In a decree issued today by Somaliland Presidency, the President of the Republic of Somaliland H.E. Muse Bihi Abdi stated that anyone participating in the political process in Somalia will be prosecuted as a traitor according to existing Parliamentary, House of Elders, and Presidential decrees issued in 2003.
Somaliland has been grappling with a political revolving door where many Somalilanders would run for office in Somalia or vote anonymously in sham elections being held in Somalia for Somaliland. Many heavy-weight politicians who have served in Somalia’s government have returned to Somaliland following Presidential pardons.
President Bihi’s decree prohibiting and criminalizing political participation in Somalia marks a turning point in this long-standing issue and explicitly states that the legal process has to take its course before Presidential pardons can be considered for individuals convicted of breaking this new law.
The current Federal Government of Somalia has many high-ranking officials originally from Somaliland including the Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Mahdi Guleid, the Minister of Finance Mr. Abdirahman Dualeh Beileh, the Minister of Information Mr. Osman Dubbe, and Somalia’s Chief Justice Mr. Bashe Y. Ahmed among others.
Most recently, Mr. Osman Aw-Mohamoud Mohamed widely known as “Buur Madow” or Black Mountain, a prominent elder and a self-styled King has visited Mogadishu where he was initially welcome but caused an uproar following a controversial remark.
President Bihi’s decree instructed Somaliland’s law enforcement agencies to execute the Parliamentary and House of Elders decision and prosecute anyone who breaks this law for national treason.
Although many Somalilanders openly question the value of talks with Somalia, President Bihi’s decree stopped short of abandoning the fruitless talks with Somalia and stated that only the government can participate in meetings with Somalia.
It is unclear if the Somaliland government will change its ambiguous posture in dealing with foreign diplomats who have openly endorsed and encouraged the inclusion of Somaliland in Somalia elections with unknown voters.
The Republic of Somaliland is a quintessential example of the phoenix that rose from the ashes, a country built back from the rubble created by the brutal Barre regime’s systemic genocide. After a prolonged struggle, it won its freedom, eventually regaining its independence on May 18th, 1991 through the ultimate sacrifice paid by its people.
In a rather unfortunate set of circumstances, and after three decades since regaining its independence, Somaliland is showing alarming signs of falling back to the anti-democratic governance of the Barre dictatorship-era under current President Bihi. Modern-day Somaliland is rife with injustices of its own, which include extra-judicial imprisonment of citizens for the slightest infractions. Some examples of these “infringements” (in the eyes of the Bihi administration) comprise of calling President Bihi “local” – a moniker he was presumably awarded for his uncanny ability to ignore the bigger picture in lieu of local issues – or producing political satire. A recent popular segment by up-and-coming comedian Sayidka Barakaysan (The Blessed Lord), depicting a scene of President Bihi discussing the state of the nation’s economy and education with his Ministers, was met with immediate arrest.
What makes injustice in Somaliland unfathomable and particularly regretful, is that Somaliland has one of its most famous freedom fighters at its helm in President Muse Bihi Abdi. His story reads like a Stephen E. Ambrose novel, starting with his career as an officer in the Somali Airforce, to deserting his post to join the Somali National Movement as a member of an organized 3000-man resistance. He and the SNM took the fight to Barre in the name of democracy, and in their struggle, President Bihi was even wounded multiple times.
Just as shocking and regretful, is the fact President Bihi is flanked by Mohamed Kahin as his Minister of Interior, and Brigadier General Dabagale as his Commander of Somaliland Police; both of who have an equally heroic pedigree in fighting at the front lines as members of the SNM.
The latest person to be arrested in Somaliland for mere speech is a young artist who has made a name for himself in skewering politicians satirically, and who speaks to the frustration of the youth and the wider population; but he is just another example of the countless people who have been arrested for expressing their views, and exercising their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech. His case is, however, eerily reminiscent of “kabtan kufay ku qosle,” a famous case quoted by Somalilanders when describing some offenses people were arrested under Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime.
There’s a tendency in Somaliland’s intelligentsia to downplay or outright dismiss the rash of arrests under President Bihi as benign when compared to neighboring Somalia’s complete lawlessness, rigged elections (dominated by NISA agents), and regular mass casualties at the hands of the Al-Shabab terror group, government-sanctioned assassinations, and tribal infighting. In fact, Somaliland’s intelligentsia somehow prefers to blame the International Community for holding Somaliland to a higher standard than its neighbor Somalia, and other despotic states in the Horn.
There is a simple counterargument to this mindset which is abundantly evident: Somaliland is not Somalia, and the fact of the matter is that this way of thinking is extremely problematic, and a hindrance to Somaliland’s quest for international recognition. Somaliland should be held to a higher standard because it has proven itself as the little country that could, and succeeded in nation-building with minimal outside intervention, and has regularly held free and fair elections to the International Community’s measured glee.
Because of these injudicious – and frankly idiotic – arrests, Somaliland’s detractors have been given the green light to sarcastically question the motive for Somalilanders’ rebellion against Siad Barre’s dictatorship, which is an altogether disingenuous argument. While there is no equivalency or comparison – short of making a mockery of the memory of those who sacrificed their lives for Somaliland – President Bihi has done his best to invite the insinuations by treating social commentary as dissent. This is, afterall, where the Barre regime began on the slippery slope that led them to pursue mass extermination of the people of Somaliland. While no one can make an honest argument that this is Somaliland’s trajectory, President Bihi’s inability to remember yesteryear’s atrocities welcomes the comparison.
