Scores of civilians were laid to rest in a mass grave in Dacawaley village following a brutal attack by the Liyuu Police, a predominantly Ogaden paramilitary force. The massacre threatens to unravel decades of carefully cultivated relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland, just weeks after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s December 11 pivot away from a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland in favor of negotiations with Mogadishu for access to sea.
The death toll continues to mount as survivors, many with severe injuries from gunshots and burns, seek treatment both at Hargeisa Group Hospital across the border in Somaliland and at medical facilities throughout Ethiopia’s Somali Region, particularly in the regional capital Jigjiga. Medical staff at multiple hospitals report being overwhelmed by the scale of casualties, with new victims arriving hourly.
The targeted community, part of the broader Isaaq tribe that forms the majority in neighboring Somaliland, has historically inhabited both sides of the Ethiopia-Somaliland border. These pastoral communities have maintained their traditional grazing patterns and social ties despite the formal international boundary, contributing to the historically strong relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland.
Somaliland’s Minister of Internal Security, Abdalle Mohamed Arab, condemned the massacre as “a gross violation of human rights,” emphasizing the targeting of pastoralist communities. Minister Arab led a high-level delegation to Jigjiga for urgent talks with Ethiopian federal and regional officials, including General Afgado, Commander of the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s Eastern Command. The discussions yielded a comprehensive agreement to cease hostilities, with unconfirmed reports suggesting Ethiopia’s federal government plans to deploy federal troops to the area while redeploying Liyuu Police forces elsewhere.
The fate of nearly sixty traditional elders from Somaliland, who had entered Ethiopia to mediate a grazing dispute with Ogaden pastoralists, remained unclear in the immediate aftermath of the violence. Images emerged of the delegation being transported in pickup trucks, and hours later they appeared in Jigjiga, the regional capital, in what appeared to be a carefully staged media event. The circumstances of their detention and transportation by the same forces responsible for the massacre raised serious concerns about their welfare and the coercive nature of their public appearance.
Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, former Foreign Minister of Somaliland and Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks, has issued an urgent appeal to the international community. Her intervention highlights the destruction of homes and mosques, and the tragic loss of innocent lives, including mothers and children, while calling for immediate protection of vulnerable communities and accountability for the perpetrators.
The Liyuu Police, operating as President Mustafe’s personal militia rather than a legitimate security force, has a documented history of extrajudicial killings, torture, and civilian displacement. Under Mustafe’s leadership, the force has increasingly been accused of using its state mandate to advance Ogaden clan interests, continuing a long-standing pattern of Ogaden dominance in the region’s governance structure that has historically excluded Isaaq representation. This entrenched political monopoly has allowed the force to operate with particular brutality against Isaaq communities.
Ethiopia’s federal government’s recent intervention marks a significant shift from its initial silence, suggesting growing concern over the destabilizing effects of the violence. The deployment of federal troops, if confirmed, would represent the first direct challenge to the Liyuu Police’s unrestricted operations in the region.
The assault appears designed not just to kill and maim, but to make the area uninhabitable for its Isaaq residents – a strategy that threatens to destabilize the intricate web of cross-border relations that have historically helped maintain regional stability. The systematic targeting of these communities risks undermining decades of diplomatic work between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa.
For the residents of Dacawaley, the attack represents more than just another incident of violence – it stands as evidence of state-sponsored terror orchestrated by President Mustafe’s administration to advance tribal interests under the guise of regional security. As casualty numbers continue to rise, the massacre adds to a growing list of atrocities for which the regional president and his paramilitary force must be held accountable.
The targeting of civilians by the Ogaden-dominated Liyuu Police threatens to destabilize an already fragile regional balance, where colonial boundaries have failed to erase centuries-old tribal bonds and rivalries. As international attention focuses on the massacre, the incident highlights not only the dangerous intersection of state power and tribal politics but also the potential unraveling of strategic partnerships that have long underpinned stability in the Horn of Africa.
As Somaliland ushers in a new era under the leadership of President Abdirman Mohammed Abdilahi, I believe the nation stands at a critical juncture. The path forward is filled with both significant challenges and promising opportunities. To navigate these effectively, the new administration must prioritize strategic initiatives that foster stability, economic growth, and national unity. In this article, I will outline what I see as the essential priorities that President Abdillahi and his government must address to secure a prosperous future for all Somaliland citizens.
Nationalisation of Civilian Forces (SSB & G36)
In recent years, Somaliland has witnessed the emergence of various civilian forces that operate independently of the formal military structure. These groups, often formed in response to local security needs or community pressures, play an important role in maintaining order. However, it is becoming increasingly essential for the new government to take proactive steps to nationalize these forces. Prompt integration into the official military framework is critical to mitigate the risks of potential social unrest and ensure stability.
If these civilian forces are not effectively integrated and regulated, there is a danger of a fragmented security landscape that could exacerbate existing tensions and lead to social conflict. The lack of a cohesive security strategy may create power vacuums in certain areas of the country that various factions could exploit, ultimately undermining social harmony.
Therefore, the establishment of a unified, professional national army under centralized command is paramount. This military structure must be free from tribal affiliations or external influences, which can hinder its effectiveness and credibility. A well-organized national army would not only serve as a deterrent to internal and external threats but also foster a sense of national identity and unity among the populace.
Addressing this challenge should be a top priority for the new administration. The government’s ability to integrate these civilian forces effectively will play a vital role in determining the future stability and well-being of our society. By prioritizing the integration of these forces into the national army, the government will enhance security and harmony among the people of Somaliland.
Security and Development in the Eastern Regions
The security and stability of Somaliland’s eastern regions are not just important; they are crucial pillars upon which the future of the entire nation rests. These areas, rich in potential yet burdened by chronic underfunding, years of conflict, and economic neglect, have encountered a myriad of challenges that hinder their development. To truly transform these regions, a comprehensive and long-term strategy is essential—one that holistically addresses the intertwined issues of security, infrastructure, education, and healthcare.
A robust plan must prioritize the restoration of peace, fostering an environment where citizens can thrive without the shadow of violence. Simultaneously, investment in infrastructure—such as roads, communication networks, and public services—will ignite economic opportunities and connect communities, ensuring that no region feels isolated. Education is another cornerstone of this vision; by empowering the next generation with knowledge and skills, we can cultivate a workforce capable of driving sustainable development. Furthermore, access to quality healthcare is vital to improve the overall well-being of citizens, which in turn contributes to a more productive society.
The successful development of these regions is not merely a local endeavor but a crucial step toward national unity, where every citizen, regardless of their geography, can partake in the fruits of national progress. While it may be daunting to envision rapid change in the short term, establishing a strong foundation for enduring peace and development is imperative. With strategic foresight and unwavering determination, the eastern regions can emerge from their challenges and embrace a future filled with stability and growth.
