Ambassador Riley’s diplomatic mission signals Washington’s growing interest in direct engagement
Key Points
U.S. Ambassador Riley led a rare full-team visit to Hargeisa, signaling deepening ties.
Washington is reviewing its One-Somalia policy and considering a diplomatic office in Somaliland.
Media misreported visit as military-related—no U.S. military officials were present.
Berbera featured prominently in talks amid growing U.S. interest in regional security.
Somaliland Presidency and Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the visit.
HARGEISA – In a visit described by insiders as anything but routine, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley brought his full senior team to Hargeisa this week for closed-door meetings with Somaliland’s leadership. The high-level delegation included Deputy Chief of Mission Steven Gillen and senior Political, Economic, and Military Affairs officers—essentially the entire top brass of the US mission to Somalia. After spending the night in Hargeisa, the group flew to Berbera the next morning. No public statements were issued by either side.
“This wasn’t a courtesy call,” said one Somaliland government source, speaking on condition of anonymity. “When the entire embassy leadership comes and stays the night, something significant is happening.”
Multiple sources confirmed to the Chronicle that Washington is quietly reassessing its decades-old One-Somalia policy—a diplomatic framework that treats Somalia as a single territorial entity and has long precluded formal US engagement with Somaliland. Officials are now weighing the possibility of opening a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, akin to the UK’s arrangement, as part of a shift toward what sources describe as a “reality-based approach.”
For decades, the One-Somalia policy has served as the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the Horn of Africa. Under this framework, the United States has recognized the sovereignty of Somalia as a unified state, avoiding any bilateral dealings with Somaliland to avoid legitimizing its independence claim. The approach has long frustrated Somaliland officials, who argue that their democratic governance and relative stability warrant separate recognition.
This would mark a clear departure from the approach of previous ambassadors—such as Donald Yamamoto and Larry André—whom a retired U.S. official described as “more Catholic than the Pope” in their rigid adherence to Mogadishu-centric diplomacy.
Ambassador Riley, a 30-year career diplomat who assumed his post almost a year ago, appears to be charting a new course. His decision to bring the full embassy leadership signals that the discussions were treated as a strategic priority. The visit also comes just days ahead of AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley’s expected trip to Somaliland—his final stop before stepping down—a move that adds military weight to the evolving relationship.
Although some media outlets rushed to frame the visit as AFRICOM-centric—fueled by social media clips of V-22 Osprey helicopters hovering over Berbera—there were no U.S. military officials present in this delegation. The coverage largely missed the fact that this was a full-spectrum diplomatic mission led by Ambassador Riley, not a defense-driven operation. The real story was in Hargeisa, behind closed doors.
“The Americans are clearly interested in more than development assistance,” said a second source familiar with the talks. “Berbera came up repeatedly.”
Berbera Port, now operated by DP World, has grown into a strategic logistics hub serving Ethiopia’s trade and sitting along critical Red Sea shipping lanes—where Chinese influence has surged. Defense analysts have identified it as a prime location for projecting U.S. power in the region and countering emerging threats.
Details of the Hargeisa meetings with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” and his senior team remain closely guarded. A Somaliland official would only describe the discussions as “seeking engagement in areas of mutual interest”—a diplomatic phrase that has done little to quell speculation.
That speculation has only intensified following public statements by Somaliland officials expressing openness to hosting U.S. forces. Sources suggest the talks included discussion of long-term military and strategic cooperation, potentially including a U.S. presence in Berbera.
The shift in U.S. posture comes amid signs of growing frustration with Somalia’s federal government. In recent months, Somalia has pivoted to China and Washington has significantly slashed funding particularly in the security sector, imposed new travel restrictions on Somali travellers, and quietly scaled down its presence in Mogadishu due to persistent security and governance concerns. These moves reflect what some analysts see as a broader recalibration of U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.
In what may be a further sign of deepening engagement, sources indicate that President Cirro is preparing for an official visit to the United States, although the timeline remains unclear. While Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Washington just last month—meeting with multiple U.S. legislators including Ted Cruz of Texas and Scott Perry—there is still no confirmation on which figures from President Trump’s adminstration in State or Defense the Somaliland delegation might engage.
The contrast in diplomatic posture is becoming impossible to ignore. For decades, the U.S. has funneled aid and engagement through federal institutions in Mogadishu. Now, Riley’s direct outreach to Hargeisa—backed by possible military coordination—signals a break with that status quo.
“They’re talking about something more permanent,” one source said, referring to the proposed diplomatic presence. Privately, some U.S. officials describe the idea of Somali unity as a “fiction,” and see Somaliland as a functional, stable partner worth engaging on its own terms.
Recent shifts in American policy—reduced aid flows, travel restrictions, and a more restrained presence in Mogadishu—have further highlighted the growing appeal of Somaliland’s relative stability and functioning institutions.
Somaliland’s foreign ministry did not respond to multiple requests for comment. The Office of the President also declined to engage, despite repeated inquiries. The silence from both institutions has only fueled speculation about the depth and direction of this new chapter in US-Somaliland relations.
The upcoming visit by General Langley may serve as a litmus test for whether defense cooperation will form a pillar of this emerging relationship. If the military angle takes shape, it would represent not just a diplomatic shift—but a significant recalibration of American strategic posture in the Horn of Africa.
After thirty years of wishful thinking in Mogadishu, Washington may finally be ready to deal with the Horn’s realities—not its illusions.
HARGEISA — Less than three years after this publication exposed the former Central Bank Governor Dahir Abdillahi Ali for flaunting an “honorary doctorate” from a Delaware-based diploma mill that shares an address with a tile supplier, yet another high-ranking official has been caught in an almost identical act of deception.
Munir Ahmed Egal, the Director General of the Presidency — the administrative engine behind the nation’s highest office — received a graduate degree from Bircham International University, an unaccredited institution repeatedly flagged by international education authorities for selling degrees without any meaningful academic requirements.
A Serial Pattern of Deception
This is not an isolated incident. In August 2022, Somaliland Chronicle revealed that Central Bank Governor Dahir Abdillahi Ali had proudly accepted an “Honorary Doctorate” from European Digital University — a university in name only, operating out of an office in Delaware with no academic standing or accreditation. That scandal was met with shrugs and silence from the very institutions tasked with protecting public integrity.
Instead of confronting the problem, the government appears to have normalized it. Now, just a few years later, an even more egregious example has surfaced — one that reaches the core of the executive branch. Egal’s fake degree isn’t honorary. It was purchased.
Gullible or Dishonest? Either Way, Unfit to Serve
Whether Egal knowingly purchased a fraudulent credential or was duped by Bircham’s elaborate marketing is beside the point. If he was complicit, he has committed fraud. If he was fooled, he lacks the discernment and judgment required for high office. Both scenarios disqualify him.
This isn’t a minor resume embellishment. It’s a question of integrity and competence in one of the most sensitive government roles in Somaliland.
A Government of Ghost Degrees
A source involved in the 2021 parliamentary and local council elections told Somaliland Chronicle that document forgery has become an entrenched part of Somaliland politics. He described a thriving underground market for fake degrees and transcripts, openly catering to political hopefuls desperate to meet basic eligibility requirements or appear more educated than they are.
“It became a seasonal business,” he said. “Election season meant peak sales.”
Legitimate degree holders now find themselves competing against officials who simply paid to appear qualified. And the consequences aren’t academic — they’re structural. Policy decisions, financial oversight, and foreign diplomacy are now being handled by people whose credentials collapse under the weight of a Google search.
Bircham: A Sophisticated Diploma Mill Operation
Bircham International University represents the modern evolution of academic fraud — a sophisticated operation that has successfully deceived officials worldwide for over three decades. Founded in 1992 by Deric Bircham, William Martin, and Bircham’s adopted son Laurence Cheng Wen, the institution has operated from multiple jurisdictions including the Bahamas, Delaware, and Spain, frequently moving when scrutinized by authorities.
The founders present themselves with grandiose credentials. William Martin claims knighthood in the “Order of the Commonwealth” and “Order of Saint Andrew of Jerusalem,” while Deric Bircham boasts of receiving “countless nominations and honors” and claims ancestral ties to medieval English nobility. Their promotional materials feature dramatic narratives about aristocratic Spanish families and connections to former U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
Despite these elaborate backstories, the reality is stark. Oregon education officials called Bircham “totally bogus” in 2003. Texas Higher Education authorities determined it has “no degree-granting authority from Spain.” Mexico, Kenya, and multiple U.S. states have issued warnings against the institution.
Among the fake credentials Bircham cites:
AAHEA — The “American Association for Higher Education and Accreditation” appears on Wikipedia’s list of unrecognized accreditors (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unrecognized_higher_education_accreditation_organizations). The real AAHEA was disbanded in 2009, but this Florida-based organization appropriated the name and Washington DC phone number to create false legitimacy. Neither the U.S. Department of Education nor the Council for Higher Education Accreditation recognizes this AAHEA as a legitimate accreditor.
