Investigative Reports

Somaliland Office in Taiwan Rejects Sexual Misconduct Allegations

The Republic of Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan has...

Ministry of Information Spends 600,000 US Dollars to Fix a Decade Old Radio Station

According to a contract signed by the Minister of Information, Culture...

How Somalia is trying to Stifle Somaliland – US ties with an Online Troll and a pseudo-Charitable Organization

In February, June, and  August 2022, Mr. Okeke-Von Batten filed Lobby Disclosure Act...
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Early Childhood Education Program in Somaliland

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Policy and Research Contributions from Pharo Foundation

Pharo Foundation’s Somaliland Early Childhood Education (ECE) Program hhas been a transformative force in shaping Somaliland’s education landscape, well beyond the mere provision of its teaching, into ECE policy and research. Pharo Foundation started the first-ever ECE centers in Somaliland public schools in 2016, allowing children from poor and middle-income families to access quality ECE. We now run 18 ECEs across the country, which cater to more than 1,000 children. Yet from a policy standpoint, we have also co-created the Somaliland National ECE Curriculum with the Ministry of Education, ensuring that all ECE centers follow the same standards and guidelines. From a global research point of view, we are also contributing to the production of global knowledge on ECEs, through the data we collect, as we have conducted the first study in Somaliland that provides evidence of the positive impact of ECE on Somaliland children.

Somaliland is a region that faces poverty and a lack of early childhood education opportunities for many children. Private kindergartens are too expensive for most families, and public schools do not have enough ECE centers. Our Early Childhood Education Program aims to address this gap by partnering with public schools and establishing ECE centers within them. However, the national diffusion of this approach to early years learning was always the ultimate aspiration for us. Hence as part of our mission to support early childhood education (ECE) in Somaliland, we have been working closely with the Ministry of Education and Sciences (Mo&ES) to develop a national ECE curriculum. Our collaboration started in 2015 when we funded the Horn Youth Services Foundation to create a provisional ECE curriculum. Pharo Foundation also trained the first cohort of 28 ECE teachers, who were ready to educate and nurture young Somali children. In 2022, we partnered with the Mo&ES to finalize the national ECE curriculum, which was written in English and made available for all ECE providers. In 2023, we translated the curriculum into Somali. We have been on the front lines of providing early childhood education to children across Somaliland as it is essential for their development and academic success.

Meanwhile, existing research has shown that ECEs can have a lasting impact on children’s educational and social outcomes, particularly children who come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. One such study is the High/Scope Perry Preschool Study.  This study is a “scientific experiment that has identified both the short- and long-term effects of a high-quality preschool education program for young children living in poverty.”

The High/Scope study followed 123 low-income African American children from ages 3 to 40. Half of the children received early education which was based on the High/Scope curriculum while the other half did not receive any preschool education.

Following the children, until they were 40, the study collected data on the effects early education had on their lives outcomes such as educational status, income, health and even on their behaviours.

The study found that “The program group significantly outperformed the non-program group on highest level of schooling completed,” and that more program groups were economically performing better.

The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study provides strong evidence on the importance of early education and its everlasting impact. The study concludes that “high-quality preschool programs for young children living in poverty contribute to their intellectual and social development in childhood and their school success, [and] economic performance.”

However, there has been no evidence of the importance of early education in Somaliland. Hence Pharo Foundation decided to carry out a quasi-experimental study to measure the impact and effectiveness of our Early Childhood Education Program in Berbera, Somaliland. The study used the International Development Educational Learning Assessment (IDELA), a standardized tool that measures the outcomes of a child’s learning and development in the areas of emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, social-emotional development, and executive functions.

In this experiment, 85 students in a control group were compared with 80 students in the treatment group, measuring their IDELA scores at the beginning and end of the program. The results showed that the treatment group had scored higher in tests. Relative to the comparison group, enrolled children demonstrated a 15 p.p. increase in average scores (equivalent to a standard deviation), with the largest gains occurring along the emergent literacy dimension. Although this effect is derived from a small sample in a single school (in its first year of operation), its magnitude is larger than those documented in much of the education research literature. We expect to release a detailed summary of findings in 2024.

YEMEN | America’s New Threat?

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While largely neglected for the past decade, the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea has suddenly received considerable attention. But while Houthi attacks pose a danger to international trade, tackling that problem threatens to reignite the war in Yemen, thus making the world’s worst humanitarian crisis even worse. So, what should be done about the situation? Is it really such a threat? And should other Red Sea and Aran states be getting involved?

In December 2023, the United States announced the creation of a new naval task force in the Red Sea: Operation Prosperity Guardian. This will tackle the rising threat posed to shipping by the Iranian-backed Houthi Movement based in Yemen. However, the mission faces many challenges. Quite apart from limited international support, there is a danger that it could undermine efforts to resolve the civil war in Yemen. In addition, it could destabilize relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have been recently improving. So, what exactly is the threat all about?

