The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland will launch a report to mark the 65th anniversary of Somaliland’s independence and call for the UK Government to recognise it as an independent nation.
The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), chaired by Sir Gavin Williamson, will formally launch its report on Thursday 26th June in the House of Commons. The APPG was formed with the goal of promoting an understanding of and support for Somaliland’s achievements in building peace, democratic governance and a sovereign state in the Horn of Africa. It is chaired by the Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP, with Kim Johnson MP as co-chair, Abtisam Mohamed MP as vice chair and Lord Udny-Lister as an officer.
The APPG’s report, entitled “Roadmap to Recognition” argues that the UK should recognise Somaliland for economic, strategic, and moral reasons, and underlines Somaliland’s potential to be a key democratic partner in what is a volatile yet geopolitically significant region.
In particular, the report highlights the leading role the UK should play in recognising Somaliland, considering its deep historical ties with the country, the presence of a large Somaliland diaspora in the UK, and the UK’s role as UN penholder for Somalia.
The report also proposes the establishment of an “Independence Institution” to provide the government with independent and technical advice; ideas for and the development of government policy; and overarching implementation of government-agreed policy and initiatives.
Sir Gavin said: “In a world that is becoming more unpredictable and unstable, the United Kingdom needs all the friends and allies it can get. Somaliland has built a stable and democratic society against all the odds, and is a bastion of good governance in an otherwise volatile region.
Not only would recognising Somaliland grant the UK an immense strategic advantage in the Horn of Africa, but it would also open up new commercial opportunities and new markets. Moreover, recognising Somaliland’s efforts to promote democratic governance would send a strong signal to other developing nations.
Somaliland deserved recognition when it re-established its independence from Somalia in 1991. The next best time to recognise Somaliland is now.”
China’s growing dominance in Africa is rarely overt. Instead of military bases or flag waving infrastructure inaugurations, it proceeds quietly through economic encroachment and strategic debt. This is China’s “silent conquest” of Africa.
Although in the Indian subcontinent, Sri Lanka offers the most vivid warning. In 2017, unable to repay a billion-dollar Chinese loan, the Sri Lankan government was compelled to lease Hambantota Port and adjacent lands to a Chinese state enterprise for 99 years. This was not simply a financial deal; it was the ceding of sovereign territory with latent military implications. In Africa, similar patterns are emerging with alarming frequency.
Zambia’s debt to China has surpassed six billion dollars. Concerns have mounted that ZESCO, the national electricity utility, may be collateralized in the event of default. Leaked documents and stalled audits reinforce fears of strategic asset forfeiture. In Nigeria, over five billion dollars in Chinese loans have funded critical infrastructure under agreements that often bypass the nation’s legal syatem, granting China considerable leverage in the event of disputes. These clauses are opaque and rarely debated in public forums. Civil society and lawmakers are rightfully worried that national autonomy is being sold off in increments.
In Somalia, Chinese support for road construction and urban development is intertwined with limited public transparency and weak institutional oversight. Chinese influence in Mogadishu, closely aligned with that of Turkey, has formed an axis of external control in a state that cannot meet its own security or budgetary needs. Allegations of unexplained wealth surrounding President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his inner circle further illustrate the risks of unchecked foreign entanglements.
China’s political leverage was also evident in Somalia’s decision to ban Taiwanese citizens from entering Somaliland’s airspace—a move widely viewed as Chinese effort to undermine the burgeoning relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. The move was met with condemnation from the United States, which invoked the Taipei Act to register its disapproval. The ban also placed Somalia at odds with democratic donors, jeopardizing development assistance and isolating the country further.
Beijing’s strategy extends beyond bilateral engagements. Its economic influence has translated into political capital within global institutions. In the United Nations General Assembly, the African voting bloc—increasingly indebted to China—often aligns with Beijing on key resolutions, challenging the institution’s ability to uphold democratic values and norms.
To respond to these challenges, the United States must act with precision and principle. America’s strategic interests require deeper, more equitable engagement across the African continent. That includes strengthening the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), not as a vague ambition, but as a defined, funded and continent specific program. In addition, a similar dedicated US Africa initiative could provide a better focused, reliable alternative for infrastructure development, digital ecosystems and credible security partnerships.
Nowhere is this engagement more urgent than in the Horn of Africa, and no country in the region offers the US a clearer opportunity than the Republic of Somaliland. A politically stable and democratically governed country that occupies a geostrategic position of vital importance. It lies along the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a maritime route through which nearly 10 percent of global trade flows. Its location alone makes it a valuable partner in ensuring freedom of navigation and countering authoritarian expansion.
Equally important, Somaliland is rich in untapped hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals, including gold, lithium, copper and silver. Although unrecognized, it holds regular multiparty elections and has maintained internal stability for over three decades. Somaliland also fulfills the universally accepted criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention in that it has a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The former British protectorate gained independence on June 26, 1960 and was recognized by the international community. Its subsequent union with Somalia was never ratified, violating Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. After years of violence, genocide and state collapse, Somaliland reclaimed its independence in 1991. A 2001 national referendum reaffirmed that decision.
For the US, formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty could represent a diplomatic masterstroke, a strategic pivot in offsetting China’s influence across Africa. A strong US-Somaliland relationship would provide a vital counterweight to Beijing’s growing presence in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the region. It would also create a base of democratic cooperation along one of the world’s most strategic and sensitive shipping corridors. Recognition would also signal America’s commitment to rewarding democratic governance and stability. Somaliland has held regular multiparty elections for over three decades and maintained internal peace in one of the world’s most volatile regions. It offers the United States an opportunity to support a self-reliant, democratic partner rather than an aid-dependent state vulnerable to external manipulation.
China’s expanding presence in Africa is not unstoppable. Across the continent, reformers, civil society groups and citizens are pushing back, demanding accountability, transparency and genuine partnership. Africa does not need tokenism or symbolic engagement, but a credible alternative to China’s debt driven model.
If the United States is to reclaim its relevance in Africa, it must bring vision and commitment to the table. The defining measure of great influence in the coming decades will not be hard power or military engagement, which undermines both economic progress and political stability, but rather the policies and partnerships each of these two major contenders has to offer Africa. A principled US-Somaliland relationship, grounded on democratic values and mutual respect, would be a credible and enduring place to begin.
In this context, Congressman Scott Perry’s introduction of the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act in the United States House of Representatives represents a timely and strategic development. It affirms that recognition of Somaliland is not only morally sound and legally justified, but also fully aligned with the national interests of the United States. The proposed legislation offers a clear and credible congressional pathway toward formal diplomatic recognition and merits broad bipartisan support.
