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The Politics of No Return: Why President Cirro Cannot Appease His Way to Reform

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Somaliland’s Democratic Triumph Faces Its Greatest Test

President-Elect Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro”’s sweeping electoral victory, securing over 60% of Somaliland’s presidential vote, represents more than a transfer of power – it marks a point of no return for both the victor and his nation. His mandate, built on promises of fundamental change and a decade of opposition politics, now collides with the entrenched interests that facilitated his rise to power. As Somalia seeks to exploit perceived weaknesses, Djibouti reacts with hostile maneuvers to protect its economic interests, and long-time political allies await their rewards, Cirro faces a stark reality: the very networks that enabled his victory now stand as the primary obstacles to the transformation his voters demanded. In this crucible of competing interests, appeasement – whether of regional adversaries or domestic powerbrokers and self-styled kings – offers no viable path forward. The fundamental question isn’t whether Cirro can maintain his political coalition, but whether he can transcend it to deliver the reforms Somaliland requires and secure the international recognition its people have long sought – their rightful place among the community of nations.

In this analysis, we examine the multifaceted challenges confronting President-elect Cirro as he assumes leadership of Somaliland. From the potentially damaging return of figures associated with failed Somalia talks to the bloated civil service demanding reform, from the calculated exploitation of Las Anod by regional adversaries to the delicate balance of international partnerships, Cirro’s administration faces decisions that will define not just his presidency but Somaliland’s future. The moment demands an unflinching and ruthless pursuit of national interest over political accommodation. At each turn, the temptation of appeasement – whether through political appointments, policy compromises, or diplomatic concessions – threatens to undermine the very reforms his mandate demands. The stakes could not be higher: Somaliland’s democratic achievement now requires leadership that can disappoint allies, confront adversaries, and advance national interests with unwavering resolve.

The Weight of Political Debts and Personnel Choices

The most immediate challenge facing Cirro’s administration emerges in its personnel decisions, none more concerning than the rumored return of Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar as Foreign Minister. As the architect of the Somaliland-Somalia talks during the Silanyo administration, Dr. Omar presided over what many consider the most damaging diplomatic initiative in Somaliland’s quest for recognition – a dialogue process that was effectively hijacked by Somalia and billed as reconciliation there by reducing Somaliland’s international standing from an aspiring sovereign state to a essentially a federal member of Somalia.

More troubling still is that this potential appointment aligns with the Waddani Party’s explicit manifesto commitment to continue these same fruitless talks – a position that appears to disregard their demonstrably damaging impact on Somaliland’s sovereignty aspirations. This policy continuity raises fundamental questions about the administration’s capacity to deliver the change its electoral mandate demands.

The Civil Service Dilemma

The incoming administration inherits a civil service bloated by tribal patronage, where government positions function more as spoils to be distributed than professional roles serving public interest. Each administration since President Egal has added layers to this unwieldy bureaucracy, creating redundant positions to satisfy clan quotas. Cirro now faces an impossible choice: maintain an unsustainable system or risk backlash through reform.

The challenge here transcends simple administrative reform – it demands a fundamental reorientation of how public service is conceived and delivered. No amount of diplomatic finesse can resolve the fundamental contradiction between professional governance and tribal patronage.

Justice and Security Sector Reform: Promises versus Reality

While Cirro’s campaign effectively highlighted the outgoing administration’s record of extrajudicial arrests and political interference in the judiciary, his proposed reforms appear remarkably modest. The focus on salary increases for security personnel, while long overdue and necessary, fails to address the fundamental institutional dynamics that have enabled judicial interference and security service overreach. The absence of a comprehensive reform framework suggests a troubling continuity with past practices rather than the promised transformation of the justice sector.

The Las Anod Reality

The crisis in Las Anod, located on Somaliland’s eastern frontier, transcends local grievances; it is a calculated proxy battle orchestrated by Somalia to destabilize Somaliland and undermine its sovereignty. This conflict emerges against the backdrop of Somaliland’s growing geopolitical significance, highlighted by its inclusion in the U.S. Defense Authorization Act and multiple visits by U.S. military personnel to Berbera, cementing the port’s strategic importance in the Horn of Africa.

Somalia’s strategy is neither coincidental nor reactionary—it is a deliberate effort to export the instability of its southern regions into Somaliland’s territory. By providing material and diplomatic support to militia groups in Las Anod, Somalia seeks to delegitimize Somaliland’s long-standing narrative of stability and democratic governance. Internationally, Mogadishu amplifies its efforts by advancing a “civil war” narrative, reframing the crisis as internal unrest rather than external aggression. This dual approach aims to erode Somaliland’s claims to sovereignty while derailing its aspirations for international recognition.

Las Anod now serves as a litmus test for Somaliland’s ability to maintain both its territorial integrity and its global reputation for governance. For President-elect Cirro, the stakes are high: resolving the crisis requires more than neutralizing external threats; it demands consolidating internal unity and showcasing Somaliland’s institutional resilience.

The challenge is compounded by the fragmentation of SSC militias and the involvement of extremist elements, which create a volatile landscape resistant to traditional diplomatic solutions. Somalia’s orchestration of an intractable conflict—where fractured opposition leadership precludes meaningful negotiations and sustained violence tarnishes Somaliland’s reputation for stability—has made Las Anod a focal point of regional geopolitics.

For Cirro, the crisis is not merely a test of diplomatic skill but a fundamental threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty. His administration must navigate a delicate balance: confronting Somalia’s destabilization efforts while protecting civilian lives and reinforcing Somaliland’s territorial claims. This moment demands a strategic approach that transcends appeasement and addresses the root causes of the crisis, recognizing that those actively seeking Somaliland’s dissolution cannot be placated. The response must align with Somaliland’s broader objectives of sovereignty and stability, proving that the nation can withstand external aggression without compromising its democratic principles or governance standards.

International Recognition and Strategic Alignments

The international reaction to President-elect Cirro’s victory highlights the complex and nuanced diplomatic landscape his administration must navigate. Western democracies have responded positively, with the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Bureau, Senator Jim Risch, and Congressman Chris Smith applauding Somaliland’s successful democratic election and peaceful transition of power. These endorsements reinforce Somaliland’s narrative as an exceptional democracy in a region rife with instability. The alignment of both houses of the U.S. Congress and the presidency under Republican leadership adds momentum to Somaliland’s growing appeal in Washington, potentially opening new avenues for deeper engagement and support.

Ethiopia’s congratulatory message to both Somaliland and President-elect Cirro carries particular diplomatic significance. Despite Cirro’s campaign rhetoric questioning the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on January 1, 2024, between outgoing President Bihi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s outreach signals a commitment to continuity in bilateral relations. The swift meeting between Cirro and Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Somaliland underscores the importance Ethiopia places on maintaining strategic ties, suggesting that the MoU may evolve rather than be discarded. This reflects Ethiopia’s long-term interest in the Berbera Port and its recognition of Somaliland as a critical partner in securing regional stability and economic growth.

However, the reactions from Somaliland’s adversaries provide a stark contrast. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s conspicuous enthusiasm for Cirro’s victory reflects a calculated attempt to exploit perceived political transitions in Somaliland to Somalia’s advantage. This strategy aligns with Mogadishu’s broader efforts to destabilize Somaliland’s sovereignty narrative, using shifts in leadership as an opportunity to create discord.

Djibouti’s measured response further underscores its alignment with Somalia’s position, driven by economic self-interest. As Somaliland’s Berbera Port increasingly challenges Djibouti’s regional trade monopoly, Djibouti’s diplomatic stance appears carefully calibrated to protect its dominance. While congratulatory on the surface, Djibouti’s actions suggest an underlying wariness of Somaliland’s growing regional influence and Ethiopia’s deepening interest in Berbera.

For Cirro, these responses underscore the challenges of navigating a diplomatic landscape where allies and adversaries alike seek to influence Somaliland’s trajectory. Successfully managing these dynamics will require Cirro to balance the expectations of international partners with the need to assert Somaliland’s sovereignty and economic priorities.

The Ethiopian Question and Regional Hostility

The Ethiopian Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has triggered an unprecedented level of regional coordination against Somaliland’s interests. Djibouti’s reaction, notably hostile, has extended far beyond diplomatic disapproval to active measures aimed at isolating and destabilizing Somaliland. Having long profited from its monopoly over Ethiopia’s maritime trade through the Port of Djibouti, the MoU represents a direct challenge to Djibouti’s economic primacy. In response, Djibouti has reportedly engaged in punitive actions, including obstructing Somaliland’s regional initiatives. Its public reception of SSC leadership—a group actively opposing Somaliland’s territorial integrity—marks a provocative escalation, signaling Djibouti’s willingness to support destabilizing forces.