Curaçao Charter — In 2018, Bircham secured a so-called “charter” from Curaçao, a jurisdiction that markets itself as offering “transnational education” opportunities with minimal oversight. The territory explicitly states it “does not provide accreditation” but merely grants charters to institutions that promise to seek accreditation elsewhere.
Professional Memberships — Bircham lists affiliations with IEEE, UN PRME, and other organizations that offer open membership to individuals. These memberships are meaningless in the context of institutional legitimacy.
IARC — The International Accreditation and Recognition Council appears on lists of unrecognized accreditors used by diploma mills and is not recognized by any major educational authority.
Bircham International University’s website touts its status as a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit in the United States, a designation typically associated with charitable or educational institutions. But this claim is deeply misleading. The IRS grants 501(c)(3) status based on tax-exemption criteria, not academic legitimacy. It does not — and never has — evaluated whether an organization offers real education, issues valid degrees, or even operates as a school in any meaningful sense.
This maneuver is common among diploma mills: masquerade as a nonprofit to gain credibility, avoid taxes, and mislead prospective students with a veneer of official recognition. In Bircham’s case, the 501(c)(3) badge is little more than decorative — a shield for a for-profit operation that sells degrees dressed up as academic achievement. In short: tax-exempt, but not legitimate.
The “Non-Formal” Education Smokescreen
Bircham’s own website reveals the elaborate legal architecture designed to avoid educational oversight while maintaining the pretense of academic legitimacy. In a telling admission of regulatory gamesmanship, the institution explicitly states it operates under Spain’s “non-formal” education framework — a classification designed for vocational training, cooking classes, and professional workshops, not university-level education. This loophole allows Bircham to avoid supervision by Spain’s Ministry of Education while still calling itself a “university.” The institution proudly declares it is “exempt from direct regulation by any Ministry of Education, as a non formal education provider” — essentially admitting it operates outside legitimate educational oversight while marketing itself as an institution of higher learning.
This regulatory arbitrage represents sophisticated institutional fraud. Rather than submitting to educational authorities who would evaluate academic standards, curricula, and faculty qualifications, Bircham has structured itself under the Ministry of Economy (business registration) and Ministry of Consumer Affairs (business oversight) — treating education as a commercial product rather than an academic discipline. In the United States, Bircham’s Delaware incorporation as a 501c3 nonprofit provides no educational validation whatsoever; it simply means they’ve filed paperwork claiming charitable status. The institution even fabricates oversight by citing “IVU, Ignita Veritas United” and “Magna Carta Bar Chambers” as supervisory bodies — grandiose names for what appear to be fictional organizations designed to create an illusion of legitimate governance. This isn’t regulatory compliance; it’s regulatory theater designed to fool those unfamiliar with real educational accreditation.
A Career Built on Connections, Not Credentials
Egal’s fraudulent degree is merely the latest chapter in a career propelled by political proximity rather than merit. His rise through Somaliland’s institutions illustrates how access to power routinely trumps qualifications in high-stakes appointments.
During the Siilaanyo administration, Egal was inexplicably appointed as European correspondent for Somaliland National TV—despite lacking any background in journalism. The post included travel on sensitive diplomatic missions, including the Somaliland–Somalia talks in Turkey. Colleagues at the national broadcaster openly questioned how someone without journalistic or diplomatic credentials landed such a role.
Those doubts proved well-founded.
After Siilaanyo left office, Egal resurfaced within the Waddani opposition, launching the Somaliland Today outlet and once again assuming a media leadership role—still without addressing long-standing concerns about his qualifications.
Now, under President Abdirahman Abdillahi, Egal occupies the powerful post of Director General of the Presidency, responsible for coordinating the operations of Somaliland’s highest executive office. Yet he brings no evident administrative experience or record of institutional management.
His ascent—despite a persistent lack of competence—underscores a deeper structural failure: in Somaliland politics, loyalty and access continue to eclipse expertise and vetting.
Presidential Complicity? A Devastating Confession
Perhaps the most explosive evidence comes from Egal himself. In a testimonial on Bircham’s website, he proudly details his fraudulent journey while revealing potential high-level government complicity. Writing under “Somalia” rather than Somaliland — effectively erasing the nation he claims to serve — Egal describes attending Bircham’s Miami ceremony in 2025.
Most shocking is his claim that President Abdirahman Abdillahi personally “encouraged me during those hard times to continue completing my studies.” This raises explosive questions: Did the President know Egal was pursuing an unaccredited degree? Is this why such officials feel emboldened to obtain fake credentials?
Egal’s gratitude extends to “the Minister of the Presidency, the Chief of Staff, the Presidential Spokesperson, and all the various leaders at the Presidency of Somaliland,” suggesting widespread knowledge of his academic pursuits within the government. His public thanks to businessman Mr. Abdirashid Duale, the CEO Dahabshil conglomerate raises further questions about who financed this fraudulent education.
The testimonial concludes with quotes from Nelson Mandela and Somali poetry — a grotesque appropriation of moral authority to validate academic fraud.
Ceremony for Sale: The Commercial Theater
Bircham’s graduation ceremonies reveal the commercial nature of this operation. The institution charges hefty fees for elaborate staged ceremonies designed to create the illusion of academic legitimacy. According to its graduation protocol (https://bircham.net/biu-graduates/ceremonies/), “formal ceremonies” cost $300-500 per graduate, while “photo sessions” range from $200-300. The protocol explicitly states these fees cover “contribution to trip expenses” — essentially charging graduates to fund executives’ international travel.
Recent ceremonies have been held in Qatar, Angola, Guatemala, and El Salvador — mostly in luxury hotels, not universities. The institution even offers “virtual graduation” where students can create fake graduation photos using provided backgrounds and purchase caps and gowns ($150-500) to stage their own ceremonies.
Most tellingly, the graduation documents “do not specify distance education” — deliberately designed to obscure the institution’s unaccredited status.
This is a Global Problem With Real Consequences
Fake degree scandals have toppled officials worldwide. In 2005, the United Nations fired Jonathan Blankson, chief of the Human Resources Information Technology Section, after discovering his degrees were purchased from Trinity College and University, a known diploma mill. A 2004 U.S. Government Accountability Office investigation exposed 350 federal employees with fake degrees from over 120 fraudulent universities, including high-ranking officials like Charles Abell, principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, and Daniel Matthews, Chief Information Officer for the Department of Transportation.
In Mexico, 22 federal health officials were arrested in 2010 after their medical and psychology licenses turned out to be fake, including the technical director of the National Center for Blood Transfusions. According to FBI investigations, the fake degree industry generates over $1 billion annually, with an estimated 200,000 fraudulent diplomas sold each year.
The Vetting Crisis No One Wants to Fix
The bigger scandal is not that another official has a fake degree. It’s that no one in government thought to check. How did someone with such credentials pass through vetting for one of the most sensitive positions in Somaliland? Was his degree listed in his personnel file? Was it paid for with public funds?
This is not a paperwork error. It’s a failure of political culture.
No Response From Officials
Somaliland Chronicle reached out to both Munir Ahmed Egal and the Minister of the Presidency for comment on this story. We specifically asked Mr. Egal to confirm his educational credentials and explain his testimonial praising Bircham International University, while requesting the Minister — as Egal’s direct supervisor — to clarify what role he played in supporting these studies and whether he was aware of the institution’s unaccredited status. Despite multiple attempts to contact both officials through official channels, neither responded to our inquiries. Their silence speaks volumes in a matter that goes to the heart of government integrity and public accountability.
No Excuses in the Age of Search Engines
Anyone with an internet connection can uncover Bircham’s track record in seconds. If Egal and his peers couldn’t bother to do the most basic due diligence on their own education, how can they be trusted to manage national policy?
Ignorance is no longer a defense. The era of plausible deniability ended when search engines were invented.
The Ball is in President Abdillahi’s Court
This is the first major credibility crisis of the new administration. How President Abdillahi responds will define his leadership. Will he investigate, audit, and clean house? Or will he excuse, ignore, and protect?
According to Egal’s own testimonial, the President encouraged these studies. This raises questions about whether the administration was complicit or simply negligent. Either scenario demands immediate action.
The people who voted for transparency deserve more than silence. They deserve to know who’s leading their government — and whether those people actually earned the titles on their business cards.
One Fraud is an Accident. Two is a Pattern. What’s Next?
The Egal case is the second major fake degree scandal Somaliland Chronicle has reported in three years. The first was ignored. The second is unfolding. What happens next will either stop the rot or confirm it runs deeper than anyone imagined.
When fake credentials become an open secret in government, the very idea of merit-based service collapses. Competent, qualified professionals are pushed aside for smooth-talking frauds who know which websites sell prestige by the pound.