This moment also presents a strategic opportunity for Somaliland’s close partner, the Republic of China (Taiwan), to discreetly lobby the 229 member Congressional Taiwan Caucus, the largest caucus in the U.S. Congress, in support of the bill.
For its part, the Republic of Somaliland must launch a focused public diplomacy and media outreach campaign in Washington to build the necessary momentum and ensure the legislation gains meaningful traction.
About the Author
Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal currently serves as the Republic of Somaliland’s Representative to Taiwan. A seasoned diplomat and politician with extensive experience in African and Asian geopolitics. Ambassador Galaal has held multiple senior government positions,
including Ambassador to Ethiopia, State Minister for Planning and National Development, and State Minister for Health. He has represented Somaliland in high-level negotiations across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and is widely recognised for his expertise in regional security and development strategy. His work draws on a strong background in law, governance, public policy, and international advocacy.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Central Bank delegation secures foundational partnership with Taiwan and technical support from African counterparts at International Association of Deposit Insurers conference
A delegation from the Central Bank of the Republic of Somaliland, led by Deputy Chairman Hamse Khayre has secured critical partnerships to establish a national deposit insurance system, a foundational step toward strengthening the country’s banking sector. The progress was made at the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) Africa Regional Committee conference, held in Mombasa, Kenya, from June 16-19, 2025.
The event, co-hosted by the Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), focused on building resilient financial safety nets across the continent. For the Somaliland team, the objective was clear: learn from established systems and forge the alliances needed to build its own.
“Confidence in banking begins with trust—and trust begins with strong institutions like deposit insurance,” said Deputy Chairman Hamse Khayre, who led the Somaliland delegation. “This forum brought together Africa’s financial safety net leaders to tackle the big questions: how to prepare for crisis before it strikes, and how to protect depositors with confidence.”
A Foundational Partnership with Taiwan
The most significant outcome was a bilateral meeting between Deputy Chairman Khayre and Ms. Yvonne Fan, an IADI Board member and Executive Vice President of Taiwan’s Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). The discussion focused on direct collaboration to create a Deposit Insurance Unit within Somaliland’s Central Bank.
“Meeting with Taiwan’s CDIC Executive Vice President Yvonne Fan was a turning point in our journey to establish a unit that protects our people’s savings,” Khayre stated, emphasizing the breakthrough.
This financial collaboration deepens the existing relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. “The shared values between Taiwan and Somaliland continue to open new pathways, not only in diplomacy but also in financial sector development,” Khayre noted.
The delegation also held productive sessions with deposit insurance agencies from Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Namibia, and Turkey to discuss best practices and potential technical support.
“We are not starting from scratch,” Khayre reflected. “With the right partners, Somaliland can design a deposit insurance system that is both homegrown and globally respected.”
“From Ghana to Namibia, South Africa to Turkey — every meeting was a reminder that financial resilience is not built in isolation, but through shared experiences and mutual support,” he added.
Why Deposit Insurance Matters for Somaliland
Establishing a deposit insurance system is a core part of the Central Bank’s strategy to modernize Somaliland’s financial architecture. For an emerging economy, such a system encourages citizens to move their savings from informal methods into the regulated banking system, providing banks with a stable capital base for lending and investment. The psychological impact cannot be understated – when people trust that their deposits are protected, they participate more actively in the formal financial system.
The global standard-bearer remains the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), established in 1933 following the Great Depression. The FDIC’s guarantee of deposits up to $250,000 per account has virtually eliminated bank runs in America for over nine decades. When Americans see the “FDIC Insured” sign, they know their money is safe regardless of economic turbulence. This confidence translates directly into economic stability and growth.
For Somaliland, the need is particularly acute given the territory’s unique position. Its lack of formal international recognition creates barriers that force reliance on traditional hawala money transfer systems for international transactions. These networks, while historically important, typically charge fees of 8-15% compared to the 1-3% seen in standard international banking. Building robust, internationally recognized financial frameworks represents a pathway toward overcoming these barriers and reducing transaction costs for citizens and businesses.
The territory has seen significant growth in mobile payment systems, with services like ZAAD and eDahab becoming widely adopted. However, these innovations exist alongside regulatory challenges that the Central Bank continues to address as part of its broader modernization efforts.
The Somaliland delegation included Mohamed Abdullahi Ali (Director, Financial Institutions Supervision), Abshir Abdi Mohamed (Director, Monetary Policy), and Mahmoud (Senior Advisor, Bank Deposit Insurance). Their participation reflects a targeted effort under the leadership of Central Bank Governor Abdinasir Ahmed Hirsi to implement comprehensive financial reforms.
“Deposit insurance isn’t just a policy—it’s a promise. And Somaliland is preparing to make that promise to its people,” Khayre declared.
As the delegation returns to Hargeisa, the focus will shift from diplomacy to policy implementation. The partnerships forged in Mombasa provide a roadmap for a system that could strengthen Somaliland’s banking sector while building the institutional credibility needed for broader economic development.
Ambassador Riley’s diplomatic mission signals Washington’s growing interest in direct engagement
Key Points
U.S. Ambassador Riley led a rare full-team visit to Hargeisa, signaling deepening ties.
Washington is reviewing its One-Somalia policy and considering a diplomatic office in Somaliland.
Media misreported visit as military-related—no U.S. military officials were present.
Berbera featured prominently in talks amid growing U.S. interest in regional security.
Somaliland Presidency and Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the visit.
HARGEISA – In a visit described by insiders as anything but routine, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley brought his full senior team to Hargeisa this week for closed-door meetings with Somaliland’s leadership. The high-level delegation included Deputy Chief of Mission Steven Gillen and senior Political, Economic, and Military Affairs officers—essentially the entire top brass of the US mission to Somalia. After spending the night in Hargeisa, the group flew to Berbera the next morning. No public statements were issued by either side.
“This wasn’t a courtesy call,” said one Somaliland government source, speaking on condition of anonymity. “When the entire embassy leadership comes and stays the night, something significant is happening.”
Multiple sources confirmed to the Chronicle that Washington is quietly reassessing its decades-old One-Somalia policy—a diplomatic framework that treats Somalia as a single territorial entity and has long precluded formal US engagement with Somaliland. Officials are now weighing the possibility of opening a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, akin to the UK’s arrangement, as part of a shift toward what sources describe as a “reality-based approach.”
For decades, the One-Somalia policy has served as the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the Horn of Africa. Under this framework, the United States has recognized the sovereignty of Somalia as a unified state, avoiding any bilateral dealings with Somaliland to avoid legitimizing its independence claim. The approach has long frustrated Somaliland officials, who argue that their democratic governance and relative stability warrant separate recognition.
