Sheryl Sandberg and Top Facebook Execs Silenced an Enemy of Turkey to Prevent a Hit to the Company’s Business

April 25, 2021

by Jack Gillum and Justin Elliott, ProPublica.

As Turkey launched a military offensive against Kurdish minorities in neighboring Syria in early 2018, Facebook’s top executives faced a political dilemma.

Turkey was demanding the social media giant block Facebook posts from the People’s Protection Units, a mostly Kurdish militia group the Turkish government had targeted. Should Facebook ignore the request, as it has done elsewhere, and risk losing access to tens of millions of users in Turkey? Or should it silence the group, known as the YPG, even if doing so added to the perception that the company too often bends to the wishes of authoritarian governments?

It wasn’t a particularly close call for the company’s leadership, newly disclosed emails show.

“I am fine with this,” wrote Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s No. 2 executive, in a one-sentence message to a team that reviewed the page. Three years later, YPG’s photos and updates about the Turkish military’s brutal attacks on the Kurdish minority in Syria still can’t be viewed by Facebook users inside Turkey.

The conversations, among other internal emails obtained by ProPublica, provide an unusually direct look into how tech giants like Facebook handle censorship requests made by governments that routinely limit what can be said publicly. When the Turkish government attacked the Kurds in the Afrin District of northern Syria, Turkey also arrested hundreds of its own residents for criticizing the operation.

Publicly, Facebook has underscored that it cherishes free speech: “We believe freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, and we work hard to protect and defend these values around the world,” the company wrote in a blog post last month about a new Turkish law requiring that social media firms have a legal presence in the country. “More than half of the people in Turkey rely on Facebook to stay in touch with their friends and family, to express their opinions and grow their businesses.”

But behind the scenes in 2018, amid Turkey’s military campaign, Facebook ultimately sided with the government’s demands. Deliberations, the emails show, were centered on keeping the platform operational, not on human rights. “The page caused us a few PR fires in the past,” one Facebook manager warned of the YPG material.

The Turkish government’s lobbying on Afrin-related content included a call from the chairman of the BTK, Turkey’s telecommunications regulator. He reminded Facebook “to be cautious about the material being posted, especially photos of wounded people,” wrote Mark Smith, a U.K.-based policy manager, to Joel Kaplan, Facebook’s vice president of global public policy. “He also highlighted that the government may ask us to block entire pages and profiles if they become a focal point for sharing illegal content.” (Turkey considers the YPG a terrorist organization, although neither the U.S. nor Facebook do.)

The company’s eventual solution was to “geo-block,” or selectively ban users in a geographic area from viewing certain content, should the threats from Turkish officials escalate. Facebook had previously avoided the practice, even though it has become increasingly popular among governments that want to hide posts from within their borders.

Facebook confirmed to ProPublica that it made the decision to restrict the page in Turkey following a legal order from the Turkish government — and after it became clear that failing to do so would have led to its services in the country being completely shut down. The company said it had been blocked before in Turkey, including a half-dozen times in 2016.

The content that Turkey deemed offensive, according to internal emails, included photos on Facebook-owned Instagram of “wounded YPG fighters, Turkish soldiers and possibly civilians.” At the time, the YPG slammed what it understood to be Facebook’s censorship of such material. “Silencing the voice of democracy: In light of the Afrin invasion, YPG experience severe cyberattacks.” The group has published graphic images, including photos of mortally wounded fighters; “this is the way NATO ally Turkey secures its borders,” YPG wrote in one post.

Facebook spokesman Andy Stone provided a written statement in response to questions from ProPublica.

“We strive to preserve voice for the greatest number of people,” the statement said. “There are, however, times when we restrict content based on local law even if it does not violate our community standards. In this case, we made the decision based on our policies concerning government requests to restrict content and our international human rights commitments. We disclose the content we restrict in our twice-yearly transparency reports and are evaluated by independent experts on our international human rights commitments every two years.”

The Turkish embassy in Washington said it contends the YPG is the “Syrian offshoot” of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which the U.S. government considers to be a terrorist organization.

Facebook has considered the YPG page politically sensitive since at least 2015, emails show, when officials discovered the page was inaccurately marked as verified with a blue check mark. In turn, “that created negative coverage on Turkish pro-government media,” one executive wrote. When Facebook removed the check mark, it in turn “created negative coverage [in] English language media including on Huffington Post.”