The damage is real. Civil servants take cues from the top. If dishonesty is rewarded with promotion, expect more dishonesty. If fake degrees are ignored, expect more fakes.
Got a tip about fake degrees or fraudulent qualifications in public office? Contact our newsroom securely and confidentially. We follow the truth, wherever it leads.
Pennsylvania congressman’s legislation comes weeks after outgoing AFRICOM commander acknowledged al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” despite decades of U.S. support to Somalia
Congressman Scott Perry introduced the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act on Wednesday, legislation that would formally recognize Somaliland as a separate, independent nation and establish diplomatic relations with Hargeisa.
Perry’s office said the legislation aims to “redirect U.S. foreign policy to align with a new, stable and self-governing partner in a region of increasing strategic importance to the United States.”
“Foreign adversaries are on the march in Africa and around the globe, and it’s in our national interest to strengthen relationships with reliable partners who share our values and contribute to our security – whenever and wherever possible,” said Perry, a retired Army National Guard brigadier general who flew 44 combat missions commanding the 2-104th Aviation Battalion during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2009-2010).
The bill is co-sponsored by Representatives Andy Ogles (TN-05), Pat Harrigan (NC-10), and Tom Tiffany (WI-07), all of whom have previously criticized U.S. policy toward Somalia while advocating for stronger ties with Taiwan.
Somalia Policy Unraveling as AFRICOM Admits Failure
The timing of Perry’s bill coincides with a broader U.S. reevaluation of Somalia as a viable state partner. In June 2025, President Trump’s travel ban proclamation declared that Somalia “lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents” and noted that “Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups.” The proclamation’s finding that “the Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement” represents a fundamental challenge to Somalia’s claims of sovereignty.
This assessment aligns with outgoing AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley’s admission that al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” despite decades of U.S. military assistance to Somalia.
Langley’s assessment represents a reversal from his previous optimism about Somalia’s security situation. In June 2024, he expressed “measured optimism” about Somali government capabilities, but recent al-Shabaab territorial gains have forced a reassessment.
The militant group overran the strategic town of Adan Yabal in May, forcing U.S.-trained Somali National Army troops to abandon their largest operational base and millions of dollars in American-supplied weapons.
Al-Shabaab territorial gains have correlated directly with recent funding reductions, with insurgents retaking “dozens of villages” and regaining operational capability in nearly one-third of territory they lost to federal forces in 2022.
Massive Aid Cuts Follow Somalia Failures
The Trump administration has implemented sweeping cuts to Somalia funding, with U.S. aid dropping from $850 million in 2024 to $180 million in 2025, according to ForeignAssistance.gov data.
The cuts ended monthly $400 salary supplements for elite Danab forces and eliminated food and fuel support following U.S. audits that found Somali forces had “padded food and fuel requisitions.”
The press release notes that Somalia’s “meritless claims over Somaliland hinder the United States’ ability to forge deeper diplomatic ties with Somaliland, a responsible partner nation that maintains internal order, conducts democratic elections, and actively counters piracy and extremism.”
Berbera Port Offers Strategic Alternative
Against this backdrop of Somalia’s deteriorating security situation, Somaliland has offered the United States what Somalia cannot: reliable partnership and strategic access.
“They’ve governed themselves peacefully for decades, built strong ties with Taiwan, and refused to bow to the Chinese Communist Party,” said Congressman Pat Harrigan. “They’ve even offered the U.S. military access to a key port in the Gulf of Aden. That’s what a real partner looks like, and it’s time we treated them like one.”
The offer of U.S. military access to Berbera Port represents a potentially significant strategic shift. The deep-water port facility, modernized through a $442 million UAE investment, provides direct access to the Red Sea shipping corridor where Houthi attacks have disrupted global trade routes.
For the United States, Berbera would offer an alternative to the increasingly constrained Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which sits just 8 miles from China’s first overseas military base. Military analysts note that Berbera’s location places it 150 miles from the Chinese facility while providing operational reach across the Gulf of Aden.
For Somaliland, hosting U.S. military presence would provide security guarantees and international legitimacy that recognition alone cannot deliver. The arrangement would also bring economic benefits through base operations and potentially deter regional adversaries from challenging Somaliland’s sovereignty.
Three Decades of Democratic Governance
The legislation cites Somaliland’s record of conducting six presidential elections since 1991, including the November 2024 election that saw opposition candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi defeat incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi.
“For more than three decades, Somaliland demonstrated the kind of governance, stability, and cooperation that America should support,” Perry said in announcing the bill.
This democratic record stands in stark contrast to Somalia, described in the press release as “the unstable, conflict-ridden and fractured capitol city of Somalia.” While Somaliland conducts peaceful elections and transfers of power, Somalia struggles with clan-based politics and militant control over much of its territory.
Taiwan Relationship Draws Chinese Pressure
The bill highlights Somaliland’s 2020 establishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, making it one of only 12 countries worldwide to maintain official ties with Taipei.
In April 2025, Somalia banned Taiwanese passport holders from entry, citing the “one-China principle” in what was widely seen as a move to derail a scheduled high-level Taiwanese diplomatic mission to Somaliland. The ban prompted immediate congressional backlash.
Senator Jim Risch called Somalia’s action “bowing to China while militants roam freely in its core regions.” Representatives Tom Tiffany and Andy Ogles sent a joint letter to Somalia’s ambassador warning of “serious retaliatory consequences” under the TAIPEI Act, which legally obligates the U.S. to reassess relationships with governments that undermine Taiwan.
The congressional pressure worked. Somalia reversed the passport ban in June 2025, but the episode demonstrated both Beijing’s influence over Mogadishu and Congress’s willingness to defend Taiwan-Somaliland relations.
“As China expands its influence across the globe, strengthening our alliances with free nations like Somaliland is more important than ever,” Ogles said in supporting the recognition bill.
Ogles had previously co-authored the letter pressuring Somalia to reverse its Taiwan passport ban, demonstrating sustained congressional support for the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership.
Congressional Support Building
The legislation has attracted support from conservative policy groups, with the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 recommending Somaliland recognition as a hedge against “malign Chinese activity” in Africa.
“It is a simple fact that Somaliland is a sovereign and self-governing nation separate from Somalia, and U.S. policy should reflect that,” said Congressman Tom Tiffany.
The press release concludes that the bill “ensures American leadership remains strong in East Africa, and sends a clear signal that the U.S. will stand with responsible partners who uphold stability and sovereignty.”
Somaliland Government Response
Somaliland officials quickly welcomed the legislation. Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adam thanked Perry on social media, calling the bill introduction “a critical step forward” and praising the congressman’s “bold leadership” and “courage in advancing this cause.”
The Somaliland Representative Office in the United States also expressed gratitude to Perry “for introducing the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act today in the U.S. House of Representatives, & calling deeper USA-SL partnership,” while thanking co-sponsors Ogles, Harrigan, and Tiffany.
Next Steps
The legislation has been referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for consideration. Committee leadership has not indicated whether hearings will be scheduled on the bill.
The bill represents the most significant congressional action on Somaliland recognition since the territory’s independence declaration 34 years ago.
The significant cash donation for drought relief is the latest example of a deepening partnership, a relationship that has recently weathered a diplomatic storm involving Somalia, China, and the United States.
HARGEISA – In a move highlighting its steadfast commitment to its partnership with the Republic of Somaliland, Taiwan delivered a $2.5 million humanitarian aid package on June 12, 2025. The funds, presented by Taiwanese Ambassador Allen C. Lou to Somaliland’s Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Abdillahi Hassan Adan , are a direct response to an urgent appeal made by the Hargeisa government in April 2025.
This timely financial support complements Taiwan’s much larger, long-term investments in Somaliland, which include the landmark Taiwan Medical Center. This ongoing project at the Hargeisa Group Hospital has been described as the most significant investment in the nation’s healthcare infrastructure since the colonial era.
This support would not only address the immediate risks but also represent a strategic investment in preserving democratic values and regional stability in the Horn of Africa,”
A Partnership Forged on Mutual Interests
At the handover ceremony, Minister Abdillahi Hassan Adan lauded the extensive and multifaceted nature of the relationship. The partnership portfolio extends far beyond humanitarian aid, encompassing a wide array of development projects across numerous sectors.
This cooperation includes tangible infrastructure projects like the Hargeisa Airport road, significant investments in human capital through higher education scholarships, and crucial financial backing for Somaliland’s 2024 elections. Furthermore, the two nations are actively working together in fields such as healthcare, agriculture, and ICT, reflecting a comprehensive approach known as the “Taiwan Model,” which is designed to directly benefit the people of Somaliland.
Navigating a Hostile—And Shifting—Neighborhood
The burgeoning Hargeisa-Taipei axis has long been a source of diplomatic friction, drawing condemnation from both Mogadishu and Beijing. This hostility peaked in April 2025 when Somalia’s government, reportedly under pressure from China, banned Taiwanese passport holders from entering or transiting its territory.
