I cautioned: “If a new tribal state infringing on Somaliland sovereignty is created with the support of Somalia, this will be a point of no return for Somaliland and Somalia talks.”
This week, those very warnings became reality.
Somalia’s Prime Minister’s recent visit to Las Anod marked a blatant violation of Somaliland’s territorial integrity—a move Somaliland’s government rightly deemed as both provocative and a departure from the path of efforts towards stability. Las Anod has long been a contested area between SSC and Somaliland, and this latest escalation only exacerbates the conflict.
The timing of the visit revealed a calculated strategy. While Somalia’s PM stirred tensions in Las Anod, Somalia’s Ambassador to the US, Dahir Hassan, brazenly announced on X: “Proud to announce Somalia is officially open for oil drilling. SSC Khatumo is now recognized as a Federal Member State…” He went on to pinpoint the Nugaal Valley Basin as the drilling site, underscoring a poorly coordinated yet deliberate attempt to escalate the conflict Somalia is waging on Somaliland’s territories. At the time of writing this article, clashes are unfolding in the rural areas near Erigavo, Somaliland. This fresh offensive by SSC militias further underscores the ongoing, highly volatile nature of this conflict, which continues to be actively fuelled by Somalia.
Somalia’s aggressive posturing is also a desperate smokescreen, distracting from its own dire situation. The country grapples with a looming threat from violent extremists, a reality underlined by the recent overrun of Aden Yabal military base, the largest military base outside Mogadishu. The attack forced Somalia’s Army Chief and other senior officials to flee the military camp, laying bare the fragility of Somalia’s security infrastructure.
Strategic towns such as Yaasoman and Aboorey, along with regions like the Shabelle Valley and Hiraan, are under siege— all the way to Afgooye.This raises questions about Somalia’s ability to counter Al-Shabaab’s relentless advance into the capital city Mogadishu.
At this critical juncture, concerns among Somalia’s citizens about the nation’s trajectory are growing louder. While some blame the security failures on the lack of political progress, others point to the absence of a coherent security policy as the root cause. It almost feels like a futile attempt to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Could Hassan Sheikh Mohamud be Somalia’s final president? Is the international community in Mogadishu prepared with contingency plans on how to get out as quick as possible? The global fallout could be catastrophic if images of kidnapped or murdered embassy personnel from Mogadishu begin circulating on screens worldwide.
While Somalia battles conflicts on multiple fronts, it is astonishing that it can still divert aid funding to actively provoke conflict with Somaliland. One thing is certain: the region is approaching a breaking point. This reality highlights one of the international community’s most glaring failures—its persistent refusal to recognize Somaliland’s rightful sovereignty. A nation acknowledged long before many other African states gained independence, but which continuous to be overlooked. Yet an even greater indictment lies in the international community’s neglect of Somaliland, while at the same time they are funnelling billions into Somalia, how unfortunate then, that Somalia consistently demonstrated an unparalleled ability to squander resources through corruption and cede territory to violent extremism.
Under the leadership of the Kulmiye Party and former President Bihi, Somaliland achieved remarkable strides in advancing its global recognition. The signing of the MOU with Ethiopia marked a pivotal moment, creating undeniable momentum for Somaliland’s sovereignty. In response, Somalia’s president embarked on a desperate world tour, urging nations to renew support for the ‘One Somalia’ policy—a concept akin to a black hole, consuming everything while giving nothing in return.
It is important to emphasize that Somalilanders deeply oppose Al-Shabaab and everything it represents, this is precisely why the group has never gained a foothold in Somaliland. Our traditions of fostering peace and democracy in the region stand as a testament to our values. While Somalilanders’ greatest wish is to live in harmony with Somalia, as we will always remain neighbours, let there be no doubt: Somalilanders are unwavering in their readiness to defend their land and their people.
What’s next?
The international community plays a crucial role in preventing the war Somalia is waging on Somaliland, from escalating into a broader regional crisis. If aid funding to Somalia is misused to ignite and sustain conflicts in Somaliland – a pattern for which evidence already exists. Somaliland is justified in seeking international legal counsel against any external actors found responsible for fuelling such conflicts.
Considering these concerns, I strongly urge Somaliland’s government to demand the following measures from the international community moving forward:
Aid allocated to Somalia must, under no circumstances, be utilized to wage conflicts, whether directly or indirectly, that undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.
Shortly, before the appointment of the Chiefs of the Somaliland National Army and the Police forces. The newly elected president of Abdirahman Abdullahi Irro has paid a visit and inspected the headquarters of Somaliland’s various security institutions and promised several reforms and initiatives intending to improve the Somaliland Security Apparatus’ overall quality and efficiency. To this effect, the president has established a ministerial committee, including the ministries of Defense, the Interior, the director of the national intelligence agency, and the national security advisor among others, to reform and modernize Somaliland’s national forces[1]. Fulfilling his campaign promise, President Abdirahman Irro has issued a presidential decree for increasing the salaries of the national security forces by 50% per year, making it a 250% raise during his five-year tenure at the office, the biggest salary raise of the security forces ever[2]. The president has ordered the biometric registration of all security forces personnel and their proper registration to eliminate ghost soldiers. During his visit to the National Military headquarters, the president of Somaliland promised the army under his term would establish the air forces of the national army, if succeeded, this would be the first time that the military would have an air service since their formation in 1994, although the army have to yet establish a navy force. The president in his inspection of the army headquarters mentioned the development of the first national security strategy in the country [3].
The reform and the modernization of Somaliland security forces, including the national army, are coming at a time when the country has seen a series of security challenges and witnessed, the violent conflict in Las Anod; the provisional capital city of Sool region, the inauguration of rival administration in the country, the formation of the clan militias groups like the Sool, Sanaag, Buhodle (SSB) and G36 that stems from the army’s performance in Las Anod and the perceived sense of insecurity by the communities. The 2018 formation of militia by Arre, then a general of Somaliland national army forces has underlined the problems that the national army forces are confronting. It exposed the lack of professionalism of the officer corps of the military and its involvement in politics. For decades, although the institution has only recently in 2023, seen the passing of the Somaliland National Military Act by the country’s parliament, to define the proper role of the national army and enhance the development of norms, rules, and procedures, that are expected to contribute to improving the professionalism of the military. The national army has been grappling with challenges of professionalism, organizational development, and the regularization of entry, promotion, and retirement procedures of the army services.
The particulars of these reforms and their targeted outcomes remain a fact to be seen yet. These initiatives and reform calls are steps in the right direction, but the need for their rigors and areas of priority cannot be stressed enough. This article will essentially focus on, the Somaliland National Army forces. It will particularly emphasize the aspects that the proposed reforms and expected initiatives to enhance the army forces’ efficiencies ought to highlight. Considering the foundational responsibility of this institution for state survival and the preeminent role of these responsibilities, it is incumbent on the new administration of Abdirahman Irro and the new government to put forward a comprehensive plan to reform and modernize the Somaliland army with the long-term aims of laying the ground foundation for the development of a force that fit the purpose. To avoid a haphazard reform the government should priorities the issues that are pressing and distinguish from areas that can wait later by being realistic, practical, and focusing on what is urgent.
The Areas for The National Army Reform
From their establishment on 2 February 1994, with the first two regiments that were drawn out of the civilian and clan milia disarmament and reintegration process during the late President Mohammed H. Ibrahim Egal’s administration, and the remanent of Somali military officers; in which some of them belong to Somali National Movement fighters, that fought against Siad Barre regime. Ever since their formation, the Somaliland National Army forces have played an instrumental role in solidifying Somaliland’s control of its territory particularly in the peripheries where government presence was not as effective as it was in the center. Until May 1997, with the move of the 17th regiment of the national army from Darer-Wayne military school to their new post in Oog town the Somaliland National Army forces particularly in eastern regions, their presences were confined to Buroa, the capital city of the Togdheer region and the country’s second capital. These have paved the way for consolidating Somaliland’s state authority in the rest of the country, it saw the establishment of Somaliland authority in localities like Yagoori, Waa-dhako, Sama-kaab, Adhi-cadeye, Af-madow, Fiqi fuliye, and Yube of the Togdher, Sanaag, and Sool regions, among other places. Somaliland National Army has aided the national police forces and other security apparatus when needed in upholding law and order in the country and was deployed in various clan and communal conflicts, it was mobilized to participate in securing the overall security of the elections, as the last year’s elections in Somaliland elucidates.
Organizationally, the national army has formed divisions in all of the country’s provinces. With the inception of the first division of 31st based on Hargeisa, it has expanded to the rest of the country. The army has set out two commands; the Eastern command based in Burao, and the Western command located in Borama in Awdal region. The education and training of its officers and recruits have seen expansion and growth. Despite the quality of the curriculums and the contents of its education. Assuming the helm of the training division, Major General Ismail Shaqalle, after the formation of the Somaliland National Army has inaugurated the three military training schools of the Sheikh, Darer-Wayne, and Goroyo-awl military schools[4], with the purpose of training and disciplining of the new forces. Later four more schools, including the only military college of Abdullahi Askar, which was constituted on September 14, 2013, were added, making the total of the military schools of the Somaliland National Army Forces seven[5]. The national army forces have yet to have the complete institutions of professional military education including staff and command colleges and war and defense universities[6]. The absence of such institutions hampers the force’s professionalization and limits it is education and learning.
War and violence are human features, that can be deterred by preparedness and improve the margins of success in the event of it is occurrence through a lifetime dedication to learning and experience. It is a profession like law or medicine. Light, mobile, and joint units are the direction that military organizations are heading underpinned by it is sutibility of the nature of threats they tackling. As a patient or client will not trust his case by an untrained lawyer, so should an institution be trusted with the responsibility of state’s military security policy for an institution that does not have the capability and required skills to discharge this task?
