As President of Somaliland Lands in Djibouti, Can the Hostile Neighbor Change Its Spots?

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May 21, 2025

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” arrived in Djibouti today, opening a chapter that many in the Republic of Somaliland hope signals a thaw in relations—though few expect one. His visit comes in the shadow of a sustained campaign of political sabotage and economic subversion orchestrated by Djibouti, following the landmark Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, which rattled power centers from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa.

While billed as a diplomatic overture, this visit is under a cloud of public suspicion, with popular sentiment in the Republic of Somaliland hardened against a neighbor many increasingly view as an existential adversary rather than a regional ally.

Djibouti’s Hostility Has Been Deliberate, Not Diplomatic

Djibouti’s antagonism toward the Republic of Somaliland is not a matter of diplomatic disagreement but calculated strategy. In June 2024, Djibouti shuttered Somaliland’s diplomatic mission after fabricating a utility payment dispute as pretext. Somaliland Chronicle previously reported the mission was “billed an exceptionally high amount for water and electricity, totaling tens of thousands of dollars” before services were abruptly disconnected – transparent diplomatic harassment thinly disguised as an administrative matter.

Djibouti President hosts leader of SSC Khatumo

In perhaps his most provocative move, President Guelleh recently hosted SSC Khatumo leader Mr. Firdhiye in Djibouti, a calculated signal of disapproval toward Somaliland’s strategic initiatives. This deliberate engagement with separatist elements from Somaliland’s eastern regions represented a direct violation of diplomatic norms and a challenge to the Republic of Somaliland’s territorial integrity – the very principle Djibouti claims to defend regarding Somalia.

“Djibouti has positioned itself as an active adversary, not merely a neutral neighbor,” noted a senior political analyst in the Republic of Somaliland. “From shuttering our diplomatic mission to hosting separatist leaders and working to undermine the Ethiopia MoU, Djibouti’s hostility has been comprehensive and deliberate. This trip must be seen in the full context of sustained aggression.”

Somaliland Public Sentiment: Mistrust Has Become Policy

Inside the Republic of Somaliland, this visit is deeply unpopular. Social media monitoring shows overwhelming disapproval, with particular anger focused on Guelleh’s reception of SSC Khatumo representatives. Many citizens view Djibouti as having betrayed regional solidarity to protect its economic monopolies.

“Djibouti is not just a competitor. It’s an active saboteur,” said a prominent business leader in Berbera. “They’ve lobbied investors to steer clear of our port and sought to maintain their monopoly at our expense.”

Business leaders have been particularly vocal about Djibouti’s economic warfare tactics, including reports of Djiboutian officials pressuring logistics firms to avoid Berbera and making backchanneled threats to regional investors. This economic sabotage has cemented perception of Djibouti as a hostile competitor rather than a potential partner.

Djibouti: Beijing’s Proxy in the Horn of Africa

Beyond the immediate bilateral tensions lies a deeper, more fundamental incompatibility – Djibouti’s increasingly entrenched role as China’s strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa. What was once a sovereign nation has, according to multiple regional security analysts, effectively transformed into “a wholly-owned subsidiary of the People’s Republic of China.”

President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti with Xi Jinping of PRC in FOCAC gathering

China’s military base in Djibouti – its first overseas installation – represents merely the visible component of Beijing’s control. Multiple sources with direct knowledge of Djibouti’s financial operations indicate that China now effectively controls the country’s economic decision-making through a web of strategic debt arrangements.

“When Djiboutian officials meet with their Somaliland counterparts, they’re not representing Djiboutian interests – they’re implementing Chinese foreign policy,” explained a former Western diplomat with extensive regional experience. “Beijing views Somaliland’s growing ties with Taiwan and the United States as a direct challenge to its regional hegemony.”

Somaliland’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 2020 positioned it in direct opposition to China’s regional ambitions. The formal establishment of Taiwan-Somaliland ties triggered furious diplomatic protests from Beijing, which subsequently intensified its support for Somalia’s territorial claims and pressured Djibouti to adopt an increasingly hostile stance toward Somaliland.

“China sees Somaliland-Taiwan relations as a dangerous precedent that must be crushed,” noted a security analyst specializing in Chinese foreign policy. “Djibouti’s sudden hostility toward Somaliland coincides precisely with Beijing’s escalating campaign against Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.”

Financial records reveal China holds over 70% of Djibouti’s external debt, giving Beijing unprecedented leverage over the country’s policy decisions. This financial control manifests in Djibouti’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Somaliland, particularly following the Taiwan recognition and discussions about potential U.S. military presence in Berbera.

Somalia’s Diplomatic Siege Is Collapsing

While Djibouti’s behavior draws scrutiny, Cirro’s visit is nonetheless a blow to Somalia’s faltering campaign to diplomatically isolate the Republic of Somaliland. Sources within Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm to Somaliland Chronicle that Mogadishu has been aggressively lobbying regional neighbors to sever ties with Somaliland.

“We were told explicitly that Mogadishu demanded Djibouti refuse any presidential-level meetings,” confirmed a Somali diplomat under condition of anonymity. “Today’s visit represents a significant failure of this strategy.”

This diplomatic offensive has taken increasingly desperate forms. Just last week, Somalia banned entry of Taiwanese passport holders, citing “national sovereignty concerns” – a transparent attempt to punish the Republic of Somaliland for its growing relationship with Taiwan. As Somalia doubles down on isolation tactics, Somaliland has managed to breach the blockade, turning diplomatic endurance into quiet success.

A Clash of Ports: Berbera vs. Djibouti

At the heart of Somaliland-Djibouti tensions lies a stark economic reality: Berbera Port is rising, and Djibouti’s monopoly is fading.

World Bank data starkly illustrates this competitive dynamic: Berbera Port ranks 82nd globally in performance while Djibouti languishes at position 382 out of 385 ports worldwide. The $442 million DP World investment in Berbera threatens to redirect Ethiopian trade away from Djibouti’s ports, which currently handle approximately 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime commerce.

A World Bank “Djibouti Country Economic Memorandum” explicitly warned that Djibouti’s economic model – dependent on a single sector (ports) and single client (Ethiopia) – has become fundamentally “unsustainable,” with Berbera Port identified as the primary competitive threat.

“These aren’t conditions for partnership,” remarked an international trade analyst. “Djibouti sees every shipment that enters Berbera as a strategic loss.”

Cirro’s Priorities Questioned: Why Not Addis First?

Curiously, President Cirro chose Djibouti as his first regional destination rather than Addis Ababa—despite the historic MoU with Ethiopia signed earlier this year. That deal promised Ethiopia naval access via Somaliland, and in exchange, informal diplomatic recognition—though Ethiopia has recently shown signs of retreat under pressure from Mogadishu and Ankara.

“The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is the crown jewel of Somaliland diplomacy,” said a former envoy to Addis. “Why would Cirro start his tour in the capital of the country that has worked hardest to destroy that agreement?”

Multiple sources inside Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry told Somaliland Chronicle there has been no scheduled visit by Cirro to Addis, despite growing concern that Ethiopia may be quietly backpedaling under Somali-Turkish pressure.

Strategic Real Estate: The Battle Over U.S. Military Presence

Adding another layer of complexity is the Republic of Somaliland’s open courtship of American military presence in Berbera – directly challenging another lucrative Djiboutian monopoly on foreign military bases. While Djibouti hosts installations for the United States, China, France, Italy, Japan and Saudi Arabia, collecting billions in lease revenue, Somaliland has positioned Berbera as an alternative strategic location.

US Africa Command has conducted multiple high-profile visits to Berbera, with flight tracking data showing U.S. military transport planes making numerous trips between Djibouti and Berbera in recent months. These movements strongly suggest serious American consideration of establishing a presence that would directly compete with Djibouti’s AFRICOM base.

“Their entire rental economy depends on monopoly,” said a regional defense expert. “A U.S. base in Berbera would collapse the market value of Djibouti’s foreign presence overnight.”

Breaking the Blockade: Cirro’s Second Destination Looms

In a further challenge to Somalia’s isolation strategy, Somaliland Chronicle has learned President Cirro is set to undertake another significant foreign visit immediately following his Djibouti trip. Multiple sources in the Republic of Somaliland confirm the President will travel to another regional neighbor later this week, though the exact destination remains closely guarded for security reasons.

“Somalia has been frantically lobbying this country as well to refuse President Cirro’s visit,” revealed a senior official from Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry. “Their diplomatic corps has been throwing everything at the wall, but it’s not sticking.”

Diplomatic sources indicate Somalia dispatched a high-level delegation to this unnamed country last week specifically to undermine Cirro’s planned visit, offering unspecified concessions in exchange for rebuffing Somaliland’s president. This upcoming visit, if successful, will mark Somalia’s second consecutive diplomatic defeat in a single week, further eroding Mogadishu’s influence in the region.

Can Djibouti Be Trusted?

As President Cirro walks Djibouti’s red carpets today, fundamental questions persist about whether a genuine reset is possible with a neighbor that has systematically worked to undermine the Republic of Somaliland’s core interests. Symbolism alone won’t move the needle in the Republic of Somaliland.

To reset relations, Djibouti must reopen Somaliland’s consulate, end support for separatists, and cease obstructing economic and military cooperation—especially concerning Berbera Port and the potential U.S. presence. Otherwise, this visit risks becoming little more than a photo op in hostile territory.

“Cirro must return with more than diplomatic smiles,” said a veteran Somaliland statesman. “He must bring results. Otherwise, Djibouti’s leopard has not changed its spots—it’s simply hiding them better.”

U.S. CITIZENS IN SOMALIA’S GOVERNMENT — LEGAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

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Staff

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May 13, 2025

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KEY FINDINGS

Multiple American citizens are serving in Somalia’s federal government, including its foreign affairs leadership.
These individuals retain active U.S. business interests or property holdings and have not publicly renounced their citizenship.
No public records indicate compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) or loss of nationality protocols.
U.S. law prohibits undisclosed foreign government service by American citizens.
Somalia’s policies—particularly its alignment with the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan—may conflict with the TAIPEI Act of 2019.
Comparable cases have led to indictments and convictions in the U.S. under FARA and immigration statutes.

Somalia has long appointed individuals with U.S. ties to influential government roles—particularly within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad) represent prominent examples of this practice.