Arbitrary detention of citizens without due process seeds fear in society and makes them amenable to the status quo. Just like the fictional five monkey experiment, Somalilanders will in due course embrace a culture of collectively punishing anyone going against the grain, to instinctively protect themselves (and the status quo) to their detriment.
In Somaliland, under President Bihi, the arc of the moral universe does not bend towards justice, because those who fought and bled for justice are now perpetrating some of these major injustices against the very people they fought to free. Arbitrary arrest of citizens for exercising their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech is against everything the Republic of Somaliland stands for, and President Bihi who is exhibiting despotic and hypersensitive traits bears sole responsibility for turning Somaliland into a police state causing irreparable harm to its case for recognition. President Bihi who was voted in democratically, in a process collectively owned by the people of Somaliland, is accountable to the citizens via speech at the very least. There are a wide range of issues that need President Bihi’s attention, such as the inconvenient truths highlighted in Sayidka Barkaysan’s recent – and popular for a reason – segment. Instead of arresting the messenger, perhaps it would be more prudent for President Bihi to pursue rectifying the truths that irked him. After all, Somaliland’s democratic credentials shouldn’t be held hostage to President Bihi’s personal shortcomings and insecurities.
Somaliland Chronicle is responsible for the content of this editorial.
A new variant named omicron (B.1.1.529) was reported by researchers in South Africa on Nov. 24, 2021, and designated a “variant of concern” by the World Health Organization two days later. Omicron is very unusual in that it is by far the most heavily mutated variant yet of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19.
The omicron variant has 50 mutations overall, with 32 mutations on the spike protein alone. The spike protein – which forms protruding knobs on the outside of the SARS-CoV-2 virus – helps the virus adhere to cells so that it can gain entry. It is also the protein that all three vaccines currently available in the U.S. use to induce protective antibodies. For comparison, the delta variant has nine mutations. The larger number of mutations in the omicron variant may mean that it could be more transmissible and/or better at evading immune protection – a prospect that is very concerning.
I am a virologist who studies emerging and zoonotic viruses to better understand how new epidemic or pandemic viruses emerge. My research group has been studying various aspects of the COVID-19 virus, including its spillover into animals.
Why do new SARS-CoV-2 variants continue to emerge?
While the unusually high number of mutations in the omicron variant is surprising, the emergence of yet another SARS-CoV-2 variant is not unexpected.
Through natural selection, random mutations accumulate in any virus. This process is sped up in RNA viruses, including SARS-CoV-2. If and when a set of mutations provides a survival advantage to a variant over its predecessors, the variant will out-compete all other existing virus variants.
Does the omicron variant’s greater number of mutations mean it is more dangerous and transmissible than delta? We simply don’t know yet. The conditions that led to the emergence of the variant are not yet clear, but what is clear is that the shear number and configuration of mutations in omicron is unusual.
One possible explanation for how viral variants with multiple mutations emerge is through prolonged infection in a patient whose immune system is suppressed – a situation that can lead to rapid viral evolution. Researchers have hypothesized that some of the earlier SARS-CoV-2 variants, such as the alpha variant, may have stemmed from a persistently infected patient. However, the unusual constellation and numerous mutations in the omicron variant make it very different from all other SARS-CoV-2 strains, which raises questions about how it came about.
Another possible source of variants could be through animal hosts. The virus that causes COVID-19 can infect several animal species, including mink, tigers, lions, cats and dogs. In a study that is not yet peer-reviewed, an international team that I lead recently reported widespread infection by SARS-CoV-2 in free-living and captive white-tailed deer in the U.S. Therefore, we also cannot rule out the possibility that the omicron variant emerged in an animal host through rapid evolution.
Delta is between 40% and 60% more transmissible than the alpha variant and nearly twice as transmissible as the original SARS-CoV-2 virus first identified in China. The delta variant’s heightened transmissibility is the primary reason why researchers believe it was able to out-compete other variants to become the dominant strain.
A key factor in viral fitness is its replication rate – or how quickly a virus can make more copies of itself. The delta variant replicates faster than previous SARS-CoV-2 variants, and a not-yet-peer-reviewed study estimated that it produces 1,000 times more virus particles than its predecessors.
In addition, people infected with the delta variant are making and shedding more virus, which is another potential mechanism for its increased ability to spread. Research suggests that a possible explanation for the delta variant’s heightened ability to replicate is that mutations in the spike protein led to more efficient binding of the spike protein to its host, via the ACE-2 receptor.
Studies also show that people infected with the delta variant have a higher risk of being hospitalized compared to those infected with the original SARS-CoV-2 and early variants. One particular mutation on the spike protein of the delta variant – the P681R mutation – is thought to be a key contributor to its improved ability to enter cells and to cause more severe disease.
Will omicron replace delta?
It is too early to say if the omicron variant is fitter than delta or if it will become dominant. Omicron shares some mutations with the delta variant but also possesses others that are quite different. But one of the reasons why we in the research community are particularly concerned is that the omicron variant has 10 mutations in the receptor-binding domain – the part of the spike protein that interacts with the ACE-2 receptor and mediates entry into cells – compared with just two for the delta variant.
Suppose the combination of all the mutations in omicron makes it either more transmissible or better at immune evasion than delta. In that case, we could see the spread of this variant globally. However, it is also possible that the unusually high number of mutations could be detrimental to the virus and make it unstable.
It is highly likely that the omicron variant is not the endgame and that more SARS-CoV-2 variants will emerge. As SARS-CoV-2 continues to spread among humans, natural selection and adaptation will result in more variants that could plausibly be more transmissible than delta.
