President Bihi’s August 2022 decision to extend his term not only created inter-party division, it also left the entire social fabric paralyzed and fragmented and bleeding into the Somaliland army’s morale and cohesion – although this was not evident at the time. The ramifications of this lack of cohesion became clear on 25 August last year when the clan militias that the Somaliland army had been fighting in the eastern region of Las Anod took advantage of the country’s internal strife to launch an offensive, expanding territorial control and declaring the formation of a breakaway state. This challenge to Somaliland’s territorial integrity served as a wake-up call to Somaliland’s political elite, leading to resounding calls to defuse the political and inter-clan crisis between the government and the core base of opposition.

A group of clan elders not associated with either rival camp organized themselves into a mediation committee and then engaged with the stakeholders to resolve their political differences. This resulted in several recommendations related to both the electoral timeline and the demobilization of the Ga’an Libah militia that were eventually accepted by most stakeholders. According to the recommendations, presidential elections will be held in November 2024 and new political associations other than Somaliland’s three official parties will be afforded the opportunity to compete to replace their established counterparts. This is contrary to the political roadmap put forward by the NEC, which stipulated that these two elements would occur separately. This solution, endorsed by the president and passed by the parliament, puts an end to one of the most controversial and divisive political disputes in Somaliland’s history.

Moving forward, political actors – particularly the government and political parties – should work together in implementing the technical steps required by the political process, while also taking into account the concerns of those constituencies that feel marginalized by the existing political settlement, such as the western minority region of Awdal. It is the right time for international partners to put their weight behind the new agreement and seize the moment to support civil society and political actors in holding peaceful and fair elections.

Somalilanders have placed their hope in this new political agreement as a means of putting their country back on the right track. The stakes could not be higher, as its success seems to be the last hope in demonstrating that the peaceful means by which Somalilanders have long conducted their politics still have influence, legitimacy and efficacy. If the arrangement fails, it could send a message to other disgruntled political actors that the use of political violence remains the only means by which to achieve the desired political outcomes.

Other reforms will also be needed. An overhaul of the Upper House or Guurti is long overdue to both replace the current members and further refine the legal regime governing its roles and responsibilities to focus more on core strengths such as working with traditional authorities in peace and security, and less on heavily politicized issues such as term extensions. It will also involve developing relevant electoral laws that are less ambiguous, and developing mechanisms for strengthening civil society and parliament to better keep the executive’s powers in check.

Elections will always be pivotal to Somaliland’s democratic credentials, and restoring resilience to the country’s unique consensus-based politics will be a part of this. However, for Somaliland to progress through the next elections and the likely contentious post-electoral environment, broader legal and institutional changes will need to be made.

About Author:

Moustafa Ahmad is a researcher who specialises in the politics and security of Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted via Twitter – @Mustafe_Ahmad.

Somaliland Rebukes G7 Communique and Firmly Asserts Sovereignty

Staff

April 21, 2024

In a strongly worded response to the recent G7 Foreign Ministers’ communique, the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs has voiced profound objections to the portrayal of Somaliland’s status, particularly its reference as the “Somaliland Region of Somalia.” The Ministry’s statement, echoing sentiments from both the Government and citizens of Somaliland, condemns the G7’s language as not only misleading but also detrimental to Somaliland’s hard-won sovereignty.

Providing historical context, the Ministry emphasized the dissolution of the union between Somaliland and Somalia, citing its lack of legal foundation following the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. Asserting Somaliland’s status as a sovereign entity with its own legal framework, validated through a democratic constitutional referendum, the Ministry reiterated the sanctity of Somaliland’s statehood.

Expressing dismay at the G7’s oversight of Somaliland’s democratic stability, the Ministry criticized the group for neglecting ground realities and called for recognition of Somaliland’s peaceful aspirations.

However, the Ministry’s response comes against the backdrop of concerns raised by the G7 regarding the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia, announced in January 2024. This MoU has drawn international attention and scrutiny.

During the G7 meeting held in Capri, Italy, from April 17th to 19th, member states expressed apprehensions about the MoU and urged both Ethiopia and Somalia to maintain open channels of dialogue. The G7 emphasized the importance of preventing further escalation and called for adherence to international law, particularly principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in the UN Charter.

“to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.”

The Somali Federal Government has accused Ethiopia of violating its sovereignty through the MoU with Somaliland, and threatening war despite Ethiopian forces’ presence in Somalia under the ATMIS mandate. However, Somaliland, despite lacking international recognition, has functioned as an independent country and entered into similar agreements with foreign entities in the past. Its main port of Berbera and free trade zone is managed DP World.

Interestingly, Somalia perceives the collaboration between Somaliland and Ethiopia as a greater threat to its stability than the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization, which recently made significant gains against Somalia’s forces on multiple fronts including attacks in the capital.

Although several countries maintain diplomatic missions in Somaliland, it is noteworthy that Somaliland, for decades has tacitly worked with foreign embassies and diplomats assigned to Somalia, especially those from the west, which has long been pointed to as detrimental to its efforts to differentiate itself from Somalia in its quest to gain international recognition.

Recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Essa Kayd, in an impromptu interview in Paris, stated that the Somaliland government will no longer work with foreign diplomats assigned to Somalia. Beyond the minister’s remark, no official communication has been issued by the Somaliland government stating its intention to cease cooperation with foreign embassies to Mogadishu.

Somaliland Presidential and National Party Elections set for November 13th, 2024

Staff

April 20, 2024

Somaliland’s National Election Commission announced the date for the Presidential and National Party elections, scheduled for November 13, 2024. This declaration holds significant importance not only due to the long-awaited presidential race but also because it signifies the opportunity for all current registered parties, including the existing three national parties, to vie for the coveted status of becoming national parties alongside the presidential elections.

Somaliland’s electoral history provides additional context to its upcoming elections. Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has undertaken several rounds of elections, showcasing its commitment to democratic governance despite its lack of international recognition. Past elections, such as those in 2001, 2005, and 2017, were generally considered free and fair by international observers, contributing to Somaliland’s reputation as a relatively stable and democratic entity in the region.

However, Somaliland’s democratization process has not been without challenges. Disputes over election results and concerns about electoral integrity have surfaced during past elections. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2017 presidential elections, opposition parties raised allegations of irregularities, prompting calls for dialogue and electoral reforms.

In contrast, Somalia’s electoral landscape has been marked by instability and challenges. The country has struggled to hold nationwide elections due to ongoing conflict and political fragmentation, hindering its democratic progress despite receiving substantial international support aimed at fostering governance reforms.

Similarly, Djibouti’s political environment differs significantly from Somaliland’s. While Djibouti has maintained relative stability compared to Somalia, its political landscape is characterized by limited political freedoms and a lack of competitive elections, raising concerns about the country’s democratic credentials.

As Somaliland prepares for the upcoming elections, drawing on lessons from its own electoral history as well as comparative case studies like Somalia and Djibouti will be crucial. Addressing past challenges and strengthening democratic institutions will be essential for ensuring the credibility and inclusivity of the electoral process and further solidifying Somaliland’s position as a beacon of democracy in the Horn of Africa region.

Three Reasons why Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Should not be Allowed to become the next African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson

Staff

April 14, 2024

Mahmoud Youssouf, the fiery and polarizing Foreign Minister of Djibouti, has boldly thrown his hat into the ring for the highly contested position of Chairperson of the African Union Commission. With this move, he becomes the third contender from the East African region, following in the footsteps of the charismatic opposition leader and ex-prime minister, Raila Odinga. However, Youssouf’s candidacy has quickly gained momentum, placing him as the second frontrunner in the race. Despite facing stiff competition from the former Somali deputy prime minister and current federal parliament member, Fawzia Yusuf, Odinga’s strong backing from numerous African leaders has solidified his position as the ultimate frontrunner. The stage is set for a fierce battle as these three powerful candidates vie for the coveted role of AU Commission Chairperson.

Despite the fact that the Djiboutian Foreign Minister harbors a strong desire for the coveted AU Commission chairmanship, his ulterior motives are rooted in seeking geopolitical dominance for his country alone. This narrow-minded ambition, fueled by his personal political ideologies, blatantly disregards the importance of promoting fair economic integration and sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa region. In essence, his flawed intentions can be attributed to three crucial factors.

It’s noteworthy that Djibouti, long aligned with Somaliland, has kept its unrecognized neighbor in a diplomatic purgatory. Privately, particularly to influential players like the United States, it has downplayed Somaliland’s importance. However, Djibouti has taken a public stance against the Somaliland-Ethiopian Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), indicating a recognition of Somaliland’s potential as a significant economic rival to its port and geostrategic economy.

Considering this perspective, Djibouti’s strong support for Somalia’s stance on the MoU, coupled with its recent closeness to Mogadishu and President Hassan Sh. Mohamed, raises suspicions. Djibouti might be hedging its bets in the African Union race by potentially backing both Somalia and its own Foreign Minister. This strategy aims to prevent Kenya’s candidate, Raila Odinga, a known ally of Somaliland, from obstructing Abiy Ahmed and Muse Bihi’s emerging alliance.

Reason #1:

Mr Yousuf’s candidacy poses a potential threat to Somaliland’s recognition, an issue that has been under consideration since a unique UN study in 2005 commended it as deserving international acknowledgment. When Congressman Payne inquired about the penalization of Somaliland in 2008 due to Mogadishu’s disarray, Djibouti’s Foreign Minister deflected blame onto Ethiopia, citing its opposition to a stronger Somalia, which he claimed bred instability and balkanized Somaliland. This argument is a typical red herring peddled by those who refuse to acknowledge Somaliland’s achievements in democracy, state building, and strong institutions, feats which are rarities in both the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Reason #2:

Mr. Yousuf’s support for Abdullahi Yussuf’s presidency in Somalia was grounded in a misguided belief that he had previously quashed the SNM in Somaliland, a feat he thought could be replicated. Contrarily, during that period, Abdullahi Yussuf led the SDDF rebels against Siad Barre, who later bribed them to abandon their pursuit of change. What demands scrutiny is Mr. Yousuf’s denial of the Isaaq genocide perpetrated by Siad Barre. His hope that another Darod politician, hostile towards the Isaaq, could repeat such atrocities is deeply troubling and unfathomable.