This Chronicle investigation examines the legal and security implications of American citizens serving in a foreign government increasingly aligned with China and hostile to U.S. strategic partners in the region. These dual nationals maintain business interests and property in the United States while implementing policies that may conflict with U.S. laws and interests.

From potential violations of foreign agent registration requirements to questions about asylum fraud, these cases raise significant legal questions that may soon attract federal scrutiny.

AMERICANS IN MOGADISHU: THE FOREIGN POLICY BEACHHEAD

Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad) represent the new face of Somalia’s government: American citizens who have risen to the pinnacle of power in a country whose policies increasingly diverge from U.S. interests.

Notable U.S. citizens in Somalia’s government include:

Abdisalam Abdi Ali (Foreign Minister) – Confirmed by Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a sitting minister; previously built a healthcare business in Ohio (Ritechoice Healthcare Services, LLC).
Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad) (State Minister, Foreign Affairs) – Former IBM engineer with an MBA from California State University, Fresno; maintains property in North Carolina and has not renounced U.S. citizenship.
Fardowsa Osman Egal Dhore (Minister of Transport) – Served in public roles in both Somalia and the U.S. for over 15 years.
Sacdiya Yasin Haji Samatar (Deputy Speaker, Parliament) – Former healthcare administrator in Minnesota; elected Deputy Speaker in 2022.
Abdilahi Bidhaan Warsame (Minister, Water and Energy) – Leads implementation of national energy and water strategies; prior U.S. ties unconfirmed by official sources but referenced in Somali media.

Somali-American Member of Parliament Ahmed Mohamed Warsame (aka Jama Solob Kayre) lost his U.S. citizenship in 2018 after admitting to immigration fraud related to the Diversity Visa Lottery program, according to documents from the U.S. Department of Justice.

Another case involves Malik Abdalla, a Somali MP and registered foreign agent for Hormuud Telecom. According to FARA records, Abdalla failed to disclose his broader governmental affiliations, raising compliance questions. He previously headed White Star Business Group and may have sought U.S. asylum while occupying Somali government posts.

FROM IBM TO MOGADISHU: ALI BALCAD’S TRANSFORMATION

Mr. Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad), currently Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, brings a tech-industry background to diplomacy. He worked at IBM for nearly 20 years and holds an MBA from California State University, Fresno.

Mr. Ali Mohamed Omar (Ali Balcad), Somalia's State Minister for Foreign Affairs

In January 2024, Balcad described the Ethiopia-Somaliland port agreement as a bigger threat to Somalia than Al-Shabaab.

Balcad retains a residence in North Carolina and has not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), despite his policy-making role. He has not confirmed any renunciation of U.S. citizenship.

When contacted for comment, Balcad stated: “My work serves Somalia’s legitimate interests as recognized by the international community. Any suggestion that this conflicts with my American citizenship is misinformed.”

DUAL CITIZENSHIP ACROSS THE HORN

Somaliland, like Somalia, appoints dual citizens to key diplomatic positions. Current Foreign Minister Abdirahman Bakaal previously resided in Minnesota and holds U.S. citizenship. His predecessor, Essa Kayd, had a medical career in Massachusetts.

The key distinction lies in foreign policy alignment. Somaliland has welcomed strategic ties with Taiwan and the United States, whereas Somalia has moved to isolate Taiwan in line with China’s demands.

SOMALIA, CHINA, AND THE TAIWAN QUESTION

Somalia has aligned its foreign policy with Beijing, taking increasingly adversarial positions against Taiwan. In April 2025, Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority banned travelers using Taiwanese passports, citing support for the “One China” principle. The directive prohibits Taiwanese citizens from entering, transiting, or departing through Somalia.

This policy directly contradicts U.S. law. The 2019 TAIPEI Act (Public Law No: 116-135) mandates that the U.S. reevaluate engagement with nations that undermine Taiwan’s diplomatic standing—exposing American officials implementing these policies to potential legal scrutiny.

Meanwhile, Somaliland continues outreach to the U.S. government and has offered port access at Berbera for U.S. military or strategic use—moves that align with U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.

LEGAL EXPOSURE: WHEN DUAL LOYALTY BECOMES A LIABILITY

For Somalia’s American officials, several legal frameworks create significant exposure:

Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires U.S. citizens to register if they engage in political or quasi-political activities on behalf of foreign governments.
Loss of Nationality statutes (8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)) allow revocation of U.S. citizenship if an individual accepts a policy-level role in a foreign government with intent to relinquish citizenship.
18 U.S.C. § 219 prohibits U.S. citizens from serving in foreign governments without approval from the Secretary of State or Attorney General.
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) enables sanctions against individuals whose activities threaten U.S. interests.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) can be used against U.S. citizens acting as foreign officials if they engage in corrupt dealings that involve U.S. financial institutions.

THE TOLEDO TRAIL: ABDISALAM’S HEALTHCARE EMPIRE

Before joining Somalia’s cabinet, Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali built a healthcare business in Ohio. He founded Ritechoice Healthcare Services, LLC in 2009 and served as CEO of MedExpress Transportation, a Medicaid-funded non-emergency transport provider, from 2015 to 2019.

Abdisalam Abdi Ali, Somalia's Minister of Foreign Affairs with China's Ambassador to Somalia Wang Yu

These companies operate in highly regulated sectors. Federal oversight requires full disclosure of foreign affiliations—especially for Medicaid-funded entities.

Despite holding a top position in Somalia’s government, Ali has not filed a FARA disclosure. He also continues to list himself as active in Ritechoice Healthcare on public directories.

His spokesperson told the Chronicle: “All business activities have been conducted with full transparency and in compliance with relevant regulations.” However, the statement did not specify whether Ali had divested or recused himself from his U.S. holdings.

PAY-TO-PLAY POLITICS: THE COST OF POWER IN SOMALIA

Somalia’s unique parliamentary system has long been criticized for its lack of transparency and susceptibility to corruption. Elections are not conducted via direct suffrage but through a clan-based system where a few hundred traditional elders and delegates select members of parliament. This unconventional model, intended as a transitional mechanism, has instead become fertile ground for influence-buying and political profiteering.

Selection, not Election. Halane Tent where Somalia's Selections were held.

Transparency International consistently ranks Somalia at the bottom of its Corruption Perceptions Index—placing it 180th out of 180 countries in its 2023 assessment. This pervasive corruption extends deeply into the electoral system, where vote-buying has become normalized.

A New York Times investigation documented how “votes were being bought for up to $30,000 apiece” in Somalia’s parliamentary elections. The article describes the process as “less of an election and more of an auction,” noting that “several sources with knowledge of the process… confirmed that parliamentary seats were essentially being sold.”

The Congressional Research Service, in its briefing to U.S. lawmakers, acknowledges the “allegations of corruption and manipulation” that have plagued Somalia’s electoral processes. Meanwhile, the Lansing Institute reported that Somalia’s electoral system remains “susceptible to vote buying, manipulation, and intimidation,” noting that the indirect voting system “enables corruption, with votes bought with millions of dollars.”

This pattern has significant implications for U.S. citizens serving in Somalia’s government. If American nationals participated in vote-buying to gain political office, they may be in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)—a U.S. law that prohibits bribing foreign officials or facilitating bribery schemes, even abroad. While direct proof is difficult to establish, the systemic nature of corruption in Somalia’s electoral system means entry into politics itself may inherently involve corrupt practices.

The U.S. Department of Justice has previously interpreted the FCPA broadly, applying it to individuals who use foreign payments to secure positions of power that result in personal or business gain, particularly where U.S.-linked assets or institutions are involved. If Somali-American politicians leveraged U.S. businesses, bank accounts, or real estate assets to fund these alleged bribes, they could face scrutiny under federal anti-corruption statutes.

Though no Somali-American officials have been charged with such violations to date, the legal risk adds another layer of potential exposure for U.S. citizens participating in Somalia’s political system.

ENFORCEMENT PRECEDENTS AND SIGNS OF CHANGE

The Department of Justice has recently demonstrated a renewed commitment to enforcing laws governing American citizens who serve foreign governments. This shift signals potential vulnerability for Somalia’s U.S.-citizen officials.

In a high-profile 2024 case, Pierre Girgis, a U.S.-Egyptian dual national, pleaded guilty to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act by failing to properly label documents he transmitted on behalf of the Egyptian government. The case marked an unusually aggressive FARA enforcement action against a dual citizen.

Earlier, in 2018, Tom Woewiyu, who had served as Liberia’s Minister of Defense, was convicted of immigration fraud for concealing his role in Liberia’s government on his U.S. citizenship application. The court sentenced him to 30 months in federal prison, establishing clear precedent for prosecuting government officials who misrepresent their foreign service.

Most recently, in January 2025, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York indicted three American citizens serving in Cameroon’s government for failing to register under FARA while lobbying U.S. officials. The indictments specifically noted that dual citizenship does not exempt individuals from FARA’s requirements.

“The Justice Department evaluates each case on its specific merits,” explains Rebecca Roiphe, former federal prosecutor. “But certain patterns consistently trigger enforcement—particularly actions that undermine U.S. foreign policy or security interests in coordination with strategic competitors.”

These cases illustrate a clear pattern: American citizens cannot serve foreign governments without proper transparency and compliance, particularly when those services potentially conflict with U.S. strategic interests. For Somalia’s American officials, the combination of unregistered foreign service, continued U.S. business interests, and implementation of policies contrary to American legislation creates significant legal exposure.

The Somaliland Chronicle contacted both the U.S. Department of State and State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Mohamed Omar regarding the legal implications of U.S. citizens serving in Somalia’s government. Neither responded to multiple requests for comment on this story.

THE LEGAL RECKONING THAT AWAITS

The American public deserves transparency when U.S. citizens or business owners participate in foreign governments advancing policies that may undermine U.S. foreign policy. Somalia’s diplomatic alignment with the People’s Republic of China—guided in part by American citizens—raises questions of dual loyalty with significant legal implications.

Foreign Minister Abdisalam Abdi Ali’s case is instructive. Ohio business records show he founded and served as statutory agent for healthcare firms receiving Medicaid funds in Toledo. While implementing Somalia’s foreign policy, he continues to hold financial interests in U.S. entities tied to federal healthcare dollars—an intersection fraught with legal risk under multiple statutes.

State Minister Ali Balcad’s decades-long career at IBM in North Carolina also underscores the dilemma. His technical expertise, honed at a leading U.S. firm, now informs Somalia’s diplomatic posture in ways that may conflict with American regional strategy and the TAIPEI Act of 2019.