Yemen is one of the most war-torn countries in the world. Having emerged as two separate countries, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), they merged in May 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen. For many years, this was ruled by Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, in 2012, he was forced to resign after mass protests erupted as part of the Arab Spring. This sparked a brutal civil war as the northern-based Houthi Movement seized power in much of the country. This, in turn, led to a Saudi Arabia intervention. But since 2022, the level of fighting has dropped significantly, and there are hopes that a peace agreement may be found. And it’s this that is causing so much concern. Many fear that the new US-led naval mission, Operation Prosperity Guardian, while crucial for protecting the international economy, may upset the delicate search for peace, plunge Yemen back into conflict, and re-ignite Saudi and Iranian tensions – thus aggravating the situation in the broader Middle East.

Somaliland President Reshuffles Again His Cabinet Members

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On Sunday, December 10, Somaliland’s president – H.E. Musa Bihi Abdi – announced significant cabinet changes with the goal of improving his performance as a president. It is anticipated that this reshuffle will happen right away.

President Bihi removed a minister and a deputy minister from their positions – Abdinasir Omar Jama, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Abdirahman Hersi Jama Dhooble, the former Minister of Youth and Sports – in a presidential decree that was released today.

“Having been aware that the privilege to serve the nation is in turns and always got entrusted with the capable, I hereby announce your removal from your cabinet posts as the Minister of Youth and Sports and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, respectively,” the presidential decree read while thanking them for their services and dedication during their tenure.

Along with this reshuffle, the president also named a new minister and deputy ministers who will start serving right away.

The president appointed the following officials in accordance with Article 90 of the Republic of Somaliland Constitution, after taking into consideration their knowledge, skills, and experience, as well as basis on consultations from others and recommendations received that they can handle their responsibilities diligently,” the presidential degree further added.

As of right now, Abdirisak Musa Farah Awad is the Minister of Youth and Sports.
Roda Jama Elmi, the current deputy minister of the ministry of financial development, will assume a new position as the deputy minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation
With effect from today, Saleban Jama Diriye will serve as the Ministry of Financial Development’s deputy minister.

Significant changes were made to the cabinet by Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi in November 2023. He removed four ministers and appointed five new ones, hoping this would improve the government’s performance and the public’s complaints over corruption and economic stagnation.

The piece was first published on SII

Dire Warning Ignored by President Bihi on Weapons Embargo on Somalia

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On September 2019, Mr. Mahmoud Adam Jama “Galaal’, current Spokesperson for Waddani opposition party and former Deputy Minister of Health who also served as Somaliland’s Ambassador to the UK and Ethiopia, sent below message to the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi on the Somalia’s weapon’s embargo and its annual review by the United Nation’s Security Council and its implication for Somaliland and the whole region. The United Nations Security Council has lifted the weapons embargo on Somalia and Somaliland has since condemned and protested the action. Below is the message from Ambassador Galaal in verbatim.


To: H.E Muse Bihi Abdi - President of the RSL

From: Mahmoud Adam Jama “Galaal’
Subject: Arms Embargo on Somalia
Date: 28 September 2019
Summary of background – Arms Embargo on Somalia

Security Council Resolution 733 first established the arms embargo on Somalia in 1992. Since the partial lifting of the embargo in 2013 there has been more than 20,000 weapons and 75 million rounds of ammunition delivered to Somalia and donated by a number of states including China, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti amongst others. A sizeable number of these weapons have found their way to Al Shabab and arms dealers in Puntland, Yemen, and Mogadishu as a result of non-compliance with the United Nations sanctions on arms to Somalia. There is a United Nations Somalia Sanctions Committee which is supported by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and a Panel of Experts (PoE) mandated under various resolutions including 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012), 2093 (2013) and 2182 (2014) and 2444 (2018). The mandate is to monitor and ensure compliance. 

Concerns on current situation Corruption and a lack of accountability continue to undermine the arms embargo and consequently security and stability of the region. It is important to highlight that whilst international financial institutions have praised the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for implementing financial reforms, between 2017 and 2018, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia expressed serious concerns with regard to corruption and misappropriation. This included specific allegations against some ministries as well of misuse of funds in the Benadir regional administration. In addition, the UN Monitoring Group of Somalia found a lack of transparency regarding Federal Government contracts and there have been reports of significant off-budget income and expenditure. A review found misappropriation and a lack of accountability of the Somali National Army and the security sector. 

Mr. President, the disparity between international financial institutions and the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia on issue of misappropriation and corruption should be of serious concern to the international community both in the context of the arms embargo and a wider unholy collusion between FGS and international financial institutions. Non-compliance to the arms embargo and institutional corruption create unfavourable conditions for regional security and must therefore be of grave concern to the government of the Republic of Somaliland. 

