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Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland: Why now and what next?

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By Mohamed Abdilahi Duale

A line has been crossed, and there is no going back. On 26 December, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland, an achievement that the Horn of African nation has been waiting for since 1991. More countries are sure to follow this policy change in due course. While Somalia and certain regional actors such as Turkey and Egypt have protested against this decision, the fact remains that Somaliland’s independence is the irrepressible will of its people, and Somaliland’s entry into the community of nations states has been a long time overdue. Rather than deny this reality, the international community must begin to envision what a new regional geopolitical and security order which includes Somaliland will look like, to maximize the benefits of this decision for regional trade, economic development, maritime security and interstate peace.

As part of the declaration signed between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar of Israel and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi of Somaliland, the two sides exchanged mutual recognition and established full diplomatic relations, with Somaliland immediately joining the Abraham Accords. On the same day, both Israel and Somaliland announced plans to open embassies.  Israel perceives its recognition of Somaliland as part of a strategy towards the realization of the Abraham Accords-a set of US brokered agreements that seek to normalise relations between Israel and Muslim states.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland will undoubtedly have regional and global implications. Somaliland, formerly a British Protectorate, became independent on 26 June 1960, united with Somalia on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic, and reasserted its sovereignty on 18 May 1991. Despite operating as a democratic state for three decades and meeting the criteria for statehood, and presenting arguably the best case for recognition of any unrecognized contemporary entities, Somaliland has remained unrecognised internationally. Since 1991, its primary foreign policy objective has been gaining recognition, but successive administrations have not yet achieved this goal. With Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, this longstanding goal is finally beginning to be realized, with major implications for regional and international security.

Absence of International recognition, and the Politics of state recognition by Great Powers: Somaliland’s case.

For the past three and a half decades, Somaliland has existed independently from Somalia, which has remained mired in civil war and Islamist insurgency. Notwithstanding the absence of international recognition as an independent state, Somaliland’s successive administrations have built a viable democratic and functioning country with all the trappings of a state. Somaliland also succeeded in establishing bilateral relations with many countries, including with its African neighbors such as Ethiopia and Djibouti; western powers, like the USA and UK, and Gulf states like the UAE. However, these relations can be characterized as an engagement without recognition.

Failure to recognize Somaliland in the post-1990 era was primarily due to inadequate interest in the affairs of Somaliland. This contrasts with Kosovo, East Timor, and South Sudan, which received widespread or full recognition among the international community due to political calculations on the benefits of such recognition in terms of stemming conflict and pursuing great power interests. Until recently, Somaliland had no such powerful state sponsor. This all changed in 2017, however, when the major Emirati logistics company DP World refurbished and then began operating Somaliland’s Berbera port, which is now fully integrated into the UAE’s Jebel Ali shipping network. This development was itself the recognition of a more multipolar world, in which competition between the US and China, as well as among regional powers in the Gulf, saw Somaliland emerge as a key strategic partner in politics of the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.

While these geopolitical shifts have meant greater international engagement for Somaliland, the lack of  recognition has meant that the country remains fundamentally encumbered by severe state-building and developmental constraints. Non-recognition limits Somaliland’s access to foreign investment, international development assistance and engagement with international development partners and financial institutions. It also carries a deep psychological and moral weight, by fostering feelings of isolation and decreased national morale among Somaliland’s population. Deferring recognition has also not had the desired effect of avoiding conflict between Somaliland and Somalia, with the latter using its de jure authority over Somaliland to punish it with imposed restrictions on airspace management and e-visa allocations, while stoking proxy wars in Somaliland’s eastern regions, which has taken many lives. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland now puts greater impetus on the international community to put an end to these legal ambiguities so that both the Somaliland and Somalia people can move on to a brighter future.

What does Somaliland gain from these developments?

For Somaliland, Israel’s recognition is a game-changer. Experts have argued that Somaliland’s biggest challenge to recognition is finding the first country to take the leap, after which the dam would finally break. For Israel to be that country offers certain advantages and dangers. As many Western nations, particularly in Europe, remain at a loss over how to deal with Trump’s upending of the liberal international order, Israel has responded by taking the initiative and rewriting the geopolitical playbook. In this, it has the backing of the US, which, through the Abraham Accords, aims to consolidate these changes into a new greater Middle Eastern partnership free from the destabilizing influence of Iran and its proxy forces. Through Israel, Somaliland will presumably be able to garner the diplomatic backing for recognition among other members of this alliance, including the US, while also drawing on Israel’s influence among African nations.

On a more practical level, Somaliland will capitalise Israel’s technological expertise, particularly in the fields such as agriculture, water management, and security frameworks – areas significant for Somaliland’s development and stability. Somaliland’s accession to the Abraham Accords will create a new diplomatic pathway that will allow it to enhance its economic and security cooperation acrodd the region and the globe. Opportunities for intelligence sharing and security cooperation with Israel and other Abraham Accord members can equally serve as a major asset for Somaliland in its efforts at countering and preventing threats from terrorist organizations in the region, such as Al Shabaab. At the same time, Somaliland will also likely require security guarantees from these new partners, given the opposition to Somaliland’s relationship with Israel from amongst extremist groups such as the Houthis and Al Shabaab. 

What does Israel gain from these developments?

Israel’s action is at least in part informed by Somaliland’s geo-strategic location along the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait on the Red Sea. This is an important sea route for international commercial shipments. Oil, gas, agricultural and industrial products to and from Europe and Asia pass through this route. DP World’s takeover of Berbera port has already enhanced Somaliland’s logistical integration into this network. Berbera also plays host to the longest runway in Horn Africa, while Somaliland’s coastline has already been identified by the UAE, the US and Ethiopia as an attractive place for one of their military bases. For Israel to tap into these strategic assets and facilities will greatly serve its regional security interests, particularly in countering Iran and the Houthis’ influence in the Red Sea.

Furthermore, Somaliland’s ascension to the Abraham Accords reenergizes momentum for the agreement following a period of diplomatic deadlock in the aftermath of the war in Gaza. With the dust settling on a period of immense destruction and tragic loss of life, it is time for the greater Middle East and North African region to begin envisioning what a new era of peace and stability might look like. With these recent diplomatic developments, Somaliland has shown that it is willing to sign up and contribute to the consolidation of this new order, in partnership with Israel and not in opposition. Furthermore, an alliance with Somaliland will enable Israel to counter the influence of Turkey and Qatar along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, given their longstanding and sizable support to the Somalia government in Mogadishu. Equally important is the potential of Somaliland’s untapped natural resources, including in petroleum deposits, minerals, gemstones and agricultural land.

What are the benefits of this agreement for the international community at large?

The recognition of Somaliland by Israel comes at a time of great volatility in the international system, with various regional and global actors increasingly seeking to take advantage of this political uncertainty to stake their own claim to leadership. Old diplomatic pieties are being revisited, including over the sanctity of Mogadishu’s claim to sole authority over the territory formerly known as Somali Republic. The Federal Government of Somalia’s failure to quell clan-based conflict and establish electoral legitimacy, or to eradicate the threats of Al Shabaab and ISIS, despite significant investment from the US and Europe and significant manpower from Africa, has made it clear that the dream of a political settlement or any future negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia is a dream whose time has long past.

Recognizing Somaliland not only affirms this reality, but offers a fresh opportunity to work with a reliable international partner such as Somaliland. When piracy was tormenting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it was Somaliland who the international community looked to for cooperation, after Somalia had let them down. Now, with the Houthis posing a danger to maritime trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Somaliland is again poised to play a critical role in maintaining maritime security and thus reducing the cost of shipping at a time of heightened inflation. And where the Somalia government has unequivocably failed to contain or degrade Al-Shabaab and ISIS, the Somaliland government is ready to work alongside Israel, the US and Europe to guarantee security and fight terrorism. 

What next for Somaliland?

The biggest obstacle standing in the way of realizing these international benefits is a lack of political will on the part of those nations who have not yet signed up to the US and Israel’s new vision for the region. Some, like Somalia itself, who have already protested the decision, may never come on board. Others, like Djibouti, Turkey and Egypt, are also likely to stubbornly reject these developments, either due to self-interested calculations around economic and political competition, or because expanding Israeli influence serves as a counterweight to their self-appointed designs of dominance over the Horn. For now, the Arab League have followed such a lead, claiming an opposition to any redrawing of borders.

However, never has there been a better time to revisit the judgement produced by a 2005 African Union fact-finding mission to Somaliland, in which a panel of experts concluded that “Somaliland’s search for recognition [is] historically unique and self-justified in African political history,” and that, “objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box.’” This was due to the fact that the union of former British Protectorate Somaliland and Somalia that created Somali Republic in 1960 was both conducted under dubious legal circumstances and was regardless legally dissolved through popular referendum among Somalilanders in 2001. This places it in the same camp as Senegal and the Gambia and Syria and Egypt, two cases of precedent for the dissolving of a political union.

In short, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not a reckless act of political realignment, but merely a prudent acceptance of political and legal realities. Other major powers, including the UK and Europe, would do well to follow suit, if only to help make their neighbourhood safer against commercial sabotage and extremist threat. Given the stakes, now is not the time to retreat into the diplomatic paralysis that has contributed to making the Horn of Africa one of the most deadly, conflict-prone regions in the world today. Whatever side one is on in Israel’s politics regarding Palestine, this should not cloud our judgement regarding what is politically rational and morally responsible regarding Somaliland, a country which has long deserved to join the community of nation-states.

About the Author

Mohamed Abdilahi Duale is the former Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Somaliland. Mr. Duale has extensive experience in public policy, humanitarian work, and development, with a focus on institutional building, climate governance, and Somaliland’s international relations.  Previously, he held the same position in both the Ministry of Planning and Development and the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. He holds an MA in International Law from the Bristol Law School, University of the West of England.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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RECOGNITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND IS FAIT ACCOMPLI.

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From Three Decades of Non-Recognition to a Historic Breakthrough.

After 34 years of state-building and institutional and human capital development, Somaliland has remained without international recognition. During this period, the country successfully prevented problems such as migration, piracy, and terrorism, but struggled to improve economic conditions, address high unemployment, rehabilitate chronic infrastructure, and enhance government services. Lacking the fiscal capacity to tackle these challenges, the absence of international recognition further exacerbated the situation. Despite these challenges, Somaliland has adopted a democratic political system, held elections, and witnessed number of peaceful transfer of powers. Situated in a strategic yet highly volatile region, Somaliland ensured the safeguarding of the 850 km long coast bordering Gulf of Aden and the borders it has with other neighbouring countries. Yet, despite these efforts, international recognition remained absent.

The six million Somaliland citizens remained resilient, believing in the statehood against all odds. Throughout the past 34 years, Somaliland citizens endured economic embargo, diplomatic isolation, community tensions, economic crises, lack of development, and the difficult situation of living in a diplomatic limbo. But that did not lead to despair and chaos; Somaliland people showed resilience and refused to give up hope. They continue to support their successive governments, democratic process, and, when needed, relying on a trusted hybrid governing system in which traditional elders supported government institutions during the period of crises.

The Guurti system, the official council of elders or the upper house of parliament, assumed the role of the institution responsible for conflict resolutions and has been instrumental in ensuring the lasting stability of this young state. However, a growing, and educated youth with limited opportunities available at home, has growingly became a significant challenge for Somaliland authorities, and without a formal recognition, and access to global markets and multilateral institutions, the government had no means to introduce policies to mitigate these growing societal challenges.