Federal agencies—including the Department of Justice, State Department, and Treasury—have tools to address these scenarios, from FARA enforcement to sanctions and citizenship reviews. Precedents suggest these mechanisms are no longer dormant.

As U.S. policymakers scrutinize Somalia’s deepening relationship with Beijing, American citizens embedded in Mogadishu’s government may soon face a stark choice: comply with U.S. law—or confront the legal machinery designed to prevent precisely this kind of conflict.

NOTE: All individuals are presumed innocent unless proven otherwise. This report is based on publicly available records and verified sources. Attempts to contact involved officials for comment were made where feasible.

Somaliland MPs Push Bill Criminalizing Ties with Somalia — But UNSOM, Foreign Diplomats Left Untouched

By

Staff

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May 11, 2025

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HARGEISA, May 11, 2025 — Somaliland’s House of Representatives is advancing legislation that would criminalize virtually all forms of participation in Somalia-related dialogue, marking the most aggressive legal step yet in the territory’s campaign to sever political and symbolic ties with Mogadishu. The bill, obtained by Somaliland Chronicle, was submitted in May 2025 and follows the executive decision announced on April 16 to withdraw entirely from all dialogue with Somalia following Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s provocative visit to Las Anod.

Identified as motion “L/R. /2025” the draft legislation codifies existing political positions into enforceable law, introducing criminal charges, financial prohibitions, and broad media restrictions. Yet, for all its sweeping language, the bill strategically avoids addressing the most persistent contradictions in Somaliland’s foreign policy: continued cooperation with UNSOM, the UN mission legally mandated for Somalia, and the reception of diplomats formally accredited to Mogadishu.

Key Provisions: Legal Threats for Crossing the Line

The bill declares that any Somaliland official who defects to Somalia, whether during or after their public service in Somaliland, is guilty of treason. Charges would be pursued under Penal Code Articles 212, 217, and 184. According to the document:

“Any Somaliland person who serves Somalia or joins Somalia after dismissal from a Somaliland position will be charged with treason under Articles 212, 217, and 184 of the Penal Code, with imprisonment beginning upon their entry into Somaliland’s borders.”
Draft legislation
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Among the legislation’s other major provisions:

Prohibition on all forms of dialogue concerning Somalia’s internal affairs or Somali unity
Criminal penalties for citizens who organize, support, or participate in such discussions
Revocation of licenses for vehicles or transport used in connection with such activities
Sanctions on civil society and media for disseminating messages deemed contrary to Somaliland’s independence
A formal ban on accepting or using funds from the Somali Stability Fund (SSF)

A member of parliament who co-sponsored the legislation provided the document to Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “This bill will likely undergo some revisions in committee, but opposition to its core provisions is not expected from either side of the aisle,” the MP said. “There is broad consensus that Somalia’s recent provocations demand a firm legislative response.”

Las Anod as a Turning Point

The motion directly references the government’s April 16 decision to suspend talks with Somalia after Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s visit to Las Anod, where Somalia has been accused of waging a proxy war against Somaliland through local militias since early 2023.

The Las Anod conflict has grown increasingly internationalized, with Somalia providing material and diplomatic support to anti-Somaliland forces, according to Somaliland government officials. In an April 16 statement, Somaliland’s Council of Ministers condemned Barre’s visit as “a direct violation of international law and Somaliland’s territorial integrity” and “political intimidation and conflict incitement that threatens stability in the Horn of Africa.”

Somalia’s recent actions against Somaliland extend beyond the battlefield. On April 22, Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority issued a directive banning Taiwanese passport holders from entering, exiting, or transiting through Somalia. The ban was widely interpreted as an attempt to derail a scheduled high-level Taiwanese diplomatic mission to Somaliland and further evidence of Somalia’s alignment with Beijing in regional affairs.

The Diplomatic Elephant in the Room

While the bill takes explicit aim at the Somalia Stability Fund, it conspicuously fails to address Somaliland’s most glaring diplomatic contradiction: its continuing engagement with UN entities specifically mandated for Somalia and international diplomats accredited solely to Mogadishu.

“Let’s be honest—Somaliland has been kept on a short leash through its addiction to UN aid that’s explicitly earmarked for Somalia,” said a Western diplomatic source with extensive experience in the Horn of Africa, speaking on condition of anonymity. “They want recognition Monday through Friday, but come the weekend, they’re at the UN conference table alongside Puntland and Jubaland with their hand out. Their independence rhetoric is purely for domestic consumption. In private, these same officials who babble endlessly about sovereignty readily accept being treated like a federal member state of Somalia when money is involved. It’s impossible to take their independence claims seriously when they behave this way.”

The financial entanglements extend far beyond the Somalia Stability Fund. Somaliland has for years accepted World Bank funding as an “implementing partner,” while Somalia’s Federal Government serves as the guarantor and signatory to the agreements with both the World Bank and the Multi-Partner Fund. This arrangement legally positions Somaliland as a sub-national entity operating under Somalia’s sovereign authority.

UNSOM and Diplomats: The Silence is Deafening

Though the bill aims to criminalize support for Somali unity, it says nothing about UNSOM’s operations in Somaliland or the reception of foreign diplomats whose accreditation is limited to Somalia. This omission sustains the international community’s convenient fiction that treats Somaliland as just another federal member state.

When UN officials like James Swan, the current UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Somalia, or his predecessors Michael Keating and Nicholas Haysom, arrive in Hargeisa, they are inevitably introduced with “and Somaliland” tacked onto their Somalia titles. This creates the illusion that they represent both entities equally, despite having presented their credentials exclusively in Mogadishu. This diplomatic fiction has undermined Somaliland’s recognition efforts, as these officials return to their headquarters and file reports that treat Somaliland as just another regional administration within Somalia’s federal system.

US Ambassador to Somalia presenting credentials to Somalia's ex-Foreign Minister and current Defense Minister Fiqi

“When UN officials and foreign diplomats present credentials in Mogadishu and are then welcomed in Hargeisa with a handshake and a press release, we undermine our own cause,” said a senior advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue. “This bill draws red lines around minor leaks while the main pipeline of diplomatic ambiguity remains wide open.”

The financial dimension of this dependency is substantial. In 2024 alone, UN agencies and international NGOs working through Somalia-focused programs disbursed approximately $45 million in Somaliland—primarily in health, education, and infrastructure projects—according to Finance Ministry estimates.

This arrangement constitutes a Faustian bargain that no administration has been willing to sever, despite its corrosive effect on sovereignty claims. The government recognizes privately that these relationships undermine Somaliland’s independence narrative, but fears the socioeconomic consequences of rejecting this assistance. The proposed legislation meticulously avoids disrupting these established aid channels.

Toward a Coherent Foreign Policy?

The bill marks an aggressive attempt to correct what officials view as years of inconsistent messaging and policy. Yet its failure to confront the core instruments of international ambiguity—particularly UNSOM and foreign diplomatic protocols—suggests an unwillingness to jeopardize aid pipelines or invite diplomatic fallout.

“This is performative sovereignty,” said a foreign affairs analyst based in Nairobi. “They want to look defiant while keeping the money flowing.”

The international community has exploited this dependency to circumvent addressing Somaliland’s status directly. At Somalia-focused donor conferences and UN coordination meetings, Somaliland representatives find themselves relegated to the same status as officials from Somalia’s federal member states, their objections noted but ultimately disregarded.

For Western governments and UN agencies, Somaliland represents their sole success story in a region where billions in state-building investment have otherwise yielded negligible returns. They showcase Somaliland’s democratic achievements and stability while sidestepping the politically fraught question of recognition.

Next Steps: Politics and Passage

The bill requires endorsement by parliamentary committee, multiple readings, and final approval by President Abdirahman Irro. Sources close to the executive say passage is all but guaranteed given overwhelming political support.

One presidential advisor remarked, “This legislation is less about law and more about signaling. It tells Somalia, and the world, that the page has turned.”

Yet unless future legislation tackles the UNSOM question and forces foreign diplomats to choose between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, Somaliland’s assertion of sovereignty will remain half-measure policy—loud in rhetoric, but compromised in execution.

Somaliland Chronicle will continue following this story as it moves through parliament.

US Congressional Vise Tightens: Somalia’s Taiwan Ban Could Cost It U.S. Support

By

Staff

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May 4, 2025

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Hargeisa, Somaliland — U.S. Senator Jim Risch has delivered a sharp rebuke of Somalia’s ban on Taiwanese passport holders, calling it a clear contradiction between Mogadishu’s claims of sovereignty and its glaring governance failures.

“Somalia bows to China while militants roam freely in its core regions,” Risch tweeted, casting a spotlight on a policy decision that has reverberated across Washington and the Horn of Africa.

In a rare and forceful intervention, Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles issued an ultimatum to Somalia: reverse the April 22 travel ban targeting Taiwanese passport holders or face immediate diplomatic and immigration sanctions.

Their letter to Somalia’s ambassador in Washington condemned the directive as a violation of international norms and a provocation driven by Beijing’s geopolitical agenda. Citing the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (TAIPEI Act) of 2020, the lawmakers warned that the United States is legally obligated to reassess its relationship with governments that undermine Taiwan’s international space.

Outlined consequences include:

Termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Somali nationals legally residing in the U.S.
Suspension of U.S. visa processing for Somali citizens
Possible shuttering of Somalia’s embassy in Washington, effectively freezing bilateral relations

Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority issued the directive on April 22, effective April 30. Airlines were instructed not to carry passengers holding Taiwanese passports for entry, transit, or departure through Somali territory. The move, while framed as an administrative regulation, is widely seen as a geopolitical signal — and a dangerous precedent.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the ban as a restriction on democratic freedoms, enacted under Chinese pressure. Beijing, unsurprisingly, welcomed the move. Its Foreign Ministry described it as a sign that Somalia “firmly abides by the One-China principle.”

Somalia Minister of Defense Ahmed Moalim Fiqi

Somalia’s current Defense Minister tried to justify the decision by accusing Taiwan of opening “an embassy” in Somaliland and training local security forces. Yet those claims stand in stark contrast to Taiwan’s documented development initiatives in Somaliland — which emphasize health, education, and economic investment.

In 2021, Taiwan’s state-owned CPC Corporation acquired a 49% working interest in Somaliland’s SL10B/13 oil block, a resource-rich zone with an estimated two billion barrels of potential reserves. This economic stake underscores Taiwan’s real focus: energy and development — not military influence.