However, in a significant recent development, the ban has been rescinded. The policy reversal was confirmed during a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on June 4, 2025. In response to direct questioning from Senator Ted Cruz about China’s malign influence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Troy Fitrell of the Bureau of African Affairs confirmed that the State Department had engaged with Mogadishu on the issue and the ban was lifted.
This pressure from Washington is underpinned by the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, which allows the U.S. to take action against governments that undermine Taiwan.
While the $2.5 million in aid will be crucial for immediate drought relief, the enduring story is the resilience of a partnership forged in shared values and mutual defiance of international pressure. The reversal of the passport ban demonstrates that the Somaliland-Taiwan relationship does not exist in a vacuum and that actions against it can trigger responses from powerful allies.
As Somaliland continues to build its case for international recognition, its strategic partnership with Taiwan remains a cornerstone of its foreign policy—a clear signal that in a world of complex geopolitics, some friendships are built on more than just formal recognition.
In just under six months, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” has embarked on four international visits—twice to the United Arab Emirates, once to Djibouti, and once to Kenya. For a nation that has struggled for decades to gain international recognition and meaningful diplomatic partnerships, these trips should have been opportunities for progress: joint declarations, formal agreements, or at the very least, symbolic gestures of goodwill.
But the results? Nothing.
No joint statements. No signed accords. No diplomatic frameworks. The UAE’s state media didn’t even acknowledge the president’s visit—an ominous silence. Djibouti offered no public commentary, and Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that bordered on polite disapproval. The only tangible moment was a photo-op handshake with President Ruto. The government’s social media platforms did not even post this.
Even more troubling is the composition of the president’s delegations. Some of those who accompanied him—especially on the trips to Djibouti and Kenya—were neither elected officials nor constitutionally mandated representatives. Yet they appeared in high-level meetings and diplomatic events, where issues of national security and sovereignty were at stake. And despite the sensitivity of such visits, no senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hargeisa was included in the delegations, not as a lead diplomat, protocol officer, or policy advisor. Foreign policy is not a personal affair. It demands institutional presence and professional continuity. The country’s foreign ministry was totally absent.
Behind closed doors, the picture deteriorates further.
The trips were not arranged through standard government protocols. Instead, the president used privately chartered flights—at great cost to taxpayers. Most notably, the flight to Kenya was operated by a private Kenyan businessman with close familial ties to the president. This raises serious ethical concerns: transparency, conflict of interest, and misuse of public funds for arrangements that bypass institutional oversight.
If the president charters flights through relatives, then what we’re witnessing isn’t just poor governance—it’s nepotism. Public funds are not a family privilege. The state does not exist to enrich a circle of confidants.
Diplomacy isn’t an inheritance passed down through a family tree. It’s a national duty—one that demands legitimacy, experience, and constitutional authority. Allowing unelected and unvetted individuals, who are the president’s family, into strategic diplomatic conversations undermines the state’s credibility and threatens its long-term interests. It also undermines the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the traditional diplomatic channels.
Previous administrations understood the gravity of foreign policy. Take, for instance, President Silanyo’s historic visit to the United Arab Emirates. That trip wasn’t just symbolic—it laid the groundwork for the DP World investment in Berbera and led to a deeper diplomatic breakthrough: the mutual exchange of liaison offices between Somaliland and the UAE—something that had never existed before.
Ironically, that very deal and diplomatic gain were harshly criticized by then opposition leader Abdirahman “Cirro”—the same man who now visits the UAE without securing even a media mention, let alone a formal agreement.
Similarly, President Muse Bihi’s visit to Kenya culminated in a formal joint communiqué—an unprecedented milestone that acknowledged Somaliland’s place in the regional diplomatic sphere. That kind of tangible outcome is what leadership looks like.
In contrast, this current administration has delivered no agreements, no recognition, not even in the form of symbolic political acknowledgement and no clear diplomatic path. At a time when Somaliland faces economic hardship, security concerns, and diplomatic isolation, the people demand more than empty travel logs. Every presidential trip must be justified—not just by intent, but by impact. Every shilling spent must bring value home.
Yes, the president took a photo with President Ruto. Yes, he shook hands. But diplomacy is not photography. Leadership is not symbolism.
A handshake cannot substitute for a policy. A press photo cannot replace a signed agreement.
Somaliland is not a one-man project. It is a nation of proud citizens who demand substance over spectacle. If these travels cannot secure real results, they must at least reflect the people’s voice, not the ambitions of a few.
Going forward, Somaliland needs a clear and principled foreign policy, centered on national interest, executed through transparent processes, and reflective of the collective will of its people. The inner circle of the president should be individuals with a clear mandate who could be held accountable. Informal and familial relationships engrained in state affairs are not only nepotism, but they also undermine state institutions and are corruptible practices.
Without accountability, diplomacy risks becoming a parade—visually impressive, but powerless in practice.
About the Author
Hon. Mohamed Hussein Jama (Rambo). Member, House of Representatives, Somaliland Parliament
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
“Somalia, no government, no police, no safety, no security — just anarchy.”
These were the stark words spoken by former President Donald Trump when defending his controversial travel ban in 2017 — a ban that placed Somalia among a list of countries deemed too unstable or poorly governed to safely manage the movement of their citizens abroad.
At the time, many dismissed the statement as exaggerated, even offensive. But now, years later, an embarrassing and dangerous scandal involving Somali officials at an international summit in Switzerland has resurrected the very concerns Trump raised. And this time, the facts speak louder than rhetoric.
A Delegation or a Smuggling Ring?
In early June 2025, a Somali delegation was sent to represent the country at the 113th session of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva, Switzerland. The group was meant to participate in high-level discussions about labor rights, development, and international cooperation. On paper, this was a routine diplomatic mission.
But what happened instead was a textbook example of how weak institutions and rampant corruption have turned Somalia’s diplomatic efforts into international security risks.
Of the 23 delegates originally listed, only 10 actually showed up for the conference. The remaining 13 members vanished — not due to illness or scheduling conflicts — but as part of a deliberate and premeditated escape into Switzerland and other parts of Europe.
These individuals allegedly paid thousands of dollars each to secure their Swiss visas. According to credible sources, the money was funneled to — and divided by — Federal Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Yusuf Mohamed Adan and Omar Faruk Osman, Secretary-General of the Federation of Somali Trade Unions. What was sold to the world as an official government delegation was, in truth, a paid migration pipeline disguised under the Somali flag.
Why This Matters More Than Ever
Some may be tempted to laugh off the incident as just another story from a country long plagued by instability. But to do so would be dangerously naive. This is not merely a case of poor planning or bureaucratic incompetence — it’s state-enabled trafficking.
And the implications go far beyond Switzerland or even Europe.
When government officials abuse their power to smuggle people abroad under the cover of diplomatic missions, they compromise international security. They erode trust between nations. And they open the door for much darker forces — including terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab — to exploit the very same routes, documents, and diplomatic privileges.
This is where the scandal moves from corruption to national security emergency.
If diplomatic passports, official delegation slots, and travel visas can be bought with bribes, then what is to stop Al-Shabaab operatives or sympathizers from purchasing their way into Europe? The group has a well-documented history of infiltration — not just through backdoor smuggling routes, but through institutional compromise. These aren’t just hypotheticals; they are strategic concerns for intelligence agencies across Europe and the U.S.
Recent investigations have revealed alarming levels of visa fraud linked to Somali civil servants and government officials. According to a 2024 report by the Somaliland Chronicle, of 700 U.S. visas issued to Somali civil servants, an astounding 600 resulted in overstays, signaling systemic abuse of the visa system. Such staggering figures not only expose rampant corruption but also raise profound security concerns.
The fraudulent visa process reportedly costs between $20,000 to $25,000 per visa, suggesting a lucrative black market operation potentially funneling millions of dollars into corrupt Somali officials’ pockets. This financial exploitation adds another layer of complexity to the problem, where political manipulation benefits certain factions within the Somali government, undermining genuine governance.
Let’s be clear: it only takes one bad actor to slip through a corrupt channel like this to cause irreparable damage. And in Somalia, where terrorist networks often overlap with political and business interests, the lines are dangerously blurred. This is why nations enact travel bans. This is why vetting is not just about documentation — it’s about trust. And Somalia’s institutions, by all accounts, have proven untrustworthy.
When travel visas become tools for criminal enrichment or terrorist movement, the international community has no choice but to respond with caution — and, in some cases, with restriction.
Trump’s Travel Ban: Revisited in Light of Reality When President Trump imposed the travel ban on Somalia, he was criticized for targeting a vulnerable population. And indeed, the vast majority of Somalis — honest, hardworking people — should not be held accountable for the actions of corrupt elites.