The newly elected President and his government have made the issue of gaining international recognition their priority from day one, when the new government assumed office a year ago. The current president, Mr Abdirahman M. Abdullahi (Irro), approached 40 heads of states, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and leaders, and sent each one of them a personal letter urging them to recognise Somaliland. The current government under President Irro, unlike previous administrations, adopted a new strategy of “Win vs Win” negotiations, making partnership and cooperation the centre of the government message to foreign partners and abandoning the tradition of “donor vs recipient” negotiation culture. It strongly showcased what Somaliland is offering (strategic location, infrastructure, stable country in a volatile region, natural resources, western leaning policies, and potential gateway to Africa) in exchange for international recognition.

First country that responded this direct appeal from the Somaliland President became the state of Israel, which offered the long-awaited recognition, after 34 years of search and after 65 years from the first time that this young nation Republic of Somaliland gained its first recognition from Britain, Israel recognised Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation on the 26th of December 2025.

A long and frustrating diplomatic journey.

Many countries and actors that are criticising Somaliland’s direct approach to Israel, ignore the fact that Somaliland did not prioritise Israel in its pursuit of international recognition during the early decades. Instead, Somaliland focused on engaging negotiations with Federal Government of Somalia, a country it voluntarily united with in July 1960 and  withdrew voluntarily from that union in May 1991, when it reinstated its independence and statehood as independent Republic of Somaliland. Dialogue with Somalia were held in London UK, Ankara Turkey, Djibouti, all these talks ended up failure and with no results. For the past three decades, Somaliland also reached out to the African Union and several African countries, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, Ethiopia and others, yet without pointable results.

African Union fact finding mission, which conducted a rigorous study regarding Somaliland’s quest for international recognition in 2005 concluded, The fact that the ‘’union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action between 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African Political history” ( African fact finding mission to Somaliland 2005). More recently Ethiopia came close to recognising the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent country in January 2024, in exchange for a proposed ‘’ Sea-Access Deal”, however, following pressure from regional blocks and from some western powers, Ethiopia decided to step back from that deal.

Throughout the past two decades Western countries including Britain, US and other countries consistently maintained that they prefer to wait until regional organisations, regional countries, and other countries grant recognition to Somaliland, implying none of them were against the quest for international recognition for Somaliland in principle.

Why Israel’s Recognition Matters

Fig 2 Geographic location of horn of Africa (Source MENAFN.com)

Although formally bilateral act between Israel and Republic of Somaliland, the recognition carries implications far beyond the two states. Its significance lies less in immediate material benefits than in the symbolic breach of a three-decades of international consensus of non-recognition. This is where Somaliland places its hope, the FIRST MOVER EFFECT. The expectation is that Israel’s recognition will lead to a diplomatic domino effect, encouraging countries previously afraid of the condemnation and blame, to follow suit. It is reasonable to expect that these countries will still wait and observe short term repercussions, and reactions from countries like US before making final decisions, this could take months or longer. Somaliland believes that the US administration under President Trump is fully aware of the strategic benefits of recognising Somaliland, and its expected relationship between the US and Somaliland will improve significantly during Trump Presidency.

US’s recent response during UN security council suggests, if any, that US has no problem Israel recognising a territory it sees, it has a strategic interest. During the last security council meeting where members discussed the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland by Israel, there was no condemnation at all, not from the US or other western Security permanent members.

Tangible and Intangible Gains from Somaliland Recognition

Tangible and intangible gains, both Somaliland and Israel have signalled their intention to collaborate through bilateral agreements, development and investment partnerships, with particular emphasis on infrastructure, agriculture, technology. Yet for Somaliland, the main point is that recognition will make its negotiation with non-recognising countries and international actors more credible. Also, a less reported and yet crucial effect is the psychological boost among Somalilanders Increased public confidence of their country is likely to mean increased national capital, greater economic activity and return from the diaspora to invest and start businesses in the Country. In this sense, diplomatic recognition may serve as a powerful economic multiplier.

Risks, Exposure, and Strategic Vulnerabilities

Recognition also brings risks. Somaliland’s exposure to regional threats may increase but that is a calculated risk that Somaliland government has carefully studied. Somaliland, however, acknowledges the security risks linked to regional conflicts and threats from regional actors who are against the recognition and religious extremists cannot be dismissed.

Regional and political fallout is inevitable, though the diplomatic backlash for both Somaliland and Israel are expected to be relatively low cost. Both countries are aware of the disunity among Arab states and other regional actors. While the short term will likely be noisy and marked by strong reactions, both Somaliland and Israel believe the outcome is worth the price. For Somaliland, the reward is one of immediate and long-cherished recognition. For Israel, it is the invaluable benefit of a friendly, stable democratic ally in Africa, strategically located near the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb.

In response to this, Somalia had already been gathering regional players and members who oppose the recent Somaliland recognition and the previous MoU with Ethiopia. Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, AU as well as Arab League are part of this coalition. But this latest recognition is far more complex than the previous MoU with Ethiopia, and it’s unlikely these objections will force any changes from the original decision (from the Israel side).

The main reason this latest adventure differs significantly from the previous MOU with Ethiopia is, that Somaliland had some valuable lessons to learn. This time, the negotiations took place quietly, with no flamboyant or public announcements. The government has demonstrated maturity, discipline and ability to maintain a complete secrecy till the date of announcement. Recognition has happened and while there are complaints, condemnations and diplomatic taking place in the African Union and Arab League, it is highly unlikely that these efforts will alter the reality on the ground or prompt Israel to withdraw its firm recognition. RECOGNITION OF SOMALILAND is a FAIT ACCOMPLI.

Who Might Follow Israel?

Somaliland believes that more countries will follow Israel’s lead. India, the United States, Britain, Ethiopia, Kenya and perhaps UAE, are likely countries to recognise Republic of Somaliland or will upgrade their diplomatic relationship with Republic of Somaliland in the coming months. In the short term, Somaliland may experience a period of isolated recognition. Subsequent recognitions are likely to be driven by geopolitics. In a multipolar world of competing powers, Somaliland’s geography gives it exceptional strategic value. It is at the mouth of the Red Sea, opposite Yemen and near Bab el‐Mandeb, one of the world’s busiest maritime areas, with a world class ports and airports makes Somaliland a focus of global attention. More countries are likely to seek a presence and influence in Somaliland, leading to further recognition in the medium and long term.

From Unrecognized entity to Active and recognized State

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a historic break with three decades of international non-recognition. It is an affirmation of a robust state that placed stability, democratic process and institutional longevity in one of the world’s most difficult regions. The shift provides a real diplomatic and psychological dividends, with potentially more recognitions down the line, but also puts Somaliland in a world of increased geopolitical competition and security challenges. Importantly, such a recognition turns Somaliland from being just another neglected unrecognised state to part of an active test case in a multipolar world.

 What happens next will be determined less by international juridical arguments than by strategic interests, regional pressures and Somaliland’s ability to translate recognition into long-term international engagement and a diplomatic domino effect. In summary, Somaliland is no longer an unrecognised state, it is a partially recognised state, located in very strategic location.

About the Author

Mr. Awale.I. Shirwac, is Horn of Africa Political Economy Analyst. A Former Minister of Planning and National Development for Somaliland. He holds MSc from London School of Economics and Political Science, MPhil from University of Surrey United Kingdom

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Somaliland Calls Out Somalia’s Fabrications Over Israel Recognition

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dismisses Allegations as Mogadishu’s Own Abraham Accords Lobbying Comes to Light

Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs moved quickly on January 1 to shut down what it described—accurately—as a campaign of fabrication emanating from Mogadishu following Israel’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.

As Somalia’s government condemned the recognition, U.S. lobbying records revealed an inconvenient truth: Mogadishu had spent months pursuing admission to the very same Abraham Accords it now weaponizes against its northern neighbor.

Somalia’s president claimed that Israel’s decision was conditioned on three demands: the resettlement of Palestinians in Somaliland, the establishment of Israeli military bases, and Somaliland’s accession to the Abraham Accords. None of the claims withstand even cursory scrutiny.

“The Government of the Republic of Somaliland firmly rejects false claims alleging the resettlement of Palestinians or the establishment of military bases in Somaliland,” the Ministry stated on X. Somaliland’s engagement with Israel, it emphasized, is diplomatic, lawful, and rooted in mutual sovereign interests.

The allegations are not merely incorrect. They are constructed to inflame, distract, and derail a diplomatic breakthrough Mogadishu neither anticipated nor controls.

The Palestinian Smokescreen

The claim that Somaliland would participate in the forced transfer of Palestinians is legally impossible and morally unserious. Forced population transfer is a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute. No such proposal exists, nor could it exist within any legitimate diplomatic framework.

That this rumor circulated months before Israel’s recognition only underscores its purpose: preemptive disinformation, not response.

What is striking is how casually “Palestinian solidarity” is invoked by governments whose own policies belie the posture. Egypt maintains full diplomatic relations with Israel while sealing Gaza behind one of the world’s most militarized borders. Turkey trades with Israel, coordinates security, and hosts Israeli diplomatic missions—yet deploys Palestinian rhetoric when it suits Ankara’s regional ambitions.

In this context, Somalia’s sudden moral outrage is less solidarity than theater.

Territorial Integrity as Fiction

Even more hollow is Mogadishu’s invocation of “Somalia’s territorial integrity.” Somalia has not governed Somaliland since 1991. It has exercised no authority there for 34 years. It cannot secure its own territory against al-Shabaab and depends on African Union forces (ATMIS) to sustain basic governance in the capital.

Yet this same state is treated as the custodian of Somaliland’s political fate.

Under the Montevideo Convention, statehood is grounded in population, territory, government, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations. Somaliland satisfies all four in practice. Somalia, increasingly, does not—at least not beyond Mogadishu.

The insistence that Somaliland remains subject to a state that has never governed it is not law. It is politics—enforced by regional organizations that have converted recognition into a veto weapon.

The Military Base Fantasy

The allegation of Israeli military bases is equally detached from reality. Israel does not maintain permanent overseas bases. Its defense doctrine is inward-facing and regionally concentrated, focused on immediate threats—not power projection in the Horn of Africa.

Security cooperation, however, is another matter—and entirely normal.

Intelligence sharing, counterterrorism coordination, training, and technology transfer are standard components of Israeli partnerships worldwide. For Somaliland, which has maintained stability in proximity to al-Shabaab and regional extremist networks without foreign troops, such cooperation is rational, defensive, and overdue.

The Abraham Accords—The One Serious Point

Of the three claims, Somaliland’s potential engagement with the Abraham Accords is the only one grounded in diplomatic reality. Even here, Somalia misrepresents the issue.

The Accords are not coercive instruments. They are frameworks for normalization between Israel and Muslim-majority nations—currently the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—that have delivered measurable benefits while signatories maintain their stated positions on Palestinian rights.

The results have been substantial. The UAE and Israel signed agreements worth over $3 billion in the first two years, spanning defense, technology, and energy. Direct flights now connect Dubai and Tel Aviv. Morocco reported tens of thousands of Israeli tourists in the first year, generating millions in revenue. Israeli expertise in water conservation and agricultural technology—critical for developing nations—has flowed to partners through the framework.

For Somaliland, locked out of the African Union and Arab League due to Somalia’s objections, the Accords offer something regional bodies have systematically denied: a path to legitimacy based on performance, not inheritance. After 34 years of maintaining democratic governance, peaceful transitions of power, and security without foreign military dependence, Somaliland has earned what it has been denied.

Somalia’s Quiet Contradiction

Somalia’s outrage is further undercut by its own behavior. In December 2024, Somalia’s Embassy in Washington retained BGR Government Affairs—a prominent lobbying firm with ties to the Trump administration—for $600,000 to advance its interests with U.S. policymakers.

Foreign Agents Registration Act filings reveal the extent of Mogadishu’s efforts. According to BGR’s supplemental statement filed in July 2025 (Registration #5430), Somalia’s lobbyists contacted senior U.S. officials repeatedly in spring 2025 specifically to discuss “Abraham Accords agreement.” The disclosure documents show multiple outreach attempts to National Security Council Africa Director Brendan McNamara, Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior staff, and House Foreign Affairs Committee Africa Subcommittee personnel—all focused on Abraham Accords engagement.