We know from influenza viruses that the process of viral adaptation never ends. Lower vaccination rates among many countries means that there are still a lot of susceptible hosts out there for the virus, and that it will continue to circulate and mutate as long as it can spread. The emergence of the omicron variant is yet another reminder of the urgency to vaccinate to stop the further spread and evolution of SARS-CoV-2.
In a directive issued today, the Minister of Telecommunications and Technology Dr. Abdiweli Abdillahi Soufi has banned advertisement text messages sent by telecommunications providers to their customers on behalf of business customers.
Telesom and Somtel, the two telecommunications companies that provide cellphone service, send an inordinate amount of unsolicited text messages to their customers.
The Minister’s directive states that if telecom providers violate the ban of unsolicited messages to customers without their permission will result in a 70 million Somaliland Shillings or 8,000 US dollar fine as defined by Somaliland Telecommunications Law. The directive does not specify an avenue for the public can report infractions to the Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology.
The Ministry of Telecommunication and Technology exerts minimal control and oversight on powerful telecommunications companies and has been unsuccessful in inter-connect the two cellphone carriers of Telesom and Somtel despite many promises.
In addition to the telecommunication service, Telesom and Somtel are also part of the two major banking conglomerates of Dara Salaam Bank and Dahabshiil Bank, which own and operate Zaad and E-Dahab digital currencies widely used throughout Somaliland.
Efforts to reach the telecom companies for comments were unsuccessful.
A high-level government delegation from the Republic of Somaliland, led by Foreign Minister Dr. Essa Kayd Mohamoud accompanied by Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, concluded a six-day visit to Washington, DC, and New York City, where they met with a number of top government officials, advocacy organizations, experts and academics focused on the Horn of Africa. They also held community events with members of the Somaliland diaspora in the United States.
Foreign Minister Kayd and Special Envoy Adan provided updates on recent developments in Somaliland and highlighted the growing need for closer ties with the United States given the many areas of mutual interest between the countries on economic, security, and governance issues in the Horn of Africa. The delegation also outlined the challenges that Somaliland continues to face as an unrecognized nation, including acquiring COVID-19 vaccines from the international community, and provided specific recommendations to advance cooperation between Somaliland and the United States.
In Washington, DC, the delegation participated in a series of meetings with officials from the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development. On Capitol Hill, they met with members and senior staff from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and other relevant committees. They also met with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States and briefed experts from the Atlantic Council, American Enterprise Institute, Jamestown Foundation, U.S. Institute of Peace, Wilson Center, American University, and National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute and Freedom House. In New York, the delegation participated in meetings with United Nations officials and experts on East Africa, peacebuilding, and democratic governance.
“Our visit was an important and timely opportunity to consult with American partners on a range of regional issues that have drawn us closer together than ever before, including the fight against terrorism and instability in neighboring countries,” said Foreign Minister Kayd.“To this end, we felt a mutual interest with U.S. Government officials in exploring a framework for U.S.-Somaliland cooperation that we look forward to building together.”
“For thirty years, Somaliland has been a beacon of democracy, security, and steady economic progress in an otherwise troubled region,” Special Envoy Adan added. “Our ability to sustain this role will benefit greatly from the support of the United States and other like-minded allies.”
Substandard and counterfeit medicines can be extremely dangerous. They are fraudulently manufactured to deceive buyers about the product’s quality, authenticity and effectiveness. These medicines don’t meet quality and regulatory standards.
Such medicines are usually manufactured by highly organised criminal groups that are often involved in cross-border trafficking. The products can be bought online, in tuck shops or at street markets. Sometimes they find their way into legitimate supply chains, cropping up in registered pharmacies and hospitals.
Commonly referred to as substandard and falsified medicines, they take many forms. These include anything from pills for erectile dysfunction and weight loss to antidepressants, anabolic steroids, antibiotics and pain killers.
These medicines are accessible and affordable. That makes them appealing to consumers – but they can do great harm. Some products may contain the wrong ingredients, others may have no or much lower concentrations of active ingredients. They may also contain toxic substances used as tablet fillers, like rat poison, boric acid, chalk or anti-freeze.
Some researchers suggest that as much as 42% of medicine distributed in African countries is counterfeit. The World Health Organisation estimates that there are over 1 million deaths annually due to substandard and counterfeit medicine. It’s also been reported that about 53% of anti-malarial drug resistance in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa may be linked to the use of substandard and falsified medicines.
There have been attempts to tackle the problem. The WHO, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol have made joint efforts to create policies and implement strategies that member countries can adopt.
We set out to explore how South Africa is managing the problem of counterfeit and substandard medicines. The answer, unfortunately, is “not very well”. There are several reasons for this. Primarily, it’s due to the absence of a specific anti-counterfeit policy for medicines.
This situation must be urgently addressed. People need a constant supply of affordable, safe and efficacious medicine.
Gaps and concerns
South Africa’s pharmaceutical regulatory framework is known to be stringent. It is compatible with international standards and far stronger than those of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. But this framework is not backed by a strong implementation strategy.
For instance, we identified the lack of specific pharmaceutical crime and anti-counterfeit policies and regulations as a major hindrance to effectively enforcing the law. This kind of legislation would do two things. First, it would deal with intellectual property issues to ensure people can’t copy medicines that are patented. Second, it would provide a clear guide on what areas need policing, which stakeholders are responsible and what action plan is required. This implementation strategy would ensure accountability, enhance collaboration and information sharing, and bolster monitoring and evaluation.
The Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 and the Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997 outline punishments for counterfeiting. These are a fine of between R5,000 (about US$326) and R10,000 or a prison sentence ranging from three to 10 years. These do not seem to be sufficient deterrents.
