Lin Chia-lung, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan (Republic of China)
Today, the world faces mounting uncertainties and challenges—from prolonged conflicts and democratic backsliding to economic coercion and disinformation campaigns. Authoritarian regimes increasingly employ gray-zone tactics that undermine the rules-based international order. In this fragile global environment, peace cannot be taken for granted. Democracies must unite to bolster resilience and safeguard our cherished values and way of life.
Taiwan is a key player and an indispensable partner in the Indo-Pacific region, working toward global peace, stability, and prosperity. It stands on the front line of the Indo-Pacific’s first island chain, defending democracy and freedom from authoritarian expansionism. Taiwan also contributes significantly to stability and prosperity through its robust economy and semiconductor ecosystem. As the 21st-largest economy, Taiwan leads in artificial intelligence and semiconductors—producing over 60 percent of the world’s chips and 90 percent of its most advanced ones. This economic strength fuels global growth and makes Taiwan an indispensable partner for global development in various fields.
Taiwan is determined to defend democratic values, both at home and abroad. President Lai Ching-te launched the Four Pillars of Peace action plan last year, which commits to raising Taiwan’s defense spending and boosting whole-of-society resilience. Taiwan does not seek conflict with China and will not provoke it. In fact, Taiwan is urging Beijing to resume dialogue on the basis of parity and dignity.
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted an “Integrated Diplomacy” to leverage Taiwan’s diplomatic, defense, technological, and economic strengths. With this smart power approach, Taiwan is navigating complex international relations, enhancing its global presence, and contributing to a more stable and prosperous world.
Through the global democratic values chain, Taiwan strengthens partnership with democracies facing uncertain geopolitical risks to resist authoritarian influence, promote human rights, advance digital governance, and uphold the rules-based international order. Taiwan’s resilience in the face of authoritarian threats proves that democracy can endure and thrive under pressure.
As a thriving economic powerhouse, Taiwan leads in semiconductor production and advanced technologies. Its economic strengths fuel innovation and growth in sectors of AI, digitalization and healthcare. To reinforce this position, Taiwan has launched an economic diplomacy strategy focused on non-red supply chains, aiming to build trusted and transparent networks that safeguard critical industries from authoritarian interference.
Taiwan also actively advances the Diplomatic Allies Prosperity Project, harnessing public-private collaboration to consolidate government resources and leverage Taiwan’s industrial strengths to promote mutually beneficial development. Initiatives include collaborating with Paraguay to develop an integrated hospital information system (HIS) to enhance nationwide medical information management; partnering with Eswatini on an oil reserve facility project to strengthen energy security and stimulate local industry; and assisting Palau in becoming a smart and sustainable island nation to exemplify Taiwan’s commitment to sustainable international cooperation.
Regrettably, despite Taiwan’s significant global contributions, it remains largely unrecognized by the international community and is unable to participate in the United Nations system. Taiwan’s unwarranted exclusion stems from China’s deliberate misrepresentation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. The resolution is falsely linked with the so-called “one China principle” and continues to be wrongfully weaponized to block Taiwan’s participation.
However, UNGA Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all—it merely addresses China’s representation in the United Nations. The resolution does not state that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), nor does it grant the PRC the right to represent Taiwan in the UN system. Nevertheless, the United Nations has yielded to China’s political pressure, using the resolution as a pretext to exclude Taiwan from the international community.
In response, Taiwan is speaking out against this injustice and garnering ever-more support. As international backing for Taiwan grows, countries worldwide are increasingly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at bilateral and multilateral forums such as the Group of Seven (G7) summit. And the executive and legislative branches of numerous nations have publicly clarified that UNGA Resolution 2758 neither determines Taiwan’s status nor precludes its participation in the international organizations, including the UN system.
As the United Nations celebrates its 80th anniversary—and with only five years remaining to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—it is time for it to fulfill its vision of “leaving no one behind” and becoming “better together’’ by including Taiwan.
Taiwan invites the world to “chip in” and help by recognizing Taiwan’s rightful place on the world stage and embracing the contributions it has to offer. Only by working together can we create a better and brighter future for the Indo-Pacific region and the world.
