Investigative Reports

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Repeat of 2022 Central Bank Fraud Scandal Exposes Somaliland...
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Stern Ultimatum from U.S. Congress: Reverse Taiwan Travel Ban or Face Sanctions, Lawmakers Warn Somalia

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Hargeisa/Washington — In a dramatic escalation of tensions, two senior members of the U.S. Congress have delivered an uncompromising message to Somalia: repeal the recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders or face tangible diplomatic and immigration reprisals.

Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles issued a blistering letter to Somalia’s ambassador in Washington, condemning the April 22 directive that bars individuals with Taiwanese documents from entering, transiting, or departing via Somali territory.

Invoking the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (TAIPEI Act), the lawmakers underscored that Somalia’s decision violates a cornerstone of U.S. policy: defending Taiwan’s international space. Passed in 2020, the TAIPEI Act not only authorizes but obliges the United States to reassess relationships with foreign governments that actively undermine Taiwan.

“Somalia’s alignment with Beijing’s anti-Taiwan agenda has crossed a red line for American lawmakers,” a diplomatic source in Washington told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “What Mogadishu perhaps failed to anticipate is that there are real consequences to becoming China’s proxy in the Horn of Africa.”

The potential repercussions outlined in the letter are substantial:

  • Revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of Somali nationals currently residing legally in the United States
  • Suspension of visa processing for Somalis seeking education, healthcare, or family reunification in America
  • Possible closure of Somalia’s embassy in Washington, effectively severing diplomatic ties at the highest level

Growing evidence suggests the ban was not Somalia’s sovereign decision, but one choreographed to curry favor with Beijing. The directive came just days after Chinese state media lauded Somalia’s loyalty to the so-called “One-China” principle — a political fiction that Beijing aggressively pushes to isolate Taiwan internationally.

This move starkly contrasts with how Somaliland, though unrecognized internationally, has boldly conducted its own foreign policy by deepening its relationship with Taiwan. The two established representative offices in 2020, and since then, Taiwan has poured resources into Somaliland’s agriculture, health, and education sectors — all without asking Somaliland to play puppet.

“Somalia’s government seems willing to mortgage its foreign policy for praise from a regime half a world away,” said a Horn of Africa policy expert familiar with the matter. “The irony is that an unrecognized territory like Somaliland manages to engage Taiwan with dignity, while Mogadishu behaves like an occupied satellite.”

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy didn’t mince words either. “One would think Somalia is a powerful nation instead of an international beggar which depends on others for security with its arrogant banning of travelers using Taiwan documents. Its ‘leaders’ should read the U.S. TAIPEI Act,” he posted on X (formerly Twitter).

Somali officials have remained silent. But Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has publicly acknowledged the congressional support and reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen ties with Somaliland.

For Mogadishu, the risks are no longer theoretical. Somalia relies heavily on U.S. aid, diplomatic backing at the UN, and security cooperation. A rupture with Washington would have seismic effects beyond visas — it could destabilize key programs tied to security, governance, and debt relief.

“Somalia is playing a dangerous game of geopolitical chess without the protections that come with real sovereignty,” noted a Western diplomat in the region. “In this contest between superpowers, Mogadishu has positioned itself as a pawn — but it’s pretending to be a king.”

Developing story: Somaliland Chronicle will continue to monitor this situation as it unfolds.

Somaliland’s Global Posture Under President Irro: A 100-Day Foreign Diplomacy Review

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On November 13, 2024, Somaliland’s political landscape shifted dramatically as President Irro claimed victory in a highly contested election, ousting the incumbent President Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye Party, which had dominated Somaliland’s politics since 2010. Irro’s win was nothing short of a landslide, garnering 63% of the vote against his rival. He campaigned on a platform focused on foreign diplomacy, which sharply contrasted with Somaliland’s established foreign policy.

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Irro’s approach was the Wadani Party’s commitment to pursuing dialogue and reconciliation with Somalia. This stance, however, raised eyebrows among many Somalilanders, as it appeared to challenge the region’s sovereignty and aspirations for international recognition. Additionally, Irro criticized the existing Somaliland-Taiwan relations, arguing that they hindered potential ties with China, a country that holds veto power in the UN Security Council and officially considers Somaliland part of Somalia.

The Wadani Party also voiced concerns over a maritime deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, labeling it a bold yet risky diplomatic maneuver. Irro’s electoral success coincided with a turbulent period for Somaliland, as domestic and foreign relations faced severe scrutiny, particularly following the Las Anod debacle and the Somali proxy conflict that had erupted in response to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This turmoil created a disillusioned electorate, evident in the stark decline in voter turnout compared to previous elections.

In the 2017 elections, an impressive 81% of registered voters—620,000 out of 759,000—cast their ballots. Kulmiye emerged victorious, with strong participation from Somaliland citizens. However, by 2024, voter turnout plummeted to just 53%, with only 633,000 out of 1.2 million registered voters participating. This significant decrease highlighted that many Kulmiye supporters chose to abstain, further emphasizing the fractures within Somaliland’s political fabric.

For the first time, the electoral process in Somaliland faced external influence from regional actors, including Djibouti, China, and Somalia, all of whom were rumored to have financially supported the Wadani Party. The Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum, a prominent NGO, underscored the urgent need for legal reforms to prohibit illicit foreign funding of political parties during elections, emphasizing that “Somaliland law currently lacks provisions against foreign financial donations to election campaigns, a pressing issue for constitutional reform.”

Despite his background as a former acting ambassador before the Somali state collapse and a long tenure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the early 1980s, Irro’s new government surprised many with its composition. A notable majority comprised individuals aligned with the Icrisaam wing, and some key ministerial appointments were puzzling, such as a foreign affairs minister whose experience was limited to running a daycare center in the U.S. Expectations were high that Irro’s diplomatic expertise would steer Somaliland in a new and promising direction, yet the unfolding events within the first 100 days of his administration left many questioning the future trajectory of the nation. On that note, let’s take a closer look at Irro’s foreign diplomacy and its influence on Somaliland’s economy and international standing since he assumed office.

Somalia Government Aggression against Somaliland Sovereignty: The bizarre situation involving the Wadani Party and the Irro administration continues as they stubbornly pursue talks between Somalia and Somaliland—a move that serves as a political lever for Somalia against Somaliland’s quest for sovereignty and international recognition. To complicate matters, Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza recently visited Las Anod, a blatant infringement on the sovereignty that Somaliland claims. This visit adds to the backdrop of a two-year proxy war, during which the Las Anod militia and Al-Shabaab have been employed to destabilize Somaliland.

In response, Somaliland issued a statement condemning this act. Somalia, undeterred by Somaliland’s diplomatic outcry, intensified its aggression by unlawfully seizing individuals from the Las Anod militia—innocent Isaaq civilians who were kidnapped and tortured, then labeled as prisoners of war. Instead of processing these captives through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Somalia quietly dispatched them to Hargeisa, where the Irro administration acquiesced without protest.

One might wonder why the Irro administration didn’t reject such an illegal transfer of abducted individuals. From a humanitarian standpoint, one could argue that their decision was the correct one. However, they failed to prepare a report on human rights violations and invite the ICRC to document these abuses, which could serve as a legal liability against the Somali government. Regrettably, the Irro administration opted for a policy of appeasement, choosing not to disrupt relations with Somalia, even in the face of blatant aggression toward Somaliland’s sovereignty.

What’s particularly shocking is that, rather than withdrawing from the talks altogether—a move that might have garnered serious attention from the international community—the Somaliland government chose to suspend the dialogue instead. Furthermore, what will become of the special envoy appointed by the Irro government to facilitate the Somaliland-Somalia discussions? Given his ties to Hassan Sheikh, will they consider dismissing him altogether? The situation remains fraught with uncertainty and potential consequences.

Somaliland Foreign Diplomacy toward Türkiye Enframement; Turkey, acting as an imperial mediator, has been actively promoting talks between Somalia and Somaliland. In 2018, Turkey appointed Dr. Onamed as its special envoy for these negotiations and has established a consulate in Hargeisa. Despite the ongoing discussions failing to yield significant results, Turkey has escalated its diplomatic maneuvers concerning Somaliland, subtly undermining its sovereignty. A telling example is the fact that Somaliland citizens are compelled to acquire Somali government passports to travel to Turkey, including politicians from Somaliland holding government positions. In stark contrast, Somaliland residents must visit the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu to secure a Turkish visa, while politicians can obtain a visa in Hargeisa only after securing a Somali passport. This is in direct opposition to the UAE, which recognizes Somaliland passports and issues visas accordingly. Furthermore, the administration of Hassan Sheikh has sought Turkish assistance to facilitate Somalia-Ethiopia maritime talks, culminating in the controversial Ankara Deal. Under this agreement, Somalia has granted 30% of its oil, gas, and fishing revenue rights from its marine resources over the next decade, encroaching upon the maritime claims of Somaliland. Strikingly, no Somaliland politician or government official has raised objections to this blatant violation of sovereignty. While the hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia has been addressed through the Ankara Deal, finalization is still pending due to unresolved technical details. Interestingly, although the specifics of these negotiations have not been officially disclosed, reports from Turkish media indicate that Turkey is further undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty. During the initial round of technical discussions between Ethiopia and Somalia, overseen by Turkey, several critical topics emerged: Somalia aims to control customs revenue from ports in Somaliland that Ethiopia intends to use; the Somali government insists on co-signing port management agreements for any ports in Somaliland utilized by Ethiopia; and Somalia is pushing for the use of Somali passports for Somaliland citizens traveling to Ethiopia, alongside ensuring Ethiopia acquires permits and pays applicable fees for any access to Somali territory and trade via land, sea, and air. One might argue that these agreements would be unacceptable for the Somaliland government under Irro, yet no protests have emerged against the Ankara declaration that undermines the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU. Moreover, in January and March of 2025, the Turkish parliament approved two significant legislations. The January decision extended Turkey’s naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, including Somali waters, which Somaliland is inherently a part of. This allows Turkey to patrol Somaliland’s maritime areas without consent, an action that could infringe on Somaliland’s sovereignty, though its political leaders have shown little concern. In March, Turkey’s parliament controversially ratified a hydrocarbon agreement covering both onshore and offshore territories of Somalia, which included Somaliland. The government of Abdirahman Irro remained silent in the face of this agreement, which clearly violates their claimed sovereignty and rights to resources. At the very least, Abdirahman Irro’s foreign minister should have summoned the Turkish consul in Hargeisa to demand clarification, asserting that Somaliland’s sovereignty is non-negotiable.