This would mark a clear departure from the approach of previous ambassadors—such as Donald Yamamoto and Larry André—whom a retired U.S. official described as “more Catholic than the Pope” in their rigid adherence to Mogadishu-centric diplomacy.
Ambassador Riley, a 30-year career diplomat who assumed his post almost a year ago, appears to be charting a new course. His decision to bring the full embassy leadership signals that the discussions were treated as a strategic priority. The visit also comes just days ahead of AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley’s expected trip to Somaliland—his final stop before stepping down—a move that adds military weight to the evolving relationship.
Although some media outlets rushed to frame the visit as AFRICOM-centric—fueled by social media clips of V-22 Osprey helicopters hovering over Berbera—there were no U.S. military officials present in this delegation. The coverage largely missed the fact that this was a full-spectrum diplomatic mission led by Ambassador Riley, not a defense-driven operation. The real story was in Hargeisa, behind closed doors.
“The Americans are clearly interested in more than development assistance,” said a second source familiar with the talks. “Berbera came up repeatedly.”
Berbera Port, now operated by DP World, has grown into a strategic logistics hub serving Ethiopia’s trade and sitting along critical Red Sea shipping lanes—where Chinese influence has surged. Defense analysts have identified it as a prime location for projecting U.S. power in the region and countering emerging threats.
Details of the Hargeisa meetings with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” and his senior team remain closely guarded. A Somaliland official would only describe the discussions as “seeking engagement in areas of mutual interest”—a diplomatic phrase that has done little to quell speculation.
That speculation has only intensified following public statements by Somaliland officials expressing openness to hosting U.S. forces. Sources suggest the talks included discussion of long-term military and strategic cooperation, potentially including a U.S. presence in Berbera.
The shift in U.S. posture comes amid signs of growing frustration with Somalia’s federal government. In recent months, Somalia has pivoted to China and Washington has significantly slashed funding particularly in the security sector, imposed new travel restrictions on Somali travellers, and quietly scaled down its presence in Mogadishu due to persistent security and governance concerns. These moves reflect what some analysts see as a broader recalibration of U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.
In what may be a further sign of deepening engagement, sources indicate that President Cirro is preparing for an official visit to the United States, although the timeline remains unclear. While Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Washington just last month—meeting with multiple U.S. legislators including Ted Cruz of Texas and Scott Perry—there is still no confirmation on which figures from President Trump’s adminstration in State or Defense the Somaliland delegation might engage.
The contrast in diplomatic posture is becoming impossible to ignore. For decades, the U.S. has funneled aid and engagement through federal institutions in Mogadishu. Now, Riley’s direct outreach to Hargeisa—backed by possible military coordination—signals a break with that status quo.
“They’re talking about something more permanent,” one source said, referring to the proposed diplomatic presence. Privately, some U.S. officials describe the idea of Somali unity as a “fiction,” and see Somaliland as a functional, stable partner worth engaging on its own terms.
Recent shifts in American policy—reduced aid flows, travel restrictions, and a more restrained presence in Mogadishu—have further highlighted the growing appeal of Somaliland’s relative stability and functioning institutions.
Somaliland’s foreign ministry did not respond to multiple requests for comment. The Office of the President also declined to engage, despite repeated inquiries. The silence from both institutions has only fueled speculation about the depth and direction of this new chapter in US-Somaliland relations.
The upcoming visit by General Langley may serve as a litmus test for whether defense cooperation will form a pillar of this emerging relationship. If the military angle takes shape, it would represent not just a diplomatic shift—but a significant recalibration of American strategic posture in the Horn of Africa.
After thirty years of wishful thinking in Mogadishu, Washington may finally be ready to deal with the Horn’s realities—not its illusions.
HARGEISA — Less than three years after this publication exposed the former Central Bank Governor Dahir Abdillahi Ali for flaunting an “honorary doctorate” from a Delaware-based diploma mill that shares an address with a tile supplier, yet another high-ranking official has been caught in an almost identical act of deception.
Munir Ahmed Egal, the Director General of the Presidency — the administrative engine behind the nation’s highest office — received a graduate degree from Bircham International University, an unaccredited institution repeatedly flagged by international education authorities for selling degrees without any meaningful academic requirements.
A Serial Pattern of Deception
This is not an isolated incident. In August 2022, Somaliland Chronicle revealed that Central Bank Governor Dahir Abdillahi Ali had proudly accepted an “Honorary Doctorate” from European Digital University — a university in name only, operating out of an office in Delaware with no academic standing or accreditation. That scandal was met with shrugs and silence from the very institutions tasked with protecting public integrity.
Instead of confronting the problem, the government appears to have normalized it. Now, just a few years later, an even more egregious example has surfaced — one that reaches the core of the executive branch. Egal’s fake degree isn’t honorary. It was purchased.
Gullible or Dishonest? Either Way, Unfit to Serve
Whether Egal knowingly purchased a fraudulent credential or was duped by Bircham’s elaborate marketing is beside the point. If he was complicit, he has committed fraud. If he was fooled, he lacks the discernment and judgment required for high office. Both scenarios disqualify him.
This isn’t a minor resume embellishment. It’s a question of integrity and competence in one of the most sensitive government roles in Somaliland.
A Government of Ghost Degrees
A source involved in the 2021 parliamentary and local council elections told Somaliland Chronicle that document forgery has become an entrenched part of Somaliland politics. He described a thriving underground market for fake degrees and transcripts, openly catering to political hopefuls desperate to meet basic eligibility requirements or appear more educated than they are.
“It became a seasonal business,” he said. “Election season meant peak sales.”
Legitimate degree holders now find themselves competing against officials who simply paid to appear qualified. And the consequences aren’t academic — they’re structural. Policy decisions, financial oversight, and foreign diplomacy are now being handled by people whose credentials collapse under the weight of a Google search.
Bircham: A Sophisticated Diploma Mill Operation
Bircham International University represents the modern evolution of academic fraud — a sophisticated operation that has successfully deceived officials worldwide for over three decades. Founded in 1992 by Deric Bircham, William Martin, and Bircham’s adopted son Laurence Cheng Wen, the institution has operated from multiple jurisdictions including the Bahamas, Delaware, and Spain, frequently moving when scrutinized by authorities.
The founders present themselves with grandiose credentials. William Martin claims knighthood in the “Order of the Commonwealth” and “Order of Saint Andrew of Jerusalem,” while Deric Bircham boasts of receiving “countless nominations and honors” and claims ancestral ties to medieval English nobility. Their promotional materials feature dramatic narratives about aristocratic Spanish families and connections to former U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
Despite these elaborate backstories, the reality is stark. Oregon education officials called Bircham “totally bogus” in 2003. Texas Higher Education authorities determined it has “no degree-granting authority from Spain.” Mexico, Kenya, and multiple U.S. states have issued warnings against the institution.