Somalia’s immediate diplomatic counteroffensive further underscores the regional stakes. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s swift outreach to regional capitals in the aftermath of the MoU reflects Somalia’s existential fear that a stable and democratic Somaliland would decisively dismantle the fiction of a unified Somalia. Mogadishu’s efforts to frame Somaliland’s agreements as destabilizing have been complemented by coordinated narratives in international forums, portraying Somaliland’s sovereignty efforts as a regional threat rather than an assertion of self-determination​.

The alignment of Djibouti and Somalia in opposing the MoU illustrates the depth of regional resistance to Somaliland’s emergence as an independent and economically competitive state. For Djibouti, the prospect of Berbera Port competing for Ethiopian trade disrupts its lucrative monopoly, while for Somalia, Somaliland’s success as a sovereign entity presents a direct threat to its territorial claims. The Ethiopian MoU thus serves not only as a framework for Somaliland’s strategic partnerships but also as a litmus test for the region’s tolerance of its sovereignty ambitions.

For President-elect Cirro, the challenge will lie in leveraging Ethiopia’s continued interest in Berbera while countering the coordinated hostility from Somalia and Djibouti. This requires navigating complex regional dynamics to preserve Somaliland’s economic and political trajectory while safeguarding its sovereignty against external threats.

Foreign Policy Contradictions

The Cirro administration’s foreign policy reveals a web of paradoxes. During the campaign, Cirro signaled a preference for strengthening ties with China over Taiwan—a stance now complicated by Beijing’s steadfast support for Somalia’s territorial claims. In contrast, Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan, fostered during Bihi’s administration, has yielded tangible benefits, including healthcare advancements and military training scholarships. More importantly, it has positioned Somaliland alongside democratic nations at a time when authoritarianism is surging across the Horn of Africa.

This diplomatic crossroads becomes even more consequential amid the looming possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Trump’s previous term was marked by a combative approach toward China and unwavering support for Taiwan—a policy stance likely to sharpen in a second term. Should Cirro pivot too far toward China, his administration risks alienating key Western allies at a critical moment for Somaliland’s recognition aspirations.

Despite these challenges, Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in Washington has quietly cultivated enduring relationships that transcend partisan shifts in U.S. politics. This rare instance of consistent and effective representation highlights the value of institutional continuity—a contrast to the perils of abrupt policy reversals.

Economic Entrenchment and Reform Challenges

Key sectors of Somaliland’s economy, from the strategic Berbera Port to the crucial livestock export sector, remain dominated by entrenched interests that backed Cirro’s rise to power. His ability to reform these sectors while maintaining political stability will be severely tested by the expectations of long-term supporters who view their backing as an investment requiring returns.

The True Price of Reform

The mandate for change that swept Cirro to power now faces its greatest test not in opposition to his critics, but in his willingness to disappoint his closest allies. The fundamental challenge of his presidency lies not in managing external opposition – which is inevitable – but in asserting the primacy of his constitutional mandate over the expectations of even his most influential supporters. His closest allies, despite their political gravitas and contributions to his decade-long journey to the presidency, must understand a crucial truth: the voters elected Cirro alone to the presidency, not a coalition of interests or powerbrokers.

The historical weight of this moment demands more than symbolic changes or carefully negotiated compromises. True reform requires the courage to disappoint those who consider themselves architects of his victory. While his diplomatic skills may help soften the impact of necessary changes, they cannot substitute for the fundamental assertion of presidential authority in service of the public good.

The voters who delivered Cirro’s landslide victory have demonstrated both their desire for change and their power to enforce it. This same electorate, having shown its willingness to decisively reject the status quo, stands ready to render judgment on his presidency. The choice facing Cirro is stark: risk disappointing powerful allies in pursuit of genuine reform, or risk becoming a one-term president who sacrificed his mandate for political accommodation.

Looking Forward: Beyond Appeasement to Leadership

The true test of Cirro’s leadership will be his ability to transform from opposition leader to national statesman. This requires not just managing policy transitions but having the courage to disappoint some supporters in service of the national good. His diplomatic skills must now serve a higher purpose: advancing Somaliland’s strategic interests in a region fundamentally opposed to its success.

Somaliland’s democratic miracle, its strategic position, and its people’s unwavering determination to secure their sovereignty provide the foundation for this transition. The path forward cannot lie in appeasing those who fundamentally oppose Somaliland’s existence as a sovereign state, but in building strategic partnerships with those who recognize its value as a stable, democratic partner in an increasingly volatile region.

The road ahead demands more than just administrative skill or diplomatic finesse. It requires strategic clarity about friends and adversaries, the courage to pursue national interests despite regional opposition, and the vision to help Somaliland’s people understand that true independence requires difficult choices. This is the profound challenge facing Cirro’s presidency – not just managing change or reducing tensions, but leading Somaliland toward its destiny as a sovereign, democratic state in a hostile region.


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Innovative Partnership: The Contribution of Taiwan and Somaliland in Formulating a New Development Discourse in the Horn of Africa

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Introduction

The formal establishment of Somaliland-Taiwan relationship in 2020 is a watershed moment that demonstrates the countries’ innovative and pragmatic approaches to international cooperation. Both Somaliland and Taiwan have a special position as nations seeking more respect on the international scene, which has inevitably brought them together. This alignment is about a deeper link based on mutual respect for democratic government, the rule of law, and the will of their people rather than only about common challenges for international legitimacy. Despite their exclusion from major world forums, Somaliland and Taiwan have beaten the odds to create strong political systems. Their bilateral partnership is typical of a forward-looking foreign policy aimed at creating alliances based on shared ideals and complimentary strengths. Recognising each other’s sovereignty in reality, if not formally, Somaliland and Taiwan have opened new avenues for cooperation especially in areas vital to the growth of both nations including education, energy, critical minerals, agriculture, promotion of democracy, trade, technology, and healthcare. Along with bringing them closer, this diplomatic link has given both sides more credibility and exposure on the world scene.

The founding of the Taiwan Medical Centre in Somaliland, which marks a major advance in healthcare collaboration between the two governments, is among the most noteworthy results of this alliance. This project will help Somaliland close a significant gap in its healthcare system, which has long suffered from poor finances, inadequate contemporary facilities, and restricted access to specialist treatment. Offering Somaliland residents access to hitherto unattainable services, the Taiwan Medical Centre will bring modern medical equipment and techniques. This progress not only raises Somaliland’s general capacity to control public health crises, enhance mother and child health outcomes, and treat chronic and infectious diseases but also raises the quality of healthcare in the nation. For Taiwan, the building of this medical centre represents a strategic political investment in East Africa rather than only the urgent relief offering. Taiwan strengthens its reputation as a conscientious global actor by proving that it can help its foreign partners to be healthy and well-off. This project highlights Taiwan’s dedication to significant development that benefits both sides of the alliance by strengthening its diplomatic power and increasing its influence in an area where it has rather few allies. By means of this cooperation, Taiwan not only aids the healthcare system of Somaliland but also achieves its more general foreign policy goals, hence reinforcing the reciprocal advantages of this special diplomatic partnership.

The Twofold Impact of the Taiwan Medical Centre

Dealing with the chronic health issues that have dogged Somaliland for decades, the Taiwan Medical Centre is likely to be a transforming agent. The nation has had ongoing problems including high rates of mother and infant mortality, poor access to basic healthcare services, and the predominance of avoidable diseases brought on by inadequate medical facilities and a dearth of qualified healthcare workers. The Taiwan Medical Centre will help Somaliland to experience significant changes in the provision of healthcare. Apart from giving instant access to cutting-edge medical technologies and treatments, the Centre will help local healthcare professionals grow and train, so building a sustainable paradigm for the provision of health services. Moreover, by combining contemporary healthcare methods with public health education, the Centre will enable Somaliland’s people to participate actively in their own health management, therefore improving the health results and increasing public confidence in the healthcare system. This project can greatly ease the load on already-existing healthcare institutions, raise the standard of treatment, and offer the required infrastructure to more successfully fight endemic health problems.

Concurrent with this growth of the Taiwan Medical Centre offers Taiwan a strategic chance to increase its diplomatic and developmental footprint in East Africa. Investing in Somaliland’s healthcare industry helps Taiwan not only be a friend but also strengthen its reputation as a consistent partner dedicated to humanitarian relief and sustainable development. This initiative complements Taiwan’s more general foreign policy objectives of increasing its global profile and promoting goodwill by means of medical diplomacy. Taiwan’s dedication to enhance health outcomes in Somaliland distinguishes it as a caring and responsible actor in a geopolitical environment where many nations are fighting for dominance in Africa. With the help of the Taiwan Medical Centre, Somaliland’s healthcare system starts to grow and Taiwan stands to get both real diplomatic advantages and intangible benefits in the form of more soft power. This mutually beneficial connection shows how larger collaboration in sectors including trade, education, and technology may be based on healthcare projects, therefore strengthening Taiwan’s strategic interests and enhancing the quality of life of Somalilanders.