At dawn, on August 24th, 2025, after finishing my morning prayers, I made my way to Boston’s Logan Airport. My destination was Washington, D.C./Virginia, where I would attend the funeral of a man whose name and legacy are etched into the history of Somaliland: Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees. As I traveled, I felt compelled to reflect, to put into words the profound impact this remarkable man had on his people, his nation, and on me personally.
Imagine a nation emerging from the ashes of war—a land stripped bare, with no functioning institutions, no electricity, no running water, no schools, no hospitals. Only ruins, despair, and fractured communities. That was Somaliland in the early 1990s, after the collapse of Somalia’s central government and the declaration of Somaliland’s independence. Rebuilding such a devastated land required vision, resilience, and leaders of rare caliber. Among those who stepped forward, few embodied the spirit of selflessness, intellect, and commitment more fully than Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees.
For more than two decades, Professor Gees gave his life’s work to Somaliland. He was a peacebuilder in the troubled Sanaag region, a mediator who helped heal wounds between clans, and later a statesman who served with distinction in the government of President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. In his hands, some of the nation’s most sensitive portfolios—Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Planning—were not just ministerial titles, but instruments for laying the foundations of a functioning state. His fingerprints remain on many of the critical decisions that gave Somaliland stability and legitimacy in its formative years.
After his years in government, Professor Gees continued his service as the Executive Director of the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) from 2004. Succeeding the work of Dr. Hussein Abdillahi Bulhan (the founder), he expanded the Academy’s role as a center for dialogue, research, and reconciliation. In doing so, he helped institutionalize peacebuilding as a permanent feature of Somaliland’s governance. What others saw as an experiment, he transformed into a living case study of how nations can rise from ruins when wisdom and integrity lead the way.
Yet to reduce Professor Gees’s contributions merely to offices he held would be to miss the essence of the man. Trained as a physicist, he carried into politics the discipline, clarity, and rigor of scientific thought. Physics, as he often reminded his colleagues, teaches one to think methodically, to respect evidence, to see patterns in chaos. He brought that same discipline into governance—approaching challenges not with arrogance, but with humility and reason. His leadership was not loud or domineering; it was persuasive, thoughtful, and deeply human.
Those who worked alongside him often spoke of his respect for every individual, no matter their rank or role. He was, in the truest sense, an intellectual—one who valued knowledge not for personal prestige, but for the collective good.
On a personal note, I was fortunate to grow close to him in the last five years of his life, particularly during my time in Washington, D.C. and Virginia. He welcomed me with warmth and generosity, and when I interviewed him for my doctoral research on peacebuilding and state-building in Somaliland, he shared not just history, but wisdom. His stories, insights, and reflections enriched my understanding of my country and its journey—and revealed the depth of his character as a humble, selfless servant of the people.
Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees was many things: a physicist, a professor, a merchant, a minister, a peacemaker, a state-builder, and above all, a noble human being. He proved that serving in office is temporary, but leaving an impact on people—that is eternal.
May Allah bless his soul, forgive his shortcomings, and grant him the highest place in paradise. Somaliland has lost a guiding light, but his legacy will continue to inspire generations to come.
The time has come for the Republic of Somaliland to reassess and decisively terminate the presence of Turkey in Hargeisa. The continuation of Turkish representation within our capital is a glaring diplomatic anomaly that not only undermines our sovereignty but also enables a hostile power to operate against our national interests from within our own territory.
Diplomacy is built on reciprocity, respect, and the recognition of mutual interests. Yet in Somaliland, Turkey has been allowed to maintain a diplomatic mission that violates these fundamental principles. The time has come for Somaliland to end this dangerous anomaly.
Turkey has positioned itself in open opposition to Somaliland’s independence and sovereignty. It has been a staunch supporter of the temporary and externally sustained administration in Mogadishu, aligning with China to use Somalia as a platform for its own geopolitical ambitions in the Horn of Africa. This policy directly challenges Somaliland’s right to self-determination and recognition under international law.
At the core of diplomatic relations lies the principle of reciprocity. Where one state establishes a mission, the other is expected to enjoy the same rights and presence. Yet Turkey maintains a fully operational diplomatic mission in Hargeisa, complete with the Turkish flag raised over its compound and the protection of Somaliland’s special diplomatic police, while Somaliland has no reciprocal representation in Ankara.