Among the fake credentials Bircham cites:
AAHEA — The “American Association for Higher Education and Accreditation” appears on Wikipedia’s list of unrecognized accreditors (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unrecognized_higher_education_accreditation_organizations). The real AAHEA was disbanded in 2009, but this Florida-based organization appropriated the name and Washington DC phone number to create false legitimacy. Neither the U.S. Department of Education nor the Council for Higher Education Accreditation recognizes this AAHEA as a legitimate accreditor.
Curaçao Charter — In 2018, Bircham secured a so-called “charter” from Curaçao, a jurisdiction that markets itself as offering “transnational education” opportunities with minimal oversight. The territory explicitly states it “does not provide accreditation” but merely grants charters to institutions that promise to seek accreditation elsewhere.
Professional Memberships — Bircham lists affiliations with IEEE, UN PRME, and other organizations that offer open membership to individuals. These memberships are meaningless in the context of institutional legitimacy.
IARC — The International Accreditation and Recognition Council appears on lists of unrecognized accreditors used by diploma mills and is not recognized by any major educational authority.
Bircham International University’s website touts its status as a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit in the United States, a designation typically associated with charitable or educational institutions. But this claim is deeply misleading. The IRS grants 501(c)(3) status based on tax-exemption criteria, not academic legitimacy. It does not — and never has — evaluated whether an organization offers real education, issues valid degrees, or even operates as a school in any meaningful sense.
This maneuver is common among diploma mills: masquerade as a nonprofit to gain credibility, avoid taxes, and mislead prospective students with a veneer of official recognition. In Bircham’s case, the 501(c)(3) badge is little more than decorative — a shield for a for-profit operation that sells degrees dressed up as academic achievement. In short: tax-exempt, but not legitimate.
The “Non-Formal” Education Smokescreen
Bircham’s own website reveals the elaborate legal architecture designed to avoid educational oversight while maintaining the pretense of academic legitimacy. In a telling admission of regulatory gamesmanship, the institution explicitly states it operates under Spain’s “non-formal” education framework — a classification designed for vocational training, cooking classes, and professional workshops, not university-level education. This loophole allows Bircham to avoid supervision by Spain’s Ministry of Education while still calling itself a “university.” The institution proudly declares it is “exempt from direct regulation by any Ministry of Education, as a non formal education provider” — essentially admitting it operates outside legitimate educational oversight while marketing itself as an institution of higher learning.
This regulatory arbitrage represents sophisticated institutional fraud. Rather than submitting to educational authorities who would evaluate academic standards, curricula, and faculty qualifications, Bircham has structured itself under the Ministry of Economy (business registration) and Ministry of Consumer Affairs (business oversight) — treating education as a commercial product rather than an academic discipline. In the United States, Bircham’s Delaware incorporation as a 501c3 nonprofit provides no educational validation whatsoever; it simply means they’ve filed paperwork claiming charitable status. The institution even fabricates oversight by citing “IVU, Ignita Veritas United” and “Magna Carta Bar Chambers” as supervisory bodies — grandiose names for what appear to be fictional organizations designed to create an illusion of legitimate governance. This isn’t regulatory compliance; it’s regulatory theater designed to fool those unfamiliar with real educational accreditation.
A Career Built on Connections, Not Credentials
Egal’s fraudulent degree is merely the latest chapter in a career propelled by political proximity rather than merit. His rise through Somaliland’s institutions illustrates how access to power routinely trumps qualifications in high-stakes appointments.
During the Siilaanyo administration, Egal was inexplicably appointed as European correspondent for Somaliland National TV—despite lacking any background in journalism. The post included travel on sensitive diplomatic missions, including the Somaliland–Somalia talks in Turkey. Colleagues at the national broadcaster openly questioned how someone without journalistic or diplomatic credentials landed such a role.
Those doubts proved well-founded.
After Siilaanyo left office, Egal resurfaced within the Waddani opposition, launching the Somaliland Today outlet and once again assuming a media leadership role—still without addressing long-standing concerns about his qualifications.
Now, under President Abdirahman Abdillahi, Egal occupies the powerful post of Director General of the Presidency, responsible for coordinating the operations of Somaliland’s highest executive office. Yet he brings no evident administrative experience or record of institutional management.
His ascent—despite a persistent lack of competence—underscores a deeper structural failure: in Somaliland politics, loyalty and access continue to eclipse expertise and vetting.
Presidential Complicity? A Devastating Confession
Perhaps the most explosive evidence comes from Egal himself. In a testimonial on Bircham’s website, he proudly details his fraudulent journey while revealing potential high-level government complicity. Writing under “Somalia” rather than Somaliland — effectively erasing the nation he claims to serve — Egal describes attending Bircham’s Miami ceremony in 2025.
Most shocking is his claim that President Abdirahman Abdillahi personally “encouraged me during those hard times to continue completing my studies.” This raises explosive questions: Did the President know Egal was pursuing an unaccredited degree? Is this why such officials feel emboldened to obtain fake credentials?
Egal’s gratitude extends to “the Minister of the Presidency, the Chief of Staff, the Presidential Spokesperson, and all the various leaders at the Presidency of Somaliland,” suggesting widespread knowledge of his academic pursuits within the government. His public thanks to businessman Mr. Abdirashid Duale, the CEO Dahabshil conglomerate raises further questions about who financed this fraudulent education.
The testimonial concludes with quotes from Nelson Mandela and Somali poetry — a grotesque appropriation of moral authority to validate academic fraud.
Ceremony for Sale: The Commercial Theater
Bircham’s graduation ceremonies reveal the commercial nature of this operation. The institution charges hefty fees for elaborate staged ceremonies designed to create the illusion of academic legitimacy. According to its graduation protocol (https://bircham.net/biu-graduates/ceremonies/), “formal ceremonies” cost $300-500 per graduate, while “photo sessions” range from $200-300. The protocol explicitly states these fees cover “contribution to trip expenses” — essentially charging graduates to fund executives’ international travel.
Recent ceremonies have been held in Qatar, Angola, Guatemala, and El Salvador — mostly in luxury hotels, not universities. The institution even offers “virtual graduation” where students can create fake graduation photos using provided backgrounds and purchase caps and gowns ($150-500) to stage their own ceremonies.
Most tellingly, the graduation documents “do not specify distance education” — deliberately designed to obscure the institution’s unaccredited status.
