Investigative Reports

Another Fake Degree Scandal Rocks Somaliland Presidency: Director General Caught With Diploma Mill “Masters”

0
Repeat of 2022 Central Bank Fraud Scandal Exposes Somaliland...

AFRICOM Commander Admits Somalia Al-Shabaab Policy Failure in Final Briefing 2025

0
Special Report | AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley acknowledges...

Security Reform vs. Security Risk: Weighing the Implications of Somaliland’s Military Biometric System

0
Key Points Somaliland's biometric registration of security personnel aims to...
Home Blog Page 5

AL-ICTISAAM: The Lurking Threat to Somaliland’s Sovereignty and Stability

By
Staff
-
0

Abstract

Al-ICTISAAM is an ideologically motivated movement that operates covertly within Somaliland under the guise of religious, humanitarian, and educational initiatives. While publicly distancing itself from overt political activity, Al-ICTISAAM is widely believed to pursue a long-term agenda that directly threatens the sovereignty, independence, and constitutional integrity of the Republic of Somaliland. This article provides a comprehensive examination of the origins, ideological underpinnings, and clandestine operations of the group, with particular focus on its strategic objectives in Somaliland. Furthermore, it outlines policy recommendations aimed at neutralizing its influence and safeguarding Somaliland’s hard-won independence and democratic foundations.

1. Introduction

The Republic of Somaliland, an unrecognized but de facto independent state in the Horn of Africa, has emerged over the past three decades as a beacon of peace and democratic governance in a turbulent region. However, this progress is now under increasing threat from both state and non-state actors, among whom Al-ICTISAAM poses a particularly insidious challenge. Unlike conventional threats such as terrorism or external military aggression, Al-ICTISAAM represents a subtler, ideologically driven infiltration aimed at undermining Somaliland’s statehood from within.

Operating under the guise of religious piety and educational service, Al-ICTISAAM has steadily expanded both the scale and sophistication of its activities in Somaliland. Its adherents have successfully infiltrated vital organs of the state, including the judiciary and legislative branches, while simultaneously extending their reach through traditional clan leadership structures and a widespread network of madrassas, private universities, and religious institutions. If left unchallenged, this covert expansion threatens to undermine the core principles upon which the Somaliland state is built, erode its hard-earned democratic achievements, and reorient its trajectory toward the irredentist vision of a unified Greater Somalia.

2. Origins and Ideological Foundations

Al-ICTISAAM is not a recent creation. It is a direct ideological and organizational descendant of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, an armed Islamist movement active in the Somali territories during the late 1980s and 1990s. While Al-Itihaad was eventually weakened by regional counterterrorism measures—particularly military operations by Ethiopian forces—its ideological residue survived in various fragmented groups, of which Al-ICTISAAM is the most prominent.

Ideologically, Al-ICTISAAM is rooted in Salafi-Wahhabi doctrines, but its operational philosophy closely aligns with the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya—a group known for its rigid fundamentalism and strategic use of societal infiltration. Unlike mainstream Salafi scholars who reject political involvement, Al-ICTISAAM subscribes to the concept of political Islam, where the state must be governed according to their narrow interpretation of Sharia. In the Somali context, this ideology is fused with Somali irredentism—the belief that all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa (including parts of Ethiopia and Kenya) must be united under one Islamic Somali polity.

This blend of religious fundamentalism and territorial revanchism makes Al-ICTISAAM a uniquely dangerous entity. It not only challenges the internal sovereignty of Somaliland but also projects a regional threat to neighboring countries with significant Somali populations.

3. Al-ICTISAAM in Somaliland: Disguise and Penetration

Due to Somaliland’s firm stance on its independence from the Federal Republic of Somalia, Al-ICTISAAM does not operate under its formal name within its borders. Instead, it masquerades as a network of humanitarian, religious, and educational NGOs, thereby avoiding direct confrontation with the authorities while establishing strongholds in communities.

3.1. Educational Institutions as Instruments of Indoctrination

One of the most strategic tools employed by Al-ICTISAAM is its ownership and management of educational institutions. These institutions present themselves as centers of Islamic learning but serve as recruitment and indoctrination hubs for young minds, particularly students with limited exposure to formal education.

Quranic schools, or dugsi, are especially vulnerable. These institutions provide little to no exposure to civic education, critical thinking, or national history—making their students easy targets for ideological manipulation. Through a curriculum heavily infused with Salafi dogma and pan-Somali narratives, students are gradually alienated from Somaliland’s state institutions and constitutional values.

3.2. Institutional Infiltration

Alarming reports indicate that Al-ICTISAAM has successfully planted sympathizers and operatives in various branches of the Somaliland government. Perhaps most troubling is the pending appointment of individuals affiliated with the movement to high judicial positions, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Such infiltration enables the group to influence legislation, block legal reforms, and protect its members from prosecution.

Furthermore, the movement boasts sympathizers in the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers, some of whom promote a conciliatory narrative toward unification with Somalia under religious or pan-Somali pretenses.

3.3. Exploiting Traditional Authority for Strategic Legitimacy

In addition to educational and institutional infiltration, Al-ICTISAAM employs a more subtle yet highly effective method to gain grassroots legitimacy and political access—strategic appropriation of traditional clan leadership roles, particularly the titles of Sultans, Garads, and other customary leaders.

This tactic reflects a sophisticated understanding of the deep sociopolitical structure of Somali society, where customary institutions often wield greater influence than formal state mechanisms, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas. By positioning their members or sympathizers as clan elders, Al-ICTISAAM seeks to bypass state authority and embed itself directly within the cultural and communal frameworks that shape public opinion and local decision-making.

These positions are not merely symbolic. In Somaliland’s hybrid governance system, traditional authorities play a critical role in conflict resolution, electoral mobilization, inter-clan negotiations, and even in legitimizing or delegitimizing political actors. Control over such roles gives Al-ICTISAAM unparalleled influence to shape political discourse, sway community allegiances, and obstruct government policies that contradict their ideological objectives.

Moreover, once installed as traditional leaders, these individuals often mask their ideological affiliations under the guise of cultural conservatism, making it difficult for authorities or communities to distinguish between genuine community leadership and covert ideological activism. In this way, Al-ICTISAAM manages to legitimize its presence without raising immediate suspicion, using the language of tradition and clan unity to advance a deeply political and religiously radical agenda.

This exploitation of clan leadership not only reinforces the group’s influence at the grassroots level but also facilitates its penetration into formal governance structures, as traditional elders often serve as intermediaries in government consultations, appointments, and conflict mediation efforts. If left unaddressed, this tactic will continue to erode Somaliland’s state-centric governance model and empower anti-state actors within the very foundations of Somali society.

4. Reaction to Somaliland’s National Identity

Al-ICTISAAM has grown increasingly alarmed by the national consciousness exhibited by the people of Somaliland, particularly the youth. The most visible manifestation of this was the 2025 celebrations of 18th May, the day Somaliland commemorates its withdrawal from the failed union with Somalia.

This year’s celebration was particularly vibrant, with participation from all sectors of society—including schoolchildren, civil servants, and religious leaders. This display of unity and patriotism directly contradicted Al-ICTISAAM’s internal assessments, which falsely suggested that their efforts were softening public attitudes toward reunification.

In reaction:

  • The group boycotted National Day celebrations and prohibited students under their influence from carrying the Somaliland flag.
  • Senior figures within the movement pressured respected scholars, such as Sheikh Mustafe Haji Ismail, to publicly criticize the symbolism of the flag—claiming its use distorted Islamic principles.
  • Inflammatory sermons by Sheikh Umal, a Nairobi-based spiritual leader, called on the group to “leave no stone unturned” to salvate the country from reckless politicians—coded language that can incite subversive actions.
  • Another cleric, Sheikh Shibili, irresponsibly alleged that homosexuals were running schools in Hargeisa, thereby inciting panic and creating an environment conducive to extremist violence.

These actions illustrate the group’s desperation and its willingness to exploit religious rhetoric to instigate unrest and delegitimize Somaliland’s democratic institutions.

5. Selective Outrage and the Weaponization of Religious Symbols

Among the most glaring contradictions in Al-ICTISAAM’s ideological posture is its selective outrage concerning the use of religious symbols—particularly those featured on national flags. During the 2025 commemoration of Somaliland’s Independence Day, the group went to great lengths to condemn the public display of the national flag, citing supposed violations of Islamic decorum due to the presence of the Shahada (Islamic testimony of faith) on the flag. These denunciations were not only voiced locally by their affiliates but were also echoed by their foreign-based spiritual leadership, including Nairobi-based clerics such as Sheikh Umal and Sheikh Shibli.

Yet, this criticism is both disingenuous and hypocritical when placed in a broader Islamic and geopolitical context. Notably, Saudi Arabia—regarded by Wahhabi-oriented Somali clerics as the spiritual epicenter of Islam—has never faced internal clerical objections for the use of its national flag, which also bears the Shahada, during national holidays, public events, or even on consumer goods. Saudi citizens frequently wave the flag in mass celebrations, including sporting events and Independence Day festivities, without drawing any rebuke from their religious establishment.

This inconsistency raises an unavoidable question: Why do Somali clerics influenced by Wahhabi ideology selectively object to Somaliland’s patriotic expressions, while remaining silent about identical practices in Saudi Arabia, a country they revere? If the display of a flag bearing the Shahada is inherently un-Islamic, then why is this criticism only reserved for the people of Somaliland?

The answer lies not in theology, but in political expediency and ideological subversion. Al-ICTISAAM’s opposition is not rooted in genuine religious doctrine but is part of a calculated effort to delegitimize Somaliland’s sovereignty and national identity by weaponizing religion. By framing the celebration of national pride as a theological violation, the group aims to alienate citizens from their national institutions, particularly the youth who are increasingly embracing Somaliland’s distinct identity and democratic values.

These manipulations are not theological clarifications but ideological instruments, carefully crafted to erode national cohesion and sow religious and political discord. They are designed to instill guilt, shame, and confusion among patriotic citizens, thereby opening the door for Al-ICTISAAM’s broader goal of reintegration into a pan-Somali Islamic state.

6. Strategic Goals of Al-ICTISAAM in Somaliland

The long-term strategic objectives of Al-ICTISAAM in Somaliland are multifaceted:

  1. Undermine National Sovereignty: The core goal is to reverse Somaliland’s independence and reintegrate it into the Somali federal framework as a stepping stone for broader irredentist ambitions.
  2. Capture Key State Institutions: Through infiltration, the group seeks to exert influence on policymaking, judicial decisions, and traditional clan structures, ensuring that pro-Somaliland voices are marginalized or neutralized.
  3. Control Education and Religious Discourse: By dominating religious education and controlling Islamic institutions, Al-ICTISAAM aims to rewrite national identity in its own ideological terms.
  4. Dismantle Civic Nationalism: Promoting a transnational Islamist identity over civic nationalism is key to fragmenting Somaliland’s internal unity and replacing it with religious allegiance to an abstract, pan-Somali caliphate.

7. Recommendations: Policy Options to Neutralize the Threat

Given the existential threat posed by Al-ICTISAAM, the Somaliland government must respond with a combination of legal, educational, intelligence, and diplomatic measures. The following policy options are proposed:

7.1. Educational Reforms and Oversight

  • All private religious and educational institutions must be licensed, regulated, and periodically audited by the Ministry of Education and Higher Studies.
  • Institutions found to propagate anti-state ideology must be nationalized or shut down.
  • Develop a standardized national curriculum that integrates civic education, critical thinking, and Somaliland’s constitutional history from primary through tertiary levels.

7.2. Political and Civil Service Vetting

  • Introduce a mandatory security and ideological background check for all candidates running for elected office and those nominated to civil service posts.
  • Strengthen the role of the National Intelligence Agency to vet appointees for affiliation with extremist movements or foreign ideologies.
  • Establish a watchlist mechanism that flags individuals or organizations promoting anti-state propaganda.