According to the seminal work of The State and the Soldier, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has remarked that the modern national military officers and their institution have the three primary responsibilities of representation, advisory, and execution. This organ, which is subordinate to the civilian statesmen that are in charge of state affairs has the functional responsibility of representing this institution on matters that relate to resource allocations, they also provide advice from their military vantage point on the matters that concern the area of the military and share the president the military options of the policy issues that the administration is contemplating and their suitability considering the capability of the army to fulfill it and lastly they execute orders once the statesmen decree it[7]. The current state of affairs of the army following it is pushback from Las Anod and their performance, which subsequently saw the formation of clan militias, the pervasive use of social media platforms by the army members; that compromise army positions and make it vulnerable for easy identifications, and other cases that predate those episodes, include the military’s former officers that involved the establishment of militia like general Aare in 2018 and the arrest and trial of colonel Doolal in which the during Muse Bihi’s administration was accused to have contact with Somalia and sentenced in two-year prison by military court in 2021, though the president have pardoned him shortly. Those issues have underscored the army’s extent of political involvement and its ill-preparedness to discharge its military responsibility. The army is an institution with the essential duty to defend the state’s existence from internal and external threats including other armies. It is an institution that is in charge of managing violence.
Somaliland National Army forces have come a long way with meager resources and institutional constraints and have a long journey to go to become forces that fit the purpose of it is duties. Taking into consideration the magnitude of the challenges that Somaliland National Army forces are confronting, this reform proposal could not have come any better time. The education of the officer corps of the army must be given a particular place. It can start by creating strong civil-military relations, developing the professionalism of the military troops and allocating the necessary resources for these matters, and subordinating of military to civilians and statesmen who are representative of the state. This organ serves the leadership of the organization and the connecting tissues that link the civilian statesmen and the ranks, and the files of the army. The investment of their educations will instill in the army an ethos of military professionalism and discipline. The new administration can focus its reforms on education that emphasizes the essential skills of military science, history, and the art of war, strategy, tactics, and operations which are the prerequisites for the development of the skills that are paramount for the military profession. Where it is possible it should include foreign languages, with particular attention being given to the ones that are widely spoken in the region.
The Somaliland National Army forces have for decades grappled with the challenges that relate to force entry, promotion, and retirement. The proposals for reforms must tackle these problems. Emphasis must be placed on the recruitment and enlisting of officers who possess the necessary skills. Currently, literacy and formal education are not requirements for entry into the services, an understandable situation considering the institution’s formation after the Somali state collapse and Somaliland’s unilateral withdrawal of Somali unity and it is reclamation of sovereignty. The situation has changed, and the army needs to adjust and reflect. Making a concerted effort to attract a pool of talented skills that can contribute to the effectiveness of the institution. The reforms should target strengthening and regularizing the promotion of officers. Since the introduction of the ranks in 2013, officer promotion has been an area that needs further development, the Abdullahi Askar military college, shortly instituted after the introduction of ranks with the mandate for evaluating the quality of the officers should be empowered, placing more emphasis on merit, service time and exams as the basis for promotion. Retirement and pension system is another dimension the reform initiatives must focus on, the Somaliland National Army Act was adopted in 2023, and its implementation will be a good start. The reforms should overhaul the army’s entry, recruitment, promotion, and retirement procedures. The introduction of the age limit of the army service is paramount for injecting new blood into the army equipped with important skills and pensioning officers who are no longer capable of serving in the army and therefore retired.
Somaliland’s military is also operating in a volatile security landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea arena. The return of great power competitions between the United States and China, in which the latter started engaging with Somaliland on security matters and eyeing to have a military installation in Somaliland’s Berbera city[8], Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan that puts on the radar of China, which draws to Somaliland into broader US and China competitions situates Somaliland in a very security complex environment. The improvement of the army’s officer corps overall education is necessary for mitigating the potential security risks that Somaliland faces. The threats of the terrorist militant groups and the persistent problems of terrorism, which in decades have proven resilient and potent are aspects that call for close cooperation with other states and constant investment in know-how and training of the armed forces to deal swiftly if needed. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group of Al–Shabab that is active in the region poses a threat to Somaliland as have been proved by their attack of 2008. The growing security role of Gulf monarchies, Türkiye, and other extra-regional powers in the Horn of Africa’s security and defense matters as far as national military security is concerned requires attention. The Türkiye’s security and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia, which promised the development, training, and equipping Somalia’s navy capability, and the growing Egyptian role in Somalia’s security and defense field and the former’s military agreement with Somalia are potential concerns for Somaliland’s security considering Somalia’s claim of Somaliland as part of it.
In conclusion, the reforms should prioritize the areas of professionalism of the military and their education, regularization of the recruitment, promotion, and retirement, and development of the necessary skills for the initiation of mitigation strategies for managing the adverse effects of the Horn of Africa security developments. The meager resource limitations and the vast areas for reform and improvement precipitate that the government must be selective in it is reform, guided by the long-term objectives of having a force that fits its mission. It is prudent that reforms should be realistic, and tailored to the force’s needs and what is possible in this conjunction. For decades, Somaliland has enjoyed close cooperation with neighboring states like Ethiopia; many leaders of the army have acquired advanced military training in command, staff, and war colleges of Ethiopia, Djibouti which units of Somaliland security have gone for training, and the new ties that Somaliland has established with Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates with the promise to contribute to the army’s capability needs to materialize and strengthened. The development of the Red Sea arena, the growing interests of many states in this area, and their involvement in the matters of the Red Sea arena call for attention. The potential negative effects this entails also make the national army reform initiatives a call at the right moment. The army and the modernization efforts need to make strives to acquire essential knowledge to develop the necessary mitigating strategies to lessen its advent effects that concern military security.
Sacad Muhumed is a researcher specializing in critical security studies, focusing on governance and security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. He holds an MA from Addis Ababa University and is pursuing a second master’s degree at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.
The government of Somaliland has officially withdrawn from all talks with Somalia, following Somalia Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s unauthorized visit to Las Anod last week. The Council of Ministers, meeting in emergency session in Hargeisa today, condemned Barre’s April 12-15 visit as “a direct violation of international law and Somaliland’s territorial integrity.“
“Somalia has clearly departed from the path of peaceful coexistence and dialogue,” the statement declared, characterizing the Prime Minister’s visit as “political intimidation and conflict incitement that directly threatens stability in the Horn of Africa.”
After regaining its independence from the brutal Siad Barre dictatorship that massacred over 200,000 of its citizens and reduced its major cities to rubble, Somaliland withdrew from its union with Somalia in May 1991 — a decision that effectively reversed an unratified merger and restored Somaliland to its original status as a sovereign nation. Prior to voluntarily joining with Italian Somalia in 1960, Somaliland had existed as the independent State of Somaliland, recognized by 35 countries including permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The subsequent three decades have seen Somaliland build a functioning democratic state while Somalia collapsed into prolonged civil war and territorial fragmentation. This fundamental reality—two distinct nations with separate colonial histories that briefly attempted an ill-fated political union—has been deliberately obscured by Somalia in its diplomatic messaging, where it persistently mischaracterizes Somaliland as a “breakaway region” rather than a sovereign state that briefly joined and then withdrew from a failed political merger.
Today’s decision to withdraw from talks marks the culmination of what many observers have long considered a diplomatic charade. After more than a decade of intermittent and ultimately fruitless negotiations, Somaliland has concluded that Somalia has been using the dialogue process not as a path to resolution but as a tactic to forestall Somaliland’s international recognition.
“Somalia has strategically exploited these talks to blunt Somaliland’s quest for international recognition,” explained a senior diplomatic source speaking on condition of anonymity. “By presenting itself to the world as engaged in dialogue, Mogadishu has effectively convinced international partners to withhold recognition of Somaliland pending an ‘internal’ Somali resolution that Somalia has no intention of ever reaching.”
The architect of the original dialogue format during the Silanyo administration, Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, has been criticized for allowing a process that effectively reduced “Somaliland’s international standing from an aspiring sovereign state to essentially a federal member of Somalia” in international perception.
Barre’s visit to Las Anod represents the most flagrant violation yet in Somalia’s campaign to undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty. During his visit, Barre met with individuals Somalia refers to as the “SSC-Khatumo Administration,” a move that directly challenges Somaliland’s territorial claims. According to an official communique from the Prime Minister’s office, Barre conducted meetings with Abdiqadir Ahmed Aw-ali (Firdhiye) and various local leaders, framing his visit as an effort to promote “peace and national unity.” Somaliland authorities view this as a calculated political maneuver designed to legitimize an entity Somalia unilaterally recognized in October 2023 following military confrontations in the region.
A particularly contentious element of Barre’s visit involves prisoners transported to Mogadishu during his stay in Las Anood. Eyewitnesses reported these individuals being dressed in Somalia flag-branded tracksuits and paraded before media cameras as they were marched onto a plane bound for Mogadishu – a choreographed display clearly designed for political propaganda rather than humanitarian concerns.
Somaliland prisoners being transferred to Mogadishu from Las Anod at the request of the Somali Prime Minister following his visit to Las Anod, Sool.
The Council of Ministers’ statement explicitly rejects Somalia’s characterization of these individuals, stating: “The prisoners that Somalia’s Prime Minister took to Mogadishu are not prisoners of war. Somaliland views this action as an attempt to cover up the political failures facing Somalia’s government.”
The statement further clarifies that “no negotiations with Somalia have taken place regarding prisoner releases.” Instead, Somaliland has been engaged in proper diplomatic channels with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several international partners including the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates regarding prisoner exchanges through internationally recognized protocols.
This unilateral action has created a significant diplomatic quandary for Mogadishu, which now finds itself in the untenable position of having to address the status of individuals effectively removed from Somaliland territory without any legal framework or international oversight.