In other words, Somalia spent months lobbying to join the very framework it now characterizes as a Zionist conspiracy when Somaliland pursues membership. The same Abraham Accords that Mogadishu’s president claims are conditions for forced Palestinian displacement were, until recently, the subject of Somalia’s own diplomatic overtures to Washington.

The contradiction is stark: Somalia sought legitimacy through normalization with Israel, failed to offer anything Israel or other Accords signatories might value from a partner mired in instability, and now attacks Somaliland for succeeding where it could not.

The hypocrisy runs deeper. Somaliland Chronicle has documented instances of Somali government officials deploying antisemitic rhetoric in public statements, undermining any claim that opposition to Israel’s recognition stems from principled foreign policy rather than political opportunism and envy.

A Familiar Pattern

Somalia’s response follows a pattern. The same arguments—destabilization, extremism, regional chaos—were deployed against the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding. None were borne out by facts on the ground.

Somaliland has maintained stability for 34 years in one of the world’s most volatile regions while conducting peaceful democratic transitions and avoiding the extremist infiltration that plagues southern Somalia. Regional instability stems from governance failures in Mogadishu, not from Somaliland’s pursuit of international partnerships.

For 34 years, Somaliland has done what the international system claims to reward: governed itself, held elections, transferred power peacefully, and secured its territory without foreign occupation. Somalia has done the opposite—and demands veto power all the same.

Israel’s recognition did not destabilize the Horn of Africa. It merely exposed an uncomfortable truth: Somaliland behaves like a state, while Somalia behaves like a claimant.

After three decades, the distinction is no longer theoretical. It is diplomatic reality catching up with political denial.

Ethiopia Weighs Following Israel’s Lead as Somaliland Recognition Gains Momentum

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Hargeisa, Somaliland – President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” announced Wednesday that “many countries will soon recognize the Republic of Somaliland,” signaling confidence that Israel’s historic December 26 recognition marks the beginning of a cascade that could fundamentally reshape the Horn of Africa.

The announcement came during an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting, where President Cirro urged citizens to uphold national unity as the republic enters what may be the most consequential period in its 34-year quest for international legitimacy. U.S. Deputy Ambassador Dorothy Camille Shea acknowledged the move at the UN Security Council, stressing Israel’s right to establish diplomatic relations as any sovereign state. This defense signals potential American openness and delivered a significant blow to opponents’ arguments.

Ethiopia’s Strategic Calculation

While Israel’s decision has drawn condemnations from predictable quarters, the most significant response may be what has not been said. Ethiopia, Somaliland’s neighbor and longstanding strategic partner, has exercised studied silence that diplomatic sources interpret as strategic ambiguity preceding potential recognition.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed

According to multiple diplomatic sources, Ethiopia is now internally consulting and contemplating becoming the second country after Israel to recognize Somaliland. Israel’s recognition fundamentally alters the calculus. Rather than merely reinstating the original January 2024 memorandum, Addis Ababa now has the opportunity to negotiate what diplomatic sources describe as an MoU 2.0. This would represent a far more advantageous arrangement with a recognized state, granting Ethiopia the Red Sea access it has sought since losing its coastline with Eritrean independence in 1993, but under terms that reflect Somaliland’s enhanced international standing and bargaining position.

Ethiopia’s calculation is being driven by escalating security concerns. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation highlights Addis Ababa’s growing alarm over security cooperation between Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea. Ethiopia views this triangle as designed to undermine its efforts to secure maritime access and encircle the country strategically. These anxieties are compounded by the long-standing Nile River dispute with Egypt and recent rapprochement between Mogadishu and Cairo, where Somalia reportedly requested Egyptian military assistance in “safeguarding its maritime waters.” The request represents transparent code for blocking Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somaliland.

One Ethiopian state minister broke the government’s official silence. Tarekegn Bululta Godana described Israel’s recognition as “a notable diplomatic move that could shape the future trajectory of the Horn of Africa.” The comment, though unofficial, signals internal debates within Ethiopia’s government about seizing the diplomatic opening Israel has created.

Ethiopian recognition would carry seismic implications. As a major regional power and African Union member state, such a move would shatter the pretense that Somaliland’s status is settled. It would validate the 2005 AU fact-finding mission’s conclusions that Somaliland’s case is “historically unique and self-justified.” Most importantly, it would trigger economic and security cooperation serving both countries’ core interests while fundamentally undermining Djibouti’s economic stranglehold on Ethiopian trade.

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has amplified this contradiction by sharing the AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission report, which concluded that “the fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history.” The Israeli government’s decision to publicize the AU’s institutional findings underscores the hypocrisy of current AU opposition to recognition when the organization’s own experts validated Somaliland’s case two decades ago.

The UAE, as both Ethiopia and Somaliland’s largest investor, has maintained strategic silence. When Arab League members convened an emergency session chaired by UAE Ambassador Hamad Obaid Al Zaabi to condemn Israel’s recognition, the UAE government issued no independent statement. This ambiguity allows Abu Dhabi to preserve its $442 million Berbera Port investment through DP World while assessing how the recognition cascade unfolds. As an Abraham Accords signatory, the UAE may find Israel’s recognition provides diplomatic cover for its own eventual acknowledgment of Somaliland.

The Recognition Cascade

Beyond Ethiopia and the UAE, speculation has reached fever pitch. South Sudan, which achieved independence in 2011, is mentioned frequently as a likely early adopter. Kenya faces growing domestic pressure to formalize ties given Berbera’s potential to compete with Mombasa. Taiwan could convert its representative office into a full embassy.

The United States represents the most consequential potential domino. Republican control of Congress and bipartisan support for countering Chinese influence create favorable conditions. Recent satellite imagery shows major upgrades to Berbera Airport, suggesting Washington may be establishing facts on the ground ahead of policy shifts. General Michael Langley’s reported AFRICOM visit to Somaliland in December 2024, along with multiple U.S. military delegations evaluating Berbera’s capabilities, indicate Pentagon planning increasingly assumes Somaliland recognition as inevitable. With Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti facing operational constraints from Chinese military proximity, Berbera offers strategic alternatives.

Djibouti’s Predictable Response

Djibouti has responded with characteristic hostility. On December 29, Djibouti unilaterally closed its land border with Somaliland and began refusing Somaliland passports. In response, Somaliland recalled its representative, Abdillahi Mohamed Dahir (Cukuse), for consultations. Djibouti’s representative, Ambassador Hussein Omar Kawaliyeh, has also departed Hargeisa.

The pattern is familiar. When Somaliland and Ethiopia signed their January 2024 MoU, Djibouti shuttered Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills, armed border communities, and supported separatist movements within Somaliland. The World Bank’s 2023 Container Port Performance Index ranked Berbera 103rd globally while Djibouti plummeted to 379th out of 405 ports, exposing the economic desperation driving Djiboutian aggression.

Questions about reciprocity are emerging. Sources indicate discussions about implementing reciprocal measures, including whether Turkey’s substantial presence in Somaliland should face consequences given Ankara’s strident opposition to recognition and military support for Somalia.

The Armageddon Myth

The chorus of condemnations invariably invokes apocalyptic language: threats to “regional stability,” risks of “continental fragmentation.” The argument is propaganda, not analysis.

Somaliland’s recognition threatens no continent-wide catastrophe. It threatens specific economic interests: Djibouti’s port monopoly, Somalia’s territorial pretensions, Egypt’s leverage against Ethiopia, Turkey’s military positioning. The manufactured hysteria serves one purpose: maintaining a status quo that benefits those making the arguments while condemning Somaliland’s population to indefinite statelessness.

Somaliland has governed itself successfully for 34 years, held multiple democratic elections certified as free and fair, and demonstrated state capacity exceeding many recognized African nations. The 2005 AU fact-finding mission confirmed Somaliland’s case is historically unique because it is not creating new borders but restoring the boundaries of a state that achieved independence on June 26, 1960, five days before joining Somalia in a voluntary union that was never legally ratified.

The truth is simpler. Somaliland’s 6 million people are being held hostage, not to principle, but to economics. Djibouti needs them unrecognized to preserve port monopoly. Somalia needs them unrecognized to maintain territorial claims over resources and coastline it cannot control. Egypt needs them unrecognized to maintain leverage against Ethiopia. Turkey needs them unrecognized to justify its military expansion in Somalia.

The African Union’s position cannot be considered objective when articulated by a Djiboutian chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose country has billions of dollars at stake in maintaining the status quo. Under Djiboutian chairmanship, the AU has rejected any reconsideration of Somaliland’s status despite its own 2005 findings, protecting Djibouti’s economic interests while abandoning institutional integrity.

What Lies Ahead

President Cirro’s announcement that “many countries will soon recognize the Republic of Somaliland” reflects informed confidence. The strategic pieces are aligning in ways that make a recognition cascade increasingly probable.

Ethiopia faces the clearest calculation. Israel’s recognition provides Ethiopia the diplomatic cover to negotiate an MoU 2.0. If Addis Ababa becomes the second country to recognize Somaliland (and the first African nation to do so), it would fundamentally alter the diplomatic landscape. Other African states would face pressure to reconsider positions based on reflexive support for “territorial integrity” rather than actual strategic interests.

For the United States, the question is not if but when. Pentagon planners have already concluded that Berbera offers strategic advantages that Camp Lemonnier cannot match. Congressional support exists. The renovations at Berbera facilities suggest preparations are underway.

The Djibouti border closure, while significant, represents a sideshow to the larger drama. President Guelleh’s regime can close borders, pressure clans, and condemn Israel’s recognition at the UN. None of it addresses the fundamental reality: Djibouti’s economic model is unsustainable, its port performance is catastrophic, and its leverage over Ethiopia is eroding.

Somaliland’s path forward demands precisely what President Cirro emphasized: vigilance, unity, and resilience. The recognition cascade will unfold over weeks and months, not days. Each country will calculate its own interests and timeline. But the momentum is building in ways that opponents cannot reverse through condemnations or border closures.

The question facing the Horn of Africa is no longer whether Somaliland’s 34-year quest for recognition will succeed. Israel has answered that question. The question now is how many nations recognize the strategic logic, how quickly they move, and how the regional order adapts.

Will Ethiopia be next? The world is watching. Addis Ababa’s decision may come within weeks. When it does, the recognition cascade will become unstoppable. For Somaliland, the new chapter in its diplomatic journey has begun. For Djibouti, the reckoning for decades of sabotage is at hand. For the Horn of Africa, the future is being written in Hargeisa, not Mogadishu or Djibouti City.

Africa Must Join Israel in Recognizing the Republic of Somaliland

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By H.E. Dr Mohamed A. Omar
Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland in Kenya
Email – rep@somalilandinkenya.com

Some political questions refuse to go away, not because they are complicated, but because answering them would require a degree of honesty we often overlook. Somaliland is one such case. For more than three decades, it has governed itself, held elections, maintained security, and managed its affairs with little outside assistance. And yet, officially, it remains unseen.

Israel’s decision on December 26, 2025, to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, the first country in more than three decades to extend such recognition, has brought that contradiction back into view.

There has been a tendency to frame Israel’s move as new or unprecedented. In fact, it is neither. When Somaliland briefly gained independence in 1960 after British decolonization, Israel was among the first 35 countries to recognize it. That period was, however, short-lived. Somaliland soon entered into a voluntary union with Somalia, in the hopes of a stronger, unified state. A “Greater Somalia”, they called it. The outcome is well known. The union failed, repression followed, and the Somali state eventually collapsed into prolonged conflict.