This is a Global Problem With Real Consequences
Fake degree scandals have toppled officials worldwide. In 2005, the United Nations fired Jonathan Blankson, chief of the Human Resources Information Technology Section, after discovering his degrees were purchased from Trinity College and University, a known diploma mill. A 2004 U.S. Government Accountability Office investigation exposed 350 federal employees with fake degrees from over 120 fraudulent universities, including high-ranking officials like Charles Abell, principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, and Daniel Matthews, Chief Information Officer for the Department of Transportation.
In Mexico, 22 federal health officials were arrested in 2010 after their medical and psychology licenses turned out to be fake, including the technical director of the National Center for Blood Transfusions. According to FBI investigations, the fake degree industry generates over $1 billion annually, with an estimated 200,000 fraudulent diplomas sold each year.
The Vetting Crisis No One Wants to Fix
The bigger scandal is not that another official has a fake degree. It’s that no one in government thought to check. How did someone with such credentials pass through vetting for one of the most sensitive positions in Somaliland? Was his degree listed in his personnel file? Was it paid for with public funds?
This is not a paperwork error. It’s a failure of political culture.
No Response From Officials
Somaliland Chronicle reached out to both Munir Ahmed Egal and the Minister of the Presidency for comment on this story. We specifically asked Mr. Egal to confirm his educational credentials and explain his testimonial praising Bircham International University, while requesting the Minister — as Egal’s direct supervisor — to clarify what role he played in supporting these studies and whether he was aware of the institution’s unaccredited status. Despite multiple attempts to contact both officials through official channels, neither responded to our inquiries. Their silence speaks volumes in a matter that goes to the heart of government integrity and public accountability.
No Excuses in the Age of Search Engines
Anyone with an internet connection can uncover Bircham’s track record in seconds. If Egal and his peers couldn’t bother to do the most basic due diligence on their own education, how can they be trusted to manage national policy?
Ignorance is no longer a defense. The era of plausible deniability ended when search engines were invented.
The Ball is in President Abdillahi’s Court
This is the first major credibility crisis of the new administration. How President Abdillahi responds will define his leadership. Will he investigate, audit, and clean house? Or will he excuse, ignore, and protect?
According to Egal’s own testimonial, the President encouraged these studies. This raises questions about whether the administration was complicit or simply negligent. Either scenario demands immediate action.
The people who voted for transparency deserve more than silence. They deserve to know who’s leading their government — and whether those people actually earned the titles on their business cards.
One Fraud is an Accident. Two is a Pattern. What’s Next?
The Egal case is the second major fake degree scandal Somaliland Chronicle has reported in three years. The first was ignored. The second is unfolding. What happens next will either stop the rot or confirm it runs deeper than anyone imagined.
When fake credentials become an open secret in government, the very idea of merit-based service collapses. Competent, qualified professionals are pushed aside for smooth-talking frauds who know which websites sell prestige by the pound.
The damage is real. Civil servants take cues from the top. If dishonesty is rewarded with promotion, expect more dishonesty. If fake degrees are ignored, expect more fakes.
Got a tip about fake degrees or fraudulent qualifications in public office? Contact our newsroom securely and confidentially. We follow the truth, wherever it leads.
Pennsylvania congressman’s legislation comes weeks after outgoing AFRICOM commander acknowledged al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” despite decades of U.S. support to Somalia
Congressman Scott Perry introduced the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act on Wednesday, legislation that would formally recognize Somaliland as a separate, independent nation and establish diplomatic relations with Hargeisa.
Perry’s office said the legislation aims to “redirect U.S. foreign policy to align with a new, stable and self-governing partner in a region of increasing strategic importance to the United States.”
“Foreign adversaries are on the march in Africa and around the globe, and it’s in our national interest to strengthen relationships with reliable partners who share our values and contribute to our security – whenever and wherever possible,” said Perry, a retired Army National Guard brigadier general who flew 44 combat missions commanding the 2-104th Aviation Battalion during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2009-2010).
The bill is co-sponsored by Representatives Andy Ogles (TN-05), Pat Harrigan (NC-10), and Tom Tiffany (WI-07), all of whom have previously criticized U.S. policy toward Somalia while advocating for stronger ties with Taiwan.
Somalia Policy Unraveling as AFRICOM Admits Failure
The timing of Perry’s bill coincides with a broader U.S. reevaluation of Somalia as a viable state partner. In June 2025, President Trump’s travel ban proclamation declared that Somalia “lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents” and noted that “Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups.” The proclamation’s finding that “the Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement” represents a fundamental challenge to Somalia’s claims of sovereignty.
This assessment aligns with outgoing AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley’s admission that al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” despite decades of U.S. military assistance to Somalia.
Langley’s assessment represents a reversal from his previous optimism about Somalia’s security situation. In June 2024, he expressed “measured optimism” about Somali government capabilities, but recent al-Shabaab territorial gains have forced a reassessment.
The militant group overran the strategic town of Adan Yabal in May, forcing U.S.-trained Somali National Army troops to abandon their largest operational base and millions of dollars in American-supplied weapons.
Al-Shabaab territorial gains have correlated directly with recent funding reductions, with insurgents retaking “dozens of villages” and regaining operational capability in nearly one-third of territory they lost to federal forces in 2022.
Massive Aid Cuts Follow Somalia Failures
The Trump administration has implemented sweeping cuts to Somalia funding, with U.S. aid dropping from $850 million in 2024 to $180 million in 2025, according to ForeignAssistance.gov data.
The cuts ended monthly $400 salary supplements for elite Danab forces and eliminated food and fuel support following U.S. audits that found Somali forces had “padded food and fuel requisitions.”
The press release notes that Somalia’s “meritless claims over Somaliland hinder the United States’ ability to forge deeper diplomatic ties with Somaliland, a responsible partner nation that maintains internal order, conducts democratic elections, and actively counters piracy and extremism.”
Berbera Port Offers Strategic Alternative
Against this backdrop of Somalia’s deteriorating security situation, Somaliland has offered the United States what Somalia cannot: reliable partnership and strategic access.
“They’ve governed themselves peacefully for decades, built strong ties with Taiwan, and refused to bow to the Chinese Communist Party,” said Congressman Pat Harrigan. “They’ve even offered the U.S. military access to a key port in the Gulf of Aden. That’s what a real partner looks like, and it’s time we treated them like one.”
The offer of U.S. military access to Berbera Port represents a potentially significant strategic shift. The deep-water port facility, modernized through a $442 million UAE investment, provides direct access to the Red Sea shipping corridor where Houthi attacks have disrupted global trade routes.