The building of a medical centre as advanced as Taiwan marks a turning point for Somaliland’s healthcare scene, thereby drastically changing it from a mostly primitive system to a more modern and effective model. Modern diagnostics techniques and treatment approaches help to greatly reduce the load of infectious diseases, which have long afflicuted the population. Using cutting-edge diagnostic tools, for example, will help to early identify diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, therefore enabling quick intervention and treatment. Taiwan’s knowledge of family planning, mother care, neonatal medicine, and maternal health could help to drastically lower mortality rates and maybe save thousands of lives annually. Moreover, the Centre is meant to be a research centre where local researchers and medical practitioners may work with Taiwanese specialists to investigate and control diseases unique to the area. This cooperation can result in creative ideas and locally relevant answers to public health issues, therefore improving the capacity of Somaliland’s healthcare system to properly meet its particular demands.

Apart from the immediate medical advantages, one should not undervalue the psychological and social influence of the Taiwan Medical Centre. Its construction will be a potent emblem of optimism and progress for Somalilanders, therefore fostering national pride and raising community morale about their healthcare system. Furthermore, this program is probably going to boost the expansion of ancillary businesses such medical supplies and drugs, therefore generating employment and supporting economic development. The Centre’s founding will have wider social and economic development in Somaliland, therefore transcending the health industry. The general well-being of the people will improve as the healthcare system develops, hence raising output and a better workforce. All things considered, the Taiwan Medical Centre positions Somaliland as a progressive participant in the area and provides the foundation for a more sustainable future, therefore catalysing major improvements in health, social cohesiveness, and economic vigour.

On the other hand, even though Somaliland stands to benefit much from the opening of the Taiwan Medical Centre, Taiwan’s contribution to this alliance is as vital and varied. The idea of mutual benefit is fundamental in modern diplomacy in helping to create lasting world relations; Taiwan’s foreign policy approach best illustrates this idea. Through developmental aid, Taiwan shows its capacity as a responsible global actor dedicated to assist its diplomatic allies and partners. Beyond simple medical treatment, the Taiwan Medical Centre is a strategic project strengthening Taiwan’s profile internationally and thereby confirming its position in East Africa. Taiwan not only meets urgent medical needs in Somaliland but also supports its character as a country that cherishes human welfare and development, especially in areas where health systems are weak by offering modern medical infrastructure and expertise.

Moreover, the opening of the Taiwan Medical Centre will help African nations—especially those in the East African area—to see and maybe replicate Taiwan’s unique growth strategy. Taiwan’s approach emphasises capacity building and sustainable development rather than conventional Western aid models that can include strict conditions or the Chinese debt trap method that might trap nations in unsustainable financial commitments. Emphasising cheap information transfer and skill development, Taiwan’s approach speaks to the cliché “teaching a man to fish” instead of just “giving him a fish.” This strategy gives local people the tools they need to enhance their own livelihoods and healthcare results, therefore empowering them. Such a methodology promotes resilience and self-reliance among the receiving nations by starkly contrasting with the dependency that sometimes defines other foreign aid policies.

The Taiwan Medical Centre will be a live illustration of this development concept in action as it opens operations, drawing interest from surrounding nations looking for other routes for their development. Taiwan can establish credibility in Africa’s development story by proving its dedication to training local healthcare practitioners and building a strong healthcare infrastructure. The success of the Centre could encourage other African countries to implement similar cooperative models, emphasising local capacity development and sustainable alliances instead of depending just on foreign handouts or crushing debts. Therefore, Taiwan’s model not only improves its own worldwide reputation but also supports a more diverse and balanced approach to development aid in the area, so stressing the empowerment of African countries and so fostering long-term stability and prosperity.

Taiwan’s Healthcare Diplomacy

Since its establishment, Taiwan has been acknowledged for having one of the strongest healthcare systems in the world. This is mostly attributable to its effective universal health coverage, state-of-the-art medical technologies, and strong public health infrastructure. This amazing system is distinguished by its accessibility and cost, which offers all people, from all backgrounds thorough treatment. Taiwan is a model for healthcare systems worldwide since the combination of modern medical research and the encouragement of preventative healthcare policies has greatly enhanced health outcomes in the island. Taiwan shows its ability for international leadership in a field essential to human growth by sharing its healthcare knowledge to nations like Somaliland. A shining example of healthcare diplomacy, the Taiwan Medical Centre in Somaliland uses its medical expertise to build closer relationships with its partners by leveraging Initiatives such as this not only highlight Taiwan’s will to improve world health but also reveal its strategic use of healthcare as a tool for establishing and strengthening diplomatic ties with countries that might lack enough health facilities and resources.

Along with strengthening diplomatic relations with Somaliland, the Taiwan Medical Centre will further improve Taiwan’s standing as a top humanitarian aid provider and advocate of African sustainable development. This project is a concrete manifestation of Taiwan’s soft power, proving its capacity to significantly support world public health issues and concurrently build goodwill among its allies. By means of this initiative, Taiwan is not only exporting medical treatments but also a transforming alliance emphasising training of local healthcare workers, raising health literacy, and implementing sustainable healthcare practices. This approach not only attends to current health issues but also encourages a long-term dedication to raise Somaliland’s health standards. Thus, the Centre will act as a catalyst for more general social and economic growth, so creating good knock-on effects all around the society and defining Taiwan as a cherished friend in the area.

Moreover, by presenting itself as a conscientious global actor with an eye on healthcare development, Taiwan can build closer ties with other countries including African ones. The Taiwan Medical Centre shows how health projects may provide a forum for more general discussions on governance, economic development, and social stability, therefore transcending conventional diplomatic activities and highlighting the possibility for cooperation. This strategy not only improves Taiwan’s international profile but also lets it actively contribute to solve urgent worldwide issues including public health crises, pandemics, and the necessity of fair access to healthcare. As Taiwan keeps funding healthcare diplomacy, it may use its achievements to encourage like-minded cooperation in other fields, so establishing itself as a model of responsible and successful global participation. In the end, the Taiwan Medical Centre in Somaliland makes a strategic investment in public health as well as diplomatic relations, therefore creating a mutually advantageous cooperation that advances regional links and development.

Taiwan’s Contribution to Foreign Aid and Development Models

Foreign aid is sometimes used strategically in the field of international relations to build alliances and show a country’s commitment to world progress. One striking example of this dynamic is Taiwan’s involvement in the healthcare system of Somaliland. Through the transmission of medical knowledge and the building of necessary healthcare infrastructure, Taiwan is not only addressing urgent health concerns but also strengthening its position as a responsible and proactive participant to world well-being by providing necessary aid. Emphasising the need of creating local capacities and encouraging self-sufficiency rather than only providing financial aid, the Taiwan Medical Centre is evidence of Taiwan’s dedication to sustainable development. This all-encompassing strategy seeks to build a healthcare system capable of running autonomously and efficiently, therefore improving the long-term resilience of Somaliland’s health services.

Taiwan’s development model stands out even more for its emphasis on creating real alliances that give sustained development top priority over transient benefits. Unlike other development partners who might give immediate cash rewards or geopolitical influence first priority, Taiwan’s programs stress the growth of local knowledge and infrastructure. The Taiwan Medical Centre fosters a culture of self-reliance and resilience inside the healthcare system by arming Somaliland with the required resources, training, and medical technologies. This capacity-building program not only enables Somalilanders to take control of their health results but also produces long-lasting effects beyond the terms of any aid agreement. By doing this, Taiwan is not only improving its reputation abroad as a kind friend but also establishing itself as an example for other countries trying to participate in meaningful and successful development aid. Based on common values of mutual respect and a dedication to raise the quality of life for all people engaged, this all-encompassing framework helps to strengthen ties between Taiwan and Somaliland.

Benefits for Taiwan’s Diplomatic Image in East Africa

Given its closeness to important international trade routes, Taiwan’s strategic position in East Africa—a area progressively acknowledged for its geopolitical relevance—is poised to be enhanced in great part by the Taiwan Medical Centre. Establishing a strong diplomatic presence in Somaliland helps Taiwan not only strengthens its ties there but also helps it to project itself as a major actor in East African growth. Focused on healthcare projects addressing immediate public health needs and promoting long-term stability, the Taiwan Medical Centre offers a proactive approach to international relations in a scene sometimes dominated by the more dominating nations’ more major economic aspirations. Leading the charge in healthcare development will help Taiwan to clearly demonstrate its dedication to raising regional health standards, hence strengthening its strategic impact among surrounding nations and global players both.