Somalia’s provocative actions in Las Anod represent a marked escalation in its campaign against Somaliland’s sovereignty, coming in the wake of the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia. That historic agreement, which would have granted Ethiopia access to a naval base and sea access in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland, triggered an immediate and hostile response from Mogadishu.
Since the announcement of the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement, Somalia has systematically intensified its destabilization efforts across multiple fronts—diplomatic, economic, and now territorial. The prisoner transfer stunt exemplifies the increasingly theatrical nature of Somalia’s attempts to reassert authority over territory it has not effectively controlled in more than three decades.
“Somalia’s willingness to manipulate humanitarian issues for political theater demonstrates how threatened Mogadishu feels by Somaliland’s growing international engagement,” noted a regional analyst who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue.
Despite withdrawing from talks with Somalia, Somaliland’s government reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to peace in the eastern Sool region. The statement references the comprehensive peace initiative announced during President Abdirahman Irro’s inauguration on December 12, 2024, declaring: “The government of Somaliland, based on its peace plan for Eastern Sool, had previously announced a peace initiative on December 12, 2024, when the President took office.”
The Council of Ministers emphasized that “Somaliland reaffirms that peace remains its top priority, while also emphasizing that the defense of Somaliland’s nationhood is non-negotiable.” This stance reflects Somaliland’s consistent governance approach throughout its three decades of restored independence: maintaining firm boundaries regarding sovereignty while pursuing peaceful resolutions to regional conflicts through dialogue and reconciliation.
Somaliland has issued a formal appeal to global partners to “urgently respond to Somalia’s violations in Eastern Sool” and to support efforts to restore peace to the region. The statement warns that “Somalia’s planned offensive against Somaliland endangers stability in the Horn of Africa and provides opportunities for extremist groups and terrorists, posing a significant threat to peace and development across the entire region.”
Given Somalia’s persistent inability to control substantial portions of its claimed territory and its ongoing struggle to contain the Al-Shabaab insurgency, the government’s provocative actions in Las Anod appear particularly reckless, potentially creating security vacuums that could be exploited by terrorist organizations that already operate with near impunity across large swaths of Somalia proper.
The Council of Ministers concluded with a definitive statement: “Due to Somalia’s continuous violations against the Republic of Somaliland and the principles of previous dialogues between the two countries, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Somaliland has decided to withdraw from the ongoing talks with Somalia, effective today, April 16, 2025.”
For the full government statement and ongoing coverage, follow the Somaliland Chronicle.
Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s recent visit to Las Anod represents a calculated provocation against the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty rather than legitimate diplomatic or piece-building engagement. This unprecedented incursion—the first by a sitting Somali Prime Minister into territory within Somaliland’s internationally recognized colonial borders—reveals Mogadishu’s increasingly desperate strategy after failing to reclaim territory through conventional means. With Somalia’s government facing financial collapse and security deterioration, Barre’s flag-waving expedition emerges as political misdirection: “Look at our authority in Las Anod,” the performance suggests, “and perhaps you’ll forget we can’t secure our own capital.”
The Incoherence of Somalia’s “Throw Everything at the Wall” Approach
Somalia’s Las Anod gambit exposes a fundamentally contradictory approach to Somaliland that borders on political schizophrenia. For years, Somalia has maintained the fiction that Somaliland is represented in its federal institutions through hand-picked “Somaliland” parliamentarians in Mogadishu—a cornerstone of Somalia’s constitutional claim that Somaliland remains an integral federal member.
Yet dangling Federal Member State status to SSC-Khatumo fundamentally undermines this narrative. If Somaliland is already represented in Somalia’s federal structure, what exactly is Somalia offering Las Anod? Are we witnessing a government so confused about its own constitutional framework that it doesn’t realize it’s contradicting itself? Or is this a cynical ploy to maintain multiple, mutually exclusive claims depending on which audience it’s addressing?
Most telling is that these very “Somaliland” MPs in Mogadishu have now issued a statement condemning Barre’s visit—a remarkable spectacle of Somalia’s puppet representatives rejecting their puppetmaster’s actions. How does Mogadishu explain this theatrical absurdity to its international backers?
The conspicuous absence of Somalia’s own Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks from the entire Las Anod affair speaks volumes. This diplomatic position, created ostensibly to facilitate reconciliation and dialogue with Somaliland, has been completely sidelined during what Somalia characterizes internationally as a peace-building visit. Instead, Somalia deployed its Prime Minister, much of the cabinet, and an unusually large security contingent—a military-political operation that bypassed the very diplomatic channel allegedly established for Somaliland engagement.
These parallel and contradictory approaches reveal a government desperately throwing anything at the wall to see what might stick—a haphazard collection of mutually exclusive initiatives unified only by their anti-Somaliland orientation.
Political Theater on Borrowed Money
Barre’s ceremonial activities centered around inaugurating a National Identification Registration Agency office and breaking ground on infrastructure projects that Somalia lacks both the means and capacity to complete. The ceremony featuring SSC-Khatumo figurehead Cabdulqaadir Firdhiye receiving the first Somali National ID was transparently symbolic—a plastic card representing phantom citizenship from a state that struggles to provide basic security across its claimed territory.
One must wonder: Is there anything more emblematic of Somalia’s approach than distributing ID cards for a nation-state that exists more in fantasy than reality? When Somalia can’t deliver basic services to neighborhoods of Mogadishu, what value does a Somali national ID carry in Las Anod? It’s the governance equivalent of a child placing a “KEEP OUT” sign on a treehouse they neither built nor own.
The promised hospitals, vocational centers, and government complexes require resources that Somalia simply does not possess. These aren’t development initiatives but territorial markers—flags planted in contested soil without the backing of actual governance capacity. Somalia’s officials are essentially playing a real-world version of the board game Risk, placing plastic game pieces on territories without the means to defend or develop them.
The Dragon’s Footprint: China’s Role in Somalia’s Financial Crisis
Increasingly credible allegations suggest that China may have financed Barre’s provocative Las Anod visit—transforming this regional incursion into a proxy for wider geopolitical competition. China’s growing frustration with Somaliland, particularly following Somaliland’s deepening ties with Taiwan, has reportedly escalated to direct threats against Hargeisa.
The context becomes clearer in light of recent developments reported by The New York Times, which detailed Somaliland’s strategic alignment with the United States and Taiwan, particularly through its offer to host a U.S. military base in Berbera. This strategic port represents exactly the kind of regional influence China seeks to counter, especially given its own military base in neighboring Djibouti.
Somalia’s desperate financial reality makes it particularly susceptible to such foreign influence operations. Official data from ForeignAssistance.gov reveals U.S. aid to Somalia plummeting from $850 million in 2024 to a mere $180 million in 2025—a financial cliff that leaves Somalia’s institutions teetering on the edge of collapse. This dramatic reduction in American support has created a vacuum that actors like China appear eager to exploit.
The FMS Carrot: Empty Promises to SSC-Khatumo
What Somalia offers SSC-Khatumo isn’t development but the mirage of recognition as a Federal Member State—a status deliberately kept just out of reach. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has mastered this political balancing act, providing enough encouragement to keep SSC-Khatumo aligned against Somaliland without committing to formal recognition that would require actual resource allocation.
The invitation to Firdhiye to participate in the National Consultation Forum exemplifies this strategy—visibility without substantive authority. This isn’t state-building; it’s conflict outsourcing. For the price of ceremonial recognition and vague promises, Somalia gains a proxy force engaged in undermining Somaliland’s territorial integrity without committing its own limited military resources.
How long will SSC-Khatumo leaders allow themselves to be used as pawns in Somalia’s territorial chess game? At what point do they recognize that the promised FMS status is like a carrot dangled before a donkey—always visible, never attainable, but effective at keeping the animal moving in the desired direction?
The Fragile Alliance: Las Anod’s Reaction to Mogadishu’s Doublespeak
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s attempt to characterize Barre’s Las Anod visit as a reconciliation effort has backfired, exposing the fragility of Somalia’s alliance with SSC-Khatumo factions. A prominent Garaad in Las Anod publicly condemned Mohamoud’s characterization as a betrayal of the Prime Minister’s actual mission, creating the unusual spectacle of Somalia’s proxy allies openly challenging Somalia’s own diplomatic narrative.
This rupture reveals Somalia’s contradictory messaging: one narrative for international consumption (reconciliation) and another for proxy allies (territorial reclamation). When these messages collide, the result is an alliance fracture exposing the fundamental incoherence of Somalia’s strategy.
Misplaced Priorities: Focusing on Las Anod While Al-Shabaab Encircles Mogadishu
The most revealing aspect of Barre’s visit is Somalia’s strategic priorities. While Al-Shabaab demonstrates operational capacity within striking distance of Mogadishu itself, Somalia’s leadership expends precious political capital on symbolic gestures in a city far from the existential threats facing the state.
This reveals a government more concerned with performative sovereignty than practical security. The National Consultation Forum further illustrates this selective approach: Firdhiye receives an invitation while the President of Jubaland is excluded and Puntland contests the process. This isn’t comprehensive national reconciliation but the cultivation of allies useful for specific territorial aims.
Shouldn’t a government facing terrorist control of significant portions of its claimed territory focus on securing those areas first? What does it say about Somalia’s governance priorities that it would rather plant flags in contested border regions than secure its own capital’s perimeter? One must ask: Is this a serious national government or a theatrical troupe performing sovereignty while actual governance remains beyond its grasp?
Somaliland’s Institutional Response: Strong Words, But Is It Enough?