In 2018, the review team, which included global policy chief Monika Bickert, laid out the consequences of a ban. The company could set a bad example for future cases and take flak for its decision. “Geo-blocking the YPG is not without risk — activists outside of Turkey will likely notice our actions, and our decision may draw unwanted attention to our overall geo-blocking policy,” said one email in late January.

But this time, the team members said, the parties were embroiled in an armed conflict and Facebook officials worried their platform could be shut down entirely in Turkey. “We are in favor of geo-blocking the YPG content,” they wrote, “if the prospects of a full-service blockage are great.” They prepared a “reactive” press statement: “We received a valid court order from the authorities in Turkey requiring us to restrict access to certain content. Following careful review, we have complied with the order,” it said.

Email from Joel Kaplan to Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg that says, "FYI that we have received an order from the Turkish government to take down the page of the Kurdish organization YPG. The team's recommendation, which Elliot and I agree with, is to hold off taking action on the YPG page until we receive further notice from the Turkish government that they will block us, but to move immediately to geo-block the page in Turkey if we do receive a blocking threat. Please let us know if you have any concerns with this approach."

In a nine-page ruling by Ankara’s 2nd Criminal Judgeship of Peace, government officials listed YPG’s Facebook page among several hundred social media URLs they considered problematic. The court wrote that the sites should be blocked to “protect the right to life or security of life and property, ensure national security, protect public order, prevent crimes, or protect public health,” according to a copy of the order obtained by ProPublica.

Kaplan, in a Jan. 26, 2018, email to Sandberg and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, confirmed that the company had received a Turkish government order demanding that the page be censored, although it wasn’t immediately clear if officials were referring to the Ankara court ruling. Kaplan advised the company to “immediately geo-block the page” should Turkey threaten to block all access to Facebook.

Email from Joel Kaplan that says, in part, "We are wary of setting the precedent that we will geo-block an opposition group's content simply because a government has deemed the organization to be illegal. However, those concerns are alleviated here as the YPG is engaged in armed conflict with the Turkish military …. Thus, we are in favor of geo-blocking the YPG content …."

Sandberg, in a reply to Kaplan, Zuckerberg and others, agreed. (She had been at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, touting Facebook’s role in assisting victims of natural disasters.)

“Facebook can’t bow to authoritarians to suppress political dissidents and then claim to be just ‘following legal orders,’” said Sen. Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat who’s a prominent Facebook critic. “American companies need to stand up for universal human rights, not just hunt for bigger profits. Mark Zuckerberg has called for big changes to U.S. laws protecting free speech at the same time he protected far-right slime merchants in the U.S. and censored dissidents in Turkey. His priority has been protecting the powerful and Facebook’s bottom line, even if it means marginalized groups pay the price.”

In a statement to ProPublica, the YPG said censorship by Facebook and other social media platforms “is on an extreme level.”

“YPG has actively been using social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and others since its foundation,” the group said. “YPG uses social media to promote its struggle against jihadists and other extremists who attacked and are attacking Syrian Kurdistan and northern Syria. Those platform[s] have a crucial role in building a public presence and easily reaching communities across the world. However, we have faced many challenges on social media during these years.”

Cutting off revenue from Turkey could harm Facebook financially, regulatory filings suggest. Facebook includes revenue from Turkey and Russia in the figure it gives for Europe overall and the company reported a 34% increase for the continent in annual revenue per user, according to its 2019 annual report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Yaman Akdeniz, a founder of the Turkish Freedom of Expression Association, said the YPG block was “not an easy case because Turkey sees the YPG as a terror organization and wants their accounts to be blocked from Turkey. But it just confirms that Facebook doesn’t want to challenge these requests, and it was prepared to act.”

“Facebook has a transparency problem,” he said.

In fact, Facebook doesn’t reveal to users that the YPG page is explicitly banned. When ProPublica tried to access YPG’s Facebook page using a Turkish VPN — to simulate browsing the internet from inside the country — a notice read: “The link may be broken, or the page may have been removed.” The page is still available on Facebook to people who view the site through U.S. internet providers.