These priorities outline a roadmap for a prosperous and secure future for Somaliland. The new government must confront these challenges with not only courage and political will but also with an unwavering commitment to fostering a stronger, more unified nation that embraces every citizen’s potential.
Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding Between Somaliland and Ethiopia
The memorandum of understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia holds considerable strategic significance for both countries, marking a pivotal moment in their diplomatic and economic relations. This memorandum lays the groundwork for a multifaceted partnership that can enhance regional cooperation and support lasting peace.
To achieve the full benefits of this agreement, it is crucial for the new government in Somaliland to prioritize its effective implementation and follow-up actions. Successful execution of this understanding can dramatically influence Somaliland’s international standing, providing opportunities to strengthen its foreign policy initiatives.
Moreover, a well-implemented agreement could lead to improved diplomatic relations, not only between Somaliland and Ethiopia but also with other countries in the region. As the partnership develops, it is likely to yield significant economic prospects, potentially spurring trade, investment, and infrastructure development.
Ultimately, the realization of this agreement contributes to reinforcing regional stability, which is essential for the prosperity of Somaliland and its neighbors. The commitment to uphold such agreements can create a positive ripple effect, fostering a secure environment conducive to growth and collaboration across the region.
About the Author
Dariq Madar is a professional based in the United Kingdom, with a strong focus on the political and economic trends shaping Africa, particularly in the diverse and rapidly evolving countries of East Africa. His dedication to understanding the complex dynamics of the region motivates him to remain well-informed on its developments and relationships.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
General Michael E. Langley, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), is set to visit Somaliland in the coming days, according to sources familiar with the matter. This significant development comes amid a notable shift in U.S. foreign policy dynamics and escalating Chinese pressure in the Horn of Africa. With Republican control of both houses of Congress and growing bipartisan support for a shift in U.S. policy, Washington’s long-held “One-Somalia” policy appears increasingly unsustainable. This high-level visit, following U.S. Ambassador Richard Riley’s attendance at President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro’s” inauguration, suggests the traditionally rigid U.S. foreign policy establishment may be adapting to new political realities that favor a more independent Somaliland.
The strategic recalibration takes on added urgency as Somaliland stands as the only African nation that has resisted Chinese overtures despite lacking international recognition, maintaining its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the face of mounting pressure from Beijing. China’s Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, recently issued a stark warning, declaring, “We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.” This threatening stance, following the attendance of Taiwan’s Deputy Foreign Minister at President Cirro’s inauguration, has only heightened the strategic importance of U.S.-Somaliland relations. These developments, coupled with strong Republican congressional backing for Somaliland recognition, signal a potential seismic shift in U.S. engagement with the Horn of Africa.
Recent reports suggest renovation work is already underway at former military facilities in Berbera, with satellite imagery showing a major renovation ongoing at Berbera Airport. The timing of these developments, alongside strategic recommendations and Republican control of Congress, suggests a coordinated effort to establish facts on the ground ahead of possible policy changes. The modernized Berbera Port and its adjacent international airport represent crucial strategic assets as the U.S. seeks to secure its interests near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint where Chinese influence has been steadily growing.
With Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti facing increasing operational constraints and strategic competition from China’s first overseas military installation in its immediate vicinity, Berbera’s infrastructure complex emerges as a critical force multiplier for U.S. power projection in the Horn of Africa. The deep-water port and airfield configuration offer an optimal forward operating base for rapid deployment capabilities, with strategic reach extending across multiple areas of operation (AOs) – from Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia to Houthi positions threatening maritime chokepoints. This dual-use facility provides essential strategic depth for counterterrorism operations, offering reduced time-on-target for kinetic responses and enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coverage across the theater of operations. Berbera’s geographic positioning enables both over-the-horizon strike capabilities and sustained forward presence in the contested Red Sea corridor, while its modernized port infrastructure supports the full spectrum of maritime interdiction operations. As a potential joint operating base, Berbera would significantly enhance AFRICOM’s operational flexibility and combat power distribution across the region’s most volatile flashpoints.
Langley’s diplomatic mission follows a carefully orchestrated series of U.S. military visits and assessments in Somaliland, now perhaps accelerated by shifting political winds in Washington. His predecessor, General Stephen Townsend, conducted a detailed evaluation of Berbera’s facilities in May 2022, accompanied by then-Ambassador Larry André. Their inspection of the port and airport infrastructure suggested growing U.S. interest in establishing a military footprint in the region. Subsequently, in January 2023, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) dispatched a delegation to evaluate Berbera’s capabilities for the U.S.-led Justified Accord military exercise.
The evolving dynamics in Somaliland’s international relationships add another layer of significance to Langley’s visit. President Cirro, who had initially questioned the wisdom of prioritizing bilateral ties with Taiwan over potential relations with China during his campaign, has since demonstrated a firm commitment to Somaliland’s existing partnerships. This evolution from campaign rhetoric to governance pragmatism reflects a growing recognition of fundamental incompatibilities between Somaliland’s democratic aspirations and Beijing’s regional ambitions.
Somaliland government officials have in the past, shown enthusiasm for hosting U.S. military facilities. While formal diplomatic recognition remains a key objective for Somaliland, the convergence of military strategic interests, Republican control of Congress, and growing bipartisan support for a stronger stance against Chinese expansion creates conditions for a historic shift in U.S. policy. The potential establishment of a U.S. military presence in Berbera, coupled with possible recognition under a new administration, could fundamentally reshape the balance of power in one of the world’s most strategically contested maritime corridors.
When reached for comment regarding General Langley’s reported visit, AFRICOM did not respond to requests for comment.
The Horn of Africa is once again in the global spotlight as reports emerge of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s plans to recognize the Republic of Somaliland. This news coincides with Somaliland celebrating the inauguration of its sixth democratically elected president, leaving the nation of 6.2 million in a jubilant mood.
For many, the name Somaliland is mistakenly associated with the failures of its chaotic neighbor, Somalia. However, Somaliland’s story stands in stark contrast, marked by state failure, piracy, terrorism, corruption, and prolonged instability in Somalia, while Somaliland has built a reputation for stability and democratic governance.
Somaliland gained its independence on June 26, 1960, from the British Empire and is often referred to as ‘Africa’s best-kept secret.’ It has managed to create a stable and democratic society, earning a unique position in a region otherwise plagued by chaos. Freedom House has ranked it as the only free country in East Africa.