Somalia, which exercises no administrative control over Somaliland, is instead attempting to assert symbolic dominance via aviation regulations. Its control of regional airspace — granted through outdated UN frameworks — is now being used as a tool of isolation against Somaliland.

Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry was blunt: “Somalia is preventing democratic nations from engaging with one another by manipulating international airspace protocols.”

As ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Risch’s critique carries real weight. His comments highlight the absurdity of Somalia investing resources into isolating Taiwan while failing to secure its own capital from Al-Shabaab.

Risch’s influence in Washington is further magnified by his close alliance with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The two veteran lawmakers forged a partnership during their years together on the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees, where they developed a shared worldview on issues ranging from China policy to Taiwan’s international standing. Their coordinated messaging on the Somalia passport ban reflects a seamless alignment between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and State Department on countering Beijing’s growing influence in strategic regions like the Horn of Africa.

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy was even more direct: “Somalia acts like a global power, but remains an international beggar. Its leaders should actually read the TAIPEI Act.”

While Mogadishu pushes diplomatic feuds, it continues to cede large swaths of territory to militants. In the past five weeks alone, U.S. Africa Command has conducted four airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab and ISIS-linked operatives.

This strategic dissonance — attacking travel documents while ignoring real threats — exemplifies why U.S. policymakers are losing patience.

Senators Risch, Ted Cruz, and Rick Scott have introduced the “AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act of 2025,” a bill that would cut U.S. support for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia until accountability measures are met.

Though not explicitly linked to the Taiwan ban, the bill adds further pressure on a government increasingly seen in Washington as unreliable, unserious, and unaccountable.

This diplomatic escalation unfolds against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s January 2025 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to 20 kilometers of coastline. Somalia’s response — aligning with Turkey and Egypt and intensifying pressure on Somaliland — signals a broader campaign to block Somaliland’s international partnerships by any means available.

In this context, the Taiwan passport ban is not an isolated measure — it’s a piece of a deliberate, multi-pronged effort to isolate a self-governing territory that has functioned independently since 1991.

The ban is just the latest in Somalia’s long-standing strategy: use international legitimacy to enforce symbolic control over Somaliland while failing to provide services, security, or governance.

At the African Union and United Nations, Somalia routinely invokes territorial integrity to block any discussion of Somaliland’s legal claim to statehood — even as its actual governance stops far short of Somaliland’s borders.

By co-opting international regulatory frameworks like airspace control, Somalia is extending its writ far beyond its administrative reach — an act of diplomatic theater that undermines both sovereignty and stability.

While Somaliland has remained largely quiet, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed it is working with the Somaliland government to push back against Somalia’s action. A joint statement urged democratic governments to challenge the misuse of international mechanisms to restrict travel and interaction.

The coordination points to a mature bilateral relationship — one rooted in common values and mutual strategic interests.

“Somalia’s alignment with Beijing’s anti-Taiwan agenda has crossed a red line for American lawmakers,” a senior Washington diplomat told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “There’s growing evidence this wasn’t Somalia’s decision — it was Beijing’s choreography.”

The move came just days after Chinese state media praised Somalia’s loyalty to the One-China policy. It also came without any internal debate or legal review inside Somalia — raising questions about sovereignty in practice.

As Senator Risch noted, the contradiction is glaring: a government that cannot secure its own roads now claims the authority to deny entry over airspace it does not control.

“Somalia is playing geopolitical chess without the protections of real sovereignty,” said a Western diplomat in Nairobi. “In this contest between superpowers, Mogadishu has positioned itself as a pawn — but it’s pretending to be a king.”

Developing story: Somaliland Chronicle will continue monitoring the situation.

Stern Ultimatum from U.S. Congress: Reverse Taiwan Travel Ban or Face Sanctions, Lawmakers Warn Somalia

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Staff

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May 2, 2025

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Hargeisa/Washington — In a dramatic escalation of tensions, two senior members of the U.S. Congress have delivered an uncompromising message to Somalia: repeal the recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders or face tangible diplomatic and immigration reprisals.

Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles issued a blistering letter to Somalia’s ambassador in Washington, condemning the April 22 directive that bars individuals with Taiwanese documents from entering, transiting, or departing via Somali territory.

Invoking the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (TAIPEI Act), the lawmakers underscored that Somalia’s decision violates a cornerstone of U.S. policy: defending Taiwan’s international space. Passed in 2020, the TAIPEI Act not only authorizes but obliges the United States to reassess relationships with foreign governments that actively undermine Taiwan.

“Somalia’s alignment with Beijing’s anti-Taiwan agenda has crossed a red line for American lawmakers,” a diplomatic source in Washington told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “What Mogadishu perhaps failed to anticipate is that there are real consequences to becoming China’s proxy in the Horn of Africa.”

The potential repercussions outlined in the letter are substantial:

Revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of Somali nationals currently residing legally in the United States
Suspension of visa processing for Somalis seeking education, healthcare, or family reunification in America
Possible closure of Somalia’s embassy in Washington, effectively severing diplomatic ties at the highest level

Growing evidence suggests the ban was not Somalia’s sovereign decision, but one choreographed to curry favor with Beijing. The directive came just days after Chinese state media lauded Somalia’s loyalty to the so-called “One-China” principle — a political fiction that Beijing aggressively pushes to isolate Taiwan internationally.

This move starkly contrasts with how Somaliland, though unrecognized internationally, has boldly conducted its own foreign policy by deepening its relationship with Taiwan. The two established representative offices in 2020, and since then, Taiwan has poured resources into Somaliland’s agriculture, health, and education sectors — all without asking Somaliland to play puppet.

“Somalia’s government seems willing to mortgage its foreign policy for praise from a regime half a world away,” said a Horn of Africa policy expert familiar with the matter. “The irony is that an unrecognized territory like Somaliland manages to engage Taiwan with dignity, while Mogadishu behaves like an occupied satellite.”

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy didn’t mince words either. “One would think Somalia is a powerful nation instead of an international beggar which depends on others for security with its arrogant banning of travelers using Taiwan documents. Its ‘leaders’ should read the U.S. TAIPEI Act,” he posted on X (formerly Twitter).

Somali officials have remained silent. But Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has publicly acknowledged the congressional support and reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen ties with Somaliland.

For Mogadishu, the risks are no longer theoretical. Somalia relies heavily on U.S. aid, diplomatic backing at the UN, and security cooperation. A rupture with Washington would have seismic effects beyond visas — it could destabilize key programs tied to security, governance, and debt relief.

“Somalia is playing a dangerous game of geopolitical chess without the protections that come with real sovereignty,” noted a Western diplomat in the region. “In this contest between superpowers, Mogadishu has positioned itself as a pawn — but it’s pretending to be a king.”

Developing story: Somaliland Chronicle will continue to monitor this situation as it unfolds.

Somaliland’s Global Posture Under President Irro: A 100-Day Foreign Diplomacy Review

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Staff

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May 2, 2025

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On November 13, 2024, Somaliland’s political landscape shifted dramatically as President Irro claimed victory in a highly contested election, ousting the incumbent President Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye Party, which had dominated Somaliland’s politics since 2010. Irro’s win was nothing short of a landslide, garnering 63% of the vote against his rival. He campaigned on a platform focused on foreign diplomacy, which sharply contrasted with Somaliland’s established foreign policy.

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Irro’s approach was the Wadani Party’s commitment to pursuing dialogue and reconciliation with Somalia. This stance, however, raised eyebrows among many Somalilanders, as it appeared to challenge the region’s sovereignty and aspirations for international recognition. Additionally, Irro criticized the existing Somaliland-Taiwan relations, arguing that they hindered potential ties with China, a country that holds veto power in the UN Security Council and officially considers Somaliland part of Somalia.

The Wadani Party also voiced concerns over a maritime deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, labeling it a bold yet risky diplomatic maneuver. Irro’s electoral success coincided with a turbulent period for Somaliland, as domestic and foreign relations faced severe scrutiny, particularly following the Las Anod debacle and the Somali proxy conflict that had erupted in response to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This turmoil created a disillusioned electorate, evident in the stark decline in voter turnout compared to previous elections.

In the 2017 elections, an impressive 81% of registered voters—620,000 out of 759,000—cast their ballots. Kulmiye emerged victorious, with strong participation from Somaliland citizens. However, by 2024, voter turnout plummeted to just 53%, with only 633,000 out of 1.2 million registered voters participating. This significant decrease highlighted that many Kulmiye supporters chose to abstain, further emphasizing the fractures within Somaliland’s political fabric.

For the first time, the electoral process in Somaliland faced external influence from regional actors, including Djibouti, China, and Somalia, all of whom were rumored to have financially supported the Wadani Party. The Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum, a prominent NGO, underscored the urgent need for legal reforms to prohibit illicit foreign funding of political parties during elections, emphasizing that “Somaliland law currently lacks provisions against foreign financial donations to election campaigns, a pressing issue for constitutional reform.”

Despite his background as a former acting ambassador before the Somali state collapse and a long tenure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the early 1980s, Irro’s new government surprised many with its composition. A notable majority comprised individuals aligned with the Icrisaam wing, and some key ministerial appointments were puzzling, such as a foreign affairs minister whose experience was limited to running a daycare center in the U.S. Expectations were high that Irro’s diplomatic expertise would steer Somaliland in a new and promising direction, yet the unfolding events within the first 100 days of his administration left many questioning the future trajectory of the nation. On that note, let’s take a closer look at Irro’s foreign diplomacy and its influence on Somaliland’s economy and international standing since he assumed office.

Somalia Government Aggression against Somaliland Sovereignty: The bizarre situation involving the Wadani Party and the Irro administration continues as they stubbornly pursue talks between Somalia and Somaliland—a move that serves as a political lever for Somalia against Somaliland’s quest for sovereignty and international recognition. To complicate matters, Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza recently visited Las Anod, a blatant infringement on the sovereignty that Somaliland claims. This visit adds to the backdrop of a two-year proxy war, during which the Las Anod militia and Al-Shabaab have been employed to destabilize Somaliland.

In response, Somaliland issued a statement condemning this act. Somalia, undeterred by Somaliland’s diplomatic outcry, intensified its aggression by unlawfully seizing individuals from the Las Anod militia—innocent Isaaq civilians who were kidnapped and tortured, then labeled as prisoners of war. Instead of processing these captives through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Somalia quietly dispatched them to Hargeisa, where the Irro administration acquiesced without protest.