Somalia’s Monopoly on Somaliland Livestock Exports; The tug-of-war between Somalia and Somaliland has intensified, particularly in the livestock export sector, which Somalia has weaponized to assert its dominance. This ongoing proxy and diplomatic conflict has evolved into an economic battle, with Somalia pressuring importing countries to obtain livestock exports from its transitional government, sidelining Somaliland’s traders. In December 2024, a significant escalation occurred when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud granted exclusive rights to Abu-Yasir, a foreign businessman, allowing him to export Somalia’s livestock, including that from Somaliland. This decision sparked widespread protests among Somaliland livestock traders, who faced devastating economic consequences.

The disruption affected the entire supply chain, from pastoralists to middlemen and traders, putting a strain on Somaliland’s economy. To put the economic impact into perspective, Somaliland exported a total of 3,802,903 livestock in 2024, averaging about 950,726 per quarter. In stark contrast, during the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), Somaliland managed to export less than 722,000 livestock, marking a staggering 76% drop. If this trend continues, which seems likely, the ramifications will be severe—given that livestock exports constitute 45% to 60% of Somaliland’s GDP, a continued decline could result in a catastrophic 34% drop in GDP, leading to significant economic losses. In response to these challenges, the Somaliland government revoked the operating license of a prominent livestock inspection facility in Berbera, accusing its Arab owner of overstepping boundaries. Unfortunately, the Somaliland government has yet to implement effective economic policies to counter this overt economic assault. There is an urgent need for investment in modernizing the livestock sector, including establishing cold chain facilities and abattoirs for exporting meat to Ethiopia, which has a substantial demand. Such initiatives would help reduce dependency on live livestock exports and preserve the economic value that is currently under threat.

Russia Interest in Somaliland; In February 2025, the diplomatic landscape was jolted by a surprising move from Somaliland President Irro and his administration, who chose to extend a welcome to Russian politician Igor Morozov. This decision raised eyebrows, particularly given Morozov’s US and UK sanctions and his notorious role in destabilizing Ukraine, along with his close ties to Putin. At the same time, legislators in the UK and US were making progress toward recognizing Somaliland, adding a layer of complexity to the situation.

To complicate matters further, the Russian ambassador to Somalia and Djibouti submitted a request for a visit from the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, seeking to strengthen ties with Somaliland. However, the Foreign Ministry of Somaliland subtly declined the invitation, offering a vague excuse that only deepened the uncertainty surrounding the nation’s foreign diplomacy. This sequence of events—going from inviting a sanctioned Russian politician to dodging a meeting with a high-ranking Russian official—underscores the urgent need for a clearer strategy and more cohesive direction in Somaliland’s foreign relations.

China’s Diplomatic Aggression Towards Somaliland and Taiwan: Despite its minimal contributions of trivial food aid to Somalia, which pale in comparison to the billions provided by the UK, EU, and US for sustainable peace and development, China seems to enjoy preferential treatment in Somalia’s foreign policy. Alarmingly, China is reportedly funding the Las Anod militia in Somaliland, which threatens to destabilize its state-building efforts and undermines Somaliland’s commitment to maintaining its diplomatic and trade relations with Taiwan. On April 29th, China pressured Somalia to refuse entry or transit for Taiwanese citizens through their territory and to halt any Taiwanese aviation’s over Somaliland airspace. This maneuver followed China’s discovery of a planned visit by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister to Somaliland, prompting Beijing to coerce Somaliland into issuing a ban on Taiwanese passports. This situation serves as a litmus test not only for the Somaliland-Taiwan relationship but also for their sovereignty and the freedom of movement. In response, Taiwan has vehemently protested and is taking steps to counter China’s encroachments, highlighting its determination to uphold its rights.

Furthermore, the situation raises concerns about Somaliland’s earlier decision to allow Somalia to manage its airspace—a strategic blunder that dates back to 2012 when the International Air Transport Association (IATA) granted Somalia control over it. This move has been criticized as the most significant political misstep Somaliland has made since 1960, essentially handing over its aviation sovereignty to a rival without guarantees.

Now, the consequences of that decision are becoming apparent. President Irro, who has previously criticized the Somaliland-Taiwan dynamic, will face critical challenges in his tenure. To demonstrate his commitment to sovereignty and solidarity with Taiwan, he must take decisive diplomatic action: 1. Jointly issue a protest letter with Taiwan against China’s encroachment on their sovereignty and freedom of movement. 2. Expel illegal Chinese companies and traders operating in Somaliland. 3. File a formal complaint with IATA, providing evidence of Somalia’s violation of aviation agreements from the 2012 London talks. Failure to act could not only jeopardize the relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan but could also label him as a puppet of Chinese interests. The time for decisive leadership is now; the future of Somaliland and Taiwan’s partnership hangs in the balance, and the world is watching closely.

Finaly, in his first 100 days in office, Irro faced significant challenges in Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy, falling short of major expectations set by his government, which might just earn a grade of D. However, this early phase marks a crucial turning point; he has the opportunity and room to improve his diplomatic efforts. A critical starting point would be reforming the foreign ministry, which is currently run from his office due to the appointment of an inept minister. Securing a competent foreign minister is vital at this juncture and for the future.

Furthermore, Irro could strengthen relations with Taiwan, especially as Somaliland finds itself under China threat. A visit to Taiwan could pave the way for tangible bilateral trade, focusing on sectors like aviation finance, security, and mineral development. This scenario presents a golden opportunity to lobby with Taiwan in the USA, promoting Somaliland’s deep-sea critical minerals through a partnership with Taiwan. Tying this into U.S. legislation, such as the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, could lead to a trilateral partnership between the USA, Taiwan, and Somaliland. With the Trump administration positioning itself as a global leader in critical minerals amidst the rising challenges of artificial intelligence and chip technology, this could strengthen Somaliland-Taiwan relations under U.S. protection against Chinese aggression and Turkish illegal hydrocarbon deal with Somalia.

Such a trilateral deal would bolster Somaliland’s aspirations for international recognition while safeguarding its sovereignty against Somalia’s aggressive posturing. Irro has the chance to lift Somaliland out of the dreamland bubble it has been trapped in for the past 30 years, a mindset that has normalized the idea that Somalia poses no threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty and prosperity. In reality, Somalia declared war on Somaliland long ago, and its aggression has only intensified, raising fears of a second iteration of the Isaaq genocide, with the use of Turkish drones, Al-Shabaab, and foreign mercenaries reminiscent of Siad Barre’s regime.

If Irro’s government fails to enhance Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy both geopolitically and geoeconomically, it would only reinforce the perception that the Wadani Party has always leaned toward unionism, desperately waiting for a call from the Mogadishu mayor, run by Ugandan overlordship sitting in Kampala. The time is now for Irro to seize the moment and chart a new course for Somaliland on the global stage.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Guled Ahmed is a Resident Scholar with the Middle East Institute and an expert in Horn of Africa Security and Development.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

Somalia Bans Taiwanese Travelers as Beijing’s Influence in Horn of Africa Deepens

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Staff
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KEY POINTS

  • Somalia bans entry of Taiwanese passport holders, citing UN Resolution 2758 amid pressure from China
  • Ban widely seen as attempt to derail scheduled high-level Taiwanese diplomatic mission to Somaliland
  • China publicly endorses Somalia’s decision, reaffirming opposition to Taiwan-Somaliland relations
  • Somaliland considering possible countermeasures, including review of Chinese nationals’ presence in its territory
  • Airspace control has become political flashpoint, with recent incidents affecting flights to Somaliland
  • U.S. TAIPEI Act could potentially trigger diplomatic consequences for Somalia

HARGEISA, Somaliland — Somalia’s Federal Government has barred holders of Taiwanese passports from entering, exiting, or even transiting through the country, a move Taiwan’s government denounced on Tuesday as the result of political pressure from Beijing. The travel ban, issued by Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority, comes amid Taiwan’s strengthening ties with the Republic of Somaliland — a development closely watched in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Somali authorities justified the ban by citing United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, a 1971 measure recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal representative of China in the UN. The resolution does not mention Taiwan, but Beijing has long used it as the foundation for pressing other countries to sever official ties with Taipei.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the decision, calling Somalia’s rationale “a willful distortion of UN Resolution 2758.” In a statement, the ministry accused Somalia of “misinterpreting the resolution under China’s instigation to create the false impression that Taiwan is subordinate to China.”

The ban prompted Taiwan to issue a travel advisory for both Somalia and Somaliland, citing safety and security concerns for its nationals. Taiwan maintains a representative office in Hargeisa, the capital of the Republic Somaliland.

Somalia’s Official Directive Invokes Constitutional Authority

According to the letter seen by Somaliland Chronicle, Somalia’s ban came through official channels on April 22, when the Somali Civil Aviation Authority issued Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) 04/25, obtained by this publication. The directive explicitly invokes Somalia’s constitutional authority to “preserve its territorial integrity and political unity” under Articles 4 and 7 of its Provisional Constitution.

