Ethiopia’s Perception of Somaliland’s New Government and the Implications for Statehood

January 20, 2025

In a recent interview with The Reporter Ethiopia, Dr. Dareskedar Taye, a researcher at Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), shared insights into Ethiopia’s perception of Somaliland under its newly elected President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi. As the IFA operates under Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Taye’s remarks carry significant weight and suggest a shift in the dynamics between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s Perspective on Somaliland

Dr. Taye noted that while Ethiopia’s position on Somaliland remains consistent, Somaliland’s foreign policy appears to have shifted under the new administration. He stated, “The new administration in Somaliland appears to prefer aligning with the Somali government rather than asserting itself as an independent state.”

This observation is striking, given Somaliland’s long-standing aspiration for international recognition as a sovereign state.

Context: The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU

On 1^st January 2024, Somaliland’s previous administration, led by President Muse Bihi Abdi, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia. The deal granted Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports, with an understanding that Ethiopia would support Somaliland’s bid for statehood. While controversial domestically and regionally, the MoU symbolised Somaliland’s commitment to leveraging its strategic location to gain recognition.

However, following President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi’s election on 13^th November 2024, Ethiopia moved swiftly to sign a separate deal with Somalia. Dr. Taye’s remarks suggest that this shift reflects Ethiopia’s perception of Somaliland’s new government as being more aligned with Mogadishu than with its longstanding independence agenda.

Signals of a Policy Shift in Somaliland

Several developments under the new administration raise questions about its priorities. Somaliland’s newly appointed foreign minister publicly criticised the MoU.

The president appointed a special envoy widely believed to be tasked with resuming talks with Somalia, a move that fuels suspicions of closer ties with Mogadishu.

These actions have sparked internal concerns about the government’s commitment to Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

Risks of Internal Division and Destabilisation

Somaliland’s statehood aspirations are a unifying force for its people. A government perceived as compromising this goal risks igniting internal divisions, potentially destabilising the country. The shift in foreign policy also comes at a critical juncture, as there is speculation that the new U.S. administration may be open to engaging with Somaliland.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether Dr. Taye’s assessment of Somaliland’s new government is accurate, the perception itself highlights a failure in the government’s foreign affairs approach. This perceived pivot towards Mogadishu undermines Somaliland’s long-standing strategy of seeking recognition and could weaken its internal cohesion.

For Somaliland to maintain its unity and advance its aspirations, the new administration must reaffirm its commitment to statehood and carefully navigate its foreign relations.

About the Author

Guleid Ahmed Jama is a Lawyer and political analyst based in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The Danger in the Horn: Somaliland’s defense against instability funded and fueled by China and the Somalian government

Staff

January 19, 2025

There are dangerous developments in the Horn of Africa where the Chinese government and the Somalian government in tandem are using proxies to destabilize Somaliland particularly by infiltrating the far eastern regions of Somaliland, as armed militias have with the support and funding of China and Somalia by supplying weapons and ammunition have taken to ferment violence and instability. the Chinese embassy in Somalia has chosen to directly fund and support these militias in the far east of Somaliland.

The involvement of China in funding proxies to destabilize Somaliland has been discussed in various analyses and reports. Here’s a summary based on available information:

Proxy Conflict:

There are suggestions that the violence in Las Anod, Somaliland, might be a proxy conflict launched by China to punish Somaliland for its recognition of Taiwan. This perspective is discussed by the American Enterprise Institute, which highlights the strategic motivations of China in this region due to Somaliland’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Diplomatic Maneuvering:

China has expressed support for Somalia’s government, which is seen as a move to counteract Somaliland’s recognition of Taiwan. A visit by China’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa to Somalia was reported to affirm China’s stance on Somalia’s sovereignty, which indirectly pressures Somaliland. This is covered by the South China Morning Post.

Ties with Militant Groups:

Posts on X (formerly Twitter) have mentioned that China is allegedly supplying weapons and logistical support to militia groups like militias in Laas Anod, Somaliland. These claims are echoed in discussions around China’s broader strategy in the region, particularly in areas where Somaliland and Somalia have overlapping claims.

Strategic Interests:

Reports from sources like 19FortyFive and the American Enterprise Institute suggest that China’s interest in oil-rich regions of Somaliland, coupled with its resentment towards Somaliland’s recognition of Taiwan, might be motivating its actions in fostering instability. This includes potential support for groups that challenge Somaliland’s authority.

The conclusion of these troubling actions is that China has chosen to destabilize Somaliland not only because of Somaliland’s pro-democracy and western friendly disposition but also due to Somaliland’s openness towards providing the United States with a base in the gulf of Aden Chinas plan as it looks for now is to outmaneuver the United States and force them to have no strategic maneuverability in the red sea to counteract the Houthis and to further destabilize the world’s busiest shipping route. This plan by the Chinese regime takes help from their major ally Iran’s and its proxy the Houthi terrorist Organization as well as Somalia and its northern region of Puntland as well as the head of the militias in far eastern Somaliland.

Why does Somaliland need political reform, and what might it look like?

Staff

January 9, 2025

By Guleid Ahmed Jama

Introduction

Somaliland is a thriving democracy that has demonstrated a successful bottom-up approach to governance rooted in the will and aspirations of its people. In 2001, Somalilanders overwhelmingly voted in favour of a constitution that firmly established sovereignty as residing with the people. This constitution mandates that the president, members of the bicameral parliament, regional councils, and district representatives be elected through free and fair elections.

