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Trump’s Geo-Transactional Effort to Resolve the GERD Dispute Between Ethiopia and Egypt Confronts the Energy–Water Dilemma

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On June 20, former President Donald Trump claimed on his social media channel, Truth Social, that the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was “stupidly financed by the United States,” adding that he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize for “keeping the peace between Egypt and Ethiopia.” This remark came during celebrations of the Congo–Rwanda agreement. Then, on July 14, Trump reiterated his stance on the GERD dispute, stating during a White House meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte:
“I think if I am Egypt, I want to have water in the Nile, and we are working on that.” He further described the dam as “closing up water going to the Nile,” which Egypt relies on for 97% of its water. Trump added, “I think the United States funded the dam. I do not know why they didn’t solve the problem before they built the dam. But it is nice when the Nile River has water,” and concluded that “closing up water… is pretty incredible. But we think we are going to have that solved very quickly.”

This statement, while controversial, is seen by some in Addis Ababa as a possible opening for engagement with a future Trump administration—contrasting with his 2020 remarks that Egypt might “blow up” the dam. However, Trump’s claim lacks factual basis: GERD was financed domestically by the Ethiopian government, loan from China, and diaspora buying government bonds, amounting to $5 billion. Unless Trump was referring to Ethiopia’s broader development aid—roughly $1.2 billion annually from the U.S as of 2024. —or the indirect effect of World Bank support freeing domestic funds, there is no evidence of direct U.S. financing. In fact, the U.S. withheld $100 million in 2020 to pressure Ethiopia during GERD negotiations. Ethiopia government has yet to respond officially to Trump’s latest comments, though the government is reportedly observing public reaction.

Trump’s renewed focus on the GERD dispute reflects his signature geo-transactional diplomacy—a strategy rooted in deal-making that leverages U.S. influence to extract concessions in exchange for tangible benefits, often backed by implicit pressure. This approach shaped past efforts such as Trump’s recent backchannel deal with Ukraine, where future military aid was reportedly discussed alongside access to critical mineral extraction rights for U.S. companies—blurring the lines between strategic support and commercial gain. Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, Trump-era envoys signaled potential de-escalation with the Houthis in exchange for guarantees of unimpeded maritime navigation, effectively pausing military operations to broker regional security through informal channels. In 2020, the Trump administration proposed a deal requiring Ethiopia to release 37 (billion cubic meter) BCM of water annually during drought years—a plan ultimately rejected by Addis Ababa, citing sovereignty and hydrological uncertainties. But under a second Trump term, this proposal might be revisited through a broader transactional lens: Ethiopia may be pressured to accept the 37 BCM threshold in exchange for U.S. support on Red Sea maritime access. In turn, Egypt might be expected to grant favorable treatment to U.S. military or commercial operations in the Suez Canal. While the approach carries risks inherent to asymmetric negotiation, it also presents a rare opportunity: if successful, a Trump-brokered deal could realign competing national interests into a durable, mutually beneficial settlement—transforming a source of tension into a platform for cooperation.

GERD Energy-Water Trade-off Delima

While Ethiopia’s GERD boasts an installed capacity of 6,000 MW (6 GW), the 2013 International Panel of Experts (IPoE) report clearly cautioned that such levels are not scientifically or hydrologically sustainable under normal or conservative flow conditions. The panel stated that “the full 6,000 MW will not be generated under 90% hydrological reliability” (Section 5.3.4.1, p. 38), and criticized the lack of validated modeling and reliable estimates of annual energy production. With a mean annual flow of around 49 BCM at the GERD site—corresponding to a 50% probability of exceedance in hydrology, meaning there’s an equal chance that yearly flow will be above or below this level—GERD’s power output is subject to natural variability. Unlike most dams, which are designed using a 90% exceedance threshold to ensure reliable generation during dry years, GERD was not. As a result, its 6 GW power target is not sustainable year-round and is likely achievable only during three peak-flow months, with the rest of the year realistically limited to a maximum of 3 GW. In drought years, with flows around 40–42 BCM, generation may drop further to 1.5–2 GW, even without water release obligations.

In 2020, the Trump administration proposed a U.S.-brokered agreement requiring Ethiopia to release 37 BCM annually to Egypt during drought periods. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government rejected the proposal outright, but this decision—framed as a defense of national sovereignty—was more politically motivated than grounded in scientific or hydrological analysis. Ethiopia never publicly disclosed the internal water flow scenarios or power generation models referenced by the IPoE, which criticized the lack of transparency. Had Ethiopia accepted the 37 BCM drought release condition, only a few BCM would remain for power generation during dry years—reducing output to under 1 GW, with dire implications for domestic electrification and export ambitions. The GERD thus embodies a core energy–water trade-off, where Ethiopia’s developmental narrative clashes with the river’s physical constraints and Egypt’s survival-based demands—a dilemma that any future mediation, including a geo-transactional one, must confront.

While Ethiopia’s decision to reject the 2020 U.S.-drafted GERD agreement was prudent—given the lack of clarity about the dam’s actual operational performance post-construction—it is now imperative for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to engage in the current mitigation talks with transparency and good faith. Acknowledging the hydrological constraints highlighted by the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) and other technical studies would not weaken Ethiopia’s position but rather strengthen its credibility.

Such a shift would help de-politicize the negotiation process and pave the way for a science-based solution. By aligning its diplomatic posture with the realistic operational limitations of GERD—particularly the seasonal and probabilistic variability of Nile flows—Ethiopia can create space for a win–win outcome: safeguarding downstream water security while maximizing its own energy and economic interests under a sustainable and cooperative regional framework.

Trump Geo-transactional Approach to GERD

During Trump’s first administration, serious efforts were made to resolve the GERD dispute between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt. However, the 2020 U.S.-drafted GERD deal collapsed due to core disagreements between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt demanded a 10–15-year filling timeline and a guaranteed annual water release of 40–42 BCM, while Ethiopia proposed a shorter 3–4-year fill (later offering five years) with a flexible 31 BCM release. The U.S. compromise suggested a 5–7-year fill and a fixed annual release of 37 BCM, even during drought periods—something Ethiopia rejected, arguing it would limit its power generation capacity and infringe on its sovereignty. Ethiopia also objected to provisions requiring large releases during dry years and strongly opposed being excluded from the final drafting phase, which it viewed as a breach of good-faith negotiations and a process biased in Egypt’s favor.

Fast forward five years: the GERD has been completed after five rounds of filling without major incident and is scheduled for inauguration in September. Meanwhile, Ethiopia has pursued maritime access by signing an MoU with the unrecognized Somaliland government, securing a 50-year lease on a 20 km coastal strip for commercial and naval development, in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The Biden administration opposed the move, citing “national security,” while Egypt and Arab states sided with Somalia in protest. In hindsight, Ethiopia’s decision to reject the original deal may have been prudent—now that the dam is operational, Trump could leverage this new geopolitical landscape to pursue a geo-transactional solution. By linking Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions with water-sharing guarantees for Egypt, Trump could facilitate a win–win compromise that also aligns with broader U.S. interests in the region.

A Trump-style geo-transactional deal might involve granting Ethiopia the green light to fully implement the Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding, including formal recognition of Somaliland. In return, Ethiopia would agree to withdraw from BRICS and restrict access to its new naval installations, ensuring that adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and China are excluded from both access to and the use of such facilities. Meanwhile, Somaliland could permit the establishment of a U.S. military base in Berbera and enter a critical minerals partnership. As recently reported by Bloomberg, such an arrangement would help address U.S. challenges in securing access to critical materials vital for the development of artificial intelligence and semiconductor technologies—resources essential to U.S. national security interests.

This would be consistent with Trump’s precedent of bold diplomatic moves, such as moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Venezuela’s opposition leader as interim president or Trump reversed longstanding U.S. policy in North Africa by declaring American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. To compensate for Ethiopia’s potential power export losses from meeting Egypt’s 37 BCM water release demand (in line with the original 2020 U.S. proposal), the U.S. could offer expanded AGOA trade benefits, increasing Ethiopia’s exports to the U.S. from $ 267 million to $2 billion annually. Egypt, in turn, could receive enhanced trade agreements and military support, while granting U.S. commercial and naval vessels free passage through the Suez Canal—a transactional deal in true Trump fashion.

However, for this deal to succeed, several contentious issues and housekeeping matters must be resolved among the three parties. Back in 2020, Egypt demanded the principle of “equitable dams,” proposing that the operation of the GERD be coordinated with the High Aswan Dam, due to concerns over its impact on Egypt’s power generation and irrigation as a result of reduced water allocations. This issue was partially addressed under the Declaration of Principles signed in 2015 in Khartoum by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Egypt also proposed a framework for hydrological data sharing and the implementation of a joint monitoring program—both of which were acknowledged in the 2015 agreement. However, Ethiopia rejected these terms on the basis of sovereignty concerns, although the World Bank had offered a neutral plan to facilitate implementation.

In addition, Sudan requested guarantees on the structural integrity and flood management of GERD. With the dam now completed and proven to be stable, incorporating a flood management protocol into the agreement is both feasible and necessary. Operational housekeeping for this deal would require at least six months of verified hydrological data and river flow monitoring. Though some may view the proposal as controversial, it represents a bold and transformative approach—one that could liberate over 120 million Ethiopians from geographic isolation by granting maritime access, while also securing the water rights of more than 100 million Egyptians for generations to come. In a region historically plagued by cycles of drought and instability—where neither globalization nor multilateralism has offered durable solutions—this deal offers a realistic geopolitical reset. It also recalibrates U.S. strategic posture in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, countering the growing influence of China and Russia through economic and security cooperation rooted in the principle of “peace through strength.”