One might wonder why the Irro administration didn’t reject such an illegal transfer of abducted individuals. From a humanitarian standpoint, one could argue that their decision was the correct one. However, they failed to prepare a report on human rights violations and invite the ICRC to document these abuses, which could serve as a legal liability against the Somali government. Regrettably, the Irro administration opted for a policy of appeasement, choosing not to disrupt relations with Somalia, even in the face of blatant aggression toward Somaliland’s sovereignty.

What’s particularly shocking is that, rather than withdrawing from the talks altogether—a move that might have garnered serious attention from the international community—the Somaliland government chose to suspend the dialogue instead. Furthermore, what will become of the special envoy appointed by the Irro government to facilitate the Somaliland-Somalia discussions? Given his ties to Hassan Sheikh, will they consider dismissing him altogether? The situation remains fraught with uncertainty and potential consequences.

Somaliland Foreign Diplomacy toward Türkiye Enframement; Turkey, acting as an imperial mediator, has been actively promoting talks between Somalia and Somaliland. In 2018, Turkey appointed Dr. Onamed as its special envoy for these negotiations and has established a consulate in Hargeisa. Despite the ongoing discussions failing to yield significant results, Turkey has escalated its diplomatic maneuvers concerning Somaliland, subtly undermining its sovereignty. A telling example is the fact that Somaliland citizens are compelled to acquire Somali government passports to travel to Turkey, including politicians from Somaliland holding government positions. In stark contrast, Somaliland residents must visit the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu to secure a Turkish visa, while politicians can obtain a visa in Hargeisa only after securing a Somali passport. This is in direct opposition to the UAE, which recognizes Somaliland passports and issues visas accordingly. Furthermore, the administration of Hassan Sheikh has sought Turkish assistance to facilitate Somalia-Ethiopia maritime talks, culminating in the controversial Ankara Deal. Under this agreement, Somalia has granted 30% of its oil, gas, and fishing revenue rights from its marine resources over the next decade, encroaching upon the maritime claims of Somaliland. Strikingly, no Somaliland politician or government official has raised objections to this blatant violation of sovereignty. While the hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia has been addressed through the Ankara Deal, finalization is still pending due to unresolved technical details. Interestingly, although the specifics of these negotiations have not been officially disclosed, reports from Turkish media indicate that Turkey is further undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty. During the initial round of technical discussions between Ethiopia and Somalia, overseen by Turkey, several critical topics emerged: Somalia aims to control customs revenue from ports in Somaliland that Ethiopia intends to use; the Somali government insists on co-signing port management agreements for any ports in Somaliland utilized by Ethiopia; and Somalia is pushing for the use of Somali passports for Somaliland citizens traveling to Ethiopia, alongside ensuring Ethiopia acquires permits and pays applicable fees for any access to Somali territory and trade via land, sea, and air. One might argue that these agreements would be unacceptable for the Somaliland government under Irro, yet no protests have emerged against the Ankara declaration that undermines the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU. Moreover, in January and March of 2025, the Turkish parliament approved two significant legislations. The January decision extended Turkey’s naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, including Somali waters, which Somaliland is inherently a part of. This allows Turkey to patrol Somaliland’s maritime areas without consent, an action that could infringe on Somaliland’s sovereignty, though its political leaders have shown little concern. In March, Turkey’s parliament controversially ratified a hydrocarbon agreement covering both onshore and offshore territories of Somalia, which included Somaliland. The government of Abdirahman Irro remained silent in the face of this agreement, which clearly violates their claimed sovereignty and rights to resources. At the very least, Abdirahman Irro’s foreign minister should have summoned the Turkish consul in Hargeisa to demand clarification, asserting that Somaliland’s sovereignty is non-negotiable.

Somalia’s Monopoly on Somaliland Livestock Exports; The tug-of-war between Somalia and Somaliland has intensified, particularly in the livestock export sector, which Somalia has weaponized to assert its dominance. This ongoing proxy and diplomatic conflict has evolved into an economic battle, with Somalia pressuring importing countries to obtain livestock exports from its transitional government, sidelining Somaliland’s traders. In December 2024, a significant escalation occurred when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud granted exclusive rights to Abu-Yasir, a foreign businessman, allowing him to export Somalia’s livestock, including that from Somaliland. This decision sparked widespread protests among Somaliland livestock traders, who faced devastating economic consequences.

The disruption affected the entire supply chain, from pastoralists to middlemen and traders, putting a strain on Somaliland’s economy. To put the economic impact into perspective, Somaliland exported a total of 3,802,903 livestock in 2024, averaging about 950,726 per quarter. In stark contrast, during the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), Somaliland managed to export less than 722,000 livestock, marking a staggering 76% drop. If this trend continues, which seems likely, the ramifications will be severe—given that livestock exports constitute 45% to 60% of Somaliland’s GDP, a continued decline could result in a catastrophic 34% drop in GDP, leading to significant economic losses. In response to these challenges, the Somaliland government revoked the operating license of a prominent livestock inspection facility in Berbera, accusing its Arab owner of overstepping boundaries. Unfortunately, the Somaliland government has yet to implement effective economic policies to counter this overt economic assault. There is an urgent need for investment in modernizing the livestock sector, including establishing cold chain facilities and abattoirs for exporting meat to Ethiopia, which has a substantial demand. Such initiatives would help reduce dependency on live livestock exports and preserve the economic value that is currently under threat.

Russia Interest in Somaliland; In February 2025, the diplomatic landscape was jolted by a surprising move from Somaliland President Irro and his administration, who chose to extend a welcome to Russian politician Igor Morozov. This decision raised eyebrows, particularly given Morozov’s US and UK sanctions and his notorious role in destabilizing Ukraine, along with his close ties to Putin. At the same time, legislators in the UK and US were making progress toward recognizing Somaliland, adding a layer of complexity to the situation.

To complicate matters further, the Russian ambassador to Somalia and Djibouti submitted a request for a visit from the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, seeking to strengthen ties with Somaliland. However, the Foreign Ministry of Somaliland subtly declined the invitation, offering a vague excuse that only deepened the uncertainty surrounding the nation’s foreign diplomacy. This sequence of events—going from inviting a sanctioned Russian politician to dodging a meeting with a high-ranking Russian official—underscores the urgent need for a clearer strategy and more cohesive direction in Somaliland’s foreign relations.

China’s Diplomatic Aggression Towards Somaliland and Taiwan: Despite its minimal contributions of trivial food aid to Somalia, which pale in comparison to the billions provided by the UK, EU, and US for sustainable peace and development, China seems to enjoy preferential treatment in Somalia’s foreign policy. Alarmingly, China is reportedly funding the Las Anod militia in Somaliland, which threatens to destabilize its state-building efforts and undermines Somaliland’s commitment to maintaining its diplomatic and trade relations with Taiwan. On April 29th, China pressured Somalia to refuse entry or transit for Taiwanese citizens through their territory and to halt any Taiwanese aviation’s over Somaliland airspace. This maneuver followed China’s discovery of a planned visit by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister to Somaliland, prompting Beijing to coerce Somaliland into issuing a ban on Taiwanese passports. This situation serves as a litmus test not only for the Somaliland-Taiwan relationship but also for their sovereignty and the freedom of movement. In response, Taiwan has vehemently protested and is taking steps to counter China’s encroachments, highlighting its determination to uphold its rights.

Furthermore, the situation raises concerns about Somaliland’s earlier decision to allow Somalia to manage its airspace—a strategic blunder that dates back to 2012 when the International Air Transport Association (IATA) granted Somalia control over it. This move has been criticized as the most significant political misstep Somaliland has made since 1960, essentially handing over its aviation sovereignty to a rival without guarantees.

Now, the consequences of that decision are becoming apparent. President Irro, who has previously criticized the Somaliland-Taiwan dynamic, will face critical challenges in his tenure. To demonstrate his commitment to sovereignty and solidarity with Taiwan, he must take decisive diplomatic action: 1. Jointly issue a protest letter with Taiwan against China’s encroachment on their sovereignty and freedom of movement. 2. Expel illegal Chinese companies and traders operating in Somaliland. 3. File a formal complaint with IATA, providing evidence of Somalia’s violation of aviation agreements from the 2012 London talks. Failure to act could not only jeopardize the relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan but could also label him as a puppet of Chinese interests. The time for decisive leadership is now; the future of Somaliland and Taiwan’s partnership hangs in the balance, and the world is watching closely.

Finaly, in his first 100 days in office, Irro faced significant challenges in Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy, falling short of major expectations set by his government, which might just earn a grade of D. However, this early phase marks a crucial turning point; he has the opportunity and room to improve his diplomatic efforts. A critical starting point would be reforming the foreign ministry, which is currently run from his office due to the appointment of an inept minister. Securing a competent foreign minister is vital at this juncture and for the future.

Furthermore, Irro could strengthen relations with Taiwan, especially as Somaliland finds itself under China threat. A visit to Taiwan could pave the way for tangible bilateral trade, focusing on sectors like aviation finance, security, and mineral development. This scenario presents a golden opportunity to lobby with Taiwan in the USA, promoting Somaliland’s deep-sea critical minerals through a partnership with Taiwan. Tying this into U.S. legislation, such as the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, could lead to a trilateral partnership between the USA, Taiwan, and Somaliland. With the Trump administration positioning itself as a global leader in critical minerals amidst the rising challenges of artificial intelligence and chip technology, this could strengthen Somaliland-Taiwan relations under U.S. protection against Chinese aggression and Turkish illegal hydrocarbon deal with Somalia.

Such a trilateral deal would bolster Somaliland’s aspirations for international recognition while safeguarding its sovereignty against Somalia’s aggressive posturing. Irro has the chance to lift Somaliland out of the dreamland bubble it has been trapped in for the past 30 years, a mindset that has normalized the idea that Somalia poses no threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty and prosperity. In reality, Somalia declared war on Somaliland long ago, and its aggression has only intensified, raising fears of a second iteration of the Isaaq genocide, with the use of Turkish drones, Al-Shabaab, and foreign mercenaries reminiscent of Siad Barre’s regime.