Reason #3:

Mr. Yousuf supports the Houthis, causing harm to African trade: In a political forum organized by the Heritage Institute in Djibouti in 2023, Youssouf stated, “God bless the Houthis…We didn’t want to be part of the US coalition…the attacks need to stop as they harm our economy but we share the same feelings with the Houthis.” This statement is not only ironic, but also alarming as it shows that Youssouf supports the Houthis who are attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, ultimately impacting African trade between the Gulf and EU countries.

Djibouti Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Yusuf, who is running as a candidate for the @_AfricanUnion’s chairmanship currently held by @AUC_MoussaFaki says his country supports Houthi attacks in the red sea and the Gulf of Aden. He says “Houthi attacks against commercial… pic.twitter.com/HbqXJnWNhm
— HE. AMB. HAGGOOGANE (@HAGGOOGANE) April 12, 2024

For two decades, Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf has advocated policies that seem to hold Somaliland hostage, delaying its development until Somalia catches up, a strategy akin to a forced, unratified, and illegal union. From advocating a Saudi livestock ban that stifle economic growth, to blocking Chinese-Ethiopian plans to develop an oil export hub in Somaliland’s Berbera port, and undermining Somaliland’s democracy by promoting politicians with Djiboutian passports, his actions have been questionable.

The African Union requires leaders who encourage unity and economic integration, rather than those who propagate a divisive, colonial mentality. The last thing the AU needs is a politician like Yousuf, who obstructs potential agreements such as the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU — a plan that could economically liberate approximately 120 million people, a feat seven times more impactful than the American Marshall Plan that provided relief for 17 million Europeans.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Guled Ahmed is a Resident Scholar with the Middle East Institute and an expert in Horn of Africa Security and Development.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

Horn of Africa’s New Security Landscape: Geopolitical Consequences of the Conflict-Cooperation Dynamics

Editor II

April 8, 2024

The Horn of Africa region is at the core of regional and international contentions. It enjoys a unique location on Bab El-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, diverse natural resources and fertile soil, a history and the present replete with conflicts and wars within and among regional countries. The region has many overlapping and competing ethnicities and several demographic and political factors. These complexities lead to a constant shift in the dynamics of conflict and cooperation, making the region stuck in a network of regional security issues.

The Horn of Africa region has recently been going through a critical juncture that puts its stability at stake, with regional – and perhaps international – repercussions. The conflict in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has expanded. There is political and security uncertainty in Somalia due to political divisions, the threat of terror from Al-Shabab Movement, and turmoil in the southeast of Somaliland. Moreover, Ethiopia’s efforts to access a seaport have caused tension with neighboring countries on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

In January 2024, a crisis erupted with Somalia after Ethiopia signed an MoU with Somaliland, giving Addis Ababa access to the Berbera Port on the Red Sea. Mogadishu viewed it as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The crisis undermined Djibouti’s efforts to resume talks between Somalia and Somaliland. This coincided with foreign powers becoming active to benefit from regional shifts, boost their influence, and gain more competitive advantages.

The Crisis of the Ethiopia-Somaliland Maritime Agreement

The most significant development expressing Ethiopia’s strategic project for expansion to the Red Sea was the Addis Ababa-Somaliland MoU on January 1. This MoU gives the Ethiopian Navy access to the Berbera Port for commercial purposes and a potential military base on the shores of the Gulf of Aden. In exchange, Addis Ababa promised to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign country and gain some stakes in Ethiopian Airlines.

The Somali federal government – which summoned its ambassador in Addis Ababa as an expression of its outright rejection of the agreement, viewing it as a “violation” of its sovereignty and a threat to its territorial integrity and vital security – continues to obstruct efforts to mediate between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. Somalia demands “Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the illegal MoU and Addis Ababa’s reiterating Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Despite efforts by Abiy Ahmed’s government to engage its Somali counterpart to de-escalate tension and ensure a political solution, Ethiopia’s discourse has failed to calm Mogadishu’s fears regarding Ethiopia’s potential military presence on the shores of Somaliland and recognize the latter as a sovereign country because this will motivate the separatist inclinations of other Somali states.

The diplomatic controversy between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu increased after Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud accused Ethiopia of attempting to prevent him from entering the African Union headquarters to participate in the African Summit held in Addis Ababa from February 17-18. It has also deepened Somalis’ fears that Addis Ababa seeks to impose its perceptions by force, exploiting their country’s fragile situation.

While efforts to defuse the Ethiopian-Somali crisis have been discussed, notably by Kenyan President William Ruto, who has attempted to engage in back-channel diplomacy to facilitate negotiations, a direct meeting between their leaders, Sheikh Mohamud and Abiy Ahmed, remains elusive. Despite these attempts, there are no indications that the escalating tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, exacerbated by ongoing negotiations between the latter and Hargeisa, can be effectively contained. The crisis is anticipated to strain bilateral relations and significantly alter the geopolitical dynamics and calculations across the wider region.