About the Author

Guled Ahmed is an author of Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc.: Uncovering the Hidden Economy of the Wealthiest Global Terrorist in Africa and Affiliate Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., specializing in Horn of Africa geopolitics, terrorist financing, and climate security. His work has been published by major outlets like CNN, The National Interest, and Al Arabiya, and recognized by institutions including Harvard, Georgetown, and Johns Hopkins.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Safeguarding Public Interest in Somaliland’s Market: A Call for Balanced Regulation

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Staff
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How Somaliland Can Leverage Public Protests to Strengthen Fair Competition and Inclusive Growth

  1. Introduction

Somaliland’s constitutional commitment to a free-market economy, as enshrined in Article 11, seeks to foster prosperity, equitable wealth distribution, and the attraction of private investment. Yet, recent public protests against coordinated price-fixing by telecom giants Telesom and Somtel have exposed deep-seated gaps in market regulation. These events have opened a rare window for Somaliland to realign its economic policies with its constitutional principles, ensuring that markets function in the public interest without undermining private sector dynamism.

This analysis examines the private sector’s historic role in Somaliland’s post-war recovery alongside its structural challenges, the government’s constrained regulatory capacity, lessons from international experiences where public protests catalyzed reforms, and a roadmap for creating a balanced economic environment that safeguards public welfare while nurturing business growth.

  1. Somaliland’s Private Sector: Engine of Growth and Exclusion

The Post-War Economic Miracle: Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland’s private sector has been the central driver of its remarkable economic revival. Contributing over 90% of GDP and operating largely without foreign aid or direct government intervention, private enterprises have fuelled national resilience. The telecom sector, for instance, has delivered world-class innovations in mobile money services such as Zaad and Edahab platforms, which have achieved global recognition for their penetration in both urban and rural communities. The diaspora has played a pivotal role, with remittances sustaining nearly 40% the households and funding critical gaps in social services like healthcare and education that the state cannot yet provide, according to the World Bank. Additionally, Somaliland’s informal economy rooted in clan-based trust networks has provided reliable access to credit and supply chains, offering a form of social and commercial stability in the absence and fragile of formal systems.

Challenges Threatening Inclusive Growth: Somaliland’s private sector success story is marred by self-inflicted and systemic obstacles that hinder inclusive growth. Monopolistic practices have taken root, with dominant firms in sectors such as telecommunications and trade engaging in anti-competitive practices with impunity. Market leaders routinely coordinate price hikes, engage in predatory pricing, supply chain barriers and other tactics to eliminate competitors, block new entrants and leverage their capital to dominate multiple sectors and in all scale from importer and final retailer, creating an economic oligarchy. This concentration of power is exacerbated by political capture, as corporate actors openly fund electoral campaigns and lobby against regulatory reforms.

Moreover, an entrenched short-term outlook has led to overinvestment in import-based trade monopolies rather than value-added production, stifling job creation in manufacturing and processing industries. The trade and telecom sectors, for example, have exploited weak oversight to raise prices in tandem, operating without quality checking, full taxed, with technological sophistications and not openly regulated mobile money operations with potential to influence the monetary policy leverage of the government. While consumer protection and environmental safeguards remain afterthoughts. These distortions persist because Somaliland’s regulatory framework never caught up with its rapid private sector growth a legacy of post-conflict institutional building that prioritized basic governance over economic oversight.

  1. The Government’s Dilemma: Mediator or Spectator?

Limited Capacity and Limited Leverage: The Somaliland government faces considerable challenges in regulating markets effectively. Fiscal constraints are acute, with revenues amounting to only about 5% of GDP, leaving little room for robust enforcement. Institutional gaps, including the absence of a dedicated competition commission and outdated commercial laws drafted before the mobile money revolution, and a tax administration that struggles to track corporate earnings across interconnected businesses. This institutional vacuum creates perverse incentives: firms that initially filled governance gaps now resist oversight, having grown accustomed to operating without checks on their market power.

The prevailing political economy further complicates reform realizations. Corporate actors have become kingmakers in Somaliland’s competitive democracy, financing campaigns and leveraging clan networks to block legislation that might threaten their dominance. This dynamic was evident during the past administrations’ failed attempt to introduce meaningful corporate taxation and approval regulatory and competition safeguarding bills and acts, for example commercial banks act, which is persistent with the current administration of Cirro, despite trials and formation of dedicated committees.

Recent Efforts –  Little and Late: The current administration’s introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST) marked a tentative step toward formalizing the private sector, but the system remains riddled with enforcement loopholes, making it unattained, yet. Along this, the administration now faces another major economic crisis with the telecom protests, responding with ad hoc price negotiations that treat symptoms rather than the disease of market concentration.

What’s missing is strategic vision. Somaliland needs more than reactive price controls it requires a comprehensive competition policy framework that realigns private sector growth with national development goals. The government’s current approach of case-by-case intervention resembles whack-a-mole, unable to address the systemic nature of anti-competitive behaviours across sectors.

  1. The Current Telecom Protests: A Watershed Moment

This Crisis Uniqueness: Past episodes of inflation, particularly in food and fuel prices, have not succeeded in uniting the public. The telecom protests, however, have proven to be different in both scale and impact. This time, the collusion was visible: firms raised prices simultaneously, making coordination undeniable. The repercussions were cross through as telecommunications and mobile money services are used by virtually every citizen, unlike price hikes confined to specific sectors. Moreover, the protests were largely youth-led mobilization through social media platforms circumvented traditional clan and regional divisions, creating Somaliland’s first truly national consumer rights movement.

Global Precedents: How Protests Drove Reform: International examples show that public mobilization can be a decisive catalyst for policy change. In South Africa in 2017, revelations of bread price-fixing by Tiger Brands triggered widespread boycotts, ultimately leading to antitrust fines and market liberalization. In Kenya in 2022, public outcry over Safaricom’s dominance in mobile money services resulted in fee caps and policies to open the market to new competitors. These precedents underscore a critical lesson for Somaliland: public outrage, if organized into clear policy demands, can break entrenched patterns of regulatory inertia, so it presents structural solutions rather than temporary price rollbacks.

  • A Roadmap for Reform: Balancing Markets and Public Interest

Realizing systemic reform demands more than momentary outrage, it requires sustained, coordinated efforts across all sectors of society, with each actor playing complementary roles. The media, often termed the “fourth estate,” must amplify public awareness, scrutinize power imbalances, and hold both corporations and regulators accountable. Without this ecosystem-wide engagement, even well-designed policies risk stagnation or capture by vested interests.

For the public, sustaining pressure through lawful and strategic means remains essential. Beyond street protests, citizens must channel energy into formal mechanisms: petitioning for a competition law, participating in regulatory consultations, and leveraging local councils to demand transparency. Grassroots movements should document and publicize market abuses from price-fixing to exclusionary contracts to build an irrefutable case for reform. Most crucially, elected representatives and political bodies with public mandates must take leadership in advancing this agenda. They should develop clear policy positions, communicate them consistently to constituents, and drive legislative action to address market distortions

The government’s response must be phased yet decisive. Immediate actions should include a freeze on telecom price hikes pending an independent audit of market concentration, coupled with a nationwide campaign to educate citizens on antitrust principles. Medium-term priorities must focus on drafting a Somaliland Competition Act, drawing lessons from Kenya’s 2021 framework and South Africa’s antitrust reforms. Establishing an independent Somaliland Competition Commission with investigative powers and judicial authority will be pivotal to enforcement. Long-term institutionalization requires formalizing the informal sector through simplified registration and tax incentives, diluting monopolies’ grip while expanding the revenue base.

Corporates must recognize that self-regulation is not charity it’s self-preservation. Leading firms should adopt transparent pricing methodologies, publish annual competition compliance reports, and invest in productive sectors like agro-processing to diversify the economy.

Academia, Elite and think tanks must bridge the knowledge gap through rigorous research and contextualized knowledge generation. Universities should host public forums linking antitrust reforms to Somaliland’s constitutional goals, while legal clinics assist SMEs in navigating new regulations.

The media’s role is existential. Investigative journalism must expose backroom deals between politicians and corporates, while op-eds translate complex market concepts into public discourse. Social media influencers and traditional leaders, often gatekeepers of public opinion, should be engaged to disseminate reform messaging.

This multi-front effort public vigilance, government action, corporate accountability, academic rigor, and media scrutiny forms the only viable path to transform protests into enduring institutional change. No single actor can succeed alone, but together, they can recalibrate Somaliland’s market ecosystem to serve the many, not the few.

  • Conclusion: A Defining Moment for Somaliland’s Economy

The telecom protests are not solely about price increases; they represent a broader referendum on economic justice in Somaliland. The private sector’s post-war achievements risk being undermined by unchecked monopolies, while the credibility of the government depends on its willingness and ability to act decisively.

History has shown that public outrage can be transformed into meaningful reform but only when paired with strategic policymaking, empowering regulatory bodies, and fostering a culture of corporate accountability, Somaliland can honor its constitutional vision of a thriving and equitable market. The choice is clear: safeguard the public interest to ensure the sustainability of the market itself.

About the Author

Roble Muse is a Somaliland-based economic analyst, development strategist and policy researcher specializing in economic policy, development, and governance. Currently, he is pursuing doctoral research on pastoral economies and climate change, with a focus on Somaliland.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

New AFRICOM Chief Inherits Failing Somalia Strategy Amid China Challenge

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Staff
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Key Points

  • New AFRICOM Chief: Gen. Anderson was confirmed on July 31, 2025, and is tasked to confront the “convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism”.
  • Strategic Shift: AFRICOM’s reported move to Africa signals a major reinvestment, requiring stable continental partners.
  • Failed Somalia Strategy: After 30+ years and billions spent with little progress, the U.S. strategy in Somalia is in tatters, positioning the Republic of Somaliland as the logical alternative.
  • China’s Direct Threat: Beijing actively pressures Somaliland over its Taiwan ties, alarming U.S. legislators.
  • Somaliland’s Proactive Offer: A security pact with Taiwan and a direct offer of a U.S. military base showcase Somaliland as a proactive ally.

Ten days after a nomination hearing on July 22, 2025, where he laid out the strategic challenges facing the continent, the U.S. Senate on July 31, 2025, confirmed General Dagvin R.M. Anderson as the new commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). He now formally takes charge of a command grappling with what he describes as a continent “at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism”. His confirmation, combined with his predecessor’s historic, final state visit to Hargeisa, signals a significant evolution in U.S. policy—one that increasingly recognizes the Republic of Somaliland as a critical partner in this new contest.