For its part, Facebook reported about 15,300 government requests worldwide for content restrictions during the first half of 2018. Roughly 1,600 came from Turkey during that period, company data shows, accounting for about 10% of requests globally. In a brief post, Facebook said it restricted access to 1,106 items in response to requests from Turkey’s telecom regulator, the courts and other agencies, “which covers a range of offenses including personal rights violations, personal privacy, defamation of [first Turkish president Mustafa Kemal] Ataturk, and laws on the unauthorized sale of regulated goods.”

Katitza Rodriguez, policy director for global privacy at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said the Turkish government has also managed to force Facebook and other platforms into appointing legal representatives in the country. If tech companies don’t comply, she said, Turkish taxpayers would be prevented from placing ads and making payments to Facebook. Because Facebook is a member of the Global Network Initiative, Rodriguez said, it has pledged to uphold the group’s human rights principles.

“Companies have an obligation under international human rights law to respect human rights,” she said.

This article is republished from ProPublica under a Creative Commons license.

The United States Appoints a Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa

Staff

April 23, 2021

The United States Department of State, in a statement, announced the appointment of Mr. Jeffrey Feltman as the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa. The appointment of the envoy comes at a time of heightened tension between Ethiopia and Sudan on the dispute of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam known as GERD and the worsening humanitarian crises in the Tigray region of Ethiopia following the military campaign against the TPLF.

Amnesty International and other human rights bodies have alleged wide-scale human rights violations, including extrajudicial killing of unarmed civilians, rapes, and the displacement of thousands of civilians from Tigray. Although the Ethiopian government has previously denied the involvement of Eritrean forces in the Tigray campaign, it has recently asked the Eritrean forces to withdraw, it still denies allegations of human rights abuses in Axum and other parts of Tigray by Ethiopian or Eritrean forces.

“Of particular concern are the volatile situation in Ethiopia, including the conflict in Tigray; escalating tension between Ethiopia and Sudan; and the dispute around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” the statement said.

The statement does not mention the renewed political and security crises in Somalia following the term extension of President Mohamed Abdillahi Farmajo’s mandate by the Lower House of the Parliament. The term extension has been unanimously denounced by the International Community where some countries including the United States have threatened sanctions.

Mr. Feldman is an experienced diplomat who served as an Ambassador to Lebanon and as former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and is currently a member of MEI‘s Board of Governors. Many regional analysts have suggested the appointment of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to bring a direct engagement of the region’s many complexities beyond the traditional diplomatic channels.

Offshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: what went wrong

Staff

April 21, 2021

Theo Neethling, University of the Free State

Recent events in Palma, a town in the volatile Cabo Delgado province in the north of Mozambique, have taken bloodshed in the region to new levels. Dozens of people were killed when hundreds of Islamist militants stormed the town on Wednesday, 25 March. They targeted shops, banks, and military barracks.

The attack has been devastating for the people living in the area – as well as the country. The escalating violence has already left at least a thousand dead and displaced hundreds of thousands more.

The conflict has put a temporary lid on plans that have been in the making for more than a decade since rich liquefied natural gas (LNG) deposits were discovered in the Rovuma Basin, just off the coast of Cabo Delgado. Western majors like Total, Exxon Mobil, Chevron and BP entered the Mozambique LNG industry as well as Japan’s Mitsui, Malaysia’s Petronas and China’s CNPC.

The gas projects are estimated to be worth US$60 billion in total. Some observers recently predicted that Mozambique could become one of the top ten LNG producers in the world.

The development of the projects had led to the area becoming a hive of economic activity.

The plan was for Palma to become a LNG manufacturing hub where hundreds of skilled workers would be located. And, more broadly, the hope was that it would drive the rapid advancement of a country that ranks close to the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index. More than 70% of the population have been classified as “multidimensionally poor” by the United Nations Development Programme.

The LNG projects in the northern Cabo Delgado area represented a silver lining of hope. Since 2012 the major multinational energy companies have spent billions of dollars on developing the offshore gas sites. Today, offshore exploration in the Cabo Delgado area includes Africa’s three largest LNG projects. These are the Mozambique LNG Project (involving Total and previously Anadarko) worth $20 billion; the Coral FLNG Project (involving Eni and Exxon Mobil) worth $4.7 billion; and the Rovuma LNG Project (involving Exxon Mobil, Eni and CNPC) worth $30 billion.