Political will lacking
There’s also a lack of resources and capacity to implement existing laws.
For instance, South Africa needs a pharmaceutical testing laboratory designated or owned by the national medicines regulator to test for ingredients in suspected substandard and falsified medicines. Such a lab could also randomly test medicinal products on the market.
An overburdened criminal justice system, weak penalties and short prison sentences make for poor prosecution rates.
Respondents in our study suggested that political will to use state resources for such cases is lacking because pharmaceutical crime is perceived as an intellectual property issue rather than one that focuses on public safety.
Another hurdle to effective prosecutions that respondents identified was a lack of regional coordination in the Southern African Development Community. Prosecutors we interviewed told us that most African criminal justice systems struggled with a lack of resources, transparency and regional collaboration. This, in turn, contributed to lack of regional cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including medicine counterfeiting.
There are various relevant government agencies and law enforcement bodies. But they don’t collaborate very well on the issue of counterfeit medicines. This has created gaps in the value chain. It makes it easier for counterfeit and substandard medicines to proliferate.
We identified a number of websites selling medicines without prescriptions. Most were remotely operated; for example, the domain was registered as coming from South Africa but the contact details showed other countries like Denmark and Switzerland. None of these websites had contact details for a responsible pharmacist.
This exposes another gap in legislation: the Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 is the main piece of legislation that regulates the sale of medicines. But it needs to be amended and updated to address the sale of medicines online.
Going forward
The implications of not having a specific pharmaceutical crime and anti-counterfeit legal framework are far-reaching. It impedes the government’s ability to prevent substandard and falsified medicines proliferation and ensure effective law enforcement once counterfeit products have been seized. The implementation of a national anti-counterfeit policy will enforce a legal mandate with objectives and responsibilities so that all relevant authorities can participate effectively.
Another important strategy is for regulators to engage the public through awareness campaigns and education, as seen elsewhere on the continent and internationally.
In other countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom, social media platforms have been used to empower consumers to identify counterfeit products online. This, as well as the use of mobile authentication systems to check product traceability, has greatly reduced counterfeiting.
There’s also room for collaboration between private companies and governments. One example is the partnership between the Center for Safe Internet Pharmacies, internet service providers such as Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, and the United States government to shut down illegal sites and support awareness efforts.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged much of the globe. In mid-May 2021, the Republic of China (Taiwan) saw a sudden rise in case numbers. When Taiwan needed help the most, partners such as the United States, Japan, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, as well as the COVAX Facility, global allocation mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines, immediately pledged to donate or provide vaccines to Taiwan, allowing Taiwan to gradually bring the pandemic back under control. This is a testament to the international joint efforts to tackle the serious challenges brought about by the pandemic. The same joint efforts will be needed to address growing international cybercrimes in the post-pandemic era, and Taiwan is willing to be part of that effort.
The increasing importance of cybertechnology in the wake of the pandemic
Throughout the pandemic, Taiwan government agencies and private companies have closely followed anti-pandemic policies to prevent cluster infections. People began working from home and schools adopted virtual learning. Consumers turned to e-commerce, and online food ordering and delivery service platforms flourished. The pandemic has led to these changes in our lives, and while it is sure to abate in the foreseeable future, the spread of cyber technology will not. It has fundamentally altered the way we work, live, learn, and relax—resulting in an entirely new lifestyle.
However, our increased reliance on cyber technology has also made it easier than ever for criminals to exploit security vulnerabilities to commit crimes. Thus, cybersecurity will be one of the most important issues in the post-pandemic era as it is essential to maintaining public safety worldwide.
Cybercrime transcends borders; transnational cooperation is the key.
As cybercrime transcends borders, victims, perpetrators, and crime scenes may be located in different countries. The most common cybercrime is telecom fraud, which utilizes the internet and other telecommunications technologies. Transnational cooperation is necessary to bring international crime rings to justice.
In 2020, Taiwan police used big data analytics to identify multiple Taiwan nationals who were suspected of establishing telecom fraud operations in Montenegro. Taiwan contacted Montenegro and proposed mutual legal assistance, enabling the Montenegrin Special State Prosecutor’s Office to move forward with the case. Through joint efforts, Taiwan and the Montenegrin police forces uncovered three telecom fraud operations and arrested 92 suspects accused of impersonating Chinese government officials, police, and prosecutors. It is believed that the suspects scammed more than 2,000 people in China, causing up to US$22.6 million in financial losses. This case highlights the features of transnational crime. The suspects were Taiwan nationals, while the victims were Chinese nationals. The alleged crime occurred in Montenegro and was perpetrated with telecommunications technologies. Thanks to bilateral police cooperation, the suspects were apprehended, preventing other innocent people from falling victim to the scam.
Caption: Montenegrin Special State Prosecutor’s Office transfers proceedings to Taiwan police.
Child and youth sexual exploitation is another internationally condemned crime, with countries worldwide making every effort to prevent it and bring perpetrators to justice. In 2019, Taiwan police received information from the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s virtual private network CyberTipline indicating that a South African citizen in Taiwan was suspected of having uploaded large quantities of child pornography to the internet. Following the lead, Taiwan police quickly located the suspect and searched his residence, seizing evidence of child pornography. Police also found photographs and videos of him sexually assaulting Taiwanese children. The illicit images were stored on servers located in the United States, and the alleged crimes were committed in Taiwan. As the victims, in this case, were underage, they were too young to adequately explain the situation or seek assistance. If Taiwan police had not received the leads, the suspect would likely have continued to assault more children. This case owes its success to transnational cooperation and criminal intelligence sharing, which can effectively curb crime.