7.3. Legal Measures and Accountability

  • Introduce legislation to criminalize covert support for foreign-based Islamist movements that threaten the constitutional order.
  • Freeze the assets of institutions and individuals found to be in material support of Al-ICTISAAM’s operations.
  • Offer a legal framework for voluntary disengagement, where members of the movement can renounce their affiliation and undergo periodic monitoring and deradicalization.

7.4. Public Awareness Campaigns

  • Launch nationwide awareness campaigns that expose the ideological agenda of Al-ICTISAAM and promote Somaliland’s achievements in peace, democracy, and development.
  • Collaborate with respected Islamic scholars who support Somaliland’s statehood to rebut extremist interpretations of Islam in mosques and media platforms.

7.5. Diplomatic Engagement

  • Engage with regional allies, including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, to monitor cross-border activities and funding streams associated with Al-ICTISAAM.
  • Seek support from the African Union and international partners to classify Al-ICTISAAM as a security threat similar to Al-Shabaab and other transnational extremist groups.

8. Conclusion

Al-ICTISAAM represents a serious and imminent threat to the Republic of Somaliland. Cloaked in religious legitimacy and operating under the radar of traditional security paradigms, the movement seeks to undo three decades of peacebuilding, institution-building, and democratic governance. Its tactics are not merely ideological but deeply strategic—aimed at hijacking the state from within rather than through direct confrontation.

If Somaliland is to preserve its independence, territorial integrity, and democratic values, it must act decisively. This requires a coordinated approach that integrates intelligence, education, law enforcement, civil society, and diplomacy. The ideological battle for Somaliland’s future will not be won in the battlefield, but in the minds of its youth, the resilience of its institutions, and the unity of its people.

About the Author

Abdullahi Hussein is a PhD candidate in Peace & Development Studies and visiting Professor of Public Policy as well as Ethics in Government at the Civil Service Institute, Hargeisa, Somaliland. He can be reached at abhussein1988[at]gmail.com

Creative Commons License

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Somaliland President’s Diplomatic Tour: A Mixed Reception in the Horn of Africa

By
Staff
-
0

By Mohammed Abdillahi

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Irro” of Somaliland concluded a significant diplomatic tour in May 2025, visiting neighboring Djibouti and regional powerhouse Kenya. The visits aimed to strengthen bilateral relations and advance Somaliland’s foreign policy objectives. While the trip to Kenya saw notable developments, the reception in Djibouti underscored the persistent challenges Somaliland faces in its quest for international recognition.

Djibouti: A Low-Key Affair Amidst Strategic Interests

President Irro’s visit to Djibouti was his first to an African nation since taking office. Initial reports suggested a warm reception, with Djiboutian officials reportedly referring to Irro as “President of the Republic of Somaliland.” However, deeper observation revealed a more nuanced reality.

During the two presidents’ discussions, the flag of Somaliland was conspicuously absent from official displays. This subtle but significant detail highlights Djibouti’s delicate balancing act, as it seeks to maintain its relationship with Somaliland while adhering to the international consensus that still considers Somaliland part of Somalia.

Crucially, discussions regarding Somaliland’s international recognition were not on the agenda. Instead, the focus was primarily on issues of mutual economic interest, particularly the utilization of Djibouti’s fiber optic cable network in Somaliland. President Irro toured Djibouti Telecom’s Haramous submarine cable station, the country’s undersea fiber-optic hub, signaling Somaliland’s keen interest in enhancing its digital infrastructure through Djiboutian connectivity. While this collaboration promises economic benefits for both sides, it reinforces that Djibouti’s engagement with Hargeisa remains largely pragmatic and economic, rather than political endorsement of Somaliland’s sovereignty.

The low-level reception, devoid of the customary diplomatic symbols of statehood, suggests Djibouti’s cautious approach, especially in light of its strained relations with Somaliland following the controversial Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2024. Djibouti, heavily reliant on Ethiopian trade, was reportedly concerned by the MoU, which offered Ethiopia a naval base in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland. President Irro’s visit to Djibouti appears to have been a move to mend these ties, focusing on shared economic opportunities rather than contentious political issues.

Kenya: A Step Towards Greater Engagement, Despite Somali Opposition

In contrast to the subdued reception in Djibouti, President Irro’s visit to Kenya, his third foreign trip since assuming office, saw more overt displays of engagement. Despite strong opposition from the Federal Government of Somalia and initial statements from Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirming Somalia’s territorial integrity, President Irro was received by Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Mining, Blue Economy, and Maritime Affairs, Hassan Ali Joho.

A significant development during the Kenyan visit was the inauguration of Somaliland’s new diplomatic mission office in Nairobi on May 29, 2025. This move, a relocation and upgrade of Somaliland’s existing liaison office, proceeded despite Mogadishu’s sustained lobbying efforts to prevent it. While Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the mission does not “enjoy the imprimatur of the Republic of Kenya,” President William Ruto met with President Irro on the same day, a clear indication of Kenya’s willingness to pursue its own regional interests.

Discussions between President Irro and President Ruto reportedly covered a range of bilateral and regional issues, including trade, security, education, and institutional development. While direct recognition of Somaliland was not declared, the meeting and the upgrade of the diplomatic mission represent a significant step in Somaliland’s efforts to enhance its international presence and establish more formal relations with key regional players.

Conclusion: A Long Road Ahead for Recognition

President Irro’s May 2025 diplomatic tour highlights the ongoing complexities of Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition. While the visits secured pragmatic cooperation, particularly in economic sectors, the underlying political challenge remains. Djibouti’s reserved reception, notably the absence of Somaliland’s flag, underscores the reluctance of some neighboring states to upset the delicate regional balance by fully endorsing Somaliland’s independence. Kenya’s more assertive engagement, despite objections from Somalia, indicates a growing willingness among some nations to engage with Somaliland based on practical interests.

For Somaliland, the path to full international recognition continues to be a gradual and multifaceted diplomatic endeavor, built on demonstrating its stability, democratic governance, and strategic importance in the Horn of Africa.

Creative Commons License

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

AFRICOM Commander Admits Somalia Al-Shabaab Policy Failure in Final Briefing 2025

By
Staff
-
0

Special Report | AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley acknowledges al-Shabaab resurgence after decades of US investment as Trump cuts Somalia funding. Full analysis.

Key Points

  • Policy Reversal: General Langley admits Al-Shabaab is “entrenched, wealthy, and large” after previously claiming US operations were “weakening” the group
  • Strategic Defeat: Al-Shabaab overran major US-backed base at Adan Yabal, forcing elite Danab forces to flee and abandon millions in weapons
  • Funding Cuts: Trump administration ended $400/month salary supplements and logistical support following audits revealing “padded requisitions”
  • China’s Victory: Somalia banned Taiwanese passport holders while receiving US military support, effectively serving Beijing’s regional objectives
  • Electoral Charade: Hassan Sheikh promises impossible “one-person, one-vote” elections while two-thirds of country remains under militant control
  • Intelligence Failure: President cycles through spy chiefs amid accusations of Al-Shabaab infiltration at highest levels of security apparatus
  • Command Uncertainty: Trump administration considers merging AFRICOM with European Command as Langley announces successor nomination pending

General Michael Langley delivered what he called his “last, final Chiefs of Defense Conference as the AFRICOM commander” with a stunning admission: after three decades and tens of billions of dollars in US investment, al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” – a complete reversal from his previous assessments dismissing reports of the group’s resurgence.

AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley
Commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Michael Langley attend the Morocco-US military exercise “African Lion 2024” in Agadir on May 30, 2024. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP) (Photo by FADEL SENNA/AFP via Getty Images)

The farewell briefing, delivered from Nairobi following the African Chiefs of Defense Conference, came as the Trump administration implements sweeping cuts to Somalia funding and considers merging AFRICOM with European Command. Langley announced that “a nomination for my successor is expected soon,” marking the end of an era that saw America’s most expensive counterterrorism failure in Africa.

The timing of Langley’s admissions couldn’t be more damaging to his legacy. Just days before the briefing, al-Shabaab forces overran the strategic town of Adan Yabal, forcing US-trained Somali National Army troops to flee their largest operational base and abandon millions of dollars in American-supplied weapons.

Al-Shabaab Resurgence: Langley’s Strategic Reversal

Langley’s current assessment stands in stark contrast to his statements just 11 months ago. In June 2024, when the Somaliland Chronicle pressed him about obvious signs of al-Shabaab’s resurgence and territorial gains, Langley expressed “measured optimism about the Somali government’s counterinsurgency efforts” and claimed “joint operations have been instrumental in weakening al-Shabaab’s grip on several regions.”

When confronted about Somalia’s divided focus between fighting terrorism and pursuing regional conflicts against democratic partners, Langley “carefully sidestepped a direct response” and deflected with diplomatic language about “comprehensive approaches.”

The reality was always obvious to regional observers. Al-Shabaab was regrouping, rearming, and preparing for major operations. The group’s February 2025 “Operation Ramadan” saw militants seize “more than 15 towns and villages” in a single day, while the March assassination attempt against Somalia’s president demonstrated their operational reach into the capital itself.

Now, facing the undeniable collapse of Somali security forces and his own imminent departure, Langley finally concedes what critics have long argued: the entire Somalia policy has failed spectacularly.

The Adan Yabal Catastrophe

The collapse that prompted US airstrikes on April 16 wasn’t just another tactical setback – it represented the complete failure of America’s Somalia strategy. Adan Yabal served as “a critical logistical hub” and “an operating base for raids on al-Shabaab,” strategically positioned 245 kilometers north of Mogadishu to project government power into militant-controlled territory.

The base housed not just regular army units but Somalia’s elite Danab special forces – the 2,500-strong unit that traditionally led the fight against al-Shabaab with US training, equipment, and until recently, direct salary support. When militants attacked before dawn, these supposedly elite forces simply fled, abandoning sophisticated weapons systems, vehicles, and communications equipment worth millions.

Al-Shabaab claimed to have “overrun 10 military installations during the fighting,” while government forces retreated so quickly that conflicting accounts emerged about who actually controlled the town. The psychological impact was immediate, with one resident reporting hearing explosions and gunfire as militants attacked “from two directions.”

Trump’s Reality Check

The Adan Yabal debacle coincided perfectly with the Trump administration’s decision to end the decades-long Somalia funding spigot. Since February, the US stopped paying stipends that boosted Danab members’ salaries to $400 per month – double what regular soldiers receive. Food support ended in April 2024, fuel support ceased in March 2025, following US audits that found Somali forces had “padded food and fuel requisitions.”

These cuts directly correlate with al-Shabaab’s recent gains. Insurgents have “taken back dozens of villages” and “regained the ability to operate in nearly a third of the territory they lost to federal forces in 2022.” The militants have mortared Mogadishu’s international airport and bombed the president’s motorcade, killing four people while demonstrating their capability to strike anywhere.

Yet despite this obvious correlation between reduced support and military failures, Langley’s briefing still suggested lingering faith in the fundamental Somalia model. His emphasis on “institution building across the Somali National Army” and addressing “root causes of instability” indicates AFRICOM leadership may not fully grasp that they’re advocating for continued investment in a demonstrably failed enterprise.

Somalia’s Strategic Pivot to China

While Somali forces collapsed under reduced US support, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s government aligned itself completely with Chinese strategic objectives. In April 2025, Somalia implemented a comprehensive ban on Taiwanese passport holders, explicitly invoking the “One China” principle in a direct rebuke to democratic Taiwan.

Chinese Ambassador to Somalia, Wang Yu with Somalia's Foreign Affairs Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali

This wasn’t diplomatic neutrality but active support for Beijing’s regional strategy. Somalia serves as China’s proxy in regional conflicts, with key government advisers like Hodan Osman serving as “the main conduit to China” while “heavy weaponry not normally present” floods into contested areas to support Chinese objectives against US partners.

