Somalilanders: Its Time to Speak Up and Course-Correct the Somaliland Government

July 9, 2025

By Dr Adali Warsame

For the past three decades Somaliland’s political leadership has been dominated by a small opportunistic and parasitic cabal of elderly men – and increasingly a group of younger tribal and ideological followers and enablers, who appear intent to take over from them and continue in the same vein. These two groups who continue to rotate between public offices, ministries, and political parties, going unchecked and unchallenged, with absolutely devastating consequences for the Republic of Somaliland and its 6.7 million citizens.

Despite citizens and Somaliland’s political elite’s extraordinary sacrifices in previous decades, to liberate Somaliland from Somalia’s tyranny, terror and genocide, Somaliland’s youthful citizens are now demanding more from Somaliland’s government. The population is demanding reliable healthcare, decent infrastructure, economic opportunities, high standards of living, and world leading public institutions. The stagnation of recent years, which has been the product of a rotten political culture that prioritises loyalty, kinship, and nepotism over merit, capability, and suitability – will no longer be tolerated.

When President Abdirahman Irro and the Wadanni party were elected, the people of Somaliland exhibited scenes of jubilation and euphoria, for they had high hopes for the new administration. Yet, a mere six months later, the country faces a moral, political and national crisis, and apparent absence or inadequacy of leadership at the top political offices – including the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Finance, to name only a few.

The cumulative effect of months of mismanagement on top of the previous Kulmiye’s administration mismangement, neglect, and willful inaction is now visible in real human suffering: excess deaths in hospitals, chronic poverty, mass unemployment, and a broken state. What makes this crisis all the more devastating is the silence of those who know better.

Because these failings are no longer just slowing progress, but they are in fact costing lives, it is now more imperative than ever that those with skepticism and critical thinking speak up. And, to quote a book title, with “Barbarians at the Gate” in the form of Somalia’s invading militias and their ongoing invasion of and excursions deep into Eastern Somaliland, time is of the essence like never before.

In this context, where are the voices of Somaliland’s intelligentsia, its technical experts, its educated class and young professionals — both at home and abroad? Where are the public thinkers, the civil servants, the reformers, the diaspora specialists, the former campaigners?

Where are the voices of sanity, of clarity, of honesty and integrity? Many have retreated into private disillusionment or quiet resignation.

Some have chosen cushy careers, diaspora comforts, or contented themselves with online commentary or debates in cafés. Yet the majority have remained silent in the face of a callous political cabal they know to not only be unfit but also deeply damaging to the country and costing countless Somalilanders lives.

This silence is no longer an option. It is time to speak up. It is time for action.

It is time to speak up. Clearly. Consistently. Collectively. Not for symbolism, but for the survival of a republic that many fought to build — and which is now under real threat, not just from outside, but even moreso from within.

A New Government, But with the Same Old Approach

When Abdirahman Irro and the Waddani Party won the presidency, many young Somalilanders – especially professionals at home and abroad – supported the movement with the belief that it would usher in a new, capable administration. That hope is now being replaced with complete disappointment, disillusionment and abhorrence.

Instead of merit-based appointments, the Irro administration has continued the same practices: prioritising political loyalty, clan appeasement, and patronage over competence. Critical positions are not filled by the most suitably qualified and appropriate, but rather through nepotism, clan appeasement, rewarding party loyalists Rather than promoting excellence and progress, President Irro appears to be reinforcing and rewarding the culture of incompetence, treason and impunity.

Even the few young professionals included in this administration are largely tokenistic in nature. These individuals do not appear to have been selected not for their skills, experience, qualificarions or ideas, but because they pose no threat to the existing order. Many gained their positions through clan quotas, party connections, or NGO backgrounds, and most subscribe to the same core assumption as their elders: that public office is a pathway to personal advancement, that roles in government are handed out based on clan quotas, and that the best way is to maintain the status quo, do as little as possible while in post, and amass personal wealth and profile.

Many do not even sincerely believe they have the capacity, capability or ability to change the status quo. Even before taking on their roles, they indicated privately that they expected to change or achieve very little while in those roles. Their intention would be to hold the role as a means to an end, not to deliver transformation of the offices which would be under their purview.

Some view governance as a scaled-up NGO project — mistaking the prior small scale local NGOs with which they were involved as being adequate preparation to wield the serious statecraft which comes with the great offices of State of Somaliland’s government. This is not a slight or an insult on their experiences, but a sober reflection of their limitations and lack of real world experiences. Managing an NGO workshop or an awareness campaign, or writing a theoretical masters dissertation or PHD thesis is not the same as executing large scale government programmes. And without the right vision, moral compass, and real world experience, their education and youth become mere tools to be exploited by more experienced unseen hands of dysfunction, mismanagement and corruption. Also without the right moral training and guidance, an educated man in public office becomes a menace to society.

Somaliland cannot afford on-the-job training. It needs leaders who can execute with discipline, clarity, and urgency — because citizens’ lives depend on it. President Abdirahman Irro has fallen short of citizens expectations with the esceptionally poor quality of people he has appointed into critical positions. Unless he changes course, his government seems on track to facilitate failure, mismanagement and corruption. I wonder, does he want that to be his legacy?

Ideological Contradictions: Appointing the Treacherous & Rewarding the Treasonous

Recycling failed old politicians like Abdirahman Beyle, Somalia’s former Minister of Finance & Minister Foreign Affairs, or Mohammad Abdulahi Omar from the Silanyo era, who presided over the disasterous 2012 conference (which reinstated international recognition to Somalia’s hitherto internationally unrecognised failed government) has been shockingly tin-eared and lacking in self awareness. Whatever vestiges of respect the Abdirahman Irro Presidency may have expressed for the sanctity of Somaliland’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the appointment of these highly disloyal, disingenuous and duplicitous two men has done irreparable damage to his credibility. It has conveyed a message that the Abdirahman Irro Presidency is perhaps just not serious, genuine or sincere about protecting and defending Somaliland’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Worse still, several senior figures in Irro’s administration like Abdulqadir Jirde have disappointingly, regrettably, yet unashamedly, expressed sympathy for the Greater Somalia ideology. This has compounded the contradictions, illogicality and incoherence of appointing people like Beyle who have previously held positions within Somalia’s federal government — raising serious questions about the Irro Presidency and Wadanni’s Party’s leadership’s ideological coherence and sincerety about Somaliland’s sovereignty, even amongst party loyalists and amongst party members.

These appointments not only betray the principles on which Somaliland was founded, but they also undermine the Republic of Somaliland claim to recognition and sovereignty. How can the government advocate for international recognition when it promotes officials who previously worked against it? How can citizens be asked to sacrifice for a cause when their own government rewards people who worked against it?

This is not ideological diversity — it is political recklessness, negligence and a dangerous and offensive disregard for the common sense sensibilities which hold the loyal people of this country together. It marks a dangerous and deliberate appointment of pro Greater Somalia proponents at the heart of Somaliland’s government institutions.

Non-Recognition as Excuse and Shield

A persistent myth used to justify governance failure in Somaliland is that everything can be blamed on the country’s lack of international recognition. This is a misleading narrative that masks deeper problems.

Non-recognition does not explain the appointment of unqualified officials, the absence of policy reform, or the looting of public funds. It does not prevent long-term planning, institutional development, or infrastructure delivery. These are internal failures — and they must be owned as such.

Yet Somaliland’s political class repeatedly uses non-recognition as a shield — feigning helplessness and pretending that nothing can be done until foreign governments say otherwise. This learned helplessness has become a national affliction — a convenient way to avoid accountability and delay difficult decisions.

Meanwhile, the rhetoric of recognition continues, but without matching action. There is no coherent foreign policy strategy, no professional diplomatic corps, and no meaningful attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of Somaliland’s institutions in the eyes of the world. Recognition is invoked rhetorically, but abandoned operationally.

Wasted Opportunities: The Ministry of Finance, The Central Bank, Foreign Affairs & Missions, and International Trade

Somaliland’s Ministry of Finance should be the beating heart which leads Somaliland’s national transformation during the Irro Presidency. So should the central bank, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Representative Offices abroad. Yet these have been reduced to be tools of patronage, kleptocracy and nepotism. Instead of appointing seasoned experts in public finance, macroeconomics, or fiscal policy, appointments and skilled communicators who can communicate with and advocate on Somaliland’s behalf with the world, the offices are filled with unqualified people appointed based on clan, party loyalty or nepotism. The result: stagnant growth, outdated revenue models, a state without a coherent economic plan, lack of foreign policy, and a virtyally absence Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

When it comes to thr Ministry of Health, maternal and infant mortality remain high. Basic medications are unavailable, and rural communities remain cut off. Health policy is rudderless, feckless, hapless and systems are collapsing. Thousands of deaths occur each year not because of a lack of resources alone, but because of neglect, incompetence, and wilful mismanagement and neglect of the healthcare system. Under the Irro Administration, expect little to no improvement.

What Somaliland Needs Now

What Somaliland lacks is it is professionalism, accountability, and moral seriousness. It needs:

Public servants chosen for merit and capability
Institutions shielded from tribal nepotism and political interference
A clear national strategy rooted in long-term development
A leadership that understands public service, not entitlement and self enrichment

There is no shortage of capable Somalilanders. Across the globe, there are professionals who have delivered world leading public, professional and financial services, worked in some of the largest governments in the world, and led serious private & public institutions. But the Irro Presidency and Wadanni Party appear to be actively and deliberately excluding them, fearing their independence, their integrity, and their refusal to serve narrow personal and Party interest, instead of the public and national interest.

To the Intelligentsia and Young Professionals: Speak Up

This is not a symbolic appeal. It is a national call to action.

To the thinkers, professionals, researchers, policy experts, activists, and youth — inside and outside the country — you must speak up. You must challenge this decline. You must refuse to participate in the culture of nepotism and corruption that has consumed Somaliland’s politics and appears to be consuming the Irro and Wadanni Presidency.

Remaining silent in the face of mismanagement, corruption, neglect, negligence, malfeasance in public office is not neutrality, is not civility, is not patriotic. It is being complicit in the destruction of the Republic of Somaliland which we all so dearly love.

Stop waiting for permission from the very people who fear your voice.
Stop assuming that change will emerge from inside the same elite circles.
Stop remaining silent, speaking in private circles, or adopting a wait and see mode

If you as Somaliland’s capable class remains passive, the outcome is predictable: further decline, growing hopelessness, and preventable suffering of Somaliland’s citizens. This is not about political rivalry. It is about Sonaliland’s survival — and the human cost of our continued inaction.

So speak up. Speak up loudly, clearly and forcefully. Speak up unequivocally. Claim your space. Play your role. Demand better. Because Somalilanders’ lives — and the future of the Republic of Somaliland — are on the line.

About the Author

Dr Adali Warsame is a political commentator and public policy professional, who is a long time observer of Somaliland politics. He writing focuses on standing up for the dignity of Somaliland’s citizens, who appear to be forgotten in the melee that is everyday Somaliland and Horn of Africa politics.

Adali is an unapologetic Somalilander. He is passionate about achieving justice for the forgotten Isaaq Genocide victims, stopping the doomed Somaliland-Somalia talks and international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.