It is also very important we are able to contest allegations made by the Monitoring Group. For example, the Monitoring Group claims it had not received a response to correspondence sent to Somaliland on 6 September 2018, requesting confirmation of the circumstances of the alleged torture and execution of the four detainees from Puntland (Tukaraq conflict) and details of the steps taken, if any, to investigate these allegations. 

The Monitoring Group further claims to have sent the government of the Republic of Somaliland correspondence on 2 February 2018, stating the establishment of a foreign military base in Berbera would constitute a violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, and that any support to Somaliland’s security sector would require the notification of and approval by the Committee, in accordance to the UN Security Council resolutions, specifically paragraph 11 (a) of Security Council resolution 2111 (2013). The Monitoring Group further claims Somaliland has not responded to the correspondence.

Conclusion and recommendation 

Mr. President, | hope you will agree that it’s essential we formulate a clear policy on the United Nations Arms Embargo and a strategy to influence and engage with the UN Sanctions Committee. Whilst the arms embargo is the principal aim of the Monitoring Group’s reporting, there are often detailed regional political, economic and security related information and analysis, which includes the Republic of Somaliland, contained in their reports. 

The arms embargo does not differentiate the Republic of Somaliland from the Federal Government of Somalia. It is therefore imperative we observe and scrutinise the work of the Monitoring Group so we may be in a position to provide robust written challenges to incorrect, inaccurate and unfavourable findings of its interim reports in order to ensure our position and views are represented in the final reports to the UN Security Council. We should also use political, diplomatic, and public relations opportunities to augment our written submissions for maximum impact. 

Mr. President, | would like to discuss the above matters with you in detail, however the most urgent and pressing at this time is we formulate a comprehensive submission document which clearly articulates our staunch opposition to the easing of the arms embargo when the matter is reviewed on 15 November 2019.  

Breaking – Somaliland Government and High-Level Chinese Delegation Held Talks in Hargeisa

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A Chinese government delegation visited Hargeisa last week and engaged in confidential discussions with Somaliland government officials. The composition of the Chinese delegation and the content of the discussion with the government of Somaliland has not been disclosed.

The Republic of Somaliland and the People’s Republic of China clashed from the outset when, on September 9, 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland formed bilateral ties, staunchly rejecting Chinese attempts to alter their decision concerning Taiwan.

The circumstances surrounding the latest contact between China and Somaliland, the nature of their talks, and whether Somaliland has reconsidered its alliance with Taiwan remain unclear. Interestingly, this meeting followed the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Essa Kayd’s recent visit to the United States, where he engaged with various U.S. government officials from State, Defense, and other departments. It is uncertain if the Chinese delegation’s visit and Minister Kayd’s U.S. trip are related.

Although Somaliland’s decision to form bilateral ties with Taiwan was lauded by US government including the White House Security Council and members at the time, Department of State’s and particularly the Bureau of African Affairs’ attitude towards Somaliland remained lukewarm at best. Multiple visit by the United States Africa Command to Somaliland and particularly Berbera have raised the specter of US base and military presence in Somaliland.

It is unknown if the President of the Republic of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi met with the Chinese delegation in Hargeisa, and the potential rapprochement between China and Somaliland raises questions about the future of Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan. What is evident, however, is that if China succeeds in swaying Somaliland away from its West-ward alignment, it will mark a significant diplomatic victory, strengthening China’s position in the Red Sea and ensures success of its Belt and Road Initiative and potentially impacting the U.S.’s aspirations for a military base in Berbera.

In a significant foreign policy address in November 2021, Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro,” the Chairman of Waddani, Somaliland’s main opposition party and Presidential candidate, voiced strong criticism of President Bihi’s government. The focal point of Cirro’s critique was the government’s decision to align with Taiwan instead of China. He advocated for a reassessment of diplomatic ties, emphasizing the need for a more positive relationship with the People’s Republic of China.

Despite inquiries, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the President’s office, Taiwan’s Representative Office in Somaliland, and China’s Embassy in Somalia have not responded to questions about the Chinese delegation’s visit to Hargeisa, the nature of the talks, and whether Somaliland intends to maintain bilateral ties with both China and Taiwan. The lack of clarity surrounding these developments underscores their sensitivity and strategic importance.

Somaliland: Berbera city’s growth is being held back by a power supply monopoly

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Nasir M. Ali, University of Hargeisa; Ayan Yusuf Ali, University of Hargeisa, and Jutta Bakonyi, Durham University

Somaliland’s main port, at the city of Berbera, accounted for two-thirds of the country’s revenues in 2020. Over the years, these revenues have mostly gone into the central state coffers, while the development of Berbera has been neglected.