The irony of the situation is stark: America conducted over 25 airstrikes in Somalia in 2025 to support a government that has publicly aligned with Beijing’s strategic objectives. Each precision strike that protects Somali government forces indirectly supports Chinese regional goals, creating an unusual dynamic where US military action serves competitors’ interests.

The Stabilization Industrial Complex

For three decades, Somalia has perfected what analysts describe as the stabilization industrial complex. The country has consumed tens of billions of dollars through various international missions and aid programs while producing what amounts to permanent instability.

Current estimates suggest two-thirds of Somalia remains under direct or indirect Al-Shabaab control, while in government-controlled Mogadishu, the federal government and Al-Shabaab operate parallel taxation systems that extract revenue from the same businesses. This isn’t state failure – it’s a business model that requires ongoing chaos to justify international intervention.

Langley’s warning that funding shortfalls could benefit Al-Shabaab highlights the dependency relationship. The system requires external funding to maintain the appearance of governance while multiple parties benefit from the arrangement.

The Propaganda Counterattack

A Washington Post article published shortly after Langley’s briefing highlighted concerns about Al-Shabaab’s resurgence following US funding cuts. The piece noted that “insurgents have taken back dozens of villages, including the strategic town of Adan Yabaal” and linked this to reduced American support for Somali forces.

Critics argue such reporting follows a predictable pattern: acknowledging military setbacks while suggesting more funding rather than examining why previous investment failed to create sustainable capabilities. The coverage serves various stakeholders who benefit from continued US engagement, including defense contractors, aid organizations, and Somali officials.

Hassan Sheikh’s Political Survival Strategy

As security failures mount and international support evaporates, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud appears to be throwing desperate political Hail Marys that underscore his government’s isolation and weakness.

In a pattern that suggests either panic or political calculation, Hassan Sheikh has embarked on two unrealistic initiatives that critics view as attempts to extend his hold on power. First, he has announced plans for “one-person, one-vote” direct elections scheduled for 2025-2026 – Somalia’s first such polls since 1967. The announcement, made at an April 2025 voter registration campaign in Mogadishu, promises local elections in June 2025 and parliamentary elections in September.

The electoral pledge faces immediate practical obstacles. Opposition leaders, including former presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, have rejected the plan outright, calling it “unilateral” and warning they could organize a parallel vote. Two of Somalia’s federal member states – Puntland and Jubaland – have refused to participate, with Puntland declaring it no longer recognizes federal institutions.

More fundamentally, the promise of nationwide elections appears divorced from security realities. With Al-Shabaab controlling an estimated two-thirds of Somalia’s territory and conducting major operations within 50 kilometers of Mogadishu, the logistics of conducting credible elections across the country seem impossible.

Simultaneously, Hassan Sheikh has engaged in musical chairs with his intelligence leadership, repeatedly firing and rehiring spy chiefs in what appears to be a futile search for competent security management. In May 2022, he appointed Mahad Mohamed Salad as Director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), replacing Fahad Yasin Haji Dahir, who had served under the previous administration.

However, the appointment quickly proved problematic. Former NISA chief Fahad Yasin launched a “blistering attack” on Salad, claiming he was “behind a series of assassinations and bombings in Mogadishu” and describing him as an Al-Shabaab operative who “facilitated their operations.” Yasin alleged that Hassan Sheikh had received warnings about Salad’s background but appointed him anyway.

By 2024, Hassan Sheikh had apparently soured on Salad, with reports indicating the intelligence chief “resigned from his position” after two years in the role. In what appears to be a return to previous arrangements, Hassan Sheikh has reportedly brought back Fahad Yasin to head NISA once again – the same official he had replaced Salad with originally.

The intelligence musical chairs reflects deeper problems with Somalia’s security apparatus. The NISA has been described as “a tool for silencing critics and independent media houses,” while being plagued by accusations of extrajudicial killings, including the high-profile murder of female intelligence officer Ikran Tahlil Farah in 2021.

These moves appear designed more for political survival than effective governance. The electoral promises provide a democratic veneer while the security reshuffles suggest desperate searches for loyalty rather than competence. Both initiatives face immediate obstacles that make success unlikely, suggesting they serve primarily as time-buying exercises for a president running out of options.

AFRICOM’s Uncertain Future

Langley’s farewell comes as the Trump administration considers merging AFRICOM with European Command to “cut bureaucracy.” The general acknowledged this uncertainty, telling reporters that “the United States is assessing the future of its military command for Africa” and calling on African governments to make their views known in Washington.

The potential merger would effectively end AFRICOM as an independent command – a fitting conclusion to an organization that presided over America’s most expensive strategic failure in Africa. Under Langley’s leadership since August 2022, AFRICOM doubled down on the failed Somalia model while losing Niger, seeing Chad expel US forces, and watching China expand its influence across the continent.

As the first Black four-star general in Marine Corps history, Langley’s tenure should have been a historic success. Instead, it concluded with admitting that Somalia’s security situation had deteriorated despite decades of American support, while China expanded its influence across the continent.

The Regional Alternative

While Somalia continues its expensive performance of statehood, genuine alternatives exist in the region. Somaliland has maintained democratic governance and effective counterterrorism capabilities for over three decades without international recognition or significant aid. The territory’s “proven track record in containing terrorist threats, particularly Al-Shabaab” demonstrates what functional governance looks like without the stabilization industrial complex.

Berbera’s strategic port offers “optimal forward operating base” capabilities with “strategic reach extending across multiple areas of operation” – from Al-Shabaab strongholds to Houthi maritime threats. Yet US policy continues supporting Somalia’s fiction while ignoring democratic realities that could actually advance American strategic interests.

Notably, Langley is reportedly planning to visit Somaliland in his final days as AFRICOM commander – perhaps finally acknowledging the democratic partner America should have been working with all along.

The Bottom Line: Horn of Africa Policy Crossroads

General Langley’s farewell briefing represents more than the end of his tenure – it marks the collapse of three decades of American counterterrorism investment in Somalia totaling tens of billions of dollars. His admission that al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” after decades of investment should prompt serious questions about every aspect of US Horn of Africa policy.

The Trump administration’s decision to reduce Somalia funding represents a shift from previous policy. Officials argue that continued engagement without measurable progress constitutes poor use of resources. The Somali government’s alignment with Chinese foreign policy objectives, including its ban on Taiwanese passport holders, has further complicated the relationship.

As Langley prepares for retirement and awaits his successor’s nomination, questions remain about the future of US engagement in Somalia. The contradiction between increased airstrikes and reduced institutional support reflects the challenge facing American policymakers: how to address immediate security threats while avoiding long-term dependency relationships that have proven ineffective.

The tragedy isn’t just the wasted resources or strategic humiliation. It’s that every dollar spent propping up Somalia’s elaborate fiction could have been invested in genuine regional partners who actually fight terrorism and support democratic values.

General Langley asked in 2022 why he was excited to lead AFRICOM into the future. Three years later, he leaves having proven exactly why America needs fewer commands chasing failed states and more partnerships with functional democracies.

The question isn’t whether al-Shabaab will exploit funding gaps – as Langley warns – but whether his successor will finally have the courage to admit what everyone except AFRICOM already knows: Somalia’s counterterrorism model is unsalvageable, and it’s time to back functional democracies instead of subsidizing failed states.

Related Coverage: AFRICOM’s Nuanced Response on Somalia’s Anti-Al-Shabaab Commitment | China’s First Proxy War in Africa

Despite Kenyan Foreign Ministry Opposition, Somaliland President Inaugurates New Mission and Meets Kenyan President Ruto

By
Staff
-
0

The Republic of Somaliland inaugurated a new diplomatic mission office in Nairobi on May 29, 2025, proceeding despite sustained opposition from the Federal Government of Somalia. The development, a relocation and upgrade of Somaliland’s long-established diplomatic mission in Kenya’s capital, marks a significant diplomatic achievement and highlights evolving regional dynamics in East Africa.

The move has sparked an outsized reaction from Somalia, which has sought to portray it as a provocative challenge to its claimed sovereignty over Somaliland’s territory. Yet, despite Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issuing statements reaffirming Somalia’s territorial integrity—clarifying that the mission “does not enjoy the imprimatur of the Republic of Kenya”—President William Ruto’s decision to meet Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” on the very same day underscored Kenya’s readiness to engage Hargeisa diplomatically.

Somalia’s Diplomatic Campaign

Somalia mounted a sustained lobbying effort to prevent the mission opening, including correspondence with Kenyan officials and public statements emphasizing territorial integrity. Despite these efforts, the presidential-level engagement proceeded, suggesting that Kenya’s executive branch prioritized practical considerations over bureaucratic protocol.

Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued statements following the mission opening, reaffirming its position on territorial integrity and expressing disappointment with Kenya’s decision. However, the ministry did not announce concrete diplomatic consequences.

Mogadishu Mulls Recalling Ambassador in Protest

Reports suggest that the Federal Government of Somalia is considering recalling its Ambassador to Kenya in response to Kenyan President William Ruto’s meeting with Somaliland’s President, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro.” If confirmed, this move would signal a clear protest against what Somalia perceives as a breach of diplomatic protocol.

However, the potential recall raises questions about Somalia’s understanding of the evolving regional landscape and its diplomatic leverage in Nairobi.

Mogadishu’s efforts to block the inauguration of Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in Kenya have so far failed. Now, by contemplating the recall of its ambassador, Somalia appears to be opting for a symbolic response—one likely aimed at its domestic audience rather than a substantive diplomatic shift. The establishment of Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in Nairobi and President Ruto’s public engagement with Cirro underline Kenya’s willingness to pursue its own regional interests, regardless of Somali objections.

This diplomatic maneuver, if carried out, may be interpreted less as a show of strength and more as an acknowledgment of Somalia’s limited influence in shaping Kenya’s foreign policy.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kenyan President William Ruto attend a welcome ceremony at The Great Hall of The People on April 24, 2025 in Beijing, China

China’s Growing Influence and Its Role in East African Diplomacy

China’s expanding presence in East Africa is a critical factor influencing regional diplomatic moves. In recent years, China has significantly deepened its trade and diplomatic ties with Kenya, including major infrastructure investments and high-level state visits, solidifying Nairobi as a key partner in its Belt and Road Initiative. Concurrently, China has exerted sustained pressure on Somaliland, wary of any actions that could challenge the status quo or disrupt its regional ambitions. This dynamic creates a subtle yet powerful influence over Kenya’s handling of Somaliland’s diplomatic outreach. The inauguration of Somaliland’s mission in Nairobi occurs against this backdrop of shifting allegiances and competing interests, where China’s strategic footprint in Kenya may have shaped the timing and nature of Kenya’s engagement with Somaliland, reflecting broader geopolitical contestations playing out in the Horn of Africa.

Kenya’s Regional Engagement: A Sovereign Choice

Kenya’s decision to host Somaliland’s President and support the establishment of a diplomatic mission reflects its commitment to maintaining and expanding regional partnerships based on economic, security, and community interests. While Somalia has expressed concern over these developments, Kenya’s actions suggest a deliberate choice to pursue independent diplomatic relationships, even in the face of criticism from Mogadishu.

If Somalia proceeds with the withdrawal of its envoy, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on Kenya’s approach. Relations between Kenya and Somaliland are built on decades of trade, shared communities, and mutual interests that extend beyond the immediate diplomatic friction.

Ultimately, the proposed recall, while perhaps satisfying short-term domestic political needs in Somalia, would do little to alter the broader dynamics at play. Somaliland’s presence in Nairobi continues to expand, and Kenya appears intent on deepening its regional engagements regardless of Mogadishu’s protests.