Critical Reflections on Abdulqadir Jirde’s Interview with Abdijaliil: A Window into Somalia-Weyn Revisionism

Staff

July 6, 2025

The recent interview between Somaliland politician Abdulqaadir Jirde and Abdijaliil—a known advocate for the Somalia-Weyn narrative—was more than just a political exchange. It offered a revealing glimpse into a persistent ideological current: a nostalgic vision of Somali unity rooted in the legacy of the Kacaan regime. Spanning over an hour, the conversation was framed as an open dialogue, yet in substance, it unfolded as a revisionist account of a political experiment long regarded as untenable.

Rather than offering critical self-reflection, Jirde’s remarks demonstrated the enduring influence of a narrative forged during a time of centralized authoritarianism and ideological conformity. His interview served less as a platform for political clarity and more as a reaffirmation of a discredited ideal.

Early Indoctrination and Unquestioned Loyalties

Jirde openly reflects on being raised within the ideological framework of the Kacaan regime. In a telling metaphor, he likens his exposure to the Somalia-Weyn ideal to receiving it “like breast milk”—a phrase that underscores how deeply embedded and emotionally internalized the narrative became during his formative years.

The proverb, ”العلم في الصغر كالنقش على الحجر“ (“Knowledge acquired in youth is like engraving on stone”), captures the essence of his political formation—not as the result of inquiry, but of early and lasting imprint. The danger, however, lies in mistaking ideological familiarity for historical truth. Jirde’s commentary reveals a political worldview shaped not by critical evaluation of the past but by inherited loyalty to a vision that no longer holds empirical or moral coherence.

The Ogaden War: Between National Myth and Historical Record

A striking moment in the interview arises when Jirde defends Siyad Barre’s 1977 invasion of Ethiopia. He presents the conflict as a principled decision to reject a federation proposed in Yemen and instead defend Somali territorial integrity. This narrative, however, selectively omits critical context and evidence.

Major General Mohamed Nur Galaal, a senior commander during the conflict, has provided a markedly different account. In his detailed interviews on Xasuus Reeb (HCTV, Vol. 2, 3 & 4), Galaal describes how the war was engineered under Soviet influence following the USSR’s expulsion from Egypt. He further alleges that Barre had acted as an informant for Ethiopian intelligence prior to taking power.

Of particular concern is Galaal’s claim that Isaaq soldiers were disproportionately deployed and used as de facto human shields. Their units—and in some cases, even their personal vehicles—were sent to the front lines, suffering disproportionately high casualties. These accounts challenge the idea of a unified national struggle and instead point to a war shaped by ethnic stratification and Cold War geopolitics. Jirde’s failure to address this context—despite his awareness of such testimony—reflects a selective historical memory that serves political nostalgia more than factual accuracy.

Structural Imbalances and Symbolic Inclusion

Jirde briefly concedes that during the Somali Republic era, power and resources were heavily centralized in Mogadishu. Northerners, particularly those from present-day Somaliland, were often placed in visible but secondary roles—what could be termed symbolic inclusion rather than substantive representation.

Yet even this acknowledgment is presented without critical interrogation. Jirde offers no meaningful reflection on how such structural imbalances contributed to the collapse of the union or the sense of alienation felt in Somaliland. Instead, he maintains a romantic attachment to the idea of unity, even as he admits the union functioned on unequal terms. This contradiction speaks to the depth of ideological conditioning and the reluctance among some former elites to fully reckon with the past.

Silencing Critical Inquiry: A Fragile Narrative

At one point in the interview, Jirde begins to question whether Somali unity ever truly existed in any functional or inclusive form. Before he can expand on this thought, the interviewer abruptly changes the subject. Whether intentional or not, this editorial redirection reflects an underlying fragility: the Somalia-Weyn narrative cannot withstand sustained scrutiny.

The brief historical clarity offered—where Jirde acknowledges Somaliland’s distinct colonial experience and independent statehood in 1960—is quickly overshadowed by a return to the unexamined ideal of unity. This evasiveness not only undermines the credibility of the interview but also illustrates the lengths to which some narratives rely on omission and selective framing to preserve ideological coherence.

Political Rhetoric and the Youth: A Crisis of Critical Engagement

Perhaps the most concerning dimension of Jirde’s public role is the influence he continues to exert on Somaliland’s youth. During the most recent election cycle, he appeared on MM Somali TV and claimed that Somaliland is inherently tribal, asserting that no single clan could “rule” over others. On its surface, this might appear to promote inclusivity. However, in context, it read more as a warning: if political outcomes do not align with specific interests, their legitimacy will be challenged.

This form of rhetoric does not foster democratic engagement—it encourages political brinkmanship. It reinforces a worldview in which clan loyalty trumps civic responsibility and in which historical accountability is subordinated to factional loyalty.

That such views continue to resonate among segments of the youth reflects a larger failure in political education. It suggests a need for alternative intellectual leadership—voices that prioritize evidence-based reasoning, democratic values, and historical integrity over recycled ideologies and partisan mythmaking.

The Cost of Unexamined Nostalgia

Abdulqaadir Jirde’s continued advocacy for Somalia-Weyn is not merely a personal conviction; it is symptomatic of a broader intellectual inertia among political elites who have not come to terms with the structural and historical failures of the past. To equate the unrealized vision of Somalia-Weyn—and to assert its inevitable resurgence—with historically grounded political formations such as the Ottoman Empire is not only analytically unsound, but also historically indefensible.

The repeated invocation of Somalia-Weyn as an enduring ideal does more than ignore reality—it actively undermines Somaliland’s sovereign identity, its political development, and its post-conflict reconciliation efforts. Nostalgia, in this context, becomes not just unproductive but obstructive.

The lesson here extends beyond Jirde as an individual. It speaks to the importance of cultivating a political culture that values historical truth, critical inquiry, and democratic accountability. Somaliland’s youth—and indeed its future—deserve leadership grounded in reality, not in the sentimental retelling of failed projects.

Author’s Note: This article is intended to encourage informed and respectful dialogue about the legacy of political ideologies in the Somali context. It does not seek to vilify individuals but to promote a critical re-engagement with historical narratives as Somaliland continues its path toward sustainable sovereignty and democratic maturity.

About the Author

Nasir Xuseen is a Somaliland activist and analyst with a background in accounting, finance, and international relations. A member of the UK Somaliland Alliance, he focuses on sovereignty, post-conflict governance, and political analysis of the Horn of Africa.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

Somaliland Recognition Moving Beyond Symbolism Toward Strategic Diplomacy

Staff

July 6, 2025

For more than three decades, Somaliland has stood out in the Horn of Africa as a rare example of stability, democratic governance, and peace. In a region often defined by fragility and conflict, Somaliland has managed to build functioning institutions, hold credible elections, and maintain internal security. Yet despite this remarkable progress, formal diplomatic recognition continues to be withheld by the international community.

One of the most significant challenges to Somaliland’s diplomatic cause lies not just in international politics, but in the absence of a coherent and credible foreign policy strategy. Rather than pursuing a long-term roadmap for recognition rooted in law, diplomacy, and national interest, successive administrations have defaulted to reactive, short-term tactics. Over the past decade in particular, Somaliland has placed increasing faith in foreign lobbying firms, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. These firms, while promising access and influence, have delivered little of lasting substance. Draft bills such as H.R.7170, S.3861, H.R.10402, and most recently H.R.3992 have all followed the same pattern: introduced with optimism, briefly mentioned in the press, then quietly forgotten in committee.

It is important to clarify that hiring lobbyists, in itself, is not inherently problematic. In fact, strategic lobbying can serve as a useful complement to official diplomacy especially when seeking to raise awareness, shape narratives, or open doors in foreign policy circles. However, lobbying must be part of a broader, government-led diplomatic strategy. It cannot substitute for statecraft, legal advocacy, or regional engagement. When used in isolation, and without oversight, lobbying risks becoming a costly exercise in symbolism rather than a tool for advancing national interests.

Despite the millions of dollars spent on these lobbying contracts, they have yet to yield binding policies or strategic leverage. What is perhaps more damaging is the way some domestic media outlets amplify these efforts, often portraying them as diplomatic breakthroughs. These narratives, sometimes politically motivated or commercially influenced, give Somalilanders the false impression that international recognition is imminent when in reality, these bills are largely symbolic and rarely lead to substantive engagement. This misrepresentation misleads the public, masks policy failures, and diverts attention from the structural reforms and serious diplomacy Somaliland actually needs.

Contrast this with earlier periods in Somaliland’s political history. The first two administrations, led by Presidents Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and Dahir Riyale Kahin, focused not only on reconciliation and rebuilding, but also on laying the groundwork for responsible foreign policy. Their emphasis on institution-building and quiet diplomacy allowed Somaliland to emerge as a serious actor in regional and international conversations. President Riyale’s 2008 visit to the United States and his meetings with senior officials from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense demonstrated how principled engagement could yield attention and respect, even without formal recognition.

That same year, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer visited Hargeisa and acknowledged Somaliland’s democratic achievements and role in regional security. Although the U.S. stopped short of recognizing Somaliland, the dialogue was based on mutual respect and policy substance. Similarly, the 2005 African Union fact-finding mission, which I personally engaged with as a member of civil society in Burao, offered an important precedent. Led by AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, the mission recognized Somaliland’s case as historically and politically unique. Its final report, though not a declaration of recognition, remains a powerful affirmation of Somaliland’s legitimacy as a self-governing territory.

Unfortunately, this pragmatic diplomacy was later abandoned. The turning point came in 2012 when Somaliland agreed to suspend its international legal campaign and instead pursue direct talks with the Somali government. This decision, while perhaps well-intentioned, weakened Somaliland’s legal posture and allowed the international community to prematurely elevate Somalia’s transitional government to full sovereign status. That recognition has since been used to block Somaliland’s access to diplomatic channels and global forums.

Rather than learning from this experience, subsequent administrations have doubled down on symbolic foreign lobbying while neglecting domestic reforms, legal advocacy, and regional diplomacy. Millions have been spent on contracts with foreign consultants whose interests do not always align with those of the Somaliland people. At the same time, there is still no comprehensive, transparent foreign policy document outlining our recognition strategy. No clearly defined priorities, no phased approach, no measurable diplomatic milestones. Even our strongest legal arguments for recognition remain scattered, inconsistently presented, and largely unpublished in international forums.

A credible and strategic government would make this legal case the foundation of its diplomacy. It would consolidate Somaliland’s legal and historical claim to statehood, publish it as a formal brief, and present it to both African and international bodies. It would not rely solely on emotional appeals or moral persuasion, but instead make the case based on governance, stability, and adherence to international law.

The reality is that recognition will only come when Somaliland becomes too stable, too prosperous, and too strategically valuable to ignore. The Berbera Port agreement with the United Arab Emirates did more to raise Somaliland’s profile than any bill introduced in a foreign parliament. Investors and global partners are drawn to states that offer security, reliable infrastructure, and a favorable business environment. These are the forms of leverage that matter. Instead of allocating millions to opaque lobbying contracts, we should be investing in legal reform, infrastructure, regional integration, and economic competitiveness.

Sadly, recent administrations have often prioritized headlines over substance, and international recognition has become a tool of domestic political theater. Declarations that “recognition is near” serve local audiences but carry little weight abroad. Diplomatic credibility cannot be built on spectacle. It must be earned through consistency, competence, and vision.