It is important to be clear that Somaliland is not a territory that broke away through force. It is a former sovereign entity that entered a union voluntarily in 1960 and withdrew from it in 1991 when that union ceased to function to protect its people.

Let it also be known that Israel’s recognition today does not invent a new relationship; it revisits one interrupted by political failure.

Since reclaiming its independence in 1991, Somaliland has governed itself continuously, without international recognition, peacekeeping forces, or inherited state institutions. The systems that exist today were built from the ground up. Elections were organized repeatedly, power changed hands peacefully, and internal stability was preserved in a region where instability became the norm.

These are not abstract claims. Over the years, Somaliland has drawn professionals from across the African continent, individuals who would not relocate or commit their expertise in the absence of functioning systems. This goes to show that our institutions work and that contracts are honored. Aren’t these markers of a functioning State?

Additionally, Somaliland has shown itself to be a credible partner in regional security, counterterrorism cooperation, and maritime stability along vital global trade routes. It offers opportunities in renewable energy, fisheries, logistics, and digital infrastructure, all of which have been sustained without external trusteeship.

Yet Somaliland remains unrecognized, particularly by African states. The explanation mostly given is adherence to the principle of territorial integrity. This principle, understandably, is not arbitrary; it emerged from Africa’s post-independence experience as a safeguard against fragmentation and instability. For a time, it served an essential purpose.

But principles are not ends in themselves. In the case of Somaliland, this rigidity produces an uneasy contradiction: a polity that has built peace, institutions, and democratic practice is disregarded, while a state that has long struggled to exercise authority retains unquestioned legal standing.

Israel’s recognition comes at a time of heightened global attention to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean corridors, a region whose stability now carries implications far beyond its immediate neighborhood. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s forthcoming visit to the White House is likely to further elevate Somaliland’s diplomatic profile and place the question of its status more firmly on the international agenda.

Africa, however, need not wait for external actors to validate what the evidence already demonstrates. The African Union, IGAD, and individual states, from Kenya and Ethiopia to Rwanda and Ghana, possess both the mandate and the institutional maturity to engage Somaliland based on facts rather than inherited assumptions, and after thirty-four years of self-governance, that acknowledgment is overdue.

About the Author

By H.E. Dr Mohamed A. Omar
Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland in Kenya
Email – rep@somalilandinkenya.com

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The Quiet Diplomat Delivers for Somaliland

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Mea Culpa: We Questioned His Silence. He Was Making History.

They said it couldn’t be done. They said Somaliland would wait another generation—perhaps two—before any state would dare extend formal recognition. The politics were too complex, the risks too high, the opposition too entrenched.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” wasn’t listening.

On the anniversary of his inauguration, Somaliland’s soft‑spoken president delivered a geopolitical thunderclap that reverberated from Hargeisa to Jerusalem, from Washington to Mogadishu: the State of Israel has formally recognized the Republic of Somaliland. Not a memorandum. Not a framework. Full. Official. Recognition.

After thirty‑three years of democratic governance, security, and institutional continuity in one of the world’s most volatile regions, Somaliland has finally secured what it earned long ago—a seat at the table. And it was delivered not by bombast or spectacle, but by a career diplomat who understands that history is often made in silence.

The Silence That Spoke Volumes

Six weeks ago, President Irro departed for Dubai. At first glance, it appeared routine. Then the days stretched into weeks. No press briefings. No photo opportunities. No diplomatic platitudes about “fruitful engagements.”

Even this publication began asking uncomfortable questions. Where the hell was he? What was taking so long? In an age of performative transparency, the blackout was striking. Speculation flourished.

The explanation, revealed only yesterday, was as simple as it was consequential: Dubai was merely the opening move.

A single photograph released by Israel’s foreign ministry told the real story. President Irro was not in a conference hotel in the Gulf; he was in Israel itself. Negotiations of historic consequence were underway—talks so sensitive that secrecy was not a preference but a prerequisite.

A small, disciplined circle of advisers kept the process sealed. No leaks. No theatrics. No premature triumphalism. While critics muttered about transparency and rivals fumed in ignorance, Somaliland’s president was quietly doing what no administration before him had managed: converting legitimacy into recognition.

Somaliland’s Henry Kissinger

Those who know Abdirahman “Irro” know he is not a man of slogans. He is deliberate, analytical, and unflashy—a diplomat shaped by process rather than applause. He understands that trust is built privately, that leverage is accumulated patiently, and that results matter more than rhetoric.

Somaliland has found its Henry Kissinger—a practitioner of real statecraft who operates in the shadows, who understands that the most consequential diplomacy happens behind closed doors, who knows when to speak and when silence is the most powerful weapon in the arsenal.

Like the great strategists of the twentieth century, Irro grasped a lesson too often forgotten in Hargeisa: transformative diplomacy is not crowdsourced. It is executed quietly, protected ruthlessly, and revealed only when irreversible.

Where others hesitated—paralyzed by imagined backlash or regional sensitivities—Irro calculated differently. He understood that waiting for the “perfect moment” is merely another way of choosing permanent deferral. Sovereignty is not granted by consensus; it is asserted and defended.

The Risk Others Refused to Take

The strategic case for Israeli recognition was never in doubt. Technology transfer, agricultural innovation, security cooperation, diplomatic amplification—every serious administration understood the upside.

What stopped them was fear: of clerical outrage, of Arab League condemnation, of predictable denunciations from Mogadishu, of domestic critics cloaked in piety and caution.

So they did nothing. They studied the issue. They formed committees. They engaged in “quiet diplomacy” that was so quiet it never made a sound.

Irro reached a harder, more honest conclusion: inaction carried greater risk than action. Somaliland’s future could not remain hostage to hypothetical reactions from actors who had denied its existence for three decades. And so he acted—decisively, discreetly, and without apology.

This was cold‑eyed realism, not recklessness. Strategic patience, not timidity. A recognition that diplomacy at this level cannot survive leaks or vetoes from those invested in Somaliland’s stagnation.

When Reality Arrived

The formal exchange between Jerusalem and Hargeisa was restrained, professional, and historic. Two governments acknowledging a reality long obvious to anyone paying attention.

The public reaction confounded every cynic.

There were no riots, no religious conflagrations, no national unraveling. Instead, Somaliland celebrated—spontaneously and joyfully. Israeli flags appeared alongside Somaliland’s green, white, and red banner with its black star and shahada. Fireworks lit Hargeisa’s skyline. Across Berbera, Burao, Borama, and beyond, citizens marked the end of a thirty‑three‑year diplomatic purgatory.

This was not manufactured enthusiasm. It was release.

The lesson was unmistakable: results unite more effectively than rhetoric ever could. The quiet diplomat had done what the loud ones couldn’t.

The Predictable Chorus of Hypocrites

Predictably, the familiar chorus assembled.

Palestinian officials echoed Mogadishu, recycling Al Jazeera propaganda about alleged plans to displace Palestinians to Somaliland Al Jazeera. Let’s be clear: Somaliland’s bilateral relationship with Israel has absolutely nothing to do with conspiracy theories or anyone else’s manufactured outrage. Somaliland has welcomed thousands of refugees—Yemenis, Syrians, and others who have built thriving communities here. Our foreign policy is not subject to veto by external actors, however loudly they protest.

Egypt coordinated objections with Somalia, Turkey, and Djibouti The Times of Israel—despite maintaining its own long‑standing peace treaty with Israel since 1979 and receiving billions in U.S. aid as a result. Moral lectures from beneficiaries of the very relationship they condemn carry limited weight.

Turkey’s denunciation was particularly theatrical. Ankara condemned recognition as Israel’s “expansionist policies” and “explicit intervention in Somalia’s internal affairs” The Times of Israel—while maintaining extensive diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel. Turkey, which signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1996 and has seen bilateral trade grow from $1.41 billion in 2002 to nearly $9 billion by 2022. Turkey, which despite Erdoğan’s fiery anti-Israel rhetoric, was Israel’s fifth-largest supplier in 2024, with exports totaling $2.86 billion.

The hypocrisy is breathtaking.

But here’s where Turkey’s moral lecture truly falls apart: this is a country with massive human rights violations and an outright massacre of Kurds in its own backyard. Turkey has no moral ground whatsoever to lecture Somaliland and Israel about sovereignty, self-determination, or human rights. The performative outrage may serve domestic audiences, but it does not substitute for credibility.

Somaliland will not outsource its sovereignty to states that reconcile with Israel in practice while condemning others in public.

Who Hesitated—and What It Cost Them

This moment also exposes the opportunity cost of hesitation—most notably for Ethiopia.

Addis Ababa once grasped what others refused to acknowledge: Somaliland is not a theoretical entity, but a strategic reality. The now‑defunct Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding reflected a hard‑nosed assessment of Ethiopian interests—access to the Red Sea, diversification away from Djibouti, and partnership with a stable, democratic neighbor rather than a perpetually fragile Somalia.

Then Mogadishu kicked dust in Ethiopia’s face.

Somalia responded to the MOU not with negotiation or compromise, but with diplomatic tantrums, threats, and manufactured outrage—despite lacking sovereignty over Somaliland and lacking the capacity to offer Ethiopia anything comparable. Faced with noise and pressure, Addis Ababa blinked. The MOU was shelved. Strategic clarity gave way to short‑term risk aversion.

That hesitation now carries a measurable cost.

The Somaliland Ethiopia courted under an MOU was an unrecognized polity willing to trade access, concessions, and flexibility for political backing. The Somaliland that now exists—recognized by a sovereign state with global reach—is categorically different. Recognition changes the balance sheet. It raises the price of entry. It formalizes expectations. It reduces the need for asymmetrical concessions.

From this point forward, Somaliland does not negotiate from isolation. It negotiates from legitimacy.

There is also a Washington factor that shaped Addis Ababa’s caution. For the past several years, Ethiopian officials have operated under the assumption—fair or not—that U.S. policy space on Somaliland was constrained by a State Department culture unusually sympathetic to Mogadishu’s narrative, amplified by influential congressional voices hostile to Somaliland’s recognition. That perception mattered. It discouraged risk‑taking and made de‑escalation seem prudent, even when Ethiopian interests argued otherwise.

That era is ending.

The geopolitical environment has shifted. Washington’s internal debates no longer freeze policy by default, and recognition by Israel punctures the illusion that Somaliland remains diplomatically radioactive. The signal to Addis Ababa—and to every capital that hesitated—is unmistakable: the train has left the station, and it is not stopping.

Ethiopia still has a seat. But it is no longer boarding at the MOU price. Engagement now means formal recognition of reality, serious state‑to‑state arrangements, and the acceptance that a recognized Somaliland bargains as an equal, not as a petitioner.

For Ethiopia, the lesson is stark: early movers shape terms; late adopters pay premiums. What could have been secured through quiet bilateral alignment will now require formal treaties, multilateral scrutiny, and harder bargaining. A recognized Somaliland is not less available to Ethiopia—but it is far more expensive.

This is the broader warning to every capital that hesitated when confronted by Mogadishu’s bluster. The cost of denial compounds. Somaliland’s recognition did not merely reward patience; it penalized indecision.

Who Stood Up—and Who Did Not

For three decades, Somaliland has governed responsibly, conducted peaceful elections, secured its territory, countered extremism, and built institutions from scratch. In return, it was told—endlessly—to wait.

Israel declined to participate in that fiction.

It assessed Somaliland as it exists, not as others wish it away. It recognized a functioning democracy exercising de facto and de jure independence. No permission sought from Mogadishu. No indulgence in diplomatic euphemism.

That’s a friend. That’s an ally. That’s a partner who checks the box with a big fat marker.

That distinction matters.

What This Moment Signals—and Who’s Next

This recognition is not an endpoint. It is a breach in a diplomatic dam.