A Legacy of Strategic Importance
Somaliland’s recent rise in global prominence is a continuation of its historical importance. Positioned strategically at the mouth of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait along the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland is crucial for the stability and security of this vital sea-lane through which almost one-third of the world’s shipping passes. Historically, Somaliland’s port city of Berbera was so significant that the Gulf was once referred to as the Gulf of Berbera before colonial shifts favored the port city of Aden.
During the Cold War, Berbera’s strategic importance was recognized by both superpowers, with the Soviet Union and the United States investing heavily to secure their influence in this crucial region.
Renewed Interest from the United States
Recent reports suggest that the U.S. has reignited its interest in Berbera, exploring the possibility of using it as a base for its African forces, potentially replacing the overcrowded Djibouti. China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017, prompting the United States to seek new options to maintain its advantage in this strategically critical region.
The United States views Somaliland as a credible alternative not only due to its strategic location but also because of its democratic governance, counterterrorism cooperation, active role in anti-piracy activities, and positive relations with Taiwan. In 2022, this led to the U.S. introducing legislation to strengthen its security partnership with Somaliland as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Fiscal Year 2023. This move followed a bipartisan letter led by Congressman Michael McCaul, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urging Secretary of State Antony Blinken to enhance engagement with Somaliland.
However, progress stalled due to the Biden administration’s adherence to the outdated “One Somalia” policy, which involved substantial financial support to Somalia despite its persistent instability. Many Americans view Congresswoman Ilhan Omar as a key figure behind this failed policy, influencing the State Department to prioritize Somalia over strategic interests.
Amid the current momentum, on December 12, 2024, Republican Congressman Scott Perry introduced a bill to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, calling for the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. We are now witnessing a race across various branches of the U.S. government to recognize Somaliland. While congressional legislation is one pathway, another option lies in President Trump issuing an executive order.
Ethiopia’s Interest in Somaliland
The U.S. is not the only country showing interest in Somaliland this year. On January 1, 2024, Somaliland and Ethiopia agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which, if implemented, would see Ethiopia recognize Somaliland in return for access to the Red Sea. This deal would also increase Ethiopia’s use of Berbera port, which, following significant investment by the UAE’s DP World, has been ranked by the World Bank as the most efficient port in Sub-Saharan Africa.
A New Chapter for Somaliland
Increased international interest and potential recognition mark a pivotal moment for the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland remains committed to seeking recognition and fostering good relations with all countries. It is becoming evident that many nations are recognizing the benefits of being the first to acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty.
The prospect of U.S. recognition could transform Somaliland’s geopolitical standing and economic prospects. As Somaliland’s leaders continue to advocate for international recognition, one thing is certain: Somaliland is poised to become a leading nation in securing the vital maritime passageways through which almost one-third of the world’s shipping passes.
About the Author:
Sharmake Abyan is a London-based political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
The pursuit of international recognition by Somaliland represents a pivotal moment that could reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This analysis examines how recognition could transform regional dynamics and serve broader international strategic interests, offering a comprehensive view of the potential implications for stability, security, and development in this critical region.
Regional Implications and Stability
Somaliland has emerged as a beacon of democratic governance in the Horn of Africa, consistently conducting peaceful elections and maintaining political stability since declaring independence in 1991. This democratic success story stands in marked contrast to the persistent instability in Somalia and several neighboring states. Recognition would not only validate these democratic achievements but could catalyze similar democratic transitions across the region, establishing a precedent for peaceful governance in an area historically plagued by conflict. The success of Somaliland’s democratic model could serve as a powerful example for other regions struggling with governance challenges, demonstrating that stable, representative government is achievable even in historically turbulent areas.
The security implications of recognition extend far beyond Somaliland’s borders. The territory’s proven track record in containing terrorist threats, particularly al-Shabaab, demonstrates its capability as a security partner. International recognition would significantly enhance these security capabilities through increased access to international support and resources. This would enable Somaliland to further develop its security infrastructure, participate in international security frameworks, and strengthen its intelligence-gathering capabilities. The resulting improvement in regional security would benefit not only Somaliland but the entire Horn of Africa, creating a more stable environment for economic development and social progress.
Despite operating without formal recognition, Somaliland has demonstrated remarkable economic resilience. The strategic port of Berbera exemplifies this potential, attracting substantial international investment and serving as a crucial gateway for regional trade. Recognition would unlock access to international financial institutions and development funding, enabling Somaliland to fully realize its economic potential. This would facilitate formal trade agreements and economic partnerships, attracting increased foreign direct investment while supporting broader regional economic integration initiatives. The economic benefits would extend throughout the region, creating new opportunities for trade and development that could help address the root causes of regional instability.
The current ambiguous status of Somaliland-Somalia relations perpetuates uncertainty and tension in the region. Recognition could establish a framework for resolving these long-standing issues through formal diplomatic channels. This would enable the establishment of clear jurisdictional boundaries and responsibilities, creating opportunities for resource sharing and economic cooperation. The resulting stability would benefit not only Somaliland and Somalia but the entire region, reducing the risk of armed conflict through increased international oversight and engagement.
United States Strategic Interests
The recognition of Somaliland presents several compelling opportunities for advancing U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s location near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea positions it as a crucial partner for American strategic objectives in the region. This geographic advantage, combined with Somaliland’s demonstrated commitment to democratic values, makes it an invaluable potential ally for the United States in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.
The United States stands to gain significant strategic advantages through formal recognition of Somaliland. The territory could serve as a vital base for naval operations, intelligence gathering, and securing maritime trade routes, particularly given the ongoing challenges in Yemen and increasing regional instability. This strategic partnership would enhance U.S. military and intelligence capabilities in a critical area where American influence needs strengthening. Furthermore, recognition would demonstrate concrete American support for democratic achievement in Africa, amplifying U.S. soft power and potentially encouraging other nations to pursue democratic reforms.
Perhaps most significantly, Somaliland’s strategic decision to align with Taiwan rather than China presents a unique opportunity for the United States to counter China’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa. While China has established a strong presence across the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative and military installations, Somaliland’s pro-Taiwan stance offers the U.S. a chance to strengthen its position in this vital region. Recognition would solidify Somaliland as a democratic partner, effectively creating a counterweight to China’s growing military and economic presence. This alignment would serve crucial U.S. interests in maintaining regional balance and preventing Chinese dominance of critical maritime routes.
The establishment of formal security and economic agreements with Somaliland would strengthen the U.S. alliance network in a region where reliable partnerships are increasingly valuable. These agreements could encompass joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development initiatives. Such comprehensive engagement would not only serve immediate U.S. security interests but would also establish a long-term partnership in a geopolitically sensitive area. Beyond bilateral relations, recognition would enable the United States to facilitate stronger regional alliances, creating a network of partnerships that could enhance collective security and diplomatic cooperation throughout the Horn of Africa. This strengthened alliance system would serve as a cornerstone for regional stability while amplifying American influence in this strategically vital region.