Somaliland’s response came swiftly and decisively. On April 11, 2025, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement characterizing the planned visit as a “blatant violation of Somaliland’s sovereignty” and “a serious threat to regional peace and stability.” The following day, Somaliland’s House of Representatives convened an extraordinary session that produced a unanimous resolution suspending all dialogue with Somalia.
The Parliament’s resolution methodically invoked Somaliland’s historical timeline—from its independence from Great Britain on June 26, 1960, through its voluntary union with Somalia in July 1960, to its reclamation of independence on May 18, 1991—reinforcing the legal basis for its sovereignty claims.
But is this enough? How many times will Somaliland issue strongly worded statements and temporarily suspend dialogue only to return to the negotiating table months later? At what point does Somaliland recognize that Somalia’s actions constitute a pattern of deliberate provocation rather than isolated incidents? When will Somaliland’s leadership abandon its perpetual hope that Somalia can be dealt with as a “brotherly” nation and acknowledge the existential threat Somalia’s territorial ambitions represent?
Somalia’s Phantom Gifts: The Diplomatic Squatter in Berbera
Somalia’s territorial overreach reached new heights when President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud offered the United States military access to Berbera’s strategic port and airport—facilities that Somalia has not controlled since 1991. This bizarre spectacle of a diplomatic squatter offering foreign powers access to another country’s infrastructure reveals Mogadishu’s increasingly desperate calculations.
The sheer audacity of this move deserves appreciation for its comedic value if nothing else—it’s the geopolitical equivalent of your neighbor inviting guests to tour your living room. “Please, come in! Don’t mind that we haven’t lived here for three decades. The furniture isn’t ours, we don’t have keys to the front door, and the actual residents might object, but please consider yourself invited!”
It demonstrates Somalia’s recognition that Berbera’s facilities represent strategic assets of genuine international interest—assets beyond their reach. It also suggests a calculated gambit to create a false narrative wherein any U.S. engagement with Somaliland could be framed as occurring with Somalia’s “permission”—the same tactic Somalia played when it failed to stop DP World from developing Berbera port years ago.
Security analysts describe this as classic “sovereignty theater”—making grand claims over territories to establish paper rights that can later be leveraged in international forums. It’s governance by assertion: if you claim something loudly enough and often enough, perhaps someone will eventually believe you.
Diplomatic Doublespeak at Antalya
President Mohamoud’s characterization of Barre’s Las Anod visit at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum further demonstrates Somalia’s commitment to parallel realities. Speaking before an international audience, Mohamoud described the visit as “aimed at fostering unity and understanding” and promoting “reconciliation”—a description bearing no resemblance to the actual events.
While Mohamoud called for “continued engagement with Somaliland leaders to resolve differences through constructive dialogue,” Barre’s activities directly undermined any foundation for such dialogue. The cognitive dissonance is striking: one cannot simultaneously respect a dialogue partner while actively challenging their fundamental sovereignty.
This is diplomacy as practiced by Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” In Somalia’s diplomatic dictionary, “reconciliation” apparently means unilateral territorial incursions, and “dialogue” means talking while simultaneously undermining your counterpart’s very existence.
Strategic Analysis: A Regime Running Out of Options
Barre’s Las Anod visit represents a significant escalation in Somalia’s approach to undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somalia’s increasingly desperate maneuvers—from phantom infrastructure promises to offering facilities it doesn’t control—reflect a weakening position rather than growing strength.
The critical strategic question now facing Somaliland isn’t whether Somalia will follow through on its Las Anod promises—both history and fiscal reality answer that question definitively. The real question is whether Somaliland’s leadership will respond by doubling down on failed dialogue or pursuing a more assertive strategy for international recognition based on its three-decade record of stability, democratic governance, and territorial control.
Will Somaliland finally recognize that Somalia’s actions reveal not a partner in dialogue but an existential threat to Somaliland’s very existence? How many more provocations will it take before Somaliland abandons its naive hope for brotherly reconciliation and pursues a more realistic approach to securing its sovereignty?
Time to Abandon the Somalia Fiction Before Mogadishu Becomes Kabul 2.0
Somalia’s Las Anod gambit ultimately reveals more about Mogadishu’s weaknesses than its strengths. Like the kicks of a dying horse, these desperate territorial assertions may be dangerous in the short term but signal a regime running out of both options and time.
The international community can no longer afford the luxury of diplomatic fiction. The pretense that Somalia and Somaliland are equal parties in a potential reunification dialogue has moved beyond wishful thinking into the realm of dangerous delusion. Thirty-three years of separate development have produced two fundamentally different entities: one a functioning democracy with established institutions and territorial control, the other a fragile state dependent on foreign forces for basic security functions.
What happens when—not if—Mogadishu follows Kabul’s trajectory? When Al-Shabaab eventually overwhelms Somalia’s paper-thin security apparatus, will the international community once again evacuate their embassies in panic only to relocate to Hargeisa while bizarrely maintaining they still represent “Somalia”? Will diplomats flee to the safety of Somaliland’s streets while continuing to deny its existence? The absurdity of such a scenario seems lost on international policymakers who continue treating the stable, functioning democracy as equivalent to its collapsing neighbor.
Western powers must make a choice: continue propping up the sovereignty theater in Mogadishu while ignoring the democratic reality in Hargeisa, or embrace a pragmatic approach that rewards stability, democratic governance, and regional security cooperation. The current approach—financing Somalia’s territorial ambitions while ignoring Somaliland’s democratic achievements—has produced neither peace nor development.
It’s time for a new paradigm that acknowledges realities on the ground rather than colonial-era borders on maps. Somaliland’s case for recognition stands on its own merits—three decades of peace, democratic transitions, and institutional development in a region where such achievements remain rare. The international community must ask itself: If not Somaliland, then who? If not now, then when?
The Las Anod provocation should serve as a wake-up call. Somalia’s territorial claims have evolved from diplomatic irritants into active threats to regional stability. The fiction of dialogue between fundamentally unequal parties has been exposed as the empty performance it always was. The time has come for the international community to abandon diplomatic pretense and embrace diplomatic reality—recognizing Somaliland as the independent state it has been since 1991, before they’re forced to acknowledge it from the safety of its territory while fleeing a Mogadishu in flames.
The Republic of Somaliland, a sovereign and democratic state that gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, remains unrecognised by the international community. Yet despite its diplomatic limbo—stemming from a void and unratified union with Somalia—Somaliland continues to attract serious interest from global players. Every 2 years or so, international observers monitor its elections to ensure fairness—something Somalia has failed to achieve in decades. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has invested over $442 million in redeveloping the Port of Berbera, transforming it into a rising trade hub. Other countries—including Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Ethiopia—have established varying levels of engagement with Hargeisa.
In stark contrast, the United States has remained largely absent, despite rising geopolitical stakes in the Horn of Africa. With the return of the Trump administration, there is an opportunity to move beyond the failed “single Somalia” policy long championed by figures such as Hillary Clinton and Ilhan Omar.
According to insider reports, the Biden administration even blocked a proposed military cooperation agreement between Somaliland and Taiwan. Such a position has not only undermined stability in the Horn but also side-lined Somaliland’s democratic credentials and geostrategic value.
The Case for Naval Access: Why Somaliland Matters Now
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are fast becoming chokepoints of chaos. Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have surged, causing maritime insurance premiums and freight costs to skyrocket—some by over 300%. Vessels are now rerouting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to delivery times and billions in extra fuel and logistics costs. In early 2024, the Suez Canal saw a 50% drop in trade volume, threatening global supply chains and economic recovery.
Djibouti is already overstretched—hosting seven foreign military bases, including those of the United States, China, and France. Meanwhile, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline offers the next logical site for a network of naval logistics and surveillance bases. Unlike Somalia, which remains plagued by insecurity, Somaliland offers stability, democratic governance, and a deep-water port with room to expand.
For nations whose trade depends on secure Red Sea shipping routes, the need for viable alternatives is no longer theoretical—it’s urgent. The goal isn’t necessarily to wage war against the Houthis, but to fill the growing power vacuum in these waters—one that is consistently exploited by non-state actors such as the Houthis, Somalia piracy, and terrorist organisations.
Hypocrisy at Sea: Double Standards in Media
While Djibouti’s foreign naval presence is praised as prudent statecraft, Somaliland’s similar aspirations are met with condescension and bias. In January 2024, Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would grant Ethiopia naval access via Berbera—a move some media labelled “coercive” or “neo-colonial.”
This is hypocrisy at best.
Berbera has long held geostrategic value, coveted by global powers for its proximity to key shipping routes. It is no more “coercive” than Djibouti leasing land to China or France. No one calls for China’s expulsion from Djibouti on the basis of its ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Uyghurs, for example. The criticism is not rooted in principle—it’s rooted in politics.
A Global Line-Up: Who Will Step Up?
Somaliland is not short on potential partners. With global shipping routes under threat and maritime logistics capacity in high demand, Hargeisa is uniquely positioned to host new regional and international partnerships. Key candidates include:
Taiwan: With one of the world’s top 15 navies and over 40 warships, Taiwan could share training, weapons systems, and maritime intelligence in exchange for a strategic foothold on the Red Sea. Taiwan, already a diplomatic leader with Somaliland, is best placed to act first. Taiwan’s military presence in Somaliland should be seen as diplomatic security partnership, not a full-scale military base like China’s base in Djibouti. It strengthens Somaliland’s partnership, fosters regional ties, and aligns with Taiwan’s broader strategic interests without shifting focus from its primary defence at home. With such a balanced security architecture, Taiwan will not divert resources or focus from defending its territories across the Taiwan Strait.
Ethiopia: Landlocked and home to over 120 million people, Ethiopia has already signed an MoU for port access—a vital step for its trade and military mobility. A robust African partner in the Gulf enhances regional balance and strengthens defence ties.