Historical Context and Economic Foundations

Former President Bihi meeting with his Kenyan counterpart Uhuru Kenyata in March 2021

The diplomatic engagement builds on established precedent. Former Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi visited Kenya from December 13-14, 2020, meeting with then-President Uhuru Kenyatta. However, the ambitious agreements from that visit — including promised Kenya Airways direct flights to Hargeisa by March 2021 and a Kenyan consulate in Hargeisa — were never implemented.

The timing of those unfulfilled commitments was significant. President Bihi’s 2020 visit occurred during a severe diplomatic crisis between Kenya and Somalia, when Mogadishu severed diplomatic ties with Nairobi and blocked Kenyan imports. When Kenya-Somalia relations later normalized, the Somaliland commitments were quietly shelved.

This history makes the current mission opening more significant, as it represents concrete progress that has withstood both diplomatic pressure and bureaucratic obstacles.

Regional analyst Rashid Abdi noted the historical foundations of Kenya-Somaliland relations: “Kenya has a soft spot for Somaliland. Relations between Somaliland and Kenya date to pre-colonial times when intrepid Isaq traders ventured into the East African hinterland. The Isahakiah are among the first minority settlers in Nairobi, central and western Kenya.”

Domestic Political Dynamics

The mission’s opening vindicated President Cirro after facing domestic criticism when Kenya’s foreign ministry initially rejected the diplomatic initiative. Critics questioned whether the President — whose main credential was his diplomatic career — had miscalculated by appearing to walk into a diplomatic trap.

The barrage of rejection letters from Kenya’s foreign ministry provided ammunition for opposition voices questioning the administration’s situational awareness. However, the successful mission opening and presidential meeting demonstrated that the apparent contradiction between Kenya’s foreign ministry statements and presidential actions was the intended outcome.

The Recognition Request

During his speech at the mission inauguration, President Cirro revealed that he had hand-delivered an official letter to President Ruto formally requesting Kenya’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This disclosure transforms the visit from a ceremonial mission opening into the delivery mechanism for Somaliland’s most direct diplomatic approach in decades.

Following the meeting, President Cirro issued a statement in Somali describing the substantive discussion

The personal delivery represents an evolution in Somaliland’s diplomatic approach, moving beyond informal engagements toward formal recognition requests delivered directly to decision-makers. The letter joins hundreds of similar requests the current government has dispatched globally, though its direct delivery to a head of state during a moment of diplomatic leverage distinguishes it from previous efforts.

Questions of Diplomatic Priorities and Venue Choices

President Cirro’s Kenya visit raises broader questions about Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy and priorities. The President recently completed a visit to Djibouti but notably has not prioritized engagement with Ethiopia – historically Somaliland’s most important regional ally.

This apparent deprioritization of Ethiopia may reflect tensions over Addis Ababa’s recent rapprochement with Somalia rather than following through on the Memorandum of Understanding it signed with former President Bihi’s administration. The MOU, signed on January 1, 2024, granted Ethiopia access to 20 kilometers of Somaliland coastline for 50 years in exchange for Ethiopia’s future recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state. The diplomatic slight, if intentional, suggests a significant recalibration of Somaliland’s regional relationships under the new administration.

The Kenya focus also highlights a persistent pattern in Somaliland’s diplomatic approach: the preference for meeting international partners in third-country venues rather than hosting them in Hargeisa. According to the Minister of Presidency, President Cirro met with numerous international donors during his Kenya visit, including representatives from the World Bank.

While such meetings may offer practical advantages — neutral venue, easier logistics for international partners, reduced security concerns — they also suggest a diplomatic posture that accommodates rather than commands. The pattern contrasts with standard diplomatic practice where sovereign states typically host visiting delegations on their own territory, reinforcing territorial authority and symbolic sovereignty.

This approach raises questions about diplomatic confidence and protocol. Why conduct high-level donor meetings in Nairobi rather than summoning partners to Hargeisa? The choice may represent efficient use of presidential time, but it also raises questions about whether Somaliland’s leadership fully embraces the diplomatic prerogatives that come with its sovereign statehood.

Regional Implications

The successful mission opening suggests that practical considerations — economic partnerships, security cooperation, and established community ties — can influence high-level diplomatic decisions even when they conflict with traditional recognition frameworks.

According to official statements from both governments, the discussions focused on key areas including:

  • Strengthening bilateral trade and investment
  • Enhancing educational and institutional cooperation
  • Countering violent extremism and fostering regional security
  • Supporting peacebuilding efforts in the Horn of Africa
  • Expanding vocational training opportunities for youth

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy commented on the diplomatic dynamics: “Really dumb diplomatic move on Kenya’s part to block opening of Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in Nairobi. Why does Kenya have to bow to Mogadishu when Somaliland is the more successful nation? We’ll see how things develop this year!”

Nagy served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 2018-2021 and prioritized dramatically increasing trade and investment between the US and Africa. Nagy’s familiarity with the region may help guide nuanced U.S. engagement with Somaliland and its neighbors.

For Somalia, the development demonstrates the limitations of relying solely on sovereignty claims without offering compelling alternatives for regional cooperation. The events in Nairobi reveal the constraints of Mogadishu’s current regional diplomatic strategy.

For Somaliland, the mission provides a foundation for expanded diplomatic engagement across East Africa. The precedent established in Kenya may influence other regional capitals as they balance formal recognition policies against practical cooperation opportunities.

Shifting Diplomatic Paradigms

The mission opening represents more than bilateral engagement between Kenya and Somaliland. It signals evolving approaches to recognition politics in the Horn of Africa, where established diplomatic frameworks increasingly compete with practical governance considerations.

Kenya’s decision to proceed with high-level engagement, despite formal policy positions suggests that regional states may be developing more nuanced approaches to the Somaliland question. This pragmatic diplomacy prioritizes functional cooperation over rigid adherence to continental consensus on territorial integrity.

The development also highlights the growing influence of diaspora communities in shaping diplomatic relationships. The Isaq community’s economic integration in Kenya provided the foundation for political engagement that transcended formal recognition barriers. From 1900 onwards the largest concentration of Isaq was to be found in Nairobi, while Isiolo became their second most important center after 1927.

Whether Kenya’s approach influences other East African states remains to be seen. However, the mission opening demonstrates that Somaliland’s path toward recognition continues to advance through sustained engagement and practical demonstration of governance capacity.

The diplomatic mission now operates as a tangible achievement that has withstood diplomatic pressure, bureaucratic obstacles, and domestic criticism — providing a model for Somaliland’s broader recognition strategy.

As President of Somaliland Lands in Djibouti, Can the Hostile Neighbor Change Its Spots?

By
Staff
-
0

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” arrived in Djibouti today, opening a chapter that many in the Republic of Somaliland hope signals a thaw in relations—though few expect one. His visit comes in the shadow of a sustained campaign of political sabotage and economic subversion orchestrated by Djibouti, following the landmark Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, which rattled power centers from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa.

While billed as a diplomatic overture, this visit is under a cloud of public suspicion, with popular sentiment in the Republic of Somaliland hardened against a neighbor many increasingly view as an existential adversary rather than a regional ally.

Djibouti’s Hostility Has Been Deliberate, Not Diplomatic

Djibouti’s antagonism toward the Republic of Somaliland is not a matter of diplomatic disagreement but calculated strategy. In June 2024, Djibouti shuttered Somaliland’s diplomatic mission after fabricating a utility payment dispute as pretext. Somaliland Chronicle previously reported the mission was “billed an exceptionally high amount for water and electricity, totaling tens of thousands of dollars” before services were abruptly disconnected – transparent diplomatic harassment thinly disguised as an administrative matter.

Djibouti President hosts leader of SSC Khatumo

In perhaps his most provocative move, President Guelleh recently hosted SSC Khatumo leader Mr. Firdhiye in Djibouti, a calculated signal of disapproval toward Somaliland’s strategic initiatives. This deliberate engagement with separatist elements from Somaliland’s eastern regions represented a direct violation of diplomatic norms and a challenge to the Republic of Somaliland’s territorial integrity – the very principle Djibouti claims to defend regarding Somalia.

“Djibouti has positioned itself as an active adversary, not merely a neutral neighbor,” noted a senior political analyst in the Republic of Somaliland. “From shuttering our diplomatic mission to hosting separatist leaders and working to undermine the Ethiopia MoU, Djibouti’s hostility has been comprehensive and deliberate. This trip must be seen in the full context of sustained aggression.”

Somaliland Public Sentiment: Mistrust Has Become Policy

Inside the Republic of Somaliland, this visit is deeply unpopular. Social media monitoring shows overwhelming disapproval, with particular anger focused on Guelleh’s reception of SSC Khatumo representatives. Many citizens view Djibouti as having betrayed regional solidarity to protect its economic monopolies.

“Djibouti is not just a competitor. It’s an active saboteur,” said a prominent business leader in Berbera. “They’ve lobbied investors to steer clear of our port and sought to maintain their monopoly at our expense.”

Business leaders have been particularly vocal about Djibouti’s economic warfare tactics, including reports of Djiboutian officials pressuring logistics firms to avoid Berbera and making backchanneled threats to regional investors. This economic sabotage has cemented perception of Djibouti as a hostile competitor rather than a potential partner.

Djibouti: Beijing’s Proxy in the Horn of Africa

Beyond the immediate bilateral tensions lies a deeper, more fundamental incompatibility – Djibouti’s increasingly entrenched role as China’s strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa. What was once a sovereign nation has, according to multiple regional security analysts, effectively transformed into “a wholly-owned subsidiary of the People’s Republic of China.”

President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti with Xi Jinping of PRC in FOCAC gathering

China’s military base in Djibouti – its first overseas installation – represents merely the visible component of Beijing’s control. Multiple sources with direct knowledge of Djibouti’s financial operations indicate that China now effectively controls the country’s economic decision-making through a web of strategic debt arrangements.

“When Djiboutian officials meet with their Somaliland counterparts, they’re not representing Djiboutian interests – they’re implementing Chinese foreign policy,” explained a former Western diplomat with extensive regional experience. “Beijing views Somaliland’s growing ties with Taiwan and the United States as a direct challenge to its regional hegemony.”

Somaliland’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 2020 positioned it in direct opposition to China’s regional ambitions. The formal establishment of Taiwan-Somaliland ties triggered furious diplomatic protests from Beijing, which subsequently intensified its support for Somalia’s territorial claims and pressured Djibouti to adopt an increasingly hostile stance toward Somaliland.

“China sees Somaliland-Taiwan relations as a dangerous precedent that must be crushed,” noted a security analyst specializing in Chinese foreign policy. “Djibouti’s sudden hostility toward Somaliland coincides precisely with Beijing’s escalating campaign against Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.”

Financial records reveal China holds over 70% of Djibouti’s external debt, giving Beijing unprecedented leverage over the country’s policy decisions. This financial control manifests in Djibouti’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Somaliland, particularly following the Taiwan recognition and discussions about potential U.S. military presence in Berbera.

Somalia’s Diplomatic Siege Is Collapsing

While Djibouti’s behavior draws scrutiny, Cirro’s visit is nonetheless a blow to Somalia’s faltering campaign to diplomatically isolate the Republic of Somaliland. Sources within Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm to Somaliland Chronicle that Mogadishu has been aggressively lobbying regional neighbors to sever ties with Somaliland.

“We were told explicitly that Mogadishu demanded Djibouti refuse any presidential-level meetings,” confirmed a Somali diplomat under condition of anonymity. “Today’s visit represents a significant failure of this strategy.”

This diplomatic offensive has taken increasingly desperate forms. Just last week, Somalia banned entry of Taiwanese passport holders, citing “national sovereignty concerns” – a transparent attempt to punish the Republic of Somaliland for its growing relationship with Taiwan. As Somalia doubles down on isolation tactics, Somaliland has managed to breach the blockade, turning diplomatic endurance into quiet success.