Moreover, Taiwan’s participation through the Medical Centre presents a special chance to balance China’s growing impact in Africa. Taiwan’s focus on healthcare stands out as an alternative form of development aid—one that gives human wellbeing top priority alongside economic growth—as China increases its engagement in the continent through massive infrastructure projects and business alliances. The clear indication that Taiwan’s strategy to participation in Africa is based on humanitarian concern and public health improvement rather than simple commercial necessity is the Taiwan Medical Centre. This program enables Taiwan to carve out a unique niche in healthcare diplomacy, therefore proving its ability to significantly improve the welfare of nearby people. By stressing this dedication, Taiwan not only improves its global reputation but also increases its influence in East Africa, so supporting the idea that sustainable development can be attained by health-oriented alliances stressing the well-being of people over essentially commercial transactions.

Strengthening Somaliland-Taiwan Relations

For Somaliland, the Taiwan Medical Centre marks a turning point since it embodies a strategic cooperation transcending simple medical treatment. The building of this institution marks a significant investment in Somaliland’s healthcare system, therefore helping the nation to solve urgent health issues like high rates of mother and newborn death as well as endemic diseases such malaria and tuberculosis. The Centre will provide local healthcare workers necessary training and capacity-building in addition to modern medical treatments and technologies. This all-encompassing strategy seeks to build a self-sustaining healthcare system, therefore enabling better health results for the Somaliland people. Somaliland shows its dedication to the welfare of its people by giving healthcare first priority and presents itself as a forward-looking country ready to welcome sensible and sustainable answers to its health problems.

Reiterating Taiwan’s leadership in healthcare diplomacy, the Medical Centre is a potent expression of its dedication to world health and development assistance. This project shows Taiwan’s ability to interact meaningfully with its partners, therefore proving its capacity to provide real advantages outside of its boundaries. Taiwan may strengthen its reputation abroad as a responsible player dedicated to bettering public health in underdeveloped areas by building a relationship based on mutual respect and shared democratic values. Moreover, the cooperation with Somaliland highlights Taiwan’s special development strategy, which gives sustainable development, capacity building, and community empowerment top priority over temporary financial advantage. Somaliland’s engagement with Taiwan marks a new era of cooperation that fits both sides’ goals for self-reliance, creativity, and human development as it declares its sovereignty and independence in the Horn of Africa. Together, they are not only enhancing life inside their boundaries but also creating a model for worldwide alliances based on common values and goals, so helping to ensure regional security and growth in East Africa.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Mohamed Hagi is a diplomat, politician and academic currently serving as the Chief Representative of the Republic of Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

Taiwan’s Landmark $22 Million Investment Promises to Transform Hargeisa Group Hospital

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In a landmark development that marks the most significant investment in Somaliland’s healthcare infrastructure since the colonial era, Taiwan has committed $22 million to construct a state-of-the-art medical center at Hargeisa Group Hospital (HGH). This project, announced yesterday, represents the largest single upgrade to the facility since its construction by the British administration in 1951. The investment not only underscores growing ties between Taiwan and Somaliland but also promises to address critical healthcare challenges that have long plagued Somaliland.

Hargeisa Group Hospital, originally built to serve a population of no more than 50,000, has struggled to keep pace with Hargeisa’s explosive growth. Today, the city’s population is estimated at one million, placing immense strain on the aging hospital’s resources. This growth has been compounded by chronic underfunding, rampant corruption and a severe shortage of qualified medical personnel.

The planned Taiwan Medical Center, a two-storey structure, promises to dramatically expand the Hospital’s capabilities. According to the hospital’s director Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Osman, the bulk of the funding is allocated for advanced medical equipment, signaling a quantum leap in the facility’s technological capacity.

“Currently, we have only one ICU unit,” the director stated in interview to MMTV. “The new facility will house seven ICU units, multiplying our capacity to handle critical cases sevenfold.” This expansion includes ten emergency rooms and a modern pharmacy, bringing HGH’s total bed capacity to nearly 600.

Taiwan’s Ambassador to Somaliland, Allen Lou, framed the investment as part of his country’s commitment to long-term, sustainable development in the region. “Taiwan shares its best, and Taiwan shares what it is good at,” he stated, referencing Taiwan’s globally recognized excellence in healthcare. “With every step forward that Taiwan takes, the world takes a step forward with us. We bravely set the course for the new world, so the world may embrace the new Taiwan.”

Dr. Mohamed Haji, Somaliland’s representative in Taiwan, emphasized the project’s significance. “For the people of Somaliland, the Taiwan Medical Centre is more than just a hospital—it’s a ray of hope,” he said. “The centre will be vital to expanding access to healthcare and tackling urgent medical issues.”

Somaliland Representative to Taiwan, Dr. Mohamed Hagi

The investment comes at a critical time for Somaliland’s healthcare system, which has long struggled with regulatory challenges. The National Health Professions Commission has faced difficulties in enforcing licensing standards, with only a small percentage of practitioners holding valid licenses. This regulatory gap has contributed to a trust deficit in the healthcare system, pushing many Somalilanders to seek medical treatment abroad at great expense.

However, HGH’s past difficulties with resource management raise questions about the long-term sustainability of this new investment. These systemic issues pose significant challenges to the successful implementation and operation of the new Taiwan Medical Center.

The challenges at HGH are further complicated by frequent changes in leadership. Since President Muse Bihi Abdi took office, the hospital has seen at least three different directors, part of a broader government effort to improve public service delivery and address governance issues. These changes, often occurring during larger cabinet reshuffles, reflect the administration’s attempts to reform the healthcare sector. However, such frequent turnover in key management positions has also raised concerns about continuity and long-term planning at the hospital.

“Every year, millions of dollars drain from our economy as patients travel overseas for medical care,” noted a health ministry official. “This new facility could help retain some of that spending within Somaliland, benefiting both patients and our economy. However, we must also address underlying issues to ensure the center’s long-term success.”

The exodus of patients seeking treatment abroad has not only strained individual finances but has also highlighted the dire need for improved local healthcare services. Many Somalilanders, faced with a lack of specialized care and advanced medical technology at home, have been forced to travel to India and Turkey for treatments ranging from complex surgeries to advanced diagnostic procedures.

Taiwan’s involvement extends beyond this new construction. They have already collaborated with HGH to introduce a Health Information Management System, digitizing patient records to improve efficiency and reduce errors. This aligns with the broader goal of modernizing Somaliland’s healthcare infrastructure and bringing it into the digital age.

Questions remain about the operational aspects of the new center. It’s unclear whether Taiwan will bring in medical professionals to help boost the sector and provide skills transfer to local practitioners, or if the facility will be immediately handed over to the Ministry of Health. These logistics will be crucial in determining the long-term impact of the investment.

As Taiwan and Somaliland deepen their bilateral ties, the healthcare sector stands to benefit from this growing partnership. However, experts caution that while substantial, this investment is just one step in Somaliland’s journey towards comprehensive healthcare reform.

As Ambassador LOU aptly quoted an African proverb, “If you want to walk fast, walk alone. But if you want to walk far, walk together.” This sentiment captures the essence of the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership, rooted in mutual respect, shared values, and a vision for sustainable development.

Dr. Haji highlighted the broader implications: “The Taiwan Medical Centre serves as an excellent example of Taiwan’s cooperative model in Africa. Taiwan’s strategy, based on sincere cooperation and progress, is a model for the continent.”

The project also comes at a time of increasing private sector involvement in Somaliland’s healthcare. While private clinics and hospitals have helped fill some gaps in service provision, concerns persist about the quality and affordability of care in these facilities. The enhanced public healthcare infrastructure represented by the new Taiwan Medical Center could help balance this landscape, providing high-quality care accessible to a broader segment of the population.

As construction begins, both governments express optimism about the center’s potential impact. While significant challenges remain, including the need to improve overall healthcare governance and address the shortage of qualified medical professionals, this investment marks a crucial milestone in Somaliland’s efforts to build a more robust healthcare system.

The success of this project could serve as a catalyst for further improvements in Somaliland’s healthcare sector. However, its true impact will depend on how effectively it can be integrated into the broader healthcare system and whether it can help address the underlying issues that have long hampered healthcare delivery in the country.