Israel brings tangible advantages—technology, security cooperation, agricultural expertise, and access to international corridors long closed to Somaliland. More importantly, it establishes precedent. The taboo has been broken. The cost of continued denial has just risen for every capital that quietly acknowledges Somaliland’s reality while publicly denying it.

The world did not collapse. The region did not ignite. A democratic state recognized another democratic state. That’s it. That’s the whole story.

And it changes everything.

Now we’re in the world community. Other countries are already lining up.

The United Arab Emirates stands out as the most likely Gulf state to formalize what has long been reality. The UAE has already recognized Somaliland—informally, quietly, but unmistakably—through its massive investment in Berbera Port and the corridor. DP World’s multimillion-dollar commitment to Berbera was not charity. It was a calculated bet on Somaliland’s stability, sovereignty, and future. The infrastructure speaks louder than any diplomatic cable: the UAE has been treating Somaliland as a viable partner for years.

Formal recognition would merely align Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic posture with its economic reality. The infrastructure is already built. The investment is already made. The relationship is already functional. What remains is paperwork—and in the post-Israel recognition environment, that paperwork just became significantly easier to justify.

The floodgates have opened. The precedent has been set. The impossible has become inevitable.

The Work Ahead

But let’s be clear-eyed: recognition confers opportunity, not absolution. The real test begins now—converting diplomatic legitimacy into economic growth, strategic depth, and institutional resilience.

This will require unity, discipline, and seriousness of purpose. We must stand behind President Irro and let him take us to the promised land we have been seeking for thirty-four years. Internal distractions, factional politics, and performative outrage are luxuries Somaliland can no longer afford.

President Irro forced the door open. Walking through it—deliberately and together—is the national task.

A Moment Earned

There will be time for critique and debate. That is the privilege of a democracy. But history also demands moments of clarity.

This is one of them.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” delivered what generations were told was unattainable. He did so quietly, methodically, and without theatrics. He has made his people proud. He has made his nation proud. Somaliland is stronger for it.

The celebration will fade. The work will not.

Somaliland has entered a new era—and the hard work begins now.


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Taiwan Office Rejects Somalia President’s Remarks as China Tightens Grip on the Horn of Africa

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Hassan Sheikh Mohamud praised Beijing’s military might against Taiwan in state media interview as U.S. recalls ambassador

HARGEISA, Somaliland — Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa issued a sharp rebuke this week after Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appeared on Chinese state television to praise Beijing’s “capacity and military might” to forcibly reunify with Taiwan.

The December 21 interview on China Global Television Network—aired to mark 65 years of China–Somalia diplomatic relations—saw Hassan Sheikh endorse potential Chinese military action against the self-governing island democracy. “China has the capacity and military might to bring back Taiwan,” the Somali president said, echoing language typically reserved for Chinese Communist Party officials rather than the leader of a fragile, aid-dependent state.

Taiwan’s Representative Office in Somaliland responded on December 23, stating that “the R.O.C. (Taiwan), which governs itself independently and maintains its own democratic institutions, is a sovereign and independent country,” and that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other. The statement urged Somalia to “focus on its national development and other internal priorities, not to be China’s cheerleader in geopolitical competition.”

Notably, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development also remained silent. At a moment when international attention on Somaliland is rising—particularly in the United States—the ministry issued no statement addressing Somalia’s president publicly endorsing the use of military force to “reunify” a self-governing polity with a stronger central state. The implication was not abstract. By validating force as a legitimate tool to resolve Taiwan’s status, Hassan Sheikh implicitly endorsed the same logic Somalia has long asserted against Somaliland. The ministry’s passivity, in this context, reflected a failure to confront a dangerous precedent: that sovereignty disputes may be settled not by consent or political reality on the ground, but by coercion—precisely the argument Mogadishu has never abandoned with respect to Somaliland.

“Issuing military threats from Mogadishu against a third party is not diplomacy—it is coercion by proxy.”

China’s embassy in Mogadishu released its own statement, titled “Response to Fallacy from an Illegal ‘Office’ in Hargeisa,” focusing primarily on attacking Taiwan rather than defending Hassan Sheikh’s remarks. The embassy thanked Somalia for upholding the “one-China principle” and repeated Beijing’s standard position that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China’s territory.”

The statement went further, issuing explicit military threats. “We will never pledge to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary,” the embassy declared, accusing Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party of pursuing a “secessionist agenda in Somalia’s territory.” Issuing such threats against a third party from a host nation’s capital violates long-standing diplomatic norms, which discourage embassies from using their host country’s territory to menace other states.

Notably absent from the embassy’s statement was any mention of the financial arrangements underpinning Somalia’s alignment with Beijing. According to Somali government announcements and Chinese state media releases, Hassan Sheikh secured a $28 million grant from Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2024 when the two countries elevated relations to a “strategic partnership,” along with 1,300 tonnes of food aid and deliveries of military equipment ostensibly intended for counterterrorism operations. The embassy’s resort to open threats appeared to validate Taiwan’s description of Beijing’s approach as political coercion and distortive propaganda.

A Pattern of Alignment

The interview is the latest example of Somalia’s alignment with Chinese strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding Taiwan’s relationship with Somaliland.

In April, Somalia imposed a blanket ban on holders of Taiwanese passports, barring them from entry, transit, and exit through Somali-controlled airspace. The directive, issued by Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority, cited adherence to the so-called “one-China” policy and a contested interpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. Although Somaliland was not party to the decision, the ban had immediate practical effects on travel to Hargeisa because Mogadishu controls internationally recognized flight permissions. Following sustained diplomatic pressure—particularly from the United States—the ban was later reversed.

When Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister Wu Chih-chung attended Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi’s inauguration in December 2024, China dispatched special envoy Xue Bing to Mogadishu. In an interview with Somalia’s state news agency, Xue issued one of Beijing’s most aggressive warnings on the Taiwan issue: “We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.

We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.
Chinese Special Envoy Xue Bing

Taiwan’s foreign ministry condemned the remarks immediately, describing them as an example of Beijing’s “grey-zone tactics” and its use of proxy states to exert diplomatic pressure without direct confrontation.

China has also opposed the memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland that would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea via the port of Berbera. Beijing endorsed Somalia’s claim that the agreement violated its territorial integrity, despite Somalia exercising no administrative, security, or judicial control over Somaliland’s territory.

American Support for a Chinese-Aligned Government

This alignment has created an increasingly awkward situation for Washington. The United States conducted more than 25 airstrikes in Somalia in 2025 to support Hassan Sheikh’s government in its campaign against al-Shabaab, according to data compiled by Airwars and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. These strikes continued even as Mogadishu publicly aligned itself with Chinese positions on Taiwan and regional geopolitics.

Until recently, during the latter Trump administration period, the U.S. provided $400 monthly salary supplements to Somali security forces along with extensive logistical support. Audits later exposed what American officials described as padded requisitions and widespread misuse of funds, prompting cuts in assistance. As U.S. backing declined, Somali forces struggled to hold territory. In April, elite Danab units abandoned a base at Adan Yabal during an al-Shabaab offensive, leaving behind American-supplied weapons and equipment.

Competing Partnerships

The contrast with Somaliland’s approach is stark. Since establishing representative offices in each other’s capitals in 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland have cultivated a partnership rooted in shared democratic values. Taiwan has committed $22 million to construct a medical center in Hargeisa, signed energy and mineral cooperation agreements, and provided scholarships for Somaliland military officers. As the world’s leading producer of advanced semiconductors, Taiwan occupies a central position in global technology supply chains—underscoring the strategic weight of the relationship.

Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognized internationally, conducts regular multiparty elections and maintains internal stability. By contrast, Hassan Sheikh’s government controls little territory beyond Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab operates within roughly 50 kilometers of the presidential palace. The militant group controls large swathes of the country—by some UN estimates, a majority of Somalia’s territory. Despite this reality, Hassan Sheikh has pledged to hold “one-person, one-vote” elections in 2026, the first since 1967. Puntland and Jubaland, two federal member states, have rejected the plan and no longer recognize federal authority.

Turkey also maintains significant influence in Somalia, operating a military base near Mogadishu and training Somali forces. The dual patronage of China and Turkey has raised growing questions about Somalia’s sovereignty, according to diplomats familiar with the situation who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Ambassador Recalled

On December 18, the Trump administration notified U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley that he would be recalled effective January 15. Riley was among 29 career diplomats removed from posts worldwide, with Africa disproportionately affected: Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda all lost ambassadors.

A State Department official described the move as part of ensuring ambassadors “advance the America First agenda.” For Somalia, the timing was pointed. The government has accepted billions of dollars in U.S. military assistance while aligning itself with Chinese strategic objectives and, until recently, enforcing a ban on Taiwanese passport holders—policies that run counter to stated American interests in the region.

The American Foreign Service Association criticized the recalls as unprecedented. “Removing senior diplomats without cause undermines U.S. credibility abroad,” the organization said.

For Somalia, Riley’s recall raises deeper questions about the future of U.S. engagement with a government that receives American military support while advancing Beijing’s diplomatic agenda. Somalia’s formal recognition by the United States in 2013—granted when Hillary Clinton served as secretary of state under President Obama—was premised on the expectation of a partner aligned with American values. Whether the Trump administration is reconsidering that assumption, or preparing to pivot toward recognizing Somaliland as some Republican lawmakers have urged, remains unclear.

Taiwan’s statement this week left little ambiguity about how Taipei views Mogadishu’s trajectory. “We will continue to work with diplomatic allies and like-minded nations to jointly preserve regional and global democracy, peace, and stability,” the representative office said, “regardless of political coercion, diplomatic suppression, and distortive propaganda orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party regime.”

Antimicrobial Resistance in Somaliland: A Silent Threat Already Among Us

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By Dr Fatumo Abdi PhD

Antimicrobial resistance rarely announces itself as a crisis. There are no sirens, no sudden outbreaks, no single moment that signals something has gone wrong. Instead, it appears in small, easily missed ways. A child whose infection does not clear. A wound that takes longer than expected to heal. A doctor who pauses before prescribing a medicine that once worked without hesitation.

Global health leaders now recognise antimicrobial resistance as one of the defining health threats of our time, yet across much of Africa it remains a hidden problem, rarely measured, poorly understood and too often ignored until treatment no longer works. In Somaliland and across the wider Somali region, this quiet crisis is already shaping everyday healthcare, even if it is rarely named.

Antimicrobial resistance happens when bacteria and other disease causing organisms change in ways that allow them to survive medicines designed to kill them. Over time, treatments lose their power. Infections linger. Recovery becomes uncertain. What was once routine care begins to feel fragile.

Across Africa, the scale of the problem is already clear. The World Health Organization estimates that hundreds of thousands of deaths on the continent each year are associated with drug resistant infections, with the heaviest burden falling on countries where health systems are least equipped to detect and respond.

What resistance looks like in daily life

The first signs of antimicrobial resistance are often subtle. A urinary infection that returns again and again. A chest infection that does not respond to the usual treatment. A mother who develops an infection after childbirth that no longer improves with standard antibiotics. These are not rare stories. They are becoming more common across health facilities in the Somali region.

As resistance grows, ordinary medical care begins to change. Doctors weigh imperfect choices, aware that the medicines they rely on may no longer work as expected. Surgeries once considered routine carry added risk because antibiotics used to prevent infection are less reliable. What used to feel predictable becomes uncertain.

Why antimicrobial resistance hits Somaliland harder

The Somaliland faces a unique set of pressures that allow antimicrobial resistance to spread. Antibiotics are widely available without prescription. Pharmacies and informal drug sellers often provide the first point of care, especially where clinics are far away, overcrowded or expensive. Medicines are shared. Courses are stopped early when symptoms improve.

Diagnostic testing is limited. Many facilities lack laboratories that can confirm which infection a patient has or which medicine will work. Clinicians are forced to treat based on symptoms alone. Broad spectrum antibiotics become the safest guess.