The Senate Armed Forces Committee receives testimony during a nomination hearing in Washington, July 22, 2025, from Navy Vice Adm. Frank M. Bradley, who is being considered for promotion to admiral and commander of U.S. Special Operations Command; and Air Force Lt. Gen. Dagvin R.M. Anderson, who is being considered for promotion to general and commander of U.S. Africa Command.

This renewed focus is underscored by recent reports that AFRICOM headquarters will relocate from Stuttgart, Germany, to Africa itself. Such a move would represent the most significant strategic reinvestment in the continent’s security architecture in a generation. Contrary to any narrative that Africa has been deprioritized, relocating the command center to the continent signals an elevation of its strategic importance. An AFRICOM headquarters in Africa dramatically increases the strategic value of having stable and well-governed partners on the ground, placing a premium on nations that can offer a secure anchor for U.S. presence and policy.

Nowhere is the need for a new approach more apparent than in Somalia. As the former “Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF)”, General Anderson has firsthand knowledge of the deep-seated issues. His praise for the “capable” U.S.-trained Danab special forces during his hearing is now starkly contrasted by reports that the unit is faltering. Due to alleged corruption within the Somali government—a government that consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt in the world on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index—U.S. support has been slashed, crippling the force’s morale and effectiveness. This leaves the 30-year, multi-billion-dollar U.S. strategy in tatters, a failure underscored by recent battlefield losses. As reported by the Somaliland Chronicle, Al-Shabaab has retaken the strategic town of El-Bur in the Galgaduud region, a major blow to the government’s offensive, along with several other villages from which government forces have withdrawn.

General Anderson in Somalia with former US Somalia Ambassador Donald Yamamoto

This institutional shift is no longer subtle. In his final days as commander, General Michael Langley made a historic visit to the Republic of Somaliland on July 28-29, meeting with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” in Hargeisa and touring the strategic port at Berbera. The visit followed his blunt admission that U.S. policy in Somalia has struggled, with Al-Shabaab remaining “entrenched, wealthy, and large.” Langley’s trip, a clear signal of AFRICOM’s search for more reliable partners, builds on a precedent set by former AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend, who also toured the Berbera corridor in 2022. For General Anderson, the value of such reliable allies is paramount. He powerfully illustrated this point by recounting a successful hostage rescue in Niger: “Within 96 hours, we located him, coordinated with multiple African partners and European allies, and executed the rescue”. His conclusion was a lesson for the entire command: “When we called in the middle of the night, our partners answered”.

This American interest is driven by an intensifying strategic competition that has become a direct threat to the Republic of Somaliland itself. China has reportedly engaged in a campaign to undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty as a direct consequence of its democratic partnership with Taiwan. This has not gone unnoticed in Washington. U.S. legislators, including Senator Ted Cruz, have expressed alarm over what they see as a concerted effort by Beijing to undermine democracies in the Horn of Africa. Senator Cruz praised the Republic of Somaliland’s partnership with Taiwan as a courageous stand against Chinese pressure and has warned that Beijing uses its Belt and Road Initiative to "trap African nations in debt", leveraging that debt to erode their sovereignty and gain control over critical resources.

In the corridors of the Pentagon, a new and alarming scenario is being considered: that the Horn of Africa is becoming the laboratory for China’s first overseas kinetic action. The concern is that Beijing, frustrated by diplomatic and economic pressure, is now experimenting with proxy warfare to achieve its goals. Reports suggest a quiet funneling of arms and funds to shadowy regional militias, designed not for outright conquest, but to bleed and pressure the Republic of Somaliland, punishing it for its democratic alliance with Taiwan. For the new AFRICOM commander, this represents a dangerous evolution—a cold war turning hot on the shores of the Red Sea.

In the face of these threats, Somaliland has demonstrated its value as a proactive security partner. As reported by the Somaliland Chronicle on July 24, 2025, Hargeisa signed a landmark maritime security pact with Taiwan, explicitly designed to safeguard international shipping lanes and counter shared threats in the Red Sea. This was followed by a direct offer to Washington. In a Bloomberg interview, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” made an explicit and compelling offer to the United States: full partnership in exchange for recognition. He put access to a strategic military base on the Red Sea and deals for critical minerals squarely on the table, stating, “If the US is interested to land in Somaliland they are most welcome.” This is not an appeal for aid; it is a direct proposal for a security-for-recognition agreement that aligns perfectly with Washington’s need to counter Chinese influence.

With a newly-confirmed commander who has direct experience with the pitfalls of past policy, and a predecessor who made a historic visit to Hargeisa, the stage is set for a significant evolution in U.S. strategy. The facts on the ground—from the crumbling of the Danab force to the direct threat from China and Somaliland’s tangible offer of partnership—make a robust, strategic alliance with the Republic of Somaliland the logical and necessary conclusion.

Somaliland’s Cities Are Growing But Where Are the Sidewalks?

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Staff
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After 32 years of self-declared independence, Somaliland has made remarkable progress in many areas peacebuilding, elections, and private-sector growth. Cities like Hargeisa, Burao, and Borama are expanding fast, with new roads, buildings, and businesses appearing every year. But amid this urban growth, one basic question remains unanswered: Where are the sidewalks?

In cities across Somaliland, pedestrians are being forgotten. Roads are built for cars, not for people. Sidewalks  if they exist at all  are narrow, broken, or blocked. There is little room for people to walk safely, freely, or comfortably.

This isn’t just about convenience. Walking is a basic form of mobility and a foundation of healthy urban life. Sidewalks reduce road accidents, promote physical and mental health, and encourage community interaction. In a country where many people cannot afford private cars, walking is not a choice  it’s a necessity.

Hargeisa: A Capital Built for Cars, Not People

Take Hargeisa, Somaliland’s political and economic capital. The city is growing rapidly, with new highways and overpasses funded by public and private investment. But few of these road projects include proper walkways. Pedestrians are forced to walk along busy traffic lanes, dodging vehicles, breathing in dust and exhaust.

If you want to walk peacefully in Hargeisa, your options are shockingly limited. Most people end up in private hotel compounds like Guled Hotel or Grand Hadi, which offer some green space. But these are not truly public spaces. Some require entrance fees, and others are too small or exclusive to serve a wider public. This reflects a bigger issue: basic urban needs are being commercialized, when they should be publicly accessible to all.

Other Cities, Same Problem

This lack of pedestrian planning is not unique to Hargeisa. The same pattern exists in nearly every major city across Somaliland — from Burao and Erigavo to Laascaanood and Borama. Urban planning is heavily vehicle-centered. Public parks and walkways are rare. Sidewalks are often overlooked in favor of wider roads and new construction that prioritizes cars over people.

Meanwhile, Berbera offers a glimpse of what’s possible. In some parts of the city, walkways have been included in urban planning efforts, especially near the beach and central areas. While not perfect, Berbera shows that walkable cities can exist in Somaliland  if they are prioritized.

Why Sidewalks Matter

Investing in sidewalks may seem secondary to major infrastructure projects like highways or ports, but their impact on daily urban life is profound and far-reaching. Sidewalks are not just physical structures; they are essential to creating healthier, safer, and more inclusive cities.

First and foremost, sidewalks promote public health. They encourage walking, which helps prevent chronic illnesses such as heart disease and obesity, while also supporting mental well-being by reducing stress and anxiety. A safe and accessible walking environment motivates people to incorporate physical activity into their daily lives.

Sidewalks also contribute to economic and social vitality. When streets are walkable, small businesses and street vendors benefit from increased foot traffic. Local economies thrive when people feel safe and comfortable exploring neighborhoods on foot. In addition, sidewalks support equity by serving the many residents especially in Somaliland who rely on walking as their primary mode of transportation.

Beyond their practical function, sidewalks help build stronger communities. They create shared public spaces where people can connect, socialize, and feel a sense of belonging. In this way, walkable cities become more vibrant, inclusive, and humane. Simply put, sidewalks matterbecause cities are for people, and people need space to walk, safely and with dignity.

Time for Action

If Somaliland is serious about sustainable development and inclusive urban growth, then walkability must become a core part of national planning. As cities expand and new roads are built, the needs of pedestrians are often ignored. Sidewalks are not a luxury or an afterthought—they are essential infrastructure that ensures safety, accessibility, and dignity for all citizens, especially children, the elderly, and those without cars.

Incorporating sidewalks into every new road project should be a requirement. Pedestrian-friendly spaces such as walking paths, shaded walkways, and public parks must be developed and maintained in all neighborhoods, not just affluent areas. Walkable cities reduce traffic congestion, improve public health, and encourage stronger community interaction.

To support this shift, there must also be public education campaigns that raise awareness about the value of walkable spaces. When people understand the personal and collective benefits—such as improved health, safety, and a cleaner environment—they are more likely to support city planning that includes pedestrian infrastructure.

Ultimately, sidewalks reflect how much we value people in our cities. A city without sidewalks is a city that has forgotten its people. If we want urban spaces that are healthy, safe, and inclusive, then we must make room for people to walknot in the distant future, but starting now. Walkability is not just a planning issue; it is a human right.

About the Author

Kaltun Osman is a humanitarian worker and gender activist who has dedicated her career to advancing women’s rights, political participation, and governance across the Horn of Africa. She brings a unique perspective that bridges grassroots activism with policy advocacy, focusing on inclusive governance and the strategic use of digital tools to empower women in their communities.

Kaltun holds Master’s degrees in Governance and Regional Integration, and Project Planning and Management. As a 2025 I AM NALA Fellow, she has been recognized as one of Africa’s emerging women leaders in peace and security. Her work spans from community-level organizing to policy development, consistently advocating for systems that ensure women’s voices are heard in decision-making processes that affect their lives.

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Ilhan Omar’s Father and the Isaaq Genocide: The Truth Revealed

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Staff
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Between 1981 and 1991, the Somali military in which Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, served as a senior officer executed a brutal and systematic campaign of genocide targeting the Isaaq people of the modern day Republic of Somaliland.

This dark chapter in Africa’s history, which was known as the Isaaq Genocide, was a merciless military campaign that resulted in the killing of over 200,000 Isaaq civilians. It also involved widespread forced displacement, scorched‑earth destruction of the second and third largest cities (Hargeisa and Burao), aerial bombardement of almost every other single city, town and village in Somaliland, and two decades of large‑scale red-terror style tactics against the civilian population of Somaliland.