For the United States, Berbera would offer an alternative to the increasingly constrained Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which sits just 8 miles from China’s first overseas military base. Military analysts note that Berbera’s location places it 150 miles from the Chinese facility while providing operational reach across the Gulf of Aden.
For Somaliland, hosting U.S. military presence would provide security guarantees and international legitimacy that recognition alone cannot deliver. The arrangement would also bring economic benefits through base operations and potentially deter regional adversaries from challenging Somaliland’s sovereignty.
Three Decades of Democratic Governance
The legislation cites Somaliland’s record of conducting six presidential elections since 1991, including the November 2024 election that saw opposition candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi defeat incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi.
“For more than three decades, Somaliland demonstrated the kind of governance, stability, and cooperation that America should support,” Perry said in announcing the bill.
This democratic record stands in stark contrast to Somalia, described in the press release as “the unstable, conflict-ridden and fractured capitol city of Somalia.” While Somaliland conducts peaceful elections and transfers of power, Somalia struggles with clan-based politics and militant control over much of its territory.
Taiwan Relationship Draws Chinese Pressure
The bill highlights Somaliland’s 2020 establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, making it one of only 12 countries worldwide to maintain official ties with Taipei.
In April 2025, Somalia banned Taiwanese passport holders from entry, citing the “one-China principle” in what was widely seen as a move to derail a scheduled high-level Taiwanese diplomatic mission to Somaliland. The ban prompted immediate congressional backlash.
Senator Jim Risch called Somalia’s action “bowing to China while militants roam freely in its core regions.” Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles sent a joint letter to Somalia’s ambassador warning of “serious retaliatory consequences” under the TAIPEI Act, which legally obligates the U.S. to reassess relationships with governments that undermine Taiwan.
The congressional pressure worked. Somalia reversed the passport ban in June 2025, but the episode demonstrated both Beijing’s influence over Mogadishu and Congress’s willingness to defend Taiwan-Somaliland relations.
“As China expands its influence across the globe, strengthening our alliances with free nations like Somaliland is more important than ever,” Ogles said in supporting the recognition bill.
Ogles had previously co-authored the letter pressuring Somalia to reverse its Taiwan passport ban, demonstrating sustained congressional support for the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership.
Congressional Support Building
The legislation has attracted support from conservative policy groups, with the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 recommending Somaliland recognition as a hedge against “malign Chinese activity” in Africa.
“It is a simple fact that Somaliland is a sovereign and self-governing nation separate from Somalia, and U.S. policy should reflect that,” said Congressman Tom Tiffany.
The press release concludes that the bill “ensures American leadership remains strong in East Africa, and sends a clear signal that the U.S. will stand with responsible partners who uphold stability and sovereignty.”
Somaliland Government Response
Somaliland officials quickly welcomed the legislation. Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adam thanked Perry on social media, calling the bill introduction “a critical step forward” and praising the congressman’s “bold leadership” and “courage in advancing this cause.”
The Somaliland Representative Office in the United States also expressed gratitude to Perry “for introducing the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act today in the U.S. House of Representatives, & calling deeper USA-SL partnership,” while thanking co-sponsors Ogles, Harrigan, and Tiffany.
Next Steps
The legislation has been referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for consideration. Committee leadership has not indicated whether hearings will be scheduled on the bill.
The bill represents the most significant congressional action on Somaliland recognition since the territory’s independence declaration 34 years ago.
The significant cash donation for drought relief is the latest example of a deepening partnership, a relationship that has recently weathered a diplomatic storm involving Somalia, China, and the United States.
HARGEISA – In a move highlighting its steadfast commitment to its partnership with the Republic of Somaliland, Taiwan delivered a $2.5 million humanitarian aid package on June 12, 2025. The funds, presented by Taiwanese Ambassador Allen C. Lou to Somaliland’s Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Abdillahi Hassan Adan , are a direct response to an urgent appeal made by the Hargeisa government in April 2025.
This timely financial support complements Taiwan’s much larger, long-term investments in Somaliland, which include the landmark Taiwan Medical Center. This ongoing project at the Hargeisa Group Hospital has been described as the most significant investment in the nation’s healthcare infrastructure since the colonial era.
This support would not only address the immediate risks but also represent a strategic investment in preserving democratic values and regional stability in the Horn of Africa,”
A Partnership Forged on Mutual Interests
At the handover ceremony, Minister Abdillahi Hassan Adan lauded the extensive and multifaceted nature of the relationship. The partnership portfolio extends far beyond humanitarian aid, encompassing a wide array of development projects across numerous sectors.
This cooperation includes tangible infrastructure projects like the Hargeisa Airport road, significant investments in human capital through higher education scholarships, and crucial financial backing for Somaliland’s 2024 elections. Furthermore, the two nations are actively working together in fields such as healthcare, agriculture, and ICT, reflecting a comprehensive approach known as the “Taiwan Model,” which is designed to directly benefit the people of Somaliland.
Navigating a Hostile—And Shifting—Neighborhood
The burgeoning Hargeisa-Taipei axis has long been a source of diplomatic friction, drawing condemnation from both Mogadishu and Beijing. This hostility peaked in April 2025 when Somalia’s government, reportedly under pressure from China, banned Taiwanese passport holders from entering or transiting its territory.
However, in a significant recent development, the ban has been rescinded. The policy reversal was confirmed during a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on June 4, 2025. In response to direct questioning from Senator Ted Cruz about China’s malign influence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Troy Fitrell of the Bureau of African Affairs confirmed that the State Department had engaged with Mogadishu on the issue and the ban was lifted.
This pressure from Washington is underpinned by the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, which allows the U.S. to take action against governments that undermine Taiwan.
While the $2.5 million in aid will be crucial for immediate drought relief, the enduring story is the resilience of a partnership forged in shared values and mutual defiance of international pressure. The reversal of the passport ban demonstrates that the Somaliland-Taiwan relationship does not exist in a vacuum and that actions against it can trigger responses from powerful allies.
As Somaliland continues to build its case for international recognition, its strategic partnership with Taiwan remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy—a clear signal that in a world of complex geopolitics, some friendships are built on more than just formal recognition.
In just under six months, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” has embarked on four international visits—twice to the United Arab Emirates, once to Djibouti, and once to Kenya. For a nation that has struggled for decades to gain international recognition and meaningful diplomatic partnerships, these trips should have been opportunities for progress: joint declarations, formal agreements, or at the very least, symbolic gestures of goodwill.
But the results? Nothing.
No joint statements. No signed accords. No diplomatic frameworks. The UAE’s state media didn’t even acknowledge the president’s visit—an ominous silence. Djibouti offered no public commentary, and Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that bordered on polite disapproval. The only tangible moment was a photo-op handshake with President Ruto. The government’s social media platforms did not even post this.