Production was scheduled to start in 2024 but intensifying attacks near the gas site on the Afungi peninsula are now posing serious challenges to the production time lines.

There have been no material benefits for the people of Cabo Delgado thus far. Moreover, many local people feel deeply aggrieved because many were evicted and had to relocate soon after the discovery of gas in Cabo Delgado to make way for LNG infrastructure development.

History of instability

Cabo Delgado is Mozambique’s most northern province. Neglected over many years, the people who live there have been politically marginalised. And the area is underdeveloped.

Since independence in 1975 investment, and rising incomes, were largely confined to the capital Maputo in the south as well as the southern parts of the country.

In addition, the central government in Maputo has only had a fragile and precarious control over the territory and borders of the country. A 16-year civil war that involved clashes between the central government and Renamo, a militant organisation and political movement during the liberation struggle and now opposition party, claimed more than a million lives.

More recently, since 2017, the militant Islamic movement, Ansar al-Sunna, locally known as Al-Shabaab, has been active in Cabo Delgado. It now poses the biggest security threat in the country, rendering some of the northern parts almost ungovernable.

The militants took advantage of the Mozambican government’s failure to exercise control over the entire territory of the country.

Ansar al-Sunna reportedly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2018. It was acknowledged as an affiliate of ISIS-Core in August 2019. In view of this, the US Department of State has designated Ansar al-Sunna Mozambique, which it refers to as ISIS-Mozambique, as a foreign terrorist organisation.

What makes this armed force so significant is that the movement has orchestrated a series of large scale and targeted attacks. In 2020 this led to the temporary capturing of the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado.

In addition, the turbulence caused by the militants’ attacks has displaced nearly 670,000 people within northern Mozambique. Obviously, foreign companies in the LNG industry with their considerable investments feel threatened, especially at the current stage where final investment decisions have to be taken.

In recent months the situation in Cabo Delgado has gone from bad to worse. In November 2020, dozens of people were reportedly beheaded by the militants. Now the bloodshed has spread to Palma.

Amid the development of an increasingly alarming human rights situation towards the end of last year, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, appealed for urgent measures to protect civilians. She described the situation as “desperate” and one of “grave human rights abuses”. Bachelet also stated that more than 350,000 people had been displaced since 2018.

Growing risk

There is little doubt that Islamist insurgents are increasing the scale of their activities in Cabo Delgado. A lack of governance and a proper security response by both the Mozambican government and southern African leaders make this a case of high political risk for the LNG industry.

The escalation of the insurgency can potentially jeopardise the successful unlocking of Mozambique’s resource wealth. Until now, the main LNG installations and sites have not been targeted, but the attacks in Palma have brought the turbulence dangerously close to some of the installations.

The Mozambican armed forces are clearly stretched beyond the point where they can protect the local communities. A part of the solution lies in Southern African Development Community or at least South African military support to stabilise Cabo Delgado and restore law and order in the short term. Wider international support might even be necessary.

But this would require the Mozambican government to change its stance by allowing multinational foreign military forces on its soil.

At the same time, a long term solution should be pursued. This will require better governance of the northern areas and the local people in what has been called a forgotten province.

It is clear that Cabo Delgado is an area which the central government in Maputo is unable to control, govern effectively, or even influence. In short, weak state institutions – including weak armed forces – are key to the problems of Mozambique and specifically the turbulence in the northern parts.

Theo Neethling, Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

New Guidelines for U.S. Government Interactions with Taiwan Counterparts

Staff

April 10, 2021

Secretary Of State Rex Tillerson Hosts Romanian President Klaus Iohannis At The State Department — WASHINGTON, DC - JUNE 09: A view of the State Department seal on the podium before Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson appear for a photo opportunity at the State Department, June 9, 2017 in Washington, DC. Iohannis is also scheduled to meet with President Donald Trump on Friday afternoon. (Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

PRESS STATEMENT

Ned Price
DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

The Department of State has issued new guidelines for U.S. government interaction with Taiwan counterparts to encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship. The guidance underscores Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and an important security and economic partner that is also a force for good in the international community. These new guidelines liberalize guidance on contacts with Taiwan, consistent with our unofficial relations, and provide clarity throughout the Executive Branch on effective implementation of our “one China” policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The new guidelines have been issued following a review as set forth in the Taiwan Assurance Act.