It was carried out through relentless aerial bombardments – planes repeatedly strafed fleeing refugees – summary executions, burning of entire villages, deportations, land‑mining of water sources and homes, Holodomor style government enforced man-made famines (the Dabadheer Drought) and the use of paramilitary units such as the Somali Armed Forces’ “Dabar Goynta Isaaqa” (The Isaaq Exterminators), composed exclusively of non-ethnically Isaaq soldiers, to enact mass killings under Somalia’s military direction.

War-damaged houses in Hargeysa, a major city in northern Somalia, 1991.

Eyewitness testimonies documented “mass executions by firing squad, forced disappearances, looting, mass torture, mass surveillance, rape used as a weapon, curfews and mass killings of civilians even in areas with limited resistance or lawful liberation movement activities, such in Berbera where thousands of government soldiers were stationed. Isaaq civilians across what was then the Somalia Republic, were detained and executed en-mass by Somalia government execution squads led by Colonels like Ilhan Omar’s father.

Across the country civilians were forced from their homes into dehumanising conditions, including many kept in dungeons, underground prisons and pits. Even famous Isaaqs such as Somaliland’s most renowned poet ‘Hadraawi’ did not escape this torture and years of detention under the most brutal and unsanitary conditions imaginable. Even in Mogadishu, deep inside neighbouring Somalia – and almosr 1,500KM from Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa – Isaaq civilians were being killed in their homes, in the city and on Mogadishu’s beaches. The Jazeera massacre of 1989 is a particularly brutal example that is etched in history. 

At the heart of this brutal military regime was Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father. His rank, authority, membership of the regime Daarood clan, and 10+ years of having climbed the hierarchy in Somalia military to the rank of Colonel, placed him squarely in the Somali military’s command hierarchy during and at the height of its Isaaq genocide campaign. Based on his position, loyalty to the regime, and his role in the military, it is virtually certain that he had intimate knowledge of and involvement in the planning, conception, direction and execution of the genocide. 

By both legal and historical standards, despite Ilhan Omar’s team’s spin in numerous recent articles which have been placed in left-leaning online publications, the logical conclusion that Ilhan Omar’s father was almost certainly intimately involved in the Isaaq Genocide is unmistakable. It is supported on the balance of probabilities and the totality of circumstantial and inferential evidence available indicates, more critically, that it meets the threshold that this was the case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

What Human Rights Reports Show

Investigations from Africa Watch, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN‑commissioned Mburu Report, articles from the Washington Post and New York Times are clear: the Isaaq Genocide was conceived, planned, and executed using official state machinery. The Somalian military directed attacks such as the scorched‑earth campaign, the mining of grazing areas and waterholes, and mass destruction of homes; entire cities were intentionally razed to eliminate Isaaq presence.

The numerous reports and newspaper articles detail how the military in which Ilhan Omar’s father was a Colonel, based on government directives such as the notorious “Letter of Death” attributed to General Morgan, advocated a campaign of obliteration and extermination of ethnically Isaaq civilians who form the absolute majority of the population in Somaliland – demonstrating that genocide was national policy, not the act of rogue units. The Somalian military deployed the most heinous an inhumane propaganda to justify and enable their genocide. Ilhan Omar’s father was at one point in charge of propaganda and during his 10+ year tenure with Somalia’s military between 1981 and 1991 – a timeline which coincides with the timeline of when Somalia’s military was perpetrating the Isaaq Genocide – would almost certainly have been involved in conceiving and disseminating Isaaq Genocide propaganda. Propaganda which would have got hundreds of thousands of innocent Somalilanders, ethnic Isaaq civilians, killed. 

Colonels like Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, would have operated within the command structure of Somalia’s military during the Isaaq Genocide. As a Colonel he would have been overseeing operations in Hargeisa, Oodweyne, Burao, El‑Afweyn, Gebiley, Berbera, Garadag, Erigabo, Sheikh and else where in Somaliland where mass arrests, executions, and infrastructure destruction were used to terrorise, ethnically cleanse and exterminate the Isaaq people of Somaliland.

Taken together, these findings show that it is extremely likely that Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, played a direct or enabling role in the genocide. This conclusion aligns with command responsibility in law and meets the legal standard of being demonstrably proven, both on the balance of probability under civil law, and beyond reasonable doubt under criminal law. The idea that a Colonel in Somalia’s military in a brutal dictatorship did not participate in the pervasive and ubiquitous genocidal activities his military was carry out in every city, town and village in the decade in which he was serving in and leading the military, is implausible, illogical and does not stand up to scrutiny. It is high time that Ilhan Omar comes clean about her father’s role in the Isaaq Genocide.

What the Isaaq Genocide entailed and the role of Colonels in the genocide

Contemporaneous reporting from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Guardian in 1988‑1989 described systematic aerial bombardments, civilian casualties, mass evacuations, and city‑scale destruction. Eyewitnesses at the time compared Hargeisa’s devastation to “the Dresden of Africa,” with over 90 percent of the city destroyed, widespread displacement, and the use of mercenary pilots for bombing runs. These independent accounts support the historical record and reinforce that senior military officers – including Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father – under a strict command and control structure, could not have remained passive much less or uninvolved. Nor is there any evidence of him refusing to carry out or resisting the military orders of genocide which the commander in chief, dictator Siad Barre, had issued. In fact, Ilhan Omar and her family only fled the country when the regime was toppled in January 1991, when his last enclave in the capital of Mogadishu was overrun by the resistance movements. This suggests her Colonel father was loyal to the dictator to the end, and fought alongside him to perpetrate the genocide, only leaving his side when the regime was toppled. A disloyal Colonel also would not have shot up through the ranks, having been promoted in quick succession, having joined as a cadet in 1981 and left as a loyal Colonel by 1991 upon the regime’s fall. This begs the question, why would a brutal dictator elevate and promote a disloyal Colonel? Of course the reality is that he would not have. Therefore her father must have been a loyal and faithful servant, who executed the orders of Genocide to the letter, and was likely handsomely rewarded for this.

While Ilhan Omar’s camp has recently pivoted to portraying her Colonel father as  a “teacher trainer”, this kind of fiction and verbal acrobatics is far removed from reality. The hint of the nature of his job and the rank he held is clear from his title: Colonel. He clearly held senior military responsibilities. In the genocide perpetrated by the Somalian military, Colonels oversaw planning, command, logistics, and ideological enforcement and practical execution of the Genocide. Their commands were clear and their role was clear. In one well publicised example of such military orders to commit genocide, issued by General Mohammed Said Hersi aka ‘General Morgan’ to all military units, was caught on video, and was later reported by Al Jazeera in their later documentary about the Isaaq Genocide titled “Kill All But the Crows”. The military orders were as follows: “Attack and eliminate them all. Destroy water sources, reservoirs. Burn villages, pillage, kill residents allow no life no activity. kill even the wounded. Kill all but the crows”. Deserters, defectors and those who went AWOL would be found and summarily executed (yet of course this does not excuse being complicit in a Genocide). It is therefore inconceivable that Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, did not carry out or did not authorise key military activities that facilitated, enabled or directly executed genocidal acts. His contributions as a high ranking Colonel likely included:

  • Ideological indoctrination, tactical training and direct military orders aligned with anti‑Isaaq policies.
  • Coordination of logistics, troop deployment, and use of Somali Airlines and military aircraft.
  • Enforcement of loyalty and genocide directives among officers and units.

These responsibilities parallel documented roles described in human rights investigations and reports on command operations during the genocide, and are reflected in US case law based on the legal cases against Colonel Tuken and General Samantar in relation crimes against humanity of which they were accused and which were proven after being brought by US citizens who are survivors of the Isaaq Genocide Ilhan Omar’s father’s military committed.

The “Teacher Trainer” Narrative

The portrayal of Ilhan Omar’s father as a mere “teacher trainer” – advanced in diaspora media and sympathetic Western outlets by Ilhan Omar’s PR machine – is contradicted by multiple authoritative obituaries and by Ilhan Omar’s own account referencing his Colonel rank and military service. This narrative serves to minimise his involvement and sanitise the genocide. But the scale, coordination, and leadership structure of the Somali military confirm that officers of his rank—including Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father—were integral to executing genocidal policy.

Legal Responsibility and U.S. Precedent

Under command responsibility, senior officers are liable when atrocities occur under their command and they fail to prevent or punish the perpetrators. U.S. courts have upheld this principle in landmark cases. The two aforementioned cases were one against General Samantar, where a U.S. federal court awarded damages to Isaaq survivor,  and recognized top Somali officials as legally responsible for genocide, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In a more recent legal case Colonel Tukeh was investigated as part of deportation case, where a U.S. judge determined in a US court that Colonel Yusuf Abdi Ali’s involvement in the genocide and therefore warranted immediate deportation from the US. These are irrefutable legal judgments, not opinion pieces. They confirm genocide occurred and that Colonels comparable in rank, role and responsibility to during Ilhan Omar’s father’s  Nur Omar Mohamed’s activities in the Somalia military were found culpable under US and international law. Since Ilhan Omar’s father is now deceased, the absence of a legal case with his name attached does not prove his innocence. It simply proves that he was never held accountable for his crimes.

Ilhan Omar’s Deafening Silence on the Isaaq Genocide

Despite this overwhelming historical and legal record of the Isaaq Genocide – and the fact that Ilhan Omar will be intimately aware that her father served as a senior Colonel in the military that perpetrated the Isaaq Genocide and everything that entailed – Ilhan Omar has remained silent on this. She has never issued a public condemnation of her father’s actions, nor acknowledged the genocide in any official capacity. In contrast to her vocal advocacy on various other issues of human rights, she has carefully and skilfully avoided addressing grave issue of immense human rights violations by her own father. Her silence on the topic speaks volumes, is deafening, stands in stark contradiction to her professed values.  It exposes her real political focus: virtue signalling, race-baiting and political opportunism in the U.S. while lauding praise on Somalia, the world’s most comprehensively failed state, and covering up her father’s role in its destruction. 