Even more troubling is the composition of the president’s delegations. Some of those who accompanied him—especially on the trips to Djibouti and Kenya—were neither elected officials nor constitutionally mandated representatives. Yet they appeared in high-level meetings and diplomatic events, where issues of national security and sovereignty were at stake. And despite the sensitivity of such visits, no senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hargeisa was included in the delegations, not as a lead diplomat, protocol officer, or policy advisor. Foreign policy is not a personal affair. It demands institutional presence and professional continuity. The country’s foreign ministry was totally absent.
Behind closed doors, the picture deteriorates further.
The trips were not arranged through standard government protocols. Instead, the president used privately chartered flights—at great cost to taxpayers. Most notably, the flight to Kenya was operated by a private Kenyan businessman with close familial ties to the president. This raises serious ethical concerns: transparency, conflict of interest, and misuse of public funds for arrangements that bypass institutional oversight.
If the president charters flights through relatives, then what we’re witnessing isn’t just poor governance—it’s nepotism. Public funds are not a family privilege. The state does not exist to enrich a circle of confidants.
Diplomacy isn’t an inheritance passed down through a family tree. It’s a national duty—one that demands legitimacy, experience, and constitutional authority. Allowing unelected and unvetted individuals, who are the president’s family, into strategic diplomatic conversations undermines the state’s credibility and threatens its long-term interests. It also undermines the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the traditional diplomatic channels.
Previous administrations understood the gravity of foreign policy. Take, for instance, President Silanyo’s historic visit to the United Arab Emirates. That trip wasn’t just symbolic—it laid the groundwork for the DP World investment in Berbera and led to a deeper diplomatic breakthrough: the mutual exchange of liaison offices between Somaliland and the UAE—something that had never existed before.
Ironically, that very deal and diplomatic gain were harshly criticized by then opposition leader Abdirahman “Cirro”—the same man who now visits the UAE without securing even a media mention, let alone a formal agreement.
Similarly, President Muse Bihi’s visit to Kenya culminated in a formal joint communiqué—an unprecedented milestone that acknowledged Somaliland’s place in the regional diplomatic sphere. That kind of tangible outcome is what leadership looks like.
In contrast, this current administration has delivered no agreements, no recognition, not even in the form of symbolic political acknowledgement and no clear diplomatic path. At a time when Somaliland faces economic hardship, security concerns, and diplomatic isolation, the people demand more than empty travel logs. Every presidential trip must be justified—not just by intent, but by impact. Every shilling spent must bring value home.
Yes, the president took a photo with President Ruto. Yes, he shook hands. But diplomacy is not photography. Leadership is not symbolism.
A handshake cannot substitute for a policy. A press photo cannot replace a signed agreement.
Somaliland is not a one-man project. It is a nation of proud citizens who demand substance over spectacle. If these travels cannot secure real results, they must at least reflect the people’s voice, not the ambitions of a few.
Going forward, Somaliland needs a clear and principled foreign policy, centered on national interest, executed through transparent processes, and reflective of the collective will of its people. The inner circle of the president should be individuals with a clear mandate who could be held accountable. Informal and familial relationships engrained in state affairs are not only nepotism, but they also undermine state institutions and are corruptible practices.
Without accountability, diplomacy risks becoming a parade—visually impressive, but powerless in practice.
About the Author
Hon. Mohamed Hussein Jama (Rambo). Member, House of Representatives, Somaliland Parliament
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
“Somalia, no government, no police, no safety, no security — just anarchy.”
These were the stark words spoken by former President Donald Trump when defending his controversial travel ban in 2017 — a ban that placed Somalia among a list of countries deemed too unstable or poorly governed to safely manage the movement of their citizens abroad.
At the time, many dismissed the statement as exaggerated, even offensive. But now, years later, an embarrassing and dangerous scandal involving Somali officials at an international summit in Switzerland has resurrected the very concerns Trump raised. And this time, the facts speak louder than rhetoric.
A Delegation or a Smuggling Ring?
In early June 2025, a Somali delegation was sent to represent the country at the 113th session of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva, Switzerland. The group was meant to participate in high-level discussions about labor rights, development, and international cooperation. On paper, this was a routine diplomatic mission.
But what happened instead was a textbook example of how weak institutions and rampant corruption have turned Somalia’s diplomatic efforts into international security risks.
Of the 23 delegates originally listed, only 10 actually showed up for the conference. The remaining 13 members vanished — not due to illness or scheduling conflicts — but as part of a deliberate and premeditated escape into Switzerland and other parts of Europe.
These individuals allegedly paid thousands of dollars each to secure their Swiss visas. According to credible sources, the money was funneled to — and divided by — Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Yusuf Mohamed Adan and Omar Faruk Osman, Secretary-General of the Federation of Somali Trade Unions. What was sold to the world as an official government delegation was, in truth, a paid migration pipeline disguised under the Somali flag.
Why This Matters More Than Ever
Some may be tempted to laugh off the incident as just another story from a country long plagued by instability. But to do so would be dangerously naive. This is not merely a case of poor planning or bureaucratic incompetence — it’s state-enabled trafficking.
And the implications go far beyond Switzerland or even Europe.
When government officials abuse their power to smuggle people abroad under the cover of diplomatic missions, they compromise international security. They erode trust between nations. And they open the door for much darker forces — including terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab — to exploit the very same routes, documents, and diplomatic privileges.
This is where the scandal moves from corruption to national security emergency.
If diplomatic passports, official delegation slots, and travel visas can be bought with bribes, then what is to stop Al-Shabaab operatives or sympathizers from purchasing their way into Europe? The group has a well-documented history of infiltration — not just through backdoor smuggling routes, but through institutional compromise. These aren’t just hypotheticals; they are strategic concerns for intelligence agencies across Europe and the U.S.
Recent investigations have revealed alarming levels of visa fraud linked to Somali civil servants and government officials. According to a 2024 report by the Somaliland Chronicle, of 700 U.S. visas issued to Somali civil servants, an astounding 600 resulted in overstays, signaling systemic abuse of the visa system. Such staggering figures not only expose rampant corruption but also raise profound security concerns.
The fraudulent visa process reportedly costs between $20,000 to $25,000 per visa, suggesting a lucrative black market operation potentially funneling millions of dollars into corrupt Somali officials’ pockets. This financial exploitation adds another layer of complexity to the problem, where political manipulation benefits certain factions within the Somali government, undermining genuine governance.