But Trump’s rationale was not built solely on race, religion, or prejudice. It was rooted in national security concerns — concerns that were mocked at the time but now seem prescient.
When Trump said Somalia had “no government, no police, no security, no safety — just anarchy,” he wasn’t inventing a narrative. He was summarizing a reality that, unfortunately, keeps proving itself again and again. If a delegation to a respected international summit can be turned into a human trafficking scheme, what further proof do we need that Somalia is not in control of its own borders, identity systems, or diplomatic processes?
The Real Victims: The Somali People and International Trust It’s important to remember who suffers most from these scandals. Not just the Western countries who must adjust their immigration policies, but the ordinary Somali citizens whose chances at legitimate travel, study, or asylum are diminished by the criminality of their own government.
The more Somalia’s name is associated with corruption, fraud, and instability, the more doors will be closed to genuine Somali applicants. And the more foreign governments will be justified in treating Somalia not as a partner — but as a risk.
Conclusion: When Leadership Sells Its People What happened in Geneva is not a diplomatic mishap — it’s a national embarrassment and a security wake-up call. The fact that passports and visas can be bought through Somali government channels shows a system in collapse. It reveals a leadership class not interested in representing its people, but in selling them — one visa at a time.
Trump’s words, once dismissed as harsh or simplistic, now carry the weight of evidence. Whether or not one agrees with his politics, the reality is clear: Somalia’s internal failures do not stay internal. They travel. They migrate. And they destabilize.
Until Somalia can prove it has functioning institutions, enforce accountability, and protect the integrity of its diplomatic processes, no country should be blamed for taking precautions.
In this case, Trump was right.
About the Author
Hussein Egeh is a strategic communications and mass media specialist living in Hargeisa Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Outgoing commander’s expected June trip to Hargeisa follows dramatic reversal on Somalia security claims
The Trump administration has nominated Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin Anderson to replace Marine Gen. Michael Langley at Africa Command, setting the stage for a leadership transition as Langley prepares for what sources say will be a long-awaited visit to Somaliland in June.
Anderson’s nomination, announced by the Pentagon on Wednesday, comes at a particularly awkward moment. Just days ago, Langley publicly admitted that Al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy and large” in Somalia despite billions in U.S. assistance. The admission represents a reversal from his earlier optimism—and raises questions about Anderson’s own track record of assessments.
Somaliland Visit Finally Taking Shape
A senior Somaliland government official, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, confirmed that discussions about Langley’s visit have been ongoing for months, although no firm dates have been finalized. The visit preparations have reportedly intensified following President Cirro’s inauguration.
The visit would mark the highest-level AFRICOM engagement with Somaliland since Gen. Stephen Townsend toured Berbera’s strategic facilities in 2022. For Hargeisa, which has lobbied intensively for greater U.S. military cooperation, Langley’s trip represents a potential breakthrough—especially given his newfound skepticism about Mogadishu’s capabilities.
AFRICOM did not respond to request for information on the matter.
From Optimism to Reality Check
The contrast between Langley’s current assessment and his previous statements is striking. When Somaliland Chronicle asked him last June about signs of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence, Langley described himself as “measuredly optimistic” and pointed to joint operations with Somali forces as evidence the militant group was weakening.
That optimism evaporated after Al-Shabaab overran Adan Yabal, sending U.S.-trained Danab special forces fleeing and capturing millions in American-supplied equipment. In his final remarks from Nairobi, Langley acknowledged that Al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy and large” despite decades of U.S. assistance.
Anderson’s Baggage
If confirmed by the Senate, Anderson would become the first Air Force officer to lead AFRICOM. But his nomination carries its own complications. As commander of Special Operations Command Africa from 2019 to 2021, Anderson repeatedly praised Somali forces’ capabilities.
Senate Armed Services Committee members are expected to grill Anderson about these assessments during confirmation hearings. With Congress already moving to slash Somalia funding—Sen. Jim Risch’s new legislation would impose strict conditions on peacekeeping money—Anderson will face tough questions about his judgment.
Berbera Back in Play?
For Somaliland, the leadership change at AFRICOM could’nt come at a better time. President Cirro’s administration has made expanding military partnerships a priority, and Berbera’s strategic location on the Gulf of Aden remains a compelling asset for any serious U.S. strategy in the region.
The timing is particularly significant given China’s growing influence in the region. Somalia’s recent decision to ban Taiwanese passport holders—a clear nod to Beijing—has raised concerns in Washington. Combined with the loss of U.S. military access in Niger, AFRICOM faces a shrinking footprint across Africa.
Corruption and Consequences
The Trump administration’s decision to cut funding for Somali forces, including canceling $400 monthly salary supplements for Danab soldiers, followed damning audits revealing widespread corruption. Officials discovered padded fuel requisitions, phantom soldiers on payrolls, and food rations being sold on the black market.
These revelations supported longstanding Somaliland arguments about international aid effectiveness in Mogadishu. The international community has invested heavily in Somalia for decades with limited improvement.
Anderson, a Michigan native commissioned in 1992, holds a masters degree from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His background includes stints as deputy director for operations at Indo-Pacific Command and overseeing the controversial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in 2020-21.
What’s Next
As Langley prepares for his Somaliland visit—assuming it actually happens this time—the question becomes whether Anderson will continue this engagement or revert to the traditional Somalia-first approach that has dominated U.S. policy for three decades.
Somaliland Chronicle first reported in December that Langley was “set to visit Somaliland in the coming days,” citing sources familiar with internal deliberations. That visit, expected amid what the publication described as “a notable shift in U.S. foreign policy dynamics,” ultimately did not materialize.
The Senate has yet to schedule Anderson’s confirmation hearing, but the combination of his past statements, Langley’s reversal, and Congress’ growing skepticism about Somalia aid suggests it won’t be a smooth process.
One thing seems certain: whoever leads AFRICOM next will inherit a Somalia policy facing significant challenges and a Somaliland seeking greater recognition. After 30 years of substantial investment in Mogadishu with limited results, Washington may be reconsidering its regional approach.
Al-ICTISAAM is an ideologically motivated movement that operates covertly within Somaliland under the guise of religious, humanitarian, and educational initiatives. While publicly distancing itself from overt political activity, Al-ICTISAAM is widely believed to pursue a long-term agenda that directly threatens the sovereignty, independence, and constitutional integrity of the Republic of Somaliland. This article provides a comprehensive examination of the origins, ideological underpinnings, and clandestine operations of the group, with particular focus on its strategic objectives in Somaliland. Furthermore, it outlines policy recommendations aimed at neutralizing its influence and safeguarding Somaliland’s hard-won independence and democratic foundations.
1. Introduction
The Republic of Somaliland, an unrecognized but de facto independent state in the Horn of Africa, has emerged over the past three decades as a beacon of peace and democratic governance in a turbulent region. However, this progress is now under increasing threat from both state and non-state actors, among whom Al-ICTISAAM poses a particularly insidious challenge. Unlike conventional threats such as terrorism or external military aggression, Al-ICTISAAM represents a subtler, ideologically driven infiltration aimed at undermining Somaliland’s statehood from within.
Operating under the guise of religious piety and educational service, Al-ICTISAAM has steadily expanded both the scale and sophistication of its activities in Somaliland. Its adherents have successfully infiltrated vital organs of the state, including the judiciary and legislative branches, while simultaneously extending their reach through traditional clan leadership structures and a widespread network of madrassas, private universities, and religious institutions. If left unchallenged, this covert expansion threatens to undermine the core principles upon which the Somaliland state is built, erode its hard-earned democratic achievements, and reorient its trajectory toward the irredentist vision of a unified Greater Somalia.
2. Origins and Ideological Foundations
Al-ICTISAAM is not a recent creation. It is a direct ideological and organizational descendant of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, an armed Islamist movement active in the Somali territories during the late 1980s and 1990s. While Al-Itihaad was eventually weakened by regional counterterrorism measures—particularly military operations by Ethiopian forces—its ideological residue survived in various fragmented groups, of which Al-ICTISAAM is the most prominent.
Ideologically, Al-ICTISAAM is rooted in Salafi-Wahhabi doctrines, but its operational philosophy closely aligns with the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya—a group known for its rigid fundamentalism and strategic use of societal infiltration. Unlike mainstream Salafi scholars who reject political involvement, Al-ICTISAAM subscribes to the concept of political Islam, where the state must be governed according to their narrow interpretation of Sharia. In the Somali context, this ideology is fused with Somali irredentism—the belief that all Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa (including parts of Ethiopia and Kenya) must be united under one Islamic Somali polity.
This blend of religious fundamentalism and territorial revanchism makes Al-ICTISAAM a uniquely dangerous entity. It not only challenges the internal sovereignty of Somaliland but also projects a regional threat to neighboring countries with significant Somali populations.