A Clash of Ports: Berbera vs. Djibouti

At the heart of Somaliland-Djibouti tensions lies a stark economic reality: Berbera Port is rising, and Djibouti’s monopoly is fading.

World Bank data starkly illustrates this competitive dynamic: Berbera Port ranks 82nd globally in performance while Djibouti languishes at position 382 out of 385 ports worldwide. The $442 million DP World investment in Berbera threatens to redirect Ethiopian trade away from Djibouti’s ports, which currently handle approximately 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime commerce.

A World Bank “Djibouti Country Economic Memorandum” explicitly warned that Djibouti’s economic model – dependent on a single sector (ports) and single client (Ethiopia) – has become fundamentally “unsustainable,” with Berbera Port identified as the primary competitive threat.

“These aren’t conditions for partnership,” remarked an international trade analyst. “Djibouti sees every shipment that enters Berbera as a strategic loss.”

Cirro’s Priorities Questioned: Why Not Addis First?

Curiously, President Cirro chose Djibouti as his first regional destination rather than Addis Ababa—despite the historic MoU with Ethiopia signed earlier this year. That deal promised Ethiopia naval access via Somaliland, and in exchange, informal diplomatic recognition—though Ethiopia has recently shown signs of retreat under pressure from Mogadishu and Ankara.

“The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is the crown jewel of Somaliland diplomacy,” said a former envoy to Addis. “Why would Cirro start his tour in the capital of the country that has worked hardest to destroy that agreement?”

Multiple sources inside Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry told Somaliland Chronicle there has been no scheduled visit by Cirro to Addis, despite growing concern that Ethiopia may be quietly backpedaling under Somali-Turkish pressure.

Strategic Real Estate: The Battle Over U.S. Military Presence

Adding another layer of complexity is the Republic of Somaliland’s open courtship of American military presence in Berbera – directly challenging another lucrative Djiboutian monopoly on foreign military bases. While Djibouti hosts installations for the United States, China, France, Italy, Japan and Saudi Arabia, collecting billions in lease revenue, Somaliland has positioned Berbera as an alternative strategic location.

US Africa Command has conducted multiple high-profile visits to Berbera, with flight tracking data showing U.S. military transport planes making numerous trips between Djibouti and Berbera in recent months. These movements strongly suggest serious American consideration of establishing a presence that would directly compete with Djibouti’s AFRICOM base.

“Their entire rental economy depends on monopoly,” said a regional defense expert. “A U.S. base in Berbera would collapse the market value of Djibouti’s foreign presence overnight.”

Breaking the Blockade: Cirro’s Second Destination Looms

In a further challenge to Somalia’s isolation strategy, Somaliland Chronicle has learned President Cirro is set to undertake another significant foreign visit immediately following his Djibouti trip. Multiple sources in the Republic of Somaliland confirm the President will travel to another regional neighbor later this week, though the exact destination remains closely guarded for security reasons.

“Somalia has been frantically lobbying this country as well to refuse President Cirro’s visit,” revealed a senior official from Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry. “Their diplomatic corps has been throwing everything at the wall, but it’s not sticking.”

Diplomatic sources indicate Somalia dispatched a high-level delegation to this unnamed country last week specifically to undermine Cirro’s planned visit, offering unspecified concessions in exchange for rebuffing Somaliland’s president. This upcoming visit, if successful, will mark Somalia’s second consecutive diplomatic defeat in a single week, further eroding Mogadishu’s influence in the region.

Can Djibouti Be Trusted?

As President Cirro walks Djibouti’s red carpets today, fundamental questions persist about whether a genuine reset is possible with a neighbor that has systematically worked to undermine the Republic of Somaliland’s core interests. Symbolism alone won’t move the needle in the Republic of Somaliland.

To reset relations, Djibouti must reopen Somaliland’s consulate, end support for separatists, and cease obstructing economic and military cooperation—especially concerning Berbera Port and the potential U.S. presence. Otherwise, this visit risks becoming little more than a photo op in hostile territory.

“Cirro must return with more than diplomatic smiles,” said a veteran Somaliland statesman. “He must bring results. Otherwise, Djibouti’s leopard has not changed its spots—it’s simply hiding them better.”

U.S. CITIZENS IN SOMALIA’S GOVERNMENT — LEGAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

By
Staff
-
0

KEY FINDINGS

  • Multiple American citizens are serving in Somalia’s federal government, including its foreign affairs leadership.
  • These individuals retain active U.S. business interests or property holdings and have not publicly renounced their citizenship.
  • No public records indicate compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) or loss of nationality protocols.
  • U.S. law prohibits undisclosed foreign government service by American citizens.
  • Somalia’s policies—particularly its alignment with the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan—may conflict with the TAIPEI Act of 2019.
  • Comparable cases have led to indictments and convictions in the U.S. under FARA and immigration statutes.

Somalia has long appointed individuals with U.S. ties to influential government roles—particularly within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad) represent prominent examples of this practice.

This Chronicle investigation examines the legal and security implications of American citizens serving in a foreign government increasingly aligned with China and hostile to U.S. strategic partners in the region. These dual nationals maintain business interests and property in the United States while implementing policies that may conflict with U.S. laws and interests.

From potential violations of foreign agent registration requirements to questions about asylum fraud, these cases raise significant legal questions that may soon attract federal scrutiny.

AMERICANS IN MOGADISHU: THE FOREIGN POLICY BEACHHEAD

Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad) represent the new face of Somalia’s government: American citizens who have risen to the pinnacle of power in a country whose policies increasingly diverge from U.S. interests.

Notable U.S. citizens in Somalia’s government include:

  1. Abdisalam Abdi Ali (Foreign Minister) – Confirmed by Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a sitting minister; previously built a healthcare business in Ohio (Ritechoice Healthcare Services, LLC).
  2. Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad) (State Minister, Foreign Affairs) – Former IBM engineer with an MBA from California State University, Fresno; maintains property in North Carolina and has not renounced U.S. citizenship.
  3. Fardowsa Osman Egal Dhore (Minister of Transport) – Served in public roles in both Somalia and the U.S. for over 15 years.
  4. Sacdiya Yasin Haji Samatar (Deputy Speaker, Parliament) – Former healthcare administrator in Minnesota; elected Deputy Speaker in 2022.
  5. Abdilahi Bidhaan Warsame (Minister, Water and Energy) – Leads implementation of national energy and water strategies; prior U.S. ties unconfirmed by official sources but referenced in Somali media.

Somali-American Member of Parliament Ahmed Mohamed Warsame (aka Jama Solob Kayre) lost his U.S. citizenship in 2018 after admitting to immigration fraud related to the Diversity Visa Lottery program, according to documents from the U.S. Department of Justice.

Another case involves Malik Abdalla, a Somali MP and registered foreign agent for Hormuud Telecom. According to FARA records, Abdalla failed to disclose his broader governmental affiliations, raising compliance questions. He previously headed White Star Business Group and may have sought U.S. asylum while occupying Somali government posts.

FROM IBM TO MOGADISHU: ALI BALCAD’S TRANSFORMATION

Mr. Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad), currently Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, brings a tech-industry background to diplomacy. He worked at IBM for nearly 20 years and holds an MBA from California State University, Fresno.

Mr. Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad), Somalia's State Minister for Foreign Affairs

In January 2024, Balcad described the Ethiopia-Somaliland port agreement as a bigger threat to Somalia than Al-Shabaab.

Balcad retains a residence in North Carolina and has not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), despite his policy-making role. He has not confirmed any renunciation of U.S. citizenship.

When contacted for comment, Balcad stated: “My work serves Somalia’s legitimate interests as recognized by the international community. Any suggestion that this conflicts with my American citizenship is misinformed.”

DUAL CITIZENSHIP ACROSS THE HORN

Somaliland, like Somalia, appoints dual citizens to key diplomatic positions. Current Foreign Minister Abdirahman Bakaal previously resided in Minnesota and holds U.S. citizenship. His predecessor, Essa Kayd, had a medical career in Massachusetts.

The key distinction lies in foreign policy alignment. Somaliland has welcomed strategic ties with Taiwan and the United States, whereas Somalia has moved to isolate Taiwan in line with China’s demands.

SOMALIA, CHINA, AND THE TAIWAN QUESTION

Somalia has aligned its foreign policy with Beijing, taking increasingly adversarial positions against Taiwan. In April 2025, Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority banned travelers using Taiwanese passports, citing support for the “One China” principle. The directive prohibits Taiwanese citizens from entering, transiting, or departing through Somalia.

This policy directly contradicts U.S. law. The 2019 TAIPEI Act (Public Law No: 116-135) mandates that the U.S. reevaluate engagement with nations that undermine Taiwan’s diplomatic standing—exposing American officials implementing these policies to potential legal scrutiny.

Meanwhile, Somaliland continues outreach to the U.S. government and has offered port access at Berbera for U.S. military or strategic use—moves that align with U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.

LEGAL EXPOSURE: WHEN DUAL LOYALTY BECOMES A LIABILITY

For Somalia’s American officials, several legal frameworks create significant exposure:

  • Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires U.S. citizens to register if they engage in political or quasi-political activities on behalf of foreign governments.
  • Loss of Nationality statutes (8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)) allow revocation of U.S. citizenship if an individual accepts a policy-level role in a foreign government with intent to relinquish citizenship.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 219 prohibits U.S. citizens from serving in foreign governments without approval from the Secretary of State or Attorney General.
  • International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) enables sanctions against individuals whose activities threaten U.S. interests.
  • Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) can be used against U.S. citizens acting as foreign officials if they engage in corrupt dealings that involve U.S. financial institutions.

THE TOLEDO TRAIL: ABDISALAM’S HEALTHCARE EMPIRE

Before joining Somalia’s cabinet, Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali built a healthcare business in Ohio. He founded Ritechoice Healthcare Services, LLC in 2009 and served as CEO of MedExpress Transportation, a Medicaid-funded non-emergency transport provider, from 2015 to 2019.

Abdisalam Abdi Ali, Somalia's Minister of Foreign Affairs with China's Ambassador to Somalia Wang Yu

These companies operate in highly regulated sectors. Federal oversight requires full disclosure of foreign affiliations—especially for Medicaid-funded entities.

Despite holding a top position in Somalia’s government, Ali has not filed a FARA disclosure. He also continues to list himself as active in Ritechoice Healthcare on public directories.

His spokesperson told the Chronicle: “All business activities have been conducted with full transparency and in compliance with relevant regulations.” However, the statement did not specify whether Ali had divested or recused himself from his U.S. holdings.

PAY-TO-PLAY POLITICS: THE COST OF POWER IN SOMALIA

Somalia’s unique parliamentary system has long been criticized for its lack of transparency and susceptibility to corruption. Elections are not conducted via direct suffrage but through a clan-based system where a few hundred traditional elders and delegates select members of parliament. This unconventional model, intended as a transitional mechanism, has instead become fertile ground for influence-buying and political profiteering.

Selection, not Election. Halane Tent where Somalia's Selections were held.

Transparency International consistently ranks Somalia at the bottom of its Corruption Perceptions Index—placing it 180th out of 180 countries in its 2023 assessment. This pervasive corruption extends deeply into the electoral system, where vote-buying has become normalized.

A New York Times investigation documented how “votes were being bought for up to $30,000 apiece” in Somalia’s parliamentary elections. The article describes the process as “less of an election and more of an auction,” noting that “several sources with knowledge of the process… confirmed that parliamentary seats were essentially being sold.”

The Congressional Research Service, in its briefing to U.S. lawmakers, acknowledges the “allegations of corruption and manipulation” that have plagued Somalia’s electoral processes. Meanwhile, the Lansing Institute reported that Somalia’s electoral system remains “susceptible to vote buying, manipulation, and intimidation,” noting that the indirect voting system “enables corruption, with votes bought with millions of dollars.”