Ilhan Omar frequently speaks about Gaza and Palestine, championing genocide recognition and accountability daily, presumably to chase headlines and media attention. Yet she has never once acknowledged the genocide associated with the military commanded by her own father. This glaring omission underscores profound hypocrisy – she condemns atrocities abroad but refuses to address atrocities connected to her own family. Her vote against recognition of the Armenian Genocide further suggests a pattern- a reluctance to support formal acknowledgment of genocide, lest it implicate and shed light on her own father’s former regime. If one considers that the genocide her own father’s military was responsible for remains unaddressed, this may explain her opposition to Armenian recognition as part of a broader attempt to quietly and tacitly lend support to broader genocide denial.

A Gilded Childhood and Inherited Privilege & Ethnic Hatred

Ilhan Omar’s early life was spent Somalia, in an environment she often remarks about gleefully and with fondness, suggesting a sheltered and privileged upbringing. As the daughter of a Colonel in Siad Barre’s military, she likely benefited from the regime’s elite status. Regime officials included Colonels, and their immediate family members like Ilhan Omar, lived gilded lifestyles and were probably in many ways indirect beneficiaries of the Genocide. It is highly plausible that she, even as a child, benefited materially or socially from the outcomes of the genocide: the seizure of Isaaq assets, the redistribution of power and wealth to regime cronies like her Colonel father, and consolidation of power by non‑Isaaq elites. In fact, Ilhan Omar is named in that context in the Palgrave Handbook on Left Wing Extremism where serious and unanswered questions are raised about her claim to be a valid refugee. It is increasingly becoming apparent that a more accurate reinterpretation of her personal history is the daughter of a Genocidaire and war criminal, who lived a gilded lifestyle as a child of the regime elite who was potentially a beneficiary of Genocide, but once in the west reinvented herself as a liberal refugee victim.

Ilhan Omar presents herself as a champion of justice, minority rights, accountability, and anti-imperialism. Her refusal to recognise or condemn the genocide her father’s military executed is irreconcilable with this public brand. Her silence is not neutral—it is an affront to survivors who endured collective persecution and loss. To inherit privilege built on systemic violence yet actively ignore that historical legacy is an insult to the hundreds of thousands of victims and millions of survivors of the Isaaq Genocide her father’s military committed.

Why Ilhan Omar Must Now Come Clean

Ilhan Omar must publicly acknowledge her father’s role in the Isaaq Genocide, issue a formal condemnation of this atrocity, and actively support international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Only through transparency and public moral accountability and redemption can she reconcile her public advocacy with her personal history. Failing to do so makes her an electoral liability to the Democratic Party, as she continuous to bring them into disrepute and cost them votes.

About the Author

Dr Adali Warsame is a political commentator and public policy professional, who is a long time observer of Somaliland politics. He writing focuses on standing up for the dignity of Somaliland’s citizens, who appear to be forgotten in the melee that is everyday Somaliland and Horn of Africa politics.

Adali is an unapologetic Somalilander. He is passionate about achieving justice for the forgotten Isaaq Genocide victims, stopping the doomed Somaliland-Somalia talks and international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.

Somaliland Asserts Red Sea Influence with Landmark Taiwan Security Pact

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Staff
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KEY POINTS

  • The Pact: Somaliland and Taiwan have signed a landmark maritime security pact, deepening their strategic alliance in the Horn of Africa.
  • Mutual Benefit: The deal enhances Somaliland’s maritime sovereignty while providing Taiwan a key democratic and economic partner in the strategic Red Sea corridor.
  • The China Angle: The partnership directly challenges China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” and its regional strategy of using Somalia to isolate both nations.
  • Signal to the West: The alliance serves as a model for the U.S. and other Western powers on how to pragmatically engage Somaliland to counter regional instability.

HARGEISA, SOMALILAND – The deepening strategic partnership between Somaliland and Taiwan has been formalized through a landmark ‘Coast Guard Cooperation Agreement,’ an alliance that signals a decisive policy pivot by the current administration and cements Somaliland’s role as an indispensable security partner in the Horn of Africa. The pact not only enhances national security but moves the bilateral relationship into a new phase of operational cooperation.

The agreement marks a significant policy evolution for President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro)’s government. It moves past the skepticism expressed during his time in opposition, when the value of the relationship was questioned, into a new phase of strategic cooperation. This deepening of ties now serves as a powerful demonstration of both nations proving their mutual value: Somaliland as a steadfast democratic partner in a critical region, and Taiwan as a capable ally that delivers tangible security benefits.

The historic agreement was signed by Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard Admiral Ahmed Hurre Hariye and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration Director-General Chang Chung-lung during Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Bakal’s visit to Taipei—his first official trip to Taiwan since assuming office in December 2024. The visit was warmly welcomed by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung, who said it “reflects the strength, resilience & shared values of our democratic partnership.”

The agreement itself, according to the official text, aims “to promote cooperation between the coast guard authorities of the Parties” on a range of critical security areas, building upon the formal relationship established when both nations opened mutual representative offices in 2020.

Alliance Anchored in Shared Values and Strategic Gain

The benefits for both nations are substantial. For Somaliland, the pact delivers an immediate and tangible boost to national security. Cooperation on maritime law enforcement and anti-piracy measures will empower the Coast Guard to better protect the nation’s 850-kilometer coastline, safeguarding sovereignty and its burgeoning blue economy.

For Taiwan, the alliance serves as a cornerstone of its global strategy. The agreement gives Taipei a reliable democratic partner situated at the strategic chokepoint of the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which approximately 12% of global trade passes. This positioning provides Taiwan with enhanced influence in one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.

The strategic calculus for Taipei also extends deep into the economic sphere, positioning Somaliland as a vital beachhead for Taiwanese commercial expansion into Africa. This partnership grants Taiwan a significant first-mover advantage, allowing it to establish a friendly and reliable gateway into the continent’s rapidly growing markets. Through Somaliland’s stability and its strategic Port of Berbera, Taiwanese enterprises can pilot resilient supply chains and investment models for the Horn of Africa. This approach stands in stark contrast to the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ model employed by Beijing across the continent. Monuments to that strategy’s failures are numerous, from Kenya’s costly Standard Gauge Railway, which has struggled with crushing debt and questionable economic returns, to the cautionary tale of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. Taiwan’s model, by focusing on building genuine local capacity and sustainable commerce, presents a partnership designed to empower, not indebt.

A New Model: From Project Partner to Strategic Ally

This direct state-to-state agreement marks a significant strategic diversification for Somaliland. Historically, the Coast Guard has received support from international missions like EUCAP Somalia. However, engagement with such “Somalia-centric” entities—often focused on administrative workshops rather than operational capability building—has long been a point of political friction, seen by many as inadvertently diluting Somaliland’s case for independence.

The Taiwan agreement operates on a fundamentally different plane, building sovereign capability through a partnership of equals. It focuses on operational cooperation, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer—the hallmarks of a genuine state-to-state partnership. This shift reflects broader changes in Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy, diversifying beyond traditional partners who are constrained by recognition politics.

Challenging Beijing’s Red Sea Ambitions

This agreement arrives at a pivotal moment, directly challenging China’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. Beijing has systematically leveraged its relationship with Somalia to pressure both Somaliland and Taiwan, most notably through Mogadishu’s recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders in April 2025.

The Taiwan-Somaliland coast guard agreement represents a direct counter to this strategy. By deepening practical cooperation between two democratic entities that Beijing seeks to isolate, the pact signals that China’s pressure tactics may be backfiring. More significantly, it establishes a precedent for other partners to accelerate their own bilateral engagement with Somaliland.

Opening Doors for Western Partners

The timing is particularly significant given the growing US-China competition in the Red Sea corridor. This Taiwan partnership essentially provides diplomatic cover for other democratic allies to deepen ties with Hargeisa. This is particularly relevant for the United States, which has shown significant interest in partnering with Somaliland, evidenced by high-level congressional visits and discussions within the Pentagon. Washington is most likely paying close attention to this development, viewing it as a test case for how a robust partnership can flourish and serve as a bulwark against Chinese influence in the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. If Beijing responds aggressively, it may inadvertently demonstrate to Washington and European capitals that engaging Somaliland is not only strategically valuable but also an effective way to counter Chinese influence.

The Next Frontier: A Question for the Skies?

With the maritime domain now on a path to being secured, a crucial question arises for the partnership’s future: what is the next frontier? For a nation hampered by Somalia’s control over its airspace, attention may naturally turn to the skies. The potential for a future agreement focused on Air Traffic Control is significant, leveraging Taiwan’s world-class aviation expertise to help Somaliland develop autonomous management of its Flight Information Region (FIR)—a monumental step in affirming practical statehood.

As Somaliland secures its seas, the foundation is being laid for a comprehensive alliance that could reshape both nations’ strategic positions. This pact proves that in the modern world, practical cooperation and shared values often matter more than formal recognition.

Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU 2.0?: After Ankara, Why a Pact is Now Inevitable

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Staff
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The recent collapse of Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia has inadvertently proven the strategic indispensability of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. Ankara’s attempt to resolve the crisis that erupted after the MoU was signed—by exploring alternatives for Ethiopia through Mogadishu—was a critical test of diplomatic and geographic realities and most importantly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s resolve. It was a test that the Somalia option failed spectacularly. This failure has shattered the illusion that a third way exists, paving a direct path back to the only viable solution. Now, amid intensifying speculation of an imminent visit by Somaliland’s President Abdirahman “Cirro” to Addis Ababa, the revival of the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding has shifted from a possibility to a geopolitical necessity.

The Ankara Declaration was signed in Ankara during a meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on 14 December, 2024 (Photo: EPA)

The Geographic and Security Imperative

Ethiopia’s strategic vulnerability stems from its landlocked status and overwhelming dependency on a single trade corridor. With 95 percent of its trade flowing through Djibouti, the nation hemorrhages over $1.5 billion annually in port fees while remaining strategically vulnerable. Recent disruptions in Red Sea shipping lanes have further exposed the fragility of this dependency, making alternative access routes existentially necessary. The geographic reality is immutable: Ethiopia’s industrial heartland lies adjacent to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast. The port of Berbera, whose capacity has been significantly expanded under a management deal with the UAE’s DP World, creates the only viable logistical alternative. Somalia’s Indian Ocean ports, by contrast, are a logistical fiction that solves neither the dependency problem nor the strategic vulnerability.