3. Al-ICTISAAM in Somaliland: Disguise and Penetration
Due to Somaliland’s firm stance on its independence from the Federal Republic of Somalia, Al-ICTISAAM does not operate under its formal name within its borders. Instead, it masquerades as a network of humanitarian, religious, and educational NGOs, thereby avoiding direct confrontation with the authorities while establishing strongholds in communities.
3.1. Educational Institutions as Instruments of Indoctrination
One of the most strategic tools employed by Al-ICTISAAM is its ownership and management of educational institutions. These institutions present themselves as centers of Islamic learning but serve as recruitment and indoctrination hubs for young minds, particularly students with limited exposure to formal education.
Quranic schools, or dugsi, are especially vulnerable. These institutions provide little to no exposure to civic education, critical thinking, or national history—making their students easy targets for ideological manipulation. Through a curriculum heavily infused with Salafi dogma and pan-Somali narratives, students are gradually alienated from Somaliland’s state institutions and constitutional values.
3.2. Institutional Infiltration
Alarming reports indicate that Al-ICTISAAM has successfully planted sympathizers and operatives in various branches of the Somaliland government. Perhaps most troubling is the pending appointment of individuals affiliated with the movement to high judicial positions, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Such infiltration enables the group to influence legislation, block legal reforms, and protect its members from prosecution.
Furthermore, the movement boasts sympathizers in the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers, some of whom promote a conciliatory narrative toward unification with Somalia under religious or pan-Somali pretenses.
3.3. Exploiting Traditional Authority for Strategic Legitimacy
In addition to educational and institutional infiltration, Al-ICTISAAM employs a more subtle yet highly effective method to gain grassroots legitimacy and political access—strategic appropriation of traditional clan leadership roles, particularly the titles of Sultans, Garads, and other customary leaders.
This tactic reflects a sophisticated understanding of the deep sociopolitical structure of Somali society, where customary institutions often wield greater influence than formal state mechanisms, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas. By positioning their members or sympathizers as clan elders, Al-ICTISAAM seeks to bypass state authority and embed itself directly within the cultural and communal frameworks that shape public opinion and local decision-making.
These positions are not merely symbolic. In Somaliland’s hybrid governance system, traditional authorities play a critical role in conflict resolution, electoral mobilization, inter-clan negotiations, and even in legitimizing or delegitimizing political actors. Control over such roles gives Al-ICTISAAM unparalleled influence to shape political discourse, sway community allegiances, and obstruct government policies that contradict their ideological objectives.
Moreover, once installed as traditional leaders, these individuals often mask their ideological affiliations under the guise of cultural conservatism, making it difficult for authorities or communities to distinguish between genuine community leadership and covert ideological activism. In this way, Al-ICTISAAM manages to legitimize its presence without raising immediate suspicion, using the language of tradition and clan unity to advance a deeply political and religiously radical agenda.
This exploitation of clan leadership not only reinforces the group’s influence at the grassroots level but also facilitates its penetration into formal governance structures, as traditional elders often serve as intermediaries in government consultations, appointments, and conflict mediation efforts. If left unaddressed, this tactic will continue to erode Somaliland’s state-centric governance model and empower anti-state actors within the very foundations of Somali society.
4. Reaction to Somaliland’s National Identity
Al-ICTISAAM has grown increasingly alarmed by the national consciousness exhibited by the people of Somaliland, particularly the youth. The most visible manifestation of this was the 2025 celebrations of 18th May, the day Somaliland commemorates its withdrawal from the failed union with Somalia.
This year’s celebration was particularly vibrant, with participation from all sectors of society—including schoolchildren, civil servants, and religious leaders. This display of unity and patriotism directly contradicted Al-ICTISAAM’s internal assessments, which falsely suggested that their efforts were softening public attitudes toward reunification.
In reaction:
The group boycotted National Day celebrations and prohibited students under their influence from carrying the Somaliland flag.
Senior figures within the movement pressured respected scholars, such as Sheikh Mustafe Haji Ismail, to publicly criticize the symbolism of the flag—claiming its use distorted Islamic principles.
Inflammatory sermons by Sheikh Umal, a Nairobi-based spiritual leader, called on the group to “leave no stone unturned” to salvate the country from reckless politicians—coded language that can incite subversive actions.
Another cleric, Sheikh Shibili, irresponsibly alleged that homosexuals were running schools in Hargeisa, thereby inciting panic and creating an environment conducive to extremist violence.
These actions illustrate the group’s desperation and its willingness to exploit religious rhetoric to instigate unrest and delegitimize Somaliland’s democratic institutions.
5. Selective Outrage and the Weaponization of Religious Symbols
Among the most glaring contradictions in Al-ICTISAAM’s ideological posture is its selective outrage concerning the use of religious symbols—particularly those featured on national flags. During the 2025 commemoration of Somaliland’s Independence Day, the group went to great lengths to condemn the public display of the national flag, citing supposed violations of Islamic decorum due to the presence of the Shahada (Islamic testimony of faith) on the flag. These denunciations were not only voiced locally by their affiliates but were also echoed by their foreign-based spiritual leadership, including Nairobi-based clerics such as Sheikh Umal and Sheikh Shibli.
Yet, this criticism is both disingenuous and hypocritical when placed in a broader Islamic and geopolitical context. Notably, Saudi Arabia—regarded by Wahhabi-oriented Somali clerics as the spiritual epicenter of Islam—has never faced internal clerical objections for the use of its national flag, which also bears the Shahada, during national holidays, public events, or even on consumer goods. Saudi citizens frequently wave the flag in mass celebrations, including sporting events and Independence Day festivities, without drawing any rebuke from their religious establishment.
This inconsistency raises an unavoidable question: Why do Somali clerics influenced by Wahhabi ideology selectively object to Somaliland’s patriotic expressions, while remaining silent about identical practices in Saudi Arabia, a country they revere? If the display of a flag bearing the Shahada is inherently un-Islamic, then why is this criticism only reserved for the people of Somaliland?
The answer lies not in theology, but in political expediency and ideological subversion. Al-ICTISAAM’s opposition is not rooted in genuine religious doctrine but is part of a calculated effort to delegitimize Somaliland’s sovereignty and national identity by weaponizing religion. By framing the celebration of national pride as a theological violation, the group aims to alienate citizens from their national institutions, particularly the youth who are increasingly embracing Somaliland’s distinct identity and democratic values.
These manipulations are not theological clarifications but ideological instruments, carefully crafted to erode national cohesion and sow religious and political discord. They are designed to instill guilt, shame, and confusion among patriotic citizens, thereby opening the door for Al-ICTISAAM’s broader goal of reintegration into a pan-Somali Islamic state.
6. Strategic Goals of Al-ICTISAAM in Somaliland
The long-term strategic objectives of Al-ICTISAAM in Somaliland are multifaceted:
Undermine National Sovereignty: The core goal is to reverse Somaliland’s independence and reintegrate it into the Somali federal framework as a stepping stone for broader irredentist ambitions.
Capture Key State Institutions: Through infiltration, the group seeks to exert influence on policymaking, judicial decisions, and traditional clan structures, ensuring that pro-Somaliland voices are marginalized or neutralized.
Control Education and Religious Discourse: By dominating religious education and controlling Islamic institutions, Al-ICTISAAM aims to rewrite national identity in its own ideological terms.
Dismantle Civic Nationalism: Promoting a transnational Islamist identity over civic nationalism is key to fragmenting Somaliland’s internal unity and replacing it with religious allegiance to an abstract, pan-Somali caliphate.
7. Recommendations: Policy Options to Neutralize the Threat
Given the existential threat posed by Al-ICTISAAM, the Somaliland government must respond with a combination of legal, educational, intelligence, and diplomatic measures. The following policy options are proposed:
7.1. Educational Reforms and Oversight
All private religious and educational institutions must be licensed, regulated, and periodically audited by the Ministry of Education and Higher Studies.
Institutions found to propagate anti-state ideology must be nationalized or shut down.
Develop a standardized national curriculum that integrates civic education, critical thinking, and Somaliland’s constitutional history from primary through tertiary levels.
7.2. Political and Civil Service Vetting
Introduce a mandatory security and ideological background check for all candidates running for elected office and those nominated to civil service posts.
Strengthen the role of the National Intelligence Agency to vet appointees for affiliation with extremist movements or foreign ideologies.
Establish a watchlist mechanism that flags individuals or organizations promoting anti-state propaganda.
7.3. Legal Measures and Accountability
Introduce legislation to criminalize covert support for foreign-based Islamist movements that threaten the constitutional order.
Freeze the assets of institutions and individuals found to be in material support of Al-ICTISAAM’s operations.
Offer a legal framework for voluntary disengagement, where members of the movement can renounce their affiliation and undergo periodic monitoring and deradicalization.