Let’s be clear: it only takes one bad actor to slip through a corrupt channel like this to cause irreparable damage. And in Somalia, where terrorist networks often overlap with political and business interests, the lines are dangerously blurred. This is why nations enact travel bans. This is why vetting is not just about documentation — it’s about trust. And Somalia’s institutions, by all accounts, have proven untrustworthy.
When travel visas become tools for criminal enrichment or terrorist movement, the international community has no choice but to respond with caution — and, in some cases, with restriction.
Trump’s Travel Ban: Revisited in Light of Reality When President Trump imposed the travel ban on Somalia, he was criticized for targeting a vulnerable population. And indeed, the vast majority of Somalis — honest, hardworking people — should not be held accountable for the actions of corrupt elites.
But Trump’s rationale was not built solely on race, religion, or prejudice. It was rooted in national security concerns — concerns that were mocked at the time but now seem prescient.
When Trump said Somalia had “no government, no police, no security, no safety — just anarchy,” he wasn’t inventing a narrative. He was summarizing a reality that, unfortunately, keeps proving itself again and again. If a delegation to a respected international summit can be turned into a human trafficking scheme, what further proof do we need that Somalia is not in control of its own borders, identity systems, or diplomatic processes?
The Real Victims: The Somali People and International Trust It’s important to remember who suffers most from these scandals. Not just the Western countries who must adjust their immigration policies, but the ordinary Somali citizens whose chances at legitimate travel, study, or asylum are diminished by the criminality of their own government.
The more Somalia’s name is associated with corruption, fraud, and instability, the more doors will be closed to genuine Somali applicants. And the more foreign governments will be justified in treating Somalia not as a partner — but as a risk.
Conclusion: When Leadership Sells Its People What happened in Geneva is not a diplomatic mishap — it’s a national embarrassment and a security wake-up call. The fact that passports and visas can be bought through Somali government channels shows a system in collapse. It reveals a leadership class not interested in representing its people, but in selling them — one visa at a time.
Trump’s words, once dismissed as harsh or simplistic, now carry the weight of evidence. Whether or not one agrees with his politics, the reality is clear: Somalia’s internal failures do not stay internal. They travel. They migrate. And they destabilize.
Until Somalia can prove it has functioning institutions, enforce accountability, and protect the integrity of its diplomatic processes, no country should be blamed for taking precautions.
In this case, Trump was right.
About the Author
Hussein Egeh is a strategic communications and mass media specialist living in Hargeisa Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Outgoing commander’s expected June trip to Hargeisa follows dramatic reversal on Somalia security claims
The Trump administration has nominated Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin Anderson to replace Marine Gen. Michael Langley at Africa Command, setting the stage for a leadership transition as Langley prepares for what sources say will be a long-awaited visit to Somaliland in June.
Anderson’s nomination, announced by the Pentagon on Wednesday, comes at a particularly awkward moment. Just days ago, Langley publicly admitted that Al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy and large” in Somalia despite billions in U.S. assistance. The admission represents a reversal from his earlier optimism—and raises questions about Anderson’s own track record of assessments.
Somaliland Visit Finally Taking Shape
A senior Somaliland government official, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, confirmed that discussions about Langley’s visit have been ongoing for months, although no firm dates have been finalized. The visit preparations have reportedly intensified following President Cirro’s inauguration.
The visit would mark the highest-level AFRICOM engagement with Somaliland since Gen. Stephen Townsend toured Berbera’s strategic facilities in 2022. For Hargeisa, which has lobbied intensively for greater U.S. military cooperation, Langley’s trip represents a potential breakthrough—especially given his newfound skepticism about Mogadishu’s capabilities.
AFRICOM did not respond to request for information on the matter.
From Optimism to Reality Check
The contrast between Langley’s current assessment and his previous statements is striking. When Somaliland Chronicle asked him last June about signs of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence, Langley described himself as “measuredly optimistic” and pointed to joint operations with Somali forces as evidence the militant group was weakening.
That optimism evaporated after Al-Shabaab overran Adan Yabal, sending U.S.-trained Danab special forces fleeing and capturing millions in American-supplied equipment. In his final remarks from Nairobi, Langley acknowledged that Al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy and large” despite decades of U.S. assistance.
Anderson’s Baggage
If confirmed by the Senate, Anderson would become the first Air Force officer to lead AFRICOM. But his nomination carries its own complications. As commander of Special Operations Command Africa from 2019 to 2021, Anderson repeatedly praised Somali forces’ capabilities.
Senate Armed Services Committee members are expected to grill Anderson about these assessments during confirmation hearings. With Congress already moving to slash Somalia funding—Sen. Jim Risch’s new legislation would impose strict conditions on peacekeeping money—Anderson will face tough questions about his judgment.
Berbera Back in Play?
For Somaliland, the leadership change at AFRICOM could’nt come at a better time. President Cirro’s administration has made expanding military partnerships a priority, and Berbera’s strategic location on the Gulf of Aden remains a compelling asset for any serious U.S. strategy in the region.
The timing is particularly significant given China’s growing influence in the region. Somalia’s recent decision to ban Taiwanese passport holders—a clear nod to Beijing—has raised concerns in Washington. Combined with the loss of U.S. military access in Niger, AFRICOM faces a shrinking footprint across Africa.
Corruption and Consequences
The Trump administration’s decision to cut funding for Somali forces, including canceling $400 monthly salary supplements for Danab soldiers, followed damning audits revealing widespread corruption. Officials discovered padded fuel requisitions, phantom soldiers on payrolls, and food rations being sold on the black market.
These revelations supported longstanding Somaliland arguments about international aid effectiveness in Mogadishu. The international community has invested heavily in Somalia for decades with limited improvement.
Anderson, a Michigan native commissioned in 1992, holds a masters degree from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His background includes stints as deputy director for operations at Indo-Pacific Command and overseeing the controversial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in 2020-21.
What’s Next
As Langley prepares for his Somaliland visit—assuming it actually happens this time—the question becomes whether Anderson will continue this engagement or revert to the traditional Somalia-first approach that has dominated U.S. policy for three decades.
Somaliland Chronicle first reported in December that Langley was “set to visit Somaliland in the coming days,” citing sources familiar with internal deliberations. That visit, expected amid what the publication described as “a notable shift in U.S. foreign policy dynamics,” ultimately did not materialize.
The Senate has yet to schedule Anderson’s confirmation hearing, but the combination of his past statements, Langley’s reversal, and Congress’ growing skepticism about Somalia aid suggests it won’t be a smooth process.
One thing seems certain: whoever leads AFRICOM next will inherit a Somalia policy facing significant challenges and a Somaliland seeking greater recognition. After 30 years of substantial investment in Mogadishu with limited results, Washington may be reconsidering its regional approach.