The Last Will and Testament of a Dictator: Djibouti’s Precarious Transition from Guelleh and Its Global Reverberations

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As Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s once-iron grip on Djibouti loosens, the Horn of Africa teeters on the brink of upheaval. Whispers of the president’s failing health have begun to circulate through diplomatic channels, lending an air of urgency to discussions about the country’s future. While such rumors are often exaggerated in the world of geopolitics, they serve as a stark reminder of an immutable truth: Guelleh, like all mortals, will one day depart the stage. This inescapable reality casts a long shadow over Djibouti’s political landscape, forcing regional and global powers to confront the implications of a post-Guelleh era.

The potential power vacuum left by Guelleh’s eventual exit threatens to unleash a perfect storm of domestic instability and international power plays that could reshape the geopolitical landscape far beyond Djibouti’s borders. Guelleh’s regime, while repressive, has maintained a delicate balance between ethnic factions, foreign interests, and economic pressures. However, Guelleh’s failure to craft a coherent succession plan—a political testament—has left Djibouti exposed to chaos. This oversight leaves the nation vulnerable to chaos and opportunism in the wake of his departure, whether through natural causes or political upheaval.

In the aftermath of Guelleh, both the U.S. and China will likely vie to install their favored proxies at the helm of the government. Yet this power struggle will only serve to exacerbate Djibouti’s already volatile domestic situation. As these giants compete for influence, the country risks descending into political fragmentation, economic stagnation, and potentially, civil unrest. The U.S., having focused solely on maintaining military dominance without investing in local governance or economic resilience, could find itself marginalized in Djibouti’s next chapter. China, with its calculated approach, may exploit this vacuum, tightening its grip on the region.

The fragility of Djibouti’s political system cannot be overstated. Guelleh’s iron-fisted rule has systematically eroded the country’s institutions, leaving them ill-equipped to manage a transfer of power. The judiciary is a tool of the regime. The electoral commission is a mere rubber stamp. Even the military, traditionally a stabilizing force in many African nations, is a wild card. Guelleh has cultivated personal loyalty among its leadership, raising the specter of factional infighting or even a coup in his absence.

Lurking beneath the surface are simmering ethnic tensions. The majority Issa and minority Afar communities have a history of conflict, kept in check by Guelleh’s calculated balance of power. His exit could reignite these divisions, plunging the country into unrest. The stakes extend far beyond Djibouti’s borders, threatening regional stability and global trade routes.

Djibouti’s escalating debt to China, now over 70% of its GDP, has shackled the nation to Beijing’s economic will, placing it on the brink of economic collapse. Despite IMF warnings, Guelleh’s borrowing spree continues, playing into China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ through projects like the Doraleh Port. This strategic asset could fall under Beijing’s control, granting China unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s most crucial maritime chokepoints. The ability to monitor or potentially interfere with maritime traffic at the mouth of the Red Sea would be a strategic coup for China, shifting power dynamics not just in the Horn of Africa, but across the Middle East and beyond.

Meanwhile, the U.S. now stands on the verge of strategic obsolescence, its influence fading in the shadow of China’s rise. Years of myopic focus on counterterrorism in Somalia have left Washington unprepared for the complexities of a post-Guelleh Djibouti. The State Department’s Africa Affairs division and AFRICOM’s lack of strategic foresight have resulted in a policy vacuum. While the U.S. has been fixated on maintaining its military foothold at Camp Lemonnier, China has been playing a long game of economic and political influence.

France, long Djibouti’s primary ally and protector, finds itself treading a delicate line between maintaining its foothold and resisting China’s expanding reach. Recent developments underscore the precariousness of America’s position. Djibouti’s increasingly erratic foreign policy moves, particularly its tacit support for Houthi forces, have sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles. This apparent realignment threatens to transform Djibouti from a stabilizing force in the region to a potential enabler of maritime insecurity. Rumors of Guelleh’s government imposing restrictions on AFRICOM’s operational capabilities suggest a deliberate effort to constrain the U.S. military’s ability to project power.

Adding to this complex tableau is the rise of the Republic of Somaliland, Djibouti’s neighbor to the south. Somaliland’s ascent threatens to redraw the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical map. With Ethiopia poised to reroute trade to Berbera, Djibouti’s lifeblood—its control over regional commerce—could be drained. The UAE’s investment in Berbera is as much about countering Turkish influence in Somalia as it is about economic opportunity. As Somaliland gains clout, pressure for international recognition may grow, potentially redrawing the political map of the Horn of Africa.

As Djibouti approaches the inevitable end of Guelleh’s rule, the stakes could not be higher. What happens next will ripple across the region, shaping the balance of power not only in the Horn of Africa but in the global corridors of trade and influence. The battle for Djibouti’s future will be fought on multiple fronts – political, economic, and strategic. The outcome of this struggle will have profound implications not just for the Horn of Africa, but for global trade and power dynamics. As Guelleh’s reign draws to a close, the world must brace for turbulence in this small but pivotal nation. The question is not whether change will come to Djibouti, but what form it will take and who will shape it. The answer may well determine the future of East Africa and beyond.

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Somaliland Supreme Court Vacates Case Against MP Abib, Upholds Parliamentary Immunity

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KEY POINTS:

  • Somaliland Supreme Court vacated the case against MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf on constitutional grounds.
  • The court ruled that MP Abib’s arrest and detention violated parliamentary immunity protections.
  • The decision focused on procedural violations, not on the merits of accusations against MP Abib.
  • The case has significant implications for the separation of powers in Somaliland’s developing democracy.

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Somaliland has ruled on a case involving Member of Parliament Mohamed Abib Yusuf, bringing to the forefront critical questions about the extent of parliamentary immunity and the separation of powers. The verdict, delivered on September 30, 2024, addresses the constitutional boundaries between legislative privilege and executive authority, marking a significant moment in Somaliland’s ongoing democratic development.

The case, numbered MSD/DDL/03/2024, originated when the House of Representatives challenged the executive branch’s decision to arrest MP Abib on September 2, 2024, upon his return from Dubai. The House argued that this action violated the constitutional protections of parliamentary immunity, setting the stage for a legal battle that would test the balance of power between government branches.

At the heart of the dispute were Articles 49 and 79 of the Somaliland Constitution, which outline legal procedures for MPs and specify conditions for suspending parliamentary immunity. The case’s complexity deepened with the filing of a habeas corpus petition under Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code, challenging the legality of MP Abib’s detention.

Somaliland Chief Justice Adam Haji Ali Ahmed

Chief Justice Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, leading a full bench of nine justices, presided over this constitutional showdown. The court’s ruling found that the procedures for arresting and detaining MP Abib failed to meet constitutional requirements, declaring the detention unconstitutional due to improper procedures and disregard for parliamentary immunity.

Notably, the court’s decision sidestepped the question of MP Abib’s guilt or innocence, focusing instead on the procedural and constitutional violations in his arrest and detention. This approach underscored the court’s role in upholding constitutional processes rather than adjudicating the merits of specific allegations against a legislator.

The executive branch, represented by the Deputy Minister of Interior, had argued that the serious nature of the allegations against MP Abib justified suspending his immunity. They claimed that Abib had engaged in activities detrimental to Somaliland’s stability, including meetings with individuals allegedly intent on destabilizing the region. This stance highlighted the tension between national security concerns and constitutional protections for elected officials.

The Supreme Court’s focus on procedural violations rather than the substance of the accusations opens up intriguing legal questions. It potentially leaves room for future legal action, raising questions about double jeopardy in Somaliland’s legal system. Could prosecutors, adhering to proper procedures, bring a new case based on the original allegations? Or does this ruling, despite its procedural nature, preclude further prosecution on these charges? The answers could significantly impact the balance between constitutional protections and prosecutorial powers in Somaliland.

This case unfolds against a backdrop of broader concerns about Somaliland’s judicial system, particularly under the current administration. Critics have pointed to a pattern of what they describe as extrajudicial arrests, where serious charges are often dropped without explanation days later. The MP Abib case, while distinct, has reignited these discussions about the role of the judiciary in safeguarding constitutional rights.

The political context adds another layer of complexity, with the case occurring just months before Somaliland’s crucial November 2024 presidential and political party elections. The House of Representatives’ decision to bring this case to the Constitutional Court underscores the legislature’s assertive role in the checks and balances system.

However, the parliament’s actions have not been without critics. Some government officials and political commentators have accused the legislature of protecting its members at the expense of national security considerations. This debate highlights the ongoing challenge of balancing institutional prerogatives with broader national interests.

As Somaliland navigates these complex issues, the MP Abib case serves as an important indicator of the system’s capacity for self-correction and adherence to constitutional principles. While broader concerns about judicial independence persist, this ruling demonstrates the potential for the judiciary to act as an arbiter between the legislative and executive branches.