These tensions threaten regional cooperation and integration, particularly in regional security and counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. They may also catalyze external involvement in the region and exacerbate water disputes in the Nile Basin, particularly given the impasse in discussions concerning the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Addis Ababa’s potential plans to develop similar projects on other rivers. This could disrupt freshwater flows to neighboring countries like the Woya Shabelle and Dawa rivers.

Even if both parties are willing to mitigate their differences, explore potential avenues for resolving the crisis, and address their concerns through amicable and cooperative means, achieving such a scenario appears optimistic. It will undoubtedly be challenging and will necessitate significant political will, genuine concessions, and the presence of objective conditions and geopolitical circumstances, which could involve addressing the issue of “Somaliland.”

MOGADISHU, SOMALIA – JANUARY 11: Hundreds protest against Ethiopia signing a memorandum of understanding for maritime access with Somaliland, which declared its unilateral independence from the country, in Mogadishu, Somalia on January 11, 2023. Abuukar Mohamed Muhidin / Anadolu (Photo by Abuukar Mohamed Muhidin / ANADOLU / Anadolu via AFP)

Heightened Somalia-Somaliland Tensions

The recent deal struck by President Muse Bihi Abdi’s government with the Ethiopian state has undermined Djibouti’s efforts, which were made just days earlier, to resume talks between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. It has also reset relations between the two entities, sparking a fresh cycle of tensions and mutual accusations. These tensions include disputes over airspace management, marking a departure from previous agreements focused on security, depoliticization of international aid, and airspace management.

On January 17 and 18, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority blocked two cargo planes destined for Hargeisa: One Ethiopian plane, purportedly carrying a high-level Ethiopian delegation to finalize a maritime agreement with Somaliland, and the other Thai plane, allegedly transporting an arms shipment to the secessionist region. This air conflict represents the first of its kind since the Federal Government of Somalia assumed control of its airspace at the end of 2017. The conflict has raised concerns about its impact on air traffic. It poses a new challenge for regional and international stakeholders concerned with maintaining regional security and international aviation safety.

The charged atmosphere highlights the depth of the crisis and the entrenched tensions in the north and south of Somalia. It underscores the intricate interplay of local dynamics, regional factors, and international alliances in the Horn of Africa. While Somalia endeavors to bolster its strategic standing by forging defense and economic partnerships with Türkiye and Egypt, it seeks to solidify its stance on the Somaliland issue, framing it as an “internal affair” to tighten external isolation and constraints on Hargeisa. Conversely, Somaliland endeavors to assert its independence from Mogadishu’s influence, asserting that the latter lacks the requisite power to impose sovereignty.

Thus, it consistently downplays the Sheikh Mohamud government’s efficacy. It cautions external powers against siding with Somalia against the “will of the people of Somaliland.” Hargeisa reaffirms its commitment to disengage from the Somali state, proceed with the maritime agreement, and bolster defense and security cooperation with Addis Ababa. It increasingly relies on its significant neighbor, Ethiopia, viewing its path to independence and international recognition as largely dependent on Addis Ababa’s support, particularly amid escalating threats to stability in Somaliland.

Somalis celebrate the victory of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after he won the presidential run-off election during the celebration organised by the government in Mogadishu, on May 29, 2023. (Photo by Hassan Ali Elmi / AFP)

New Turkish Engagement

Amid ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea and against the escalating crisis between Somalia and Ethiopia, Türkiye, and Somalia, they reached a significant milestone on February 8. They finalized the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which was swiftly ratified by the Somali Parliament two weeks later. Under this agreement, Türkiye commits to safeguarding Somalia’s coasts and waters for 10 years, shielding them from “foreign invasion and external interference” and illicit activities such as piracy, overfishing, drug smuggling, and terrorism.

Additionally, Türkiye will assist Somalia in bolstering its naval forces, enhancing maritime security capabilities, and advancing maritime resource development and blue economy initiatives. Somali officials hailed these aspects, among others covered in the agreement, as “historic.” However, the agreement faced rejection from the Somaliland government and the extremist al-Shabab al-Mujahideen movement.

Based on available information, the comprehensive agreement, which will follow detailed sub-protocols, entails significant security and economic benefits for Türkiye. This agreement will bolster Türkiye’s presence in Somalia and its territorial waters, granting Türkiye access to Somali airspace and security zones. Furthermore, Türkiye will receive 30 percent of the revenues from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.

Turkish involvement in Somalia’s hydrocarbon reserves, estimated to be tens of billions of barrels (approximately 30 billion barrels, according to US estimates), has already commenced. On March 7, the Turkish Energy Minister and his Somali counterpart for petroleum and mineral resources signed an agreement to explore oil and gas within Somalia’s economic zone.