Global Strategic Considerations
Somaliland’s strategic location along critical maritime corridors presents significant opportunities for international security cooperation. The territory’s position near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea makes it an invaluable partner in securing vital international trade routes. Recognition would enhance maritime security operations, strengthening anti-piracy efforts and providing stable ports for naval operations. This would contribute to the safety and efficiency of international maritime trade, benefiting the global economy while advancing regional security interests.
In an era of increasing great power competition, Somaliland’s strategic alignment with democratic values and its relationship with Taiwan present unique opportunities for the international community. Recognition would strengthen democratic partnerships in the Horn of Africa, helping to counter growing authoritarian influence in the region. This would support independent foreign policy choices by African nations while promoting multilateral cooperation among democratic states. The resulting network of relationships would contribute to a more balanced and stable regional order.
The economic potential unlocked by recognition would transform Somaliland into a significant regional economic hub. Development of energy and mineral resources would accelerate, while expanded port facilities would enhance maritime trade capabilities. Investment in regional transportation infrastructure would improve connectivity, facilitating economic integration and growth. Integration into global financial systems would provide access to international markets and investment opportunities, creating a foundation for sustained economic development.
Policy Implications
Recognition of Somaliland would require a carefully coordinated international approach. This should begin with increased diplomatic engagement, gradually building toward formal recognition while addressing potential regional concerns. The process should include the development of comprehensive security cooperation agreements focusing on counter-terrorism, maritime security, and regional stability. Economic assistance programs would support Somaliland’s integration into the global economy, while diplomatic initiatives would build regional consensus and support for recognition.
Conclusion
The recognition of Somaliland represents more than a simple diplomatic decision; it offers a strategic opportunity to strengthen regional stability, promote democratic governance, and enhance international security cooperation in a critical region. The demonstrated success of Somaliland’s democratic institutions, combined with its strategic location and potential for economic growth, makes recognition a compelling policy choice that could yield significant benefits for regional and global security.
The advantages of recognition extend beyond immediate political considerations to encompass lasting improvements in regional security, economic development, and democratic governance. Recognition would simultaneously advance multiple strategic objectives: strengthening democracy in Africa, enhancing regional security cooperation, countering China’s expanding influence, securing vital maritime routes, and fostering economic development. As global attention increasingly focuses on the Horn of Africa, the recognition of Somaliland could serve as a transformative step toward a more stable, prosperous, and democratic region. The combination of Somaliland’s proven democratic track record, its strategic location, and its potential for economic growth makes recognition a compelling policy choice that could yield significant benefits for both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. The potential benefits of recognition, from enhanced security cooperation to economic development and democratic consolidation, make a strong case for the international community to seriously consider this important step forward in regional development.
About the Author:
Mariam Robly is an independent journalist and political analyst based out of the MENA region.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Questions mount as André partners with Somali MP who concealed government role in foreign agent filing
In a move that raises significant concerns about diplomatic integrity and national security, former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Larry André Jr. Jr. registered as a foreign agent (Registration Number: 7468) on September 25, 2024, for Hormuud Telecom. According to UN Security Council documents, this company emerged from the remnants of Al-Barakaat, a network previously dismantled by U.S. authorities for terrorist financing. André now serves as Strategic Advisor, with an explicit mission to correct what they term “unfair, inaccurate, and outdated perceptions or libelous accusations” about Hormuud.
Timeline of Key Events
2001 (November 7):U.S. authorities raid Al-Barakaat offices across eight states
2002: Formation of Hormuud Telecommunications by former Al-Barakaat leaders
2017 (October): Two Hormuud employees prosecuted for role in Somalia’s deadliest terror attack
2018: UN Security Council report details Hormuud employee dismissals for terror links
2019: Hormuud infrastructure allegedly linked to Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi
2023 (June): Larry André Jr.’s premature departure from ambassadorial post
2024 (September 25):André and Malik Abdalla register as foreign agents for Hormuud
The Al-Barakaat Legacy: Resurrecting a Terrorist Financial Network
Understanding André’s new role requires examining Hormuud’s documented emergence from Al-Barakaat, once among Al-Qaeda’s most sophisticated financial operations. By 2001, Al-Barakaat had built a global empire spanning 40 countries, moving approximately $140 million annually through its hawala network while operating telecommunications and internet services throughout Somalia. This integrated model – combining financial services with telecommunications infrastructure – proved invaluable for terrorist operations, allowing seamless communication and money movement across borders.
The UN Security Council Report S/2002/1209 highlights Al-Barakaat’s sophisticated and far-reaching involvement in financing terrorism. The organization skimmed percentages from legitimate remittances sent by the Somali diaspora, creating an informal and virtually untraceable value transfer system. The telecommunications infrastructure provided by Al-Barakaat facilitated real-time coordination of financial movements and enabled terrorist communications.
The operation’s sophistication became clear on November 7, 2001, when U.S. authorities launched coordinated raids across eight states, targeting Al-Barakaat’s American offices. Yet the 2001 crackdown, rather than dismantling the network, prompted its evolution. In 2002, just months after Al-Barakaat’s designation as a terrorist entity, key figures from the organization emerged behind a new venture: Hormuud Telecommunications. According to UN Security Council documents, “Hormuud Telecommunications was created by former leaders of Al-Barakaat in an attempt to reestablish themselves as a dominant telecom provider in Somalia.”
Terror Links and Banking Ambitions
Hormuud’s operational history, marked by security breaches and financial irregularities, is particularly concerning. According to UN Security Council report S/2018/1002, in October 2017, two Hormuud employees were prosecuted for their role in facilitating what became Somalia’s deadliest terrorist attack, with prosecutors presenting evidence that the employees allowed bomb-laden vehicles through checkpoints. Intelligence reports subsequently linked the company to the 2019 Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi, where Hormuud’s office infrastructure allegedly provided logistical support to the attackers.
The attack involved a large VBIED, with an estimated TNT equivalence of over 1,200 kg, making it one of the largest explosive devices in Al-Shabaab’s history.
It is against this backdrop that André’s primary mission, according to FARA filings, becomes particularly alarming: gaining U.S. regulatory recognition for Hormuud’s subsidiary, Salaam Somali Bank. The scope of potential risk becomes clear when considering Al-Barakaat’s historical operations: a $140 million annual operation spanning 40 countries, demonstrating how quickly such networks can achieve global scale. While Hormuud seeks access to today’s more regulated financial infrastructure – including U.S. dollar clearing operations, correspondent banking relationships, and direct interface with SWIFT and ACH systems – the fundamental vulnerabilities remain.
