Trump’s recognition of Somaliland goes beyond just countering Chinese influence. It reflects a practical need to bring back realism – a foreign policy approach that emphasizes U.S. national interests and addresses the limits of relying too heavily on international institutions through the lens of Liberalism.

The Shortcomings of Liberalism in the Horn of Africa

Liberalism has worked well for Europe with the creation of the EU. It sets a high standard that inspires other regions like Africa with the African Union. However, this worldview has been damaging to both the United States and Somaliland. Globalization has allowed China to use trade as a weapon through pressure tactics, while not living up to the liberal expectation that China would be a fair player globally. Somaliland, with its Berbera port and relatively large population, could have benefited from a decentralized international system driven by shared trade. However, due to the strict application of the liberal theory of international law, their trade is invisibly labelled as Somalia’s, with all the negative failed state connotations that come with it. The focus on cooperation between many parties has also put Somaliland at a disadvantage, leading to its isolation and hindering both its human capital and hard-won sovereignty and freedom.

Supporters of liberalism believe they can change the international system by promoting democracy through engaging non-governmental organizations, the diaspora, and sometimes war. However, this approach has had negative impacts on Somaliland. Somaliland’s homegrown democracy has not only been disregarded but actively undermined by UN agencies directly in the early 1990s and later indirectly by offering weapons and full recognition to Somalia but not to Somaliland. In contrast, realism starts with the view that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no central authority governing relations between states, and that states act mainly in their own national interest. This, for example, better explains Turkish involvement in Somalia; it is not primarily about global collaboration and trade but about securing 30% of Somalia’s resources as a neo-colonial power. The issue is not with liberalism itself but with how it conceals the ongoing geopolitical dynamics.

The rigid application of liberal internationalism in Somalia has produced measurable policy failures. Since 1991, international interventions guided by liberal institutional frameworks have cost tens of billions in US assistance, yet key measures of state functionality have declined. Most of southern Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab terrorists. This is unsurprising as the World Bank’s governance indicators show Somalia’s government effectiveness score has decreased sharply since 2000, while Transparency International consistently ranks it among the world’s most corrupt states. These outcomes reflect a fundamental flaw in the liberal approach: the assumption that external support and institution-building can replace organic state development. This systemic failure demands a recalibration of international engagement strategies in the region.

A Realistic Alternative for The Horn

From a realist perspective, Somalia’s failed state status stems from its fundamental inability to define and pursue consistent national interests. It does not support the influx of foreign aid and intervention that has created a dependency that erodes both domestic accountability and the state’s capacity for self-governance in Somalia. In a realist view, international relations should prioritize state capacity over external intervention.

A realist foreign policy shift, shown by Trump’s proposed withdrawal from Somalia and recognition of Somaliland, could spark Somalia’s transformation toward genuine self-governance. This dual approach serves multiple strategic interests: it pressures Somalia to establish effective control over its territory while acknowledging Somaliland’s successful state-building model. Somaliland’s economic self-sufficiency and democratic stability align with America’s vision of an Africa built on strategic partnerships rather than aid dependency. This creates a blueprint for U.S. engagement that enhances regional stability while advancing American interests.

Building Consensus Through Strategic Realism

Far from being a spur-of-the-moment decision, the recognition of Somaliland emerges from years of careful policy development within America’s foreign policy establishment. This methodical approach is evidenced by sustained efforts ranging from several bills to recognize Somaliland, to Senator James Risch’s successful incorporation of the Somaliland Partnership Act into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act – marking Somaliland’s first formal recognition in U.S. law. This builds upon the groundwork laid by former Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, whose earlier diplomatic initiatives for Somaliland recognition were constrained primarily by institutional deference to the African Union.

The implementation of this policy represents the culmination of long-term strategic planning rather than a sudden shift in U.S. foreign policy. The Somaliland-US partnership has been developed through extensive consultation with policy institutions, national security experts, and diplomatic professionals, demonstrating how strategic realism can unite different political actors behind well-researched foreign policy objectives.

State Recognition: Restoring Sovereign Prerogative

The recognition of states remains fundamentally a sovereign prerogative, not subject to institutional vetoes. This principle holds particular relevance for Somaliland, whose independence predates both the African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. While multilateral institutions serve valuable purposes, their recent effective monopoly over state recognition has created a rigid international system that fails to address legitimate cases of state formation. This institutional gridlock ignores historical precedent – the emergence of nations like Ireland, Bangladesh, and the United States itself demonstrates that state formation often requires bilateral recognition outside multilateral frameworks. The current system’s rigidity perpetuates regional instability by denying diplomatic solutions to unique cases that fall outside conventional parameters.