This development coincided with Ankara dispatching a high-level military delegation to Mogadishu. It occurred shortly after Sheikh Mohamud’s visit to Türkiye to participate in the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, during which he received assurances from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan regarding Ankara’s commitment to supporting Somalia in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These actions underscore the mutual determination of both parties to promptly translate their directives into tangible steps to reinforce their partnership.

While the Somali president has reiterated that the defense cooperation agreement signed with Türkiye is not directed against any third party, implicitly referring to Ethiopia, it is framed within the context of advancing Somalia’s interests and safeguarding its territorial waters from external ambitions. However, some observers argue that Türkiye’s presence could potentially contribute to establishing a form of balance, limiting Ethiopia’s maneuvering space and slowing down its efforts to proceed with its maritime agreement with Somaliland. Moreover, it may enhance Ankara’s leverage and increase the likelihood of actively mediating and mitigating the crisis.

However, the Turkish initiative underscores a broader strategic vision to extend its military presence beyond borders to enhance influence and safeguard interests in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Through defense agreements with Ethiopia, Kenya, and most recently, Djibouti, where it signed three cooperation agreements on February 19, Ankara is positioning itself to emerge as a significant player in regional security affairs and address various regional and African challenges. This approach aligns with Türkiye’s expanding network of economic relations and its evolving geopolitical aspirations.

The Turkish-Somali agreement carries more profound implications and potentially wider repercussions than the Ethiopian-Somaliland MoU. This is particularly evident in reshaping relationships, forging alliances, and altering the Horn of Africa’s balance and dynamics. The region is experiencing heightened international and regional competition, given its increasing geopolitical and economic significance in the strategic considerations of competing powers. This trend is underscored by major global transformations, including indications of a new multipolar world order and evolving dynamics in critical minerals markets, driven by the global shift towards new and sustainable energy sources.

A general view of the logo of the African Union at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa on February 15, 2024. (Photo by Michele Spatari / AFP)

How Can We Contribute to Containing Crises?

Gulf states and international partners, particularly Western nations, are keenly interested in restoring the Horn of Africa’s stability. This includes increasing investment in collective action mechanisms and platforms to contain crises and reduce hotspots of tension in the region. These efforts also aim to reformulate relations and interactions between local actors, governments, and states while mitigating the risks of proxy conflicts and internationalizing issues in the Horn of Africa. These initiatives enhance regional peace and security and foster win-win partnerships by fostering climates that rationalize competition and cooperation.

Considering the entrenched positions, current tensions, and mistrust among local and regional actors, it is crucial to discuss guarantees, incentives, and joint pressures necessary to steer them toward peaceful resolutions of existing crises. In this context, the following guidelines should be considered:

Enhance joint diplomatic engagement to address conflicts in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. It has become evident that the adherence to the mantra African Solutions to African Problems (ASAP) has sometimes complicated and prolonged regional conflicts. This is due to the lack of proactive strategies by the African Union and regional organizations to prevent conflicts and establish mechanisms for finding final and sustainable solutions, ensuring that parties involved are committed to their implementation.

Preventing and de-escalating tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa and between Mogadishu and Somaliland should be a priority. Drawing lessons from similar international cases and conflicts could offer insights into reconciling Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions with Mogadishu’s sovereignty and territorial integrity concerns.

Increase focus on the situation in Somaliland and address its long-standing issues. It is imperative to inform the parties involved in the Somali crisis about the potential consequences of escalating internal hostilities and pursuing “zero-sum” policies. Emphasize the importance of restoring cooperation, particularly in security and airspace management, and addressing common threats such as terrorism and drought. There is also a need to push for the resumption of negotiations between Mogadishu and Hargeisa and develop a roadmap for a settlement between them.

Intensify efforts pressure conflicting factions in Sudan to de-escalate tensions and pursue peace. Develop a clear roadmap to resolve the crisis and address its underlying causes. This should include practical plans to expedite and resume negotiations, focusing on achieving an interim cessation of hostilities that can be extended and used as a foundation to build confidence and initiate a comprehensive political process in the country.

There is a critical need for powerful external actors to engage sincerely in efforts to resolve crises in the Horn of Africa rather than exploiting them for their interests. It is essential to foster healthy and positive competition to prevent the region from suffering the adverse consequences of external polarization and competition. This can be achieved by increasing coordination among external actors, states, and regional actors to align objectives and minimize conflicts of interest. It is imperative to agree on reliable and diversified paths for long-term cooperation and to explore new opportunities and prospects for expanding partnerships to enhance mutual benefits.

The Emirates Policy Center (EPC), an independent think tank with its headquarters in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, originally published this opinion piece.

Somaliland & UK Parliamentarians Met to Discuss Important Issues

Editor II

April 8, 2024

A delegation from England made up of members of the UK Parliament was received yesterday by MP Sayid Mire Farah (Gire), the First Deputy Chairman of the Somaliland House of Representatives who is also currently the Acting Chairman of that House, together with a number of other representatives.

The members of the UK Parliament, known for staunchly backing the Somaliland case for recognition, are accompanied by journalists from the British media and experts from the College Green Group firm.