The circular goes beyond merely banning Taiwanese passports, extending to “all passports, travel documents, visas, and consular credentials issued by or affiliated with Taiwan.” Airlines received strict instructions to ensure passengers with Taiwan-issued documents “are not processed through any stage of travel connected to Somalia territory,” with warnings of regulatory action for non-compliance.

Most notably, the directive specifically condemns “the unauthorized establishment of a so-called ‘Taiwan Representative Office’ in Hargeisa,” calling it “a clear violation of Somalia’s sovereignty” that “contravenes the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.” By framing the ban in terms of sovereignty and constitutional authority, Somalia positions the issue as a matter of internal affairs rather than external pressure, despite China’s visible endorsement of the action.

Ban Appears Timed to Derail High-Level Visit

Diplomatic sources say the Somali directive came just days before a scheduled visit by Lin Chia-lung, Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Somaliland — a trip that would have marked the highest-level Taiwanese visit to Somaliland since formal ties were established in 2020.

Minister Lin was expected to be accompanied by senior trade officials and representatives from Africa and other parts of the world where Taiwan has trade representation. The delegation was set to inaugurate several infrastructure and development projects, including a major expansion of Hargeisa Group Hospital funded by Taiwan.

The timing suggests the ban was a direct response to the minister’s planned visit, according to regional diplomatic observers. It appears intended to send a message not only to Taiwan but also to Somaliland about the consequences of their deepening relationship.

Neither the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa responded to requests for comment on the matter.

Airspace Control Emerges as Geopolitical Flashpoint

The dispute also throws a spotlight on airspace control — a longstanding source of friction between Somalia and Somaliland. Though Somaliland claims de facto autonomy, air traffic over its territory is administered by Somalia under a UN-backed arrangement. In recent months, control of the skies has increasingly become a political tool.

In January, Somali authorities reportedly denied airspace clearance to an Ethiopian Airlines Dash 8 aircraft carrying a delegation to Somaliland, citing a lack of formal permission. There were also unverified reports that an air ambulance was blocked while transporting a critically ill patient from Somaliland — a claim Somalia has denied.

By February, international aviation safety bodies issued risk alerts after multiple pilots reported receiving conflicting instructions from unidentified radio operators while flying over Somali airspace. The warnings pointed to escalating risks stemming from competing claims of air traffic control authority by Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

China Endorses Somalia’s Action

China openly backed Somalia’s decision to bar Taiwanese travelers. At a press conference in Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun called the move “a legitimate measure taken by a sovereign nation” and commended Somalia for upholding the “one-China principle.”

Guo emphasized that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China” and reiterated Beijing’s opposition to any official contact between Taiwan and Somaliland. “China firmly opposes the Taiwan authorities and Somaliland hosting each other’s institutions or engaging in any form of official interaction,” he said.

China does not recognize Taiwan as an independent nation and has sought to isolate it diplomatically, particularly in Africa and Latin America.

Somaliland’s Strategic Caution

While officials in Hargeisa have not publicly commented, sources say Somaliland is considering several options in response — including a possible review of its engagement with Chinese nationals operating within its territory. Still, analysts expect Somaliland to proceed cautiously.

Somaliland’s leadership has generally avoided retaliatory moves, even under provocation, according to regional security experts. Their strategy has focused on building relationships with Western democracies while avoiding direct confrontations that could escalate tensions.

Somaliland has positioned itself as a democratic ally in a volatile region, courting partnerships with the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded nations. In meetings with U.S. congressional staff, Somaliland officials have emphasized their country’s role as a counterweight to authoritarian influence in the Horn of Africa.

Proxy Competition in a Globalized Arena

The dispute over Taiwan’s diplomatic outreach in Somaliland illustrates a larger trend: China’s growing willingness to project power through proxy partners. While Beijing’s attention has historically centered on the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific, its activities in East Africa are increasingly strategic.

Somalia appears to be functioning as a surrogate for Chinese influence, according to Africa policy specialists. The conflict extends beyond Taiwan to encompass broader geopolitical competition over strategic locations, infrastructure development, and influence in the Red Sea corridor.

China has heavily invested in infrastructure projects and development aid across East Africa. In December 2024, Chinese envoy Xue Bing visited Mogadishu and pledged support for Somalia’s sovereignty — a visit widely interpreted as a counter to growing international engagement with Somaliland.

U.S. Law Could Trigger Repercussions

The travel ban could also have implications under the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative, or TAIPEI Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2020. The law authorizes Washington to adjust diplomatic or economic engagement with countries that “take significant actions to undermine Taiwan’s security or prosperity.”

While the Trump administration and particularly the State Department has not commented on Somalia’s ban, observers note that the act offers a framework for potential sanctions or aid reductions — particularly at a time when U.S. interest in recognizing or expanding ties with Somaliland is rising.

Somalia’s economic stability relies heavily on international assistance, making its alignment with Beijing potentially risky if it leads to reduced support from Western allies who back Taiwan’s international participation.

Somalia Under New Management: How Kampala Became Mogadishu’s New Capital

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Staff
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In a dramatic shift of regional power dynamics that has gone largely unnoticed by Western media, Somalia has effectively ceded significant control over its security apparatus and governance to Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni. The handover wasn’t marked by ceremony or treaty but rather through a bureaucratic sleight-of-hand executed at last week’s extraordinary summit in Kampala. There, a new “TCCs Plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism” was quietly established under Museveni’s chairmanship, placing him at the helm of an oversight structure with sweeping authority over Somalia’s security, military operations, and international military funding.

Quietly approved by Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud during the April 25 summit, the mechanism comes as Al-Shabaab tightens its grip around Mogadishu in what may be the terrorist group’s most successful offensive in over a decade.

Trading Sovereignty for Survival

The arrangement is a desperate gambit from Mogadishu — a trade of sovereignty for survival. Since February, Al-Shabaab has increased its attacks by over 50% compared to 2024, cutting supply routes and overrunning federal outposts. The capital is increasingly encircled by Al-Shabaab forces.

“With our collective efforts towards securing Somalia, we have been able to have the space to further our state-building efforts,” President Mohamud claimed at the summit. But on the ground, it’s a different story: one of federal disintegration, military collapse, and the slow fragmentation of what little remains of centralized Somali authority.

The summit concluded with Somalia authorizing an additional 8,000 foreign troops under the AUSSOM banner, bringing the total foreign military presence to roughly 20,000. The majority of these forces are not under Somali command.

Foreign Deals, Foreign Rule

Somalia’s sovereignty has been parceled out through a series of desperate security arrangements that trade long-term national interests for short-term security promises. In March 2024, Mogadishu granted Turkey rights to recover up to 90% of petroleum production from major oil and gas deposits in exchange for vague security assurances and naval protection.

Turkey already controls Somalia’s last major state revenue sources, including the strategic port and international airport — the country’s primary revenue generators and gateways to the outside world. Despite this economic stranglehold, the Turkish military presence — anchored at Turkey’s only foreign base in Mogadishu — has remained focused on force protection, not counterinsurgency. Turkey denies accusations that it is deploying SADAT, its controversial paramilitary firm often likened to Russia’s Wagner Group.

Somalia also signed a defense pact with Egypt, formalized during Mohamud’s Cairo visit in August 2024. The agreement included military protocols and Egyptian troop contributions to AUSSOM. Despite a flurry of announcements — including the trilateral Somalia-Egypt-Eritrea summit in Asmara — none of these partnerships have produced meaningful battlefield results.

The NATO Illusion and Buyer’s Remorse

Somali elites who triumphantly celebrated the Turkish security pact last year are now experiencing severe buyer’s remorse as details of the hydrocarbon agreement have emerged. When the defense agreement was first signed, Somalia’s political class boasted that the deal effectively placed them under NATO’s protective umbrella, given Turkey’s membership in the alliance.

Across social media and in parliamentary debates, Somali officials boasted about their newfound security umbrella, with one prominent lawmaker suggesting that Ethiopia should reconsider any confrontational stance now that Somalia had allied with a NATO member. The prevailing sentiment was that Turkey’s military alliance would transform regional power dynamics in Somalia’s favor.

This wishful thinking reflected a fundamental misreading of NATO’s collective defense principles. The ink had barely dried before Ankara began laying the groundwork for its real objective: privileged access to Somalia’s estimated 30 billion barrels of oil reserves and 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas.

“Even colonial extraction agreements rarely exceeded 50% resource claims,” noted a Somali analyst. “We’ve managed to negotiate terms worse than those imposed on defeated nations after wars.”

The Federal System Collapse

Somalia’s federal structure, once envisioned as a solution to state-building challenges, has become another vector of disintegration. Ironically, the very federal system that was partly designed to counterbalance Somaliland — through the creation of various “…land” states like Puntland, Jubaland, and others — has now undermined the central government it was meant to strengthen.

Puntland formally severed ties with Mogadishu in March 2024, declaring its own path forward after years of deteriorating relations with the federal government. Meanwhile, vast swathes of territory in Hirshabelle and other regions have fallen under Al-Shabaab control, creating governance voids the federal government cannot fill.

This fragmentation creates a paradox: as Somalia authorizes more foreign troops on its soil, it exercises effective control over less of its own territory. What began as political fiction — federal member states created partly to dilute Somaliland’s unique status — has evolved into a political reality where these entities often function more effectively than the federal government itself.

“The federal project is collapsing under its own contradictions,” noted one Somali political analyst. “We’re witnessing the slow-motion disintegration of whatever unified governance remained.”

Yet even amid fragmentation, Somalia’s deeper crisis is not geography — it’s the absence of national will.

The Heart of the Problem: Will, Not Weapons

Somalia’s security crisis isn’t primarily a matter of insufficient armaments or inadequate training. The country has received billions in security assistance since 2007, with tens of thousands of soldiers ostensibly trained by foreign partners. Yet these forces consistently underperform against Al-Shabaab.