This pattern has significant implications for U.S. citizens serving in Somalia’s government. If American nationals participated in vote-buying to gain political office, they may be in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)—a U.S. law that prohibits bribing foreign officials or facilitating bribery schemes, even abroad. While direct proof is difficult to establish, the systemic nature of corruption in Somalia’s electoral system means entry into politics itself may inherently involve corrupt practices.

The U.S. Department of Justice has previously interpreted the FCPA broadly, applying it to individuals who use foreign payments to secure positions of power that result in personal or business gain, particularly where U.S.-linked assets or institutions are involved. If Somali-American politicians leveraged U.S. businesses, bank accounts, or real estate assets to fund these alleged bribes, they could face scrutiny under federal anti-corruption statutes.

Though no Somali-American officials have been charged with such violations to date, the legal risk adds another layer of potential exposure for U.S. citizens participating in Somalia’s political system.

ENFORCEMENT PRECEDENTS AND SIGNS OF CHANGE

The Department of Justice has recently demonstrated a renewed commitment to enforcing laws governing American citizens who serve foreign governments. This shift signals potential vulnerability for Somalia’s U.S.-citizen officials.

In a high-profile 2024 case, Pierre Girgis, a U.S.-Egyptian dual national, pleaded guilty to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to properly label documents he transmitted on behalf of the Egyptian government. The case marked an unusually aggressive FARA enforcement action against a dual citizen.

Earlier, in 2018, Tom Woewiyu, who had served as Liberia’s Minister of Defense, was convicted of immigration fraud for concealing his role in Liberia’s government on his U.S. citizenship application. The court sentenced him to 30 months in federal prison, establishing clear precedent for prosecuting government officials who misrepresent their foreign service.

Most recently, in January 2025, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York indicted three American citizens serving in Cameroon’s government for failing to register under FARA while lobbying U.S. officials. The indictments specifically noted that dual citizenship does not exempt individuals from FARA’s requirements.

“The Justice Department evaluates each case on its specific merits,” explains Rebecca Roiphe, former federal prosecutor. “But certain patterns consistently trigger enforcement—particularly actions that undermine U.S. foreign policy or security interests in coordination with strategic competitors.”

These cases illustrate a clear pattern: American citizens cannot serve foreign governments without proper transparency and compliance, particularly when those services potentially conflict with U.S. strategic interests. For Somalia’s American officials, the combination of unregistered foreign service, continued U.S. business interests, and implementation of policies contrary to American legislation creates significant legal exposure.

The Somaliland Chronicle contacted both the U.S. Department of State and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar regarding the legal implications of U.S. citizens serving in Somalia’s government. Neither responded to multiple requests for comment on this story.

THE LEGAL RECKONING THAT AWAITS

The American public deserves transparency when U.S. citizens or business owners participate in foreign governments advancing policies that may undermine U.S. foreign policy. Somalia’s diplomatic alignment with the People’s Republic of China—guided in part by American citizens—raises questions of dual loyalty with significant legal implications.

Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali’s case is instructive. Ohio business records show he founded and served as statutory agent for healthcare firms receiving Medicaid funds in Toledo. While implementing Somalia’s foreign policy, he continues to hold financial interests in U.S. entities tied to federal healthcare dollars—an intersection fraught with legal risk under multiple statutes.

State Minister Ali Balcad’s decades-long career at IBM in North Carolina also underscores the dilemma. His technical expertise, honed at a leading U.S. firm, now informs Somalia’s diplomatic posture in ways that may conflict with American regional strategy and the TAIPEI Act of 2019.

Federal agencies—including the Department of Justice, State Department, and Treasury—have tools to address these scenarios, from FARA enforcement to sanctions and citizenship reviews. Precedents suggest these mechanisms are no longer dormant.

As U.S. policymakers scrutinize Somalia’s deepening relationship with Beijing, American citizens embedded in Mogadishu’s government may soon face a stark choice: comply with U.S. law—or confront the legal machinery designed to prevent precisely this kind of conflict.

NOTE: All individuals are presumed innocent unless proven otherwise. This report is based on publicly available records and verified sources. Attempts to contact involved officials for comment were made where feasible.

Somaliland MPs Push Bill Criminalizing Ties with Somalia — But UNSOM, Foreign Diplomats Left Untouched

By
Staff
-
0

HARGEISA, May 11, 2025 — Somaliland’s House of Representatives is advancing legislation that would criminalize virtually all forms of participation in Somalia-related dialogue, marking the most aggressive legal step yet in the territory’s campaign to sever political and symbolic ties with Mogadishu. The bill, obtained by Somaliland Chronicle, was submitted in May 2025 and follows the executive decision announced on April 16 to withdraw entirely from all dialogue with Somalia following Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s provocative visit to Las Anod.

Identified as motion “L/R. /2025” the draft legislation codifies existing political positions into enforceable law, introducing criminal charges, financial prohibitions, and broad media restrictions. Yet, for all its sweeping language, the bill strategically avoids addressing the most persistent contradictions in Somaliland’s foreign policy: continued cooperation with UNSOM, the UN mission legally mandated for Somalia, and the reception of diplomats formally accredited to Mogadishu.

Key Provisions: Legal Threats for Crossing the Line

The bill declares that any Somaliland official who defects to Somalia, whether during or after their public service in Somaliland, is guilty of treason. Charges would be pursued under Penal Code Articles 212, 217, and 184. According to the document:

“Any Somaliland person who serves Somalia or joins Somalia after dismissal from a Somaliland position will be charged with treason under Articles 212, 217, and 184 of the Penal Code, with imprisonment beginning upon their entry into Somaliland’s borders.”

Among the legislation’s other major provisions:

  • Prohibition on all forms of dialogue concerning Somalia’s internal affairs or Somali unity
  • Criminal penalties for citizens who organize, support, or participate in such discussions
  • Revocation of licenses for vehicles or transport used in connection with such activities
  • Sanctions on civil society and media for disseminating messages deemed contrary to Somaliland’s independence
  • A formal ban on accepting or using funds from the Somali Stability Fund (SSF)

A member of parliament who co-sponsored the legislation provided the document to Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “This bill will likely undergo some revisions in committee, but opposition to its core provisions is not expected from either side of the aisle,” the MP said. “There is broad consensus that Somalia’s recent provocations demand a firm legislative response.”

Las Anod as a Turning Point

The motion directly references the government’s April 16 decision to suspend talks with Somalia after Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s visit to Las Anod, where Somalia has been accused of waging a proxy war against Somaliland through local militias since early 2023.

The Las Anod conflict has grown increasingly internationalized, with Somalia providing material and diplomatic support to anti-Somaliland forces, according to Somaliland government officials. In an April 16 statement, Somaliland’s Council of Ministers condemned Barre’s visit as “a direct violation of international law and Somaliland’s territorial integrity” and “political intimidation and conflict incitement that threatens stability in the Horn of Africa.”

Somalia’s recent actions against Somaliland extend beyond the battlefield. On April 22, Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority issued a directive banning Taiwanese passport holders from entering, exiting, or transiting through Somalia. The ban was widely interpreted as an attempt to derail a scheduled high-level Taiwanese diplomatic mission to Somaliland and further evidence of Somalia’s alignment with Beijing in regional affairs.

The Diplomatic Elephant in the Room

While the bill takes explicit aim at the Somalia Stability Fund, it conspicuously fails to address Somaliland’s most glaring diplomatic contradiction: its continuing engagement with UN entities specifically mandated for Somalia and international diplomats accredited solely to Mogadishu.

“Let’s be honest—Somaliland has been kept on a short leash through its addiction to UN aid that’s explicitly earmarked for Somalia,” said a Western diplomatic source with extensive experience in the Horn of Africa, speaking on condition of anonymity. “They want recognition Monday through Friday, but come the weekend, they’re at the UN conference table alongside Puntland and Jubaland with their hand out. Their independence rhetoric is purely for domestic consumption. In private, these same officials who babble endlessly about sovereignty readily accept being treated like a federal member state of Somalia when money is involved. It’s impossible to take their independence claims seriously when they behave this way.”

The financial entanglements extend far beyond the Somalia Stability Fund. Somaliland has for years accepted World Bank funding as an “implementing partner,” while Somalia’s Federal Government serves as the guarantor and signatory to the agreements with both the World Bank and the Multi-Partner Fund. This arrangement legally positions Somaliland as a sub-national entity operating under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

UNSOM and Diplomats: The Silence is Deafening

Though the bill aims to criminalize support for Somali unity, it says nothing about UNSOM’s operations in Somaliland or the reception of foreign diplomats whose accreditation is limited to Somalia. This omission sustains the international community’s convenient fiction that treats Somaliland as just another federal member state.

President of Somaliland, current Abdirahman Cirro, former Presidents Bihi and Silanyo with UNSG Special Representatives James Swan and his predecessor Michael Keating.

When UN officials like James Swan, the current UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Somalia, or his predecessors Michael Keating and Nicholas Haysom, arrive in Hargeisa, they are inevitably introduced with “and Somaliland” tacked onto their Somalia titles. This creates the illusion that they represent both entities equally, despite having presented their credentials exclusively in Mogadishu. This diplomatic fiction has undermined Somaliland’s recognition efforts, as these officials return to their headquarters and file reports that treat Somaliland as just another regional administration within Somalia’s federal system.

US Ambassador to Somalia presenting credentials to Somalia's ex-Foreign Minister and current Defense Minister Fiqi

“When UN officials and foreign diplomats present credentials in Mogadishu and are then welcomed in Hargeisa with a handshake and a press release, we undermine our own cause,” said a senior advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. “This bill draws red lines around minor leaks while the main pipeline of diplomatic ambiguity remains wide open.”

The financial dimension of this dependency is substantial. In 2024 alone, UN agencies and international NGOs working through Somalia-focused programs disbursed approximately $45 million in Somaliland—primarily in health, education, and infrastructure projects—according to Finance Ministry estimates.

This arrangement constitutes a Faustian bargain that no administration has been willing to sever, despite its corrosive effect on sovereignty claims. The government recognizes privately that these relationships undermine Somaliland’s independence narrative, but fears the socioeconomic consequences of rejecting this assistance. The proposed legislation meticulously avoids disrupting these established aid channels.

Toward a Coherent Foreign Policy?

The bill marks an aggressive attempt to correct what officials view as years of inconsistent messaging and policy. Yet its failure to confront the core instruments of international ambiguity—particularly UNSOM and foreign diplomatic protocols—suggests an unwillingness to jeopardize aid pipelines or invite diplomatic fallout.

“This is performative sovereignty,” said a foreign affairs analyst based in Nairobi. “They want to look defiant while keeping the money flowing.”

The international community has exploited this dependency to circumvent addressing Somaliland’s status directly. At Somalia-focused donor conferences and UN coordination meetings, Somaliland representatives find themselves relegated to the same status as officials from Somalia’s federal member states, their objections noted but ultimately disregarded.

For Western governments and UN agencies, Somaliland represents their sole success story in a region where billions in state-building investment have otherwise yielded negligible returns. They showcase Somaliland’s democratic achievements and stability while sidestepping the politically fraught question of recognition.

Next Steps: Politics and Passage

The bill requires endorsement by parliamentary committee, multiple readings, and final approval by President Abdirahman Irro. Sources close to the executive say passage is all but guaranteed given overwhelming political support.

One presidential advisor remarked, “This legislation is less about law and more about signaling. It tells Somalia, and the world, that the page has turned.”

Yet unless future legislation tackles the UNSOM question and forces foreign diplomats to choose between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, Somaliland’s assertion of sovereignty will remain half-measure policy—loud in rhetoric, but compromised in execution.