Two decades later, while Somaliland’s democratic journey offers many successes, there are valuable lessons to build upon and areas requiring meaningful reforms to ensure continued progress.

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the constitution states that “the political system of the Republic of Somaliland shall be based on peace, co-operation, democracy and plurality of political parties.” However, Article 2 contradicts this plurality and states that “the number of political parties in the Republic of Somaliland shall not exceed three (3).”

The Act for the Registration of Political Associations and Certification of Political Parties, known as Law Number 14, was enacted to regulate the formation of political parties. The Act has undergone several changes, but its foundation remains: the number of political parties shall not exceed three. With limited guidance in the constitution, determining how parties should be formed (while not exceeding three) and avoiding parties based on regionalism and clannism became a challenge. To address these issues, the drafters of Law No. 14 proposed two solutions:

Political associations would be formed initially, and only three of these associations, after a competitive process, would qualify as political parties.
In 2012, the Act introduced a ten-year license for political parties, limiting the registration of political associations or parties to once every ten years.

In 2022, Somaliland faced political instability and violence due to these restrictions. The former president, Muse Bihi Abdi, sought an extension of his expired term and proposed opening new political associations to compete for the three-party slots. The opposition rejected this move, perceiving it as a threat to their existence. Given that clans back political parties, the disagreement quickly escalated into clan violence. A rebel group clashed with security forces, resulting in the deaths of nine police officers and numerous injuries. The dispute was eventually resolved when clan leaders intervened, proposing that political party elections and the presidential election be held on the same day. The then-president reluctantly accepted this compromise, having no other viable options as he faced multiple challenges, including defeat in Las Anod and the presence of a rebel group stationed near the capital.

The crises of 2022 and 2023 exposed the vulnerabilities of Somaliland’s political system. Factors contributing to this fragility include a weak judiciary, clan-based political parties, poverty, and a polarised society. The closed political system, with its restrictions, exacerbates tensions and hinders political stability.

Reform the System

The new president has pledged to reform the political system and propose constitutional amendments. Such reforms could lead to a dialogue on lifting the restrictions on the number of political parties. However, the slow progress of the new administration and the poor quality of its ministers indicate that constitutional amendments are not an immediate priority.

To address Somaliland’s flawed political system, the government could reduce the licensing cycle for political associations from ten years to five. This change would allow citizens to organise and challenge existing parties more frequently, revitalising the political landscape without requiring constitutional amendments.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi’s recent announcement that he may not seek re-election may weaken his leadership, as many politicians, including his cabinet members, are likely to align themselves with potential presidential candidates. This unexpected position could also provide an incentive for him to push for systemic reforms, potentially shaping his legacy.

Politicised Electoral Body

Another destabilising factor is the composition of the National Electoral Commission, which is dominated by political appointees. Since 2008, the commission has lacked neutrality, with most members being politicians appointed by the president. To address this, Somaliland should conduct a comparative study of electoral bodies in other countries and adopt a model suited to its unique needs. This would help depoliticise the commission and build a strong, functional, and independent electoral body.

Conclusion

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi is not known as a reformist, as evidenced by his track record as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, his experience as an opposition leader has likely provided him with insights into the fragility of Somaliland’s political system. If the president wants to leave a lasting legacy, he must prioritise reforming the political system. Resistance will likely come not from the public but from party leaders and opposition figures who supported his election and expect rewards at the expense of national stability. Ultimately, the president must choose between securing his legacy and yielding to the political ambitions of others, which could undermine Somaliland’s stability and progress.

About the Author

Guleid Ahmed Jama is a Lawyer and political analyst based in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The Diplomacy of Gullibility: How Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry Keeps Falling for International Fraudsters

Staff

January 5, 2025

In what has become a familiar scene in Somaliland’s corridors of power, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently played host to yet another dubious diplomatic visitor. The reception of Amb. Dr. Hajj Alhousseni E. B. Banao – whose credentials crumble under basic scrutiny – marks the latest chapter in a long-running saga that raises fundamental questions about the nation’s diplomatic protocols and institutional safeguards.

A Somaliland Chronicle investigation reveals Dr. Banao’s organizations – AGIC Foundation, Africa Gulf International Corporation, and Salone International Airlines – exist primarily as hastily assembled websites sharing identical templates and stock photos, some so carelessly deployed that male executives appear with female names. His claimed airline shows no evidence of aircraft or aviation licenses, while his supposed humanitarian commission lacks any verifiable operations. This digital Potemkin village extends to his carefully curated social media presence, where Dr. Banao presents himself as the epitome of diplomatic grandeur through staged videos titled “Leaving my residence” and “Entering my residence,” featuring luxury vehicles and security details – calculated displays meant to reinforce his claims of influence and wealth.

“Arriving Home”

The facade becomes more elaborate on LinkedIn, where Dr. Banao claims an astonishing array of simultaneous high-level positions: Chairman of Endora Digital Solutions (since 2007), CEO of ENDORA HOLDINGS GROUP INTERNATIONAL (since 2008), Founder-President of International Aviation Services for Africa (since 2008), Board Member of ZHONG JIA ELECTRONICS LTD HONG KONG (since 2002), and Chairman of Salone International Airlines Corporation (since 2020). Each organization, under scrutiny, proves as substantial as a desert mirage.