Realism provides a more nuanced approach to state recognition that aligns with U.S. strategic interests. It enables the United States to distinguish between unique cases like Somaliland and separatist movements. This secures two national US interests: preserving independence-era borders in Africa and recognizing Somaliland. On the other hand, the vulnerability of liberalism is already evident: China has leveraged institutional frameworks to advance its regional influence, particularly through its growing sway over non-democratic states within the African Union. This reality demonstrates how rigid multilateralism can weaken rather than protect genuine African decision-making.

To illustrate, the United States brings a unique historical perspective and diplomatic expertise in understanding state formation. This expertise stems from both its founding history and its extensive diplomatic record worldwide. U.S. State Department archives document America’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence in 26 June 1960, predating the existence of many modern African states. This historical precedent is particularly significant because it established a clear U.S. position: that the legitimacy of any union between Somaliland and Somalia would depend on the popular consent of both people and not just Mogadishu. While subsequent State Department interpretations have attempted to reframe this history through a liberal institutional lens, the original diplomatic record provides a clear foundation for contemporary U.S. policy considerations.

Numerous historical events and documents demonstrate that Somalilanders have rejected the final Act of Union and that it was never ratified. Academic literature consistently highlights that the union was not legitimately established. The African Union’s own fact-finding mission in 2005 confirmed this assessment, though the organization failed to act—a shortcoming that underscores the limitations of multilateral institutions compared to the institutional memory of sovereign states like the United States.

The U.S. has precedent in addressing forced unions, as seen in its stance on the Baltic states. In such cases, the United States did not view the situation as secession, but as a matter of state continuity. Just as the Baltic states were illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union, Somaliland was similarly incorporated into the now-collapsed Somali Republic. This will not be the first time the U.S. adjusts its diplomatic positions, as evidenced by its previous shift in recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The U.S. experience in navigating complex cases of state formation highlights the soft power that allows it to lead Somaliland’s recognition more effectively than the African Union.

The Horn of Africa in the Indo-Pacific Century

The Horn of Africa stands distinctly apart from the rest of the continent, characterized by its unique geopolitical landscape and openness to external interventions. Recent diplomatic developments, such as Turkey’s mediation of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, underscore this region’s complex international dynamics. Somaliland’s strategic position becomes even more significant in this context, transcending traditional regional boundaries. Its connections to Taiwan and its location place it at the intersection of African and Indo-Pacific geopolitical interests, as outlined in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The strategic imperative is clear: diversify regional influence and prevent Chinese monopolization. By expanding diplomatic and strategic relationships with Somaliland, and potentially extending similar engagements to Ethiopia and Kenya, the United States can offer African nations a meaningful alternative to China’s growing economic and political influence. This approach empowers African states by providing them with more strategic options and reducing dependency on a single global power.

Strategic Timing and Military Implications

The current global landscape makes this strategic pivot to realism particularly timely. The limitations of liberal internationalism are increasingly evident across multiple strategic theatres: protracted conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine’s complex relationship with international institutions, and the deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea.

The timing for Somaliland recognition is critically opportune. The potential shock of such a move has been minimized by recent diplomatic developments, including Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. This approach naturally aligns with the strategic imperative to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia, positioning Somaliland’s recognition as a signature foreign policy move that reestablishes realism as the cornerstone of future American diplomatic strategy.

Militarily, a presence in Somaliland would provide exceptional strategic value. Its geographic position offers a unique opportunity to reduce U.S. dependence on bases in the Arab Gulf while simultaneously securing American interests across three critical regions: the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea corridor, and the sphere of Iranian influence in these regions.

Conclusion

Recognizing Somaliland presents a defining opportunity to cement a realist approach to foreign policy. The Somaliland case demonstrates how realist foreign policy can achieve what decades of liberal internationalism could not: supporting genuine African democracy without creating aid dependency or requiring military intervention. This strategic realignment would not only reshape the Horn of Africa’s political landscape but also provide an opportunity to reexamine our understanding of the international system.

.

About the Author:

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.