Indonesia: With a navy of over 200 vessels and 10% of its trade affected by Red Sea disruptions, Jakarta offers a moderate Muslim partner eager to balance power in the Indo-Pacific.
United States: Although late to the game, Washington still has a chance to counter rising BRICS influence by supporting a democratic, strategically located partner. Recognising Somaliland could reset its credibility in the Horn.
Australia: With over $80 billion in trade passing through the Suez and Red Sea, and a recent quiet exit from Operation Prosperity Guardian, Canberra has a golden opportunity to reassert its regional leadership by backing Somaliland.
India: After conducting over 100 anti-piracy missions since 2008, New Delhi would benefit immensely from a logistics base in eastern Somaliland—strengthening its western maritime arc.
United Kingdom: Spending $100 million annually on base operations in Qatar, Britain could cut costs and gain better strategic reach by shifting to Berbera. The 1990s are over—there’s no war in Iraq or Afghanistan to justify outdated posturing.
Greece: With 40% of its trade moving through the Red Sea and a top-20 navy, Athens could fill the void left by Turkey’s Somalia-focused policy and bolster its role in maritime security.
South Korea: With $200 billion in trade with Europe and expanding commercial interests across Africa, Seoul would find both strategic and economic sense in a Somaliland partnership.
The Red Sea Can’t Wait
As shipping lanes turn into battlegrounds and global supply chains unravel, Somaliland offers something rare in the region: predictability. With stable governance, peaceful elections, and geographic centrality, it is more than just a strategic opportunity—it’s a ready-made solution.
The real question is: who will act first?
For Taiwan and other like-minded nations, the time to engage isn’t some future date—it’s now. There’s no need to wait for the United States to lead or for Trump to officially recognise Somaliland. The opportunity already exists—because Trump, unlike Biden, is unlikely to block Somaliland’s rise.
In a world fractured by war, tariffs, and protectionist politics—from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific—the safeguarding of international maritime routes could be the issue that unites instead of divides. Here lies Somaliland: a rare chance to rebuild trust, foster cooperation, and address a shared global challenge head-on.
About the Author:
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Somalia’s President offered US “exclusive control” over Berbera port and airbase, assets firmly under Somaliland’s control since 1991.
Somaliland’s President responded: “No one has authority to broker Somaliland’s territory, and Hassan Sheikh cannot even govern Mogadishu.”
The offered facilities are partially operated by UAE’s DP World, which has invested $442 million in Berbera Port.
Somaliland officials called the offer “patently ridiculous” and “a badly done SNL sketch.”
Somalia receives approximately $1 billion yearly in US aid while being unable to deliver on its promises.
AFRICOM is already in direct talks with Somaliland about Berbera’s strategic facilities, completely bypassing Mogadishu.
This diplomatic overreach may accelerate US recognition of Somaliland’s de facto independence.
In a move that would make even the boldest con artists blush, Somalia has just attempted what might be the most audacious diplomatic swindle of the century – trying to gift America control over territories it hasn’t governed since George H.W. Bush was president.
In what might be the most brazen diplomatic fraud in recent memory, Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has penned a letter to President Donald Trump offering “exclusive control” of strategic ports and airbases that Somalia hasn’t controlled since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.
Somaliland’s President Responds
The President of the Republic of Somaliland Dr. Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro” has issued a direct and unequivocal response to this diplomatic fraud:
“No one has the authority to broker Somaliland’s territory, and Hassan Sheikh [Somalia’s President] does not even rule or control Mogadishu.”
This powerful statement from Somaliland’s highest office underscores the absolute rejection of Somalia’s presumption to offer territory it neither controls nor has any right to negotiate over, while pointedly highlighting Somalia’s failure to effectively control even its own capital.
The Deception: Promising Trump What Somalia Can’t Deliver
Reuters and Semafor have now confirmed the existence of this extraordinary March 16 letter, in which Somalia attempts to mislead the United States with “exclusive operational control” over Berbera port and airbase in Somaliland, and Bosaso port in Puntland – facilities where Somalia’s writ hasn’t run for over three decades.
The sheer audacity of this maneuver can’t be overstated: Somalia is offering President Trump exclusive control of facilities it doesn’t control, can’t access, and that are already partially operated by one of Trump’s strongest Middle Eastern allies, the UAE, through its DP World port operator.
A Brief History: Somaliland’s Independence
To understand the true absurdity of Somalia’s offer, one must remember that Somaliland reclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of dictator Siad Barre’s regime. Since then, Somaliland has built a functioning democracy with its own currency, military, government institutions, and regular democratic elections. Meanwhile, Somalia has struggled to control even its own capital city without foreign peacekeepers.
No Somali official has set foot in Somaliland. Somalia has no administrative presence, security forces, or operational capability in the territory it now casually offers to the United States.
Somaliland Exposes the Charade
From the highest office to key ministries, Somaliland’s government has responded with a unified voice exposing Somalia’s deceptive ploy. After the President’s blunt assessment of Somalia’s inability to govern even Mogadishu, let alone broker Somaliland territory, other government officials have added their equally forceful rejections.
Somaliland’s US Representative Bashir Goth thoroughly dismantled Somalia’s fraudulent offer:
“The Republic of Somaliland strongly rejects Somalia’s impertinent offer of access and control of the Port of Berbera to the United States,” Goth declared before stating plainly that, “The Port of Berbera is unequivocally within the sovereign territory of the Republic of Somaliland.”
Goth revealed that Somaliland “has welcomed several AFRICOM delegations to assess how the U.S. can best utilize the Port of Berbera” and that the 2023 NDAA requires “U.S. secretaries of State and Defense are obligated to regularly update Congress on efforts to deepen defense, diplomatic, and development ties with Somaliland.”
Most devastatingly, Goth characterized Somalia’s attempted deception as an action that “would barely pass as a badly done SNL sketch and is patently ridiculous,” adding that President Trump “is wise enough to see through such a charade, which insults both him and the people of the U.S.”
Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Aden was equally direct when speaking to Reuters:
“The USA is not stupid. They know who they need to deal with when it comes to Berbera port.”
Expert Analysis: A Desperate Ploy
“Who are they to offer that access?” said Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They are offering this as a way of getting the US to recognize the legitimacy of the Somali state over these breakaway regions.”
Editor’s Note: While Hudson’s quote refers to “breakaway regions” plural, it’s important to clarify that Puntland and Somaliland have significantly different statuses. Puntland is a federal member state of Somalia that, despite periodic disagreements with Mogadishu, remains part of Somalia’s federal structure. Somaliland, on the other hand, withdrew from its union with Somalia, and fully restored its independence in 1991 and has held widely-acclaimed democratic elections for over three decades.
Former US Special Envoy Dr. Peter Pham exposed Somalia’s desperation: “It’s not enough that his PM & FM insult @POTUS & Mog is a $1 billion yearly drain on #USA taxpayers, but rump #Somalia’s @HassanSMohamud thinks Americans are so dumb that he can offer us key #Somaliland & #Puntland ports that he doesn’t even control!”
With President Trump’s “America First” doctrine threatening to shut off the financial spigot that has kept Somalia’s government afloat, Mogadishu is frantically trying to pull off yet another deception by promising military access it has absolutely no means to deliver.
The UAE Factor: Trying to Swindle Trump Out of His Ally’s Investment
Perhaps the most reckless aspect of Somalia’s scheme is that it casually offers control of facilities already operated by DP World – the flagship port operator owned by the United Arab Emirates, one of President Trump’s most valued international partners.
Does Mogadishu seriously believe it can trick America into disrupting a major UAE commercial operation? Does Somalia’s President think he can simply brush aside multi-million-dollar development agreements between Somaliland, Puntland, and the UAE?
Berbera Port, far from being some derelict backwater, has undergone a $442 million transformation under DP World’s stewardship. This includes a deep-sea terminal, a 17-meter draft, a 400-meter quay, and state-of-the-art gantry cranes. Expansion plans will push its capacity to 2 million TEUs annually. And yet, in some backroom fantasy, Mogadishu imagines it can override UAE-backed contracts with an empty letter to Washington.
The Facade Crumbles Under Basic Scrutiny
The fundamental question that exposes this entire diplomatic charade remains breathtakingly simple: How exactly does Somalia plan to deliver on this offer when it controls absolutely nothing in Berbera?
Somalia cannot secure its own capital without foreign forces, yet somehow believes it can deceive the Trump administration into thinking it can deliver operational control of territory where its officials would be arrested if they attempted to enter without Somaliland’s permission.
While Hassan Sheikh Mohamud daydreams about leasing out ports he has never seen, Al-Shabaab continues its stranglehold over key supply routes around Mogadishu. The terror group’s recent attacks on Beledweyne and the outskirts of the capital underscore just how little control the Somali government actually wields. It’s no surprise that Somalia’s leaders would rather fabricate foreign policy victories than deal with the grim reality that Mogadishu itself is on borrowed time.
The Bottom Line
Somalia’s letter represents not diplomacy but a desperate deception – a transparent attempt to maintain the flow of American taxpayer dollars as the Trump administration reassesses foreign aid that produces little return on investment.
Somalia’s Washington lobbyists – paid millions to orchestrate this scheme – undoubtedly promised that this fraudulent letter would not only reach the Oval Office but generate favorable press coverage painting Somalia as a crucial strategic partner.
What they couldn’t promise was that anyone – from President Trump to the UAE to AFRICOM – would fall for the obvious ploy that Somalia can offer exclusive control of ports it doesn’t own, can’t access, and where it has exercised zero authority for over 30 years.
As Goth suggested, President Trump is wise enough to recognize a deception when he sees one – especially when the scheme involves one of America’s strongest Middle Eastern allies and territory Somalia cannot possibly deliver.