His supposed airline in Sierra Leone lacks any aviation authority registration, while the International Aviation Services for Africa (IASA), which he claims to have led since 2008 from Bamako, Mali, shows no trace in regional aviation records. His “World Humanity Commission” appears in no international NGO databases, and even his educational credentials from “Academy Royale des Armees” (2000-2005) prove untraceable.

Dr. Banao’s path to Somaliland’s corridors of power appears to have been paved through Eswatini, where he has been photographed meeting officials. This connection coincides with former Somaliland Foreign Minister Dr. Essa Kayd’s diplomatic efforts in the country as part of Somaliland’s alliance with Taiwan. While this might explain his access to Somaliland’s institutions, efforts to reach Dr. Kayd to verify any previous encounters with Dr. Banao were unsuccessful. This pattern of exploiting legitimate diplomatic channels to gain credibility has become a recurring theme in Somaliland’s international relations.

When confronted about the meeting, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Mr. Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal offered a defense that inadvertently highlighted the very problem at hand. “We are not gullible,” the Minister insisted to the Somaliland Chronicle. “Our doors are open, and we will meet with everyone, but at the end of the day, people will need to prove what they claim they can do. The burden of proof is on the visitors to show us what they can do.” He emphasized that the ministry has not signed any agreements with Dr. Banao, adding that “our doors are open to everyone.”

This response reveals a profound misunderstanding of diplomatic protocol. The Minister’s stance – that verification should follow rather than precede high-level meetings – inverts basic diplomatic practice. The controversy has already claimed its first casualties within the ministry, with all ministerial advisors reportedly dismissed following a heated internal debate about Dr. Banao’s credentials. Notably, Director General Ahmed Abokor, who defended Dr. Banao’s credentials much like he insisted that Maxtor Bank was all too real, is no stranger to such controversies.

During his tenure at the Ministry of Investment in 2018, Abokor orchestrated the infamous Maxtor Bank affair – embracing a phantom Chinese financial institution promising billion-dollar investments. Even after Chinese officials confirmed they had never heard of the bank, his ministry attempted to justify their due diligence by presenting a three-month-old Colorado company registration for an entity operating from a parking lot. His current defense of Dr. Banao suggests a troubling continuity in institutional judgment.

The implications extend far beyond mere embarrassment. Each fraudulent engagement creates potential “squatters” – individuals or entities with dubious claims that could later complicate or litigate against legitimate investors. Several potential European investors have already cited concerns about competing claims from unverified actors who previously secured ministerial audiences and photo opportunities. While Somaliland’s diplomats chase phantoms, genuine diplomatic and investment opportunities wither.

The institutional vulnerability to fraudsters has manifested across multiple administrations. The 2019 Singapore New Silk Oil Refinery project saw multiple ministers, including Vice President Abdirahman Saylici, preside over elaborate ceremonies for a purported multi-billion dollar investment without basic verification of the proponents’ capabilities. Similarly, Swedish citizen Mikael Thorstensson, despite running failing businesses and being evicted from his Hargeisa residence, managed to orchestrate a massive “marine conservation project” that would have handed control of 35% of Somaliland’s coastline to a tombstone seller and his associates.

For a nation seeking international recognition, Somaliland’s inability to perform even rudimentary verification of diplomatic contacts isn’t just embarrassing—it’s suicidal. While officials defend their “open door” policy as showcasing diplomatic accessibility, they’ve instead transformed government offices into a carousel of con artists, where anyone with a template website and stock photos can secure ministerial audiences. The real cost isn’t just wasted time and resources—it’s the growing perception of Somaliland as an easy mark on the international stage, driving away legitimate partners while attracting an endless parade of fraudsters.

President Cirro’s administration now faces a choice that will define its legacy: Will it continue the ruinous tradition of embracing anyone brandishing an impressive business card and flashy social media presence, or will it finally install the basic verification procedures that every functioning state maintains? Somaliland’s diplomatic future hangs in the balance – between continued exploitation by international fraudsters and the professional credibility required of a nation seeking its rightful place in the world. The cost of maintaining “open doors” to obvious confidence tricksters may ultimately be the closing of doors to legitimate international partners.

Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

EXCLUSIVE: Banking Mogul with Strong Ties to Somalia’s President Named Somaliland’s Special Envoy

Staff

January 2, 2025

Appointment Raises Questions About Direction.

In a significant political move that has sparked intense discussion across Somaliland’s political landscape, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” has appointed Mr. Ahmed Abdirahman Sheikh Bashir as Special Envoy. The scope of his appointment remains unclear—particularly whether it mirrors the position previously held by Dr. Edna Adan under former President Muse Bihi Abdi as Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks.

President Irro’s early diplomatic appointments have established a pattern that is drawing attention from political observers. While his decision to bypass Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar for the Foreign Affairs portfolio initially suggested responsiveness to public concerns, subsequent appointments have complicated this narrative.

The appointment of Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal as Foreign Affairs Minister raised questions after videos surfaced showing his strong opposition to the Ethiopia MOU prior to taking office—a stance that contrasts with the delicate diplomatic balance many see as necessary in the current regional context.

Now, the appointment of Sheikh Bashir as Special Envoy introduces new questions about the administration’s vetting process and strategic intentions.

According to government officials and business leaders who have known Sheikh Bashir for years, speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the matter, he is a close friend of Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and has played a pivotal role in securing financial support throughout the Somali President’s political career.