The fundamental problem is the absence of will to fight. Somalia’s clan-based society has never fully embraced the concept of a national army fighting for a unitary state. Soldiers’ primary loyalties remain with their clans, not with abstract notions of the Somali nation. When military units are organized along clan lines, their willingness to fight often depends on whether the battle serves their clan’s interests — not the national strategic objectives set in Mogadishu.

The Kampala summit produced recommendations that read like a recycled script from the past decade of failed interventions, emphasizing “enhancing Somali National Armed Forces training” and establishing “mechanisms for countering extremist narratives.” Notably absent was any serious reckoning with the root causes of Somalia’s security collapse: endemic corruption, predatory governance, and the absence of political will to reform.

Museveni: Somalia’s New Security Overlord

President Museveni, 80, has ruled Uganda since 1986. Now, he holds unprecedented sway over Somali security policy. The Peer Review Mechanism gives him formal oversight of military operations, federal-state coordination, and international troop contributions. The summit also empowered Museveni to speak directly to the UN Security Council on Somalia’s behalf — a stunning diplomatic concession.

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni Abubaker

Uganda already contributes the largest foreign troop contingent in Somalia (4,500), followed by Ethiopia (2,500), Djibouti (1,520), Kenya (1,410), and Egypt (1,091). The Kampala mechanism effectively turns this military weight into political leverage.

Political oversight is only one piece of the puzzle; the financial levers of power are shifting as well.

Somalia’s Foreign Backers Cut and Run

AUSSOM faces a $73.7 million funding shortfall for the first half of 2025, with urgent needs totaling $92.1 million. The Kampala summit tasked Museveni with designing a “Resource Mobilization Strategy and Financing Plan,” placing Somalia’s defense budget under foreign supervision.

As Western attention drifts elsewhere, Somalia’s backers are losing patience. China has pledged only $17 million to the AUSSOM mission — a token sum that reflects its preference for maximum strategic leverage at minimum cost. The European Union, still the largest financial backer of Somali security, has voiced escalating frustration, warning: “We cannot carry this burden alone.”

The United States has drastically scaled back its aid footprint, with USAID operations slashed by 83%. Somalia’s once heavily fortified U.S. embassy compound inside Mogadishu’s “green zone” now operates with minimal staff. Talk of permanent closure is no longer hypothetical.

Ethiopia’s Red Sea Dilemma

Ethiopia’s bold January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland—offering potential recognition in exchange for port access—was a strategic gambit that continues to reverberate throughout the region. This assertive move triggered the very dynamics that led to today’s Kampala arrangement, as Somalia scrambled to shore up international support against what it perceived as an existential threat. The MoU effectively forced Somalia into deeper dependency on foreign partners, accelerating the security outsourcing that culminated in Uganda’s oversight role.

Yet despite triggering these tectonic shifts, Ethiopia has failed to capitalize on its initial advantage. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s subsequent retreat from the MoU’s commitments has left Ethiopia in a paradoxical position: contributing 2,500 troops to AUSSOM to stabilize a Somali government actively undermining Ethiopia’s core strategic interests. The diplomatic pressure that caused Addis Ababa to pull back has not resolved Ethiopia’s fundamental dilemma—a landlocked nation of 120 million people with no sovereign access to maritime trade routes.

For Ethiopia, the geographic reality remains both unchanged and unforgiving. Viable Red Sea access runs either through Somaliland’s territory or via Eritrea—requiring renewed engagement with Isaias Afwerki, the mercurial strongman in Asmara. Abiy previously navigated this difficult relationship during his early peace offensive, but the rapprochement has cooled significantly. Somalia’s ports remain under Turkish control and its governance increasingly fragmented among competing foreign interests, rendering that route strategically compromised.

Addis Ababa now faces the challenge of rebuilding a strategic partnership with Hargeisa under more difficult circumstances, having demonstrated hesitancy in its previous commitment. As the region’s strategic chessboard continues to evolve, Ethiopia’s initial boldness followed by diplomatic wavering has resulted in the worst of both scenarios: antagonizing Somalia without securing the Red Sea access that motivated the original MoU. Meanwhile, Somaliland retains the singular asset—functioning Red Sea ports and the territory connecting them to Ethiopia—that keeps it central to the region’s geopolitical calculations regardless of formal recognition status.

Somaliland: Strategic Opportunity Amid Somalia’s Protectorate Shift

As Somalia surrenders control to multiple foreign powers — security to Uganda, economic resources to Turkey — Somaliland’s stable self-governance stands in striking contrast. While Mogadishu struggles to maintain even the appearance of sovereignty, Hargeisa continues to exercise effective control over its territory, security forces, and governmental functions without foreign oversight. More remarkably, in a region where democratic governance is rare, Somaliland has demonstrated a consistent commitment to electoral democracy that puts it ahead of most of its neighbors.

Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs

This divergence creates a historic opening for Somaliland to strengthen its case for recognition. In a region where volatility is the norm, Somaliland’s consistent governance stands as a rare strategic asset — one Washington cannot afford to ignore under a pragmatic foreign policy approach. The strategic implications have never been clearer, particularly as the reality of Somalia’s fragmentation catches up with international partners who have clung to the fiction of a unified Somalia despite mounting evidence that this model may be unworkable.

Somalia’s obsession with destabilizing Somaliland, even amid its own crises, reveals the threat that Somaliland’s success poses to Mogadishu’s legitimacy. The Somali Prime Minister’s provocative visit to Las Anod amid active hostilities at his doorstep represents a calculated effort to undermine Somaliland’s territorial integrity. Somaliland responded by suspending dialogue with Somalia — a proportionate measure against a bad-faith actor.

For the United States, this moment presents a strategic imperative aligned perfectly with the pragmatic foreign policy championed by Secretary of State Rubio, who emphasizes decisions based on whether they “make us stronger, safer, and more prosperous.” Washington, hamstrung by decades of misguided adherence to the “One Somalia” fiction, risks squandering a natural partnership with Somaliland precisely when pragmatism should prevail over ideological rigidity. Somaliland’s vast, untapped reserves of critical minerals, including rare earth elements and lithium, represent resources the United States urgently needs to secure its technological future and reduce dependence on adversarial supply chains — a clear case where strategic interest aligns with Secretary Rubio’s emphasis on “concrete shared interests, not vague platitudes or utopian ideologies.”

As Somalia fragments under the weight of its own contradictions and foreign entanglements, Somaliland has a unique opportunity to project coherence and purpose through expanded bilateral engagements with countries willing to understand its unique position.

A Shadow Administration

The Kampala agreement creates a shadow administration over Somalia’s most vital state function: security. Museveni now chairs the body that manages foreign troops, allocates international funds, and liaises with the UN — all roles that traditionally belong to a sovereign state.

The arrangement recalls the mechanisms of a colonial protectorate: Somalia retains formal independence, but critical levers of control now sit in Kampala. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is still technically in office — but power is elsewhere.

This is the culmination of years of strategic decay. Somalia has surrendered its economic sovereignty to Turkey and now its security architecture to Uganda. The fiction of Somali self-rule grows thinner by the day.

Whatever the next chapter holds, one thing is clear: Somalia’s path to stability no longer runs through Mogadishu. It runs through Kampala — and it’s Museveni holding the map.

The Khatumo Dilemma and the Legacy of Clan-Based Politics in Somalia

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The political choices of the Khatumo community have long perplexed many observers, myself included. Their decision to pursue a federal arrangement with the Federal Government of Somalia—rather than aligning with either Somaliland or Puntland—raises significant questions about historical memory, political calculations, and perceived benefits. After engaging with three seminal works written by esteemed Somali scholars on the country’s tumultuous political history, I have come to the conclusion that the people of Khatumo are not driven purely by ideological or national considerations. Rather, they appear to be seeking to reclaim a perceived lost entitlement: the disproportionate share of political power and public resources they enjoyed under the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.

However, this aspiration is deeply problematic. The assumption that reintegration with Mogadishu will lead to the restoration of these privileges is, at best, wishful thinking. As the Somali proverb wisely puts it, “Meesha ay dacawo macal uga baratay bay macaluul ugu bakhtidaa”—”The place where the fox once learned to find food is the same place where it ultimately dies of hunger.” This metaphor poignantly captures the futility of looking to a failed center of power to deliver the same benefits it once promised but can no longer sustain.

To better understand the dangers and long-term consequences of clan-dominated governance, it is instructive to revisit a pivotal episode in Somali political history involving two prominent members of the Somali Revolutionary Council’s politburo: General Ismail Ali Abokor and General Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla (commonly known as Dafle). Their interaction offers a window into how clan hegemony, once institutionalized within the state apparatus, not only alienated key national actors but also contributed to the eventual unraveling of the Somali state.

In Politics of Cain, Professor Hussein Bulhan recounts a revealing incident that marked a turning point in General Abokor’s political evolution. Though Abokor was Isaaq and Dafle a Darod (Dhulbahante), the two men had been schoolmates in both Somaliland and the United Kingdom, developing a friendship that transcended clan divisions. However, Abokor’s trust and belief in the ideals of the Somali revolution began to erode during a visit to Dafle’s office. While waiting in the adjoining room, Abokor overheard his long-time colleague urging a group of Marehan officials to consolidate Darod hegemony in Somalia. Dafle reportedly told them that “every country in the region is ruled by a clan or tribe,” and therefore, the Darod needed to ensure that power remained in their hands.

For Abokor, this moment was a revelation—deeply personal and politically disillusioning. That such a divisive call for clan dominance could come from a friend whose own mother was an Isaaq woman deeply unsettled him. It confirmed his growing suspicions that the revolution had been hijacked by clannish ambitions. By the late 1970s, Abokor had become openly critical of the regime. Alienated and spiritually disillusioned, he withdrew from public life, retreating into private religious practice. Nevertheless, he remained an influential figure behind the scenes, quietly encouraging Isaaq officers in the Somali armed forces to align with the Somali National Movement (SNM), the very group that would lead the armed resistance against Barre’s dictatorship in the northwest.