Livestock is central to life and livelihoods across Somaliland, where animals far outnumber people. The sheer scale of animal health care means that antibiotics used in livestock play an important role in shaping antimicrobial resistance. Without consistent veterinary oversight, resistant organisms can move quietly between animals, people and the environment.

Another, less visible driver is the quality of medicines themselves. The World Health Organization estimates that up to one in ten medical products in low-and-middle income countries is substandard or falsified. In hot climates and long supply chains, antibiotics can lose strength through poor storage or weak manufacturing. When medicines are too weak to fully clear an infection, resistant bacteria survive and spread.

Water and sanitation challenges add another layer of risk. Where clean water is scarce and overcrowding common, infections spread more easily. Resistant infections spread fastest of all.

A pattern across Africa

Across Africa in 2019, antimicrobial resistance was linked to over one million deaths each year in recent global estimates, with hundreds of thousands of those deaths directly caused by resistant infections themselves. 

Antimicrobial resistance is undermining progress against pneumonia, bloodstream infections, urinary infections and tuberculosis. Yet surveillance remains uneven. In many countries, resistance appears low on paper not because it is absent, but because it is not being measured.

Somaliland faces the same challenge. Without laboratory surveillance, resistant infections remain largely invisible even as treatment failure becomes more common.

More than just a medical issue

Antimicrobial resistance reflects how societies organise care. Regulation of medicines, training of health workers, access to clean water, community health litercy and coordination across sectors all shape resistance patterns.

For Somaliland, the consequences extend beyond individual patients. Resistant infections increase the risk of death for mothers and newborns, undermine tuberculosis treatment and raise the danger and cost of surgery.

Figure1. Using antibiotics the wrong way makes bacteria harder to kill and medicines stop working

What can still be done?

It is not too late for Somaliland to take effective action. Its health system is still evolving, allowing change without dismantling large structures. Strengthening oversight of antibiotic sales, expanding basic laboratory services and supporting health workers with practical guidance would make a real difference.

Linking animal and human health surveillance is essential in a region where livestock plays such a central role. Aligning with regional African initiatives can bring shared learning while maintaining national ownership.

A quiet test of leadership

Antimicrobial resistance does not demand dramatic speeches. It demands attention, coordination and foresight. The bacteria are already adapting. The question is whether our systems will adapt too.

This is a quiet test of leadership that will shape the resilience of the health system for generations to come.

About the Author

Dr Fatumo Abdi is a global public health and policy specialist and the Founder of Nexora Global Strategies. She has developed and led strategic health and humanitarian programmes in both the UK and across Africa. Dr Abdi has advised governments, academia and regional institutions, and worked with international media to spotlight issues affecting local communities. Her work centres on diplomacy, equity, systems strengthening and shaping evidence-based policy. She is also the first Somali woman to earn a PhD in the United Kingdom.

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Security Forces vs. Citizens: The Critical Governance Failure in Borama

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The tragic events in Borama, Awdal region of Somaliland, involving clashes between demonstrators and security forces, underscore a critical test for the government’s commitment to democratic principles and peaceful governance. While specific details of the incident involving President Abdirahman Irro’s administration vary in reporting, any incident where the state uses lethal force against its own citizens during a protest raises serious questions about the adherence to international standards for crowd control and the fundamental right to peaceful assembly.

The core diplomatic failure, in such scenarios, is the apparent prioritization of military intervention over de-escalation and political dialogue. A constructive government response, aiming to calm tensions and preserve the lives of its citizens, would typically explore several non-violent and communication-based strategies.

Diplomatic Alternatives to Military Force

A responsible government, in the face of civil unrest, has a range of diplomatic and political tools that should be fully exhausted before the deployment of force, particularly lethal force.

1. Immediate De-escalation and Command Review

The most crucial step is a swift de-escalation. The government of Abdirahman Irro could have immediately:

  • Mandated the withdrawal of all military units not specifically trained for non-lethal crowd control, replacing them with police (or other forces) equipped only with non-lethal gear. This signals a commitment to dialogue over confrontation.
  • Publicly confirmed or reinforced strict rules of engagement prohibiting the use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, ensuring all security personnel understood the penalty for violating these orders.

2. Proactive and Transparent Political Dialogue

The underlying grievances of the protestors—whether related to Xeer Ciise or otherwise—must be addressed directly.

  • Dispatched respected Elders, religious leaders, or impartial government ministers to the area for direct, face-to-face talks with protest organizers and local community leaders.
  • Issued a televised or radio address from President Irro or a senior representative, acknowledging the citizens’ right to protest and committing to a timeline for addressing their concerns.
  • Offered to suspend or reconsider the controversial policy (e.g., the Xeer Ciise )that sparked the unrest, pending a period of structured, inclusive public consultation.

3. Building Trust through Accountability

The use of force, even if deemed necessary by authorities, must be followed by immediate and independent investigation to maintain public trust.

  • Immediately announced the formation of a fully independent investigative commission composed of legal experts and respected civil society representatives to determine how and why lethal force was used, and to identify those responsible.
  • Publicly expressed sincere condolences to the families of the deceased and injured, alongside a commitment to provide immediate medical assistance and financial compensation. This demonstrates the state values the lives of its citizens.

The Primacy of Peaceful Assembly

The use of military force against civilian protestors fundamentally undermines the democratic contract between a government and its people. While governments are obliged to maintain public order, this responsibility is balanced by the necessity to uphold the fundamental rights of its citizens, including the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression.

In the context of the Borama unrest, the more prudent and diplomatic approach would have been a strategy rooted in patience, negotiation, and non-violence. Such a response not only avoids a tragic loss of life but also strengthens the nation’s democratic institutions and its long-term stability—a crucial factor in Somaliland’s ongoing quest for international recognition. The cost of shedding citizen blood is always higher than the cost of prolonged political negotiation.

Somaliland’s entire argument for statehood rests on its claim of being a stable, democratic, and secure entity distinct from the turbulence of Somalia. An incident like the one in Boramadirectly undermines this foundational narrative in the eyes of the international community, particularly Western liberal democracies whose support is crucial for recognition.

Key Diplomatic Setbacks from the Incident

1. Erosion of the “Democratic and Stable” Narrative

Somaliland has consistently presented itself as a model of democracy and stability in the Horn of Africa, citing its regular elections and peaceful transfers of power.

  • The use of military force to suppress domestic political dissent, resulting in civilian casualties, provides evidence that the government is willing to use authoritarian tactics against its own people.
  • This undermines the perception of the state’s legitimacy and democratic maturity, making it harder for foreign ministries to justify recognition on the grounds of shared democratic values. International partners prioritize the protection of human rights and the right to peaceful assembly as prerequisites for full state recognition.

2. Fueling Internal Instability and Unity Concerns

The violence, especially if linked to regional or clan-based grievances in Awdal, highlights deep-seated internal tensions and a failure of central government control.

  • A major argument against recognizing Somaliland is the risk of further fragmentation of Somalia. Incidents like the one in Boorama—which can be seen as an expression of regional discontent with the Hargeisa government—strengthen the counter-argument that Somaliland does not have the definitive and effective control over all its claimed territory.
  • Foreign governments will be hesitant to grant recognition to a state facing active internal political conflict and potentially escalating clan-based unrest, seeing it as a source of regional instability rather than a solution.

3. The Human Rights and Accountability Lens

International recognition often hinges on a country’s adherence to international law and human rights standards.

  • The incident invites international scrutiny from human rights organizations and foreign governments. Failure by the Abdirahman Irro government to conduct a swift, transparent, and independent investigation into the killings—with clear accountability for those who ordered or carried out the use of excessive force—will be viewed as impunity.
  • Donors and partners may suspend or redirect assistance to Hargeisa, or impose travel restrictions on officials involved, as a means of pressuring the government to improve its human rights record.

4. Weaponization by Somalia and Regional Rivals

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and regional actors opposed to Somaliland’s independence will use this incident as direct evidence to lobby against recognition.

  • The FGS can point to the violence as proof that Somaliland’s stability is an illusion and that its government is oppressive and divisive. This provides a strong narrative for maintaining the existing African Union (AU) and UN policy of upholding the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic.
  • Furthermore, regional geopolitical rivals may exploit the instability in Awdal, which sits on the border, to complicate Somaliland’s foreign policy maneuvering, such as its strategic agreements with Ethiopia or other partners.

In short, every civilian death from state violence is a severe diplomatic wound. For a de facto state like Somaliland, whose legitimacy is not yet secured, these incidents fatally weaken its most powerful diplomatic tools: its democratic credentials and its reputation for peace.

To mitigate the severe diplomatic damage caused by the use of lethal force against demonstrators in Boorama, Somaliland must execute a swift, multi-faceted strategy focused on accountability, internal political healing, and the reaffirmation of democratic governance. This is necessary to restore the confidence of international partners, whose support is vital for recognition.

The overall strategy must pivot back to Somaliland’s core diplomatic narrative: stability, democracy, and respect for human rights.

Immediate Measures for Accountability and Transparency

The most urgent requirement is to address the human rights violations transparently and credibly, demonstrating that the government operates under the rule of law.

  • Establish a High-Level, Independent Investigative Commission: The President must immediately form a commission to investigate the events, comprising respected figures from outside the government bureaucracy, such as senior traditional elders, legal experts, and civil society leaders (including human rights advocates).
    • Mandate: The commission must be tasked with determining the precise chain of command, whether security forces adhered to established rules of engagement, and identifying all individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out the use of lethal force.
    • Public Reporting: Commit to making the commission’s findings and recommendations public within a defined, short timeline.
  • Prosecute and Discipline Responsible Personnel: Based on the commission’s findings, the government must move quickly to prosecute any security personnel, regardless of rank, found to have used excessive or unlawful force. This public commitment to ending impunity is the single most critical step in restoring international trust.
  • Offer Comprehensive Restitution: Publicly and formally issue official apologies to the families of the victims and injured. Provide immediate financial compensation and cover all medical expenses. This act demonstrates that the state accepts responsibility and values its citizens’ lives.

Internal Political Healing and Inclusivity

The Boramaevents highlight deep-rooted grievances of marginalization in the Awdal region. Diplomatic mitigation requires solving this internal political crisis.

  • Renew Dialogue with Regional Leaders: Engage in sincere, high-level dialogue with the political and traditional leaders of the Awdal region. This dialogue must focus on addressing the core grievances that sparked the unrest (e.g., representation, resource allocation, or local cultural issues like the Xeer Ciise book launch controversy).
  • Constitutional and Administrative Review: Launch a credible process to review the constitutional and administrative structures to ensure equitable political representation and fair distribution of power and resources across all regions, particularly in areas like Awdal that feel marginalized.
  • Prioritize National Unity Rhetoric: The President and senior government officials must consistently use language that prioritizes national unity and the right to peaceful dissent, explicitly rejecting any attempts to politicize the violence along clan lines.

Diplomatic Re-engagement

Once internal steps are underway, the government must proactively re-engage with its international partners to explain the corrective measures.

  • Direct Diplomatic Briefings: Dispatch special envoys, led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to key foreign capitals (e.g., London, Washington D.C., Addis Ababa, and Brussels) to provide direct, detailed briefings on the incident, the findings of the investigation, and the specific actions taken for accountability and reconciliation.
  • Invite Human Rights Monitoring: To demonstrate transparency, formally invite UN human rights monitors or AU observers to Somaliland to assess the investigation and the implementation of security sector reforms related to crowd control.
  • Recommit to the Democratic Path: Highlight the peaceful resolution of the political crisis that followed the incident (e.g., the withdrawal of military forces and the decision to postpone or reverse the controversial action) as evidence that Somaliland’s democratic institutions ultimately prevailed over confrontation.