Leveraging Somaliland’s Blue Economy

Staff

April 6, 2021

SLPA Quarterly Op-Ed by Deqa Aden

The blue economy is one of the least exploited sectors in Somaliland contributing 0.3% to GDP despite the fact that the Horn of Africa has the largest coast in mainland Africa. Somaliland has an 850 km long coastline that borders the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Currently, there are more than 600 species present in Somaliland’s marine fisheries of which 400 could be leveraged commercially. However, less than 10% of these fish stocks are exploited leaving the blue economy completely untapped.

There have been both local and international efforts to invest in the fishing industry, but most of these projects did not take off due to lower demand for fish, culturally Somalis prefer livestock. Nonetheless, fish diet is becoming more acceptable in urban areas, as climate change is pushing this desert state into finishing. Somaliland has a comparative advantage to export fish stocks to neighboring, landlocked East African countries.

The Somaliland National Development Plan projected that by 2021 the tuna fish harvest will increase by 20% due to an increase in demand for fish stocks from urban areas. Despite the projected increase in demand, the industry has few challenges to address before any growth.

The cold chain infrastructure is barely non-existent at the moment. This makes it challenging for the fish stocks to be marketed and sold across Somaliland. Cold chain development is essential in reducing food losses and improving food quality in the fishing industry. Low access to ice and cold storage often result in fish being spoiled before reaching the market. Improving the cold chain infrastructure would immediately benefit fishers, processors, and others involved in the sector.

*Source: Cold Catch – Developing a Cold Chain Infrastructure for the Somali Fishing Industry*

Regarding infrastructural challenges, there are many limitations to consider throughout the fishing supply chain. For instance, the quantity of appropriate boats is very limited, which affects the number of fish that are caught. Other challenges include the lack of appropriate storage facilities and nests. The lack of infrastructure for hygienically storing, processing, and transporting fish products is one of the major impediments to the development of the Somali domestic fishing industry.

There is no doubt that Somaliland has rich marine assets, but it lacks the appropriate infrastructure to fully leverage the industry. Currently, the unexploited fish stocks become vulnerable to piracy from neighboring countries and foreign fishing.

*Source: Industry Analysis, Fishing in Somaliland, 2013*

Somaliland’s marine life is abundant enough to be exported to neighboring, landlocked countries. For instance, Ethiopia imports fish stocks from China, Belgium, or Indonesia. This is a perfect example of Africa’s assets not being fully leveraged. Somaliland has a relative advantage in exporting fish stocks to mainland Africa. However, there are no processing facilities to produce and package the fish stocks.

The fishing industry is a highly profitable sector where the tuna industry alone is worth $6 billion globally. This is a market that Somaliland could easily tap into if the proper processing facilities are built. Investment in the marine sector would not only generate revenues but would create jobs for many unemployed youths in the coastal regions.

*Source: Export Genius, Ethiopia’s fish stocks export data, 2020*

Furthermore, foreign investment is vital in expanding Somaliland’s fishing industry. UAE is a potential investor, as they are currently building the port of Berbera. UAE company, Dubai Port, already invested US$ 442 million to expand the port of Berbera, which is considered to be a strategic location for the UAE. However, foreign investment requires accurate data collection to evaluate and project the industry’s profits. Accurate data statistics play a crucial role in market analysis that is needed to attract potential investors. Another method of attracting foreign investors is significant tax incentives. The Somaliland government could offer a 0% tax rate for foreign investors during the first three years of operation or provide a 50% reduction on taxable profits. Both approaches have proven to attract foreign investors, which is a must if Somaliland wants to capitalize on its marine life.

Despite the structural challenges that have limited the potential of Somaliland’s blue economy, this is not a lost cause. In this article, we will also address a few recommendations that could dramatically change the outlook of the industry.