7.4. Public Awareness Campaigns
Launch nationwide awareness campaigns that expose the ideological agenda of Al-ICTISAAM and promote Somaliland’s achievements in peace, democracy, and development.
Collaborate with respected Islamic scholars who support Somaliland’s statehood to rebut extremist interpretations of Islam in mosques and media platforms.
7.5. Diplomatic Engagement
Engage with regional allies, including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, to monitor cross-border activities and funding streams associated with Al-ICTISAAM.
Seek support from the African Union and international partners to classify Al-ICTISAAM as a security threat similar to Al-Shabaab and other transnational extremist groups.
8. Conclusion
Al-ICTISAAM represents a serious and imminent threat to the Republic of Somaliland. Cloaked in religious legitimacy and operating under the radar of traditional security paradigms, the movement seeks to undo three decades of peacebuilding, institution-building, and democratic governance. Its tactics are not merely ideological but deeply strategic—aimed at hijacking the state from within rather than through direct confrontation.
If Somaliland is to preserve its independence, territorial integrity, and democratic values, it must act decisively. This requires a coordinated approach that integrates intelligence, education, law enforcement, civil society, and diplomacy. The ideological battle for Somaliland’s future will not be won in the battlefield, but in the minds of its youth, the resilience of its institutions, and the unity of its people.
About the Author
Abdullahi Hussein is a PhD candidate in Peace & Development Studies and visiting Professor of Public Policy as well as Ethics in Government at the Civil Service Institute, Hargeisa, Somaliland. He can be reached at abhussein1988[at]gmail.com
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Irro” of Somaliland concluded a significant diplomatic tour in May 2025, visiting neighboring Djibouti and regional powerhouse Kenya. The visits aimed to strengthen bilateral relations and advance Somaliland’s foreign policy objectives. While the trip to Kenya saw notable developments, the reception in Djibouti underscored the persistent challenges Somaliland faces in its quest for international recognition.
Djibouti: A Low-Key Affair Amidst Strategic Interests
President Irro’s visit to Djibouti was his first to an African nation since taking office. Initial reports suggested a warm reception, with Djiboutian officials reportedly referring to Irro as “President of the Republic of Somaliland.” However, deeper observation revealed a more nuanced reality.
During the two presidents’ discussions, the flag of Somaliland was conspicuously absent from official displays. This subtle but significant detail highlights Djibouti’s delicate balancing act, as it seeks to maintain its relationship with Somaliland while adhering to the international consensus that still considers Somaliland part of Somalia.
Crucially, discussions regarding Somaliland’s international recognition were not on the agenda. Instead, the focus was primarily on issues of mutual economic interest, particularly the utilization of Djibouti’s fiber optic cable network in Somaliland. President Irro toured Djibouti Telecom’s Haramous submarine cable station, the country’s undersea fiber-optic hub, signaling Somaliland’s keen interest in enhancing its digital infrastructure through Djiboutian connectivity. While this collaboration promises economic benefits for both sides, it reinforces that Djibouti’s engagement with Hargeisa remains largely pragmatic and economic, rather than political endorsement of Somaliland’s sovereignty.
The low-level reception, devoid of the customary diplomatic symbols of statehood, suggests Djibouti’s cautious approach, especially in light of its strained relations with Somaliland following the controversial Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2024. Djibouti, heavily reliant on Ethiopian trade, was reportedly concerned by the MoU, which offered Ethiopia a naval base in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland. President Irro’s visit to Djibouti appears to have been a move to mend these ties, focusing on shared economic opportunities rather than contentious political issues.
Kenya: A Step Towards Greater Engagement, Despite Somali Opposition
In contrast to the subdued reception in Djibouti, President Irro’s visit to Kenya, his third foreign trip since assuming office, saw more overt displays of engagement. Despite strong opposition from the Federal Government of Somalia and initial statements from Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirming Somalia’s territorial integrity, President Irro was received by Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Mining, Blue Economy, and Maritime Affairs, Hassan Ali Joho.
A significant development during the Kenyan visit was the inauguration of Somaliland’s new diplomatic mission office in Nairobi on May 29, 2025. This move, a relocation and upgrade of Somaliland’s existing liaison office, proceeded despite Mogadishu’s sustained lobbying efforts to prevent it. While Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the mission does not “enjoy the imprimatur of the Republic of Kenya,” President William Ruto met with President Irro on the same day, a clear indication of Kenya’s willingness to pursue its own regional interests.
Discussions between President Irro and President Ruto reportedly covered a range of bilateral and regional issues, including trade, security, education, and institutional development. While direct recognition of Somaliland was not declared, the meeting and the upgrade of the diplomatic mission represent a significant step in Somaliland’s efforts to enhance its international presence and establish more formal relations with key regional players.
Conclusion: A Long Road Ahead for Recognition
President Irro’s May 2025 diplomatic tour highlights the ongoing complexities of Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition. While the visits secured pragmatic cooperation, particularly in economic sectors, the underlying political challenge remains. Djibouti’s reserved reception, notably the absence of Somaliland’s flag, underscores the reluctance of some neighboring states to upset the delicate regional balance by fully endorsing Somaliland’s independence. Kenya’s more assertive engagement, despite objections from Somalia, indicates a growing willingness among some nations to engage with Somaliland based on practical interests.
For Somaliland, the path to full international recognition continues to be a gradual and multifaceted diplomatic endeavor, built on demonstrating its stability, democratic governance, and strategic importance in the Horn of Africa.
Special Report | AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley acknowledges al-Shabaab resurgence after decades of US investment as Trump cuts Somalia funding. Full analysis.
Key Points
Policy Reversal: General Langley admits Al-Shabaab is “entrenched, wealthy, and large” after previously claiming US operations were “weakening” the group
Strategic Defeat: Al-Shabaab overran major US-backed base at Adan Yabal, forcing elite Danab forces to flee and abandon millions in weapons
Funding Cuts: Trump administration ended $400/month salary supplements and logistical support following audits revealing “padded requisitions”
China’s Victory: Somalia banned Taiwanese passport holders while receiving US military support, effectively serving Beijing’s regional objectives
Electoral Charade: Hassan Sheikh promises impossible “one-person, one-vote” elections while two-thirds of country remains under militant control
Intelligence Failure: President cycles through spy chiefs amid accusations of Al-Shabaab infiltration at highest levels of security apparatus
Command Uncertainty: Trump administration considers merging AFRICOM with European Command as Langley announces successor nomination pending
General Michael Langley delivered what he called his “last, final Chiefs of Defense Conference as the AFRICOM commander” with a stunning admission: after three decades and tens of billions of dollars in US investment, al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” – a complete reversal from his previous assessments dismissing reports of the group’s resurgence.
Commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Michael Langley attend the Morocco-US military exercise “African Lion 2024” in Agadir on May 30, 2024. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP) (Photo by FADEL SENNA/AFP via Getty Images)
The farewell briefing, delivered from Nairobi following the African Chiefs of Defense Conference, came as the Trump administration implements sweeping cuts to Somalia funding and considers merging AFRICOM with European Command. Langley announced that “a nomination for my successor is expected soon,” marking the end of an era that saw America’s most expensive counterterrorism failure in Africa.
The timing of Langley’s admissions couldn’t be more damaging to his legacy. Just days before the briefing, al-Shabaab forces overran the strategic town of Adan Yabal, forcing US-trained Somali National Army troops to flee their largest operational base and abandon millions of dollars in American-supplied weapons.
Langley’s current assessment stands in stark contrast to his statements just 11 months ago. In June 2024, when the Somaliland Chronicle pressed him about obvious signs of al-Shabaab’s resurgence and territorial gains, Langley expressed “measured optimism about the Somali government’s counterinsurgency efforts” and claimed “joint operations have been instrumental in weakening al-Shabaab’s grip on several regions.”
When confronted about Somalia’s divided focus between fighting terrorism and pursuing regional conflicts against democratic partners, Langley “carefully sidestepped a direct response” and deflected with diplomatic language about “comprehensive approaches.”
The reality was always obvious to regional observers. Al-Shabaab was regrouping, rearming, and preparing for major operations. The group’s February 2025 “Operation Ramadan” saw militants seize “more than 15 towns and villages” in a single day, while the March assassination attempt against Somalia’s president demonstrated their operational reach into the capital itself.
Now, facing the undeniable collapse of Somali security forces and his own imminent departure, Langley finally concedes what critics have long argued: the entire Somalia policy has failed spectacularly.
The Adan Yabal Catastrophe
The collapse that prompted US airstrikes on April 16 wasn’t just another tactical setback – it represented the complete failure of America’s Somalia strategy. Adan Yabal served as “a critical logistical hub” and “an operating base for raids on al-Shabaab,” strategically positioned 245 kilometers north of Mogadishu to project government power into militant-controlled territory.