Caption: International joint cooperation to combat child pornography
Cybercrime involves cross-border investigations. However, jurisdictions and definitions of crimes vary among law enforcement agencies worldwide. Criminal rings understand this all too well and exploit the resulting information barriers, fleeing to other countries to decrease the likelihood of being caught. Like COVID-19, cyber crime can strike individuals in any country. Therefore, just as the world has joined forces to combat the pandemic, countering cybercrime requires the cooperation of international police forces assisting and sharing information with one another. Only then can more crimes be prevented and more cases be solved efficiently, allowing people worldwide to enjoy a safer life.
Taiwan police authorities have long strived to promote international cooperation in combating cross-border crime. In 2020, there were three prominent cases. Through the joint efforts of Taiwan, Vietnam, and the United States, transnational telecom fraud call centers were raided in January; the following month, a US currency counterfeiting ring was discovered; and 12 individuals suspected of involvement in human trafficking and violation of the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act were arrested in July.
Taiwan police authorities have a specialized High Technology Crime Investigation Unit and professional cybercrime investigators. The Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) under the National Police Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, also established a Digital Forensics Lab that meets international standards. The laboratory was issued the world’s first ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation for Windows Program Analysis by the Taiwan Accreditation Foundation. In 2021, the CIB standardized its malware analysis procedures, in addition to establishing file analysis and network analysis mechanisms. Taiwan’s expertise in combatting cybercrime will benefit global efforts to build safer cyberspace.
Taiwan can help create a safer world.
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the fact that diseases transcend national borders and it can affect anyone—regardless of skin color, ethnicity, language, or gender. Distrust, disagreements, and a lack of transparency between nations accelerated the spread of the virus. Only when international partners provide mutual assistance and share anti-pandemic information, expertise, and vaccines can the world overcome the pandemic faster and successfully.
The Global Policing Goals were endorsed by INTERPOL member countries in 2017, with the stated purpose of creating a safer and more sustainable world. With this mission in mind, we must work together to combat crime—just as we have joined forces to combat the pandemic. No police agency or country should be excluded. To fight cybercrime and bolster global cybersecurity effectively, the world needs to cooperate. Taiwan needs the world’s support and Taiwan is willing and able to help the world by sharing its experience.
As the entire world teams up to combat the pandemic this year, we urge the international community, in the same spirit, to support Taiwan’s bid to attend the INTERPOL’s General Assembly as an observer this year and participate in INTERPOL meetings, mechanisms, and training activities. Taiwan’s pragmatic and meaningful participation would help make the world a safer place for all.
COVID-19 continues to spread globally to threaten people’s lives and cause massive economic losses. In order to assist Somaliland to increase its related capability to combat this pandemic, the Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland once again cooperates with KMUH healthcare system, Taiwanese NGO, and company to donate Taiwanese-made high-quality surgical masks and protective gowns to the Ministry of Health Development of the Republic of Somaliland.
Taiwan has been side by side with Somaliland to combat COVID-19 by sharing various Taiwanese-made medical supplies including masks, PPE, antigen rapid tests, PCR machines and reagents and many others since the outbreak of COVID-19. As the weather turns cooler, there are concerns to prepare for the new wave of the pandemic, and since the global vaccine coverage is insufficient and the treatment methods are not yet popular, people still need to take necessary measures to combat COVID-19, including wearing masks and sanitize hands. Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland integrated the resources of the International College of Surgeons Taiwan Section (Taiwan ICS) and ACTife, providing Somaliland Government with high-quality masks and gowns to assist the government in safeguarding her people’s health.
Viruses know no borders and no one is safe until everyone is. No country can remain on the sidelines and should be all integrated to the international community to fight against this pandemic that threatens all mankind. Taiwan is willing and ready to contribute and share more with the international community. The G7 foreign ministers, government leaders or high-level officials of diplomatic allies as well as Japan, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, and the United States have publicly expressed their rock-solid support for Taiwan to participate in the related international activities. Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland would also like to express heartfelt gratitude to Somaliland Government’s continuous support in this regard.
Taiwan will continue to share the medical resources and work together with Somaliland to combat the pandemic. “Taiwan can help” and “Taiwan is helping” are not only slogans, they also show the brotherly friendship between Taiwan and Somaliland. The core principles of the “Taiwan Model” of cooperation are based on “mutual assistance for mutual benefits” (MAMB). Taiwan and Somaliland are together to shape this new “WIN-WIN” cooperation model.
Somaliland is an important partner of Taiwan in East Africa. Both sides share the common core values of freedom and democracy. Taiwan commits to deepen bilateral cooperation with Somaliland Government to benefit the people, as well as together with like-minded countries, in various fields.
The Chairman of the Opposition party of Waddani Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro”, in a speech to the party’s second general assembly questioned the value of Somaliland’s bilateral ties to the quest for international recognition and called for improved ties with the People’s Republic of China instead.
“It is necessary for Somaliland’s recognition to find a government that is a member of the United Nations Security Council with veto power. At this time Somaliland has close allies and it would’ve been nice if our government improved its relationship with China which is bringing vast development to the region and an unrecognized such as Taiwan adds no value for our question for recognition. We must always improve how we deal with important nations.” Said Chairman Cirro.
Chairman Cirro stated that Somaliland’s bilateral ties with neighboring countries have declined under President Muse Bihi Abdi’s leadership and added that Somaliland has not been invited to the inauguration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia’s reelection.
Chairman Cirro who is running for President for the second time has previously questioned Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investment by DP World to develop the Berbera Port and corridor. He has called for the prosecution of President Bihi and his predecessor President Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo for the deal with DP World.