Investment in Data and Knowledge

The most pressing challenge that Somaliland’s economy faces is the lack of scientific research and knowledge on its sectors. At the moment, there is a lack of concrete data on the diversity of the fish stocks, the conditions of commercially viable fish stocks, species under threat, and the overall ecosystem. In order to fully understand the potential of the fishing industry, it is imperative to have a thorough assessment of the sector. The government in collaborations with international organizations must commission institutions with adequate expertise to assess the status of the marine habitat around the country. International agencies such as the World Food Programme (WFP) could be particularly interested in providing expert analysis. The only way to improve the market value of the fish stocks is through improved market access and partnership with relevant investors and donors. Without data and comprehensive knowledge of the sector, potential donors will be less likely to invest.

2. Strengthen the Capacity of Local Institutions

It is no secret that Somaliland’s marine life is vulnerable to piracy and illegal exploitation from neighboring countries. Sometimes Yemeni fishers catch their fish stocks within the Somaliland borders. Recently, the Somaliland Coastal Guard arrested 81 Yemenis in six fishing boats near Berbera (northern coast) for unlicensed fishing.

These Coast guards need proper training, equipment, and better facilities to guard the marine borders. The Coast Guards are one of the weakest institutions that would greatly benefit from some sort of capacity-building. Illegal fishing in the Somali waters could threaten marine life and lead to overexploitation. In addition, the Somali coast has a bad reputation for piracy that has reached its peak in 2011. These piracy incidents have severe economic consequences as well as a poor public image that would push away investors and donors. In order for Somaliland to compete with international markets and export fish stocks to neighboring countries, it should put together a comprehensive strategy that would strengthen the capacity of the coastal guards and other relevant local institutions.

3. Development of Regulatory Policies across the Value Chain

Most of the fishing enterprises in Somaliland are informal – businesses that lack formal license registration and do not pay any taxes. Informality often leads to poor governance and low productivity. According to World Bank research, the average informal business in developing economies is only one-quarter as productive as the average firm operating in the formal sector. Therefore, Somaliland’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism should put together a plan that would formalize the businesses in the fishing industry. In order for Somaliland’s blue economy to significantly contribute to the GDP, fishing businesses should all be formalized by including them in the formal tax and financial systems.

The Earth’s oceans have been a source of sustenance to the coastal population and generated income opportunities to millions. Seafood currently provides 17% of daily animal protein consumed globally, yet the blue economy is underexploited in Somaliland. In addition, over 1 billion people globally rely on seafood as their primary source of protein, which demonstrates the large, global demand for fish stocks. According to food security economists, seafood supplies for human consumption will need to increase by 70% due to population growth and economic development.

On the supply side, based on recent research, investors have approximately $5.6 billion in capital to invest over the next five years and dramatically shape the world’s blue economy. Lack of funding or finance is not a challenge, but connecting the donors to Somaliland’s abundance of marine life is the biggest obstacle. Hence, investment in data, knowledge, and sector analysis could provide valuable insights that could attract such investors. However, Somaliland cannot rely heavily on donor funding alone. The local institutions play an important role as well, in particular the coastal guards and regulatory institutions in charge of the formalization of businesses.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Deqa Aden A Pearson Fellow and Masters in Public Policy (MPP) candidate at The University of Chicago and a member of the Somaliland Professionals Association of America (SLPA). She is an alumni of the Abaarso School, Grinnell College, The World Bank HQ in Washington DC where she was an Analyst and most recently Manager of Hargeisa Innovation Hub. SLPA Website: myslpa.org Email: myslpa.info@gmail.com

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

DP World Berbera ‘Extremely Disappointed’ by The Minister of Trade’s Interference of its Operation of Berbera Port

Staff

April 5, 2021

In an apparent response to a request by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Hon. Mohamoud Hassan Saad (Saajin) on behalf of a private company – The National Flour Mill Company, DP World Berbera Director Mr. Sanjay Badam started his letter with his company’s extreme disappointment by the Minister’s letter.

The locally owned National Flour Mill Company is based in Berbera and has recently come online as the largest flour plant in Somaliland. The plant’s locally made flour under the Wataniya brand is available in Somaliland markets.

The letter describes the issue as a matter between two private parties – DP World and NFMC and should be resolved directly between them. Although Somaliland Chronicle has not seen the Minister’s letter to DP World, the matter seems to center around Geele or porters fees at Berbera port currently managed by DP World under a thirty-year concession.