London, England is home to the public relations company College Green Group. The company specializes in strategic campaigns and communication, assisting clients in influencing laws and achieving other political objectives.

According to a press release outlining the topics discussed at the meeting, the two sides discussed and exchanged ideas during the meeting at the House of Representatives Chamber. They also emphasized the close ties that exist between Somaliland and Great Britain as well as the role that the UK government can play in assisting Somaliland’s independence, particularly in light of global politics, the Horn of Africa, and the country’s democratic transition.

“Chairman Gire briefed the delegation on the journey of present-day Somaliland Republic for resuming its statehood and the eight one-vote-one-person elections that ensued since 2001 as well as the referendum on the Nation’s Constitution,” according to a statement from the House of Representatives.

The House of Representatives in Somaliland is the lower house of the two houses of the Somaliland Parliament, and its role in legislating, monitoring, and representing the electorate is paramount.

The chairman went on to discuss the important laws that he approved during his tenure, including the “Amendment of the General Elections and Voter Registration Act, which made it possible to schedule holding joint elections for the President and the political organizations slated for later this year.”

According to the same press release, members of the ruling Conservative Party in the UK Parliament, Tim Loughton and Alexander Stafford, expressed their appreciation for the warm reception and pledged support for the Republic of Somaliland’s democracy and sound governance.

The delegates emphasized the significance of maintaining peace and commerce in this region for the benefit of the global community as well as the need to fortify the bonds of friendship and collaboration that bind Somaliland to its allies abroad.

“The MPs pointed out the need to work together in order to prevent obstacles that could derail the regaining of Somaliland’s independence by accelerating the international flirtation and highlighting the determination Somaliland people for recognition.”

To further enhance the role that members of both sides may play in strengthening the ties between the two nations, both sides decided to establish a joint forum that links members of the Somaliland Parliament and friends in the UK. This is what the press release stated.

The meeting was attended by MP Hussein Ismail Jama, the chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Somaliland House of Representatives; MP Abu Bakar Said Ali, the deputy chairman of the Finance and Economic Committees; and MP Ibrahim Ali Jama, MP Omar Jama Farah, MP Mubarak Muse Ismail, Prof. Hassan Mohamed Jama (Hasan-Hiis), the presidential advisor on development affairs and international relations, and MP Mohamed Osman Limo of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Investment, and International Relations.

When the Somaliland public went shopping for the impending Eid Fidri, which marks the end of the Holy Month of Ramadan, members of the UK parliament strolled with Mayor Mooge around the downtown area of the nation’s capital city of Hargeisa without fear of terrorist attacks or criminal activity.

Speaking last night on behalf of a visiting UK delegation to Somaliland was Honorable MP Alex_Stafford.

Turkey and Ethiopia have had close ties for many years: Somalia maritime deals may shift the dynamics

Staff

April 8, 2024

Michael B. Bishku, Augusta University

Ethiopia and Turkey, which have had cordial ties since the early 20th century, have drawn even closer in recent years as both battle criticism from the west over domestic policies. But new developments are putting the relationship to the test. These include Turkey assuming the role of protecting Somalia’s waters – deemed to include the Gulf of Aden – as well as efforts by Ethiopia to gain access to the sea through a deal with Somaliland.

Michael Bishku, a Middle Eastern and African history scholar who has recently researched Ethiopia-Turkey relations, explains why Turkey’s ties with Ethiopia are largely economic while those with Somalia are sentimental, in assisting an impoverished Muslim country.

What binds Ethiopia and Turkey historically?

Turkey and its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, have had a long history of interactions in the Horn of Africa, going back to the 16th century. But formal diplomatic ties between Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik II and the Ottoman Empire’s Sultan Abdul Hamid II were not initiated until 1896. At the time, the Ethiopians had just defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adwa. In 1889, the Italians began to occupy the largest share of Somalia, while the British established a protectorate in the Somaliland region in 1898. Ethiopia did not participate in the first world war and Britain and Italy were part of the victorious Entente. After the war, the Ottoman Empire, as part of the defeated Central Powers, was partitioned. Turkey, by 1923, asserted control over Turkish areas of the former empire.

The new Republic of Turkey opened its first embassy in sub-Saharan Africa in Addis Ababa in 1926. Ethiopia reciprocated by setting up its embassy in Ankara in 1933.

When Italy invaded Ethiopia between 1935 and 1937, Turkish soldiers volunteered for the Ethiopian army, with the Turkish government strongly supporting sanctions against Italy. During the occupation, which lasted until 1941, Ethiopia’s embassy in Turkey never closed. Turkey was neutral until the end of the second world war. But it embraced alliance with the United States after the war, as did Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia.

Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia remained close during the 1960s. At the time, both countries took the pragmatic approach of improving relations with both the Soviet bloc and the Arab world.

In 1974, Haile Selassie was overthrown by the military. The military then established a Marxist regime in Ethiopia which lasted until 1991. Relations were suspended by Turkey during this time.

What’s the history of Turkey’s relations with Somalia?