In the wake of the ruling, both the government and MP Abib have remained reticent. The Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s office have yet to comment on the decision or Abib’s release. Abib himself, upon regaining his freedom, briefly addressed the media but refrained from discussing his detention, promising a more comprehensive statement at a later date.

As Somaliland continues to develop its democratic institutions, this ruling affirms the nation’s commitment to constitutional governance. It underscores the delicate balance between national security concerns and the rule of law, a balance crucial for Somaliland’s stability and democratic growth. The coming months will likely reveal the full impact of this case on the nation’s legal and political landscape, potentially reshaping the dynamics between the three branches of government in this evolving democracy.

Taiwan Commits $2 Million to Support Somaliland’s 2024 Presidential and Party Elections

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The Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has taken a significant step in supporting Somaliland’s democratic journey by committing $2 million for the upcoming 2024 Presidential and Party elections. This funding, announced by Ambassador Allen Lou, aims to reinforce Somaliland’s electoral process, advancing transparency, accountability, and fairness. The Ministry of Finance will transfer the funds to Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC).

This commitment builds on Taiwan’s previous contribution to Somaliland’s electoral infrastructure in 2021, when it provided funds for an Iris Biometric Voter Verification System (IBVVS) during the parliamentary and local government elections. While technical issues prevented its full deployment at the time, Somaliland’s political parties have now agreed to use the system in six cities for the upcoming elections. Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance will transfer the funds to Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) to facilitate this process.

“Taiwan is proud to collaborate with the Somaliland government, especially NEC, to advance transparency, accountability, fairness, and trust in the 2024 Presidential and Party elections,” said the Taiwanese Representative in Somaliland Ambassador Lou.

The IBVVS, designed to enhance voter verification and reduce fraud, combines traditional voter cards with advanced iris scan technology. Somaliland’s National Election Commission states that the system ensures no voter is registered more than once. However, the introduction of this technology has sparked debate within Somaliland. While President Muse Bihi Abdi’s Kulmiye party strongly supports the system as a safeguard against election fraud, opposition groups such as the Waddani party have raised concerns about potential delays and voter disenfranchisement. Logistical challenges in deploying the technology in remote regions have also been highlighted as potential issues.

The Taiwan-Somaliland partnership, established in 2020, has faced opposition from both China and Somalia. Beijing, adhering to its “One China” policy, views Taiwan’s international outreach, particularly in Africa, as a challenge to its sovereignty claims. Similarly, the Somali government, which does not recognize Somaliland’s independence, has criticized the partnership. Despite these pressures, both Taiwan and Somaliland have maintained a strong relationship built on shared democratic values and mutual interests.

In addition to financial and sectoral cooperation, Taiwan has offered democratic expertise. In January 2024, Taiwan invited NEC officials to observe its own Presidential and Parliamentary elections, giving Somaliland’s election authorities an opportunity to learn from Taiwan’s advanced electoral systems. A high-level Somaliland delegation, including the Vice President of the Guurti and members of the House of Representatives, also attended the inauguration ceremony of Taiwan’s 16th President and Vice President in May 2024.

The cooperation between Taiwan and Somaliland extends far beyond electoral support, encompassing critical sectors such as healthcare, education, agriculture, and technology:

  1. Healthcare: Taiwan has provided crucial support to Somaliland’s public health infrastructure, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes the delivery of medical supplies, personal protective equipment (PPE), and testing kits. Taiwan has also sent medical teams to Somaliland, offering expertise in disease prevention and healthcare management.
  2. Agriculture: Taiwan has partnered with Somaliland on projects aimed at improving food security and increasing agricultural productivity. These initiatives include technical training for farmers, introduction of modern farming techniques, and support for water conservation and irrigation systems.
  3. Education: Taiwan offers scholarships to Somaliland students, enabling them to pursue higher education in fields such as engineering, science, and information technology. This program equips young Somalilanders with skills crucial for their country’s development.
  4. Technology: Beyond the electoral biometric system, Taiwan has been involved in strengthening Somaliland’s IT infrastructure. This includes the development of e-governance systems and cybersecurity measures, aimed at modernizing public services and enhancing administrative efficiency.

As Ambassador Lou noted, “Freedom and democracy constitute the fundamental values that connect Taiwan and Somaliland to the international community.” This multifaceted collaboration reflects Taiwan’s deep commitment to Somaliland’s development, demonstrating a shared vision of progress, modernization, and stability.

As Somaliland prepares for its 2024 elections, Taiwan’s contributions, both financial and technical, underscore the growing strength of this unique partnership. Their relationship serves as a model for international cooperation, particularly in regions striving for greater democratic governance and sustainable development.

Prodigal Sons of Betrayal: Why Somaliland is Unable to Close the Revolving Door to Mogadishu

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In a land where loyalty to Somaliland is expected to be unwavering, the spectacle of its leaders pardoning traitors with ease is both shocking and demoralizing. The latest farce—Osman Aw Mohamud Buurmadow’s grand return—starkly reveals the systemic hypocrisy undermining our nation’s sovereignty. Mr. Mohamud, a self-styled king colloquially known as Boqor Buurmadow, was welcomed with pomp befitting a monarch rather than the scorn his treachery demands. This turncoat, having shamelessly sold his birthright for a mess of pottage in Mogadishu, finds himself not only absolved but embraced as a returning hero.

Although President Bihi is said to be highly allergic to folks who go to Mogadishu, his actions tell a different story. The president’s capitulation to tribal pressures while violating the rule of law reflects the broader inconsistencies in Somaliland’s political approach. This debacle reveals the farcical nature of our governance, where leaders claim to fight treason yet rehabilitate the very individuals who have betrayed us.

Is this the Somaliland for which our forebears fought and bled? Did they envision a nation where betrayal is not just forgiven but celebrated?

 The Pardoning of Traitors

This revolving door to Mogadishu extends far beyond Buurmadow. Consider the cases of Somalia’s former Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamed Omar Arte, and former Minister of Finance, Abdirahman Duale Beyle. Both men, after serving a government actively working to undermine Somaliland, were granted unconditional pardons upon their return. In a world where Somalia seeks to obliterate our claim to sovereignty, these pardons send a chilling message: betrayal isn’t just tolerated—it’s our new national industry.

Even more repugnant are those who openly supported forces fighting against Somaliland in Las Anod, ghoulishly reveling in the deaths of our fallen soldiers. That these despicable individuals will likely be next in line for state pardons is not just a failure of governance—it’s an unforgivable betrayal of every drop of blood spilled in the name of our independence.

 The Role of Tribal Politics

This farce is not merely a stain on our political landscape; it is a metastasizing cancer, eating away at the very foundations of our aspiring nation. The rot extends far beyond the gilded corridors of power in Hargeisa. Our populace, afflicted by a deeply entrenched tribal mindset, bears its share of culpability in this national disgrace. This collective malady sees large swathes of the public rallying behind their clan’s standard-bearers, regardless of the reprehensible acts these individuals may have committed. It’s as if we’ve replaced our national conscience with a tribal slot machine, always ready to pay out loyalty to the lowest bidder.

Both the ruling Kulmiye Party and the Waddani Opposition Party view Buurmadow not as a traitor but as a pawn in their quest for power. Their eagerness to court this self-styled “king” is nothing short of a national disgrace, revealing a sickening display of moral bankruptcy where those who betray Somaliland are elevated to positions of influence, while the nation’s genuine patriots are left to watch in horror.

 The Complicity of Businesses

Why has Somaliland consistently failed to rein in businesses that actively undermine it – enterprises that eagerly follow directives from Mogadishu, erasing our very existence from their systems? The answer lies in the same poisoned well from which these endless pardons are drawn. Our leaders, those compromised custodians of our national interest, care more for securing personal loans or acquiring the latest luxury vehicles than safeguarding the nation’s dignity. They have traded their duty for comfort, their integrity for a handful of shillings.

 Inconsistency in Applying Justice

To illustrate a broader point about consistency in justice, consider the case of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf. While we take no position on the merits of his arrest, it serves as a stark contrast to other recent events, laying bare glaring inconsistencies in Somaliland’s approach to national security. A sitting parliamentarian now faces imprisonment on treason allegations, while individuals who have openly aligned with Somaliland’s enemies walk free, even celebrated as heroes upon their return.

This dichotomy – swift action against an MP versus leniency for known collaborators – exposes a troubling selectivity in the application of justice by Somaliland’s political elite. If safeguarding national interests is truly the priority, how can we reconcile such disparate treatment? These apparent double standards suggest a system where political expediency, rather than consistent principles, governs the course of justice. Such practices not only undermine the rule of law but also corrode the very foundations of national integrity that Somaliland’s leaders claim to uphold.