The People’s Republic of China has approached Somaliland following the establishment of bilateral ties with Taiwan and offered a conditional development package which Somaliland has rejected and since China and Somalia have both condemned the newly established bilateral ties.
The People’s Republic of China claims Taiwan as part of its territory much like Somalia claims Somaliland. It is unclear how Chairman Cirro plans to convince the Chinese government and garner support for Somaliland’s case for independence.
Although Mr. Cirro did not explicitly state termination of bilateral ties with Taiwan should he be elected President in 2022, it’s clear that pivot to China is featured prominently in his foreign policy posture.
Efforts to reach Chairman Cirro and other Waddani officials for clarification on the party’s position on Taiwan, potential pivot to China, and how the latter will reconcile its budding relationship with Somalia’s Federal Government and its pledge to respect the territorial integrity of Somalia with the diplomatic ties Chairman Cirro has called for with the People’s Republic of China.
Taiwan’s Representative Ambassador Allen C. Lou did not respond to request for comment on Chairman Cirro’s statement on Somaliland’s bilateral ties with Taiwan.
A decade has passed since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan landed in Mogadishu at the height of one of Somalia’s worst famines, announcing grandiose projects like the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to the Somali capital, the remodeling of a hospital, and the opening of the biggest embassy in Africa, all designed to show that Turkey’s mission goes well beyond aid and that Ankara is an alternative to Somalia’s traditional donors. Erdoğan’s historic visit earned him high praise throughout Somalia. Although his trip appeared to be a heartfelt humanitarian mission, in reality, it was part of a long-term, strategically planned effort. Erdoğan had been scouting out Somalia as early as 2007 when he met the former President of the Transitional Federal Government Abdullahi Yusuf and asked him to provide a list of what Somalia needs. His efforts were fruitless, however, until President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed came to power in 2008. Sharif visited Turkey three times between 2009 and 2011, reluctantly signing a military pact with Turkey, which asked to help Somalia with security.
If Turkey had come to Somalia before 2011, it would have been seen as a foreign occupying force, just like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but in 2011, amid the devastation of one of the worst famines in the country’s history, Turkey’s self-proclaimed humanitarian mission was perceived differently. Erdoğan’s historic visit to Somalia was well-orchestrated and well-timed: It came during the holy month of Ramadan, nine days before the Eid festival, after 250,000 Somalis had starved to death, and during an election year, at a time when Somalia’s donors were scrambling to address a major humanitarian crisis.
Ever since Erdoğan declared 2005 “the Year of Africa,” he has pursued every Muslim-majority African country that is widowed by conflict, locked out by the IMF, starved by man-made climate change, and neglected by the West; a fragile Somalia checks all the boxes.
A decade on, Somalis are starting to realize that Turkey has evolved from friend to foe, trade partner to trade protectionist, state builder to outright spoiler. Turkey is an opportunist just like any other country and has its own agenda focused on geoeconomics and geopolitics. Instead of facilitating Somalia’s development, Turkey has used state-sponsored corporations to exploit its assets, all as part of a development trap cloaked in the guise of religion.
The Turkish development trap
Post-2011, Turkey’s humanitarian mission gradually shifted from an emphasis on soft power to a more assertive, politicized state-building effort involving de facto and de jure exploitation of Somalia’s federal government development projects and monopolization of the economy in Mogadishu’s Benadir region. Turkish private companies Albayrak Group and Favori LLC were given lucrative no-bid contracts to run Mogadishu’s port and airport and protected by Ankara. As was documented in a 2016 U.N. monitoring report, these companies have allegedly been engaged in criminal practices ranging from bribery of government ministers to money laundering.
Predatory practices and trade barriers
In 2010, Somalia exported $1.36 million worth of goods to Turkey and imported $4.8 million, which was a manageable trade deficit. After Albayrak Group took over the management of Mogadishu Port, however, Turkish exports to Somalia increased exponentially, growing to $37.5 million in 2011 and reaching $256 million in 2019, even as Somalia’s exports to Turkey rose to just $6.7 million over the same period. By comparison, in 2019 Somalia exported $18 million and $195 million to China and the UAE respectively. Although Somalia has a port revenue-sharing agreement with Albayrak, which receives 45%, this has resulted in one-sided expansion of trade, with Turkish traders importing nearly 50 times as much to Somalia as Somali traders exported to Turkey in 2020.
In 2015, Somalia’s Financial Government Committee (FGC) published a detailed report reviewing public procurement and concessions; among the concessions reviewed in the report were the contracts for Albayrak Group and Favori LLC, which manage two of the largest domestic revenue generators for the Somalia government. The committee found several flaws in the Albayrak concession that resulted in uncompetitive port service costs, reduced revenues, labor disputes, and a lack of clarity on revenue sharing despite a general agreement laying out a 45-55% split. The FGC recommended that “the federal government seek an amicable renegotiation of the contract’s more troubling clauses.”
As with Albayrak’s Mogadishu Port contract, the FGC has also called for amendments to the concession of Favori LLC, a subsidiary of Turkey’s Kozuva Group that manages Mogadishu airport under a 15-year deal signed on June 30, 2013. According to an aviation expert who examined the concession, Favori violated its contractual obligations by collecting illegal fees that should have been passed on to the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (SCAMA). Separate from the general revenue sharing, these allegedly include but are not limited to fees for landing, air navigation, parking, passenger safety, freight, and fuel.