This one-sided arrangement is not merely unbalanced. It is a staggering violation of diplomatic norms. Nowhere else in the world would such asymmetry be tolerated. The absence of reciprocity underscores the contemptuous approach that Turkey adopts toward Somaliland, which is nothing short of open hostility disguised as diplomacy.
Turkey’s presence in Hargeisa is not benign. Its diplomatic footprint in Hargeisa is not genuine state-to-state relations but a platform for subversive activity. Their mission is primarily engaged in espionage, interference in domestic political affairs, and coercive measures that weaken Somaliland’s international standing. Far from respecting the norms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Turkey’s conduct represents a deliberate abuse of diplomatic privileges to undermine Somaliland’s very existence as a sovereign state.
It is impossible to point to a single advantage Somaliland derives from Turkey’s presence. Instead, the costs are heavy and ongoing. Somaliland citizens encounter immense difficulties in securing Turkish visas, particularly for those seeking medical treatment in Turkey. The supposed humanitarian dimension of Turkish engagement is revealed to be hollow when citizens are treated with such bureaucratic hostility and obstruction.
The citizens of Somaliland are justifiably angered by Turkey’s persistent interference in our internal affairs. Their sentiment is not marginal but overwhelming. The expulsion of Turkey would therefore not only reflect the will of the people but also send an unmistakable signal to the international community that Somaliland is fully capable of exercising its sovereign prerogatives. Such an act would demonstrate resolve, dignity, and the ability to uphold the standards of statecraft expected of any responsible member of the international order.
Expelling Turkey is not a rash or reactionary act but a measured step rooted in sound legal and diplomatic reasoning. Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations explicitly allows the declaration of foreign diplomats as persona non grata if their presence is inconsistent with the interests of the host state. Turkey’s activities in Hargeisa have long surpassed that threshold.
Furthermore, in international practice, no country is expected to tolerate within its borders a mission that openly undermines its sovereignty. The current arrangement is not merely disadvantageous. It is dangerous, for it allows a foreign power opposed to Somaliland’s independence to collect intelligence, exert pressure, and reinforce narratives that deny our right to recognition.
The Republic of Somaliland has nothing to gain and everything to lose from the continuation of the Turkish presence in Hargeisa. By maintaining a one-sided, hostile mission, Turkey violates the principles of reciprocity, exploits our openness, and works actively against our statehood. Their expulsion would bring an end to this abnormal situation and affirm Somaliland’s dignity as a sovereign state.
Such a step would be universally welcomed by the public, respected by international observers, and would underscore Somaliland’s determination to uphold international norms in the face of persistent external hostility. It would demonstrate that Somaliland is not merely capable of governing itself but also capable of conducting diplomacy in a manner consistent with sovereignty, reciprocity, and the universally accepted standards of international relations.
The People’s Republic of China seems determined to prove Senator Ted Cruz right. After the Chinese Embassy in Somalia unleashed a torrent of angry statements over Cruz’s call to recognize Somaliland, the Texas Republican fired back with typical bluntness: “The fact that the CCP is this upset is even further reason that the Administration should recognize Somaliland.“
That response has turned what was already a diplomatic mess into something much bigger—a window into China’s broader campaign of arm-twisting and what mounting evidence shows is outright proxy warfare in the Horn of Africa. Beijing’s furious overreaction hasn’t intimidated anyone. Instead, it’s made Cruz’s argument for him while the clock ticks on China’s escalating campaign of destabilization.
Wolf Diplomacy Backfires
Cruz wrote to President Trump on August 14, urging recognition of Somaliland “as an independent state, with sovereignty within its 1960 borders.” The Chinese response was predictably hysterical. Their embassy in Somalia cranked out statement after statement, calling Cruz’s letter a “baseless attack” and “serious interference.” They even branded Taiwan’s office in Hargeisa an “illegal” presence.
This is classic Wolf Diplomacy—Beijing’s preferred method of diplomatic intimidation through aggressive rhetoric and barely concealed threats. But Cruz’s comeback has reframed the entire episode. China’s meltdown isn’t just diplomatic protest anymore. It’s proof of how much they fear losing control in this critical region.
Blood Money and Proxy Violence
The pressure campaign goes well beyond angry press releases. Cruz’s letter documented China’s “economic and diplomatic coercion” designed to punish Somaliland for maintaining ties with Taiwan. In April, Beijing got Somalia to ban Taiwanese passport holders from even transiting through to Somaliland—collective punishment disguised as immigration policy.