Beyond these logistical absurdities, any Ethiopian route through Somalia presents an insurmountable security risk. Somalia remains a deeply unstable state where vast territories are controlled not by the federal government, but by Al-Shabaab and a multitude of other terror networks. An Ethiopian naval base on its coast or a commercial trade corridor transiting its lands would immediately become a high-value, symbolic target. The constant threat of attacks on Ethiopian goods, infrastructure, and personnel would require a massive and perpetual security commitment, effectively dragging Ethiopia into Somalia’s internal quagmire. No responsible government would stake its national economic lifeline on a route that passes through one of the world’s most complex security emergencies. This stark reality contrasts sharply with Somaliland’s three decades of proven stability and effective internal security, making the choice for Addis Ababa not just one of convenience, but of fundamental risk management.

The Coalition of Containment

This stark geographic and security logic is precisely why the opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is so fierce. The sophisticated containment strategy reveals the high stakes involved, with Somalia serving as the linchpin. Its approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active warfare, including fueling the Las Anod Crisis in a bid to dismember Somaliland from within. This has been accompanied by a terrifying rhetorical escalation from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who has reportedly taken to mosque pulpits to declare a ‘Jihad’ and threatened to align with Al-Shabaab.

This proxy warfare has attracted broader regional support. Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Similarly, the February 2024 Turkey-Somalia defense pact establishes a Turkish naval presence as a direct counter to Ethiopian maritime ambitions. More troubling is the emerging China factor, with Beijing making strategic calculations about countering American influence by engaging with anti-recognition forces. The tragic irony is that for Somalia’s government, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than defeating the terrorists who control its own country.

The Legal Architecture and the Strategic Opportunity

The proposed naval base requires a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—a binding international treaty that can only be negotiated between sovereign entities. This legal requirement creates a de facto recognition pathway that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels, an approach with precedents ranging from the US lease agreement for Guantanamo Bay to the progressive recognition of Kosovo.

The current alignment of forces creates a historic, but fleeting, window for this pact. The failure of the Turkish-led mediation has provided both nations with the political justification for renewed bilateral engagement. A new US administration guided by transactional realpolitik creates a permissive international environment. However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage carries an expiration date. Long-standing US strategic interest in the Berbera airport and port could translate into a direct US military presence, providing Hargeisa an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage.

The Inevitable Crystallization of a New Reality

The failure of the Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia was not a crisis for the MoU; it was its ultimate vindication. It removed the final illusion that a viable alternative could be found through Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the experiment proved that the solution to its vulnerability lies not in placating its adversaries but in an alliance with a reliable partner. For Somaliland, its strategic indispensability has been demonstrated for all to see. The question facing both leaderships is no longer whether to act, but how decisively they can capitalize on this historic alignment of interests. The revival of their MoU represents the crystallization of a new strategic reality in the Horn of Africa—one where geographic logic and mutual security triumph over diplomatic fiction.

Solving Berbera’s Electricity Crisis: A Roadmap for Sustainable Energy

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Staff
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Berbera, a coastal city located along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, is one of the hottest cities in Somaliland in terms of climate. Economically, Berbera holds immense importance, serving as a critical hub for exports, imports, transportation, and other services. Additionally, the city is a key source of revenue for Somaliland, generating an estimated $120+ million annually with financial supplements of more than $12+ million. Berbera is also home to thousands of workers from diverse regions, making it a growing center for economic development and investment. However, the lack of reliable electricity services has become a significant challenge, hindering the life of its residents and slowing the city’s progress.

An article titled “Somaliland: Solar Power and Microgrid Intelligence for an Urban Power Grid,” published in June 2021, highlighted that; As of April 2021, the citywide power grid supplying Berbera, home to the largest port in the area, is being monitored and controlled using DHYBRID microgrid technology. For this purpose, two solar plants with a total capacity of 8 megawatts, a containerized lithium-ion power storage system with a capacity of 2 megawatt hours, and three modern diesel generators were combined in the Berbera Electricity Company (BEC) utility grid. This has enabled BEC to reduce the electricity tariff in Berbera, which is now the lowest in Somaliland. With the help of its international partners, DHYBRID was able to complete this large expansion, despite the global logistics challenges.

To improve the energy supply, more photovoltaic power plants are being built in Somaliland to supplement the existing generators, in addition to other measures. But this development poses major challenges for power grids. “Various generators within the grid must be continuously coordinated, especially when renewable energies are involved. Otherwise, problems with the grid frequency and voltage will become unavoidable, making it impossible to utilize all the available power,” explains Benedikt Böhm from DHYBRID. “It is simply not enough to just consider the solar capacity available. Effective grid management is essential.”

Challenges in Berbera’s Electricity Service

The hot climate of Berbera, where temperatures often reach an average of 40°C during summer, exacerbates the struggles of residents, especially when electricity is unavailable. The city depends on one main power plant, making the grid vulnerable to breakdowns. No backup energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, or battery storage) to mitigate outages is also something the community sees at lack of care from the service provider. Berbera faces significant challenges in its electricity sector. Access to electricity is limited, with only some percentage of the population really connected and having access to quality electricity, forcing many not to rely on Berbera Electricity Company (BEC).

The high cost of electricity makes it unaffordable for many, particularly among the urban poor, exacerbated by a lack of competition and regulation in the market. Service reliability is another major issue, as frequent power outages disrupt daily life.

Challenges of Berbera Electricity

Electricity is a vital service that supports daily life and economic activities, Berbera faces various challenges in this area. The Somaliland government has repeatedly received concerns regarding electricity issues through community representatives, social media, and direct inquiries to President Muse Bihi. Notably, on August 22, 2023, during his visit to Berbera, there was a significant electricity failure. Additionally, on March 23, 2025, the current president, Mr. Abdirahman Cirro, laid the foundation stone for the Berbera Electricity Expansion Project, signaling a commitment to improving the region’s energy infrastructure.

Several challenges facing the electricity in Berbera include:

  1. Low-quality power lines: Poorly maintained electricity cables lead to accidents such as electrical fires, shocks, and others that endanger people’s lives and property.
  2. Weak poles and infrastructure: The utility poles often collapse or become unstable, causing damage to property and posing risks to public safety.
  3. Technical failures in machinery: The coastal winds affect the operations of the power plant, leading to frequent blackouts in the city.
  4. Insufficient equipment and technicians: The electricity company lacks the necessary tools and a well-trained workforce to efficiently resolve technical issues. Lack of skilled technicians and maintenance capacity are the issues resulting in unannounced power cuts, disrupting businesses and households.
  5. Unnotified power cuts: Electricity is often turned off without prior notice to the public, disrupting daily activities and creating frustration.
  6. Electricity Summer Issues: In Berbera, the electricity supply becomes unreliable during the summer months, particularly when temperatures peak. This seasonal challenge poses significant issues for residents and businesses alike, as the demand for electricity increases due to heightened use of cooling systems and appliances.
  7. Politically motivated power outages: For example, in May 2025, the electricity service was deliberately shut down in the city, allegedly for political reasons, marking the first time such a politically driven power cut had occurred.

Solutions to Berbera’s Electricity Challenges

To address these issues, significant investment in energy infrastructure is essential to enhance generation capacity, transmission, and distribution, ultimately improving access and reliability for all residents of Berbera. Addressing the ongoing electricity problems requires a thorough understanding of the city’s unique circumstances and the needs of its people. While many cities worldwide face electricity outages and quality issues due to technical difficulties or natural disasters, Berbera’s 10+ years of persistent electricity problems highlight systemic failure. Potential solutions can be divided into three approaches:

Solution 1: Reforming the Current Electricity Management with BEC

BEC must take urgent steps to improve its services. Key actions include:

  1. Upgrading and modernizing power lines:
  2. Replace old, faulty cables and enhance functioning ones to reduce accidents and outages.
  3. Underground cables in high-risk zones to prevent wind/heat damage.
  4. Strengthening poles and infrastructure:
  5. Reinforce or replace weak poles to prevent collapses and related damages.
  6. Install automated fault detection systems to reduce outage response times.
  7. Modernizing the power plant:
  8. Invest in new machinery to improve electricity generation and reliability.
  9. Building a second power plant:
  10. Another power plant could reduce the burden on the existing facilities.
  11. Introduce modular gas turbines for rapid deployment during peak demand.
  12. Accountability and responsibility:
  13. The company must prioritize the well-being of the public, ensuring that the electricity fees collected are reinvested in improving the service.
  14. Conduct an independent audit of the current utility company’s performance.
  15. Enforce strict service-level agreements with penalties for non-compliance.

Solution 2: Canceling the Current Contract

If the current electricity management fails to address the problems, the government should terminate its contract with the company, return the electricity services to the government or open a transparent bidding process for new providers. This could involve:

  • Revoking the current agreements:
  • If the current provider fails, terminate the contract and launch a competitive bidding process or return the electricity services to the government.
  • The decision to return electricity services to the government from a BEC stems from the latter’s inability to provide reliable and quality service.
  • Open Transparent tenders:
  • Advertise a competitive bidding process to attract capable companies. These companies should be assessed based on the quality of their services, the affordability rates, and ability to address the city’s electricity challenges.
  • Establishing an oversight committee:
  • Create a monitoring body consisting of community representatives, the electricity company, LG officials, the Ministry, and other stakeholders. This committee would ensure accountability and maintain service quality.

Solution 3: Promoting Solar Power Usage

If neither the electricity company nor the government takes action to resolve the challenges, the community must seek alternative solutions. One viable option is solar energy:

  • Adopting solar power systems:
  • Residents should begin using solar energy to reduce dependence on the unreliable electricity service.
  • Offer MFI from businesses for households installing solar panels.
  • Install wind turbines along the coast to capitalize on strong sea breezes.
  • Encouraging local businesses to sell affordable solar systems:
  • Entrepreneurs should provide low-cost solar equipment to enable more people to access this renewable energy source.
  • Encourage pay-as-you-go solar systems for low-income households.