This relationship extends beyond personal ties: Sheikh Bashir was previously offered a cabinet position in Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s current government. While he declined the role, his brother, Ismail Abdirahman Sheikh Bashir, subsequently served as Somalia’s Minister of Public Works and Housing. The younger Bashir now holds a seat in Somalia’s Parliament—a position that sources say was orchestrated through his brother’s influential relationship with President Mohamoud and Somalia’s political landscape.

In contrast to the region’s other business leaders who regularly appear at public forums and business conferences, Sheikh Bashir maintains a distinctly private profile, with his rare public appearances typically limited to essential Premier Bank functions.

Sheikh Bashir’s regional influence was significantly enhanced in March 2023 when Premier Bank, under his leadership, acquired a 62.5% controlling stake in Kenya’s First Community Bank Limited. This strategic acquisition granted Premier Bank access to the SWIFT international banking system through First Community Bank’s existing credentials.

The deal established a powerful financial footprint across the Horn of Africa. Unconfirmed reports suggest Somalia’s President maintains a shareholding position in Premier Bank, further intertwining political and financial interests across the region.

Those who have worked closely with Sheikh Bashir characterize him as “a businessman first, whose strategic vision extends beyond national boundaries.” His approach to regional politics, described as “pragmatic unionism,” stems from his extensive business operations across Somalia, Kenya, and Sudan.

Former colleagues from his time overseeing Dahabshiil’s operations in Sudan describe him as a reserved yet astute technocrat who favors analytical depth over rhetoric. However, his apparent alignment with Somalia’s federalist aspirations has emerged as a contentious issue.

The timing of the appointment has drawn particular scrutiny, coinciding with widespread speculation about potential renewed talks between Somaliland and Somalia. These discussions have gained momentum following recent diplomatic movements in the region, including a visit to Djibouti by ruling party Chairman Mr. Hersi Haji Hassan that overlapped with Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s presence in the country.

Sources within Somaliland’s government circles indicate that while Sheikh Bashir’s financial acumen was a significant factor in his potential role in the administration, the implications of his close ties to Somalia’s presidency remain unclear. “His technical credentials are impressive, and perhaps he should have been advising the President on financial and monetary policies, but I am not sure about the envoy part,” noted one senior official speaking on condition of anonymity. “In matters of sovereignty, personal relationships and political leanings carry significant weight.” Against this backdrop of diplomatic uncertainty, political observers in Hargeisa are scrutinizing both the timing and implications of the appointment. As one veteran diplomat noted, speaking on condition of anonymity, “In diplomatic negotiations, the choice of envoy itself can signal strategic intent. Selecting someone known for unionist sympathies raises questions about the administration’s approach to any potential future talks.

Attempts to reach Sheikh Bashir and Somaliland Presidency for comment were unsuccessful at the time of publication.

Somaliland’s Indigenous Democracy Highlighted in Nobel Economics Lecture

Staff

December 30, 2024

In his 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics lecture titled “Paths towards the Periphery,” delivered in Stockholm on December 8, Professor James A. Robinson presented Somaliland as a compelling example of successful indigenous state-building. While the world often focuses on state failures in the Horn of Africa, Professor Robinson, who holds dual appointments at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science, and the University of Nigeria-Nsukka’s Institute of African Studies, highlighted how Somaliland’s innovative use of traditional institutions offers a powerful counter-narrative.

The Stockholm lecture elevated Somaliland’s governance system to the global academic discourse. Professor Robinson, co-author of “Why Nations Fail,” demonstrated how Somaliland’s blend of traditional and modern governance structures challenges conventional wisdom about democratic development, particularly in regions where Western models have struggled to take root.

Central to Professor Robinson’s analysis was the Guurti, Somaliland’s council of elders serving as the upper house of parliament. Since its formation during the 1993 Borama Conference, the Guurti has proven instrumental in stabilizing Somaliland during its formative years. Its effectiveness was particularly evident in 2003 when President Dahir Riyale Kahin’s razor-thin victory margin of 80 votes was peacefully accepted—a defining moment for Somaliland’s democracy.

The institution’s success in conflict mediation exemplifies how traditional mechanisms can effectively address contemporary challenges. In 2021, Somaliland held parliamentary and local elections praised by international observers for their transparency and inclusivity. This adaptability has been key to Somaliland’s stability in a region often characterized by political turbulence.

Professor Robinson explained that normative orders—the underlying societal norms and values—are critical to shaping governance systems. While many African states struggle with post-colonial systems that clash with local traditions, Somaliland avoided this pitfall by weaving its clan-based norms into state institutions. The Guurti, representing 82 clans, institutionalizes community harmony and consensus-building, though this sometimes creates economic trade-offs between stability and reform.

Bashir Goth, Somaliland Representative to the United States with Professor Robinson at the Pearson Institute of the Chicago University. — Bashir Goth, Somaliland’s Representative to the United States with Professor Robinson at the Pearson Institute of the Chicago University.

Bashir Goth, Somaliland’s representative to the United States, contextualized the Guurti’s role for international audiences by drawing parallels with the U.S. Senate. “This analogy helps foreigners understand the Guurti’s function,” Goth explained, “but its unique origin in pastoral democracy and continued role in peace-building has become a subject of scholarly interest, now recognized in the annals of Nobel Prize history.”