When we visited the city for our research project on port infrastructure, international politics, and everyday life, this neglect was immediately visible. Buildings in the city centre were abandoned and dilapidated. Physical and social infrastructure – ranging from roads, water and electricity to health and schooling – were lacking.

Berbera port consumes a lot of energy while most city dwellers lack affordable electricity. ED RAM/AFP via Getty Images

Infrastructure development carries modernity’s promise of progress and development. But it relies on affordable and reliable energy. That is what is lacking for most of Somaliland’s residents. The electricity access rate is estimated at 15%. Eighty percent of the population use biomass fuel, mostly charcoal and firewood, to fulfil their daily energy needs.

The Somaliland government has mainly left the energy market to its own devices. Lack of regulation, and collaboration between the government and private businesses have spawned a monopoly of energy provision in Berbera. This in turn makes electricity unaffordable for most residents.

The uneven development of Berbera city manifests in the contrast between the large amounts of energy consumed by the port and the lack of affordable electricity for most urban dwellers. These inequalities challenge the expectation that Somaliland’s further integration into the globalised chains of production and consumption – through its modern port – will greatly benefit its citizens.

Berbera and other cities in Somaliland need policies that ensure energy becomes affordable for the urban poor. Without such policies, the gap between the rich and the poor is likely to widen further, with access to energy being but one of the indicators of this inequality.

Berbera port and development

The neglect of Berbera city stands in stark contrast to the modern technologies and equipment at its port. Since 2017 the port has been managed by the Dubai-based logistics giant DP World. The company brought in new transport technologies and modernised the port’s infrastructure to handle containerised trade.

A special economic zone has been established to attract investors. And a transport corridor that links the port with Ethiopia is nearly complete.

A DP World representative explained to us that the port had established its own energy source to meet the huge power demands of the new container terminal. Sudden energy cuts and blackouts would risk damaging the new technologies and undermine the port’s ability to become a global trade hub.

Somaliland’s government acknowledges the lack of reliable energy provision as a major constraint to development. The government plans to ensure that all citizens have access to affordable energy from local and renewable sources by 2030.

This goal is ambitious. Electricity across Somaliland is privatised and relies on fossil fuel, mainly diesel, which is imported from the Arabian peninsula. Energy is, therefore, costly and unsustainable. Somaliland has one of the world’s highest energy prices punctuated with frequent and often long-lasting power cuts.

So far, only limited investments have been made into the generation of clean energy, among them a solar mini grid in Berbera, funded by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development.

The privatisation of energy

Somaliland withdrew from Somalia in May 1991, after more than two years of civil war. When the country started to build its state apparatus, the private sector was already flourishing. The state relied, to a large extent, on financial support from private businesses. It therefore adopted a policy of minimal government involvement in the economy.

The energy sector, for example, started with private business people who initially used generators for their own consumption. The businesses eventually provided their neighbourhoods with excess energy. Some of these small scale, informal businesses grew into large enterprises which are providing thousands of customers with electricity today.

At least four major energy suppliers are competing for customers in Somaliland’s capital city, Hargeisa.

But in contrast, the market in Berbera is dominated by the Berbera Power House, a private company that has established a monopoly position in the city. With no competition, prices are up, and only the wealthy people can afford electricity in Berbera city.

Mini grid solar power plant

The concession for DP World was accompanied by expectations of closer cooperation between Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, for example, provides financial and technical support for the transport corridor from Berbera to Ethiopia. It has also initiated social projects for the urban poor in Berbera, like building schools and providing green and affordable energy. It financed a 7MW solar power plant which was inaugurated in January 2021.

This was considered a significant step towards providing energy to poorer households and reducing Somaliland’s dependence on fossil fuels.

But immediately after the launch of the project, the Somaliland Ministry of Mines and Energy handed over the solar facility to Berbera Power House. The move further entrenched the company’s electricity monopoly in the city.

During the inauguration of the mini grid solar power plant, the finance minister proposed that electricity prices in Berbera would be reduced to US$0.1 per unit compared to US$0.6 per unit before the investment.

The interviews that we conducted with Berbera city residents in February and March 2023 revealed that electricity prices had not come down. We also found that the reliability of energy services had not improved.

It seems that the company lacks incentives and pressure from the government to improve its services and cut down energy prices. The company refused our requests for interviews.

Currently, a number of international organisations are exploring the potential for green energy in Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa. These initiatives primarily aim to overcome environmental limits of the globally rising energy demand. Whether they will eventually benefit the population depend, among others, on how they are regulated and governed.

Abdiqadir A. Ismail, a researcher at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Hargeisa, contributed to this article.