Somaliland must break this cycle. The newly elected government has a unique opportunity to reset our foreign policy and reinvest in strategies that produce real, measurable results. This means establishing a clear national recognition strategy, engaging African partners more meaningfully, restoring legal diplomacy, and ensuring that every dollar spent abroad is transparently documented and publicly justified. More importantly, it means aligning our foreign policy with our domestic development priorities building legal institutions, ensuring economic opportunity, and strengthening democratic governance.

The people of Somaliland have sacrificed too much to be shortchanged by empty symbolism. They deserve a recognition campaign that reflects the maturity and resilience of their state. This requires honest dialogue, public accountability, and a shift from outsourced advocacy to homegrown leadership.

Our place among the community of nations will not be handed to us out of sympathy. It will be earned through law, through strength, and through strategy.

About the Author

Mr. Mohamed Aideed, co-founder of the BARWAAQO Party in Somaliland and the founder of Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organization (SOYDAVO). Mr. Aideed holds a Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from Kampala University. Mr. Aideed is a commentator on on East and Horn of Africa politics, he has published notable work on the Somaliland-Somalia Talks.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

The Cost of Incompetence: How Unqualified Appointments Fuel Corruption and Erode Public Trust in Governance

Staff

July 4, 2025

Introduction

Governance and Public Service in Somaliland

Since its self-declared independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has pursued a relatively peaceful and stable trajectory compared to other parts of the region. It has built nascent democratic institutions, held multiple elections, and maintained security through hybrid governance mechanisms that combine modern state structures with traditional clan-based systems (Bradbury, 2008). However, despite these achievements, Somaliland’s public administration continues to face structural challenges, particularly regarding institutional capacity, rule of law, and public sector efficiency.

Public service delivery in Somaliland is largely managed through ministries and local government authorities, yet the sector is severely underfunded, understaffed, and lacks standardized human resource systems. Recruitment processes remain largely opaque and informal, heavily influenced by political, clan, and personal connections rather than qualifications or merit (Abokor et al., 2010). This undermines the development of a professional and accountable civil service essential for the effective delivery of services and implementation of public policies. Since its self-declared independence in 1991, Somaliland has established a unique hybrid political system that blends traditional authority with modern democratic structures. Its governance system is founded on a combination of formal institutions such as an elected president, bicameral legislature, and judiciary and customary clan-based mechanisms of conflict resolution and power distribution (Bradbury, 2008). This hybrid model was critical in maintaining peace, rebuilding after civil war, and laying the foundation for stability in a region marked by turmoil.

The Somaliland government is organized into three branches: the executive, led by the President and a cabinet of ministers; the legislature, consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Elders (Guurti); and the judiciary, with courts operating at district, regional, and national levels. Local governments also play a key role in service delivery and community administration, though their capacity is often constrained by financial and technical limitations (Eubank, 2012).

However, while democratic elections have been held regularly, the system still heavily relies on informal practices—especially in public appointments. Ministries and local authorities are often staffed not through transparent recruitment but via appointments made at the discretion of political elites, often without adherence to clear professional standards or job requirements (Renders & Terlinden, 2010).

What Constitutes “Unqualified Appointments”?

Unqualified appointments refer to the practice of assigning individuals to public positions for which they lack the minimum academic qualifications, professional experience, or technical competencies required to perform the role effectively. These individuals may be appointed based on familial, political, or clan affiliations rather than objective criteria (OECD, 2017).

In Somaliland’s case, appointments are often made without transparent recruitment procedures, job descriptions, or performance evaluations. The absence of a formalized civil service commission with regulatory power exacerbates this issue, as does limited oversight by the legislative and judicial branches. Consequently, individuals with limited or no experience in governance, finance, project management, or public policy are often entrusted with leading key government institutions or managing significant budgets.

This practice not only weakens administrative competence but also fuels resentment among educated and qualified youth who are excluded from opportunities based on merit, further eroding public trust in state institutions (Harper, 2022).

How Incompetence Appointments Affect Somaliland’s State-Building

The reliance on nepotism and favoritism in public appointments has serious implications for Somaliland’s state-building process. At its core, state-building requires the creation of effective, inclusive, and legitimate institutions that can provide services, enforce the rule of law, and promote citizen participation. However, the appointment of unqualified individuals undermines each of these pillars in several key ways:

Institutional Weakness and Inefficiency: Incompetent leadership at the helm of ministries or departments results in poor planning, implementation failures, and mismanagement of public funds. This weakens state institutions and impedes the provision of critical services such as health, education, and infrastructure (World Bank, 2020).
Corruption and Patronage Networks: Nepotism often leads to the establishment of patron-client networks that prioritize personal and clan interests over the national good. This fosters corruption and reduces transparency, particularly in procurement, hiring, and budgeting processes (Transparency International, 2023).
Erosion of Public Trust and Legitimacy: When citizens see public offices occupied by unqualified individuals with poor performance records, trust in government erodes. This loss of confidence can lead to political apathy, decreased civic engagement, and resistance to tax compliance or rule of law (Grindle, 2012).
Marginalization of Women and Minorities: Nepotistic systems often perpetuate gender and social exclusion. Qualified women and members of minority clans are frequently overlooked, further marginalizing them from decision-making processes (Ahmed, 2019).
Brain Drain and Youth Disengagement: Educated youth who feel blocked by unfair hiring practices are more likely to migrate or disengage from public life. This drains the country of human capital that is essential for long-term development and reform.

Role of Clan-Based Politics and Power-Sharing

Clan identity plays a central role in Somaliland’s political life. The clan system has historically been both a source of resilience and a barrier to institutional development. On one hand, clan-based negotiations were crucial in mediating peace and establishing a national charter after the collapse of the Somali state. On the other, it has entrenched a quota-based approach to public power, where representation and appointments are distributed across major clans to maintain balance and avoid conflict (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007).

This system of clan power-sharing has led to an informal but deeply rooted expectation that all major clans should be proportionally represented in state institutions. While this has prevented large-scale political violence, it has also compromised meritocratic principles. As a result, public positions particularly at the ministerial and managerial levels—are often filled based on clan affiliation rather than competence. Appointees are expected to serve the interests of their sub-clans, which can create conflicting loyalties and reduce institutional neutrality (Walls & Kibble, 2011).

The politicization of clan identity in appointments has further entrenched patronage networks, creating a “jobs for the boys” culture that prioritizes loyalty and kinship ties over qualifications and performance (Grindle, 2012). This not only affects efficiency but also limits inclusivity, as women and marginalized clans are often left out of the power-sharing equation.

Challenges in Institutionalizing a Merit-Based Public Service System

Somaliland faces several structural and political challenges in building a merit-based public service. One major issue is the absence of a strong, independent civil service commission with the authority to standardize recruitment, enforce job qualifications, and oversee career progression. In practice, most appointments especially in the civil service and public enterprises are made directly by the President, ministers, or regional governors, often without competitive processes or public advertisement (Abokor et al., 2010).

Another challenge is the weak enforcement of rules and regulations related to public service conduct. Although there are frameworks such as the Somaliland Civil Service Law (Law No. 31/2004), implementation is inconsistent, and oversight bodies such as the Auditor General’s Office lack autonomy and resources. The politicization of civil service positions undermines impartiality, accountability, and performance-based evaluation (Harper, 2022).

Moreover, the culture of patronage and informality remains pervasive. Appointments are frequently used as political rewards or tools for maintaining clan alliances. This undermines institutional development and leads to high turnover, as appointees are replaced following political changes rather than performance reviews. In addition, budget constraints and donor dependence affect the government’s ability to recruit and retain qualified professionals. Many skilled Somalilanders emigrate or work for international NGOs where salaries and working conditions are better, resulting in a capacity vacuum in key sectors such as education, health, and finance (World Bank, 2020).

Ultimately, while Somaliland has made notable strides in self-governance, the entrenchment of clan-based power-sharing and weak institutional frameworks continue to obstruct the creation of a transparent and meritocratic public service—one that is vital for sustainable state-building, inclusive development, and democratic consolidation.

The Nature and Drivers of Unqualified Appointments in Somaliland

The appointment of unqualified individuals to public positions in Somaliland is a reflection of deeper structural and socio-political challenges. This trend undermines institutional effectiveness, service delivery, and public trust, and is largely driven by clan-based patronage, and the absence of strong human resource governance frameworks.

Influence of Clan Affiliation, Political Patronage, and Personal Loyalty

In Somaliland’s post-conflict political landscape, clan identity continues to shape access to power and public resources. Ministries and state institutions are often treated as extensions of clan influence, with leaders pressured to “balance” appointments across dominant clans to maintain political harmony (Renders & Terlinden, 2010). While this system has helped maintain peace, it has also entrenched a system where competence is secondary to representation and loyalty. Furthermore, individuals appointed through political patronage often feel more accountable to their political sponsors or clans than to the institution or the public they serve (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007).

This dynamic not only limits performance-based accountability but also creates fragile institutions where leadership changes result in high staff turnover and policy discontinuity. It also deepens social exclusion, as minority clans and women—who lack strong patronage networks—are disproportionately affected by favoritism in recruitment.

Lack of Clear Human Resource Policies and Weak Oversight Institutions

The absence of standardized recruitment and promotion mechanisms has allowed informal practices to dominate public sector hiring. Although Somaliland has a Civil Service Law (Law No. 31/2004), it is rarely enforced in practice, and many institutions operate without job descriptions, performance evaluation criteria, or open competition for posts (Harper, 2022). Moreover, oversight bodies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Civil Service Commission lack the authority, independence, and resources to enforce compliance.

These institutional gaps create a fertile environment for non-merit-based hiring and limit the ability of the government to attract, retain, and promote qualified personnel. The result is a civil service that is not only understaffed but often misaligned with national development goals.

Consequences of Appointing Unqualified Individuals

a) Increased Corruption and Mismanagement

One of the most visible consequences of appointing unqualified individuals to public positions is the rise in corruption and financial mismanagement. When those in charge of public funds lack the necessary skills and ethical grounding, they are more likely to engage in corrupt practices or fail to prevent them. In Somaliland, ministries often suffer from poor financial oversight, which leads to the misallocation or embezzlement of public resources (Transparency International, 2023).

For example, procurement processes in several key sectors are often manipulated due to weak controls and lack of technical know-how among senior officials. Without training in budgeting, accounting, or procurement compliance, unqualified leaders are unable to establish proper internal controls, leaving public institutions vulnerable to theft and inefficiency (World Bank, 2020).

In many cases, audits and reviews—if they occur at all—are ignored or lack enforcement mechanisms. Institutions such as the Office of the Auditor General and Anti-Corruption Commission are under-resourced and lack independence, making it difficult to hold high-level appointees accountable (Harper, 2022).

b) Poor Public Service Delivery

Another consequence is the deterioration of service delivery in critical sectors such as education, health, water, and infrastructure. When public offices are led by individuals without technical or administrative qualifications, project planning, implementation, and monitoring are severely compromised.

For instance, the education sector in Somaliland has suffered from inconsistent policy reforms and poor resource allocation, partially due to leadership gaps at the ministerial and regional levels. Schools remain underfunded and teachers unpaid because unqualified administrators are unable to plan budgets effectively or advocate for sustainable funding (Ahmed, 2019).