Somalia’s limited regulatory capacity creates particular challenges. Even with U.S. regulatory frameworks like the Bank Secrecy Act and OFAC oversight, the integration of telecommunications and banking services poses unique monitoring challenges. Modern financial controls, designed for traditional banking operations, may struggle to effectively oversee a system where telecommunications, mobile money, and banking services blur traditional regulatory boundaries. The complex corporate structures and Somalia’s informal financial sector create opacity that could shield questionable transactions from scrutiny.
A Web of Political Connections
This banking initiative, advanced through a complex web of political connections, raises serious concerns. FARA registrations reveal that Malik Abdalla, a current member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, registered as a foreign agent alongside André. Before entering parliament in March 2022, Abdalla served as CEO of White Star Business Group from 2017 to 2022. His previous roles as Director of the Disengaged Combatants Program at the Ministry of Internal Security (2015-2017) and Senior Political Advisor to the Ministry of Defense (2011-2012) point to deep connections within Somalia’s intelligence apparatus, particularly with intelligence chief Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbalolshe”.
The structure of White Star Business Group itself presents red flags. CEO Amira Elmi’s rapid transition from corporate planning at Canada’s Meteorological Service to running a complex security and diplomatic consulting operation in Somalia strains credibility. White Star’s consulting agreement reveals a broader strategy targeting “regional and global capitals in priority countries,” suggesting this Washington lobbying effort is part of a larger campaign to expand Hormuud’s influence internationally.
Hidden Parliamentary Role Raises Legal Red Flags
Malik Abdalla’s involvement adds further layers of concern beyond political connections. FARA registration documents reveal that Abdalla, while serving as a member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, failed to disclose this role as a foreign government official when registering as a foreign agent (Registration Number: 7468) on September 25, 2024. The filings show Abdalla, who acquired U.S. citizenship through asylum in 2011, describing himself merely as a “Businessperson” and “Member” of White Star Business Group LLC – a company he wholly owns.
This omission becomes more significant given Abdalla’s U.S. citizenship status. His service in a foreign parliament while maintaining U.S. citizenship potentially violates 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A), which addresses loss of nationality through foreign government service. That he now operates as an undisclosed foreign government official while lobbying U.S. authorities raises serious national security concerns and appears to violate FARA’s explicit requirement to disclose all positions held with foreign governments.
Problematic Pattern of Diplomatic Service
In light of Mr. Abdalla’s undisclosed role as a current member of Somalia’s Parliament and possible intelligence connections, a critical question emerges: Given his position and access to classified intelligence, did André know that Malik Abdalla, his current employer, was a member of Somalia’s Parliament with extensive connections to Somalia’s intelligence services and its chief Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbalolshe”? The implications of this question reach beyond mere ethical concerns into the realm of potential security compromise.
The timing raises particular red flags. André’s premature departure from his ambassadorial post coincided with a period of intense scrutiny of Somalia’s financial networks. His immediate transition to representing interests he would have received classified briefings about – particularly through a firm run by a parliamentary figure with deep intelligence connections – suggests either a troubling lack of judgment or more concerning possibilities.
Throughout his diplomatic tenure, André faced criticism for appearing to act more as an advocate for Somali government interests than a representative of the United States. His unusually supportive stance toward Mogadishu, sometimes appearing to serve as an unofficial spokesperson for the administration, takes on new significance given this rapid transition to representing major Somali business interests.
The FARA filing’s deliberate omission of André’s specific salary details, while acknowledging his compensation is “not based solely on services rendered to the foreign principal,” adds another layer of opacity. This arrangement, combined with his abrupt departure and immediate alignment with figures of intelligence interest, raises profound questions about potential compromise.
National Security Implications
The gravity of this situation extends beyond typical concerns about the revolving door between diplomatic service and private consulting. André’s role represents a potential compromise of national security interests in the Horn of Africa, particularly given his access to classified intelligence about the very networks he now represents.
The precedent this sets is deeply troubling: a former U.S. Ambassador, having had access to classified intelligence about regional financial networks and their security implications, now works to integrate those same networks into the U.S. financial system. The implications for U.S. national security and regional stability could be severe if these efforts succeed in providing access to the American banking system without proper scrutiny of historical connections and current operations.
Hormuud’s ambitious strategy to expand its influence through “regional and global capitals in priority countries” suggests this Washington lobbying effort is part of a broader campaign to legitimize its operations internationally. Given the documented history of how such networks can rapidly achieve global scale and the challenges of effective oversight, the potential risks to U.S. financial security cannot be overstated.
Repeated attempts to reach Mr. Andre for comment on his transition from Ambassador to foreign agent were unsuccessful. Mr. Abdalla did not respond to detailed questions about his parliamentary role, U.S. citizenship status, and FARA filing omissions. White Star Business Group’s office in Washington declined to address questions about its broader lobbying strategy or the nature of Mr. Andre’s compensation arrangement.
In a landmark legislative milestone, Congress has introduced H.R. 10402, the “Somaliland Independence Act,” signaling a potential sea change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. This bold initiative seeks to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, ending decades of ambiguity and elevating its status as a strategic and democratic partner. The bill comes as Republicans consolidate their control of Congress and advance Project 2025, a sweeping blueprint to recalibrate U.S. foreign policy by prioritizing partnerships with democratic allies and countering authoritarian regimes.
Somaliland’s Recognition Gains Traction
The “Somaliland Independence Act” represents the most significant U.S. legislative push for Somaliland’s recognition to date. Spearheaded by Representative Scott Perry (R-PA-10) and co-sponsored by Andrew Ogles (R-TN-5), the bill builds on the foundation of previous measures, including the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act (H.R. 7170) and the Somaliland Partnership Act (S. 3861).
Notably, it draws heavily from the work of Senator James Risch (R-ID), whose Somaliland Partnership Act laid the groundwork for deepening U.S.-Somaliland ties in governance and security. While Risch’s earlier legislation stopped short of advocating outright recognition, it created a legislative framework that H.R. 10402 now seeks to expand into full diplomatic recognition, reflecting Somaliland’s progress as a model for stability in the Horn of Africa.
The Decline of Opposition and Shifting Policy Dynamics
The introduction of H.R. 10402 coincides with a waning of opposition to Somaliland’s recognition within U.S. policymaking circles. For years, Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN), a vocal critic of Somaliland’s independence, wielded significant influence through her position on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Omar, who has consistently advocated for Somalia’s federal government, leveraged her platform and close ties to key figures within the State Department’s Africa Bureau to bolster Somalia’s case against Somaliland’s recognition.