In conclusion, Berbera is a critical city that serves as Somaliland’s economic gateway. Addressing basic services such as electricity is essential to ensuring the well-being of its residents and sustaining the city’s growth. The central government, local authorities, and private companies must work together to respond to the community’s complaints and improve the electricity service. Solving Berbera’s electricity problems will not only enhance the quality of life for its residents but also boost investment opportunities and further establish the city as a hub of economic activity. The people of Berbera deserve better, and best electricity services.

Berbera’s electricity crisis is solvable through a multi-pronged approach combining infrastructure upgrades, policy reforms, and renewable energy expansion. Immediate actions—such as grid modernization and solar adoption—can provide short-term relief, while long-term solutions like wind energy and private sector participation will ensure sustainability.

The Government of Somaliland has received financing from the World Bank toward the cost of Somali Electricity Sector Recovery Project (P173088), and applied part of the proceeds toward payments under the Contract Design, Supply, Installation, Testing, and Commissioning of 12MWp Solar PV Power Plant with 36MWh of Battery Energy Storage System Including a 13.5km of 33kV Evacuation line for BEC, Berbera, Somaliland. The project aims to increase access to lower cost and cleaner electricity services in the project areas and reestablish the electricity supply industry in Somaliland (World Bank).

The implementation of the project would have four main outcomes: A) Institutional, legal & regulatory. B) Integrated Infrastructure for optimized operations. C) Increased electricity access. D) Reduced the cost of electricity and increased reliability of electricity supply.

This project is vital for Berbera residents and the town’s development. By implementing a 12MWp Solar PV Power Plant with a 36MWh Battery Energy Storage System, this significantly enhances access to electricity, ensuring that households and businesses benefit from reliable and affordable power. Transitioning to solar energy will also promote cleaner, more sustainable practices, reducing reliance on fossil fuels and minimizing environmental impact. Overall, the increased and reliable electricity access will attract investments, stimulate economic growth, and improve the quality of life for residents, positioning the town for a prosperous and sustainable future. Finally, President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi Cirro’s government, city local government and members of Parliament representing Sahil region and the city musttake a decisive action now to transform Berbera into a model city for energy resilience, unlocking economic growth and improving quality of life for its residents.

References

  1. DHYBRID Technology (2021). Somaliland: Solar Power and Microgrid Intelligence for an Urban Power Grid, https://www.dhybrid.de/en/press-article/somaliland-solar-power-and-microgrid-intelligence-for-an-urban-power-grid.
  2. Nasir Ali, Ayan Yusuf, Abdiqadir A. Ismail, and Jutta Bakonyi (2023) Somaliland: Berbera city’s growth is being held back by a power supply monopoly, https://theconversation.com/somaliland-berbera-citys-growth-is-being-held-back-by-a-power-supply-monopoly-204396.
  3. Electricity Sector Recovery Project (SESRP) (P173088). (2025). https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/procurement-detail/OP00343017.

About the author:

Mukhtar Mahdi is a dedicated humanitarian worker with extensive experience in education and community development. He has committed his career to empowering communities through innovative educational programs and sustainable development initiatives with successful implementation of numerous educational and community projects aimed at providing access to quality learning and community resilience for underserved populations

Mukhtar holds a master’s degree in International Humanitarian Aid and a master’s degree in Internation Relations. Mukhtar is also certified project planning and management. Mukhtar is actively involved in community development projects that foster collaboration and resilience among Somali communities which leads to sustainable improvements in living conditions and economic opportunities.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

Creative Commons License

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

Diplomatic Delusion: Ex-U.S. Official’s Call for Al-Shabaab Talks Undermines U.S. Strategy, Emboldens Terrorists

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Staff
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While U.S. drones rain fire on Al-Shabaab hideouts, a former U.S. official is lobbying for a peace table instead of a battlefield—offering a diplomatic fantasy that may be destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa.

At a Glance:

  • Claims by a former U.S. official of secret U.S.-Al Shabaab talks are threatening to fracture the AU peacekeeping mission, with Uganda’s top general, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, citing the rumors as a reason to call for a “total withdrawal.”
  • The mission, AUSSOM, is already struggling with significant funding gaps and waning commitment from international donors.
  • Warfa claims, without evidence, that the Trump administration may already be engaged in talks—an assertion not confirmed by U.S. officials and doubted by regional experts.
  • The proposal is at odds with current U.S. policy and the military reality of a resurgent Al-Shabaab capable of overrunning army bases.
  • Warfa’s record raises serious questions about his judgment and potential conflicts between U.S. interests and his own nationalist allegiances.

The long-standing African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), already teetering due to chronic shortfalls in international funding, now faces existential threat. Unverified claims by a former U.S. official that Washington is negotiating with Al-Shabaab risk splintering this fragile mission, potentially accelerating Somalia’s descent into chaos.

Hamse Warfa with former US President Joseph R Biden

The tipping point came when Uganda’s top general, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, publicly declared that he would recommend a “total withdrawal” of Ugandan forces—the backbone of the AU mission. His reasoning? Rumors that the U.S. had opened backchannel talks with Al-Shabaab, rumors traceable directly to former State Department advisor Hamse Warfa. “We even hear that the US has begun secret negotiations with Al-Shabaab in Somalia,” Muhoozi posted on X, before concluding that such betrayal warranted a full Ugandan exit.

That a senior military official is citing Warfa’s unsupported claims as justification for undermining an entire mission underscores the real-world damage of irresponsible diplomacy. Warfa’s advocacy, once an academic policy pitch, is now a political grenade lobbed into an already volatile region. It has drawn interest from a curious alliance—Al-Shabaab, Qatari intermediaries, Somali nationalists—but little support from Washington. A Somaliland Chronicle investigation into Warfa’s campaign reveals glaring contradictions and a worldview shaped less by strategic clarity than by allegiance to a collapsing Somali nationalism.

Military Reality vs. Diplomatic Fantasy

Warfa’s proposal arrives at the worst possible moment. AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley recently testified before Congress about Al-Shabaab’s resurgence. In response, the U.S. has increased its drone strike tempo throughout 2025, targeting the group’s senior leadership.

Commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Michael Langley attend the Morocco-US military exercise “African Lion 2024” in Agadir on May 30, 2024. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP) (Photo by FADEL SENNA/AFP via Getty Images)

This strategic escalation makes Warfa’s proposal not just mistimed, but deeply unserious. As the International Crisis Group notes, Al-Shabaab’s leadership views negotiations as “more dangerous than weapons of mass destruction.” Why would a group that overran a major army base in April 2025 and just this week captured the strategic town of Moqokori choose diplomacy over domination? It wouldn’t. And it won’t.

The Prophet of American Abandonment

The roots of Warfa’s position lie in a 2024 Heritage Institute conference in Djibouti, where he warned Somalis to prepare for American abandonment. In a twist of irony, his prediction proved partially true—but not because of U.S. fatigue. The Trump administration, under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, recalibrated U.S. foreign policy around a cold-eyed America First doctrine.

Mogadishu’s government, long propped up by U.S. taxpayers, failed every basic test of a reliable partner. Corruption, incompetence, and outright collaboration with terrorist elements turned Somalia into an international welfare state. The Trump team finally called the bluff.

Yet here lies Warfa’s logical collapse. He correctly diagnosed U.S. skepticism but now asks the same administration to double down. He wants Washington to underwrite peace with the very terrorists Mogadishu never had the will to defeat. That’s not strategic recalibration—it’s intellectual incoherence. He’s not resolving a contradiction—he’s laundering it.

A Pattern of Flawed Judgment

This isn’t the first time Warfa has demonstrated poor judgment. In August 2023, as the State Department’s Senior Advisor for Human Rights, he met with Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre to affirm shared values. Two months later, Barre publicly praised Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group.

There are only two explanations. Either Warfa misread Barre so badly it disqualifies his credibility, or his version of human rights diplomacy is politically selective and practically useless.

A Coordinated Political Campaign?

Warfa’s push for negotiations mirrors the long-standing efforts of his political ally and fellow Minnesotan, Rep. Ilhan Omar. For years, Omar has led efforts to curtail the U.S. drone program in Somalia. Now, Warfa surfaces with a diplomatic solution that perfectly complements her agenda.

Whether by coordination or coincidence, the optics are damning. One flank aims to disable the military option, the other steps forward to declare peace talks as the only viable alternative. Together, they form a political pincer movement—one that serves neither U.S. interests nor regional stability.

Hijacking U.S. Policy: The ‘Somalia-First’ Agenda

The clearest insight into Warfa’s worldview comes from his vocal opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. His position aligned with Biden-era policy—itself strongly shaped by Rep. Omar—that prioritized Somali territorial claims over evolving strategic partnerships.

This reveals a deeper agenda. Far from being a neutral bureaucrat, Warfa was a key proponent of a Somalia-first doctrine that worked against growing Congressional consensus in favor of Somaliland. It was a policy shaped more by clan allegiance than strategic reality.

The facts on the ground offer no comfort to his thesis. Somalia’s military is compromised by Al-Shabaab infiltration. Its government openly collaborates with Communist China, recently banning Taiwanese nationals to placate Beijing. Senator Ted Cruz called Somalia a “wholly owned subsidiary of Communist China.”

And yet Warfa—who once used Trump as an example of democratic decay—now claims he’s the president best suited to bring peace to Somalia. The moral gymnastics are staggering.

Serving Different Masters

Warfa’s proposal, stripped of its diplomatic varnish, serves interests far removed from Washington’s. For Al-Shabaab, negotiations legitimize their movement. For Qatar, they offer leverage. For Somali nationalists, they sustain the illusion of a unified state. None of these actors advance U.S. interests. Nor do they promote stability.

The question isn’t whether this strategy will work. It won’t. The real question is whether American policymakers will squander decades of investment for a fantasy that flatters terrorists and undermines allies. In an era of strategic realignment, the cost of getting it wrong has never been higher.