Similarly, in the health sector, hospitals face a chronic shortage of medical supplies, delayed salaries, and weak referral systems. Reports from civil society indicate that health department heads often lack health administration backgrounds, leading to poor coordination and inefficient service delivery (Abokor et al., 2010). Infrastructure projects, such as road or water development, are frequently delayed or fail entirely due to poor contract management and lack of engineering expertise among leadership.The long-term impact is public dissatisfaction, inequality in access to basic services, and failure to meet development goals.

c) Erosion of Institutional Trust and Legitimacy

Perhaps the most damaging impact of unqualified appointments is the erosion of public trust in government institutions. Citizens become disillusioned when they see individuals rewarded with public office not for their ability but for their connections. This undermines the credibility of state institutions and weakens their legitimacy.

In Somaliland, youth in particular express growing frustration at the lack of opportunities and fairness in the job market. Educated young people who invest in degrees and technical training often find themselves locked out of government employment due to nepotism and patronage networks (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007). This drives brain drain, as qualified professionals emigrate or shift to the NGO sector, leaving government institutions further weakened.

Furthermore, the lack of institutional meritocracy diminishes the will of citizens to engage with the state, pay taxes, or participate in democratic processes. When citizens lose faith in the system, democratic consolidation and peacebuilding efforts are put at risk (Eubank, 2012).

5. Voices from the Field: Local Examples and Testimonies

To understand the human impact of unqualified appointments, it is essential to listen to local actors on the ground. Civil society leaders, journalists, and professionals in Somaliland consistently point to public frustration over appointment practices that prioritize loyalty over merit.

A civil society organizer in Hargeisa stated during a public policy dialogue in 2023:

“Many ministers are replaced every year, and each time they come with their relatives or clan members. Policies change, priorities change, and public servants are demoralized.”

In 2022, the controversial appointment of a regional education director with no teaching experience triggered backlash from teachers’ unions, who protested that classroom performance and examination standards were declining due to leadership failures.

Journalists from Horn Diplomat and Somaliland Chronicle have also reported on instances where politically connected individuals secured high-level posts despite lacking basic credentials, often after electoral periods when power-sharing deals are renegotiated.

Grassroots youth groups in Burao and Berbera have highlighted how clan affiliation trumps competence, particularly in government scholarships, internships, and entry-level civil service roles. One youth leader remarked:

“If you’re not connected, you’re not considered. Even with a Master’s degree, you sit at home while someone with high school gets a director’s job.”

These testimonies underscore the need for institutional reform that prioritizes fairness, transparency, and merit in public appointments.

6. Pathways to Reform and Merit-Based Governance

Despite these challenges, there are clear pathways Somaliland can pursue to build a more competent and accountable public administration.

a) Establishment of a Professional Civil Service Commission

A key reform priority is the creation and empowerment of a Civil Service Commission with full independence and legal authority to oversee recruitment, promotion, and discipline across the public sector. The commission should ensure job advertisements are open, qualifications are enforced, and interviews are competency-based. It must also be gender-inclusive and regionally balanced to build trust among all communities.

b) Transparency in Recruitment and Promotion

To rebuild public trust, recruitment processes must be publicly advertised, with clear criteria for selection and objective evaluation tools. Performance-based promotion and demotion mechanisms should be institutionalized. This includes regular performance appraisals, leadership assessments, and audit reports that are made publicly available.

Digital platforms can also be leveraged to improve access to job opportunities and monitor recruitment integrity, reducing opportunities for corruption and favoritism (OECD, 2017).

c) Role of Civil Society, Media, and Youth

Civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media play a critical watchdog role. They must be supported to investigate and expose corrupt practices in hiring, advocate for transparency, and conduct civic education campaigns on meritocracy.

Youth-led movements, such as university alumni networks and job seekers’ associations, should be encouraged to demand reform and monitor appointment processes at local and national levels.

Donors and development partners can support these efforts through technical assistance, training, and funding to build capacity and accountability tools.

d) Regional and International Best Practices

Somaliland can draw lessons from other African countries that have transitioned toward more merit-based systems. For example, Rwanda has implemented public service reforms that require all senior civil servants to pass through competency-based interviews and performance contracts.

In Ghana and Botswana, independent civil service commissions oversee recruitment and promotion, reducing political interference. These models demonstrate that institutional meritocracy is achievable, even in resource-constrained contexts, when political will and legal enforcement are present (Grindle, 2012).

Conclusion

The appointment of unqualified individuals to public office is not a minor issue it is a systemic threat to governance, service delivery, and the future of Somaliland’s state-building. From increased corruption to weakened institutions and public disillusionment, the costs are high and long-term.To move forward, Somaliland must prioritize institutional reform. A transparent and merit-based public administration is not only more efficient it is more just, inclusive, and responsive to the needs of its people. Reform will require strong leadership, active civil society engagement, and regional cooperation but the benefits for peace, development, and legitimacy are well worth the investment.

References

Abokor, A. Y., Bradbury, M., Yusuf, H. A., & Harper, M. (2010). Somaliland: Choosing politics over violence. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, (21).
Ahmed, I. I. (2019). Gender and governance in Somaliland: Barriers and opportunities. Rift Valley Institute.
Bradbury, M. (2008). Becoming Somaliland. James Currey.
Eubank, N. (2012). Taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: Lessons from Somaliland. Journal of Development Studies, 48(4), 465–480. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510
Grindle, M. S. (2012). Jobs for the boys: Patronage and the state in comparative perspective. Harvard University Press.
Hansen, S. J., & Bradbury, M. (2007). Somaliland: A new democracy in the Horn of Africa? Review of African Political Economy, 34(113), 461–476. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240701672595
Harper, M. (2022). The fragility of unrecognized states: Lessons from Somaliland. African Affairs, 121(482), 102–123. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adab038
OECD. (2017). Preventing policy capture: Integrity in public decision making. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en
Renders, M., & Terlinden, U. (2010). Negotiating statehood in a hybrid political order: The case of Somaliland. Development and Change, 41(4), 723–746. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01661.x
Transparency International. (2023). Corruption perceptions index 2022. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Walls, M., & Kibble, S. (2011). Somaliland: Progress, state and outsiders. Progressio.
World Bank. (2020). Enhancing government effectiveness and transparency: The fight against corruption. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/publication/enhancing-government-effectiveness-and-transparency-the-fight-against-corruption

About the Author

Kaltun Osman is a humanitarian worker and gender activist who has dedicated her career to advancing women’s rights, political participation, and governance across the Horn of Africa. She brings a unique perspective that bridges grassroots activism with policy advocacy, focusing on inclusive governance and the strategic use of digital tools to empower women in their communities.

Kaltun holds Master’s degrees in Governance and Regional Integration, and Project Planning and Management. As a 2025 I AM NALA Fellow, she has been recognized as one of Africa’s emerging women leaders in peace and security. Her work spans from community-level organizing to policy development, consistently advocating for systems that ensure women’s voices are heard in decision-making processes that affect their lives.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

The Minister of Appeasement and the President Who Won’t Act

Staff

July 4, 2025

President Cirro’s Moment of Truth: Fire Him or Own the Failure

There comes a moment in every nation’s struggle for recognition when its own officials become the greatest obstacle to its dignity. That moment arrived this week when our Minister of the Presidency—a man entrusted with safeguarding the honor of our Republic—chose instead to bow, scrape, and genuflect before Qatar’s diplomatic insult with the enthusiasm of a colonial subject grateful for his master’s attention.

The facts are stark and shameful. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement dripping with contempt, referred to Somaliland as a mere “province of Somalia” and had the audacity to claim they discussed “Somalia affairs” with President Abdirahman Abdillahi “Cirro”—the duly elected President of the Republic of Somaliland. This was not a diplomatic mishap or translation error. This was a calculated humiliation, a deliberate erasure of our sovereignty delivered with the precision of a surgical knife.

Any self-respecting official would have demanded an immediate correction. Any patriot would have recalled our delegation or if the President truly thought this was a good idea resign on the spot. Any leader worthy of the title would have made it crystal clear that the Republic of Somaliland stands as an independent nation, not as some wayward province awaiting reconciliation with a failed state.

Instead, our Minister of the Presidency—let us now call him what he truly is, the Minister of Appeasement—returned from Doha with a statement so craven, so utterly devoid of national pride, that it belongs in a museum of diplomatic cowardice. “The statement from Qatar was okay,” he declared with the casual indifference of a man selling his birthright for a mess of pottage, “because Somaliland is not officially recognized.”

Not officially recognized? This is the pathetic mantra of a defeated mind, the white flag of surrender disguised as pragmatism. By this logic, we should accept every insult, endure every humiliation, and smile gratefully at every slight because some distant capitals have not yet acknowledged what we have built with our blood, sweat, and unwavering determination.

For thirty-three years, Somaliland has stood as a beacon of democracy, stability, and progress in a region torn apart by chaos. We have held free and fair elections while Somalia remained a playground for warlords and foreign interventions. We have built institutions while they collected aid money. We have secured our borders while they begged for peacekeepers. We have created a functioning state from the ashes of genocide while they perfected the art of failure.

Yet our Minister of Appeasement would have us believe that none of this matters because a few bureaucrats in foreign capitals have not yet rubber-stamped our existence. This is not realpolitik—this is capitulation. This is not diplomatic wisdom—this is the mentality of the colonized, forever seeking validation from masters who view them as subjects, not equals.

The President of Somaliland does not discuss “Somalia affairs” any more than the President of France discusses “German affairs” or the President of Kenya discusses “Ethiopian affairs.” He discusses Somaliland affairs, Horn of Africa affairs, regional affairs, and international affairs—but never the internal matters of a foreign nation with which we share nothing but a colonial border drawn by European powers who cared nothing for our distinct identity, culture, and aspirations.

Qatar’s foreign ministry knew exactly what they were doing when they issued that statement. They were testing our resolve, measuring our spine, and calculating whether we would defend our dignity or accept their contempt. Thanks to our Minister of Appeasement, they have their answer: we will not only accept their insults, we will thank them for the privilege of being insulted.

This is what happens when appeasement becomes policy, when the desperate desire for acceptance trumps self-respect, when officials mistake servility for diplomacy. The Minister of Appeasement has not advanced Somaliland’s cause—he has set it back by demonstrating that we can be bullied, dismissed, and humiliated without consequence.

The people of Somaliland deserve better than officials who treat their sovereignty as a negotiable commodity. They deserve leaders who understand that recognition is not a gift bestowed by benevolent powers but a right earned through struggle, sacrifice, and the unwavering defense of principle.

Every concession to those who would deny our existence makes the next concession easier. Every acceptance of diplomatic slight paves the way for greater humiliations. Every moment of appeasement delays the day when the world will have no choice but to acknowledge what we have always known: that Somaliland is a nation, not a province, and its people are citizens, not subjects.

But this is not the first time our Minister of Appeasement has displayed such breathtaking political tone-deafness. When he sat in opposition as Secretary General of Waddani party, pontificating about diplomatic wisdom and lecturing the government on proper statecraft, he demonstrated the same shocking inability to grasp the most basic principles of sovereignty that he now exhibits from the driver’s seat.

The incident remains seared in the memory of anyone who understands the stakes of our struggle. When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed floated the disastrous idea of bringing Somalia’s then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo to Somaliland—a scheme so transparently designed to legitimize Somalia’s claim over our territory that even a first-year political science student could see through it—the entire political establishment united in opposition.