However, Omar’s removal from the Foreign Affairs Committee has curtailed her ability to influence policy. Furthermore, her allies within the State Department, many of whom resisted Somaliland’s recognition, are expected to vacate their positions as the department undergoes a Republican-led restructuring. These shifts present Somaliland’s advocates with an unprecedented opportunity to advance their case in a more favorable political environment.
Senator Marco Rubio and Somaliland’s Strategic Role
The involvement of Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) underscores the growing importance of Somaliland in U.S. foreign policy. A seasoned member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Senator Risch, Rubio has long recognized Somaliland’s strategic value. His experience addressing regional stability, maritime security, and countering Chinese influence in Africa positions him as a key figure in rallying bipartisan support for H.R. 10402.
Aligned with the goals of Project 2025, Rubio’s advocacy reflects a Republican foreign policy vision that emphasizes democratic partnerships and strategic realignments. Recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state not only supports these objectives but also strengthens U.S. presence in the Horn of Africa—a region critical to global trade and counterterrorism efforts.
A Democratic and Strategic Partner
Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has built a robust democratic system characterized by free elections, peaceful power transitions, and a vibrant civil society. This record of stability and governance contrasts sharply with Somalia’s ongoing struggles with political turmoil and insecurity.
Strategically, Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden makes it indispensable for securing maritime trade routes and countering regional extremism. The Berbera Port, developed with Emirati investment, further enhances its potential as a logistical and naval hub for U.S. and allied forces. U.S. recognition would bolster Somaliland’s capacity to contribute to regional stability while cementing America’s commitment to democratic partners.
Timely Alignment with Domestic and Regional Changes
The introduction of this bill aligns with key political transitions in both Somaliland and the United States. Newly inaugurated President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Cirro’ has prioritized economic growth and national unity, presenting a strong case for international recognition. U.S. recognition would provide his administration with the diplomatic legitimacy and economic opportunities needed to strengthen Somaliland’s role as a democratic leader in the region.
Domestically, the Republican consolidation of Congress and the State Department’s expected overhaul provide a rare window to advance Somaliland’s recognition. Rubio’s influence, combined with the groundwork laid by Risch, ensures that Somaliland’s case will remain a foreign policy priority.
A Transformative Moment
If passed, the “Somaliland Independence Act” would mark a historic shift in U.S. foreign policy, reaffirming America’s commitment to democracy and strategic alliances in a volatile region. By recognizing Somaliland, the United States would not only stabilize the Horn of Africa but also project a strong countermeasure against authoritarian influence from China and Russia.
For Somaliland, U.S. recognition would open the door to international legitimacy, investment, and deeper bilateral ties. For the United States, it represents an opportunity to reaffirm its global leadership and its resolve to support democratic partners in strategic regions.
Editor’s Note: The Somaliland Chronicle will continue to provide updates as this story develops.
HARGEISA, Somaliland – In a carefully orchestrated announcement that signals both continuity and dramatic change, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” unveiled his inaugural cabinet on Saturday, December 14, 2024. The comprehensive restructuring of government portfolios and surprising ministerial choices reveal a complex balancing act between party loyalty, technocratic expertise, and political pragmatism.
Strategic Appointments and Notable Reforms
The appointment of Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has emerged as one of the most striking decisions in the new administration. At a crucial moment when Somaliland’s diplomatic efforts appear to be gaining traction—particularly amid speculation about potential shifts in U.S. foreign policy under a possible second Trump administration—the selection of Bakal represents an unconventional choice for this pivotal position.
The timing of this appointment is particularly significant as Somaliland’s strategic position in the Horn of Africa has never been more crucial. Bakal’s limited diplomatic experience stands in stark contrast to the complex international relationships Somaliland must navigate during this critical period. However, his extensive background in the private sector, particularly his role at Telesom, suggests a potential shift towards leveraging economic diplomacy to further Somaliland’s recognition efforts.
Party Loyalty and Administrative Experience
In a move that bridges party loyalty with administrative expertise, President Cirro appointed Khadar Hussein Abdi Loge as Minister of the Presidency. Loge’s selection is noteworthy given his long-standing role as Secretary-General of the Waddani Party, where he worked closely with Cirro during the party’s opposition years. This appointment suggests a strategic effort to maintain party cohesion while placing a trusted ally in a critical coordination role, ensuring that the president’s vision is effectively implemented across the government.
Structural Reforms and Governance Innovation
The new administration has introduced significant structural changes, most notably the division of the Interior Ministry into two distinct portfolios. Abdalle Mohamed Arab will head the Ministry of Internal Security, while Hassan Ahmed Duale takes charge of the Ministry of Local Governments and Urban Development. This bifurcation reflects a recognition of the distinct challenges facing Somaliland’s internal security and urban development sectors.
While Abdalle Mohamed Arab’s appointment as Minister of Internal Security signals the administration’s initial security sector reforms, President Cirro has yet to announce his choices for several crucial security positions. The heads of the police force, intelligence services, and military command remain undecided, leaving a significant gap in the security apparatus during a sensitive transition period. These positions, historically subject to intense political calculations, have often been seen as extensions of presidential power rather than independent security institutions. The intelligence services, in particular, have faced public scrutiny for functioning more as a law enforcement arm than a traditional intelligence agency.
President Cirro has previously accused law enforcement of extrajudicial actions, leaving it unclear how much reform he plans to institute. His administration’s approach to these appointments will be a key indicator of his commitment to addressing these concerns and reforming the security sector.
Notable Absences and Direction of Change
The most immediate challenge facing Cirro’s administration emerges in its personnel decisions, none more significant than the decision to avoid appointing Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar as Foreign Minister. As the architect of the Somaliland-Somalia talks during the Silanyo administration, Dr. Omar presided over what many consider the most damaging diplomatic initiative in Somaliland’s quest for recognition—a dialogue process that effectively reduced Somaliland’s international standing from an aspiring sovereign state to essentially a federal member of Somalia. By selecting Bakal instead, Cirro signals a clear break from past practices that many Somalilanders view as detrimental to their quest for international recognition.
The absence of other anticipated appointments has also drawn attention. Somalia’s former Finance Minister, Abdirahman Bayle, whose name had been widely circulated in political circles, was notably absent from the final lineup. Similarly, several prominent Waddani party figures who were expected to secure positions found themselves outside the cabinet.
Private Sector Influence and Expertise
Instead, the cabinet composition reveals strong ties to Somaliland’s private sector. Several appointees maintain significant connections to major businesses, marking a departure from traditional political appointments. Similarly, Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur, now Minister of Civil Aviation and Airports Development, brings extensive private sector experience from his leadership role at Dahabshiil Group, where he notably headed their Edahab digital currency division.