What’s Next: The Diplomatic Fallout
This diplomatic fiasco may actually accelerate American recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty. With the letter exposing Somalia’s tenuous claims to territory it clearly doesn’t control, and AFRICOM already engaged in direct discussions with Somaliland officials, Trump’s administration has even more reason to reassess America’s one-Somalia policy.
For AFRICOM and the Pentagon, which prioritize strategic access and reliable partners over diplomatic fictions, Somalia’s overreach makes a stronger case for direct engagement with Hargeisa than any Somaliland diplomat could have made.
As President Trump reviews this diplomatic charade, the most likely outcome isn’t increased American engagement with Somalia – but rather, accelerated recognition of the reality on the ground: that Somaliland, not Somalia, controls Berbera, and any serious strategic partnership must be negotiated with Hargeisa, not Mogadishu.
Somaliland’s biometric registration of security personnel aims to eliminate payroll fraud but raises security concerns
Kenya-based company Innovii, which has operations in Somalia, reportedly secured the implementation contract
Multiple sources indicate personal connections between Innovii executives and Minister Khadar Hussein Loge
No competitive bidding process was conducted despite the system’s national security implications
National Electoral Commission’s equipment and personnel are being used, but their implementation expertise is being sidelined
Recent security lapses raise questions about Somaliland’s capacity to protect sensitive military personnel data
Somaliland stands at the threshold of a military transformation that could redefine its security capabilities for decades to come. President Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro”‘s ambitious biometric registration initiative represents the most significant modernization of defense infrastructure in years—a digital evolution that promises to create a more efficient, transparent, and data-driven security apparatus. By eliminating ghost soldiers, optimizing resource allocation, and enabling evidence-based strategic planning, the system holds the potential to make Somaliland’s security forces a model of 21st-century military management in the region. Yet as this transformation unfolds, evidence suggests a rushed implementation approach may inadvertently introduce new vulnerabilities to the very institution it aims to strengthen. The balance between modernization benefits and security considerations will determine whether this initiative ultimately enhances or compromises national security.
Beyond Compensation: The Context and Legitimate Goals
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi commenced his tenure with a bold fiscal initiative, authorizing an immediate 50% increase in security personnel compensation effective January 22nd. This substantial enhancement—the first installment of a promised 250% increase over his administration—addresses longstanding grievances within Somaliland’s security establishment and signals a commitment to military welfare previously absent from governance priorities.
Accompanying these salary reforms is the introduction of the IRIS Biometric Registration System, designed to modernize personnel management and eliminate payroll fraud. The registration process officially launched in March 2025, with Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge speaking at the ceremony. According to Horn Diplomat’s reporting, the initiative has been characterized as a “historic modernization” of Somaliland’s security forces.
The administration’s initiative addresses a recognized problem: ‘ghost soldiers’—non-existent personnel whose salaries are misappropriated, typically by high-ranking officers. These fictitious payroll entries not only drain millions from military resources but create misleading assessments of actual force strength and readiness.
While Somaliland Chronicle has not independently verified the scale of this practice, multiple sources within the security sector characterize the problem as ‘substantial.’ A senior defense ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, estimated that addressing this issue could recover ‘millions of dollars annually’ for legitimate operations. “This has been a systemic problem for years,” the official stated. “Accurate personnel records are fundamental to both fiscal responsibility and operational readiness.”
The initiative will likely face resistance from entrenched interests who have benefited from the current system’s lack of transparency. “Any reform that threatens established financial channels will encounter pushback,” noted a former military finance officer. “The administration deserves credit for tackling this issue despite the political risks involved.”
Official Statements vs. Implementation Reality
While the goals of the biometric registration initiative are commendable, an examination of its implementation raises several concerns that merit careful scrutiny.
Somaliland Chronicle has learned that Innovii (also operating as Vivacom), a Kenya-based telecom and digital solutions provider, has reportedly been selected to implement the biometric registration system. The company, headed by Mohamed Barre as Director and co-founder, has limited documented experience with military-grade security systems. Their primary expertise lies in healthcare platforms and telecom solutions, raising questions about their qualifications for handling sensitive security data.
At the March 2025 launch event, Minister Khadar Hussein Loge explicitly stated that “No outsiders are involved in this process,” adding that technical committees consisting of multiple government agencies and military personnel are overseeing the implementation. However, the Minister did not specify which entities are handling which aspects of the system, and notably did not address reports about Innovii’s role or the concerns raised about the company’s Somalia connections.
Sources close to the process indicate that Innovii may have secured this critical security infrastructure project without an open, competitive bidding process. This approach stands in contrast to international best practices for critical security systems, which typically involve rigorous vendor evaluation and competitive selection.
Multiple sources with direct knowledge of the registration initiative have revealed to Somaliland Chronicle that Innovii’s CEO and several senior executives maintain longstanding personal and professional relationships with Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge—a prominent member of the committee overseeing the security personnel registration. With no public procurement process to require disclosure of such connections, these relationships have remained largely unscrutinized.
The Somalia Connection: Documented Business Ties
Further investigation reveals that Innovii maintains an extensive operational footprint in Somalia. The company has successfully implemented “Baano,” a healthcare platform in Mogadishu, while simultaneously operating a similar platform called “Shaafi” in Somaliland. This dual presence establishes the company’s business activities in both territories.
Somalia represents a clear and present danger to Somaliland’s security, having repeatedly demonstrated both the will and capability to destabilize the country through military, intelligence, and proxy operations. Beyond its territorial claims, Somalia appears intent on Somaliland’s reincorporation by any means necessary. The Somali government has consistently opposed Somaliland’s independence while seeking to undermine its sovereignty through diplomatic, economic, and occasionally military pressure.
Given this context, entrusting Somaliland’s comprehensive security personnel data to a company with substantial business interests in Somalia raises legitimate national security questions. If compromised, this biometric database would deliver unprecedented strategic intelligence—revealing force distribution, command structures, specialized unit compositions, and individual identities of security personnel.
The vulnerability extends beyond regional threats. International actors with advanced offensive cyber capabilities—particularly China, which has demonstrated sophisticated data exfiltration techniques against military targets worldwide—could potentially access this information through direct intrusion or via partnerships with regional actors. China’s documented interest in Horn of Africa security infrastructure creates an additional layer of risk.
When approached for comment about these business connections, neither Minister Khadar Hussein Loge nor Innovii executives responded to our inquiries.
Security Clearance Gaps and Technical Vulnerabilities
An examination of the implementation process reveals significant structural gaps in security protocols. Unlike established military and intelligence institutions where clearance levels dictate access to classified information, Somaliland has yet to implement a formal vetting framework for individuals involved in key security projects. This absence of a structured security clearance process means that external contractors and government officials—whose ultimate loyalties and interests remain unexamined—are granted access to sensitive military data without the rigorous background scrutiny standard in comparable security environments.
Recent events highlight existing vulnerabilities in Somaliland’s information security practices. A classified document detailing the reassignment of intelligence officers from Somaliland’s National Intelligence Directorate to military units has surfaced in various circles, effectively exposing these operatives. Somaliland Chronicle has not independently authenticated this document, but security experts consulted about its contents expressed alarm.
“This leak compromises these intelligence officers’ operational security,” explained a former intelligence official who reviewed the document. It should be noted that in some political circles, the reassignment and potential “burn notice” of these intelligence operatives has been lauded due to longstanding misgivings about the intelligence agency’s politicized nature and inward-looking focus rather than addressing external threats, particularly under former President Bihi’s administration.
However, security professionals maintain that regardless of the merits of restructuring intelligence services, the public exposure of operative identities through unsecured documents represents a fundamental security lapse that raises broader concerns about information protection capabilities.
The 2018 incident in the Ministry of Finance’s Financial Management Information System provides another example, where sensitive financial data was exposed due to a critical security hole in the system’s architecture. These incidents raise questions about whether Somaliland currently possesses the institutional capacity to secure a comprehensive database of all security personnel.
The Technical Implementation: Questions Without Answers
Sources close to the implementation have indicated that the biometric system will be housed at military headquarters and operate on an offline network—a positive initial security measure. However, security experts caution that this offline status creates a new dimension of concern: ongoing maintenance and system updates. Contractors will almost certainly need to maintain access for maintenance, patches, and technical support, creating what security professionals call a “privileged access dilemma“.
“Military-grade systems require military-grade access protocols,” explained a former cybersecurity officer with experience in defense systems. “Each maintenance session should be supervised, all update code should be scanned for malware, and contractor personnel should never be left alone with the system.”
“Even with proper encryption, the human element remains the greatest vulnerability,” noted a security consultant who requested anonymity due to ongoing work with regional governments. “Without proper clearance protocols and continuous monitoring, systems can be compromised from within.”
Security experts note that modern military biometric systems typically employ advanced encryption standards with sophisticated key management systems. Yet when asked about specific security protocols, government officials provided only general assurances about “taking all necessary precautions,” without detailing specific technical safeguards.
A robust approach to mitigating these risks would involve adopting a Zero-Trust Security Model, a framework widely used in sensitive military and governmental systems. This model operates on the principle of “never trust, always verify,” ensuring that no user, system, or network is inherently trusted—whether inside or outside the organization.
The NEC Paradox: A Positive but Partial Engagement
The involvement of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) represents one of the few positive aspects of the implementation process. The NEC has demonstrated impressive technical capability by successfully deploying biometric systems during recent elections—establishing a proven track record of managing sensitive data securely within Somaliland’s specific context.
President Cirro’s formal request for the NEC to transfer 50 complete IRIS Biometric registration kits and 50 of their highest-level trainers shows recognition of this indigenous expertise. However, this engagement appears to be only a half-measure. While leveraging the NEC’s equipment and trained operators, the administration has inexplicably stopped short of consulting the Commission on implementation strategy and security architecture—areas where the NEC has demonstrated considerable competence.