The then-President Bihi, in a rare moment of genuine statesmanship, consulted with all relevant stakeholders. The Chairman of Parliament, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and leaders of both opposition parties understood immediately what was at stake. Allowing Farmajo to set foot on Somaliland soil would have handed Somalia’s beleaguered president the propaganda victory of a lifetime—the symbolic return of the “prodigal son” to the fold, regardless of the circumstances of his arrival.

The optics alone would have been devastating. Here was a man whose government controlled barely half of Mogadishu, whose authority was so weak that he couldn’t venture outside the Green Zone without an army of foreign peacekeepers, whose legitimacy was so questioned that he extended his own mandate by force—and we would have given him the gift of appearing as the president who brought Somaliland back into Somalia’s embrace.

The political establishment understood this. The intelligentsia understood this. The man on the street understood this. Even children playing in the streets of Hargeisa understood that you don’t invite those who deny your existence to tea in your living room.

Everyone understood except our current Minister of Appeasement, who responded to this grave threat to our sovereignty with the casual indifference of a man discussing the weather: “What is the big deal if Farmajo comes to Hargeisa?”

What is the big deal? The big deal, Mr. Khadar Loge, is that symbols matter in politics. The big deal is that perception shapes reality in international relations. The big deal is that we have spent three decades building a reputation as a sovereign nation, not a wayward province awaiting reconciliation with a failed state.

The big deal is that every photograph of Farmajo in Hargeisa would have been worth a thousand Somali propaganda pamphlets. Every handshake would have been transformed into evidence of Somalia’s benevolent leadership over its “northern regions.” Every moment of his visit would have been weaponized against our cause in every African Union summit, every Arab League meeting, every international forum where our recognition is debated.

But our Minister of Appeasement couldn’t see the big deal then, just as he can’t see it now when Qatar treats our President as a regional administrator discussing “Somalia affairs.” This is not growth in office—this is consistency in capitulation, a career-long dedication to missing the point of our struggle.

And if his casual dismissal of sovereignty weren’t damaging enough, the Minister of Appeasement has now ventured into the most sacred territory of our national narrative—the very foundation of our independence—with the delicacy of a bulldozer in a graveyard. In another moment of jaw-dropping insensitivity, he has declared that Somaliland is “not as fragile as an eggshell” and that we should not frame our exit from the ill-fated Somalia union on the genocide and catastrophic events that led to our destruction.

Let that sink in. The Minister of Appeasement wants us to forget the genocide. He wants us to whitewash the systematic destruction of our cities, the deliberate targeting of our civilians, the mass graves that still scar our landscape. He wants us to pretend that our independence was not born from the ashes of Siad Barre’s war machine but from some genteel philosophical disagreement about governance structures.

This is not just historical amnesia—this is historical vandalism of the most obscene kind. The Minister of Appeasement would have us erase the very foundation of our moral case for independence, the bedrock argument that no people should be forced to remain united with those who sought to exterminate them.

The bones of our martyrs in Hargeisa’s mass graves would turn if they could hear such words. The survivors of the concentration camps in Mandheera would weep at such betrayal. The mothers who lost their children to Siad Barre’s jets would curse the day they trusted their story to such hands.

“Not as fragile as an eggshell”? Tell that to the families who fled across the border with nothing but the clothes on their backs while their cities burned behind them. Tell that to the entire population of Somaliland—yes, the entire population—who were displaced, scattered like leaves in a hurricane, their lives shattered by a regime that viewed them as obstacles to be removed rather than citizens to be protected.

The Minister of Appeasement, in his infinite wisdom, believes we should downplay this “inconvenient” history. He thinks our case for independence would be stronger if we simply forgot why we needed to be independent in the first place. This is the logic of the colonized mind—the desperate desire to appear reasonable, moderate, and unthreatening to those who would deny our very right to exist.

But the genocide is not a liability to be hidden—it is the ultimate proof of why Somaliland can never, must never, and will never return to a union with Somalia. When a government turns its military machine against its own citizens, when it bombs cities into rubble, when it forces an entire population into exile, it forfeits forever any claim to legitimacy over those people.

The world understands this principle. It is why South Sudan gained independence. It is why Bangladesh exists. It is why the international community accepts that some unions are so poisoned by violence that they cannot be salvaged. But our Minister of Appeasement, in his eagerness to appear diplomatic, would throw away our strongest argument because it makes him uncomfortable at cocktail parties.

This is not pragmatism—this is capitulation to the oppressor’s narrative. This is not strategic thinking—this is the internalized shame of a man who believes our suffering was somehow our fault, that our genocide was somehow an embarrassment rather than a crime that cries out for justice.

The Minister of Appeasement has now crossed a line that no Somalilander should ever cross. He has not just failed to defend our sovereignty—he has actively undermined the moral foundation upon which that sovereignty rests. He has not just accepted insults from foreign powers—he has provided them with the arguments they need to dismiss our cause.

But the damage extends far beyond hurt feelings or wounded pride. Every act of appeasement, every acceptance of humiliation, every capitulation to those who would erase us sends a clear and devastating message to the international community: Somaliland itself is not convinced of its own sovereignty.

When potential suitors—those brave nations who might muster the courage to recognize Somaliland—witness our officials accepting insults with gratitude, they draw the obvious conclusion: if Somaliland’s own ministers don’t believe in their independence, why should we risk our diplomatic capital to support it?

Our Minister of Appeasement has been while in opposition and unfortunately, it has not been just an election rhetoric, he has become Somalia’s most effective ambassador. With every statement that downplays our independence, with every acceptance of being treated as a province, with every dismissal of our historical grievances, he telegraphs to the world that we are indeed still part of Somalia—perhaps just waiting for a better deal to be offered, a sweeter reunion package, a more palatable version of subjugation.

This is diplomatic suicide of the most sophisticated kind. The Minister of Appeasement has managed to convince potential allies that recognition would be premature, that Somaliland itself is ambivalent about its independence, that we might yet return to the fold if the terms were right.

Why would any nation risk Somalia’s wrath to recognize a state whose own officials suggest it might not be permanent? Why would any government expend political capital on a cause that Somaliland’s own representatives seem reluctant to champion? Why would any leader take the leap of recognition when Somaliland’s own ministers are building the arguments against it?

The international community takes its cues from our actions, not our aspirations. When we accept being called a province, they see a province. When we dismiss our genocide as irrelevant, they see a grievance without substance. When we treat our independence as negotiable, they see a temporary arrangement awaiting better terms.

The Minister of Appeasement has single-handedly convinced potential allies that Somaliland is playing hard-to-get rather than fighting for survival, that we are negotiating terms rather than defending principles, that we are waiting for a better Somalia rather than rejecting Somalia entirely.

This is not diplomacy—this is the slow-motion destruction of our international case. This is not strategic patience—this is the systematic demolition of everything our people have built with their sacrifice and determination.

Here lies the true tragedy of our Minister of Appeasement: he spends more time defending his asinine policies to outraged Somalilanders than he does defending Somaliland to the world. When Qatar insults our sovereignty, he rushes to defend Qatar’s position. When Ethiopians propose legitimizing Somalia’s claims over our territory, he asks “what’s the big deal?” When his own people cry out against his capitulation, he lectures them about not being “fragile as eggshells.”

This is a man who has perfected the art of fighting the wrong battles. He will argue passionately with patriotic Somalilanders who question his judgment, but he will not lift a finger to challenge foreign powers who deny our existence. He will spend hours explaining to his own people why they should accept humiliation, but he will not spend five minutes demanding respect from those who humiliate us.

The Minister of Appeasement has his priorities exactly backward. He treats his fellow Somalilanders as the enemy to be defeated and foreign powers as friends to be appeased. He has more fight in him when responding to criticism from Hargeisa than when defending Hargeisa’s honor abroad.

This is the ultimate betrayal of office: a minister who sees his own people as the problem and their oppressors as the solution. This is not diplomacy—this is collaboration with those who would erase us from the map.

The Minister of Appeasement has forgotten the most fundamental principle of sovereignty: possession is nine-tenths of the law. We possess our land—every hill, every valley, every grain of sand from Zeila to Las Anod. We possess our institutions—a functioning democracy, a professional military, a working bureaucracy. We possess our dignity—earned through three decades of self-governance and democratic progress.

Somalia possesses nothing but empty claims and faded maps. They cannot govern their own capital without foreign peacekeepers, yet they claim dominion over a nation that has governed itself successfully for over three decades. They cannot secure their own borders, yet they draw lines on our territory. They cannot feed their own people, yet they dream of ruling ours.

The world may debate recognition, but reality has already rendered its verdict. We are here. We are functioning. We are thriving. We possess what is ours—our country, our government, our future. No amount of diplomatic double-talk can change the fact that Somaliland exists as a sovereign nation while Somalia exists as a concept sustained by international life support.

Yet our Minister of Appeasement would have us beg for permission to exist from those who themselves exist only through the charity of others. He would have us seek validation from failed states and their enablers, as if our three decades of democratic governance count for nothing compared to a rubber stamp from bureaucrats who have never set foot in our country.

Possession is not just nine-tenths of the law—in our case, it is the entirety of the law. We possess our sovereignty not because anyone granted it to us, but because we built it with our own hands, defended it with our own blood, and sustained it with our own will. Those who would deny this reality are denying the evidence of their own eyes.

But ultimately, the Minister of Appeasement is not the one who stands before history as the guardian of our national destiny. That responsibility belongs to President Abdirahman Abdillahi “Cirro,” the man Somalilanders elected with a clear and decisive majority to lead them into the promised land of international recognition.

The President now faces a moment of truth that will define his legacy and determine whether he is the leader who finally delivers Somaliland to its rightful place among the world’s recognized nations or another chapter in the long litany of failed leadership.

If his Minister of the Presidency is truly compromised—if foreign influences have found in him a receptive ear for their narratives about Somaliland’s place in the world—then President Cirro’s failure to act reveals a fatal weakness in his own leadership. A minister operating under such influences is not just the minister’s shame; it is the President’s abdication of duty.

If, alternatively, his Minister of the Presidency genuinely believes this garbage through sheer ignorance—if his understanding of diplomacy comes from hastily reading leaflets or ChatGPT summaries rather than grasping the fundamental realities of statecraft—then what does that say about the President’s judgment in selecting such a man for such a critical role?

Either way, President Cirro stands condemned by his own choices. Either he lacks the strength to remove a minister who has lost his way, or he lacks the wisdom to recognize basic incompetence when it stares him in the face. Either he is too weak to act, or too blind to see. Neither bodes well for a president entrusted with the sacred mission of leading Somaliland to recognition.

The people of Somaliland did not elect President Cirro to manage decline or to oversee the systematic undermining of their cause by his own appointees. They elected him to be the president who would walk Somaliland into the community of nations as a respected and recognized member. They entrusted him with carrying their will—not appeasing their enemies.

Every day the Minister of Appeasement remains in office is another day that President Cirro fails the mandate he was given. Every capitulation his minister makes is a capitulation the President owns. Every insult his minister accepts is an insult the President endorses.