According to interviews with local aviation experts and former employees, Favori has also failed to reconstruct the airport’s main runway, hampered the development of local human resources by allocating key positions to non-Somalis, and neglected airport maintenance and safety, as required under its contract. Issues that should have been addressed in 2013 are only now being discussed. In addition, the company illegally built a hotel and shopping mall inside the airport property in a place that was supposed to be a parking lot for airport customers. It’s not clear if the revenue generated from the Decale Hotel, which is a Somalia government asset, is supplemental revenue for the government or for Favori LLC.
Furthermore, according to a 2016 U.N. report, Favori LLC has inflated its expenses to maximize its profits, reporting monthly revenue of $1.16 million and expenses of more than $500,000 in 2016, compared to revenue of an estimated $8 million per month before it took over management of the airport. This reduced the government’s share of the revenue from 45% to just 6%. Favori LLC even went so far as to claim asset depreciation as an expense, despite the fact that the assets in question are the Somalia government’s and not part of the contract. Rather than canceling the Favori LLC contract, the Somalia government re-negotiated terms with the company in May 2019, amid secrecy.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (C), his wife Emine Erdoğan (C-L), and Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud (2nd R) attend the Inauguration of Aden Abdulle International Airport Somalia in Mogadishu on Jan. 25, 2015. Photo by Kayhan Ozer/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Though the government finally inked a 14-year concession to streamline revenue sharing and port development with Albayrak Group in October 2020, this largely reinforced the company’s original concession obligations. In addition, the revised concession has so many ambiguities that it’s not clear if the new 14-year deal is an extension of the previous 20-year lease, if it requires Albayrak Group co-management as part of technical knowledge transfer, or if the Albayrak Group’s exclusive port financing rights provision prohibits using the port of Mogadishu as collateral to access international loans.
According to interviews with former employees, Favori LLC has allegedly repatriated its profits to Turkey in cash without making a transfer through the Somalia Central Bank, as required by Somalia’s finance laws, which would be a violation of the anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism act that was passed in 2016. This would also violate the Somalia government’s compliance with its debt relief obligations with the World Bank and IMF, including revenue mobilization and accountability requirements to reduce corruption and enhance monetary and financial sector governance.
Qatar-Turkey axis and geopolitical influence
Beyond the economic issues, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia has also entangled the African country in the broader regional geopolitical dispute between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE on the other for influence in the Horn of Africa. While this rivalry seems to be easing at present, as Turkey and Qatar are making efforts to mend relations with Gulf countries and their regional allies, it may flare up again in the future, with consequences for Somalia.
Turkey and Qatar are brothers in arms with joint ventures ranging from support for the Muslim Brotherhood to financing Islamists and proxy wars in fragile countries all over the Middle East. Their bond grew stronger during the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, which pushed them into a geopolitical and geoeconomic alliance. The GCC crisis also spilled over into Somalia, when the new government led by Mohammed Abdullahi (known as Farmaajo), whose election was financed by Qatar, confiscated $9 million from an Emirati plane at Mogadishu airport. In retaliation, the UAE cut off support for the Somalia government, including military training, a devastating blow for the newly elected government and for a fragile state still recovering from one of its worst famines.
Though Turkey steered clear of the bickering between the Gulf countries in Somalia at the time, it had earlier pursued a covert plan with Qatar, in 2011 during the post-Arab Spring era, to sway Somalia’s foreign policy away from the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union and align it with Egypt’s then-President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. This effort failed as Morsi was overthrown by the Egyptian military in 2013.
Turkey has also repeatedly tried to serve as an arbiter in Somalia-Somaliland talks, sending its ambassador Elgon Beker from Mogadishu to Somaliland in 2019. The ambassador’s efforts were dead on arrival. Somaliland does not see Turkey as an impartial and fair arbiter, but rather as a dishonest broker since Ankara believes in the preservation of Somalia’s territorial integrity based on the illegal union of 1960 between the two. Moreover, Somaliland is extremely wary of Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu, as the Somaliland government believes Farmaajo, who openly denied the Hargeisa genocide committed by former Somali dictator Siad Barre in his post-graduate thesis and has already waged an economic war against Somaliland, could use military forces trained by Turkey to invade Somaliland in an effort to bring about forceful reunification.
Turkey and militarization
To capitalize on Somalia’s geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean, Turkey signed multiple military pacts with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in 2009 and 2010 and continued to sign new agreements with Somalia’s federal government in 2012 and 2015. These pacts covered areas ranging from military training to defense industry cooperation and are aimed at gaining a foothold in the Indian Ocean.
The Turkish government invested $50 million to build the largest overseas Turkish military base with the goal of training 10,000 members of the Somali National Army (SNA), although Turkey officially refers to it as the largest embassy in the world. The Turkish “embassy” in Mogadishu, which is perhaps the only diplomatic compound where military training and exercises are held, sits on a vast, 400-hectare swath of prime beach-front real estate worth an estimated $1.5 billion based on local property prices. It is almost twice the size of the U.S. military base in Djibouti. But Turkey did not pay for the land and there is no sign that the military pact contained any stipulation for lease payment to the Somali people. In comparison, France not only provides military protection to Djibouti in exchange for hosting its military base, but it also pays annual rent of $70 million and offers budgetary support.
Somali soldiers are seen marching during training held by the Turkish Armed Forces at the Turkish Military Training Center in Mogadishu, Somalia on Jan. 15, 2018. Photo by Volkan Furuncu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.
The Somali Ministry of Defense does not exercise any oversight, is not part of the training, and is oblivious to what the troops are learning. Worse still, it does not seem to understand the challenges of integrating the Turkish-trained units with the larger SNA. There are further concerns over the role played by SADAT, a notorious Turkish private military contractor, which has been confirmed to be involved in training Somali troops. Founded by an Erdoğan ally, SADAT has been heavily involved in conflicts in Syria and Libya and has been accused of providing training and weapons to the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.