Professor Robinson drew parallels between Somaliland and Botswana’s successful integration of the kgotla system, challenging the notion that poorer nations must mimic Western systems to succeed. Even more remarkable is Somaliland’s success in scaling traditional governance principles to the national level—a feat many African states have failed to achieve.

The absence of international recognition, often seen as a handicap, may have been advantageous. Without foreign interference dictating its political systems, Somalilanders crafted governance structures tailored to their needs, resulting in a democracy that is participatory, resilient, and accountable.

For Somaliland’s ongoing quest for international recognition, Professor Robinson’s academic validation carries particular weight. It strengthens the argument that Somaliland’s unique path to statehood, while unconventional, has produced a stable, functioning democracy worthy of global acknowledgment. Highlighting how the west can help less developed people, Professor Robinson said: “we have to take seriously and study more intensively the nature of their societies.” Somaliland’s success demonstrates this principle, showing how indigenous institutions like the Guurti can be effectively adapted for modern democratic governance while maintaining cultural continuity

New Cabinet Orientation Concludes: Questions of Accountability Linger

Staff

December 29, 2024

Republic of Somaliland’s First Post-Election Transition Brings Focus on Governance Reform

Key Points:

Two-day cabinet orientation emphasizes unity but lacks concrete performance metrics
Notable shift from NGO-heavy recruitment to private sector appointments raises questions about conflict of interest protocols
Key ministries remain heavily dependent on UN agencies and international NGOs
Parliament’s oversight role uncertain despite President’s extensive experience as former Chairman
Financial disclosure requirements and ministerial performance benchmarks absent from agenda

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” of the Republic of Somaliland’s newly minted cabinet concluded a two-day orientation, wrestling with the age-old question of how to turn campaign promises into reality. The sessions, wrapped in the fresh motto “Wadajir iyo Wax-Qabad” (Unity and Action), remained notably light on details about the ‘action’ part. According to a source familiar with the proceedings, the orientation was largely administrative in nature, focusing on procedural matters rather than substantive policy discussions or governance reforms.

Institutional independence – or the lack thereof – lies at the heart of the Republic of Somaliland’s governance challenges. Key ministries, particularly Health Development and Education, have long operated as de facto extensions of UN agencies and international NGOs. UNICEF, WHO, and Save the Children maintain such a grip on these institutions that distinguishing between donor guidance and ministry independence requires a magnifying glass. This dependency presents an immediate challenge to the new administration’s promise of effective governance.

The new cabinet marks a departure from the NGO-heavy recruitment pool favored by former President Muse Bihi Abdi. Instead, President Cirro has appointed several business executives to key positions, including Minister of Civil Aviation Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur and Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi Looge, both with ties to major companies like Dahabshiil and Telesom. The newly appointed National Intelligence Director Jama Mahamoud Egal similarly brings private sector experience to his role.

Minister of Civil Aviation Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur

While private sector experience might bring fresh perspectives to government operations, the orientation sessions conveniently sidestepped the thorny issue of conflict of interest protocols – a policy that quietly vanished under the previous administration. In countries where government actually functions, ministers with extensive business ties are required to file detailed financial disclosures to prevent them from tipping the scales for former employers or business associates. The Republic of Somaliland’s new administration has yet to indicate whether it will implement such basic safeguards.

Equally absent was any discussion of how ministries will measure success beyond feel-good pronouncements. Modern governments track concrete metrics: emergency room wait times, student graduation rates, road project completion timelines. For instance, a functioning Health Development Ministry might set specific targets for reducing maternal mortality rates or increasing vaccination coverage – metrics that could demonstrate real progress beyond donor-driven initiatives. Yet the orientation’s agenda suggested no such performance benchmarks for the incoming cabinet.

After years of opposition critiques about healthcare delivery, education quality, and public sector performance, the Waddani Party now faces the sobering reality of governance. The administration’s emphasis on “Unity and Action” comes as the Republic of Somaliland grapples with political fissures and the Las Anod conflict, but unity without concrete action risks becoming another empty political slogan.

While the business-oriented cabinet concludes its orientation with promises of efficiency and action, one critical oversight mechanism remains conspicuously undiscussed: Parliament’s role in ensuring ministerial accountability. The irony couldn’t be sharper – President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi “Cirro”, who spent years as Chairman of Parliament watching it devolve into a rubber-stamping auxiliary of the executive branch, now sits on the other side of that equation. Under his chairmanship, Parliament’s various subcommittees, theoretically tasked with rigorous legislative oversight, instead became a conveyor belt for executive branch bills.

Now, as the head of an administration that includes several business executives and lacks clear conflict of interest guidelines, President Cirro faces a pivotal choice: Will he leverage his intimate knowledge of Parliament’s weaknesses to perpetuate its ceremonial role, or will he break with tradition and empower genuine legislative oversight? The question is particularly pressing given his cabinet’s business ties and the absence of concrete performance metrics. A robust parliament, through its subcommittees, could demand the very financial disclosures and performance benchmarks missing from this week’s orientation agenda.

The shift from NGO veterans to private sector experience signals a potentially different approach to governance – if properly managed. Business executives are accustomed to measuring results; the question is whether this administration will apply that same results-driven mindset to government operations, establishing clear performance metrics and maintaining transparency in both personal finances and ministerial achievements.