President Cirro, you cannot fulfill your destiny with a Minister of Appeasement who believes our strongest arguments should be hidden and our proudest achievements should be downplayed. You cannot lead Somaliland to recognition with an official who spends more energy defending our enemies than defending our interests. You cannot be the president who delivered recognition while tolerating a minister who delivers only excuses and humiliation.

The choice before you is stark and unforgiving: be the president who had the courage to remove those who betrayed the people’s trust, or be the president who will be remembered as the man who let appeasement destroy Somaliland’s destiny. History will not judge you kindly if you choose the latter. Neither will the people who believed in you enough to give you their votes.

The Republic of Somaliland deserves better than ministers who mistake surrender for sophistication. It deserves better than presidents who mistake loyalty to failed appointees for leadership. It deserves recognition, and it deserves leaders strong enough to demand it.

Somaliland Chronicle is responsible for the content of this editorial.

Qatar’s Hypocrisy on Somaliland

Staff

July 2, 2025

By Michael Rubin

On June 30, 2025, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro arrived in Qatar to meet Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, who serves jointly as the Gulf emirate’s prime minister and foreign minister. While previous Somaliland presidents have visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the visit to Qatar appeared a diplomatic breakthrough as it marked an expansion of Somaliland’s diplomatic reach.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affair’s subsequent statement was an insult, one that should disqualify Qatar from any future role mediating conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Qatari press release stated that it was “the State of Qatar’s belief that Somalia’s future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”

Put aside the fact that neither under President Mohamed Farmaajo nor Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has the Federal Republic of Somalia respected constitutional federalism. Under both unelected leaders, the federal government in Mogadishu has encroached on the constitutional rights of Puntland, Jubaland, and the South West State. Both Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh divert international aid both to their own supporters in Mogadishu and into their own personal bank accounts in countries and territories like Switzerland and Gibraltar or property holdings in Türkiye. The two presidents have hijacked security assistance meant to counter Al-Shabaab in order to target their own political opponents. Meanwhile, both leaders have repeatedly sold Somalia’s sovereignty to the highest bidder, be it Chinese fishing concessions or land grants and construction contracts to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. How does Qatar expect anyone to respect Somalia’s sovereignty when its own leaders make a mockery of it?

Greater Somalia is as much a dream as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Kenya’s former North Eastern Province will never return to Mogadishu’s control. To state that is not to be anti-Somali; after all, more Somalis live outside Mogadishu’s control than inside it and have no desire to be under Mogadishu’s control. Why would they wish to join the least successful, most corrupt, and most dysfunctional government of all Somali-populated regions? If Qatar is not going to share its gas wealth with Egypt’s impoverished Arab population or subject itself to Baghdad’s corrupt leadership, why does Qatar believe Somaliland should give Somalia title over its scant resources?

The real hypocrisy, however, is in any comparison of historical grounds by which Qatar justifies its independence with its own hostility toward Somaliland’s case. After Arabs ended Persian rule over Bahrain in the 18^th century AD, the Khalifa family took control not only ruling Bahrain’s main island, but also the Qatar peninsula. Over subsequent decades, the ancestors of Qatar’s current rulers staged a number of rebellions, most unsuccessful. In 1861, Bahrain and British Indian authorities signed a treaty recognizing Qatar as a dependent of Bahrain. In the 1867 Bahrain-Qatar War, Bahraini forces completely destroyed Doha and Wakrah, much as Somali dictator Siad Barre would do just over a century later to Hargeisa. The following year, the British government imposed a settlement that recognized Qatar as a separate entity. In effect, British forces confirmed Qatar’s distinctness less than two decades before they did the same thing in Somaliland.

While Qatar appears to buy the logic of Somali irredentists who say that clan identity should not be enough to justify Somaliland’s independence, the only difference between Qatar, Bahrain’s ruling family, and the United Arab Emirates is tribal identity. Qataris may argue that the Khalifa’s family’s persecution of the Thani shaped Qatari identity, but even the worst Bahraini persecution of Qatari tribes was orders of magnitude less than what Siad Barre and his Darod clan did to Somaliland’s Isaaq.

Qatar’s hypocrisy gets worse, however. While the British may have recognized the Qataris as a distinct entity in 1868, independence did not come for more than a century. Prior to the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain, and the seven Trucial State were part of a joint Federation of Arab Emirates that the British envisioned maintaining control. Qatar and Bahrain ultimately refused to cede political and economic autonomy to the new entity; both unilaterally declared their independence leaving the Trucial States to form the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar today enjoys full independence. Its history shows its willingness to take up arms to prevent outside powers from forcing it into an unwanted union with either Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates. How ironic, then, that its approach to Somaliland forgets its own origins and negates the principles upon which its independence rests.

About the Author

Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.

Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).

Dr. Rubin has a PhD and an MA in history from Yale University, where he also obtained a BS in biology.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The Doha Directive: Inside Qatar’s Mission to Scuttle the Somaliland-US Alliance

Staff

June 30, 2025

An $8 Billion Air Base, a Terror Portfolio, and Qatar’s High-Stakes Pressure Campaign to Keep the US Out of Berbera

What appeared to be a diplomatic breakthrough for Somaliland has unmasked what senior officials describe as a sophisticated diplomatic campaign by Qatar aimed at one primary objective: preventing the establishment of a US military base in Berbera.

Instead of issuing an outright warning, the unprecedented visit was dominated by a subtle but unmistakable focus from Qatari officials on Somaliland’s future intentions regarding a potential United States military base in Berbera. Through a persistent and highly specific line of questioning, Qatari officials sought to extract the precise nature of Somaliland’s security consultations with the United States. This penetrating focus on the Berbera base stunned the delegation, according to a senior Somaliland official who was present, revealing the true strategic intent behind Qatar’s sudden diplomatic outreach: to preempt a security partnership that could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. The message, though never stated as an explicit warning, was unmistakable: any move by Somaliland to host American forces would be viewed by Doha as a direct challenge to its own strategic position.

The Al Udeid Strategic Imperative

Qatar’s sudden interest in Somaliland cannot be separated from its existential interest in protecting Al Udeid Air Base—its single most valuable geopolitical asset. Since 2003, Doha has poured more than $8 billion into the sprawling desert facility, which hosts over 10,000 U.S. personnel and serves as the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Al Udeid is not just a military hub; it is Qatar’s insurance policy—one that has shielded it from regional isolation, granted it disproportionate diplomatic weight, and bound U.S. policy interests tightly to its survival.

But that calculus begins to fall apart when Berbera enters the frame.

Unlike landlocked Al Udeid, Berbera offers direct access to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—one of the most vital maritime corridors in the world. It is the only potential U.S. partner location between Diego Garcia and the Suez Canal with that level of strategic access. From a power-projection standpoint, Berbera can do what Al Udeid never could: impose influence over both flanks of the Red Sea. It would also place U.S. surveillance assets within striking range of China’s military base in Djibouti, creating a direct counterweight to Beijing’s creeping dominance.

That prospect is especially relevant now. With China having all but squeezed the U.S. military presence out of Djibouti—AFRICOM operations increasingly marginalized and confined—the United States is in urgent need of an alternative forward operating position. The strategic implications are not lost on Qatar. A permanent U.S. military presence in Berbera would not only devalue Al Udeid, it would also dilute Qatar’s influence over U.S. regional posture. No longer the indispensable host, Qatar would find its monopoly on American dependence broken. For Doha, this isn’t just about geography. It is about leverage, prestige, and survival.

That is why the Berbera question was not just a curiosity during President Cirro’s visit—it was the point.

Diplomatic Sleight of Hand and Public Backlash

Qatar’s handling of the visit reveals a calculated diplomatic strategy that was widely seen in Somaliland as designed to discredit and embarrass the President of the Republic of Somaliland and his delegation. While the high-level meeting between President Cirro and Qatar’s Prime Minister offered a significant platform for Somaliland, the official statement released by Doha immediately afterward seemed engineered to erase that very status.

The Qatari Foreign Ministry press release conspicuously described the meeting as covering “the latest developments in Somalia,” and concluded with an unambiguous reaffirmation of “respect for the sovereignty and unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”

This linguistic sleight of hand—using the prestige of a prime ministerial meeting as a backdrop for a political rebuke—was interpreted in Hargeisa as a deliberate affront. Across social media and in commentary by political analysts, the prevailing view was clear: Qatar had staged a high-level photo-op for the sole purpose of reaffirming its hostility toward Somaliland’s political identity in the most public way possible.

“It was diplomatic pageantry with a political knife,” remarked one prominent politician and a member of the President’s party who did not want to be quoted for speaking on the president’s visit. “You don’t grant a president that level of access just to write him out of the story in your press release, this was intentional.” The fallout has only reinforced growing skepticism among Somalilanders about the value of engaging regional powers who remain tethered to the political fiction of Somali unity.

The Double Threat: How Berbera Undermines Qatar’s Entire Regional Strategy

Qatar’s alleged willingness to mediate with Al-Shabaab while propping up the internationally recognized government in Mogadishu is central to its “whole pie” strategy: controlling all major factions to make itself indispensable. According to two regional intelligence analysts and one senior Horn of Africa diplomat, this entire edifice of influence is directly threatened by the emergence of a stable, democratic, and pro-Western Somaliland as a strategic U.S. ally.

A formal U.S.–Somaliland security partnership presents what one source called a “double threat” for Doha. First, it represents a complete rejection of Doha’s Somalia-centric architecture, as a robust U.S. military presence in Berbera would operate entirely outside its influence network. Second, and just as critically, a U.S. base in Berbera would devalue Al Udeid—Qatar’s crown jewel—reducing the Gulf state’s leverage over Washington on a global scale.

The Terror Portfolio: A Lever for Coercive Control

This alleged use of militant proxies fits into a broader, more audacious regional pattern. According to multiple sources in the region’s security community—including one diplomat formerly stationed in Doha—Qatar is actively mediating between Al-Shabaab and elements of the Somali federal government. These sources allege that Doha’s strategy involves using its influence to modulate the group’s operations: easing the tempo of attacks to reward compliance and ramping up violence to punish political defiance. Qatar has previously denied any ties to Al-Shabaab or involvement in Somalia’s internal security dynamics.

Gulf Rivalry and a Trail of Blood

The intense focus on a potential US base in Berbera carries ominous weight when seen through the lens of the Gulf proxy war. A chilling precedent is the assassination of a DP World contractor in Puntland. On February 4, 2019, Paul Anthony Formosa, manager for P&O Ports—a DP World subsidiary—was gunned down at the Bosaso port. While Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, a high-profile leak later suggested a more sinister backstory. In July 2019, The New York Times published a report on a leaked phone call in which a Qatari businessman bragged that violence in Bosaso had been carried out by “our friends” to “make Dubai people run away from there.” While the Qatari government quickly disavowed the individual, the incident underscored the blurred lines between commercial rivalry and sanctioned destabilization.

Escalation Calculus: The Real Cost of Strategic Obstruction

The evidence is mounting that Doha views a U.S. base in Berbera not as a diplomatic inconvenience, but as a direct threat to the heart of its regional strategy. The carefully choreographed outreach to Hargeisa—followed by a calculated public embarrassment—were not missteps. They were the opening moves in what appears to be a broader campaign of obstruction.

Given Qatar’s documented playbook—from alleged backchannel dealings with Al-Shabaab to its reported role in fomenting violence against commercial competitors—the question is no longer if Doha will escalate, but how.