A united Somalia, including former British Somaliland, achieved independence in 1960. The enlarged state coveted the Somali-populated Ogaden region in Ethiopia. Turkey did not establish an embassy in Somalia until 1979, when that country shifted away from close ties to the Soviet bloc in the midst of a war against Ethiopia when it attempted unsuccessfully to occupy Ogaden (1977-1978).

Somalia’s President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991 and the country fell into chaos. The Turkish embassy closed until 2011. Turkey participated in the two United Nations operations in Somalia, the first one between 1992 and 1993 and the second one from 1993 to 1995.

In 2011 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was then Turkey’s prime minister and whose government regarded itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests, became the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in two decades. Five years later, he visited the country again as president, to open Turkey’s largest embassy complex in the world. Mogadishu’s airport and seaport are run by Turkish companies. https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9xTxL/1/

In 2017, Turkey opened a military base in Mogadishu to train Somali soldiers. It has also built hospitals and infrastructure though the offices of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) as well as providing scholarships for Somalis to study in Turkey.

Turkey has provided more than US$1 billion in humanitarian aid since 2011, part of which came from Muslim NGOs.

Both Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) support the efforts of the Somali government against the threat of al-Shabaab.

The UAE’s assistance to Somalia has been far less than that of Turkey. However, it’s been involved in the country in other ways. In 2015, it also participated in the second UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and set up a military training facility in Mogadishu. It also upgraded Berbera airport in Somaliland and manages two Somali ports: Berbera and Bosaso. Bosaso Port is in Puntland, another breakaway Somali territory.

These moves were regarded as a means to increase security against Iran and its Houthi ally in Yemen.

How does Somaliland complicate matters?

Somaliland declared its independence in 1991. But it is still internationally recognised as a de jure part of Somalia.

Ethiopia, Turkey and Djibouti have established consulates in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital city. Other countries such as Kenya and the UAE have liaison offices there. But only the UAE and Ethiopia have bypassed Mogadishu to make deals directly with the Somaliland government even though the UAE publicly supports the territorial integrity of Somalia.

The UAE’s deal involved setting up a military base in Somaliland and training Somaliland’s security forces.

In January 2024 Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding under which Somaliland has offered Ethiopia port access through a lease for 50 years of 20km of Somaliland’s coastline. In return, Ethiopia would give Somaliland diplomatic recognition.

Somalia countered the announcement of this deal by making Turkey a key security partner. Turkey is to train and equip Somalia’s naval force and help patrol the Somalia’s coastline.

Michael B. Bishku, Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and African History, Augusta University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Embracing Balkanization: A Path to Peace and Prosperity in the Somali Region

Staff

April 6, 2024

The recent developments in the Somali region, including Puntland’s decision to assert autonomy and Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of independence, present an opportunity to reshape the regional landscape positively. Far from signaling the “crumble” of greater Somalia, these developments underscore the resilience and agency of Somali communities in shaping their own destinies. Embracing diversity and recognizing the unique aspirations of each region can pave the way for a more peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for all.

Puntland’s move towards greater autonomy reflects a desire among its people to assert their identity and govern themselves effectively. By withdrawing recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia and seeking to engage directly with the international community, Puntland is taking steps towards greater self-determination and independence. This shift can be a catalyst for stronger governance structures, enhance local decision-making, and empower communities to address their own needs and challenges.

Similarly, Somaliland’s pursuit of independence, spanning over three decades, demonstrates the resilience and determination of its people to chart their own course. Despite facing numerous obstacles and enduring years of unrecognized statehood, Somaliland has maintained stability, built democratic institutions, and fostered economic development. The recent proposal for an Ethiopian naval base in Somaliland in reciprocal to its statehood recognition presents an opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation, enhance maritime security, and bolster economic ties.

By embracing the diversity of the Somalis in horn of Africa region and recognizing the legitimacy of diverse governance structures, regional actors can unlock the full potential of the Somali people. Djibouti, Somaliland, Puntland, and South Somalia each have unique strengths, resources, and contributions to offer. By fostering dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect among these entities, the Somali region can harness its collective potential to address shared challenges, promote economic growth, and build a more stable and prosperous future.

Regional and international stakeholders play a crucial role in supporting the positive trajectory of the Somali region. By respecting the sovereignty and autonomy of each entity, supporting inclusive dialogue, and facilitating cooperation, the international community can contribute to peace, security, and development in the region. Moreover, investments in infrastructure, education, and economic development can create opportunities for all Somali communities, promoting shared prosperity and reducing the drivers of conflict and instability.

As greater Somali region navigates its path towards peace, stability, and prosperity, there is much to be gleaned from the success story of the Gulf countries. The Gulf region, encompassing nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, stands as a shining example of how diversity, cooperation, and visionary leadership can transform societies and propel them towards unprecedented growth and development. By embracing the Gulf model, greater Somalia has the opportunity to chart a course towards a brighter future, characterized by economic prosperity, social progress, and regional cooperation.