If Irro’s government fails to enhance Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy both geopolitically and geoeconomically, it would only reinforce the perception that the Wadani Party has always leaned toward unionism, desperately waiting for a call from the Mogadishu mayor, run by Ugandan overlordship sitting in Kampala. The time is now for Irro to seize the moment and chart a new course for Somaliland on the global stage.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Guled Ahmed is a Resident Scholar with the Middle East Institute and an expert in Horn of Africa Security and Development.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

Somalia Bans Taiwanese Travelers as Beijing’s Influence in Horn of Africa Deepens

By

Staff

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April 30, 2025

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KEY POINTS

Somalia bans entry of Taiwanese passport holders, citing UN Resolution 2758 amid pressure from China
Ban widely seen as attempt to derail scheduled high-level Taiwanese diplomatic mission to Somaliland
China publicly endorses Somalia’s decision, reaffirming opposition to Taiwan-Somaliland relations
Somaliland considering possible countermeasures, including review of Chinese nationals’ presence in its territory
Airspace control has become political flashpoint, with recent incidents affecting flights to Somaliland
U.S. TAIPEI Act could potentially trigger diplomatic consequences for Somalia

HARGEISA, Somaliland — Somalia’s Federal Government has barred holders of Taiwanese passports from entering, exiting, or even transiting through the country, a move Taiwan’s government denounced on Tuesday as the result of political pressure from Beijing. The travel ban, issued by Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority, comes amid Taiwan’s strengthening ties with the Republic of Somaliland — a development closely watched in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Somali authorities justified the ban by citing United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, a 1971 measure recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal representative of China in the UN. The resolution does not mention Taiwan, but Beijing has long used it as the foundation for pressing other countries to sever official ties with Taipei.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the decision, calling Somalia’s rationale “a willful distortion of UN Resolution 2758.” In a statement, the ministry accused Somalia of “misinterpreting the resolution under China’s instigation to create the false impression that Taiwan is subordinate to China.”

The ban prompted Taiwan to issue a travel advisory for both Somalia and Somaliland, citing safety and security concerns for its nationals. Taiwan maintains a representative office in Hargeisa, the capital of the Republic Somaliland.

Somalia’s Official Directive Invokes Constitutional Authority

According to the letter seen by Somaliland Chronicle, Somalia’s ban came through official channels on April 22, when the Somali Civil Aviation Authority issued Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) 04/25, obtained by this publication. The directive explicitly invokes Somalia’s constitutional authority to “preserve its territorial integrity and political unity” under Articles 4 and 7 of its Provisional Constitution.

The circular goes beyond merely banning Taiwanese passports, extending to “all passports, travel documents, visas, and consular credentials issued by or affiliated with Taiwan.” Airlines received strict instructions to ensure passengers with Taiwan-issued documents “are not processed through any stage of travel connected to Somalia territory,” with warnings of regulatory action for non-compliance.

Most notably, the directive specifically condemns “the unauthorized establishment of a so-called ‘Taiwan Representative Office’ in Hargeisa,” calling it “a clear violation of Somalia’s sovereignty” that “contravenes the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.” By framing the ban in terms of sovereignty and constitutional authority, Somalia positions the issue as a matter of internal affairs rather than external pressure, despite China’s visible endorsement of the action.

Ban Appears Timed to Derail High-Level Visit

Diplomatic sources say the Somali directive came just days before a scheduled visit by Lin Chia-lung, Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Somaliland — a trip that would have marked the highest-level Taiwanese visit to Somaliland since formal ties were established in 2020.

Minister Lin was expected to be accompanied by senior trade officials and representatives from Africa and other parts of the world where Taiwan has trade representation. The delegation was set to inaugurate several infrastructure and development projects, including a major expansion of Hargeisa Group Hospital funded by Taiwan.

The timing suggests the ban was a direct response to the minister’s planned visit, according to regional diplomatic observers. It appears intended to send a message not only to Taiwan but also to Somaliland about the consequences of their deepening relationship.

Neither the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa responded to requests for comment on the matter.

Airspace Control Emerges as Geopolitical Flashpoint

The dispute also throws a spotlight on airspace control — a longstanding source of friction between Somalia and Somaliland. Though Somaliland claims de facto autonomy, air traffic over its territory is administered by Somalia under a UN-backed arrangement. In recent months, control of the skies has increasingly become a political tool.

In January, Somali authorities reportedly denied airspace clearance to an Ethiopian Airlines Dash 8 aircraft carrying a delegation to Somaliland, citing a lack of formal permission. There were also unverified reports that an air ambulance was blocked while transporting a critically ill patient from Somaliland — a claim Somalia has denied.

By February, international aviation safety bodies issued risk alerts after multiple pilots reported receiving conflicting instructions from unidentified radio operators while flying over Somali airspace. The warnings pointed to escalating risks stemming from competing claims of air traffic control authority by Mogadishu and Hargeisa.

China Endorses Somalia’s Action

China openly backed Somalia’s decision to bar Taiwanese travelers. At a press conference in Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun called the move “a legitimate measure taken by a sovereign nation” and commended Somalia for upholding the “one-China principle.”

Guo emphasized that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China” and reiterated Beijing’s opposition to any official contact between Taiwan and Somaliland. “China firmly opposes the Taiwan authorities and Somaliland hosting each other’s institutions or engaging in any form of official interaction,” he said.

China does not recognize Taiwan as an independent nation and has sought to isolate it diplomatically, particularly in Africa and Latin America.

Somaliland’s Strategic Caution

While officials in Hargeisa have not publicly commented, sources say Somaliland is considering several options in response — including a possible review of its engagement with Chinese nationals operating within its territory. Still, analysts expect Somaliland to proceed cautiously.

Somaliland’s leadership has generally avoided retaliatory moves, even under provocation, according to regional security experts. Their strategy has focused on building relationships with Western democracies while avoiding direct confrontations that could escalate tensions.

Somaliland has positioned itself as a democratic ally in a volatile region, courting partnerships with the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded nations. In meetings with U.S. congressional staff, Somaliland officials have emphasized their country’s role as a counterweight to authoritarian influence in the Horn of Africa.

Proxy Competition in a Globalized Arena

The dispute over Taiwan’s diplomatic outreach in Somaliland illustrates a larger trend: China’s growing willingness to project power through proxy partners. While Beijing’s attention has historically centered on the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific, its activities in East Africa are increasingly strategic.

Somalia appears to be functioning as a surrogate for Chinese influence, according to Africa policy specialists. The conflict extends beyond Taiwan to encompass broader geopolitical competition over strategic locations, infrastructure development, and influence in the Red Sea corridor.

China has heavily invested in infrastructure projects and development aid across East Africa. In December 2024, Chinese envoy Xue Bing visited Mogadishu and pledged support for Somalia’s sovereignty — a visit widely interpreted as a counter to growing international engagement with Somaliland.

U.S. Law Could Trigger Repercussions

The travel ban could also have implications under the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative, or TAIPEI Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2020. The law authorizes Washington to adjust diplomatic or economic engagement with countries that “take significant actions to undermine Taiwan’s security or prosperity.”

While the Trump administration and particularly the State Department has not commented on Somalia’s ban, observers note that the act offers a framework for potential sanctions or aid reductions — particularly at a time when U.S. interest in recognizing or expanding ties with Somaliland is rising.

Somalia’s economic stability relies heavily on international assistance, making its alignment with Beijing potentially risky if it leads to reduced support from Western allies who back Taiwan’s international participation.

Somalia Under New Management: How Kampala Became Mogadishu’s New Capital

By

Staff

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April 26, 2025

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In a dramatic shift of regional power dynamics that has gone largely unnoticed by Western media, Somalia has effectively ceded significant control over its security apparatus and governance to Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni. The handover wasn’t marked by ceremony or treaty but rather through a bureaucratic sleight-of-hand executed at last week’s extraordinary summit in Kampala. There, a new “TCCs Plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism” was quietly established under Museveni’s chairmanship, placing him at the helm of an oversight structure with sweeping authority over Somalia’s security, military operations, and international military funding.

Quietly approved by Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud during the April 25 summit, the mechanism comes as Al-Shabaab tightens its grip around Mogadishu in what may be the terrorist group’s most successful offensive in over a decade.

Trading Sovereignty for Survival

The arrangement is a desperate gambit from Mogadishu — a trade of sovereignty for survival. Since February, Al-Shabaab has increased its attacks by over 50% compared to 2024, cutting supply routes and overrunning federal outposts. The capital is increasingly encircled by Al-Shabaab forces.

“With our collective efforts towards securing Somalia, we have been able to have the space to further our state-building efforts,” President Mohamud claimed at the summit. But on the ground, it’s a different story: one of federal disintegration, military collapse, and the slow fragmentation of what little remains of centralized Somali authority.

The summit concluded with Somalia authorizing an additional 8,000 foreign troops under the AUSSOM banner, bringing the total foreign military presence to roughly 20,000. The majority of these forces are not under Somali command.

Foreign Deals, Foreign Rule

The President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has defended his country's recent oil and gas deal with Türkiye, saying it is based on ''mutual interests'' pic.twitter.com/rDgf0k2m3t
— TRT Afrika (@trtafrika) April 25, 2025

Somalia’s sovereignty has been parceled out through a series of desperate security arrangements that trade long-term national interests for short-term security promises. In March 2024, Mogadishu granted Turkey rights to recover up to 90% of petroleum production from major oil and gas deposits in exchange for vague security assurances and naval protection.

Turkey already controls Somalia’s last major state revenue sources, including the strategic port and international airport — the country’s primary revenue generators and gateways to the outside world. Despite this economic stranglehold, the Turkish military presence — anchored at Turkey’s only foreign base in Mogadishu — has remained focused on force protection, not counterinsurgency. Turkey denies accusations that it is deploying SADAT, its controversial paramilitary firm often likened to Russia’s Wagner Group.

Somalia also signed a defense pact with Egypt, formalized during Mohamud’s Cairo visit in August 2024. The agreement included military protocols and Egyptian troop contributions to AUSSOM. Despite a flurry of announcements — including the trilateral Somalia-Egypt-Eritrea summit in Asmara — none of these partnerships have produced meaningful battlefield results.

The NATO Illusion and Buyer’s Remorse

Somali elites who triumphantly celebrated the Turkish security pact last year are now experiencing severe buyer’s remorse as details of the hydrocarbon agreement have emerged. When the defense agreement was first signed, Somalia’s political class boasted that the deal effectively placed them under NATO’s protective umbrella, given Turkey’s membership in the alliance.