The base housed not just regular army units but Somalia’s elite Danab special forces – the 2,500-strong unit that traditionally led the fight against al-Shabaab with US training, equipment, and until recently, direct salary support. When militants attacked before dawn, these supposedly elite forces simply fled, abandoning sophisticated weapons systems, vehicles, and communications equipment worth millions.
Al-Shabaab claimed to have “overrun 10 military installations during the fighting,” while government forces retreated so quickly that conflicting accounts emerged about who actually controlled the town. The psychological impact was immediate, with one resident reporting hearing explosions and gunfire as militants attacked “from two directions.”
Trump’s Reality Check
The Adan Yabal debacle coincided perfectly with the Trump administration’s decision to end the decades-long Somalia funding spigot. Since February, the US stopped paying stipends that boosted Danab members’ salaries to $400 per month – double what regular soldiers receive. Food support ended in April 2024, fuel support ceased in March 2025, following US audits that found Somali forces had “padded food and fuel requisitions.”
These cuts directly correlate with al-Shabaab’s recent gains. Insurgents have “taken back dozens of villages” and “regained the ability to operate in nearly a third of the territory they lost to federal forces in 2022.” The militants have mortared Mogadishu’s international airport and bombed the president’s motorcade, killing four people while demonstrating their capability to strike anywhere.
Yet despite this obvious correlation between reduced support and military failures, Langley’s briefing still suggested lingering faith in the fundamental Somalia model. His emphasis on “institution building across the Somali National Army” and addressing “root causes of instability” indicates AFRICOM leadership may not fully grasp that they’re advocating for continued investment in a demonstrably failed enterprise.
This wasn’t diplomatic neutrality but active support for Beijing’s regional strategy. Somalia serves as China’s proxy in regional conflicts, with key government advisers like Hodan Osman serving as “the main conduit to China” while “heavy weaponry not normally present” floods into contested areas to support Chinese objectives against US partners.
The irony of the situation is stark: America conducted over 25 airstrikes in Somalia in 2025 to support a government that has publicly aligned with Beijing’s strategic objectives. Each precision strike that protects Somali government forces indirectly supports Chinese regional goals, creating an unusual dynamic where US military action serves competitors’ interests.
Current estimates suggest two-thirds of Somalia remains under direct or indirect Al-Shabaab control, while in government-controlled Mogadishu, the federal government and Al-Shabaab operate parallel taxation systems that extract revenue from the same businesses. This isn’t state failure – it’s a business model that requires ongoing chaos to justify international intervention.
Langley’s warning that funding shortfalls could benefit Al-Shabaab highlights the dependency relationship. The system requires external funding to maintain the appearance of governance while multiple parties benefit from the arrangement.
The Propaganda Counterattack
A Washington Post article published shortly after Langley’s briefing highlighted concerns about Al-Shabaab’s resurgence following US funding cuts. The piece noted that “insurgents have taken back dozens of villages, including the strategic town of Adan Yabaal” and linked this to reduced American support for Somali forces.
Critics argue such reporting follows a predictable pattern: acknowledging military setbacks while suggesting more funding rather than examining why previous investment failed to create sustainable capabilities. The coverage serves various stakeholders who benefit from continued US engagement, including defense contractors, aid organizations, and Somali officials.
Hassan Sheikh’s Political Survival Strategy
As security failures mount and international support evaporates, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud appears to be throwing desperate political Hail Marys that underscore his government’s isolation and weakness.
In a pattern that suggests either panic or political calculation, Hassan Sheikh has embarked on two unrealistic initiatives that critics view as attempts to extend his hold on power. First, he has announced plans for “one-person, one-vote” direct elections scheduled for 2025-2026 – Somalia’s first such polls since 1967. The announcement, made at an April 2025 voter registration campaign in Mogadishu, promises local elections in June 2025 and parliamentary elections in September.
The electoral pledge faces immediate practical obstacles. Opposition leaders, including former presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, have rejected the plan outright, calling it “unilateral” and warning they could organize a parallel vote. Two of Somalia’s federal member states – Puntland and Jubaland – have refused to participate, with Puntland declaring it no longer recognizes federal institutions.
More fundamentally, the promise of nationwide elections appears divorced from security realities. With Al-Shabaab controlling an estimated two-thirds of Somalia’s territory and conducting major operations within 50 kilometers of Mogadishu, the logistics of conducting credible elections across the country seem impossible.
Simultaneously, Hassan Sheikh has engaged in musical chairs with his intelligence leadership, repeatedly firing and rehiring spy chiefs in what appears to be a futile search for competent security management. In May 2022, he appointed Mahad Mohamed Salad as Director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), replacing Fahad Yasin Haji Dahir, who had served under the previous administration.
However, the appointment quickly proved problematic. Former NISA chief Fahad Yasin launched a “blistering attack” on Salad, claiming he was “behind a series of assassinations and bombings in Mogadishu” and describing him as an Al-Shabaab operative who “facilitated their operations.” Yasin alleged that Hassan Sheikh had received warnings about Salad’s background but appointed him anyway.
By 2024, Hassan Sheikh had apparently soured on Salad, with reports indicating the intelligence chief “resigned from his position” after two years in the role. In what appears to be a return to previous arrangements, Hassan Sheikh has reportedly brought back Fahad Yasin to head NISA once again – the same official he had replaced Salad with originally.
The intelligence musical chairs reflects deeper problems with Somalia’s security apparatus. The NISA has been described as “a tool for silencing critics and independent media houses,” while being plagued by accusations of extrajudicial killings, including the high-profile murder of female intelligence officer Ikran Tahlil Farah in 2021.
These moves appear designed more for political survival than effective governance. The electoral promises provide a democratic veneer while the security reshuffles suggest desperate searches for loyalty rather than competence. Both initiatives face immediate obstacles that make success unlikely, suggesting they serve primarily as time-buying exercises for a president running out of options.
AFRICOM’s Uncertain Future
Langley’s farewell comes as the Trump administration considers merging AFRICOM with European Command to “cut bureaucracy.” The general acknowledged this uncertainty, telling reporters that “the United States is assessing the future of its military command for Africa” and calling on African governments to make their views known in Washington.
The potential merger would effectively end AFRICOM as an independent command – a fitting conclusion to an organization that presided over America’s most expensive strategic failure in Africa. Under Langley’s leadership since August 2022, AFRICOM doubled down on the failed Somalia model while losing Niger, seeing Chad expel US forces, and watching China expand its influence across the continent.
As the first Black four-star general in Marine Corps history, Langley’s tenure should have been a historic success. Instead, it concluded with admitting that Somalia’s security situation had deteriorated despite decades of American support, while China expanded its influence across the continent.
The Regional Alternative
While Somalia continues its expensive performance of statehood, genuine alternatives exist in the region. Somaliland has maintained democratic governance and effective counterterrorism capabilities for over three decades without international recognition or significant aid. The territory’s “proven track record in containing terrorist threats, particularly Al-Shabaab” demonstrates what functional governance looks like without the stabilization industrial complex.
Berbera’s strategic port offers “optimal forward operating base” capabilities with “strategic reach extending across multiple areas of operation” – from Al-Shabaab strongholds to Houthi maritime threats. Yet US policy continues supporting Somalia’s fiction while ignoring democratic realities that could actually advance American strategic interests.
Notably, Langley is reportedly planning to visit Somaliland in his final days as AFRICOM commander – perhaps finally acknowledging the democratic partner America should have been working with all along.
The Bottom Line: Horn of Africa Policy Crossroads
General Langley’s farewell briefing represents more than the end of his tenure – it marks the collapse of three decades of American counterterrorism investment in Somalia totaling tens of billions of dollars. His admission that al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” after decades of investment should prompt serious questions about every aspect of US Horn of Africa policy.
The Trump administration’s decision to reduce Somalia funding represents a shift from previous policy. Officials argue that continued engagement without measurable progress constitutes poor use of resources. The Somali government’s alignment with Chinese foreign policy objectives, including its ban on Taiwanese passport holders, has further complicated the relationship.
As Langley prepares for retirement and awaits his successor’s nomination, questions remain about the future of US engagement in Somalia. The contradiction between increased airstrikes and reduced institutional support reflects the challenge facing American policymakers: how to address immediate security threats while avoiding long-term dependency relationships that have proven ineffective.
The tragedy isn’t just the wasted resources or strategic humiliation. It’s that every dollar spent propping up Somalia’s elaborate fiction could have been invested in genuine regional partners who actually fight terrorism and support democratic values.
General Langley asked in 2022 why he was excited to lead AFRICOM into the future. Three years later, he leaves having proven exactly why America needs fewer commands chasing failed states and more partnerships with functional democracies.
The question isn’t whether al-Shabaab will exploit funding gaps – as Langley warns – but whether his successor will finally have the courage to admit what everyone except AFRICOM already knows: Somalia’s counterterrorism model is unsalvageable, and it’s time to back functional democracies instead of subsidizing failed states.