This story of personal betrayal and political awakening is emblematic of a broader systemic crisis. What began as a revolutionary project aimed at building a unified, socialist Somali state quickly degenerated into a vehicle for clan-based authoritarianism. As recorded in Waaya-Arag by Faarax Qaaray, the first decade of the revolution saw the consolidation of power in the hands of a narrow coalition known as the M.O.D. alliance—comprising the Marehan (Barre’s paternal clan), the Ogaden (his maternal clan), and the Dhulbahante (his son-in-law’s clan). This alliance excluded other major clans and communities, thereby sowing the seeds of discontent and rebellion.

Abdulqadir Aroma, in Sababihii Burburka Soomaaliya, offers further insight into the transformation of this alliance. Initially disguised as a revolutionary partnership, the M.O.D. coalition eventually became a naked expression of tribal favoritism. Barre, fearing loss of control, undermined constitutional governance and centralized power within his own kinship networks. According to Aroma, among the 76 founding members of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (XHKS), 38 were selected purely on the basis of clannish loyalty, all belonging to the Darod clan. The constitutional framework was subordinated to tribal dictates, as exemplified by the infamous rallying cry of Darod delegates: “O Daarood Ismaaciil, you have disgraced the family.”

This corruption of the revolutionary ideal culminated in systemic exclusion and militarized repression. Bulhan explains that even before Barre’s military defeat by Ethiopia in 1977-78, he had already begun arming loyalists and militarizing clan networks. The ideological facade of socialism and nationalism disintegrated under the weight of authoritarian paranoia and tribal patronage. The myth of Barre’s invincibility collapsed, and with it, the very foundations of the Somali state.

The Khatumo community’s nostalgia for the Barre era must be viewed within this historical context. While it is understandable that certain constituencies may seek to restore what they see as lost entitlements, the reality is that those privileges were granted under a system built on exclusion, coercion, and eventual collapse. Attempts to revive such a system—whether through federal alignment with Mogadishu or through other forms of political restoration—are not only misguided but potentially dangerous.

In contrast, Somaliland offers a radically different political experiment. Since declaring its independence in 1991, Somaliland has rejected the legacy of Barre’s rule and instead embarked on a path of indigenous reconciliation, democratic institution-building, and relative stability. Though unrecognized internationally, Somaliland has demonstrated a commitment to peace, self-governance, and pluralism that stands in stark contrast to the tumultuous politics of Mogadishu.

By choosing to align with a federal government in Mogadishu that is itself struggling with legitimacy, plagued by corruption, and infiltrated by terrorist threats, Khatumo risks repeating the mistakes of the past. The pursuit of federalism under the illusion of regained influence may in fact lead to deeper marginalization, especially in a context where centralized power remains weak and volatile.

Ultimately, the lessons of Somali political history should not be forgotten. The tragedy of the Somali state collapse was not merely the result of external interventions or ideological failures, but of the internal corrosion caused by clan hegemony, exclusionary politics, and personal ambition disguised as national interest. The story of Abokor and Dafle is not just a cautionary tale—it is a mirror reflecting the dangers that lie ahead for any community that seeks power at the expense of pluralism, equity, and justice.

Khatumo, and other regions like it, would do well to critically reassess the legacy they are seeking to restore. Instead of clinging to the ghost of a regime that prioritized clan over country, they could chart a new course rooted in inclusive governance, historical reconciliation, and meaningful self-determination. The past should inform the future—not imprison it.

About the Author

Mr. Abdillahi Hussein is PhD Candidate in Peace & Development Studies and visiting Prof. of Public Policy as well as Ethics in Government at the Civil Service Institute, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Turkey’s Shadowy Deal: Exploiting Somalia’s Resources Under the Guise of Partnership

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Staff
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Turkey’s recent energy agreements with Somalia raise serious concerns about neo-colonial exploitation, masking a power grab under the veneer of economic cooperation. While Turkey frames its involvement as a win-win partnership, a closer examination reveals a deeply unbalanced arrangement that leaves Somalia vulnerable and significantly disadvantaged.

Turkey’s Energy Crisis and Strategic Ambitions:

Turkey’s energy dependence, coupled with a weakened lira and soaring inflation, has driven its pursuit of alternative energy sources and transit routes. This pursuit has led to strategic partnerships, some questionable, across the globe. Somalia, a nation grappling with instability and weak governance, has become an attractive target.

Somalia: A Vulnerable Target:

Somalia’s fragile state presents an opportunity for Turkey to secure access to its oil and gas reserves with minimal oversight and accountability.  The agreement’s terms are heavily skewed in Turkey’s favor, granting it:

  • Predatory Cost Recovery: A 90% upfront cost recovery clause allows Turkey to effectively claim the lion’s share of the revenue, leaving Somalia with minimal returns. This is far beyond the norm for even conflict-ridden nations, where cost recovery typically caps around 70-80%.
  • Unilateral Control:  Legal disputes are to be arbitrated in Istanbul, giving Turkey a significant advantage and potentially stifling any challenge to the deal’s terms.
  • Minimal Local Investment: Turkey’s lack of commitment to establishing local offices or contributing to local development further highlights the exploitative nature of the agreement. This means no local job creation and no significant revenue for the Somali people.

A Façade of Partnership:

The agreement is presented as a mutually beneficial partnership, but the reality is far different. Somalia receives minimal financial benefits while Turkey gains substantial access to resources and strengthens its geopolitical position.  The lack of transparency and the one-sided terms raise concerns about corruption and the potential for long-term exploitation.

Challenging the Narrative:

Several arguments put forth to justify the agreement’s terms are demonstrably false:

  • The “Fair Royalty” Claim: The 5% royalty offered to Somalia is significantly below the standard for new oil-producing nations, indicating a blatant disregard for equitable resource sharing.
  • The “Normal Cost Recovery” Claim: The 90% cost recovery is far above the norm, even in unstable regions, showcasing the deal’s inherent imbalance.
  • The “International Arbitration” Claim: Arbitration in Istanbul provides Turkey with an unfair advantage, undermining Somalia’s ability to challenge unfavorable decisions.
  • The “Efficiency” Claim: The lack of a local office translates to a lack of local investment and economic benefits for Somalia.

Geopolitical Implications:

Turkey’s actions in Somalia are not merely about energy; they are about asserting geopolitical influence in Africa and the Middle East. This move could destabilize the region further and undermine Western efforts to support Somalia’s development. The deal casts a shadow on Turkey’s international reputation and raises questions about its commitment to fair and equitable partnerships.

Conclusion:

Turkey’s deal with Somalia is a stark example of neo-colonial exploitation. It underscores the need for greater transparency and accountability in international resource agreements and highlights the vulnerability of weak states in the face of powerful actors pursuing their own economic and geopolitical interests.

About the Author:

Mariam Robly is an independent journalist and political analyst based out of the MENA region.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Advancing health equity and promoting a healthier Taiwan on the 30th anniversary of Taiwan’s National Health Insurance system

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Dr. Chiu Tai-yuan
Minister of Health and Welfare
ROC (Taiwan)

Health is a fundamental human right and a universal value. Improved health results in greater well-being for the people and has ramifications for the survival and development of a country and even the world. At the 77th World Health Assembly, members adopted the World Health Organization (WHO) Fourteenth General Programme of Work for 2025-2028. The program includes such strategic objectives as improving health service coverage and bolstering financial protections to ensure universal health coverage. WHO has called on all countries to take action on these issues.

As concerns universal health coverage, Taiwan launched the National Health Insurance (NHI) system in 1995. The scheme, which brought together already existing occupational insurance schemes, has reached its 30th year and now covers 99.9 percent of the population. The NHI system provides equitable, accessible, and efficient healthcare to all people in Taiwan. It is also an important pillar and guarantor of Taiwan’s social stability as well as people’s health and safety. It has, moreover, become a global benchmark for achieving universal health coverage. In an annual survey carried out by Numbeo, Taiwan has been ranked first in the Health Care Index category for seven consecutive years.

The NHI operates on a pay-as-you-go, self-sustaining model capable of addressing the financial challenges posed by an aging population and rising healthcare costs. By reforming premium rates and adding additional funding sources, such as the tobacco health and welfare surcharge, the system is on a sound, sustainable footing.

To promote the health of our people, President Lai Ching-te articulated a vision of a healthy Taiwan in 2024. This aims to ensure that people are healthy, the nation is strong, and the world is more ready to embrace Taiwan. Remaining focused on people, families, and communities, we are expanding health promotion operations and preventive healthcare. Moreover, we are implementing a family physician plan, offering comprehensive care to patients with chronic diseases, and utilizing telemedicine to improve healthcare accessibility in rural areas. By promoting integrated long-term care, palliative care, and aging in place, we ensure holistic, lifelong, and dignified care for all people, realizing health equity.

In 2021, WHO released the Global Strategy on Digital Health for 2020-2025. Under this plan, the global health body is seeking the development and adoption of person-centric digital health solutions to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases. It is also overseeing development of infrastructure and applications to use health data to promote health and well-being. Taiwan continues to utilize its prowess in information and communications technology to build effective, high-ROI health systems and services. The NHI cloud facilitates the more efficient exchange of medical records, while the adoption of international standards such as Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources enhances international medical data sharing. Additionally, the incorporation of AI-assisted technologies is advancing the development of smart healthcare. And the introduction of a virtual health insurance card and the My Health Bank app, which enables real-time management of personal health data, empowers people to make health-enabling choices.