 The Path Forward

Somaliland’s leadership today stands as a monument to moral bankruptcy—too timid to fight for real independence, too compromised to deliver justice, and too myopic to see beyond the next election cycle. But let us not absolve ourselves, the public, of blame. Our unwavering devotion to tribalism has fertilized the soil in which these betrayals flourish. We have become willing accomplices in our own national sabotage.

If Somaliland is to break free from this cycle of treachery, it must not only purge itself of these Janus-faced leaders but also excise the tribal tumor that has metastasized throughout our body politic. We, the citizens, must awaken from our clan-induced stupor and confront an uncomfortable truth: every time we support a traitor for the sake of tribal loyalty, we drive another nail into the coffin of our national aspirations.

The stakes could not be higher. A nation cannot survive, let alone thrive, when betrayal is its most lucrative export. Somaliland’s very existence as a sovereign entity hangs in the balance. Our current path leads not to independence and prosperity, but to a future as a footnote in history—a cautionary tale of a dream squandered on the altar of tribal politics and personal greed.

This is Somaliland’s moment of reckoning. Will we continue to embrace this revolving door of treachery, watching helplessly as our so-called leaders shuttle back and forth to Mogadishu? Or will we slam it shut, bolt it, and throw away the key? The path forward demands nothing less than a complete reconstruction of our political culture, a vehement rejection of tribal politics, and a renewed commitment to placing our national interests above all else.

Only then can we hope to build the Somaliland our founders envisioned—a nation governed by leaders worthy of the torch they bear, supported by a populace united not by clan, but by an unwavering commitment to true independence and shared prosperity. The choice, as ever, remains ours to make. Let us choose wisely, for the ghosts of our betrayed past and the specters of our threatened future are watching.

Somaliland Orders Closure of Egyptian Cultural Center Amid Strategic Diplomatic Maneuver

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In a bold diplomatic move, the government of Somaliland has ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Center in Hargeisa, its capital. Dr. Essa Kayd, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, cited “national security” concerns as he announced a 72-hour deadline for all staff to depart the country.

An anonymous government official further elaborated on these concerns, stating that the center was allegedly involved in activities that threatened Somaliland’s national security. “We have evidence that certain individuals associated with the Egyptian Cultural Center were engaging in espionage and other activities that compromised our national interests,” the official revealed .

This decisive action marks a significant departure from Somaliland’s traditionally cautious foreign policy approach. Known for its diplomatic restraint, even in the face of complex regional dynamics, Somaliland has historically refrained from such overt measures against foreign entities operating within its borders. The closure of the Egyptian facility stands in stark contrast to Somaliland’s treatment of other nations with similar regional engagements, notably Turkey, whose diplomatic mission in Hargeisa remains operational despite its defense pact with Somalia mirroring that of Egypt.

Somaliland Presidency and Egyptian Cultural Center proximity in Hargeisa, Somaliland

The timing of this decision is particularly noteworthy, coinciding with Egypt’s recent defense agreement with Somalia and speculation about Cairo’s potential involvement in post-ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) stabilization efforts. These developments have stirred unease among neighboring states, with some observers suggesting that Egypt aims to fortify its regional position, partly in response to its protracted dispute with Ethiopia over Nile water rights and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project.

At the heart of this regional tension lies the GERD, Ethiopia’s ambitious hydroelectric endeavor on the Blue Nile. Initiated in 2011 and slated to become Africa’s largest power plant of its kind, the dam has been a source of contention between Ethiopia and Egypt. While Ethiopia views the project as vital for its economic growth, Egypt, heavily dependent on the Nile, has expressed grave concerns about potential impacts on its water supply, particularly during the reservoir filling phase.

Adding a significant and positive shift to the geopolitical landscape is the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia, finalized in January 2024. This agreement, which grants Ethiopia coveted access to the Red Sea via Somaliland’s port of Berbera, represents a strategic breakthrough for both nations. For Somaliland, it underscores its pivotal role in regional trade and logistics, while for Ethiopia, it opens new avenues for economic growth and enhanced connectivity. Despite sparking opposition from Somalia and concern among regional players like Djibouti, this MoU is seen as a tectonic shift that has the potential to reshape the power dynamics in the Horn of Africa positively. Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Essa Kayd emphasized that the formal agreement cannot be signed without Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland, further highlighting the MoU’s significance in the broader geopolitical context.

The Ethiopian-Somaliland partnership potentially aligns Somaliland more closely with Ethiopia in its ongoing Nile water dispute with Egypt. By closing the Egyptian Cultural Center while maintaining relations with other nations that have similar agreements with Somalia, Somaliland demonstrates the nuanced and strategic nature of its foreign policy. This calculated move suggests a delicate balancing act between asserting national interests, managing regional relationships, and positioning itself within broader geopolitical dynamics.

As this situation unfolds, the international community will keenly observe how Somaliland’s bold move affects its regional relationships and broader foreign policy objectives. The closure of the Egyptian Cultural Center, viewed against the backdrop of the Ethiopia MoU and ongoing regional tensions, may herald a new era in Somaliland’s approach to regional diplomacy.

This diplomatic chess move by Somaliland underscores the complex interplay of regional alliances, resource disputes, and the quest for influence that characterizes the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. As the region grapples with these multifaceted challenges, Somaliland’s actions may well serve as a catalyst for broader diplomatic realignments in this strategically critical part of the world.

Balancing National Security and Rule of Law: The Controversial Arrest of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf in Somaliland

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KEY POINTS:

  • Arrest of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf: Detained on September 2, 2024, upon returning from Dubai, sparking a fierce debate over parliamentary immunity.
  • Constitutional Clash: The House of Representatives argues that the arrest violates Article 55 of the Somaliland Constitution, which grants immunity to MPs, while the government cites Article 79(2) allowing suspension of immunity for serious crimes.
  • Accusations and Defense: The Deputy Minister of Interior claims Abib used immunity for destabilizing activities. The Attorney General defends the arrest but has not specified the charges, raising transparency concerns.
  • Opposition Reaction: Waddani, Somaliland’s main opposition party, condemns the arrest as politically motivated and calls for Abib’s release.
  • Election Impact: The arrest comes ahead of November 2024 elections, potentially influencing the political climate and highlighting tensions between Somaliland’s legislative and executive branches.

In a significant development that has sent ripples through Somaliland’s political landscape, the arrest of Member of Parliament Mohamed Abib Yusuf has triggered a fierce legal and constitutional debate between the government and the House of Representatives. The arrest, which has been met with sharp criticism from the legislative body, is now the subject of intense scrutiny as both sides present their arguments.

Adding to the controversy, the Deputy Minister of Interior recently held a press briefing where he accused MP Abib of exploiting parliamentary protection to engage in activities detrimental to Somaliland’s stability. The Deputy Minister claimed that the Parliament’s refusal to suspend Abib’s immunity, as requested by the Attorney General, has emboldened the MP to continue his actions. The Minister further alleged that Abib has met with individuals overseas who are intent on destabilizing Somaliland, and assured that evidence will be presented in due time in a court of law.

On 2nd September 2024, MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf was detained by law enforcement authorities upon his return from Dubai, a move that has since drawn widespread condemnation from the House of Representatives. The parliamentary body has been vocal in its opposition to the arrest, denouncing it as a violation of MP Abib’s parliamentary immunity and accusing the government of overstepping its legal bounds.

In a detailed response dated 3rd September 2024, the House of Representatives issued a letter of protest, in which it strongly rebuked the government’s actions. The letter asserts that MP Abib’s arrest contravenes Article 55 of the Somaliland Constitution, which guarantees immunity to sitting members of Parliament. According to the House, the government’s decision to detain MP Abib without first seeking parliamentary approval represents a blatant disregard for this constitutional protection.

The House’s letter also raises concerns about the principle of double jeopardy, arguing that MP Abib is being subjected to multiple legal actions for the same alleged offenses. The parliamentary body contends that the government’s actions undermine the rule of law and set a dangerous precedent for the treatment of elected officials in Somaliland.

However, the government has responded to these accusations with a robust defense of its actions, articulated through a letter from the Attorney General’s office. Dated 3rd September 2024, the Attorney General’s letter provides a detailed legal justification for the arrest of MP Abib, countering the claims made by the House of Representatives.