But old habits die hard in Somaliland politics. The transformation from parliamentary chairman who witnessed the erosion of legislative power to a president willing to submit his administration to genuine parliamentary scrutiny would require a rare type of political evolution. For a government promising ‘action,’ restoring Parliament’s oversight muscle would be the most consequential action of all. Citizens of the Republic of Somaliland will be watching to see if corporate efficiency can triumph where NGO expertise fell short, and whether the administration can finally assert real independence from its international benefactors while maintaining the accountability standards expected of a modern government.

All Roads Lead to Somaliland Guban: What to expect from Ankara’s Declaration

Staff

December 28, 2024

Introduction

The Ankara Declaration has a primary goal and a secondary, more opportunistic aim. The primary objective is to address the deadline for transitioning from ATMIS to AUSSOM by the end of the year. By signing this declaration without cancelling the MoU, it gives Somalia and Ethiopia a diplomatic ceasefire until the AU mission is resumed.

Our focus, and the secondary aim of the declaration, is to test the waters with the new Somaliland administration to see if they would sign the MoU under Somalia’s sovereignty and drop the recognition condition. This latter goal isn’t far-fetched, considering Waddani Party leader Hersi Ali’s initial reaction to the MoU, where he objected to signing it without first consulting Somalia.

The good news for Somaliland is that, after the aftershocks of the initial MoU and the dozens of counter-MoUs, all parties have arrived at one conclusion: the only feasible access to the sea for Ethiopia is via Somaliland’s Guban (a coastal plain running parallel to the Gulf of Aden). Somalia could theoretically grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden by traversing 2,078 kilometres of desert land—an utterly impractical proposition. Even the Indian Ocean, at 1,662 kilometres, is closer.

In stark contrast, the Berbera Corridor spans only 950 kilometers and passes through densely populated regions, making it the most practical and efficient route. Ignoring this reality defies fundamental principles of mathematics, geography, economics, social science and history. I say history since the issue of access to the sea was called the Hawd-Zeila exchange and was negotiated between Britain and Ethiopia even before independence.

The bad news is that this declaration, mediated by Turkey, underscores a troubling trend: Somaliland’s strategic assets are repeatedly compromised in international negotiations. Much like the airspace sell-off of 2014, the Ankara process risks repeating history, leveraging Somaliland’s position without guaranteeing recognition or safeguarding sovereignty. The Ankara Declaration reportedly involves leasing Somaliland ports to Ethiopia, echoing past missteps. This article explores how pro-talks politicians surrendered Somaliland’s airspace and examines the implications of the Ankara Declaration for Somaliland’s sovereignty.

The Airspace Sell-Off: A Case Study in Miscalculation

Somaliland’s loss of airspace control didn’t happen through open consensus—Somalilanders would never have allowed it. Instead, it was a case of being outmaneuvered by Somalia.

Here’s how it unfolded:

Egal and Riyale’s Leadership: Former presidents Egal and Riyale maintained a strict “no talks without mutual recognition” policy, ensuring all negotiations upheld Somaliland’s sovereignty.
Policy Shift by Pro-Talks Politicians: Leaders like Hersi and Hashi deviated from this policy, engaging in unconditional talks with Somalia.
The 2014 Agreement: Held in Ankara, Somaliland signed an agreement allowing Somalia to reclaim airspace control from international organizations (INGOs), with a promise that the operational office would be based in Hargeisa.

-Unilateral Action by Somalia: By 2019, Somalia unilaterally relocated airspace control to Mogadishu.

-ICAO’s Response: Somaliland’s protests were met with a definitive statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization: “We only recognize Somalia.”

The outcome: Pro-talks politicians inadvertently ceded control of Somaliland’s airspace to Somalia, proving that without international recognition, any agreements with Somalia inherently undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty. Alarmingly, some factions, like the Waddani Party, seem oblivious to this lesson, clinging to the belief that a Ciro-Hassan Sheikh partnership could succeed where others failed.

Strategic Missteps: Arrogance of Pro-Talks Leaders

Sovereign states possess the ultimate authority over their territories and can withdraw from agreements, especially those made with entities they consider part of themselves. While such actions carry consequences, sovereignty provides the agency to act decisively. Somalia, viewing Somaliland as a “secessionist region,” faces negligible fallout from reneging on agreements.

Yet Somaliland’s pro-talks politicians continue to place faith in external guarantors or vague notions of “Somalinimo” (Somali solidarity). When questioned about these assumptions, Waddani leaders sidestep accountability, proposing national conferences instead of concrete strategies. This evasiveness weakens Somaliland’s position. The foundation of Somaliland’s claims lies in its 1960 independence and legal arguments rooted in state continuity—not in empty rhetoric or misplaced negotiation tactics.

Worse still, some pro-talks figures appear to actively collaborate with Somalian interests advocating unification. Symbolic gestures, such as opening offices in Hargeisa, subtly undermine Somaliland’s independence. The 2014 establishment of the airspace office in Hargeisa exemplifies this, setting the stage for portraying Hargeisa as the capital of a unified Somaliland and Somalia.

Muse Bihi’s Legacy

Former President Muse Bihi adopted a pragmatic stance on negotiations. While he participated in summits, he firmly insisted that recognition remain the sole agenda item. His unwavering “You shall not pass” approach avoided compromises that could jeopardise Somaliland’s sovereignty. Instead, Bihi emphasised alternative agreements and MoU that bolstered Somaliland’s position.

What is next?

Putting aside the high possibility of Trump recognizing Somaliland, how can Somalilanders trust pro-talks leaders like Hersi Haji Hassan to manage access to Guban when they handed over our airspace and failed to learn from past mistakes?