In 2008, Taiwan introduced the Health Technology Assessment to facilitate evidence-based policymaking. It also accelerated the inclusion of new treatments under the NHI system. For example, in 2023, gene and cell therapies were covered for the first time, marking a new era for precision medicine and offering patients enhanced treatment options. Taiwan also continues to leverage innovative technologies to improve the working environment for the medical workforce and to bolster the overall quality of medical service.

What’s more, despite facing political challenges, Taiwan has continuously participated in international health affairs and has been dedicated to supporting the global health system. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan played a crucial role in sharing supplies, strategies, and experiences, and proved to be a reliable partner of countries worldwide. Separately, Taiwan’s success story in implementing universal health coverage offers valuable lessons for countries worldwide. As we continue to share our experiences in universal coverage, financial management, and digital health, we hope to facilitate other nations in reaching WHO’s goal of universal health coverage.

In this rapidly changing era, health challenges transcend borders, and global cooperation has become essential to addressing various health crises. However, Taiwan has been prevented from participating in WHO—the foremost global health cooperation body—due to China’s continued distortion of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and World Health Assembly Resolution 25.1. Neither of these resolutions mentions Taiwan or declares that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, these resolutions have no power to confer upon the PRC any right to represent Taiwan in WHO.

In light of this, and to uphold the core UN values of inclusiveness and universality, we urge WHO and all relevant parties to recognize Taiwan’s considerable contributions to global public health and the human right to health. It is imperative that WHO adopt a more open-minded approach and demonstrate flexibility, adhering to the principles of professionalism and inclusivity. Taiwan should be included, as a matter of pragmatism, in the World Health Assembly and all WHO meetings, activities, and mechanisms, particularly those concerned with the WHO pandemic agreement. Taiwan earnestly hopes to work with the international community to create a future of borderless healthcare that realizes the fundamental human right to health stipulated in the WHO Constitution and the vision of leaving no one behind espoused in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Somaliland President Unveils Military Reserve in First Parliament Address

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Hargeisa, April 20, 2025 – President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” delivered his first address to a joint session of Parliament today, offering his most detailed blueprint yet for Somaliland’s national security, economic policy, and foreign affairs agenda. In a speech that stretched nearly two hours, the President announced the formation of the Somaliland National Reserve Forces and outlined his administration’s achievements during its first 100 days in office.

The joint session, attended by members of both houses, Supreme Court justices, political party leaders, cabinet ministers, and military brass, was notably stripped of the ceremonial fanfare that characterized prior administrations. Attendees described the mood as businesslike, reflecting President Abdirahman Cirro’s emerging governance style: heavy on policy, light on theatrics.

National Reserve Forces

The establishment of the Somaliland National Reserve Forces emerged as the headline announcement of the day—a significant shift in the republic’s military doctrine. The President, however, provided no operational details, leaving open questions about the force’s size, recruitment model, and legal framework.

Global models for reserve forces present contrasting approaches: countries like Finland, Israel, and Singapore maintain mandatory reserve service following compulsory military training, while others such as the United States operate volunteer-based systems where citizens balance civilian careers with part-time military service. Which path Somaliland intends to pursue remains unclear, though security experts acknowledge that each option carries vastly different implications for cost, readiness, and public support.

This new force represents one component of a broader security reform package introduced since President Abdirahman Cirro’s administration took office. Other elements include the nationalization of clan militias, comprehensive biometric registration to eliminate “ghost soldiers” from payrolls, and enhanced Coast Guard capabilities—which the President claimed have “tripled” without specifying whether this refers to vessels, manpower, or funding allocations.

Peace in Erigavo and Vice President’s Role

The President celebrated what he characterized as one of the administration’s crowning achievements: brokering an end to a nine-year clan conflict in Erigavo that had resulted in significant bloodshed and regional instability. The complex peace agreement involved the disarmament of clan militias and their formal integration into national forces.

In a notable moment of public recognition, the President credited the success to a high-level delegation led by Vice President Mohamed Ali Aw Abdi, comprising military commanders, cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and traditional leaders. He singled out the Vice President’s diplomatic efforts for special praise, requesting the assembly to recognize him with applause—a rare display of executive collegiality in Somaliland’s often competitive political landscape.

State of the Nation and Security Reforms

President Abdirahman Cirro used substantial portions of his address to frame Somaliland as emerging from a period characterized by economic stagnation, security deterioration, and democratic paralysis driven by electoral delays and political fragmentation. His administration’s early interventions, he asserted, have stabilized the republic and established foundations for comprehensive institutional reform.

Among the security achievements highlighted was the implementation of biometric registration across the armed forces to curb payroll fraud—a long-standing challenge that has diverted defense resources from operational needs. The President also noted the introduction of direct salary payments from the treasury to service members, expanded training programs for more than 700 officers—some of whom have received specialized instruction abroad—and technological upgrades to both Immigration services and airport security protocols nationwide.

Economic Development Strategy

The President articulated a three-pronged economic strategy centered on enhancing domestic production, diversifying revenue streams, and investing in critical infrastructure. In concrete terms, he announced that Berbera’s electricity rate will drop to $0.20 per kilowatt-hour by July 2025—positioning it as the most affordable power supply in the country—and highlighted seven road construction projects designed to connect agricultural and livestock-producing regions to urban centers and port facilities.

The President reported that Lughaya port has completed its evaluation phase and is poised for commercial expansion, potentially diversifying Somaliland’s maritime trade capacity beyond Berbera. His administration has overseen the completion of 32 wells, reservoirs, and water catchment systems to address chronic water shortages in rural regions and support agricultural development.

Foreign investment has played a central role in the administration’s economic approach. The President highlighted a $20 million commitment from the Pharo Foundation and $22 million from Germany targeted toward agricultural modernization. Additionally, the World Bank has allocated $30 million for solar energy projects in Berbera and Borama, potentially transforming the energy landscape in these strategic urban centers.

Environmental and Social Programs

Environmental sustainability featured prominently in the address, with the President pledging to plant three million trees during his term—approximately 600,000 annually. He noted that 300,000 seedlings have already been planted during the National Tree Planting Day commemorated on April 15th, suggesting an institutional approach to environmental conservation in a region increasingly vulnerable to climate change impacts.

On social development, the President cited the rehabilitation of 77 health centers with particular emphasis on expanding maternal healthcare access in underserved regions. Educational reform initiatives currently underway aim to promote national identity formation, ethical development, environmental consciousness, and social inclusion. Additional programs include correctional education designed to reduce recidivism, educational scholarships for children of fallen security personnel, and modernization of civil service systems including pension reform.

Foreign Affairs: UAE, United States, and Regional Relations

The President devoted significant attention to Somaliland’s evolving diplomatic position, highlighting strengthened ties with the United Arab Emirates as a cornerstone of his foreign policy. In January 2025, he conducted a formal state visit to the UAE, holding substantive closed-door talks with Vice President Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum. He returned to Dubai in February to participate in the World Government Summit, which hosted delegations from over 140 countries.

These high-level engagements, according to the President, have advanced Somaliland’s international standing while securing commitments for development assistance and investment in health infrastructure, educational institutions, water resources, and transportation networks.

The President specifically highlighted strengthened relations with the United States, noting ongoing efforts to encourage American interest in Somaliland. He also mentioned security assistance and various collaborative initiatives received from the United Kingdom, demonstrating Somaliland’s broadening international partnerships beyond regional actors.

Notably absent from the President’s remarks was any reference to the now-defunct Memorandum of Understanding signed with Ethiopia on January 1, 2024, which had granted Ethiopia access to the Port of Berbera and envisioned formal diplomatic recognition. Ethiopia has since pivoted toward engagement with Somalia through Turkish-brokered talks, prioritizing its role as a troop-contributing country to Somalia’s peacekeeping missions to maintain regional influence against growing Egyptian ambitions. This diplomatic realignment culminated in the Ankara Declaration of December 2024—an agreement emphasizing respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity—which effectively leaves Ethiopia without the coveted access to the Red Sea through Somaliland that the original MoU had promised.

The fallout from the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU triggered a pronounced deterioration in relations with Djibouti, which closed Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills—a move widely interpreted as politically motivated. Somaliland subsequently accused Djibouti of providing tacit support to separatist elements in the Awdal region.

Despite these challenges, the President emphasized that “the Government of Somaliland will strengthen the historical relationship based on good neighborliness, brotherhood, and cooperation that we have with Ethiopia and Djibouti.” He specifically announced that his administration “is planning trips that we will make to those countries,” signaling a diplomatic initiative to improve regional relationships.

Somalia Relations and Sovereignty

In his remarks, President Cirro reaffirmed Somaliland’s position on Somalia’s repeated provocations, most notably Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s unsanctioned visit to Las Anod on April 16, 2025. The visit, which included meetings with SSC-Khatumo leaders and the transfer of prisoners from Las Anod to Mogadishu for a staged display before Somalia’s media, was condemned by Somaliland as a flagrant violation of Somaliland’s sovereignty.

The President confirmed the cancellation of bilateral talks with Somalia following Barre’s visit, calling it a destabilizing move designed to undermine hard-won peace in the Sool region. The government maintained that no negotiation had occurred regarding the prisoner releases, accusing Somalia of using the incident for political theater.

Democratic Values and Parliamentary Oversight

The President concluded his address by reaffirming his administration’s commitment to democratic governance, institutional integrity, and constitutional order. He emphasized the centrality of rule of law and national unity to Somaliland’s development trajectory and acknowledged Parliament’s essential oversight function in ensuring accountable governance.

While government-aligned lawmakers responded to the address with expressions of support, opposition representatives raised substantive concerns regarding the lack of specificity on legislative timelines, budgetary transparency, and the constitutional procedures required for implementing the sweeping initiatives announced in the speech. They particularly emphasized the constitutional requirement for parliamentary approval of major security and financial commitments, including the establishment of the National Reserve Forces.