Nasir M. Ali, Lecturer of Political Science and International Relations, University of Hargeisa; Ayan Yusuf Ali, Research Manager at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa, and Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Taiwan’s Cooperation in Africa for A Net-Zero Future

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By Ambassador Allen Chenhwa Lou
Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland

Include Taiwan for Collective Climate Actions

As the concentration level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere rises and temperatures across nations reach record highs, it is clear that climate change is an issue that involves the whole world, an issue of no boundary. Therefore, Taiwan has been proactively tackling climate challenges in their wakes, alongside other international partners toward the common goal of net-zero emissions. Turning slogans into actions, Taiwan is planning to roll out ambitious climate reforms in 2024, with the introduction of carbon fees and other net-zero-oriented policies for private sectors. However, despite Taiwan’s continuous efforts of setting ambitious 2050 net-zero target and complying with international norms under the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, Taiwan is unable to fully engage the formal dialogue of climate actions. Such injustice is inconsistent with the global efforts of combating climate change, leaving a widening gap in the climate campaign.

Taiwan’s Contribution and Attempts to Join COP

Taiwan’s potential and tangible contributions in fields such as capacity building, technology research, education, public health, and healthcare are note-worthy. Recently from spearheading the green transition in the Caribbean, assisting high-quality rice seed production in Indonesia, to ensuring adequate crop production in Thailand against climate change, the International Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) has been actively involved with the climate actions. Taiwan has always tried to contribute where we can and share our best practices.

Taiwan’s Climate Actions in East Africa

Taiwan’s climate effort had also made its landfall in East Africa. In Kenya, TaiwanICDF partners with Terre des hommes Foundation (Tdh) to improve the access to basic water, sanitation and hygiene in ten health care facilities in Garissa County Kenya; In Uganda, Taiwanese NGO Love Binti International has received the carbon credit for more than a thousand acre of land donated by a Taiwanese benefactor, gearing toward promoting the environmental cause and establishing scholarship.

In Somaliland, Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland coordinated with Taiwan’s Forest Bureau of Council of Agriculture to fund Cheetah Conservation Fund (CCF) to ensure the biodiversity and to help the wild survive. TaiwanICDF also helps facilitate the volunteer program for CCF; In terms of food security for climate resilience, Taiwan Technical Mission in the Republic of Somaliland has assigned agricultural experts to improve the quality and quantity of fruit and vegetable, introduce high-quality seeds from Taiwan, and educate the store on extending the shelf life of produce; Taiwan also integrate NGOs’ resources for joint climate actions. Taiwanese NGO Step30 International Ministries, known for donating used shoes to African children struggling for sand jiggers on their bare foot, had joined force with Taiwan Representative Office to fund Drilling & Equipping of K15(2) groundwater project in in Ged-deeble Somaliland. Moreover, Step30 is also involved in other borehole-drilling projects in East Africa countries such as Kenya and Uganda. From government agencies to non-government entities, Taiwan’s support for climate actions in Africa is tangible.

Taiwan, a Key Component to Global Climate Reforms

In this year’s COP28, Taiwan is again barred from fully participating in the global climate change conference. As a responsible member of the global community and a force for good in the world, Taiwan is ready to share our experiences and engage with friendly countries in East Africa, to identify risks and opportunities for tangible contributions to be made. Taiwan is committed to work with partners to develop climate resilience.

There is only one world, and this is the only Earth we know. As the world confronts the mounting threat of climate change and scrambling to restructure our supply chains, “Denying Taiwan is to Deny Global Climate Reforms”.

Is the Mayor of Hargeisa, Mr. Moge, A Political Opportunist or the Savior that Somaliland Needs?

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The blind embrace of personality cults and a propensity to swallow heavy dose of empty rhetoric whole has led to the calamity that is President Bihi’s tenure, possibly the worst President since the reestablishment of our Republic. While we won’t dwell on the train wreck that is President Bihi’s place in the history books, the crux of the matter is Somaliland’s public has troubling tendency to fall head over heels for charismatic figures with minimal substance.

The Somaliland public, evidently slow learners in the school of political disappointments, now entertains the absurd notion that Hargeisa’s Mayor, Mr. Abdikarim Ahmed Moge, is the panacea to all their ills. Before we start dancing to the premature tunes of his supposed salvation, let’s examine what Mayor Moge has accomplished so far as the mayor of Hargeisa since his election in 2021.

Credit is due to Mayor Moge for surpassing his predecessor, Mayor SOLTELCO, with notable initiatives like monthly city garbage clean-ups, tree planting, and public roadway rehabilitation, earning praise from Hargeisa residents. His early crackdown on corruption within the local municipality is commendable. However, let’s peel back the charismatic facade and delve deeper.