Across social media and in parliamentary debates, Somali officials boasted about their newfound security umbrella, with one prominent lawmaker suggesting that Ethiopia should reconsider any confrontational stance now that Somalia had allied with a NATO member. The prevailing sentiment was that Turkey’s military alliance would transform regional power dynamics in Somalia’s favor.

This wishful thinking reflected a fundamental misreading of NATO’s collective defense principles. The ink had barely dried before Ankara began laying the groundwork for its real objective: privileged access to Somalia’s estimated 30 billion barrels of oil reserves and 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas.

“Even colonial extraction agreements rarely exceeded 50% resource claims,” noted a Somali analyst. “We’ve managed to negotiate terms worse than those imposed on defeated nations after wars.”

The Federal System Collapse

Somalia’s federal structure, once envisioned as a solution to state-building challenges, has become another vector of disintegration. Ironically, the very federal system that was partly designed to counterbalance Somaliland — through the creation of various “…land” states like Puntland, Jubaland, and others — has now undermined the central government it was meant to strengthen.

Puntland formally severed ties with Mogadishu in March 2024, declaring its own path forward after years of deteriorating relations with the federal government. Meanwhile, vast swathes of territory in Hirshabelle and other regions have fallen under Al-Shabaab control, creating governance voids the federal government cannot fill.

This fragmentation creates a paradox: as Somalia authorizes more foreign troops on its soil, it exercises effective control over less of its own territory. What began as political fiction — federal member states created partly to dilute Somaliland’s unique status — has evolved into a political reality where these entities often function more effectively than the federal government itself.

“The federal project is collapsing under its own contradictions,” noted one Somali political analyst. “We’re witnessing the slow-motion disintegration of whatever unified governance remained.”

Yet even amid fragmentation, Somalia’s deeper crisis is not geography — it’s the absence of national will.

The Heart of the Problem: Will, Not Weapons

Somalia’s security crisis isn’t primarily a matter of insufficient armaments or inadequate training. The country has received billions in security assistance since 2007, with tens of thousands of soldiers ostensibly trained by foreign partners. Yet these forces consistently underperform against Al-Shabaab.

The fundamental problem is the absence of will to fight. Somalia’s clan-based society has never fully embraced the concept of a national army fighting for a unitary state. Soldiers’ primary loyalties remain with their clans, not with abstract notions of the Somali nation. When military units are organized along clan lines, their willingness to fight often depends on whether the battle serves their clan’s interests — not the national strategic objectives set in Mogadishu.

The Kampala summit produced recommendations that read like a recycled script from the past decade of failed interventions, emphasizing “enhancing Somali National Armed Forces training” and establishing “mechanisms for countering extremist narratives.” Notably absent was any serious reckoning with the root causes of Somalia’s security collapse: endemic corruption, predatory governance, and the absence of political will to reform.

Museveni: Somalia’s New Security Overlord

President Museveni, 80, has ruled Uganda since 1986. Now, he holds unprecedented sway over Somali security policy. The Peer Review Mechanism gives him formal oversight of military operations, federal-state coordination, and international troop contributions. The summit also empowered Museveni to speak directly to the UN Security Council on Somalia’s behalf — a stunning diplomatic concession.

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni Abubaker

Uganda already contributes the largest foreign troop contingent in Somalia (4,500), followed by Ethiopia (2,500), Djibouti (1,520), Kenya (1,410), and Egypt (1,091). The Kampala mechanism effectively turns this military weight into political leverage.

Political oversight is only one piece of the puzzle; the financial levers of power are shifting as well.

Somalia’s Foreign Backers Cut and Run

AUSSOM faces a $73.7 million funding shortfall for the first half of 2025, with urgent needs totaling $92.1 million. The Kampala summit tasked Museveni with designing a “Resource Mobilization Strategy and Financing Plan,” placing Somalia’s defense budget under foreign supervision.

As Western attention drifts elsewhere, Somalia’s backers are losing patience. China has pledged only $17 million to the AUSSOM mission — a token sum that reflects its preference for maximum strategic leverage at minimum cost. The European Union, still the largest financial backer of Somali security, has voiced escalating frustration, warning: “We cannot carry this burden alone.”

The United States has drastically scaled back its aid footprint, with USAID operations slashed by 83%. Somalia’s once heavily fortified U.S. embassy compound inside Mogadishu’s “green zone” now operates with minimal staff. Talk of permanent closure is no longer hypothetical.

Ethiopia’s Red Sea Dilemma

Ethiopia’s bold January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland—offering potential recognition in exchange for port access—was a strategic gambit that continues to reverberate throughout the region. This assertive move triggered the very dynamics that led to today’s Kampala arrangement, as Somalia scrambled to shore up international support against what it perceived as an existential threat. The MoU effectively forced Somalia into deeper dependency on foreign partners, accelerating the security outsourcing that culminated in Uganda’s oversight role.

Yet despite triggering these tectonic shifts, Ethiopia has failed to capitalize on its initial advantage. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s subsequent retreat from the MoU’s commitments has left Ethiopia in a paradoxical position: contributing 2,500 troops to AUSSOM to stabilize a Somali government actively undermining Ethiopia’s core strategic interests. The diplomatic pressure that caused Addis Ababa to pull back has not resolved Ethiopia’s fundamental dilemma—a landlocked nation of 120 million people with no sovereign access to maritime trade routes.

For Ethiopia, the geographic reality remains both unchanged and unforgiving. Viable Red Sea access runs either through Somaliland’s territory or via Eritrea—requiring renewed engagement with Isaias Afwerki, the mercurial strongman in Asmara. Abiy previously navigated this difficult relationship during his early peace offensive, but the rapprochement has cooled significantly. Somalia’s ports remain under Turkish control and its governance increasingly fragmented among competing foreign interests, rendering that route strategically compromised.

Addis Ababa now faces the challenge of rebuilding a strategic partnership with Hargeisa under more difficult circumstances, having demonstrated hesitancy in its previous commitment. As the region’s strategic chessboard continues to evolve, Ethiopia’s initial boldness followed by diplomatic wavering has resulted in the worst of both scenarios: antagonizing Somalia without securing the Red Sea access that motivated the original MoU. Meanwhile, Somaliland retains the singular asset—functioning Red Sea ports and the territory connecting them to Ethiopia—that keeps it central to the region’s geopolitical calculations regardless of formal recognition status.

Somaliland: Strategic Opportunity Amid Somalia’s Protectorate Shift

As Somalia surrenders control to multiple foreign powers — security to Uganda, economic resources to Turkey — Somaliland’s stable self-governance stands in striking contrast. While Mogadishu struggles to maintain even the appearance of sovereignty, Hargeisa continues to exercise effective control over its territory, security forces, and governmental functions without foreign oversight. More remarkably, in a region where democratic governance is rare, Somaliland has demonstrated a consistent commitment to electoral democracy that puts it ahead of most of its neighbors.

This divergence creates a historic opening for Somaliland to strengthen its case for recognition. In a region where volatility is the norm, Somaliland’s consistent governance stands as a rare strategic asset — one Washington cannot afford to ignore under a pragmatic foreign policy approach. The strategic implications have never been clearer, particularly as the reality of Somalia’s fragmentation catches up with international partners who have clung to the fiction of a unified Somalia despite mounting evidence that this model may be unworkable.

Somalia’s obsession with destabilizing Somaliland, even amid its own crises, reveals the threat that Somaliland’s success poses to Mogadishu’s legitimacy. The Somali Prime Minister’s provocative visit to Las Anod amid active hostilities at his doorstep represents a calculated effort to undermine Somaliland’s territorial integrity. Somaliland responded by suspending dialogue with Somalia — a proportionate measure against a bad-faith actor.

For the United States, this moment presents a strategic imperative aligned perfectly with the pragmatic foreign policy championed by Secretary of State Rubio, who emphasizes decisions based on whether they “make us stronger, safer, and more prosperous.” Washington, hamstrung by decades of misguided adherence to the “One Somalia” fiction, risks squandering a natural partnership with Somaliland precisely when pragmatism should prevail over ideological rigidity. Somaliland’s vast, untapped reserves of critical minerals, including rare earth elements and lithium, represent resources the United States urgently needs to secure its technological future and reduce dependence on adversarial supply chains — a clear case where strategic interest aligns with Secretary Rubio’s emphasis on “concrete shared interests, not vague platitudes or utopian ideologies.”

As Somalia fragments under the weight of its own contradictions and foreign entanglements, Somaliland has a unique opportunity to project coherence and purpose through expanded bilateral engagements with countries willing to understand its unique position.

A Shadow Administration

The Kampala agreement creates a shadow administration over Somalia’s most vital state function: security. Museveni now chairs the body that manages foreign troops, allocates international funds, and liaises with the UN — all roles that traditionally belong to a sovereign state.

The arrangement recalls the mechanisms of a colonial protectorate: Somalia retains formal independence, but critical levers of control now sit in Kampala. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is still technically in office — but power is elsewhere.

This is the culmination of years of strategic decay. Somalia has surrendered its economic sovereignty to Turkey and now its security architecture to Uganda. The fiction of Somali self-rule grows thinner by the day.

Whatever the next chapter holds, one thing is clear: Somalia’s path to stability no longer runs through Mogadishu. It runs through Kampala — and it’s Museveni holding the map.

The Khatumo Dilemma and the Legacy of Clan-Based Politics in Somalia

By

Staff

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April 25, 2025

0

The political choices of the Khatumo community have long perplexed many observers, myself included. Their decision to pursue a federal arrangement with the Federal Government of Somalia—rather than aligning with either Somaliland or Puntland—raises significant questions about historical memory, political calculations, and perceived benefits. After engaging with three seminal works written by esteemed Somali scholars on the country’s tumultuous political history, I have come to the conclusion that the people of Khatumo are not driven purely by ideological or national considerations. Rather, they appear to be seeking to reclaim a perceived lost entitlement: the disproportionate share of political power and public resources they enjoyed under the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre.

However, this aspiration is deeply problematic. The assumption that reintegration with Mogadishu will lead to the restoration of these privileges is, at best, wishful thinking. As the Somali proverb wisely puts it, “Meesha ay dacawo macal uga baratay bay macaluul ugu bakhtidaa”—”The place where the fox once learned to find food is the same place where it ultimately dies of hunger.” This metaphor poignantly captures the futility of looking to a failed center of power to deliver the same benefits it once promised but can no longer sustain.