Instead, the central implementation role has apparently been given to Innovii, despite the NEC’s proven experience with these exact systems in Somaliland. This partial engagement creates a puzzling situation: Why tap the NEC for hardware and personnel but not their implementation expertise?
The decision to utilize NEC resources while apparently sidelining them from the overall security design and implementation strategy represents a missed opportunity to fully leverage Somaliland’s own proven capabilities. Given the previously noted personal relationships between Minister Khadar Hussein Loge and senior Innovii executives, one must question whether these connections, rather than technical merit, are influencing the implementation approach.
International Lessons: Learning from Others’ Mistakes
The risks associated with compromised biometric systems are not theoretical. When Taliban forces captured biometric devices containing Afghan security personnel data in 2021, the information enabled systematic identification and targeting of former government employees—many of whom faced brutal retribution. As documented by Human Rights Watch and the MIT Technology Review, these captured databases contained detailed personal and occupational information that put thousands of lives at risk.
Somalia’s own biometric infrastructure has become a cautionary tale. Despite international oversight and claimed safeguards, Somalia’s government has admitted Al-Shabaab has infiltrated its institutions at virtually every level, likely giving terrorists access to sensitive personnel data. Somalia’s military systems—built with millions from US, EU, and UK taxpayers—have become a security liability rather than an asset. Somaliland should carefully consider these precedents as it implements its own system.
The Path Forward: Differing Perspectives on Security and Reform
The government’s initiative to modernize security personnel records and eliminate payroll fraud represents a significant shift in Somaliland’s approach to security management. Various security experts and defense analysts consulted by Somaliland Chronicle offered divergent perspectives on how such systems might be implemented.
Some security professionals emphasized the importance of independent security audits, noting that in other contexts, such assessments have helped identify vulnerabilities before they could be exploited. Others pointed to clearance frameworks as an established practice in military contexts worldwide, with proponents arguing they create necessary accountability for those accessing sensitive data.
“The biometric system presents both opportunities and challenges,” observed a retired senior military commander. “While eliminating ghost soldiers addresses a legitimate administrative problem, the handling of personnel data has broader implications for national security. These considerations will need to be balanced carefully as the process unfolds.”
Military technology experts noted that the specific technical approaches adopted in similar systems internationally vary widely. In some countries, heightened security measures prioritize compartmentalized access, while others focus on system hardening and encryption. The specific balance Somaliland strikes between administrative efficiency and security protocols will likely emerge as implementation progresses.
The military biometric registration initiative undoubtedly represents a significant change in Somaliland’s security administration. Stakeholders across the security establishment will continue to debate the merits of different implementation approaches as the system develops. The ultimate impact on both administrative efficiency and national security will only become clear as the initiative moves forward in the coming months.## Security Reform vs. Security Risk: Weighing the Implications of Somaliland’s Military Biometric System
We reached out to key figures involved in the biometric registration implementation for responses. Questions were sent to Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge regarding the procurement process, his alleged personal connections to Innovii executives, security vetting procedures, and technical safeguards for the system. Similar inquiries were directed to Innovii CEO Mohamed Barre concerning his company’s qualifications for handling sensitive military data and its extensive operations in Somalia. However, neither the Minister nor Innovii’s executives responded to our inquiries.
In a blunt rebuke that has reverberated across diplomatic channels, Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has issued a pointed message on X, declaring: “China has no right to dictate who we have relationships with, as we have no right to dictate who they have relationships with.”
The statement comes as the Taiwan Representative Office in Hargeisa has also fired back at Beijing’s increasingly aggressive posturing with a statement that leaves little room for misinterpretation: “Neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other, and China has never governed Taiwan for a second.”
This unified front marks the latest chapter in the ongoing diplomatic tug-of-war that has intensified since Somaliland and Taiwan formalized relations in 2020, much to Beijing’s consternation.
Rejecting Beijing’s Pressure Tactics
Somaliland’s firm stance comes after Chinese Ambassador to Somalia, Wang Yu, escalated tensions by stating in an interview with a local Somali news outlet: “I strongly condemn Somaliland for strengthening its ties with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a country; it is a part of China. We have taken countermeasures against Hargeisa. There is significant cooperation between China and Somalia.”
The Ambassador’s explicit mention of “countermeasures” represents an unusually direct threat from Chinese diplomacy, which typically shrouds punitive actions in more ambiguous language. The statement also underscores Beijing’s strategy of leveraging its relationship with Mogadishu as a counterweight to Somaliland’s independent foreign policy.
This diplomatic confrontation follows the Chinese Embassy in Mogadishu issuing yet another condemnation in May 2024, labeling Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan a “violation” of the increasingly threadbare “One-China Principle.”
Sources close to the Somaliland government revealed to Somaliland Chronicle that Chinese officials had attempted to sweeten the deal by dangling the prospect of a liaison office in Hargeisa and vague promises of development assistance—if only Somaliland would abandon Taiwan. The offer was promptly rebuffed.
“The ‘One-China Principle’ and the ‘One-Somalia Principle’ are outdated clichés that bear no resemblance to ground realities,” a senior official at Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told this newspaper on condition of anonymity. “Neither Taiwan nor Somaliland is subordinate to China or Somalia. That era is finished.”
China has intensified its pressure campaign against Somaliland, employing political, economic, and diplomatic tactics. Chinese officials have issued explicit warnings regarding Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan, with Ambassador Wang Yu emphasizing that “there is only one China in the world; Taiwan is an inseparable part of China.”
The economic pressure has been equally direct. In response to Somaliland’s diplomatic shift towards Taiwan, Chinese businesses that had previously established a presence in Somaliland abruptly withdrew, leaving gaps in various sectors of the economy. This move is perceived as an attempt by Beijing to exert economic pressure on Hargeisa.
China’s actions form part of a broader strategy to isolate Taiwan internationally and deter other nations from establishing formal relations with Taipei. The pressure exerted on Somaliland serves as a cautionary example to other countries considering similar diplomatic engagements.
Political Pragmatism and Mutual Benefits
While Somaliland’s current government expressed reservations about the choice of Taiwan over China when they were in opposition and during the presidential campaign, it has since fully embraced the bilateral relationship established under former President Muse Bihi Abdi’s administration. This pragmatic shift suggests a recognition of the tangible benefits the Taiwan partnership has delivered to Somaliland, overriding any previous political hesitations.
Similarly, political transitions in Taipei have done little to disturb the foundations of the relationship, with Taiwan maintaining consistent support despite its own complex domestic politics. “We appreciated G7 Foreign Ministers recently supported Taiwan by opposing any unilateral attempts to change the status quo of the Taiwan Strait whether by force or by coercion,” the Taiwan Representative Office stated, signaling growing international discomfort with Beijing’s military posturing.
The relationship, initially endorsed by the Trump White House in 2020, appears positioned for continued support as President Trump returns to office. U.S. Congressman Mike Smith has described China’s attempts to isolate Taiwan and pressure Somaliland as “counterproductive and alarming”—diplomatic speak for strong disapproval.
“Under the Trump administration, the White House National Security Council openly acknowledged and praised the new relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan in 2020,” the Taiwan Representative Office reminded observers, strategically emphasizing the continuity with the incoming administration.
While the diplomatic gamesmanship captures headlines, the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership has delivered concrete benefits that transcend symbolic gestures. Taiwan’s investments in Hargeisa’s healthcare infrastructure have significantly improved medical capacity, while educational exchanges have provided Somalilanders with technical training opportunities previously unavailable.
The establishment of a vegetable farm demonstration project in Arabsiyo has introduced advanced agricultural technologies that boost local food production capabilities—practical advantages that underscore why Somaliland continues to resist Beijing’s pressure campaign.
For Taiwan, Somaliland’s strategic position near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints—offers significant geopolitical value as China continues its military expansion throughout the Indian Ocean region.
Looking Ahead: Regional Stability and International Recognition
The Taiwan Representative Office raised particular alarm about what it described as the “weaponization” of humanitarian assistance “to fuel internal conflicts and cognitive warfare to further destabilize the region.” The statement concluded with an appeal: “We urge China to cease its provocation and truly uphold the values of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.”
As Somaliland’s democratic credentials continue to impress international observers following the 2024 Presidential Election, both Taiwan and Somaliland see their partnership as a potential catalyst for broader international recognition.
“We are glad to see more and more democratic like-minded partners endorsing the values of Taiwan-Somaliland relationship,” the Taiwan Representative Office noted. “We believe that Taiwan-Somaliland relationship can catalyze more international support for both nations.”
Despite formidable opposition from Beijing and Mogadishu, the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship has evolved into something more significant than a mere diplomatic arrangement between two unrecognized states. It represents a defiant statement that even smaller nations can chart independent courses when fundamental interests are at stake—regardless of how loudly larger powers might protest.
China’s President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan stand for a group photo together with leaders from African countries before a welcome dinner of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, 04 September 2024. ANDRES MARTINEZ CASARES/Pool via REUTERS
Beijing is increasingly assertive in Africa, aiming to expand its influence. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has invested billions of dollars to establish a Chinese-centric trade route in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland, the only country in the region to resist Chinese investments, has instead allowed pro-Western firms to invest in connectivity projects as an alternative to BRI. In 2016, Somaliland struck a landmark deal with DP World, a Dubai-based port operator, to develop and manage Berbera Port. DP World’s investment has been instrumental in transforming Berbera Port into a major trade hub, providing an alternative to Djibouti for accessing the vast hinterland in the region, including Ethiopia. The transformation of Berbera Port is already taking shape, attracting Western firms like the UK investment arm CDC and Trafigura, which won concessions in the port and energy infrastructure. Similar to the Lobito Corridor, Berbera Corridor is a substitute to China-centric trader routes in East Africa.