It’s important to remember that SOLTELCO is an insanely low bar to clear. In fact, Hargeisa would have fared better if it had no mayor at all. He was one of the worst mayors in recent memory, and because the public is so accustomed to horrific leadership, even mediocrity is mistaken for salvation. Mayor Moge has barely moved the needle in making Hargeisa the capital it deserves. He has promised that Hargeisa would rival world capitals and two years on, that seems like a pipe dream.

Mayor Moge has failed a basic litmus test as a true leader, an anti-corruption champion and the reformer he sold to the public as a candidate as he chose to look the other way on the mass-looting of public land and institutionalized corruption put in place by his predecessor that still puts money in SOLTELCO’s pocket at the expense of Hargeisa residents.

Former Mayor SOLTELCO privatized key funding sources—land management and refuse collection—to companies he had personal stakes in. Mayor Moge, two years in, turns a blind eye, allowing SOLTELCO to to continue to bleed Hargeisa dry even when he is no longer the mayor. This makes Mayor Moge another politician who will say anything to get elected and a willing accomplice who will put his political ambition over the public interest without hesitation.

Mayor Moge has proven himself a shrewd politician, although this attribute hardly deserves commendation. His mastery of political expediency is evident in his adeptness at rolling over and playing dead to avoiding confrantation and difficult battles. An example is rebuilding the Waheen Market, a matter falling squarely within his municipal jurisdiction, which was astonishingly, it was effortlessly wrested away from him by the Ministry of Public Works, a move presumably orchestrated to accommodate a lucrative contract awarded to a company from Estwini in less than transparent manner. Strikingly, Mayor Moge remained silent, offering no protest in the face of this blatant corruption.

His conspicuous silence and absence from public view continued in the ongoing surge of public asset sale to private hands, such as the sale of Police Lane land and the forced displacement of residents, predominantly comprising families of current and former police officers, and the basketball playground in Jijiga Yar to make way for a parking lot for the adjacent hotel, further showcases Mayor Moge’s inexplicable disappearance from public scrutiny when confronted with potential negative publicity.

In these instances of questionable dealings involving public land that falls within his jurisdiction, Mayor Moge has perfected the art of vanishing into thin air, leaving the impression that his political acumen is not directed toward championing the public interest but rather towards self-preservation and conveniently avoiding any controversy that might tarnish his image. This pattern of behavior raises serious concerns about his honestly, commitment to transparency, accountability, and, ultimately, the well-being of the constituents he purportedly serves.

Despite Mayor Moge’s ostentatious use of the slogan “it’s your taxes” on billboards, his two-year tenure has been marked by a glaring absence of transparency. Shockingly, not a single report detailing the revenue, expenses, and budget of Hargeisa Municipality has been published under his leadership, mirroring the opacity of his predecessor. Compounding this lack of transparency are allegations that the municipality been heavily borrowing from Somaliland’s Central Bank. Mayor Moge attempted to deny this fact but callously admitted it in the same speech, underscoring a concerning pattern of obfuscation and potential fiscal mismanagement under his watch.

Moreover, Mayor Moge’s about-face on anti-corruption and freedom of speech, coupled with his newfound apathy towards these critical issues, indicates a leader more concerned with self-preservation and appeasing President Bihi’s than the well-being of his constituents and Somaliland in general. His toned-down bravado may suit his role as mayor, but it raises serious doubts about his suitability for the arduous role of leading a nation.

Leading the Republic of Somaliland, an unrecognized country grappling with monumental challenges, is a far cry from overseeing the Hargeisa municipality. Unfortunately, Mayor Moge, shrouded in a record of political expediency and a blatant disregard for transparency and accountability, not only falls catastrophically short as the leader Somaliland needs, but practically serves as the embodiment of everything wrong with Somaliland’s leadership. His current rightful place seems to be nothing more than standing behind President Bihi, smirking and complacently witnessing the central government pillage whatever meager public assets remain.


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Projects funded by the World Bank Group’s private sector arm fuel violent conflict – it’s time to reform the system

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Brian Ganson, Stellenbosch University; Anne Spencer Jamison, Copenhagen Business School, and Witold Jerzy Henisz, University of Pennsylvania

To what extent does private investment help developing countries to reduce conflict and violence and to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals?

This is a hotly debated issue. Most international institutions such as the World Bank Group take the stance that the problem is not enough private investment. So they mobilise public resources to subsidise and protect private sector actors with the goal of greatly increasing foreign direct investment.

Meanwhile, community, labour and human rights advocates – particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries – tend instead to see the dominant patterns of foreign direct investment as part of a continuing history of exploitation of the developing world.

To help shed light on this debate, we undertook a comprehensive study of thousands of projects of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group. We focused on the period between 1994 and 2022.