To better understand the dangers and long-term consequences of clan-dominated governance, it is instructive to revisit a pivotal episode in Somali political history involving two prominent members of the Somali Revolutionary Council’s politburo: General Ismail Ali Abokor and General Ahmed Suleiman Abdalla (commonly known as Dafle). Their interaction offers a window into how clan hegemony, once institutionalized within the state apparatus, not only alienated key national actors but also contributed to the eventual unraveling of the Somali state.

In Politics of Cain, Professor Hussein Bulhan recounts a revealing incident that marked a turning point in General Abokor’s political evolution. Though Abokor was Isaaq and Dafle a Darod (Dhulbahante), the two men had been schoolmates in both Somaliland and the United Kingdom, developing a friendship that transcended clan divisions. However, Abokor’s trust and belief in the ideals of the Somali revolution began to erode during a visit to Dafle’s office. While waiting in the adjoining room, Abokor overheard his long-time colleague urging a group of Marehan officials to consolidate Darod hegemony in Somalia. Dafle reportedly told them that “every country in the region is ruled by a clan or tribe,” and therefore, the Darod needed to ensure that power remained in their hands.

For Abokor, this moment was a revelation—deeply personal and politically disillusioning. That such a divisive call for clan dominance could come from a friend whose own mother was an Isaaq woman deeply unsettled him. It confirmed his growing suspicions that the revolution had been hijacked by clannish ambitions. By the late 1970s, Abokor had become openly critical of the regime. Alienated and spiritually disillusioned, he withdrew from public life, retreating into private religious practice. Nevertheless, he remained an influential figure behind the scenes, quietly encouraging Isaaq officers in the Somali armed forces to align with the Somali National Movement (SNM), the very group that would lead the armed resistance against Barre’s dictatorship in the northwest.

This story of personal betrayal and political awakening is emblematic of a broader systemic crisis. What began as a revolutionary project aimed at building a unified, socialist Somali state quickly degenerated into a vehicle for clan-based authoritarianism. As recorded in Waaya-Arag by Faarax Qaaray, the first decade of the revolution saw the consolidation of power in the hands of a narrow coalition known as the M.O.D. alliance—comprising the Marehan (Barre’s paternal clan), the Ogaden (his maternal clan), and the Dhulbahante (his son-in-law’s clan). This alliance excluded other major clans and communities, thereby sowing the seeds of discontent and rebellion.

Abdulqadir Aroma, in Sababihii Burburka Soomaaliya, offers further insight into the transformation of this alliance. Initially disguised as a revolutionary partnership, the M.O.D. coalition eventually became a naked expression of tribal favoritism. Barre, fearing loss of control, undermined constitutional governance and centralized power within his own kinship networks. According to Aroma, among the 76 founding members of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (XHKS), 38 were selected purely on the basis of clannish loyalty, all belonging to the Darod clan. The constitutional framework was subordinated to tribal dictates, as exemplified by the infamous rallying cry of Darod delegates: “O Daarood Ismaaciil, you have disgraced the family.”

This corruption of the revolutionary ideal culminated in systemic exclusion and militarized repression. Bulhan explains that even before Barre’s military defeat by Ethiopia in 1977-78, he had already begun arming loyalists and militarizing clan networks. The ideological facade of socialism and nationalism disintegrated under the weight of authoritarian paranoia and tribal patronage. The myth of Barre’s invincibility collapsed, and with it, the very foundations of the Somali state.

The Khatumo community’s nostalgia for the Barre era must be viewed within this historical context. While it is understandable that certain constituencies may seek to restore what they see as lost entitlements, the reality is that those privileges were granted under a system built on exclusion, coercion, and eventual collapse. Attempts to revive such a system—whether through federal alignment with Mogadishu or through other forms of political restoration—are not only misguided but potentially dangerous.

In contrast, Somaliland offers a radically different political experiment. Since declaring its independence in 1991, Somaliland has rejected the legacy of Barre’s rule and instead embarked on a path of indigenous reconciliation, democratic institution-building, and relative stability. Though unrecognized internationally, Somaliland has demonstrated a commitment to peace, self-governance, and pluralism that stands in stark contrast to the tumultuous politics of Mogadishu.

By choosing to align with a federal government in Mogadishu that is itself struggling with legitimacy, plagued by corruption, and infiltrated by terrorist threats, Khatumo risks repeating the mistakes of the past. The pursuit of federalism under the illusion of regained influence may in fact lead to deeper marginalization, especially in a context where centralized power remains weak and volatile.

Ultimately, the lessons of Somali political history should not be forgotten. The tragedy of the Somali state collapse was not merely the result of external interventions or ideological failures, but of the internal corrosion caused by clan hegemony, exclusionary politics, and personal ambition disguised as national interest. The story of Abokor and Dafle is not just a cautionary tale—it is a mirror reflecting the dangers that lie ahead for any community that seeks power at the expense of pluralism, equity, and justice.

Khatumo, and other regions like it, would do well to critically reassess the legacy they are seeking to restore. Instead of clinging to the ghost of a regime that prioritized clan over country, they could chart a new course rooted in inclusive governance, historical reconciliation, and meaningful self-determination. The past should inform the future—not imprison it.

About the Author

Mr. Abdillahi Hussein is PhD Candidate in Peace & Development Studies and visiting Prof. of Public Policy as well as Ethics in Government at the Civil Service Institute, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Turkey’s Shadowy Deal: Exploiting Somalia’s Resources Under the Guise of Partnership

By

Staff

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April 23, 2025

0

Turkey’s recent energy agreements with Somalia raise serious concerns about neo-colonial exploitation, masking a power grab under the veneer of economic cooperation. While Turkey frames its involvement as a win-win partnership, a closer examination reveals a deeply unbalanced arrangement that leaves Somalia vulnerable and significantly disadvantaged.

Turkey’s Energy Crisis and Strategic Ambitions:

Turkey’s energy dependence, coupled with a weakened lira and soaring inflation, has driven its pursuit of alternative energy sources and transit routes. This pursuit has led to strategic partnerships, some questionable, across the globe. Somalia, a nation grappling with instability and weak governance, has become an attractive target.

Somalia: A Vulnerable Target:

Somalia’s fragile state presents an opportunity for Turkey to secure access to its oil and gas reserves with minimal oversight and accountability. The agreement’s terms are heavily skewed in Turkey’s favor, granting it:

Predatory Cost Recovery: A 90% upfront cost recovery clause allows Turkey to effectively claim the lion’s share of the revenue, leaving Somalia with minimal returns. This is far beyond the norm for even conflict-ridden nations, where cost recovery typically caps around 70-80%.
Unilateral Control: Legal disputes are to be arbitrated in Istanbul, giving Turkey a significant advantage and potentially stifling any challenge to the deal’s terms.
Minimal Local Investment: Turkey’s lack of commitment to establishing local offices or contributing to local development further highlights the exploitative nature of the agreement. This means no local job creation and no significant revenue for the Somali people.

A Façade of Partnership:

The agreement is presented as a mutually beneficial partnership, but the reality is far different. Somalia receives minimal financial benefits while Turkey gains substantial access to resources and strengthens its geopolitical position. The lack of transparency and the one-sided terms raise concerns about corruption and the potential for long-term exploitation.

Challenging the Narrative:

Several arguments put forth to justify the agreement’s terms are demonstrably false:

The “Fair Royalty” Claim: The 5% royalty offered to Somalia is significantly below the standard for new oil-producing nations, indicating a blatant disregard for equitable resource sharing.
The “Normal Cost Recovery” Claim: The 90% cost recovery is far above the norm, even in unstable regions, showcasing the deal’s inherent imbalance.
The “International Arbitration” Claim: Arbitration in Istanbul provides Turkey with an unfair advantage, undermining Somalia’s ability to challenge unfavorable decisions.
The “Efficiency” Claim: The lack of a local office translates to a lack of local investment and economic benefits for Somalia.

Geopolitical Implications:

Turkey’s actions in Somalia are not merely about energy; they are about asserting geopolitical influence in Africa and the Middle East. This move could destabilize the region further and undermine Western efforts to support Somalia’s development. The deal casts a shadow on Turkey’s international reputation and raises questions about its commitment to fair and equitable partnerships.

Conclusion:

Turkey’s deal with Somalia is a stark example of neo-colonial exploitation. It underscores the need for greater transparency and accountability in international resource agreements and highlights the vulnerability of weak states in the face of powerful actors pursuing their own economic and geopolitical interests.

About the Author:

Mariam Robly is an independent journalist and political analyst based out of the MENA region.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Investigative Reports

Djibouti’s Hostility Has Been Deliberate, Not Diplomatic

Somaliland Public Sentiment: Mistrust Has Become Policy

Djibouti: Beijing’s Proxy in the Horn of Africa

Somalia’s Diplomatic Siege Is Collapsing

A Clash of Ports: Berbera vs. Djibouti

Cirro’s Priorities Questioned: Why Not Addis First?

Strategic Real Estate: The Battle Over U.S. Military Presence

Breaking the Blockade: Cirro’s Second Destination Looms

Can Djibouti Be Trusted?

Key Provisions: Legal Threats for Crossing the Line

Las Anod as a Turning Point

The Diplomatic Elephant in the Room

UNSOM and Diplomats: The Silence is Deafening

Toward a Coherent Foreign Policy?

Next Steps: Politics and Passage

Outlined consequences include:

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

KEY POINTS

Somalia’s Official Directive Invokes Constitutional Authority

Ban Appears Timed to Derail High-Level Visit

Airspace Control Emerges as Geopolitical Flashpoint

China Endorses Somalia’s Action

Somaliland’s Strategic Caution

Proxy Competition in a Globalized Arena

U.S. Law Could Trigger Repercussions

Trading Sovereignty for Survival

Foreign Deals, Foreign Rule

The NATO Illusion and Buyer’s Remorse

The Federal System Collapse

The Heart of the Problem: Will, Not Weapons

Museveni: Somalia’s New Security Overlord

Somalia’s Foreign Backers Cut and Run

Ethiopia’s Red Sea Dilemma

Somaliland: Strategic Opportunity Amid Somalia’s Protectorate Shift

A Shadow Administration

About the Author

Turkey’s Energy Crisis and Strategic Ambitions:

Somalia: A Vulnerable Target:

A Façade of Partnership:

Challenging the Narrative:

Geopolitical Implications:

Conclusion:

About the Author:

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