Somaliland Chronicle will continue following this story as it moves through parliament.

US Congressional Vise Tightens: Somalia’s Taiwan Ban Could Cost It U.S. Support

By
Staff
-
0

Hargeisa, Somaliland — U.S. Senator Jim Risch has delivered a sharp rebuke of Somalia’s ban on Taiwanese passport holders, calling it a clear contradiction between Mogadishu’s claims of sovereignty and its glaring governance failures.

“Somalia bows to China while militants roam freely in its core regions,” Risch tweeted, casting a spotlight on a policy decision that has reverberated across Washington and the Horn of Africa.

In a rare and forceful intervention, Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles issued an ultimatum to Somalia: reverse the April 22 travel ban targeting Taiwanese passport holders or face immediate diplomatic and immigration sanctions.

Their letter to Somalia’s ambassador in Washington condemned the directive as a violation of international norms and a provocation driven by Beijing’s geopolitical agenda. Citing the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (TAIPEI Act) of 2020, the lawmakers warned that the United States is legally obligated to reassess its relationship with governments that undermine Taiwan’s international space.

Outlined consequences include:

  • Termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Somali nationals legally residing in the U.S.
  • Suspension of U.S. visa processing for Somali citizens
  • Possible shuttering of Somalia’s embassy in Washington, effectively freezing bilateral relations

Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority issued the directive on April 22, effective April 30. Airlines were instructed not to carry passengers holding Taiwanese passports for entry, transit, or departure through Somali territory. The move, while framed as an administrative regulation, is widely seen as a geopolitical signal — and a dangerous precedent.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the ban as a restriction on democratic freedoms, enacted under Chinese pressure. Beijing, unsurprisingly, welcomed the move. Its Foreign Ministry described it as a sign that Somalia “firmly abides by the One-China principle.”

Somalia Minister of Defense Ahmed Moalim Fiqi

Somalia’s current Defense Minister tried to justify the decision by accusing Taiwan of opening “an embassy” in Somaliland and training local security forces. Yet those claims stand in stark contrast to Taiwan’s documented development initiatives in Somaliland — which emphasize health, education, and economic investment.

In 2021, Taiwan’s state-owned CPC Corporation acquired a 49% working interest in Somaliland’s SL10B/13 oil block, a resource-rich zone with an estimated two billion barrels of potential reserves. This economic stake underscores Taiwan’s real focus: energy and development — not military influence.

Somalia, which exercises no administrative control over Somaliland, is instead attempting to assert symbolic dominance via aviation regulations. Its control of regional airspace — granted through outdated UN frameworks — is now being used as a tool of isolation against Somaliland.

Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry was blunt: “Somalia is preventing democratic nations from engaging with one another by manipulating international airspace protocols.”

As ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Risch’s critique carries real weight. His comments highlight the absurdity of Somalia investing resources into isolating Taiwan while failing to secure its own capital from Al-Shabaab.

Risch’s influence in Washington is further magnified by his close alliance with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The two veteran lawmakers forged a partnership during their years together on the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees, where they developed a shared worldview on issues ranging from China policy to Taiwan’s international standing. Their coordinated messaging on the Somalia passport ban reflects a seamless alignment between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and State Department on countering Beijing’s growing influence in strategic regions like the Horn of Africa.

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy was even more direct: “Somalia acts like a global power, but remains an international beggar. Its leaders should actually read the TAIPEI Act.”

While Mogadishu pushes diplomatic feuds, it continues to cede large swaths of territory to militants. In the past five weeks alone, U.S. Africa Command has conducted four airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab and ISIS-linked operatives.

This strategic dissonance — attacking travel documents while ignoring real threats — exemplifies why U.S. policymakers are losing patience.

Senators Risch, Ted Cruz, and Rick Scott have introduced the “AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act of 2025,” a bill that would cut U.S. support for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia until accountability measures are met.

Though not explicitly linked to the Taiwan ban, the bill adds further pressure on a government increasingly seen in Washington as unreliable, unserious, and unaccountable.

This diplomatic escalation unfolds against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s January 2025 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to 20 kilometers of coastline. Somalia’s response — aligning with Turkey and Egypt and intensifying pressure on Somaliland — signals a broader campaign to block Somaliland’s international partnerships by any means available.

In this context, the Taiwan passport ban is not an isolated measure — it’s a piece of a deliberate, multi-pronged effort to isolate a self-governing territory that has functioned independently since 1991.

The ban is just the latest in Somalia’s long-standing strategy: use international legitimacy to enforce symbolic control over Somaliland while failing to provide services, security, or governance.

At the African Union and United Nations, Somalia routinely invokes territorial integrity to block any discussion of Somaliland’s legal claim to statehood — even as its actual governance stops far short of Somaliland’s borders.

By co-opting international regulatory frameworks like airspace control, Somalia is extending its writ far beyond its administrative reach — an act of diplomatic theater that undermines both sovereignty and stability.

While Somaliland has remained largely quiet, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed it is working with the Somaliland government to push back against Somalia’s action. A joint statement urged democratic governments to challenge the misuse of international mechanisms to restrict travel and interaction.

The coordination points to a mature bilateral relationship — one rooted in common values and mutual strategic interests.

“Somalia’s alignment with Beijing’s anti-Taiwan agenda has crossed a red line for American lawmakers,” a senior Washington diplomat told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “There’s growing evidence this wasn’t Somalia’s decision — it was Beijing’s choreography.”

The move came just days after Chinese state media praised Somalia’s loyalty to the One-China policy. It also came without any internal debate or legal review inside Somalia — raising questions about sovereignty in practice.

As Senator Risch noted, the contradiction is glaring: a government that cannot secure its own roads now claims the authority to deny entry over airspace it does not control.

“Somalia is playing geopolitical chess without the protections of real sovereignty,” said a Western diplomat in Nairobi. “In this contest between superpowers, Mogadishu has positioned itself as a pawn — but it’s pretending to be a king.”

Developing story: Somaliland Chronicle will continue monitoring the situation.

Stern Ultimatum from U.S. Congress: Reverse Taiwan Travel Ban or Face Sanctions, Lawmakers Warn Somalia

By
Staff
-
0

Hargeisa/Washington — In a dramatic escalation of tensions, two senior members of the U.S. Congress have delivered an uncompromising message to Somalia: repeal the recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders or face tangible diplomatic and immigration reprisals.

Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles issued a blistering letter to Somalia’s ambassador in Washington, condemning the April 22 directive that bars individuals with Taiwanese documents from entering, transiting, or departing via Somali territory.

Invoking the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (TAIPEI Act), the lawmakers underscored that Somalia’s decision violates a cornerstone of U.S. policy: defending Taiwan’s international space. Passed in 2020, the TAIPEI Act not only authorizes but obliges the United States to reassess relationships with foreign governments that actively undermine Taiwan.

“Somalia’s alignment with Beijing’s anti-Taiwan agenda has crossed a red line for American lawmakers,” a diplomatic source in Washington told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “What Mogadishu perhaps failed to anticipate is that there are real consequences to becoming China’s proxy in the Horn of Africa.”

The potential repercussions outlined in the letter are substantial:

  • Revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of Somali nationals currently residing legally in the United States
  • Suspension of visa processing for Somalis seeking education, healthcare, or family reunification in America
  • Possible closure of Somalia’s embassy in Washington, effectively severing diplomatic ties at the highest level

Growing evidence suggests the ban was not Somalia’s sovereign decision, but one choreographed to curry favor with Beijing. The directive came just days after Chinese state media lauded Somalia’s loyalty to the so-called “One-China” principle — a political fiction that Beijing aggressively pushes to isolate Taiwan internationally.

This move starkly contrasts with how Somaliland, though unrecognized internationally, has boldly conducted its own foreign policy by deepening its relationship with Taiwan. The two established representative offices in 2020, and since then, Taiwan has poured resources into Somaliland’s agriculture, health, and education sectors — all without asking Somaliland to play puppet.

“Somalia’s government seems willing to mortgage its foreign policy for praise from a regime half a world away,” said a Horn of Africa policy expert familiar with the matter. “The irony is that an unrecognized territory like Somaliland manages to engage Taiwan with dignity, while Mogadishu behaves like an occupied satellite.”

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy didn’t mince words either. “One would think Somalia is a powerful nation instead of an international beggar which depends on others for security with its arrogant banning of travelers using Taiwan documents. Its ‘leaders’ should read the U.S. TAIPEI Act,” he posted on X (formerly Twitter).

Somali officials have remained silent. But Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has publicly acknowledged the congressional support and reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen ties with Somaliland.

For Mogadishu, the risks are no longer theoretical. Somalia relies heavily on U.S. aid, diplomatic backing at the UN, and security cooperation. A rupture with Washington would have seismic effects beyond visas — it could destabilize key programs tied to security, governance, and debt relief.

“Somalia is playing a dangerous game of geopolitical chess without the protections that come with real sovereignty,” noted a Western diplomat in the region. “In this contest between superpowers, Mogadishu has positioned itself as a pawn — but it’s pretending to be a king.”

Developing story: Somaliland Chronicle will continue to monitor this situation as it unfolds.

Somaliland’s Global Posture Under President Irro: A 100-Day Foreign Diplomacy Review

By
Staff
-
0

On November 13, 2024, Somaliland’s political landscape shifted dramatically as President Irro claimed victory in a highly contested election, ousting the incumbent President Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye Party, which had dominated Somaliland’s politics since 2010. Irro’s win was nothing short of a landslide, garnering 63% of the vote against his rival. He campaigned on a platform focused on foreign diplomacy, which sharply contrasted with Somaliland’s established foreign policy.

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Irro’s approach was the Wadani Party’s commitment to pursuing dialogue and reconciliation with Somalia. This stance, however, raised eyebrows among many Somalilanders, as it appeared to challenge the region’s sovereignty and aspirations for international recognition. Additionally, Irro criticized the existing Somaliland-Taiwan relations, arguing that they hindered potential ties with China, a country that holds veto power in the UN Security Council and officially considers Somaliland part of Somalia.

The Wadani Party also voiced concerns over a maritime deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, labeling it a bold yet risky diplomatic maneuver. Irro’s electoral success coincided with a turbulent period for Somaliland, as domestic and foreign relations faced severe scrutiny, particularly following the Las Anod debacle and the Somali proxy conflict that had erupted in response to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This turmoil created a disillusioned electorate, evident in the stark decline in voter turnout compared to previous elections.

In the 2017 elections, an impressive 81% of registered voters—620,000 out of 759,000—cast their ballots. Kulmiye emerged victorious, with strong participation from Somaliland citizens. However, by 2024, voter turnout plummeted to just 53%, with only 633,000 out of 1.2 million registered voters participating. This significant decrease highlighted that many Kulmiye supporters chose to abstain, further emphasizing the fractures within Somaliland’s political fabric.

For the first time, the electoral process in Somaliland faced external influence from regional actors, including Djibouti, China, and Somalia, all of whom were rumored to have financially supported the Wadani Party. The Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum, a prominent NGO, underscored the urgent need for legal reforms to prohibit illicit foreign funding of political parties during elections, emphasizing that “Somaliland law currently lacks provisions against foreign financial donations to election campaigns, a pressing issue for constitutional reform.”

Despite his background as a former acting ambassador before the Somali state collapse and a long tenure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the early 1980s, Irro’s new government surprised many with its composition. A notable majority comprised individuals aligned with the Icrisaam wing, and some key ministerial appointments were puzzling, such as a foreign affairs minister whose experience was limited to running a daycare center in the U.S. Expectations were high that Irro’s diplomatic expertise would steer Somaliland in a new and promising direction, yet the unfolding events within the first 100 days of his administration left many questioning the future trajectory of the nation. On that note, let’s take a closer look at Irro’s foreign diplomacy and its influence on Somaliland’s economy and international standing since he assumed office.