This notable presence of private sector leaders in key positions suggests a new direction in governance, blending business expertise with public service. However, it also raises questions about the balance between commercial interests and public accountability in crucial government portfolios. The influence of these business leaders within the government could lead to innovative public-private partnerships, but it also necessitates stringent measures to ensure transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.
Technical Expertise and Development Focus
The economic and development portfolios reflect a strong emphasis on technical expertise. Abdillahi Hassan Adan’s appointment as Minister of Finance and Economic Development, alongside Kaltun Sh Hassan Abdi Madar as Minister of Planning and National Development, suggests a focus on professional competence in these critical areas. Both ministers have extensive backgrounds in economic planning and financial management, indicating that the new administration is prioritizing fiscal responsibility and strategic development planning.
Inclusive Representation and Social Progress
In a landmark development, President Cirro has prioritized equitable divisions of positions among Somaliland tribes and has, for the first time, given ministerial posts to minority tribes, including the Gaboye community. This historic decision underscores Cirro’s dedication to fostering unity and ensuring that all segments of Somaliland society have a voice in the new government. The inclusion of minority tribes in key governmental roles not only enhances the legitimacy of his administration but also sets a new standard for future governance in Somaliland.
International Relations and Recognition Efforts
The restructuring of the foreign affairs portfolio comes at a pivotal moment for Somaliland’s international recognition efforts. With increasing global attention on the Horn of Africa and potential shifts in major powers’ regional policies, the effectiveness of Bakal’s unconventional appointment will be closely watched by the international community. His approach to diplomacy, particularly in leveraging Somaliland’s economic strengths, could redefine the region’s geopolitical dynamics.
Implementation Challenges
The new cabinet faces immediate challenges, with President Cirro directing outgoing ministers to complete their handover within three days. This aggressive timeline underscores the administration’s urgency in implementing its agenda but may pose practical challenges in ensuring smooth transitions. The effectiveness of these transitions will be critical in maintaining governmental stability and continuity.
Full Cabinet Composition
Abdalle Mohamed Arab – Minister of Internal Security
Hassan Ahmed Duale – Minister of Local Governments and Urban Development
Yonis Ahmed Yonis – Minister of Justice
Abdillahi Hassan Adan – Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal – Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Dr. Hussein Bashir Hersi Wahan – Minister of Health Development
Hussein Ahmed Aideed – Minister of Public Works, Housing and Reconstruction
Khadar Hussein Abdi Loge – Minister of the Presidency
Ali Jama Farah (Buureed) – Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Mohamed Yusuf Ali (Ilka-case) – Minister of Defense
Ahmed Jama Barre Roble – Minister of Energy and Minerals
Kaltun Sh Hassan Abdi Madar – Minister of Planning and National Development
Osman Ibrahim Nur (Af-gaab) – Minister of Transport and Roads Development
Professor Ismail Yusuf Duale – Minister of Education, Early Childhood and Science
Abubakar Abdirahman Good – Minister of Water Resources
Migo Mohamed (Sambaloolshe) – Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Family
Mahmoud Egeh Yusuf – Minister of Agriculture Development
Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur – Minister of Civil Aviation and Airports Development
Ahmed Yasin Sh Ali Ayanle – Minister of Information, Awareness and Culture
Abdillahi Osman (Geel-jire) – Minister of Environment and Climate Change
Ahmed Aw-Dahir Haji Hassan – Minister of Parliamentary Relations and Constitutional Affairs
Jamal Mohamed Jama Ahmed – Minister of Telecommunications and Technology
Saleban Duale Haji Jama – Minister of Resettlement and Humanitarian Affairs
Ahmed Mohamed Farah Oofle – Minister of Youth and Sports Development
Omar Shuayb Mohamed – Minister of Livestock and Pastoral Development
Sheikh Abdillahi Dahir Jama – Minister of Religious Affairs and Endowment
Abdirahman Hassan Nur Furre – Minister of Commerce and Industry
Said Mohamed Burale Arrale – Minister of Investment Development and Industries
Looking Ahead
As Somaliland enters this new political chapter, the administration’s success hinges on the ability of this diverse cabinet to work cohesively. The combination of party loyalists, technical experts, and private sector leaders represents a calculated gamble on the president’s part.
The international community will be watching closely, particularly as Somaliland positions itself for potential diplomatic breakthroughs. The effectiveness of these appointments, especially in key portfolios like foreign affairs and the presidency, will be crucial in determining whether President Cirro can navigate the complex landscape of Somaliland’s political and developmental aspirations.
By charting a new course through his cabinet selections, President Cirro has set the stage for a potentially transformative era in Somaliland’s history. The success of this bold approach—combining private sector expertise, political experience, and inclusive representation—will ultimately be measured by its ability to advance Somaliland’s development and international recognition goals while maintaining domestic stability and social cohesion.
Correction: The previous version of this report inaccurately stated that the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Cabdiraxmaan Daahir Aadan Bakaal, serves on the board of Telesom, Somaliland’s leading telecommunications company. We apologize for this error and any confusion it may have caused.
At Somaliland Presidency, President Muse Bihi Abdi convened his 134th and final ministerial meeting, delivering pointed guidance to both successors and supporters as Somaliland enters a critical transition period.
“To those who were in opposition, I say: You have won the election, and we have congratulated you. Since our focus is on building a nation, the right to continue with opposition rhetoric and divisive speech is no longer yours – go back and reconsider your approach,” Bihi declared, his tone mixing concession with caution.
Foreign Policy Legacy
President Bihi’s tenure has been marked by bold diplomatic initiatives that challenged regional orthodoxy. His administration’s latest and most consequential move—the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia—appeared to redraw the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical map. The agreement, promising naval access in exchange for potential recognition, achieved what years of patient diplomacy could not: forcing global engagement with Somaliland’s sovereignty aspirations.
This was not Bihi’s first diplomatic gambit. His 2020 decision to establish formal ties with Taiwan, directly defying China’s opposition, marked a significant shift in Somaliland’s foreign policy. The move strengthened relations with Taiwan while positioning Somaliland against China’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa. Despite Beijing’s pressure and Somalia’s alignment with the “One-China” policy, the partnership has yielded dividends in health, education, and technology cooperation.
The administration’s independent foreign policy stance has found increasing resonance in Washington. Under President Trump, and now with a Republican-controlled Congress, there are growing indications of a potential shift away from the traditional “One-Somalia” policy. This reconsideration reflects broader strategic calculations in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding competition with China and securing vital maritime routes.