For Somaliland to secure its sovereignty and capitalise on its strategic assets, it must prioritise recognition, legal continuity, and strategic foresight over the infamous talks with Somalia.

About the Author:

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Incoming U.S. Administration Signals New Direction on Somaliland: Will Somalia Talks Derail Cirro’s Moment?

Staff

December 28, 2024

A recent New York Times article and a statement from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicate significant potential shifts in U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa, with particular implications for Somaliland’s bid for international recognition.

“The Biden Administration should not be approving new U.S. taxpayer dollars for @UNpeacekeeping. The Trump Administration will not be supportive of this new open-ended mandate for Somalia & I’m glad to be part of the change and reform coming to the @UN,” stated the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a recent post on X.

Dr. J. Peter Pham, Trump’s former U.S. envoy to the Sahel and a key voice in African policy, reinforced this position, describing it as a “strong warning” from the incoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair. “The times they are a-changin’ — and not a moment too soon,” Pham noted, highlighting the significance of this policy shift regarding Somalia.

Strong warning from incoming @SenateForeign Chair @SenatorRisch on #UN🇺🇳 Security Council vote today on the endless mission in rump #Somalia🇸🇴: the new #USA🇺🇲 admin “will not be supportive of this new open-ended mandate.” The times they are a-changin’ — and not a moment too soon. https://t.co/iDV96Ryexw
— Dr. J. Peter Pham 🇺🇲 (@DrJPPham) December 27, 2024

This statement, combined with reporting from the Times, suggests a broader realignment of U.S. policy in the region. “There is a general belief that Somaliland will be better off under the Trump administration,” Bashir Goth, who leads the Somaliland mission to the United States, told the Times. This optimism appears well-founded, as officials who previously served under Trump indicate he could recognize Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991.

The Times article reveals a significant shift in U.S. diplomatic approach under the incoming administration. While current U.S. policy maintains a “one Somalia” stance, former Trump administration officials suggest a more pragmatic approach is forthcoming. The potential recognition would be part of a broader strategy to strengthen American presence in strategically vital regions of Africa.

According to the Times article, the U.S. is particularly interested in securing “an airfield and a seaport on the strategic route along the Gulf of Aden” as part of any recognition agreement. This strategic interest aligns with broader American efforts to counter China’s growing influence in Africa, where U.S. influence has notably declined in recent years. The report highlights that African exports to the United States have dropped dramatically, from over 20 percent in 2000 to less than 5 percent in 2022, according to World Bank data.

The timing of these developments is particularly significant given shifting global dynamics in Africa. The Times notes that China has emerged as the most popular foreign power in Africa, according to recent Gallup polls, while American influence has waned. Recognition of Somaliland could serve as a strategic counter to this trend, particularly given Somaliland’s strategic location and the growing importance of the Gulf of Aden shipping route.

The incoming administration’s approach to Africa is expected to be “pragmatic and transactional,” focusing on strategic interests and economic opportunities. This new direction, coupled with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s statement opposing UN peacekeeping funding in Somalia, suggests a broader shift in U.S. policy that could benefit Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

This potential policy shift comes at a time when the U.S. is reassessing its strategic partnerships in Africa. The Times reports that American embassies in Africa are understaffed, and the country has lost security access to parts of the jihadist-affected Sahel region. In this context, Somaliland’s stable governance and strategic location make it an increasingly attractive partner for U.S. interests in the region.

However, the path forward requires careful diplomatic navigation. Questions remain about how Somaliland’s new government under President Abdirahman M. Cirro will position itself regarding these potential developments. While President Cirro brings diplomatic experience to his role, having long touted his diplomatic credentials, some of his early appointments have raised eyebrows among political observers. Most notably, his choice of Foreign Affairs Minister, whose fiery rhetoric against the now defunct Ethiopia MoU preceded his appointment, has drawn quiet scrutiny at a time when nuanced diplomacy is crucial. The current moment demands more than traditional diplomacy or political pronouncements – it requires careful statecraft to navigate these unprecedented opportunities for recognition.

Adding complexity to this diplomatic landscape is Somalia’s continued push for fruitless talks with Somaliland. Somalia’s government has consistently marketed these discussions to the international community as a “reconciliation process” that would ultimately lead to reunification – a narrative that fundamentally contradicts Somaliland’s three-decade pursuit of recognition. Previous rounds of talks, spanning multiple years and international venues, have all collapsed due to Somalia’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge the possibility of a two-state solution as the final outcome. Despite numerous international mediation efforts, Somalia’s negotiating position has remained unchanged: treating dialogue as a path to reunification rather than addressing the fundamental question of Somaliland’s sovereignty.

This situation bears striking parallels to Sudan’s historical attempts to prevent South Sudan’s independence by promoting dialogue as an alternative to separation. Like South Sudan before its independence, Somaliland faces the challenge of maintaining its sovereign aspirations while managing international pressure for talks that Somalia frames as a path to reunification. The historical record of failed negotiations underscores the futility of dialogue without Somalia’s willingness to discuss a two-state solution.

The timing of any renewed participation in such talks could prove disastrous for Somaliland given the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s clear stance on reducing support for UN operations in Somalia. While the opportunity for recognition appears more tangible than ever, success may hinge on President Cirro’s ability to pivot from his traditional diplomatic approach to match the Trump administration’s more transactional style. The effectiveness of Somaliland’s newly appointed foreign affairs team in navigating these waters will be crucial, particularly in resisting pressure for talks that Somalia could use to undermine Somaliland’s push for recognition.