In January, Rep. John Moolenaar, Chair of the US-China House Select Committee on the CCP, wrote a letter to then Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging the US to establish a representative office in Somaliland. He stressed that this move is vital for advancing US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and countering China’s growing influence. In 2018, China took control of a port terminal in Djibouti, which US lawmakers viewed as a significant gift to China. Sen Chris Coons warned that without US engagement, China could shift Somaliland’s interests in its favour, consolidating its influence in the Red Sea. Then-Sen Marco Rubio also stressed the need to work on “countering Chinese influence in Djibouti”, describing the takeover as “even more alarming.” General Thomas Waldhauser, the then US military commander for Africa, stated in a congressional hearing that the US military could face “significant” consequences if China gains control of the port. In an effort to gain influence in Somaliland, China proposed a tempting conditional development package aimed at persuading Somaliland to expel Taiwan and prevent aligning with the US. However, Somaliland government rejected the offer. A move Rep John Moolenaar had warned.
As Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi group threatens seaborne trade in the Red Sea, forcing shipping companies to reroute their vessels and disrupting the delicate fabric of global commerce. Djibouti has allowed Iranian ships to dock at China’s military base, facilitating the flow of critical intelligence to the Houthis as they mount attacks on maritime trade. Djibouti has also rejected the US request to use its territory for attacks against the Houthis. The Houthi also established implicit cooperation with Djibouti, enabling the country to benefit from the Red Sea conflict for higher port traffic and turn the crisis into a profitable opportunity, in return Djibouti rejects to condemn Houthi attacks in the crucial shipping lines.
Somaliland, a crucial gateway to the Indo-Pacific, overlooking the Gulf of Aden positions a vital conduit for nearly 15% of global seaborne trade. If its quest for international recognition is accommodated, its geographic position offers a distinct advantage to the U.S., Israel, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in securing the security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea while counterbalancing China and Iran in this critical region. The use Berbera military airfield, would strengthen US deterrence against the Houthis and provide crucial operational support to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel in monitoring Houthi activities and Iranian manoeuvres in the Red Sea. It also promote collaborative efforts in combating piracy, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing. In this dynamic partnership, Somaliland is determined to align itself with the US axis in exchange for recognition.
About the Author
Abdinasser Ahmed is a developmental economics practitioner and political commentator based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. He can be reached through Twitter @Abdinasserahm or abdinasserahm[at]gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud spends lavishly on international travel and Washington lobbying firms while soldiers go unpaid
Al-Shabaab now controls more territory than any time since 2011, following Taliban’s successful playbook
African Union peacekeeping mission (AUSSOM) faces financial collapse as donors withdraw support
Trump administration unlikely to continue funding a government with no accountability or results
When Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways suspended flights to Somalia’s capital last week, few outside the region noticed. They should have. This development, alongside American diplomats fleeing Mogadishu’s airport after militant attacks, isn’t just another security hiccup – it’s the beginning of the end for a Western experiment that has swallowed billions with nothing to show for it.
A Corruption Network with a Government Problem
Somalia’s corruption isn’t just bad – it’s historic. Ranking 179th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 index with a pathetic score of 9/100, Somalia has actually managed to get worse, dropping 2 points since 2023. This isn’t corruption within a system; this is corruption as the system.
While Finance Minister Bihi Egeh bemoans the potential loss of $1.5 billion in U.S. aid, he conveniently forgets to mention where previous billions vanished. Military commanders pocket salaries for non-existent “ghost soldiers,” leaving actual units undermanned. Weapons purchased with Western funding routinely disappear from government armories, only to resurface in Al-Shabaab attacks. Intelligence leaks so consistently that security analysts assume Al-Shabaab has penetrated every level of government. Even judicial positions are bought and sold openly, driving desperate citizens to seek justice from Al-Shabaab’s harsh but predictable courts.
Patrons Head for the Exit
The suspension of flights by Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways isn’t merely a business decision – it’s a devastating vote of no confidence from Somalia’s most committed international backers. Unlike Western powers who engage from embassy compounds, Turkey manages Mogadishu’s port and airport while maintaining its largest overseas military base in the country. Qatar has bankrolled government operations during funding gaps, while simultaneously keeping communications open with Al-Shabaab – much as it does with Taliban, Hamas, and other terrorist networks.
Will these patron states simply work with Al-Shabaab if militants eventually take Mogadishu? Their pragmatism knows no bounds, and it’s entirely possible they don’t care who rules Somalia as long as they maintain their prime position in the country’s economy. Turkey’s infrastructure investments and Qatar’s relationships across the political spectrum practically guarantee they’ll be among the first to recognize any new power reality.
“When your closest friends start heading for the exits, it’s time to acknowledge the building is on fire,” notes a Gulf diplomatic source familiar with Qatar’s decision-making.
The $50 Billion Experiment That Failed
Let’s be brutally honest: Somalia has absorbed over $50 billion in international aid since 1991 with minimal sustainable improvements in governance or security. The Danab Brigade – Somalia’s elite U.S.-trained counter-terrorism unit – remains somewhat effective only because Americans bypassed government structures entirely, maintaining direct oversight of recruitment, payment, and operations.
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has become infamous as one of the world’s most frequent-flying heads of state, jetting off to international conferences and photo opportunities nearly weekly while his country burns. As Al-Shabaab consolidates control over increasing territory, Mohamud and his inner circle have funneled millions into glitzy Washington lobbying firms to keep American money flowing. These lavish expenditures – paid for ultimately by American taxpayers – represent the perfect microcosm of Somalia’s dysfunction: U.S. aid creates a bloated class of government kleptocrats whose primary skills lie not in governance or security provision, but in separating gullible Western donors from their money. While Mogadishu’s political elites wine and dine at five-star hotels in Western capitals and maintain luxury residences abroad, soldiers on the front lines go unpaid, and Al-Shabaab’s shadow government expands its reach. American billions haven’t brought stability to Somalia – they’ve created a parasitic political class with no incentive to actually defeat the insurgency that justifies their continued international support.
The evidence is inescapable: Somalia’s problems aren’t about funding levels but legitimacy, accountability, and trust. More money doesn’t build state capacity; it merely enables more sophisticated corruption networks. As one Western official put it, “We’re not funding a government. We’re funding a money laundering operation with a flag.”
Adding to this complex picture, Somalia has increasingly strengthened ties with China, signing onto Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative while accepting infrastructure deals with limited transparency requirements. This diplomatic balancing act raises questions about whether China might become Somalia’s next financial backer as Western donors reconsider their investments. The challenge for Beijing, should it step into this role, would be avoiding the same patterns of ineffective aid that have characterized Western engagement for decades.
Al-Shabaab Executes the Taliban Playbook
For anyone who watched Afghanistan’s collapse, Somalia’s trajectory is disturbingly familiar. Al-Shabaab has methodically followed the Taliban’s successful blueprint: focus on rural control while launching just enough urban attacks to demonstrate government weakness; patiently wait out Western resolve; weaponize public resentment against corruption; infiltrate government security structures; and establish shadow governance that, while brutal, appears more competent than the internationally-backed government.
Intelligence reports confirm Al-Shabaab now controls more territory than at any point since 2011, collects taxes more efficiently than the government, and dispenses predictable justice in areas under its control. “The reality Western policymakers refuse to accept is that insurgencies don’t need to be loved by the population—they just need to be seen as more competent and less predatory than the government,” notes a former Western counterinsurgency advisor with extensive experience in both Afghanistan and Somalia. “By that measure, Al-Shabaab is winning.”
AUSSOM: Peacekeeping Without Peace or Funding
Somalia’s last security bulwark, the newly rebranded African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), teeters on the brink of financial collapse. Despite diplomatic platitudes about “sustainable funding mechanisms,” donor fatigue has set in. The European Union’s willingness to cover troop stipends is waning, while United Nations logistical support grows increasingly tenuous.
This financial uncertainty couldn’t come at a worse moment. Ethiopia – AUSSOM’s backbone – is distracted by internal conflicts and maritime disputes with Somalia. Uganda has made it clear that continued troop contributions depend entirely on reliable international funding that isn’t materializing.
Without a robust AUSSOM presence, intelligence assessments suggest Al-Shabaab would likely expand control to most population centers outside Mogadishu within months. The bitter irony: Western nations, having spent billions on Somalia’s stability, now appear unwilling to fund the one mechanism that has somewhat contained Al-Shabaab.
Trump Administration: No More Blank Checks
The Trump administration represents the final nail in Somalia’s financial coffin. President Trump’s “America First” approach and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s hawkish stance make additional funding for Somalia virtually unthinkable. The White House team sees Somalia’s corruption rankings, territorial losses to Al-Shabaab, and decades of squandered aid as textbook examples of failed investment.
“The days of writing blank checks to failing states are over,” a Republican foreign policy advisor remarked privately. “The President wants concrete returns on American taxpayer dollars, and Somalia has consistently proven it cannot deliver.”
This policy shift comes exactly when Somalia’s government is most desperate for support, creating a perfect storm where years of mismanagement, corruption, and security failures are finally coming due. The chickens, as the saying goes, are coming home to roost.
The Next Kabul Awaits
Somalia’s internationally-backed government is approaching a point of no return. The combination of endemic corruption, resurgent Al-Shabaab, wavering international support, and AUSSOM’s precarious funding creates conditions eerily similar to pre-collapse Afghanistan.
For Western nations that have poured billions into this failed experiment, it’s time to acknowledge reality rather than writing more checks. Additional money without addressing core governance failures will simply disappear into the same corrupt systems that have swallowed previous investments.
The fall of Kabul shocked the world in 2021. The fall of Mogadishu – when it comes – should surprise no one.