Somalia Government Aggression against Somaliland Sovereignty: The bizarre situation involving the Wadani Party and the Irro administration continues as they stubbornly pursue talks between Somalia and Somaliland—a move that serves as a political lever for Somalia against Somaliland’s quest for sovereignty and international recognition. To complicate matters, Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza recently visited Las Anod, a blatant infringement on the sovereignty that Somaliland claims. This visit adds to the backdrop of a two-year proxy war, during which the Las Anod militia and Al-Shabaab have been employed to destabilize Somaliland.

In response, Somaliland issued a statement condemning this act. Somalia, undeterred by Somaliland’s diplomatic outcry, intensified its aggression by unlawfully seizing individuals from the Las Anod militia—innocent Isaaq civilians who were kidnapped and tortured, then labeled as prisoners of war. Instead of processing these captives through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Somalia quietly dispatched them to Hargeisa, where the Irro administration acquiesced without protest.

One might wonder why the Irro administration didn’t reject such an illegal transfer of abducted individuals. From a humanitarian standpoint, one could argue that their decision was the correct one. However, they failed to prepare a report on human rights violations and invite the ICRC to document these abuses, which could serve as a legal liability against the Somali government. Regrettably, the Irro administration opted for a policy of appeasement, choosing not to disrupt relations with Somalia, even in the face of blatant aggression toward Somaliland’s sovereignty.

What’s particularly shocking is that, rather than withdrawing from the talks altogether—a move that might have garnered serious attention from the international community—the Somaliland government chose to suspend the dialogue instead. Furthermore, what will become of the special envoy appointed by the Irro government to facilitate the Somaliland-Somalia discussions? Given his ties to Hassan Sheikh, will they consider dismissing him altogether? The situation remains fraught with uncertainty and potential consequences.

Somaliland Foreign Diplomacy toward Türkiye Enframement; Turkey, acting as an imperial mediator, has been actively promoting talks between Somalia and Somaliland. In 2018, Turkey appointed Dr. Onamed as its special envoy for these negotiations and has established a consulate in Hargeisa. Despite the ongoing discussions failing to yield significant results, Turkey has escalated its diplomatic maneuvers concerning Somaliland, subtly undermining its sovereignty. A telling example is the fact that Somaliland citizens are compelled to acquire Somali government passports to travel to Turkey, including politicians from Somaliland holding government positions. In stark contrast, Somaliland residents must visit the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu to secure a Turkish visa, while politicians can obtain a visa in Hargeisa only after securing a Somali passport. This is in direct opposition to the UAE, which recognizes Somaliland passports and issues visas accordingly. Furthermore, the administration of Hassan Sheikh has sought Turkish assistance to facilitate Somalia-Ethiopia maritime talks, culminating in the controversial Ankara Deal. Under this agreement, Somalia has granted 30% of its oil, gas, and fishing revenue rights from its marine resources over the next decade, encroaching upon the maritime claims of Somaliland. Strikingly, no Somaliland politician or government official has raised objections to this blatant violation of sovereignty. While the hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia has been addressed through the Ankara Deal, finalization is still pending due to unresolved technical details. Interestingly, although the specifics of these negotiations have not been officially disclosed, reports from Turkish media indicate that Turkey is further undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty. During the initial round of technical discussions between Ethiopia and Somalia, overseen by Turkey, several critical topics emerged: Somalia aims to control customs revenue from ports in Somaliland that Ethiopia intends to use; the Somali government insists on co-signing port management agreements for any ports in Somaliland utilized by Ethiopia; and Somalia is pushing for the use of Somali passports for Somaliland citizens traveling to Ethiopia, alongside ensuring Ethiopia acquires permits and pays applicable fees for any access to Somali territory and trade via land, sea, and air. One might argue that these agreements would be unacceptable for the Somaliland government under Irro, yet no protests have emerged against the Ankara declaration that undermines the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU. Moreover, in January and March of 2025, the Turkish parliament approved two significant legislations. The January decision extended Turkey’s naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, including Somali waters, which Somaliland is inherently a part of. This allows Turkey to patrol Somaliland’s maritime areas without consent, an action that could infringe on Somaliland’s sovereignty, though its political leaders have shown little concern. In March, Turkey’s parliament controversially ratified a hydrocarbon agreement covering both onshore and offshore territories of Somalia, which included Somaliland. The government of Abdirahman Irro remained silent in the face of this agreement, which clearly violates their claimed sovereignty and rights to resources. At the very least, Abdirahman Irro’s foreign minister should have summoned the Turkish consul in Hargeisa to demand clarification, asserting that Somaliland’s sovereignty is non-negotiable.

Somalia’s Monopoly on Somaliland Livestock Exports; The tug-of-war between Somalia and Somaliland has intensified, particularly in the livestock export sector, which Somalia has weaponized to assert its dominance. This ongoing proxy and diplomatic conflict has evolved into an economic battle, with Somalia pressuring importing countries to obtain livestock exports from its transitional government, sidelining Somaliland’s traders. In December 2024, a significant escalation occurred when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud granted exclusive rights to Abu-Yasir, a foreign businessman, allowing him to export Somalia’s livestock, including that from Somaliland. This decision sparked widespread protests among Somaliland livestock traders, who faced devastating economic consequences.

The disruption affected the entire supply chain, from pastoralists to middlemen and traders, putting a strain on Somaliland’s economy. To put the economic impact into perspective, Somaliland exported a total of 3,802,903 livestock in 2024, averaging about 950,726 per quarter. In stark contrast, during the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), Somaliland managed to export less than 722,000 livestock, marking a staggering 76% drop. If this trend continues, which seems likely, the ramifications will be severe—given that livestock exports constitute 45% to 60% of Somaliland’s GDP, a continued decline could result in a catastrophic 34% drop in GDP, leading to significant economic losses. In response to these challenges, the Somaliland government revoked the operating license of a prominent livestock inspection facility in Berbera, accusing its Arab owner of overstepping boundaries. Unfortunately, the Somaliland government has yet to implement effective economic policies to counter this overt economic assault. There is an urgent need for investment in modernizing the livestock sector, including establishing cold chain facilities and abattoirs for exporting meat to Ethiopia, which has a substantial demand. Such initiatives would help reduce dependency on live livestock exports and preserve the economic value that is currently under threat.

Russia Interest in Somaliland; In February 2025, the diplomatic landscape was jolted by a surprising move from Somaliland President Irro and his administration, who chose to extend a welcome to Russian politician Igor Morozov. This decision raised eyebrows, particularly given Morozov’s US and UK sanctions and his notorious role in destabilizing Ukraine, along with his close ties to Putin. At the same time, legislators in the UK and US were making progress toward recognizing Somaliland, adding a layer of complexity to the situation.

To complicate matters further, the Russian ambassador to Somalia and Djibouti submitted a request for a visit from the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, seeking to strengthen ties with Somaliland. However, the Foreign Ministry of Somaliland subtly declined the invitation, offering a vague excuse that only deepened the uncertainty surrounding the nation’s foreign diplomacy. This sequence of events—going from inviting a sanctioned Russian politician to dodging a meeting with a high-ranking Russian official—underscores the urgent need for a clearer strategy and more cohesive direction in Somaliland’s foreign relations.

China’s Diplomatic Aggression Towards Somaliland and Taiwan: Despite its minimal contributions of trivial food aid to Somalia, which pale in comparison to the billions provided by the UK, EU, and US for sustainable peace and development, China seems to enjoy preferential treatment in Somalia’s foreign policy. Alarmingly, China is reportedly funding the Las Anod militia in Somaliland, which threatens to destabilize its state-building efforts and undermines Somaliland’s commitment to maintaining its diplomatic and trade relations with Taiwan. On April 29th, China pressured Somalia to refuse entry or transit for Taiwanese citizens through their territory and to halt any Taiwanese aviation’s over Somaliland airspace. This maneuver followed China’s discovery of a planned visit by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister to Somaliland, prompting Beijing to coerce Somaliland into issuing a ban on Taiwanese passports. This situation serves as a litmus test not only for the Somaliland-Taiwan relationship but also for their sovereignty and the freedom of movement. In response, Taiwan has vehemently protested and is taking steps to counter China’s encroachments, highlighting its determination to uphold its rights.

Furthermore, the situation raises concerns about Somaliland’s earlier decision to allow Somalia to manage its airspace—a strategic blunder that dates back to 2012 when the International Air Transport Association (IATA) granted Somalia control over it. This move has been criticized as the most significant political misstep Somaliland has made since 1960, essentially handing over its aviation sovereignty to a rival without guarantees.

Now, the consequences of that decision are becoming apparent. President Irro, who has previously criticized the Somaliland-Taiwan dynamic, will face critical challenges in his tenure. To demonstrate his commitment to sovereignty and solidarity with Taiwan, he must take decisive diplomatic action: 1. Jointly issue a protest letter with Taiwan against China’s encroachment on their sovereignty and freedom of movement. 2. Expel illegal Chinese companies and traders operating in Somaliland. 3. File a formal complaint with IATA, providing evidence of Somalia’s violation of aviation agreements from the 2012 London talks. Failure to act could not only jeopardize the relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan but could also label him as a puppet of Chinese interests. The time for decisive leadership is now; the future of Somaliland and Taiwan’s partnership hangs in the balance, and the world is watching closely.

Finaly, in his first 100 days in office, Irro faced significant challenges in Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy, falling short of major expectations set by his government, which might just earn a grade of D. However, this early phase marks a crucial turning point; he has the opportunity and room to improve his diplomatic efforts. A critical starting point would be reforming the foreign ministry, which is currently run from his office due to the appointment of an inept minister. Securing a competent foreign minister is vital at this juncture and for the future.

Furthermore, Irro could strengthen relations with Taiwan, especially as Somaliland finds itself under China threat. A visit to Taiwan could pave the way for tangible bilateral trade, focusing on sectors like aviation finance, security, and mineral development. This scenario presents a golden opportunity to lobby with Taiwan in the USA, promoting Somaliland’s deep-sea critical minerals through a partnership with Taiwan. Tying this into U.S. legislation, such as the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, could lead to a trilateral partnership between the USA, Taiwan, and Somaliland. With the Trump administration positioning itself as a global leader in critical minerals amidst the rising challenges of artificial intelligence and chip technology, this could strengthen Somaliland-Taiwan relations under U.S. protection against Chinese aggression and Turkish illegal hydrocarbon deal with Somalia.

Such a trilateral deal would bolster Somaliland’s aspirations for international recognition while safeguarding its sovereignty against Somalia’s aggressive posturing. Irro has the chance to lift Somaliland out of the dreamland bubble it has been trapped in for the past 30 years, a mindset that has normalized the idea that Somalia poses no threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty and prosperity. In reality, Somalia declared war on Somaliland long ago, and its aggression has only intensified, raising fears of a second iteration of the Isaaq genocide, with the use of Turkish drones, Al-Shabaab, and foreign mercenaries reminiscent of Siad Barre’s regime.

If Irro’s government fails to enhance Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy both geopolitically and geoeconomically, it would only reinforce the perception that the Wadani Party has always leaned toward unionism, desperately waiting for a call from the Mogadishu mayor, run by Ugandan overlordship sitting in Kampala. The time is now for Irro to seize the moment and chart a new course for Somaliland on the global stage.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Guled Ahmed is a Resident Scholar with the Middle East Institute and an expert in Horn of Africa Security and Development.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

Creative Commons License

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

1...456...95Page 5 of 95
2,134FansLike
11,078FollowersFollow

About us

Most recent

Most popular

Subscribe

Visit Store

© Somaliland Chronicle - All rights reserved. We are a news website designed to bring you in-depth news, analysis, and more from #Somaliland. Send us tips or hate mail to info@somalilandchronicle.com