DP World reminds the Minister that fairness matters in its operation and that it cannot discriminate between customers by offering unique discounts to any customer and that the National Flour Mill Company should pay the Geele fees like any other customer of Berbera Port. Continuing on the point of discriminating between customers, the letter states “This is the first time globally, we have received a letter from a Minister ordering special treatment to a private company that will put all other traders in the country at a disadvantage”.

In addition to basic fairness, the DP World letter states that if one customer is allowed to not pay the porters or Geele as known locally, all others will do the same and will result in the loss of nearly 700 jobs.

The letter’s final point reminds the Minister that DP World is currently managing the port under the agreement it signed with the government of Somaliland which stipulated that it has full freedom to change tariffs at the port and increase them on a bi-annual basis and that it cannot simply alter the tariff structure of the port at the request of the government without carrying out a full analysis of all tariffs at the port.

DP World Berbera and the Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism Hon. Mohamoud Hassan Saad (Saajin) did not respond to inquiries for this report.

Somaliland Welcomes Zambian Government Delegation

Staff

April 5, 2021

A Zambian government delegation led by the Minister of Justice Mr. Gavin Lubinda has arrived today in Hargeisa, the capital city of the Republic of Somaliland. The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Hon. Liban Yusuf Osman and other Somaliland government officials have received at Egal International Airport.

Hon. Liban Yousuf Osman, acting and Deputy Minister of foreign affairs and International Cooperation received a high-profile delegation from Zambia led by zambia minister of justice H.E Gavin Lubinda. pic.twitter.com/QixM0BMmua
— MFA Somaliland (@somalilandmfa) April 5, 2021

This follows the recent three-day visit by the Malawian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Eisenhower Mkaka to Somaliland and delegations from South Africa, the Czech Republic. Somaliland’s diplomatic profile has been on an upward trajectory that started with the establishment of bilateral ties with Taiwan last summer and President Bihi’s historic visit to Nairobi and the meeting with President Uhuru Kenyatta in December 2020.

Other governments have closely watched Somaliland’s upcoming local and parliamentary elections, including the United States. On March 2nd Congressional hearing on Elections in Africa of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Global Human Rights, Congressman Chris Smith has praised Somaliland for advancing electoral democracy on its upcoming parliamentary and local elections on May 31st.

The itinerary of the delegation and the purpose of their visit to Somaliland has not been disclosed yet, but they are expected to meet the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi, and members of his cabinet.

Elections will Not be Delayed Due to COVID-19 Pandemic – Somaliland Cabinet

Staff

April 1, 2021

In its weekly meeting, Somaliland’s cabinet meeting chaired by the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi stated that the local and parliamentary elections slated to take place on May 31, 2021, will not be delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing draughts affects parts of the country.

The confirmation that elections will not be delayed was among other points discussed in today’s cabinet meeting that includes emergency water distribution to drought-affected communities and efforts to curb the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the statement released by the Presidency following the cabinet meeting, so far 17,000 people have received the COVID-19 vaccine and, on Sunday, a national conference that will be will be convened. The statement adds that the purpose of the conference which will be attended by the business community is to discuss ways to raise funds to purchase additional COVID-19 vaccines. Somaliland has received 65,000 single doses of AstraZeneca/Oxford COVID-19 vaccine through COVAX.

Besides looking to raise funds to purchase COVID-19 vaccines, the statement from the Presidency stated that Somaliland’s friends, presumably countries with whom Somaliland maintains diplomatic ties, have promised to donate COVID-19 vaccines.

There is no clear deployment plan for the COVID-19 vaccine to ensure the most vulnerable members of the society and frontline health workers are getting vaccinated. Somaliland government was criticized for administering the vaccine to seemingly young and healthy government officials.

Why is Somaliland vaccinating politicians over the most vulnerable? This is outrageous and needs to end. https://t.co/6YecO1LfSu
— Nimco Ali (OBE) 🔻 (@NimkoAli) March 27, 2021

Although the government of Somaliland seems to acknowledge the sharp rise of infection of COVID-19 and the dangers of the second wave of the pandemic, the Ministry of Health Development is reporting a low single-digit death rate despite reports to the contrary. It is unclear what is causing the disparity between the Ministry’s COVID-19 death rate and the sharp rise in funerals around Somaliland.