If Qatar was allegedly willing to flirt with sanctioned terror networks and tolerate bloodshed to preserve its influence in Somalia, what measures might it now be willing to employ to shield an $8 billion military asset and salvage its waning relevance in the Horn of Africa? The stakes are exponentially higher, and so too is the potential for coercive interference cloaked in diplomacy.

The Somaliland government did not provide an official, on-the-record comment for this story. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also sent a detailed list of questions regarding the strategic threat a Berbera base poses to Al Udeid, the contradiction between hosting President of the Republic of Somaliland while officially reaffirming Somalia’s unity, and its alleged role as a mediator for the Al-Shabaab terror group. No response was received by press time

DRC Rwanda Peace Agreement 2025: Historic Deal Ends 30-Year Conflict in Great Lakes Region

Staff

June 30, 2025

ANALYSIS | Washington Brokers DRC–Rwanda Peace After 30 Years of War
Based on the U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin – June 29, 2025

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a comprehensive peace agreement on June 27, 2025, ending three decades of conflict that has devastated the Great Lakes region of Africa. The signing ceremony at the U.S. State Department, witnessed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, caps months of difficult negotiations and represents a significant diplomatic achievement for the Trump administration.

The DRC-Rwanda peace agreement goes beyond previous failed attempts by establishing concrete mechanisms for implementation, including a joint security coordination system and specific timelines for disarming rebel groups. Most importantly, the 2025 peace deal addresses the central issue that has fueled the Great Lakes conflict: the presence of FDLR militants in eastern Congo, remnants of the forces responsible for Rwanda’s 1994 genocide.

DRC Rwanda Peace Agreement Details: Key Provisions and Implementation

Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, who led the U.S. negotiating team for the DRC-Rwanda peace talks, structured the discussions around specific operational details rather than broad promises. The comprehensive peace agreement includes provisions for territorial integrity, cessation of hostilities, disarmament of non-state armed groups, and the establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism building on existing frameworks from the Luanda Process.

The key breakthrough in the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement involves Rwanda’s commitment to lift defensive measures along its border in exchange for concrete action against the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe emphasized that the FDLR “is no ordinary militia” but rather “the remnant of the forces which committed the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.”

Qatar’s role in the DRC-Rwanda peace process proved crucial despite its official status as an observer. Qatari officials facilitated the initial meetings that broke the diplomatic deadlock in the Great Lakes conflict. Minister of State Mohammed Al-Khulaifi continues separate negotiations between the DRC government and the M23 rebel group, creating parallel tracks that could prove essential for lasting peace in the region.

U.S. Africa Policy 2025: Strategic Partnerships and Diplomatic Engagement

The DRC-Rwanda peace agreement signing coincided with several other African diplomatic engagements that reveal broader U.S. Africa policy priorities under the Trump administration. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued statements marking independence celebrations for Mozambique, Madagascar, and Djibouti—each highlighting different aspects of American strategic interests in Africa.

Mozambique’s 50th independence anniversary statement emphasized U.S.-Africa partnerships in critical minerals, natural gas, and agriculture. Madagascar’s 65th independence celebration focused on maritime security and cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and African nations. Djibouti, marking 48 years of independence, was praised for its role in Horn of Africa regional stability and its hosting of American military facilities.

These diplomatic statements, while ceremonial, indicate which African partnerships the U.S. considers most valuable: resource-rich countries, maritime security partners, and strategic military hosts in key regions like the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes.

Statement from Senator Jim Risch: “A Real Chance for Lasting Change”

In a strong show of bipartisan support, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Senator Jim Risch (R-ID), who attended the signing, issued the following statement:

“President Trump and Secretary Rubio have shown crucial leadership in working to end the brutal conflict in Eastern Congo, a conflict that has driven regional instability and immense human suffering for decades. While the signing of this agreement does not guarantee immediate peace, it creates a real chance for lasting change. Now, it is up to the parties to honor and fulfill their commitments.

It is in America’s national security interest to see this agreement fully implemented without delay. There must be consequences if the parties fail to deliver, or spoilers undermine its implementation.”
The full statement is available on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee website.
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Great Lakes Conflict Resolution: Implementation Challenges Ahead

Both foreign ministers acknowledged the significant challenges facing DRC-Rwanda peace agreement implementation during the signing ceremony. DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner warned that “no text, however carefully negotiated, can carry on its own the weight of peace.” She referenced feedback from Congolese women’s organizations demanding “a peace that is real, lived, shared, and built with us.”

The Great Lakes peace agreement’s immediate test will come with the planned White House summit in the coming weeks, where DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda President Paul Kagame will meet to finalize implementation details. More challenging will be the actual disarmament of armed groups and the return of displaced populations—processes that have derailed previous Great Lakes conflict resolution efforts.

Rwanda has already indicated it will begin implementing the neutralization of FDLR forces, while the DRC has committed to facilitating the return of Rwandan refugees. These parallel processes will require sustained international monitoring and support to succeed in ending the decades-long Great Lakes conflict.

Congressional support for the DRC-Rwanda peace process has been notable, with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch and Senator Mike Rounds attending the signing ceremony. This bipartisan backing may prove crucial for maintaining American engagement during the difficult implementation phase of the Great Lakes peace agreement.

African Conflict Resolution 2025: Regional Impact and Future Prospects

The Great Lakes conflict has affected far more than just the DRC and Rwanda over the past three decades. Millions of people have been displaced by the DRC-Rwanda conflict, regional trade has been disrupted, and armed groups have proliferated across Central and East African borders. The 2025 peace agreement could unlock significant economic potential in a Great Lakes region rich in minerals essential for global technology production.

Success in DRC-Rwanda peace agreement implementation might also influence other African conflict resolution efforts. Senior Advisor Boulos has already indicated that Sudan represents the next target for similar U.S. mediation efforts, suggesting the Trump administration sees this as a replicable model for American diplomatic engagement in African conflicts.

However, the Great Lakes region’s history of failed peace agreements suggests caution about long-term success. Previous DRC-Rwanda peace efforts have collapsed when international attention shifted elsewhere or when domestic political calculations changed. The presence of multiple armed groups like M23 and FDLR, weak state institutions, and competing economic interests all pose ongoing threats to sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region.

The involvement of Qatar in African diplomacy adds another significant dimension to conflict resolution efforts. Gulf states have been expanding their diplomatic and economic presence across Africa, often in coordination with rather than competition against Western powers. This U.S.-Qatar cooperation in the DRC-Rwanda peace process could become a template for future diplomatic initiatives across the African continent.

This analysis of the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement is based on official U.S. Department of State documents and statements from the June 29, 2025 Weekly Digest covering African diplomatic developments.

Unlocking Economic Potential: How Somaliland Can Attract Ethiopian Trade and Investment

Staff

June 30, 2025

1. Strategic Location and Geopolitical Leverage

Somaliland, with its prime location on the Gulf of Aden and immediate proximity to Ethiopia, holds unparalleled potential as a trade and logistics gateway for the landlocked East African giant. Currently, over 90% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade is channeled through Djibouti, a logistical overreliance that raises costs and exposes the country to potential supply chain vulnerabilities (AfDB, 2019). Somaliland’s Berbera Port and the Berbera Corridor, backed by substantial investments from DP World and the UAE, offer an efficient and competitive alternative, reducing both distance and time for goods traveling from Ethiopia’s highlands to international markets (DP World Berbera, 2022). Furthermore, the historical, cultural, and commercial ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland lay a strong foundation for deepening trade relations. As emphasized by the World Bank (2020), landlocked economies benefit significantly from diversified trade corridors. To capitalize on this, Somaliland must actively present itself as a politically stable and business-ready partner, an image it can sustain given its track record of relative peace in a volatile region.

2. Infrastructure, Connectivity, and Trade Facilitation

Infrastructure remains the cornerstone of Somaliland’s ambitions to attract Ethiopian trade. The modernization of Berbera Port, equipped with a new container terminal and extended quays, has enhanced its capacity and global appeal. In parallel, the Berbera Corridor has already facilitated increased goods movement, while plans for rail connectivity with Ethiopia could unlock bulk freight opportunities, reduce road congestion, and enhance efficiency (AfDB, 2021). Logistics infrastructure like dry ports, bonded warehouses, and cold storage facilities near the Tog Wajale border is essential to manage cargo effectively and expand perishable goods trade. Harmonized customs procedures and digitized trade systems, as advocated by the World Economic Forum (2020), can reduce border delays by up to 40%, further boosting trade competitiveness. Moreover, energy security through potential Ethiopia–Somaliland cooperation in renewable power can support industrial zones and processing plants. Establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along the corridor will offer Ethiopian manufacturers tax incentives, simplified regulations, and a strategic location to re-export to Gulf markets.

3. Regulatory Reforms and Investment Climate Improvement

Attracting sustained Ethiopian investment requires a transparent, efficient, and legally secure business environment. Somaliland must prioritize reforms to ease business registration, ensure contract enforcement, protect investor rights, and reduce tariffs on capital goods (World Bank Doing Business Report, 2021). A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Ethiopia, even under Somaliland’s unrecognized status, could offer Ethiopian investors legal certainty and arbitration frameworks. Lessons from the East African Community (EAC Report, 2020) show that trade agreements and regulatory harmonization can increase intra-regional trade by up to 30%. Institutional capacity must also be strengthened: customs officers, port personnel, and investment promotion agencies require technical training and resourcing. The establishment of a Somaliland-Ethiopia Joint Trade Commission could serve as a formal mechanism to resolve disputes, coordinate investment initiatives, and evaluate cross-border bottlenecks. Additionally, international agencies like UNCTAD (2021) underscore the importance of anti-corruption policies and public-private partnerships in building investor trust areas, where Somaliland must show consistent progress.

4. Investment Opportunities and Sectoral Diversification

Somaliland’s economic transformation depends on diversifying investment inflows beyond ports and livestock. Ethiopian entrepreneurs and firms can explore untapped sectors such as agro-processing, fisheries, renewable energy, tourism, and financial services. The Berbera Corridor provides an ideal base for agro-processing ventures that add value to farm produce from both Ethiopia and Somaliland, targeting export markets (ITC, 2021). Ethiopia’s proven success in renewable energy projects, especially hydropower and wind, offers an opportunity for technology transfer and grid interconnectivity to support Somaliland’s industrial ambitions (IRENA, 2020). The livestock sector, long a regional staple, can also be formalized with joint quarantine, veterinary, and export systems aimed at Gulf consumers. As Ethiopia’s urban middle class grows, Somaliland’s tourism industry, featuring coastal sites and cultural heritage, could attract leisure and business travelers, particularly with improved connectivity. Moreover, investment in services such as telecom, education, and banking would enhance both economies and foster regional interdependence (World Tourism Organization, 2019).