We chose the IFC because it claims to invest with developmental purpose. It also purports to apply the highest standards of social and environmental performance. Additionally, many other private and public actors follow its lead in setting standards. If the IFC is getting it wrong it would be a good indicator of how things stand in the broader global system. We focused our study on the relationship between IFC projects and armed conflict, as violence has a clear and detrimental effect on human development.

The results establish that IFC projects cause significant increases in armed conflict around the world. A single project, on average, causes 7.6 additional armed conflict events in the year after it is introduced. These findings are consistent with other large quantitative studies that question the relationship between foreign direct investment and development. Foreign direct investment that increases violent conflict and makes development nearly impossible appears the rule, not the exception.

We conclude that current approaches to foreign investment need urgent reconsideration, with particular focus on the risk of violent conflict.

Our methodology

Many factors influence violent conflict, including the history of intergroup and state-society relations. So the study used sophisticated econometric analyses to isolate the IFC’s impact.

We first geolocated IFC projects and noted the years in which they were approved. Then we tested whether armed conflict rose in the area proximate to the IFC project in the following year. We controlled for other factors – such as the presence of politically excluded groups, GDP, the regime type, or the population size – that affect conflict.

In the analysis, we were careful to match and compare an IFC project area with those areas without IFC projects to which it is most similar. Finally, we considered and controlled for the possibility that conflict was already rising before the IFC project arrived. By excluding these other explanations for conflict events, we were able to make reasonable causal attributions.

Disturbingly, the study found that increases in armed conflict were concentrated in projects that the IFC told local and international stakeholders had potential limited adverse environmental or social risks. It claimed that these could be readily addressed through mitigation measures. These mitigation measures appear to be either ineffective or under-employed. Alternatively, the IFC is mis-classifying projects that carry more substantial conflict risk than it recognises or cares to make public.

One particularly disturbing example is the Ugandan government’s campaign of terror against local citizens to turn land over to an IFC client. The IFC also has yet to resolve activists’ complaints from 2019 of gender-based violence and threats of reprisals and intimidation against one of its project partners, Salala Rubber Corporation in Liberia.

The study also demonstrated that capital-intensive projects (that is, agribusiness, oil, gas, mining and infrastructure) have a larger propensity for socio-political and socio-economic disruption. Areas that receive capital-intensive projects experience, on average, an additional death from armed conflict in the following year.

Not above the rule of law

These results should perhaps not be surprising. Civil society groups have long concluded that the IFC prioritises its own profits and business interests over the “suffering of others” in ways that contribute to “multiple paths of extraction, dispossession, and conflict”. In 2020 Human Rights Watch characterised the IFC as “failing at remedies for project abuses”. This was based on the World Bank Group’s own commissioned review.

Yet, the IFC’s strategy has been to position itself above the rule of law. It continues to assert sovereign immunity. It claims that, as an international organisation, it should not be liable in national courts – even to parties it admittedly harms.

It maintains this stance despite recent reports of IFC complicity in covering up the sexual abuse of children to further its investment projects.

It appears beyond time for the 186 member governments that own the IFC to demand transparency, accountability and redress for harms done from the corporation and the private sector actors it funds. Others can also play a role. Governments that have perhaps naively relied on the World Bank halo should question the benefits they are told they can expect from IFC investments. The ratings agencies that classify IFC bonds as positive from an environmental, social, and governance perspective may want to question the bases on which such determinations are made.

At the same time, perhaps more credence can be given to recent calls by the UN secretary general to reform the global financial system to better support human security and human development.

This could include specialised intermediaries between the IFC and sensitive projects in difficult places. Independent and empowered local oversight appears necessary to ensure more inclusive and accountable forms of contextual analysis and risk mitigation planning, monitoring and evaluation of development impact, proactive conflict management, and accessible redress for harms done. This could reduce violent conflict and open more developmental potential for private investment in the developing world.

Brian Ganson, Professor and Head, Centre on Conflict & Collaboration, Stellenbosch University; Anne Spencer Jamison, Assistant Professor of International Economics, Government, and Business, Copenhagen Business School, and Witold Jerzy Henisz, Vice Dean and Faculty Director, ESG Inititative; Deloitte & Touche Professor of Management, University of Pennsylvania

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Taiwan Working With The World Toward A Net-Zero Future

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By Shieu Fuh-sheng, Minister of Environment, R.O.C. (Taiwan)

Climate change is impacting the world at an unprecedented rate. The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continues to rise and global average temperatures have reached record highs. But it is not too late. If we act now, we can still achieve a livable and sustainable future. Taiwan is working together with the international community toward the common goal of net-zero emissions. It is looking for opportunities to contribute its strengths in green and other technologies. With the world facing the threat of climate change and the challenge of supply chain restructuring, Taiwan is a reliable, secure, and trustworthy partner.