As part of the government’s efforts to combat the spread of COVID-19 in Somaliland, the cabinet stated that the Independence Day festivities on 18th May will be canceled and all resources including funding will be reallocated to drought and COVID-19 related activities.

President Bihi Fires the Head of Somaliland Civil Aviation and Airports Administration

Staff

March 31, 2021

According to a statement from the Presidency of the Republic of Somaliland, President Muse Bihi Abdi has relieved the Chief of the Somaliland Civil Aviation Administration Mr. Mohamed Abdi Rodol of his duties and has replaced him with the Director-General of Ministry of Transportation and Road Development Mr. Omar-Sayid Abdillahi Adan Qalinle. Mr. Rodol, a retired pilot was appointed by President Muse Bihi Abdi in December 2017 to head the Civil Aviation and Airports Administration.

Despite his expertise as an airline captain, there is no noticeable improvement in the condition of Egal International Airport Somaliland’s only functioning airport. No official date is set for when Berbera Airport will open for business and if the United Arab Emirates will have a role in managing it. Previously, the Berbera Airport has been leased to the United Arab Emirates for military use for an unspecified sum and period by the former government of President Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo.

There are a number of critical cabinet level positions currently unfilled in President Bihi’s government including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation who has resigned to run for a parliamentary seat in the upcoming elections. It is unclear if President Bihi will make reshuffle his cabinet in the upcoming days.

Somaliland’s Civil Aviation and Airports Administration was downgraded from a ministry by President Bihi as part of a large restructuring of government agencies when he took office in 2017.

Results of President Muse Bihi Abdi’s Job Performance Review Poll

Staff

March 28, 2021

We have completed our second public polling to gauge the approval rating of the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and his cabinet on various metrics including the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and droughts. Our previous poll from August 2018 contained similar questions and we will be comparing the results of those questions.

Number of Participants	1,735
Poll Duration	14 Days
Poll Method	Online

In our first question in the poll about the President’s handling of his job, respondents gave a 38.9% approval rating and 61.1% disapproval. The disapproval rating of 69.1% is a sharp rise from the 2018 polling of the same question where the President received only a 29.1% disapproval of handling his job. President Bihi was in office for few months at the time of our first polling.

We ask respondents about their view of public corruption under President Bihi compared to his predecessor and 43.3% of respondents think there is less corruption under President Bihi while 21.9% see no change between President Bihi and Former President Ahmed Mohamoud Siilanyo’s government. 38.4% of respondents think corruption is higher. The majority or 65.4% of respondents to the same question in our 2018 poll saw less corruption under President Bihi.

Most respondents or 62.7% do not think President Bihi has been successful in keeping his campaign promises three years into his term where only 23.1% have voted favorably. In 2018, 55.1% of respondents thought it was too early to rate the President on his campaign promises.

On President Bihi’s cabinet appointments, most respondents have an unfavorable view compared to 27.8% who rated President Bihi’s cabinet appointments as outstanding and above average. A similar question in our 2018 poll 63% of respondents were unsatisfied with President Bihi’s choice of ministers.

Quest for recognition has always been one of Somaliland’s highest priorities and we have asked the public of their view and if the President has put an effective team to get Somaliland recognized and despite major diplomatic successes, 46.9% of respondents do not think the President has the right team in place to realize recognition during his term. This is an improvement of how respondents answered this same question in 2018.

On reelecting President Bihi if elections were held today, 69% of respondents voted No, compared to 31%. 54.3% of respondents to the same question in our poll in 2018 were favorable compared to 45.7% negative votes on reelecting President Bihi.

On priority issues where the government should put more effort in, most respondents voted for corruption, this is compared to national unity in our 2018 poll.

In a more general sense, respondents were asked about their view of how Somaliland has faired since electing President Bihi.

Somaliland is experiencing a second wave of COVID-19 pandemic with a sharp rise in infection and deaths. Currently, the Somaliland government has started the distribution of 65,000 doses of AstraZeneca received through COVAX. 77.2% of respondents do not think the government has an effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The majority of respondents do not believe President Bihi’s government has been effective in responding to droughts. Climate change has made drought in Somaliland and other parts of the world a constant factor.

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Investigative Reports

History of instability

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PRESS STATEMENT

SLPA Quarterly Op-Ed by Deqa Aden

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