By focusing on concrete, verifiable acts of accountability and genuine political reform, Somaliland can attempt to redefine the narrative, proving to the international community that the Borama incident was a tragic, but isolated, failure of command, not a systemic failure of its democratic foundation.

About the Author

Hon. Mohamed Hussein Jama (Rambo). Member, House of Representatives, Somaliland Parliament

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The Hour of Decision: President Cirro’s Failure of Leadership in the Borama Crisis

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The bodies were still warm in Borama, one of the most vibrant and important cities in Somaliland when President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” finally made the decision he should have made from the beginning. After days of deadly unrest, after at least seventeen civilians paid with their lives for his dithering—though the true toll may be far higher as full accounting continues—after more than fifty were wounded, after Somaliland’s second-largest region erupted in fury—only then did the President find the courage to halt the Issa Law unveiling in Zeila. Too little. Too late. And utterly damning.

This wasn’t a failure of information. This was a failure of leadership at the most fundamental level—a collapse that cost Somaliland lives, stability, and precious credibility in a region where we can afford to lose none of these things. Blood has been spilled on Somaliland soil, and that blood stains not just the streets of Borama but the hands of a president who chose political expedience over the lives of his own citizens. At least seventeen dead, likely more as reports continue to emerge. Fifty wounded that we know of. Families shattered. A city traumatized. And for what? To appease Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh for a few more days before reality forced a reversal anyway? History will record this moment with the clarity it deserves, and no amount of post-crisis posturing will wash away what has happened here.

From Principle to Capitulation: The Anatomy of Presidential Weakness

The timeline of this disaster reveals everything we need to know about this administration’s character. The President knew the stakes from the very beginning. His government initially came out strongly against the unveiling of the Issa Law in Zeila, recognizing—correctly—the explosive nature of the long-standing territorial disputes between communities in Awdal and Selal regions. This wasn’t ancient history or abstract political theory. This was real, present danger, visible to anyone with minimal competence to understand Somaliland’s regional dynamics.

That initial position was right. It was principled. It acknowledged the legitimate concerns of Awdal’s people and recognized that some symbolic gestures, no matter how important to other communities or neighboring countries, are simply too dangerous to permit when they threaten to tear apart the fragile fabric of inter-communal peace. For a brief moment, it seemed President Cirro understood the most basic requirement of his office: protecting Somaliland’s stability and territorial integrity.

Then came Djibouti. Then came President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s pressure—his phone calls, his diplomatic maneuvers, his reminders of regional relationships and mutual interests. And suddenly, catastrophically, Somaliland’s principled position evaporated like morning mist under the desert sun. The Minister of Information—speaking for a president apparently too cowardly to deliver the news himself—announced that Somaliland would not only permit the Issa Law unveiling in Zeila but would take on the logistics and security of the summit. Our sovereignty, it turns out, is for sale, and the price isn’t even that high. A little pressure from Djibouti, some smooth words from President Guelleh, and our leadership folded completely.

The most telling detail in this entire sordid affair? Our Intelligence Chief remains in Djibouti even as one of our major cities burns. While Borama bleeds, while mothers weep over their dead sons, while families bury children killed by security forces that were supposed to protect them, our security leadership sips tea in a foreign capital. He’s still there. Still coordinating. Still taking meetings. Still serving interests that are manifestly not Somaliland’s. The symbolism couldn’t be more savage if our enemies had scripted it themselves. This is not an intelligence chief serving Somaliland—this is a functionary serving Djibouti while drawing a Somaliland salary, while his own country burns.

A Pattern of Indecision: More Than Just Borama

But Borama is not an isolated incident of presidential weakness—it is merely the most deadly manifestation of a pattern that has defined this administration in less than a year. President Cirro’s chronic indecisiveness has revealed itself repeatedly, each time chipping away at Somaliland’s sovereignty and credibility.

Consider the ongoing humiliation of Somaliland travelers at the hands of two airlines—Ethiopian Airlines and Fly Dubai —who have essentially appointed themselves as extensions of Somalia’s immigration authorities, enforcing Mogadishu’s E-Visa requirements on travelers to Somaliland, forcing them to obtain visas from a government in Mogadishu that has no jurisdiction over them, no authority over their movement, no legitimate claim to regulate their travel. This should’ve been an easy decision of disinviting both airlines and immediately seeking an alternative carrier while asking the people of Somaliland to postpone their trip to their homeland. What we got was photo ops and bravado that had no substance and went no where.

This is not a minor administrative inconvenience. This is a direct assault on Somaliland’s sovereignty, carried out not by Somalia itself but by private corporations doing Mogadishu’s dirty work. And what has President Cirro done? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. The government has issued no ultimatum to these airlines. There have been no consequences for this flagrant disrespect of Somaliland’s statehood. No sanctions. No banned flights. No diplomatic pressure. Just silence, dithering, and the quiet acceptance of humiliation.

Does this rank with the seventeen confirmed dead in Borama—a number that may well climb as the full scope of the violence becomes clear? Of course not. The scale of tragedy is incomparable. But the pattern is identical: a president who cannot or will not act decisively when Somaliland’s interests are threatened, who watches as our sovereignty is trampled and does nothing, who mistakes paralysis for prudence and calls capitulation diplomacy.

The government’s baffling chumminess with Qatar and multiple inexplicable visits to what is essentially Somalia’s patron state, adds another layer to this portrait of confusion. While we have no evidence that Doha played any role in the Borama crisis, the administration’s eager cultivation of Qatari relationships—pursued with more energy than the defense of our own sovereignty—raises troubling questions about where this government’s priorities actually lie. When you’re more concerned with pleasing foreign capitals than protecting your own citizens, when you invest more diplomatic capital in courting Gulf states than in standing firm against airlines that treat your passport as worthless, you’ve fundamentally misunderstood what leadership means.

This is a president who seems perpetually caught between competing pressures, unable to plant his feet and say “enough.” A president who waits for consensus that never comes, who seeks permission from foreign powers when decisive action is required, who mistakes the appearance of consultation for actual leadership. In less than a year, this pattern has cost us credibility, sovereignty, and now—in Borama—it has cost us lives. How many lives, we still don’t fully know.

Hollow Words, Broken Promises

On December 4th, as Borama descended into chaos, as protesters took to the streets to reject what they correctly perceived as a betrayal of their most fundamental concerns, President Cirro finally found his voice. Standing before cameras, reading from prepared remarks sanitized by his advisors, he declared: “I order all military forces in the city of Borama to return to their barracks. Nothing is more precious to me than the blood of my people, and there will be nothing that we are forced to spill without consultation.”

Beautiful words. Noble sentiments. Absolutely meaningless in practice.

Because even as the President promised that nothing was more precious than his people’s blood, the policy that provoked the crisis remained unchanged. The Issa Law unveiling would proceed. Djibouti’s interests would be served. Awdal’s concerns would be ignored. The President spoke of valuing his people’s blood while pursuing the exact policy guaranteed to spill more of it.

And spill it did. A second day of unrest. A third day. More deaths. More injuries. The Human Rights Center’s statement, issued today, confirms what everyone in Borama already knew: at least seventeen people killed—though the actual number may be higher as information continues to emerge from a traumatized city—more than fifty wounded, with military forces using live ammunition against protesters, deploying AK-47s against civilians whose only crime was demanding that their government listen to them. The Director of the Human Rights Center, Yasmin Omar Haji Mohamoud, stated it plainly: “We ask that the military not use live ammunition against the people. Dialogue is the solution, not shooting people whose opinions differ from the government’s.”

The people of Borama saw through the president’s December 4th speech immediately. They recognized it for what it was: another example of presidential paralysis dressed up as deliberation, more words designed to buy time without addressing substance. They responded with continued protests, continued demands, continued insistence that their voices matter.

Only today—December 6th, after days of bloodshed that could have been entirely avoided—did President Cirro finally announce what he should have said from the beginning: “Today, as President, I have halted the Issa Law ceremony, looking at the general interest and the feelings of my nation.” The correct decision, made far too late, purchased with the blood of at least seventeen Somaliland citizens—perhaps more—and the shattered trust of an entire region.

The Unelected Shadow Government and the Foreign Strings That Move Them

But let’s talk about who really made these decisions, because the Somaliland people deserve to know whose hands are actually on the wheel of state. President Cirro’s Minister of Presidency and a small cabal of advisors have wielded influence far beyond anything the electorate granted them. The people of Somaliland did not vote for these individuals. They did not elect this inner circle that apparently believes Djibouti’s interests matter more than Somaliland lives.

These advisors, these unelected power brokers who hide behind the President’s title while pulling the strings, have turned our executive branch into a subsidiary of foreign interests. They pushed for accommodating Djibouti. They advocated for the summit despite clear warnings. They dismissed concerns from Awdal as manageable. They convinced a weak president that he could navigate this crisis through clever maneuvering rather than principled leadership, that he could serve both Djibouti’s interests and Somaliland’s stability.

And when it all went catastrophically wrong, when the bodies started piling up in Borama’s streets, they retreated into the shadows while the President’s face took the blame.

But make no mistake about where ultimate responsibility lies: President Abdirahman Cirro is responsible for every single drop of blood spilled in Borama. Every one of the seventeen confirmed dead, and every additional victim whose death we have yet to confirm. Every one of the fifty wounded. Every widow’s tears. Every orphaned child. This is his legacy now, permanently etched into Somaliland’s history, and no amount of shuffling advisors or promising investigations will erase it.

He chose these advisors. He listened to their counsel over the clear warnings from Awdal’s people. He made the decisions—or rather, he failed to make them until citizens were dying in the streets. He stood before cameras on December 4th and promised that nothing was more precious than his people’s blood, then continued the exact policy guaranteed to spill more of it. The buck stops at his desk, and he will carry this stain for the rest of his presidency and beyond.

If President Cirro needs this much consensus, if he requires this much hand-holding before making basic decisions about Somaliland’s sovereignty and security, if he can be so easily swayed by Djibouti’s pressure against his own people’s clear interests, then he needs fundamentally different people around him—people not driven by foreign influences, people who won’t sacrifice everything we’ve built for approval from Djibouti, people who serve Somaliland first, last, and always.

The Price Must Be Paid: Real Accountability or Empty Gestures

Let’s be clear about what “accountability” must mean, because empty gestures will not suffice. The seventeen confirmed dead and fifty wounded—numbers that may grow as the full truth emerges—demand more. The people of Awdal deserve more. Somaliland’s future requires more.

Firing people is not enough. The entire security and governmental structure of Awdal Region needs to be dismantled and rebuilt from the ground up. Every official who supported this disastrous decision, who enabled this crisis, who chose Djibouti’s interests over Somaliland’s stability, needs to be removed from office immediately and permanently. This includes officials in the executive branch who pushed this policy, who dismissed warnings from Awdal’s community leaders, who prioritized their relationships with foreign powers over their duty to the Somaliland people.

The military commanders who ordered live ammunition used against protesters need to be identified and prosecuted. The Human Rights Center’s statement makes clear that AK-47s were deployed against civilians, that military force was used not as a last resort but as a first response. Someone gave those orders. Someone decided that shooting protesters was an appropriate response to political dissent. Those people need to face criminal prosecution, not administrative discipline.

And someone—the right people, the people actually responsible for the policy decisions that led directly to civilian deaths—needs to go to prison. Not symbolic detention. Not house arrest. Real prison time, with real consequences. We need full allocution of responsibility, public acknowledgment of exactly who made which decisions and when, a complete accounting of how this catastrophe unfolded. We need trials that establish legal and moral accountability. We need verdicts that tell future officials that Somaliland lives are not bargaining chips in foreign policy negotiations.