(Dis)integration with the SNA
Turkey is equipping the SNA units it trains with Turkish-made weapons such as the MPT-76 and other HK G3 variants made by MKEK with 7.62×51 NATO ammunition. This creates a dangerous incompatibility that prevents these units from being integrated into the larger SNA. In addition, there are also signs of a disconnect from command and control that may stem from Turkish-provided communications equipment, according to members of the SNA. By contrast, the U.S. and the U.K., which have trained and equipped effective units, opt to retrofit Kalashnikovs and other weapons widely available in Somalia to outfit the units they train, instead of the M4s or Enfields used by their armies. Turkey is thereby creating a market for its weapons manufacturers such as MKEK at the expense of building a cohesive army that is capable of carrying out joint operations between various branches and units.
This was a turning point that changed how many Somalis perceived Turkey, especially the residents of Mogadishu. Having welcomed Turkey with open arms in 2011 as a peacemaker and state builder, they were now shocked by its indifference to their plight, as Turkey openly took Farmaajo’s side and the troops it trained turned their guns on local residents instead of fighting al-Shabab. The U.N. Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) has repeatedly warned Turkey for violating the U.N. arms embargo by equipping Somali police forces without notifying and getting approval from SMEG.
Erdoğan’s “neo-Ottoman” threat to Somalia
Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia in 2011 and the provision of assistance by multiple Turkish aid agencies at the height of the famine made Turkey a godsend in the eyes of many Somalis, who were yearning for an alternative to the failed Western-backed Somalia government. These overtures served as a litmus test of Erdoğan’s soft power, putting Turkey on the map as a humanitarian actor and an emerging donor.
In reality, however, the Turkish model has been a form of humanitarian enterprise diplomacy aimed at winning destitute Somali hearts and the backing of corrupt political elites who benefit from aid dependency on the West. However, the branding of Turkish aid has had a damaging impact on public perception, creating high expectations that the Turkish government would invest in state-building and provide protection. This perception is predictable when political elites have oversold expectations of the Turkish government and its economic strength. These elites are not happy with the EU and U.S.; even though they provide the majority of Somalia’s budget support and developmental aid, this comes with rules, regulations, and bureaucratic accountability, while the Turkish government has a different approach that meets their long-standing principal demand of “what’s in it for me.”
Erdoğan has said he believes Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was a good omen for the African country, writing in a piece published in Foreign Policy in October 2011, “In Turkish culture, it is believed that something good will come out of all bad experiences.” A decade later the only thing Somalia has gained from the Turkish model is costly bad experience stemming from imported autocracy, democratic backsliding, and a development trap.
Turkish state-sponsored private companies Albayrak and Favori resemble the Italian colonial enterprise Benadir Company, and over the past 10 years they have benefitted from illegal long-term concessions and political impunity that has cost Somalia’s government and investors as much as $5 billion in lost revenue due to trade barriers and exploitation of state resources, according to estimates from the author confirmed by former government finance officials. Turkey’s bilateral trade relationship with Somalia has put its economy in a stranglehold, turning Somalia’s assets into dead capital that has weakened the government and private sector’s financial footing and ability to attract foreign direct investment, limiting its sovereignty, and creating an addiction to Turkey’s artificial aid and its development trap.
Turkey has used Somalia to incubate its private sector companies and build a portfolio and track record it can pitch to other African or low-income countries with the deceptive marketing that “if it works in Somalia, it can work in your country too.” An African country that cannot access stringent World Bank loans or Chinese soft loans could easily be tempted to accept such an offer and risk falling into a development trap. This is especially true for countries with authoritarian regimes, fragile states, and weak government institutions, like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya.
Rather than reforming and strengthening Somalia’s weak government institutions to reduce corruption, the Turkish government chose to corrupt Somalia government ministries to reap the benefits of lucrative concessions in an effort to maintain its prestige at home and polish its credentials as an international actor abroad, all at the expense of Mogadishu’s taxpayers.
If future Somalia leaders do not hedge against Erdoğan’s irredentism and neo-Ottoman expansionism by taking a page from Tunisia, which imposed a 27% tariff on Turkish goods to reduce the trade deficit, in the next 10 years Turkey may expand its hold on the economy and take over Somalia’s agricultural sector as well, just like the Italian colonialists did when they realized that the Benadir coastal ports and towns depend on a hinterland (Shabelle River belt) supply chain.
Turkey is using its military base in Somalia to expand its influence and gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa, all without paying a cent in rent, and it has become clear that the government’s goal is not to protect Somalia from the scourge of al-Shabab or provide any meaningful security assistance.
Perhaps Erdoğan has no interest in seeing a secure and peaceful Somalia and the units that Turkey is training, whose record in combat against al-Shabab is dismal compared to the other units like the Danab (“Lightning Brigade”), may instead be a backstop to ensure that any future occupant of Villa Somalia does not go against Ankara’s interests. If so, Erdoğan could be providing the kindling for future conflicts in Somalia.
Erdoğan has exploited Somalia’s fragility to pursue his ambition of making Turkey an international power and furthering his “neo-Ottoman” aspirations. Erdoğan’s new empire is a thinly veiled feudal system that depends on militarism and economic exploitation for its survival. It is a threat to Somalia’s stability and prosperity, and if replicated elsewhere, it could destabilize other countries too.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Guled Ahmed is a non-resident scholar at MEI, renewable energy and water infrastructure expert, and an entrepreneur. The views expressed in this piece are his own.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