As Somaliland navigates this critical period of institutional development, the relationship between executive vision and legislative oversight will likely define the practical implementation of the ambitious agenda outlined in the President’s landmark address.

Somalia’s War on Somaliland: What’s Next?

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Staff
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In September 2023, amidst the conflict in Las Anod, I warned President Hassan Sheikh of Somalia against granting Federal State membership to the city of Las Anod—a region integral to Somaliland and predominantly inhabited by the Dhulbahante clan. In that article, (https://www.horndiplomat.com/2023/09/op-ed-tribal-borders-cannot-lead-to-unity-for-somalia-or-bring-back-somaliland/)

 I cautioned: “If a new tribal state infringing on Somaliland sovereignty is created with the support of Somalia, this will be a point of no return for Somaliland and Somalia talks.”

This week, those very warnings became reality.

Somalia’s Prime Minister’s recent visit to Las Anod marked a blatant violation of Somaliland’s territorial integrity—a move Somaliland’s government rightly deemed as both provocative and a departure from the path of efforts towards stability. Las Anod has long been a contested area between SSC and Somaliland, and this latest escalation only exacerbates the conflict.

The timing of the visit revealed a calculated strategy. While Somalia’s PM stirred tensions in Las Anod, Somalia’s Ambassador to the US, Dahir Hassan, brazenly announced on X: “Proud to announce Somalia is officially open for oil drilling. SSC Khatumo is now recognized as a Federal Member State…” He went on to pinpoint the Nugaal Valley Basin as the drilling site, underscoring a poorly coordinated yet deliberate attempt to escalate the conflict Somalia is waging on Somaliland’s territories. At the time of writing this article, clashes are unfolding in the rural areas near Erigavo, Somaliland. This fresh offensive by SSC militias further underscores the ongoing, highly volatile nature of this conflict, which continues to be actively fuelled by Somalia.

Somalia’s aggressive posturing is also a desperate smokescreen, distracting from its own dire situation. The country grapples with a looming threat from violent extremists, a reality underlined by the recent overrun of Aden Yabal military base, the largest military base outside Mogadishu. The attack forced Somalia’s Army Chief and other senior officials to flee the military camp, laying bare the fragility of Somalia’s security infrastructure.

Strategic towns such as Yaasoman and Aboorey, along with regions like the Shabelle Valley and Hiraan, are under siege— all the way to Afgooye. This raises questions about Somalia’s ability to counter Al-Shabaab’s relentless advance into the capital city Mogadishu.

At this critical juncture, concerns among Somalia’s citizens about the nation’s trajectory are growing louder. While some blame the security failures on the lack of political progress, others point to the absence of a coherent security policy as the root cause. It almost feels like a futile attempt to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Could Hassan Sheikh Mohamud be Somalia’s final president? Is the international community in Mogadishu prepared with contingency plans on how to get out as quick as possible? The global fallout could be catastrophic if images of kidnapped or murdered embassy personnel from Mogadishu begin circulating on screens worldwide.

While Somalia battles conflicts on multiple fronts, it is astonishing that it can still divert aid funding to actively provoke conflict with Somaliland. One thing is certain: the region is approaching a breaking point. This reality highlights one of the international community’s most glaring failures—its persistent refusal to recognize Somaliland’s rightful sovereignty. A nation acknowledged long before many other African states gained independence, but which continuous to be overlooked. Yet an even greater indictment lies in the international community’s neglect of Somaliland, while at the same time they are funnelling billions into Somalia, how unfortunate then, that Somalia consistently demonstrated an unparalleled ability to squander resources through corruption and cede territory to violent extremism.

Under the leadership of the Kulmiye Party and former President Bihi, Somaliland achieved remarkable strides in advancing its global recognition. The signing of the MOU with Ethiopia marked a pivotal moment, creating undeniable momentum for Somaliland’s sovereignty. In response, Somalia’s president embarked on a desperate world tour, urging nations to renew support for the ‘One Somalia’ policy—a concept akin to a black hole, consuming everything while giving nothing in return.

It is important to emphasize that Somalilanders deeply oppose Al-Shabaab and everything it represents, this is precisely why the group has never gained a foothold in Somaliland. Our traditions of fostering peace and democracy in the region stand as a testament to our values. While Somalilanders’ greatest wish is to live in harmony with Somalia, as we will always remain neighbours, let there be no doubt: Somalilanders are unwavering in their readiness to defend their land and their people.

What’s next?

The international community plays a crucial role in preventing the war Somalia is waging on Somaliland, from escalating into a broader regional crisis. If aid funding to Somalia is misused to ignite and sustain conflicts in Somaliland – a pattern for which evidence already exists. Somaliland is justified in seeking international legal counsel against any external actors found responsible for fuelling such conflicts.

Considering these concerns, I strongly urge Somaliland’s government to demand the following measures from the international community moving forward:

  • Aid allocated to Somalia must, under no circumstances, be utilized to wage conflicts, whether directly or indirectly, that undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.

About the Author

By Sagal Ashour – Social epidemiologist

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The Pressing Issues for the Reform of Somaliland National Army Forces 

By
Staff
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0

Introduction  

Shortly, before the appointment of the Chiefs of the Somaliland National Army and the Police forces.  The newly elected president of Abdirahman Abdullahi Irro has paid a visit and inspected the headquarters of Somaliland’s various security institutions and promised several reforms and initiatives intending to improve the Somaliland Security Apparatus’ overall quality and efficiency.  To this effect, the president has established a ministerial committee, including the ministries of Defense, the Interior, the director of the national intelligence agency, and the national security advisor among others, to reform and modernize Somaliland’s national forces[1].  Fulfilling his campaign promise, President Abdirahman Irro has issued a presidential decree for increasing the salaries of the national security forces by 50% per year, making it a 250% raise during his five-year tenure at the office, the biggest salary raise of the security forces ever[2].  The president has ordered the biometric registration of all security forces personnel and their proper registration to eliminate ghost soldiers.  During his visit to the National Military headquarters, the president of Somaliland promised the army under his term would establish the air forces of the national army, if succeeded, this would be the first time that the military would have an air service since their formation in 1994, although the army have to yet establish a navy force.  The president in his inspection of the army headquarters mentioned the development of the first national security strategy in the country [3].  

The reform and the modernization of Somaliland security forces, including the national army, are coming at a time when the country has seen a series of security challenges and witnessed, the violent conflict in Las Anod; the provisional capital city of Sool region, the inauguration of rival administration in the country, the formation of the clan militias groups like the Sool, Sanaag, Buhodle (SSB) and G36 that stems from the army’s performance in Las Anod and the perceived sense of insecurity by the communities.  The 2018 formation of militia by Arre, then a general of Somaliland national army forces has underlined the problems that the national army forces are confronting.  It exposed the lack of professionalism of the officer corps of the military and its involvement in politics. For decades, although the institution has only recently in 2023, seen the passing of the Somaliland National Military Act by the country’s parliament, to define the proper role of the national army and enhance the development of norms, rules, and procedures, that are expected to contribute to improving the professionalism of the military.  The national army has been grappling with challenges of professionalism, organizational development, and the regularization of entry, promotion, and retirement procedures of the army services. 

The particulars of these reforms and their targeted outcomes remain a fact to be seen yet.  These initiatives and reform calls are steps in the right direction, but the need for their rigors and areas of priority cannot be stressed enough.  This article will essentially focus on, the Somaliland National Army forces.  It will particularly emphasize the aspects that the proposed reforms and expected initiatives to enhance the army forces’ efficiencies ought to highlight.  Considering the foundational responsibility of this institution for state survival and the preeminent role of these responsibilities, it is incumbent on the new administration of Abdirahman Irro and the new government to put forward a comprehensive plan to reform and modernize the Somaliland army with the long-term aims of laying the ground foundation for the development of a force that fit the purpose.  To avoid a haphazard reform the government should priorities the issues that are pressing and distinguish from areas that can wait later by being realistic, practical, and focusing on what is urgent. 

The Areas for The National Army Reform

From their establishment on 2 February 1994, with the first two regiments that were drawn out of the civilian and clan milia disarmament and reintegration process during the late President Mohammed H. Ibrahim Egal’s administration, and the remanent of Somali military officers; in which some of them belong to Somali National Movement fighters, that fought against Siad Barre regime.  Ever since their formation, the Somaliland National Army forces have played an instrumental role in solidifying Somaliland’s control of its territory particularly in the peripheries where government presence was not as effective as it was in the center.  Until May 1997, with the move of the 17th regiment of the national army from Darer-Wayne military school to their new post in Oog town the Somaliland National Army forces particularly in eastern regions, their presences were confined to Buroa, the capital city of the Togdheer region and the country’s second capital.  These have paved the way for consolidating Somaliland’s state authority in the rest of the country, it saw the establishment of Somaliland authority in localities like Yagoori, Waa-dhako, Sama-kaab, Adhi-cadeye, Af-madow, Fiqi fuliye, and Yube of the Togdher, Sanaag, and Sool regions, among other places.  Somaliland National Army has aided the national police forces and other security apparatus when needed in upholding law and order in the country and was deployed in various clan and communal conflicts, it was mobilized to participate in securing the overall security of the elections, as the last year’s elections in Somaliland elucidates.

Organizationally, the national army has formed divisions in all of the country’s provinces. With the inception of the first division of 31st based on Hargeisa, it has expanded to the rest of the country.  The army has set out two commands; the Eastern command based in Burao, and the Western command located in Borama in Awdal region.  The education and training of its officers and recruits have seen expansion and growth.  Despite the quality of the curriculums and the contents of its education.  Assuming the helm of the training division, Major General Ismail Shaqalle, after the formation of the Somaliland National Army has inaugurated the three military training schools of the Sheikh, Darer-Wayne, and Goroyo-awl military schools[4], with the purpose of training and disciplining of the new forces.  Later four more schools, including the only military college of Abdullahi Askar, which was constituted on September 14, 2013, were added, making the total of the military schools of the Somaliland National Army Forces seven[5].  The national army forces have yet to have the complete institutions of professional military education including staff and command colleges and war and defense universities[6].  The absence of such institutions hampers the force’s professionalization and limits it is education and learning.  