This February, President Tsai Ing-wen announced the enactment of the Climate Change Response Act, codifying the 2050 net-zero emissions goal into law. By elevating the net-zero target from a policy declaration to a legal requirement, Taiwan has demonstrated its determination to cut emissions. The government is setting up a carbon pricing mechanism and introducing financial incentives to guide businesses toward sustainable, low-carbon development. In 2022, Taiwan published its Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions in 2050 and announced 12 key strategies for net-zero transition. Based on the twin governance foundations of technology research and development and climate legislation, Taiwan is stepping up energy, industrial, lifestyle, and social transition. The first phase (2023 to 2026) of the net-zero science and technology programwill focus on five main development areas—sustainable and future-oriented energy sources, low-carbon and carbon reduction, negative carbon emissions, the circular economy, and humanities and social sciences. The program will promote net-zero technology research, development, and applications.

Taiwan has achieved outstanding results in energy transition. For the past 10 years, energy intensity has improved by an annual average of 2.9 percent. According to a 2022 report published by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Taiwan’s energy efficiency has risen to eighth in the world, second only to Japan in Asia. Over the last five years, Taiwan’s installed capacity of renewable energy has grown by an average of 21.9 percent each year. The global average is 9.1 percent. Taiwan has outperformed its Asian neighbors including the Republic of Korea, China, and Japan. In 2023, the combined capacity of wind and solar power installations in Taiwan reached around 13.9 gigawatts, a sevenfold increase from 2016. A total of 264 offshore wind turbines have been installed nationwide. Renewable energy is expected to generate 10 percent of all Taiwan’s electricity this year. To ensure a stable power supply and reduce air pollution and carbon emissions, the government will continue to maximize the development of green power and future-oriented energy and further improve energy efficiency. Through these efforts, together with complementary measures such as developing diversified energy storage and strengthening power grid resilience, Taiwan is steadily achieving energy transition.

As more countries commit to net-zero emissions, Taiwan has made structural reforms to consolidate its environmental authorities and strengthen administrative capacity. This August, the Environmental Protection Administration was restructured and upgraded to the Ministry of Environment (MOE). Its newly established Climate Change Administration coordinates efforts to respond to climate change and reduce greenhouse gases. The results of scientific research on climate change and the implementation of adaptation actions have been published in the Adaptation Communication report. Taiwan also set up an interdisciplinary team to compile the Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan. The initiative promotes nature-based solutions and empowers vulnerable groups. These efforts aim to boost Taiwan’s overall capacity to respond to climate change, protect public safety, and promote national sustainable development.

Over 70 percent of Taiwan’s resources are imported. But in 2022, the municipal waste recycling rate reached 59.5 percent and the industrial waste reuse rate rose to 86.5 percent. Through the newly established Resource Circulation Administration under the MOE, the previous focus on controlling pollution has shifted to developing overall resource circulation, improving the efficiency of environmental governance, developing a circular economy, and introducing the concept of zero-waste. Building on existing solid foundations, Taiwan has formulated three circulation strategies—using green designs for waste reduction at the source, recycling and reusing resources, and balancing and managing waste treatment capacity. A well-functioning circular network will be created in coordination with upstream, midstream, and downstream industries. Taiwan is also developing innovative technologies and systems to support resource circulation and accelerate progress toward the vision of zero-waste and net-zero emissions.

Taiwan is an export-oriented economy. Its business operations are heavily influenced by international conditions and regulations. With the global trends toward carbon border adjustment mechanisms and green supply chain requirements, the government has established an interministerial coordination mechanism to help companies understand and reduce the carbon content of their products and promote a carbon pricing system. Taiwan’s Green Finance Action Plan supports the low-carbon transition of industry by steering capital investment to green or sustainable businesses; improving the environmental, social, and corporate governance of Taiwanese companies; and strengthening their sustainable development. The Taiwan Carbon Solution Exchange (TCX), established this August, creates incentives for enterprises to reduce carbon emissions through market trading and exchanges. The TCX also promotes low-carbon technology research and development, strengthens carbon market talent cultivation, and drives the virtuous cycle of the green economy.

As a force for good in the world, Taiwan continues to pragmatically seek opportunities to contribute to the international community, despite encountering multiple obstacles. Leveraging its advantages and strengths in green technology development, Taiwan can apply its expertise to programs in fields such as disaster relief, disaster prevention, the environment, medicine, public health, and green energy. We look forward to the Taiwanese people gaining equal access to the work of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. We hope that Taiwan will be able to join international cooperation mechanisms to address climate change, participate in negotiations related to the Paris Agreement, and take collective action with the international community to jointly overcome the climate crisis. Taiwan is an important part of the solution and a reliable, secure, and trustworthy partner as the world confronts the mounting threat of climate change and adjusts to the restructuring of supply chains.