Former U.S. officials quoted in the Times article suggest that the Trump administration’s transactional approach could lead to more concrete outcomes in African relations. While previous administrations focused on democracy promotion and human rights, the incoming administration is expected to prioritize strategic partnerships and economic opportunities, potentially accelerating decision-making on issues like Somaliland’s recognition.

For Somaliland, these developments represent a potential breakthrough in its independence journey. The convergence of U.S. strategic interests, changing regional dynamics, and the incoming administration’s practical approach to foreign policy could create unprecedented opportunities for advancing Somaliland’s sovereign aspirations. The coming months will test Somaliland’s diplomatic capabilities as its leadership navigates these emerging opportunities.

Liyuu Paramilitary Forces Massacre Civilians in Ethiopia’s Somali Region

Staff

December 27, 2024

Scores of civilians were laid to rest in a mass grave in Dacawaley village following a brutal attack by the Liyuu Police, a predominantly Ogaden paramilitary force. The massacre threatens to unravel decades of carefully cultivated relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland, just weeks after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s December 11 pivot away from a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland in favor of negotiations with Mogadishu for access to sea.

The death toll continues to mount as survivors, many with severe injuries from gunshots and burns, seek treatment both at Hargeisa Group Hospital across the border in Somaliland and at medical facilities throughout Ethiopia’s Somali Region, particularly in the regional capital Jigjiga. Medical staff at multiple hospitals report being overwhelmed by the scale of casualties, with new victims arriving hourly.

The targeted community, part of the broader Isaaq tribe that forms the majority in neighboring Somaliland, has historically inhabited both sides of the Ethiopia-Somaliland border. These pastoral communities have maintained their traditional grazing patterns and social ties despite the formal international boundary, contributing to the historically strong relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Somaliland’s Minister of Internal Security, Abdalle Mohamed Arab, condemned the massacre as “a gross violation of human rights,” emphasizing the targeting of pastoralist communities. Minister Arab led a high-level delegation to Jigjiga for urgent talks with Ethiopian federal and regional officials, including General Afgado, Commander of the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s Eastern Command. The discussions yielded a comprehensive agreement to cease hostilities, with unconfirmed reports suggesting Ethiopia’s federal government plans to deploy federal troops to the area while redeploying Liyuu Police forces elsewhere.

The fate of nearly sixty traditional elders from Somaliland, who had entered Ethiopia to mediate a grazing dispute with Ogaden pastoralists, remained unclear in the immediate aftermath of the violence. Images emerged of the delegation being transported in pickup trucks, and hours later they appeared in Jigjiga, the regional capital, in what appeared to be a carefully staged media event. The circumstances of their detention and transportation by the same forces responsible for the massacre raised serious concerns about their welfare and the coercive nature of their public appearance.

Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, former Foreign Minister of Somaliland and Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks, has issued an urgent appeal to the international community. Her intervention highlights the destruction of homes and mosques, and the tragic loss of innocent lives, including mothers and children, while calling for immediate protection of vulnerable communities and accountability for the perpetrators.

The Liyuu Police, operating as President Mustafe’s personal militia rather than a legitimate security force, has a documented history of extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian displacement. Under Mustafe’s leadership, the force has increasingly been accused of using its state mandate to advance Ogaden clan interests, continuing a long-standing pattern of Ogaden dominance in the region’s governance structure that has historically excluded Isaaq representation. This entrenched political monopoly has allowed the force to operate with particular brutality against Isaaq communities.

Ethiopia’s federal government’s recent intervention marks a significant shift from its initial silence, suggesting growing concern over the destabilizing effects of the violence. The deployment of federal troops, if confirmed, would represent the first direct challenge to the Liyuu Police’s unrestricted operations in the region.

The assault appears designed not just to kill and maim, but to make the area uninhabitable for its Isaaq residents – a strategy that threatens to destabilize the intricate web of cross-border relations that have historically helped maintain regional stability. The systematic targeting of these communities risks undermining decades of diplomatic work between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa.

For the residents of Dacawaley, the attack represents more than just another incident of violence – it stands as evidence of state-sponsored terror orchestrated by President Mustafe’s administration to advance tribal interests under the guise of regional security. As casualty numbers continue to rise, the massacre adds to a growing list of atrocities for which the regional president and his paramilitary force must be held accountable.

The targeting of civilians by the Ogaden-dominated Liyuu Police threatens to destabilize an already fragile regional balance, where colonial boundaries have failed to erase centuries-old tribal bonds and rivalries. As international attention focuses on the massacre, the incident highlights not only the dangerous intersection of state power and tribal politics but also the potential unraveling of strategic partnerships that have long underpinned stability in the Horn of Africa.

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Investigative Reports

About the Author

Proxy Conflict:

Diplomatic Maneuvering:

Ties with Militant Groups:

Strategic Interests:

About the Author

Appointment Raises Questions About Direction.

Republic of Somaliland’s First Post-Election Transition Brings Focus on Governance Reform

Key Points:

Introduction

The Airspace Sell-Off: A Case Study in Miscalculation

Here’s how it unfolded:

Strategic Missteps: Arrogance of Pro-Talks Leaders

Muse Bihi’s Legacy

What is next?

About the Author:

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