At the heart of the Gulf model lies a commitment to unity amidst diversity. Despite being comprised of distinct nations with varying cultures, traditions, and governance structures, the Gulf countries have forged strong bonds of cooperation and collaboration. This unity has been instrumental in driving economic diversification, attracting foreign investment, and fostering innovation across sectors such as finance, technology, and infrastructure. Similarly, greater Somalia, with its diverse countries and communities, can harness the power of unity to overcome historical divisions and build a more inclusive and cohesive society.

Lastly, the recent developments in the Somali region offer a unique opportunity to redefine the narrative from one of fragmentation and discord to one of unity, resilience, and progress. By embracing diversity, respecting the rights and aspirations of all Somali communities, and fostering cooperation and dialogue, the region can overcome its challenges and build a future of peace, security, and prosperity for generations to come.

About the Author

Mr. Mohamed Aideed, co-founder of the BARWAAQO Party in Somaliland and the founder of Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organization (SOYDAVO). Mr. Aideed holds a Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from Kampala University. Mr. Aideed is a commentator on on East and Horn of Africa politics, he has published notable work on the Somaliland-Somalia Talks.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

Sahra Halgan Rose to Prominence as One of Africa’s Top Rock Stars

Editor II

March 25, 2024

In the late 1980s, Sahra Halgan gave up her dreams of becoming a singer to join Somaliland’s secession movement, becoming a self-taught, gun-toting nurse tending to injured fighters.

But she soon realized that just as powerful as her newfound bandaging skills was the comfort she could provide with her voice.

“I don’t know why, but the people injured by gunshots – the pain was coming at night,” she recalls from her home in Hargeisa, the capital of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. “We didn’t have nothing at that time – no painkillers, no antibiotics. And I said we will sing together. Song is not just for the concerts, for the festivals, to become rich. The song becomes the medical supplies, it becomes the army, it’s everything.”

It was during this time that Sahra Ahmed Mohamoud earned her moniker Halgan – meaning fighter – that she took as her stage name.

Her unbridled faith in the potency of performance is written through every note of her third album, released March 29. Titled Hiddo Dhawr (Preserve Culture) – the same name as the music venue she established a decade ago in her home city – it is a pulsating fusion of Somali folk and French rock, full of rough guitar riffs, palpitating percussion and vintage keys.

Its first single – Sharaf – is, the 53-year-old singer says, “a hymn to the pride and dignity of the human being”. It opens with her waving her national flag, with “I [heart] Somaliland” printed along its central white stripe. The state is still unrecognized by the international community.

After gaining independence from the UK in 1960, Somaliland – a territory to the north of Somalia, in the Horn of Africa – only existed as a sovereign entity for five days before it was absorbed into the Republic of Somalia (which had also gained its independence, from Italy).

In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre took power via a military coup and by the late 1980s, a recession fuelled internal turmoil, while Barre’s regime became more authoritarian, bombing his own people. At the same time, the anti-Barre Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somaliland took up arms and fought for independence.

Halgan supported the SNM rebels, but in 1991 – after Hargeisa was turned to rubble – she fled first to Djibouti, and then on to France.

Halgan had started to become famous in her home country, but in Europe, she was a nameless refugee. “No one knew who I was. I became a cleaner, I worked helping disabled people.”

She raised five children – now in their 20s and 30s – and formed a trio with drummer and percussionist Aymeric Krol (founder of French-Malian band BKO Quintet) and guitarist Maël Saletes, who she met in Lyon. All her songs are in Somali, but her French band-mates provide backing vocals.

She returned in 2013 keen to help rebuild her homeland. But tensions in Somaliland have not disappeared. For the first couple of years after she opened Hiddo Dhawr – a complex of traditional Somali huts – it was the only music venue in the city and she had local religious men arriving to try to close her down. Her response was straightforward: “I said to them, ‘during the civil war, I was a singer and my song became a medical tool, and then where were you? At that time, we needed you – where were you?’ And he didn’t give me an answer. I said, ‘leave me alone.’”

Halgan – who began singing aged 13 – is used to people trying to silence her voice. Her mother’s father was a singer, but her father’s family “don’t like it – until now. They said ‘Now you have a child, you have a daughter, why you sing?’ And then I say, ‘I love to sing – it’s no problem.’ But they said, ‘When you stop to sing? I said, I tell you on that day.’” That day does not look like it will be coming very soon.

Halgan mentions the UK’s history with Somaliland – the British protectorate was established in 1884 – and says: “The people of Britain, I demand support for our cause.” She asks whether it is attitudes to Islam that are delaying progress: “What is preventing us from being recognized? It is our right. We got our independence in 1960. We need a reason why we aren’t recognized, if it’s not because of religion. What is the world waiting for? We can do this but what are they waiting for from us? I don’t know. They must respond.”

However, she has lost none of her belief in the liberating capacity of music. “When you sing, everybody comes to see you and is laughing and dancing,” she says. “In this world now, everything divides people, [whether] it’s political, religion, [or] money. But we have only one thing to bring us together. It’s music.”

Sahra Halgan’s new album, Hiddo Dhawr, is released on 29 March

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