Clarifications on ‘Somali-Weyn’

By
Staff
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In my recent article about Somali-Weyn and Islam-Weyn, I examined how these two ideologies, rooted in ethnonationalism and belief orientation, have been politicized in a way defying the geographic boundaries that define the modern territorial state. The article traced the historical and contextual evolution of both Pan-Somalism and political Islamic movements in 20th century as being shaped by, or reacting to, the colonial and postcolonial political dynamics. Both Somali-weyn ideology and Islamic movements were parts of broader anticolonial, revivalist and respectively Pan-Somali unity and Caliphate restoration ambitions organically connected with African liberation movements, Arab nationalism, and subsequent Islamic revivalism.

The article generated considerable feedback in different platforms, but most notably from Ibrahim Hirsi, whose response was both thoughtful insights and significant misinterpretations. His central critique was that I had reduced Somali-weyn and Islam-weyn to mere colonial byproducts and I had downplayed the grievous impacts of the colonial history on Somalis which led to their lands’ partition and territorial dismemberment. Ibrahim argued that Somalinimo, as a political ethnonationalist sentiment, existed for centuries, and that the states historically evolved through shared identities of culture, language and religion. He implied that geographical borders were not central in the history of state formation.

I acknowledge Ibrahim’s points about the colonial grave legacy on Somalis and on all other colonized nations, and the idea that European colonialism divided Somalis into pieces of land and how impactful this legacy was on their land and psyche is undeniable, as documented by Dr. Bulhan in his great book – Politics of Cain; One Hundred Years of Crisis in Somali Politics and Society. Yet, this history needs to be thoroughly examined without succumbing to anticolonial narratives, particularly because defining nationalism solely through the lens of anti-colonialism can be deeply problematic. Such an approach risks reproducing the colonial logic it seeks to oppose- reifying boundaries and identities forged by external domination rather than reimagining them beyond it. According to Achille Mbembe critiques, in (On the Postcolony) the way postcolonial regimes have instrumentalized anti-colonial rhetoric while mimicking colonial authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and pluralism in the name of national unity.

In fact, precolonial Somalis, as most of other African nations, were organized in lineage-based clan structure, without any central authority based on Somali ethnicity, or nation state. The kinship organization of the clans developed as clan identity domination and sense of ‘tolnimo – clan loyalty’ over any ethnocentric loyalties related to ‘being Somalis’. In truth, the outsiders commonly used the term ‘Somali’ to describe Somalis, while pastoral populations within these societies used to identify themselves by their clan names or ancestral legend. Thus, and to Somali perspective, the colonial powers divided the territory and the people of individual clans among Somalis. The Somali pastoralists resented more to the lineage division and pastoral land limitations imposed by the colonial rule, than resentment to tearing Somali territorial land mass in an ethnocentric consciousness.

The rise of Somali nationalism was largely the result of political awakening of Somali elites and urbanized communities who were educated and exposed to global and regional ideologies, particularly after World War II and associated geopolitical and world view changes. Many of these elite figures, including veterans returned from colonial military service and those educated and lived in Aden and other overseas capitals, were influenced by liberation currents and the wave of nationalism in Africa and the Arab world.  Mover over in the Somali context, a Pan-Somali loose movement was pushed by different actors in different circumstance; the role of the British rule in four Somali territories in 1940s in promoting Pan-Somali unity, both locally and internationally, is well documented and founded. Ernest Bevin, the then British Foreign Secretary (1945- 1951), campaigned among the great powers for Pan-Somali Unity and ethnic state formation. One may wonder what could justify that intellectually Italian-Speaking elites in Somalia had self-styled as Somali Youth League – SYL (founded in 1943), without British fingerprints in the league’s emergence during the British Military Administration of Somalia in 1941 – 1949.

Ibrahim rightly asserted that state formation historically stemmed from, and evolved through, tribal organization and religious societies, and that is partially true. However, that is the history of state formation, but for modern state, the concept is shifting from ethnicity to citizenship promoting inclusivity, rule of law and civic consciousness in nationality. Ethnocentric states in the contemporary era face challenges and mostly handle brutal politics of suppression and ethnic cleansing. As the recent history demonstrates, almost all racial and ethnocentric states were both genocidal and failure. Nazism and Italian Fascism, in modern European nation states, ultimately collapsed after years of brutality and failure to achieve racial supremacy, and they are now remembered as despised figures and history by the same races they fought for. Likewise, while Europe was shifting from nation states to citizen states, vast territories of the world, including Africa and the Arab world, were vigorously campaigning for nationalism and ethnic politics. In the Somali context, as an example of other nationalist race-based states and political movements, Pan-Somalism failed to translate into viable statehood but unleashed significant levels of violence, wars and lasting instability. Some may argue that the concept was not the culprit, but how it was implemented or employed. This argument may have some merit, but how the Somali-weyn rhetoric was politically initiated would have the brutal end of what Dr. Hussein A. Bulhan eloquently described as a ‘Fratricidal state’.

Political Somali-weyn proponents defamed the civilian Somali governments and condemned how they handled the Somali territories under Ethiopian and Kenyan sovereignties and paved the way for Siad Barre’s rise to power in 1969 with tactical visions aligned with the Somali-weyn rhetoric and aspirations. Siad Barre, with the political ingredients of racial supremacy and salvation, readily took the path of Hitler and Mussolini to conduct repressive campaign of silencing all voices of opposition either forever or for unspecified durations of solitary confinements by labeling them with dabadhilif and anti-Somali.

 Finally, he ended up genocide, ethnic cleansing and national fragmentation, in total contradiction of all ambitious components of the less-defined Somali-weyn ideology. Almost all autocratic tyrants led destructive policies through ethnocentric statecrafts and pretexts of racial supremacy, unity and salvation, and the Somalian autocratic Kacaan, in the guise of Somali-weyn ideology, did little to alleviate the suffering of Somalis living in the peripheral territories annexed to Ethiopia, Kenya, and then France-colonized Djibouti. These populations paid a heavy price for a dream that never materialized. In addition, the counterproductive pursuit of Pan-Somali state led to inevitable conflicts with the neighboring countries, like Ethiopia and Kenya, with its dire consequences on the Somalis living in these countries. Ironically, even the hastily achieved unification between Somaliland and Somalia, intended to anchor the pan-Somali unity, resulted in decades of instability, civil war and self-destruction.

Another critical misrepresentation of Somali-weyn political ideology lies in its assumption of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, and even restoring a pre-existed unity. This ideology gravely failed to accept the ethnic diversity in Somalia itself, as significant populations including Bantu tribes, and many other ethnicities of the coastal residents, were systematically assimilated and culturally eliminated by the state institutions. The whole concepts were not founded as the Somalis were never united in a central administration before the colonial era, and that those living in some of the colonies have never been a pure nation. Somalia, the largest of the five territories, was not, and is not yet, ethnically homogeneous population. From Mogadishu to Kismayo and beyond, the Bantu tribes and other nationalities were, unfortunately, suppressed in culture, language and even lineages, and were pushed into demise to force them into somalization through somali-weyn ideology using the state tools.  Somali nationalism adopted the European nation-state ideals without accounting for the country’s clan-based social order and promoted ethnic unity and centralization while ignoring internal diversity to reproduce colonial frameworks which contributed to later state collapse.

Re-Imagining Somalinimo and Islam in Somali Political Life  

In his response, Ibrahim articulated his views under the above title, a concept that resonates with my central argument about Somali political future. Indeed, Somalis share deep cultural bonds, linguistic commonalities and some degree of collective memory about their history that can serve as a foundation for cooperation and broader unity, but these should not be premises for resurrecting failed ideologies, ethnic misrepresentation and misuse, as these commonalities do not still grantee a nation state. Considering these commonalities, Somali state should be re-imagined based on citizenship, collective interest and civic principles, but not on bloodline, belief and ethnic exclusivity. The shared heritage and identity of Somalinimo will naturally feed cooperation, togetherness and formulate future collective and voluntary shared interests, without consuming it for political agendas and group interests, or distorting it with constitutionally or forcefully forged state apparatuses.  

Similarly, Islam is an integral to Somali culture, social identity and sacred values. Islam necessarily guided considerable aspects of Somalis’ world view, their life and social relations for centuries, and still does. However, transforming Islam into a political ideology of parts or movements and being re-evangelized in the Somali community has often led to radicalization, infighting and belief distortion. In fact, and contrary to Ibrahim’s assertion, the internal dynamics of Somali state including corruption, moral vacuum and clan-based politics could only be justifications used as a motive for proselytizing the Islamist ideology and to propagate their political agenda. But the truth is that all the Somali Islamists were not more than franchise of other movements in the Arab world. They were all either of Muslim Brotherhood or Wahabi Salafists. Even in case of further proliferation of a group in its original country, that division reflects in the Somali groups indicating how any change in the idea, attitude and interpretations of a mother group in one of the Arab states, would rapidly echo in the Somali groups. For instance, the takfīr doctrine—originally propagated by radical Egyptian group of jama Islamiyah —rapidly found its way into Somali Islamist discourse and contributed to organizational division of al-Ahli group – Somali Jama Islamiyah. This pattern reveals that Somali Islamism was more externally influenced than organically developed from home-grown idea.

In conclusion, the Somali identity and Islam remain integral to the social fabric of the people, but their politicization has led to clan and ideological conflicts, political crisis, belief confusions and radicalization. So, we must re-imagine them as cultural fabric that can inspire collaboration, mutual respect, and coexistence instead of forcing homogeniety, domintaion in  ethnoccentric statehood, racial chauvinism, and religious extremism at the expense of civic rights and embraced diversity within all other similirities. Somali statehood should move beyond ideology of uniformity and embrace free will, historical differences, and somali political imagination should be reclaimed towards peaceful coexistance and future prosperity without persuing delusional racial hegemony that transcends geographical borders.

About the Author

Dr. Mohamed Hirsi is a health professional, university lecturer, and writer specializing in political history and philosophy. He holds an MBBS in Medicine and Surgery and a Master’s in Public Health Epidemiology. Dr. Hirsi is the author of the Somali novel Dabinkii Jiraalka – Diiriye-Maarkoos and has translated several significant works into Somali, including Bamboo Stalk by Sanusi and Politics of Cain; One Hundred Years of Crisis in Somali Politics and Society by Bulhan. His multidisciplinary background spans healthcare, academia, and literary contributions to Somali culture and political discourse.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

Creative Commons License

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

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