We need real, meaningful compensation for the victims and their families—not token payments, but genuine restitution that acknowledges the magnitude of what has been taken from them. The state failed to protect its own citizens. The state must pay for that failure in ways that hurt, in ways that force even the most insulated officials to understand the human cost of their political calculations.

This must hurt. It must hurt enough that no future president, no future advisor, no future official ever again thinks they can play games with Somaliland’s regional stability, ever again imagines they can ignore an entire region’s legitimate concerns for foreign approval, ever again believes that Djibouti’s interests are more important than Somaliland lives. The pain must be institutional and personal, political and financial, immediate and lasting.

The Strategic Disaster and the Enemy We Invited In

What makes this crisis truly unforgivable is that it was entirely preventable—and that its consequences will echo through Somaliland’s politics for years to come. President Cirro walked straight into a trap that was clearly marked, guided by advisors who either didn’t understand or didn’t care about what they were doing.

Even more damningly, the government’s own press release dated December 6th—the same day the President finally halted the summit—reveals the depth of either their delusion or their dishonesty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns “the continued interference and destabilizing actions of the Federal Government of Somalia in relation to the situation in Borama,” claiming that Somalia’s actions are “deliberate, coordinated, and clearly intended to inflame tensions.”

This is deflection of the most cowardly sort. Yes, Somalia likely tried to exploit this crisis—that’s what hostile neighboring states do. But Somalia didn’t create this crisis. Djibouti and President Cirro’s capitulation to Djibouti created this crisis. Somalia didn’t force Somaliland to reverse its initial strong position. Djibouti’s pressure did that. Somalia didn’t order military forces to use live ammunition against protesters in Borama. Somaliland’s own security apparatus did that.

To blame Somalia for “destabilizing” Somaliland when our own government’s policy choices created the destabilization is an insult to the intelligence of every Somaliland citizen. The press release claims “Somaliland’s unity and stability remain unwavering.” At least seventeen people are dead, perhaps more. Fifty are wounded. Borama has seen three days of unrest. And we’re claiming our unity is “unwavering”? This is either delusional or deliberately dishonest.

Here’s what actually threatens Somaliland’s unity: presidents who capitulate to foreign pressure against their own people’s interests. Advisors who serve Djibouti while claiming to serve Somaliland. Security forces that shoot protesters instead of protecting them. Governments that ignore regional grievances until cities burn. Airlines that treat our passports as worthless while our government does nothing.

Djibouti has never been a friend to Somaliland’s aspirations for independence and international recognition. Every ounce of instability we suffer is a strategic victory for Guelleh’s government. And now we’ve handed them exactly what they wanted: proof that Somaliland’s leadership can be manipulated, that our president will sacrifice domestic stability for foreign approval, that we cannot maintain basic internal security when it conflicts with what Djibouti wants.

Worse still, we’ve created the exact opening that Somaliland’s enemies have been working toward since Las Anod. When you alienate an entire region, when you ignore legitimate grievances, when you treat your own people as expendable, when you shoot them in the streets for demanding to be heard—you create the perfect conditions for secession. You hand separatists their best recruiting tool. You transform regions that should be pillars of your state into potential breakaway territories.

The whispers of an “Awdal State” as a Federal Member State of Somalia aren’t idle speculation anymore. We made them real. We gave them oxygen, credibility, and at least seventeen martyrs—possibly more. We provided the grievances, the evidence of government indifference, the proof that Hargeisa doesn’t care about Awdal. And for what? To please Djibouti for a few days before reversing course anyway?

Las Anod should have taught us this lesson in blood and tears: regional alienation leads to regional loss. When you make people feel like foreigners in their own country, they start looking for a different country. We lived through this nightmare once already. And now, impossibly, we’re doing it again—only this time in Awdal, a region we literally cannot afford to lose.

Awdal Is Somaliland: The Existential Truth We Cannot Afford to Forget

This is the brutal truth that should have guided every decision from the beginning: Somaliland cannot survive the loss of Awdal. Not politically. Not economically. Not strategically. Not morally.

Awdal is Somaliland.

Not a peripheral region we can afford to alienate. Not a negotiable territory whose concerns can be set aside when they conflict with foreign policy objectives. Not a political problem to be managed through security crackdowns. Awdal is Somaliland, as fundamental to our national identity and territorial integrity as Hargeisa itself, as essential to our survival as our constitution.

The people of Awdal are not subjects to be ruled or populations to be controlled. They are citizens, equal partners in this national project, stakeholders in our collective future with the same rights as any other Somaliland citizen, participants in the same dream of independence that has sustained us through decades of struggle.

Without Awdal, there is no Somaliland worth the name. Without Awdal’s territory, our geographic coherence collapses. Without Awdal’s people, our demographic base shrinks to unsustainability. Without Awdal’s resources, our economic foundation crumbles. Without Awdal’s participation in our political life, our claim to be a democracy becomes a cruel joke. Without Awdal’s buy-in to the Somaliland project, we are not a nation—we are a fractured territory held together by force.

Any president who doesn’t understand this fundamental reality has no business leading this nation. Any advisor who counsels policies that risk Awdal’s alienation for Djibouti’s approval should be fired immediately for gross incompetence. Any official who treats Awdal’s concerns as secondary to foreign relations should be removed from government service permanently.

This is not negotiable. This is not subject to political calculation. This is existential.

The Moment of Truth and the Reckoning to Come

President Abdirahman Cirro now faces the defining choice of his presidency, less than a year into his tenure, with at least seventeen bodies in Borama—the true count still emerging—fifty wounded citizens, and a legacy already stained with blood. History will judge him not by his words but by what he does next.

Does he continue down this path of indecision and capitulation, letting Djibouti dictate domestic policy while regions burn and airlines humiliate our citizens with impunity? Does he keep delegating critical decisions to unelected advisors who serve foreign interests? Does he maintain this inner circle who sold him down the river? Does he preside over the slow-motion disintegration of everything previous generations fought to build?

Or does he finally step up and lead?

Real leadership means making difficult decisions before bodies pile up in the streets. It means standing firm against foreign pressure when our sovereignty is at stake—whether that pressure comes from Djibouti demanding we host provocative summits or from airlines treating our passports as worthless. It means listening to all of Somaliland’s regions with equal respect. It means having the courage to say “no” to powerful neighbors when they ask us to set ourselves on fire for their convenience.

It means cleaning house with thoroughness that leaves no doubt about the new direction. The Minister of Presidency and the advisors who pushed this disastrous policy must go, immediately and permanently. No golden parachutes. No reassignments to comfortable posts. Out. Finished. Their judgment has been tested and found catastrophically wanting. They served Djibouti’s interests over Somaliland’s stability.

The security structure in Awdal that failed so spectacularly must be dismantled and rebuilt with people who actually answer to Hargeisa. Every executive branch official who supported this decision needs to be identified and removed from authority.

Criminal accountability must follow. Prison time for military commanders who ordered live fire against protesters. Prison time for officials whose policy decisions led to civilian deaths. Public trials that establish exactly what happened. Legal consequences that demonstrate this will never be tolerated again. Compensation for victims that reflects the true cost of the state’s failure.

These are not optional measures. These are the bare minimum required to begin rebuilding trust and establishing that leadership in Somaliland comes with real responsibility.

Most of all, real leadership means understanding that unity isn’t optional—it’s existential. Without Awdal, there is no Somaliland. Without trust between regions, there is no path to recognition. Without a president willing to lead decisively rather than react weakly, to choose Somaliland over foreign approval every single time, there is no future worth building.

Time Is Running Out: Choose Now, Mr. President

Mr. President, you have failed the first major test of your leadership spectacularly. But this failure is part of a pattern—a pattern of indecision that has defined your brief tenure. At least seventeen people are dead because you were too weak to stand up to Djibouti, and we may not yet know the full extent of the carnage. Fifty are wounded because you prioritized foreign relationships over your own people’s safety. Somaliland travelers are humiliated daily by airlines because you cannot bring yourself to act decisively even on matters of basic sovereignty.

The question now is whether you will learn from these failures or continue repeating them.

Your words from December 4th ring hollow: “Nothing is more precious to me than the blood of my people.” If that were true, you would never have reversed your initial correct position. If that were true, you would have stood firm against Djibouti’s pressure. If that were true, you would have halted the summit before the first drop of blood was spilled, not after at least seventeen funerals—and counting—became necessary.

Somaliland stands at a crossroads. One path leads to fragmentation, vulnerability, the loss of Awdal mirroring Las Anod, the slow death of the dream that has sustained us through decades of struggle. That path is littered with the wreckage of nations that couldn’t hold themselves together, led by presidents who chose the easy way, who served foreign interests, who mistook paralysis for prudence.

The other path leads to unity forged through genuine respect for all our regions, strength built on national cohesion and institutional accountability, international recognition earned through demonstrating we can govern ourselves effectively and defend our sovereignty against all comers—whether neighboring states or commercial airlines, and the prosperity we have earned through sacrifice but have yet to claim. That path requires the kind of decisive leadership you have failed to demonstrate thus far.

You cannot walk both paths. You cannot please everyone—not Djibouti and Awdal, not foreign powers and the Somaliland people, not your weak-willed advisors and the demands of justice for at least seventeen dead citizens. You cannot delegate this choice or wait for consensus that will never come. The time for dithering is over.

It’s decision time, President Cirro.

What is it going to be?

Will you be remembered as the president who let Somaliland slip through his fingers through chronic indecision, who proved too weak to hold our nation together when it mattered most, who allowed Djibouti to dictate our internal policies while our cities burned, who stood by helplessly while airlines treated our sovereignty as a joke, who surrounded himself with advisors more loyal to foreign powers than to the people they supposedly served? Will history record you as the leader who failed to learn from Las Anod, who repeated the same catastrophic mistakes in Awdal? Will your legacy be the bodies in Borama’s streets—seventeen that we know of, perhaps more—the pattern of weakness and capitulation, the slow erosion of everything Somaliland has fought for?

Or will you finally show the leadership this moment demands—clean house ruthlessly, put Somaliland first without qualification, stand firm against foreign manipulation regardless of pressure, rebuild trust with Awdal through actions rather than words, pursue criminal accountability for those responsible, defend our sovereignty against all threats however small they may seem, and lead us toward the recognition and prosperity that remains within reach if we have the courage and decisiveness to grasp it?

The bodies in Borama demand an answer. The at least seventeen dead—the full count still unknown—who should still be alive demand an answer. The grieving families whose loved ones died because you were too weak to stand up to Djibouti deserve an answer. The fifty wounded recovering in hospitals deserve an answer. The people of Awdal who have watched their concerns dismissed and their lives treated as expendable require an answer. The Somaliland travelers humiliated daily at airports require an answer. The Human Rights Center, speaking for those who cannot speak, demands an answer. Somaliland’s future depends on your answer.

The hour of decision is here. Choose wisely. Choose now. Choose with the understanding that this choice will define not just your presidency but potentially Somaliland’s survival as a nation.

Because Somaliland cannot afford another failure of leadership. The margin for error is gone. The buffer of trust has been exhausted. The next crisis will find us weaker, more divided, less capable of holding together. Las Anod was a warning. Borama is a final notice written in blood—blood still being counted.

And neither can you afford it, Mr. President. Your legacy is being written right now, in blood and fire and daily humiliations, in the streets of a city that should never have erupted and in airports where our citizens are treated as second-class. You can still change the ending of this story, but only if you finally discover the spine that has been so conspicuously absent, only if you demonstrate that you’ve learned what decisive leadership actually means.

The choice is yours. The time is now. And Somaliland is watching, waiting, and running out of patience with a president whose defining characteristic thus far has been an inability to decide anything until it’s far too late.

What is it going to be, Mr. President? Will you end Somaliland through weakness and indecision, or will you finally lead it with the strength and clarity our survival demands?


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