5. Partnerships, Risk Management, and Future Outlook

To unlock its full economic potential, Somaliland must strategically engage regional and global partners. Collaborating with IGAD, the African Union, and financial institutions like the World Bank and AfDB will provide technical assistance, capacity building, and infrastructure financing (AfDB, 2020). The UAE’s investments in Berbera signal international confidence in Somaliland’s trade proposition, which can be used to attract Ethiopian firms seeking a stable logistics partner with global linkages (Gulf News, 2021). Diaspora networks from both countries, particularly in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa, can play a pivotal role in mobilizing capital, building trust, and facilitating market entry. However, challenges remain: political non-recognition restricts access to some multilateral mechanisms; infrastructure must be maintained; and trade must be secured from smuggling and conflict. Risk mitigation strategies such as trade insurance, customs cooperation, and environmental safeguards are necessary for sustainability (UNODC, 2019). With a visionary approach blending diplomacy, reform, and cross-border cooperation, Somaliland is poised to become Ethiopia’s second major trade lifeline, reshaping the economic map of the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Somaliland stands at a pivotal moment in its economic development trajectory, uniquely positioned to emerge as Ethiopia’s strategic trade partner in the Horn of Africa. Its proximity, political stability, and ongoing infrastructure upgrades—especially through the Berbera Port and Corridor have laid the foundation for a mutually beneficial trade and investment partnership. As documented by the World Bank (2020), diversified trade routes are essential for landlocked countries like Ethiopia to reduce dependency, enhance resilience, and drive down transaction costs. Somaliland’s offer of a competitive logistics alternative supports this goal, while also boosting its economic profile.

Furthermore, the African Development Bank (2021) and UNCTAD (2021) emphasize that infrastructure must be complemented by institutional reform, investment-friendly policies, and regional cooperation to unlock true trade potential. Somaliland’s efforts to modernize customs, implement regulatory reforms, and engage in bilateral diplomacy are aligned with these recommendations. The successful expansion of the Berbera Port under DP World’s management also mirrors findings from Gulf News (2021), which show that international partnerships significantly enhance investor confidence and operational efficiency in emerging markets.

Most importantly, the economic synergy between Ethiopia and Somaliland can go beyond logistics. As shown in studies by the International Trade Centre (2021) and IRENA (2020), sectoral integration in agro-processing, renewable energy, and services can create value chains that benefit both nations. By leveraging these sectoral complementarities, Somaliland can position itself not just as a transit hub, but as an active contributor to regional industrialization and economic diversification.

To realize this vision, however, Somaliland must maintain momentum in infrastructure development, invest in institutional capacity, and adopt risk mitigation mechanisms against political and economic uncertainties echoing policy recommendations from the International Crisis Group (2020) and UNODC (2019). If coordinated effectively, these strategies can transform the Ethiopia Somaliland corridor into a model for trade-led regional integration, offering a resilient, efficient, and inclusive economic bridge that benefits millions across the Horn of Africa.

References

African Development Bank (AfDB). (2019–2021). Regional Infrastructure & Trade Reports.
DP World Berbera. (2022). Port Development Briefings.
World Bank. (2018–2022). Trade Corridors and Doing Business Reports.
International Trade Centre (ITC). (2021). Trade Facilitation in Africa.
UNCTAD. (2019, 2021). Investment Promotion and Legal Framework Reports.
World Economic Forum. (2020). Trade Digitalization Insights.
IRENA. (2020). Renewable Energy in the Horn of Africa.
Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perception Index.
Gulf News. (2021). UAE–Horn of Africa Trade Projects.
UNODC. (2019). Illicit Trade and Border Security Reports.
East African Community (EAC). (2020). Trade Integration Reports.
World Tourism Organization. (2019). Regional Tourism Trends.

About the Author

Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali is an infrastructure analyst based in Somaliland, specializing in regional development across the Horn of Africa with particular expertise in Somaliland’s infrastructure landscape. Drawing from more than ten years of hands-on experience in project leadership and infrastructure development, he combines practical field knowledge with academic excellence as both a researcher and senior lecturer. Eng. Mouktar Yusuf holds a Master of Science degree in Project and Programme Management and Construction Management, positioning him as a leading voice on infrastructure policy and development in the region.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Qatar’s Somaliland Gambit: Strategic Masterstroke or Trojan Horse?

Staff

June 28, 2025

The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro’s” departure for Qatar aboard a private jet, following an official invitation from Doha, has ignited a critical question that cuts to the heart of Horn of Africa geopolitics: What does Qatar, long considered Somalia’s primary patron state, truly want with Somaliland?

This unprecedented diplomatic overture arrives at a moment when global discourse on Somaliland’s recognition has reached a fever pitch. The invitation represents either a breakthrough that finally acknowledges Somaliland’s strategic value, or a calculated maneuver to drag Somaliland back into the Somali quagmire that Qatar has spent years cultivating.

The Qatar-Somalia Nexus: Following the Money

Qatar emerged as the main backer of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo,” with opposition figures and international observers alleging that Qatari influence shaped the 2012 and 2017 election outcomes through financial incentives. This established Doha as the power broker behind Mogadishu’s political theater. Farmajo’s current residence in Doha—following reports of his 2019 renunciation of U.S. citizenship—serves as a permanent reminder of Qatar’s deep investment in Somali political figures.

For over a decade, Qatar has poured resources into Somalia, positioning itself as the indispensable mediator in a failed nation that exists only in headlines and the occasional complaint about violation of its territorial integrity. Yet here stands Qatar, extending a formal invitation to the very entity that represents Somalia’s greatest existential challenge.

The contradiction is stark: Why would Somalia’s primary benefactor legitimize the leadership of a territory that Mogadishu claims as its own? The answer may lie in Qatar’s broader agenda—controlling the entire “Somali” equation by maintaining influence in both Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

Uncle Sam: The Elephant in the Bab-al-Mandeb

The United States may be the geopolitical force driving Qatar’s sudden interest more than any Gulf rivalry. Washington’s engagement with Somaliland has moved well beyond diplomatic courtesy calls.

A recent U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley and Gen. Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command, traveled to Somaliland to meet with President Cirro and discuss “shared security, maritime, and defense interests.” The delegation’s assessment of infrastructure capabilities at Berbera port signaled concrete steps towards deeper military cooperation.

Outgoing AFRICOM Chief, General Langley with Somaliland Military Chief and US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley in Hargeisa, Somaliland

This strategic pivot reflects America’s escalating competition with China. Somaliland represents a rare opportunity: a stable, pro-Western partner in a region where Beijing has made significant inroads. While Somalia maintains complex relations with China, Somaliland’s formal bilateral ties with Taiwan position it as a natural ally in America’s strategic competition.

The shift is becoming explicit at the highest levels of U.S. policymaking. “I believe that a serious conversation about U.S. recognition of Somaliland is both necessary… and is long overdue,” stated Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He emphasized that a stable partnership would make Somaliland “a strong economic partner committed to integrating into the American global security system.”

Qatar, serving as Washington’s go-to mediator in complex regional disputes, likely possesses greater insight into American strategic thinking than even Somaliland’s government. If the U.S. is moving toward recognition—driven by the imperative of securing the Bab-al-Mandeb chokepoint and countering Chinese influence—Qatar must position itself advantageously before that decision crystallizes.

UAE President, Emir of Qatar meet in Doha to discuss close bilateral ties, regional developments

The UAE Factor: Gulf Rivalry Spills into Africa

Qatar’s overture cannot be separated from its bitter rivalry with the UAE. Despite being Somaliland’s largest foreign investor through DP World’s development of the Berbera port, the UAE has remained cautious about offering political concessions. Abu Dhabi has consistently stopped short of providing the diplomatic recognition that Somaliland seeks most desperately.

If Abu Dhabi won’t provide political legitimacy to match its economic investments, Doha may seize the opportunity to outflank its Gulf rival by offering what the UAE won’t: genuine diplomatic engagement at the highest levels. This invitation represents the latest move in a proxy chess game that has transformed the Horn of Africa into another theater for Gulf competition.

The Recognition Trap: Mediation or Manipulation?

The central question remains: Is this genuine outreach or a sophisticated gambit designed to revive the dormant Somaliland-Somalia dialogue under Qatari mediation?

Qatar has brokered agreements in the Horn before, consistently working to strengthen central government structures. If Doha’s objective is to restart what Mogadishu calls “reconciliation talks,” President Cirro’s government must proceed with extreme caution. This concern is particularly acute following Somaliland’s formal suspension of all dialogue with Somalia in April 2025, a move made in response to what it termed “calculated provocation” from Mogadishu.

Somaliland - Somalia talks from President's Ahmed Mahamoud Siilanyo to President Muse Bihi Abdi

These talks have served Somalia’s devious yet brilliantly simple purpose: convincing the international community and the world at large that Somaliland is not serious about recognition and is, in fact, working to “reconcile” with Mogadishu. While achieving nothing substantive, these talks have been a masterpiece of Somali diplomatic deception. Somalia frames the process as reconciliation between estranged brothers, while Somaliland politicians have repeatedly fallen into the trap of repackaging them as a “dialogue for separation”—a contradiction that has only muddied Somaliland’s narrative on the global stage.

The psychological effect has been devastating. Every time Somaliland leaders sit down for these talks, they inadvertently signal to the world that perhaps their independence isn’t so final after all. International observers see these discussions and conclude that even Somaliland’s own leadership believes unity remains possible—why else would they keep talking? Meanwhile, Somalia gets to play the patient, reasonable party always willing to welcome its “wayward region” back home.

The Qatar invitation could represent an attempt to revive this diplomatic theater, with Doha positioning itself as the indispensable mediator.

Strategic Implications: The Whole Pie Strategy

Qatar’s approach suggests a “whole pie” strategy—rather than backing either Somaliland or Somalia exclusively, Doha may be positioning itself to control both sides of the equation. By maintaining its traditional support for Mogadishu while simultaneously courting Hargeisa, Qatar could emerge as the indispensable external power regardless of how the recognition question ultimately resolves.

This strategy would mirror Qatar’s broader Middle Eastern approach, where it maintains warm relations with Iran while serving as a key American ally, playing all sides to maximize its leverage and influence.

For Somaliland, the calculation is complex. At a time when recognition momentum appears stronger than ever, with international attention at unprecedented levels, any engagement that could be perceived as legitimizing renewed union talks carries enormous risks.

Official Positions: Exploration, Not Expectations

According to multiple government and diplomatic sources briefed on the matter, the Qatar visit is exploratory in nature and may not yield major visible breakthroughs. “Somaliland is open for business and is willing to explore ways to work with other nations even if there are divergent views on certain areas,” one senior official stated, emphasizing Hargeisa’s pragmatic approach to international engagement.

When pressed about the potential restart of Somaliland-Somalia talks, one source was dismissive: “That is not a thing at the moment and we all know Somalia is not in a position to negotiate anything at the moment, so it may or may not come up during the visit, but our position on the matter is clear.”

This official stance suggests that while Somaliland remains open to dialogue, it recognizes the reality that Somalia’s current state makes meaningful negotiations virtually impossible.

The Moment of Truth

President Cirro’s Qatar visit will be measured not by ceremonial gestures, but by tangible outcomes. If Qatar genuinely recognizes Somaliland’s strategic value and offers meaningful political support, this could mark a historic breakthrough.

However, if the invitation masks an attempt to resurrect failed unity talks under Qatari mediation, it may represent one of the most perilous diplomatic challenges Somaliland has navigated in over three decades.

The question is no longer what Qatar wants with Somaliland—it’s whether Somaliland can get what it needs from Qatar without getting dragged back into the cesspool that has consumed Somalia for generations. The stakes could not be higher, and the margin for error has never been smaller.

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