War and violence are human features, that can be deterred by preparedness and improve the margins of success in the event of it is occurrence through a lifetime dedication to learning and experience.  It is a profession like law or medicine.   Light, mobile, and joint units are the direction that military organizations are heading underpinned by it is sutibility of the nature of threats they tackling.  As a patient or client will not trust his case by an untrained lawyer, so should an institution be trusted with the responsibility of state’s military security policy for an institution that does not have the capability and required skills to discharge this task? 

According to the seminal work of The State and the Soldier, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has remarked that the modern national military officers and their institution have the three primary responsibilities of representation, advisory, and execution.  This organ, which is subordinate to the civilian statesmen that are in charge of state affairs has the functional responsibility of representing this institution on matters that relate to resource allocations, they also provide advice from their military vantage point on the matters that concern the area of the military and share the president the military options of the policy issues that the administration is contemplating and their suitability considering the capability of the army to fulfill it and lastly they execute orders once the statesmen decree it[7].   The current state of affairs of the army following it is pushback from Las Anod and their performance, which subsequently saw the formation of clan militias, the pervasive use of social media platforms by the army members; that compromise army positions and make it vulnerable for easy identifications, and other cases that predate those episodes, include the military’s former officers that involved the establishment of militia like general Aare in 2018 and the arrest and trial of colonel Doolal in which the during Muse Bihi’s administration was accused to have contact with Somalia and sentenced in two-year prison by military court in 2021, though the president have pardoned him shortly.  Those issues have underscored the army’s extent of political involvement and its ill-preparedness to discharge its military responsibility.  The army is an institution with the essential duty to defend the state’s existence from internal and external threats including other armies.  It is an institution that is in charge of managing violence. 

Somaliland National Army forces have come a long way with meager resources and institutional constraints and have a long journey to go to become forces that fit the purpose of it is duties.  Taking into consideration the magnitude of the challenges that Somaliland National Army forces are confronting, this reform proposal could not have come any better time.  The education of the officer corps of the army must be given a particular place.  It can start by creating strong civil-military relations, developing the professionalism of the military troops and allocating the necessary resources for these matters, and subordinating of military to civilians and statesmen who are representative of the state.   This organ serves the leadership of the organization and the connecting tissues that link the civilian statesmen and the ranks, and the files of the army.  The investment of their educations will instill in the army an ethos of military professionalism and discipline.  The new administration can focus its reforms on education that emphasizes the essential skills of military science, history, and the art of war, strategy, tactics, and operations which are the prerequisites for the development of the skills that are paramount for the military profession.  Where it is possible it should include foreign languages, with particular attention being given to the ones that are widely spoken in the region. 

The Somaliland National Army forces have for decades grappled with the challenges that relate to force entry, promotion, and retirement.  The proposals for reforms must tackle these problems.  Emphasis must be placed on the recruitment and enlisting of officers who possess the necessary skills.  Currently, literacy and formal education are not requirements for entry into the services, an understandable situation considering the institution’s formation after the Somali state collapse and Somaliland’s unilateral withdrawal of Somali unity and it is reclamation of sovereignty.  The situation has changed, and the army needs to adjust and reflect.  Making a concerted effort to attract a pool of talented skills that can contribute to the effectiveness of the institution.  The reforms should target strengthening and regularizing the promotion of officers.  Since the introduction of the ranks in 2013, officer promotion has been an area that needs further development, the Abdullahi Askar military college, shortly instituted after the introduction of ranks with the mandate for evaluating the quality of the officers should be empowered, placing more emphasis on merit, service time and exams as the basis for promotion.  Retirement and pension system is another dimension the reform initiatives must focus on, the Somaliland National Army Act was adopted in 2023, and its implementation will be a good start.  The reforms should overhaul the army’s entry, recruitment, promotion, and retirement procedures.  The introduction of the age limit of the army service is paramount for injecting new blood into the army equipped with important skills and pensioning officers who are no longer capable of serving in the army and therefore retired. 

Somaliland’s military is also operating in a volatile security landscape of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea arena.  The return of great power competitions between the United States and China, in which the latter started engaging with Somaliland on security matters and eyeing to have a military installation in Somaliland’s Berbera city[8],  Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan that puts on the radar of China, which draws to Somaliland into broader US and China competitions situates Somaliland in a very security complex environment.  The improvement of the army’s officer corps overall education is necessary for mitigating the potential security risks that Somaliland faces.  The threats of the terrorist militant groups and the persistent problems of terrorism, which in decades have proven resilient and potent are aspects that call for close cooperation with other states and constant investment in know-how and training of the armed forces to deal swiftly if needed.  The Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group of Al–Shabab that is active in the region poses a threat to Somaliland as have been proved by their attack of 2008.  The growing security role of Gulf monarchies, Türkiye, and other extra-regional powers in the Horn of Africa’s security and defense matters as far as national military security is concerned requires attention.  The Türkiye’s security and economic cooperation agreement with Somalia, which promised the development, training, and equipping Somalia’s navy capability, and the growing Egyptian role in Somalia’s security and defense field and the former’s military agreement with Somalia are potential concerns for Somaliland’s security considering Somalia’s claim of Somaliland as part of it.    

In conclusion, the reforms should prioritize the areas of professionalism of the military and their education, regularization of the recruitment, promotion, and retirement, and development of the necessary skills for the initiation of mitigation strategies for managing the adverse effects of the Horn of Africa security developments.  The meager resource limitations and the vast areas for reform and improvement precipitate that the government must be selective in it is reform, guided by the long-term objectives of having a force that fits its mission.  It is prudent that reforms should be realistic, and tailored to the force’s needs and what is possible in this conjunction.  For decades, Somaliland has enjoyed close cooperation with neighboring states like Ethiopia; many leaders of the army have acquired advanced military training in command, staff, and war colleges of Ethiopia, Djibouti which units of Somaliland security have gone for training, and the new ties that Somaliland has established with Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates with the promise to contribute to the army’s capability needs to materialize and strengthened.  The development of the Red Sea arena, the growing interests of many states in this area, and their involvement in the matters of the Red Sea arena call for attention. The potential negative effects this entails also make the national army reform initiatives a call at the right moment.  The army and the modernization efforts need to make strives to acquire essential knowledge to develop the necessary mitigating strategies to lessen its advent effects that concern military security.

References 

The Soldier and the State — Harvard University Press. (n.d.). Harvard University Press. https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674817364

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2022). Professional military education institutions

in Africa. https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/African-PMIs.pdf

Somaliland Channel. (2019, November 20). Taliyaha Dugsiga Tababarka Sardheeye oo ku dheeraaday ujeedka Saraakiishan loo Tababarayo [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFwUoaeHl2k

Faysal Fifa. (2022, February 2). Sareeye Gaas Nuux Taani taliyaha ciidanka  qaranka S/land oo ka sheekeeyay horumarka ciidanku gaadhe [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjlA6CP0Fv8

HORYAAL TV. (2022, March 17). Maalmihii Qadhaadhaa Ee Ismaaciil Shaqale Taliyihii Hore Ciidanka Qaranka | Qaybtii 4 Aad [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmrvEYukZ-Q

Olander, E. (2024, December 13). Why some African countries welcome Trump’s return to power. The China-Global South Project. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/podcasts/why-some-african-countries-welcome-trumps-return-to-power/

CBA TV. (2025, January 18). Madaxweyne Cirro oo tagay Taliska Guud ee Ciidanka Qaranka Somaliland [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5la65cBUmLA

SAAB TV. (2025, January 25). Guddiga Dib-u-dhiska iyo Casriyaynta Ciidamada, Qaranka oo la magacaabay [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpnQPhhUGQw

MM Somali TV. (2025, January 22). Madaxweynaha Somaliland oo mushaharkii u kordhiyay Ciidamada. [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1VTkmNIV0A

[1] SAAB TV. (2025, January 25). Guddiga Dib-u-dhiska iyo Casriyaynta Ciidamada, Qaranka oo la magacaabay [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpnQPhhUGQw

[2] MM Somali TV. (2025, January 22). Madaxweynaha Somaliland oo mushaharkii u kordhiyay Ciidamada. [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1VTkmNIV0A

[3] CBA TV. (2025, January 18). Madaxweyne Cirro oo tagay Taliska Guud ee Ciidanka Qaranka Somaliland [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5la65cBUmLA

[4] HORYAAL TV. (2022, March 17). Maalmihii Qadhaadhaa Ee Ismaaciil Shaqale Taliyihii Hore Ciidanka Qaranka | Qaybtii 4 Aad [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmrvEYukZ-Q

[5] Faysal Fifa. (2022, February 2). Sareeye Gaas Nuux Taani taliyaha ciidanka qaranka S/land oo ka sheekeeyay horumarka ciidanku gaadhe [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjlA6CP0Fv8

[6] Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2022). Professional military education institutions in Africa. https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/African-PMIs.pdf

[7] The Soldier and the State — Harvard University Press. (n.d.). Harvard University Press. https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674817364

[8] Olander, E. (2024, December 13). Why some African countries welcome Trump’s return to power. The China-Global South Project. https://chinaglobalsouth.com/podcasts/why-some-african-countries-welcome-trumps-return-to-power/

About the Author:

Sacad Muhumed is a researcher specializing in critical security studies, focusing on governance and security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. He holds an MA from Addis Ababa University and is pursuing a second master’s degree at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. 

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