Current Challenges
Yet these diplomatic gains face immediate tests. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s upcoming meeting with Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—who recently dropped demands for third-party mediation—suggests complex maneuvering ahead. Somalia’s response to the Ethiopia MoU has been particularly severe, mobilizing alliances with Turkey and Egypt while making unprecedented overtures to Al-Shabaab militants. Throughout January and February, pro-Somalia religious clerics and government officials declared holy war against both Somaliland and Ethiopia.
Regional Dynamics
The January 1st, 2024 Ethiopia MoU unleashed a diplomatic firestorm. Somalia’s response bordered on hysteria – mobilizing alliances with Turkey and Egypt while making unprecedented overtures to Al-Shabaab militants, all in desperate attempts to derail the agreement. Throughout January and February, pro-Somalia religious clerics and government officials declared holy war against both Somaliland and Ethiopia, marking an alarming escalation from a government claiming sovereignty over Somaliland.
In the wake of the Ethiopia MoU, the regional response has been varied, with Djibouti emerging as one of the most vocal critics. Interestingly, high-ranking members of the Waddani Party recently traveled to Djibouti and met with President Ismail Omar Guelleh. The delegation’s outreach raised eyebrows, especially given Guelleh’s antagonistic stance toward the MoU, which he views as a direct threat to Djibouti’s economic hegemony.
However, Waddani itself has remained notably silent on the delegation’s visit, leaving key questions unanswered. It is unclear whether these figures were acting in an official capacity as representatives of the party or as independent actors navigating the evolving regional dynamics. The lack of a formal position from Waddani adds an air of ambiguity, fueling speculation about the party’s posture toward Djibouti and the Ethiopia agreement.
Mogadishu’s diplomatic offensive reached new levels when President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud dropped his core precondition for direct talks with Prime Minister Abiy – namely, that Ethiopia must first repudiate the MoU. This dramatic concession, rather than signaling flexibility, underscores Somalia’s determination to prevent Somaliland’s diplomatic breakthrough through any means necessary.
Democratic Milestones and Governance Challenges
“We shouldered 90% of the electoral costs,” Bihi emphasized, referring to Somaliland’s successful execution of simultaneous presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections. This self-reliance, while strengthening democratic credentials, contrasted with his administration’s domestic governance record.
Critics point to frequent cabinet reshuffles and a governance style that often prioritized loyalty over expertise. Yet these shortcomings stand against significant achievements in elevating Somaliland’s international profile.
To his Kulmiye Party supporters, facing opposition status after 14 years in power (2010-2024), Bihi offered characteristically direct counsel: “Though we lost the election yesterday and the day before, we are still nation-building,” he stressed. “While we haven’t yet transferred power, when we do, we must observe a period of restraint. Just as a newborn needs forty days, new governments need their first hundred days – any destabilizing criticism from you is forbidden.”
Economic Stakes
The MoU’s implications for regional commerce are profound. Djibouti, which currently handles 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade worth an estimated $1.5 billion annually, faces unprecedented competition. The proposed development of Somaliland’s Berbera Port and Ethiopian naval facility promises to reshape regional trade dynamics. Conservative estimates suggest the deal could generate over $600 million in annual revenue for Somaliland’s economy.
However, the new administration faces complex challenges in implementation. Beyond managing diplomatic pressures, they must ensure equitable distribution of potential benefits across Somaliland’s regions. The experience of Djibouti, where port development created concentrated wealth without broad economic transformation, serves as both lesson and warning.
A Future Unwritten
“We remain custodians of this nation’s progress,” Bihi concluded—words carrying fresh significance as Somaliland navigates perhaps its most consequential diplomatic juncture since declaring independence. The upcoming Ethiopia-Somalia dialogue could validate his strategic vision or highlight the limitations of unilateral diplomacy in the complex Horn of Africa.
For a nation built on pragmatic diplomacy and democratic values, this peaceful transition marks another step toward maturity. Bihi’s successor inherits elevated international visibility alongside significant challenges—a legacy as complex as the leader himself.
HARGEISA, Republic of Somaliland — U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley and Major General Brian Cashman, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), are set to arrive in Somaliland in the coming days for high-level talks with President-elect Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro.” The delegation, which will also attend Cirro’s inauguration ceremony alongside representatives from the U.S. Embassy and expected congressional staffers, marks an unprecedented level of U.S. diplomatic and military engagement with the Republic of Somaliland. While not confirmed, sources indicate the delegation may also meet with outgoing President Muse Bihi Abdi.
The upcoming visit marks a stark departure from previous U.S. engagement. Under Ambassador Riley’s predecessor Larry André, relations with Somaliland were hampered by an almost zealous adherence to the ‘One Somalia’ policy. André, along with Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, were often described by State Department colleagues as ‘more Catholic than the Pope’ in their rigid stance—seemingly prioritizing the ‘One Somalia’ policy over U.S. strategic interests in the region. Their approach appeared to go beyond diplomatic caution into active appeasement of Mogadishu, even when it potentially undermined U.S. security interests in the Horn of Africa.
Diplomatic sources suggest multiple interpretations of the visit’s timing. However, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy suggests a more straightforward diplomatic purpose. “Normally such a visit would signal U.S. officials’ interest in meeting with new heads-of-state to discuss U.S. engagement priorities,” Nagy noted, adding that under the current ‘one Somalia’ policy, such engagement falls under the U.S. Ambassador to Somalia’s responsibilities. Nagy emphasized that Somaliland should use this opportunity to “aggressively promote its priorities – including formal recognition and its value as a strategic partner of the U.S.”
The timing coincides with Somaliland’s inclusion in the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” roadmap, designed for a potential Republican administration, which explicitly supports Somaliland’s recognition. Additionally, Somaliland recently signed a landmark Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia, granting military and commercial access to its coastline in exchange for potential recognition.
General Cashman’s presence underscores AFRICOM’s evolving approach to regional security, particularly given China’s expanding presence in neighboring Djibouti. Berbera Port’s strategic location and modernized facilities have become central to these calculations, offering potential alternative access points for U.S. military operations in the region. In 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense conducted capability tests at Berbera Airport using C-130J Super Hercules aircraft. This was followed by a significant visit in 2022 from then-AFRICOM Commander General Stephen Townsend, who personally assessed Berbera’s strategic potential. These previous high-level military engagements have laid the groundwork for increased U.S.-Somaliland security cooperation.
For President-elect Cirro, U.S. engagement presents unprecedented opportunities amid complex challenges. The convergence of U.S. diplomatic interest, military engagement, and the potential for recognition through Project 2025 opens new possibilities for Somaliland’s international standing, even as his administration navigates the implementation of the Ethiopian agreement and domestic challenges.
AFRICOM, the U.S. Embassy in Somalia, and members of the Somaliland Presidential transition team did not respond to multiple requests for comment regarding this article.