According to the Attorney General, the charges against MP Abib are of a serious nature, necessitating the lifting of his parliamentary immunity to allow for legal proceedings. The letter references Article 79(2) of the Somaliland Constitution, which permits the suspension of immunity in cases where a parliamentarian is accused of serious crimes. However, in a move that has further fueled controversy, the letter notably does not specify the exact charges against MP Abib, leaving the nature of the allegations shrouded in mystery. This omission has drawn criticism from various quarters, with some accusing the government of a lack of transparency in handling the case.

The Attorney General’s letter also addresses the issue of double jeopardy, asserting that the charges currently being pursued against MP Abib are distinct from any previous legal actions. The letter emphasizes that the prosecution is based on new evidence and additional allegations, dismissing the House’s concerns as unfounded.

The Attorney General defends the judiciary’s role in the case, stating that the courts are operating within their jurisdiction and that MP Abib’s arrest and detention were carried out in full compliance with Somaliland’s legal standards. The letter stresses the importance of judicial independence, arguing that the judiciary must be allowed to function without interference from the legislative branch to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Adding to the growing chorus of opposition, Somaliland’s main opposition party, Waddani, has also condemned the arrest of MP Abib. In a statement shared on their official Facebook page, Waddani expressed strong disapproval of the government’s actions, labeling the arrest as politically motivated and a direct attack on parliamentary independence. The party called for the immediate release of MP Abib and urged the government to respect the rule of law and constitutional protections afforded to elected representatives.

The timing of MP Abib’s arrest is particularly significant as it comes just months before Somaliland is set to hold crucial elections in November 2024. These elections are expected to be a pivotal moment in Somaliland’s democratic process, with both local council and presidential elections on the horizon. The arrest of a prominent MP like Abib, who is known for his fiery rhetoric and controversial positions, could have far-reaching implications for the electoral landscape. Opposition parties are likely to leverage the arrest as evidence of government overreach and an attempt to stifle dissent ahead of the elections, further intensifying the political climate.

The upcoming elections in Somaliland, scheduled for November 13, 2024, represent a significant moment in the region’s political evolution. This election will encompass not only the presidential race but also parliamentary and local council elections, marking the fourth instance of universal suffrage since Somaliland’s declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991. The electoral landscape will feature candidates from three principal political parties: Kulmiye, UCID, and Waddani, each vying for influence in a climate charged with anticipation and scrutiny. Originally slated for November 2022, the elections were postponed due to a contentious extension of President Muse Bihi Abdi’s term, which has led to widespread protests and a violent crackdown by security forces. These events have raised alarm about the stability of Somaliland’s political framework, which has historically been characterized by consensus-building and peaceful transitions of power. As the country approaches this critical electoral milestone, the stakes are high, with the potential for both democratic consolidation and renewed tensions.

The popular and fiery legislator, elected from the Awdal region, has long been a lightning rod for controversy in Somaliland politics. MP Abib has been at the center of numerous heated debates, including his stance on the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding, which he initially supported before later opposing. His shifting position on this issue has drawn both support and criticism from various quarters. Most recently, he stirred further controversy with a statement regarding the Somali National Movement (SNM), the rebel group instrumental in toppling the Somali dictatorship and securing Somaliland’s independence. His remarks, perceived by some as disrespectful to the legacy of the SNM, have only added to the contentious atmosphere surrounding his political career.

Despite his often-rambunctious demeanor and penchant for making controversial statements, the exact crime MP Abib is being charged with remains unclear. The government has yet to provide a detailed account of the allegations against him. However, sources within the government, speaking on condition of strict anonymity, have accused MP Abib of committing high treason, although they have yet to present any evidence to substantiate these claims. It remains to be seen what specific charges the Attorney General will bring against MP Abib and how these charges will interact with the legal questions surrounding his parliamentary immunity.

As this high-stakes legal and political battle unfolds, the tension between Somaliland’s legislative and executive branches has become increasingly pronounced. The arrest of MP Abib has not only sparked a constitutional crisis but has also raised questions about the balance of power within Somaliland’s government. The outcome of this dispute could have far-reaching implications for the country’s legal and political systems, testing the resilience of its constitutional framework and the integrity of its democratic institutions.

On the court of public opinion, those that support the government’s position and the actions it has taken are framing the issue as not only a case of treason but also as evidence that Mr. Abib is attempting to destabilize Somaliland, much like the former Chairman of the Parliament, Mr. Abdirasak Khalif, who abandoned Somaliland and joined SSC at the beginning of the Las Anod conflict. The opposition party, Waddani, has also defended Mr. Khalif despite his clear stance against Somaliland.

For its part, the Somaliland government enjoys little confidence in its handling of legal cases or its general dispensation of justice, as evidenced by a rash of extrajudicial arrests under President Bihi. These arrests, which come with hefty charges, are often dropped within days with minimal explanation.

For now, the nation watches closely as the case of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf continues to develop, with both sides preparing for what promises to be a protracted and contentious legal showdown.


This revision incorporates the new information provided, placing it prominently near the beginning to set the stage for the ongoing legal and political debate.

Ethiopia Reiterates its Quest for Red Sea Access as Djibouti Presents a Counterproposal

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In a recent media address, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister Taye Atske-Selassie reaffirmed Ethiopia’s position on Red Sea access, stating, “There has to be safe, reliable, sustainable and durable access to and from the sea, because it’s our legitimate [need], we don’t want to be suffocated.” This powerful declaration underscores Ethiopia’s resolve to secure a “reliable and dependable independent sea outlet,” a quest that has led to the ground-breaking Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland.

Recent developments include the appointment of Ambassador Teshome Shunde Hamito as Ethiopia’s representative to Somaliland, marking a formal step in establishing diplomatic relations. During a meeting with Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi, discussions emphasized regional security, strengthening bilateral relations, and future cooperation. This diplomatic advancement comes despite Somalia’s continued objections and Djibouti’s strategic counteroffer. It signals that Ethiopia and Somaliland are moving forward in implementing critical aspects of the MoU, undeterred by regional opposition.

Addressing the Turkish brokered talks with Somalia in Ankara, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister acknowledged progress but issued a stark warning about Somalia’s stance. “We have seen some positive developments,” he noted, but quickly added, “At the same time, we are witnessing unhelpful rhetoric and pronouncements from the Somali side.” He further emphasized, “Their hostile rhetoric and threats will not discourage Ethiopia from its commitment to peace in this region”. This pointed comment reveals Ethiopia’s growing frustration with what it perceives as obstructionist behavior from Somali officials.

Meanwhile, Djibouti has launched its own strategic maneuver. Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, presented Ethiopia with an enticing proposition: full management rights to Djibouti’s northern port of Tajoura. Youssouf framed this offer as a “new corridor that is already built,” emphasizing the immediacy and practicality of the solution.

However, Ethiopia’s recent actions suggest that Djibouti’s offer may indeed be too little, too late. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister’s assertion that “we have already set our direction” takes on new significance in light of Ethiopia’s commitment to diversifying maritime access options beyond its traditional reliance on Djibouti.

Adding to the complexity, Djibouti has taken assertive steps to counter Somaliland’s growing influence. Djibouti has closed Somaliland’s diplomatic mission and invited adversaries, highlighting its determination to thwart Somaliland’s emerging strategic competition. This aggressive stance underscores Djibouti’s intent to maintain control over regional maritime access and keep Ethiopia as a landlocked customer, rather than offering genuine access to the Red Sea.

Moreover, Djibouti is also competing for the African Union chairmanship, although its prospects may not be as bright against East Africa’s venerable elder statesman, Mr. Raila Odinga. This adds another layer to Djibouti’s aggressive regional posturing, as it seeks to maintain its strategic significance amidst rising competition.

The economic implications of this diplomatic chess game are immense. Ethiopia stands to save up to $1 billion annually in logistics costs by diversifying its sea access. Conversely, Djibouti faces potential economic upheaval, with port-related revenues accounting for nearly 80% of its GDP. Djibouti’s recent actions further cast doubt on its reliability as a partner for Ethiopia, indicating a preference for keeping Ethiopia dependent on its ports rather than facilitating true maritime access.

As these events unfold, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister’s words resonate with particular gravity: “This is about the future of our nation and the prosperity of our people.” It’s clear that Ethiopia views its maritime strategy as non-negotiable and is taking concrete steps to implement its vision.

As Ethiopia pushes forward with its ambitious plans, seemingly undeterred by Somalia’s objections or Djibouti’s counteroffers, the region finds itself at a critical juncture. The decisions and actions taken in the coming months have the potential to fundamentally reshape the economic, diplomatic, and security landscape of the entire Horn of Africa for years to come. The world watches closely as this high-stakes maritime diplomacy unfolds, with the stability and prosperity of the region hanging in the balance.