But the real story is much darker. As this publication reported just weeks ago, “the Chinese embassy in Somalia has chosen to directly fund and support these militias in the far east of Somaliland” with weapons and ammunition to foment violence. The bloody conflict in Las Anod isn’t some organic tribal dispute—it’s a Chinese-funded proxy war designed to punish Somaliland for its Taiwan ties and prevent any American military presence.
China’s plan “is to outmaneuver the United States and force them to have no strategic maneuverability in the red sea to counteract the Houthis and to further destabilize the world’s busiest shipping route.” This isn’t just about Taiwan anymore. It’s about control of global shipping lanes and America’s ability to project power in one of the world’s most critical waterways.
The timing couldn’t be worse. While American policymakers debate and deliberate, Chinese weapons are flowing to militants in eastern Somaliland right now. Every day of delay gives Beijing more time to consolidate its proxy forces and create facts on the ground that will be harder to reverse.
Strategic Nightmare for Beijing
China’s panic makes perfect sense when you map out their “String of Pearls” strategy across the Indian Ocean. They’ve spent years building this network of ports and bases to control critical shipping lanes. The jewel of the whole operation sits in Djibouti—a massive naval base that gives them dominant influence over the approaches to the Red Sea.
Somaliland sits right across the water from that base. As Cruz noted in his letter, Somaliland occupies prime real estate “along the Gulf of Aden, putting it near one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors.” Even better from an American perspective, Somaliland “has proposed hosting a U.S. military presence near the Red Sea.”
For China, this represents their worst-case scenario. A sovereign, U.S.-aligned Somaliland hosting American forces would put a competitor right at the chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Their carefully constructed String of Pearls would have a major weak link, and Chinese naval dominance in the region would be broken.
No wonder they’re throwing a diplomatic tantrum while simultaneously funding militias to prevent that outcome.
Somalia Joins the Pressure Campaign
Somalia’s government has now joined China’s pressure campaign with equally desperate tactics. In an August 14 letter to the Trump administration, Somalia’s Embassy in Washington attempted to hold U.S. counterterrorism efforts hostage, claiming that recognizing Somaliland “would only embolden extremists and threaten the stability of the entire Horn of Africa.”
The argument is absurd on its face. Somalia is essentially claiming that recognizing the most stable, democratic territory in the Horn of Africa would somehow benefit Al-Shabaab terrorists. This from a government that loses territory to Al-Shabaab on a near-daily basis while Somaliland has been successfully fighting both Al-Shabaab and ISIS for years with minimal international support.
The timing reveals the coordination. While China deploys Wolf Diplomacy and funds proxy militias, Somalia resorts to terrorism scaremongering—the one argument Mogadishu’s handlers believe might work with American policymakers. The message is clear: stick with the failed state that’s actively hemorrhaging ground to extremists rather than recognize the functioning democracy that’s actually containing them.
Somalia’s letter boasts of “more than twenty successful joint strikes conducted in 2025 alone” against terrorists, inadvertently highlighting the problem. After decades of international support and military intervention, Somalia still needs constant American airstrikes just to slow its territorial losses to Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, Somaliland has maintained stability and expanded its control without requiring U.S. military intervention at all.
The Iranian Connection
The proxy warfare gets even more complex. China’s destabilization plan “takes help from their major ally Iran’s and its proxy the Houthi terrorist Organization as well as Somalia and its northern region of Puntland.” This isn’t just China versus Taiwan—it’s part of a broader axis of authoritarian powers working to strangle maritime trade and limit American influence.
The Houthis have already shown they can disrupt Red Sea shipping with relatively crude weapons. Imagine what they could accomplish with Chinese-backed militias controlling territory on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The global economy runs through that chokepoint, and China is systematically working to control it.
Standing Firm Against Intimidation
Somaliland and Taiwan haven’t blinked despite the escalating pressure. The Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan reaffirmed their nation’s “inalienable right to self-determination.” Taiwan’s office in Hargeisa was equally defiant, rejecting China’s “false claims of territorial sovereignty” and declaring that “Neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other.”
These responses highlight something important: China’s Wolf Diplomacy doesn’t work when countries refuse to be intimidated. But defiance alone won’t stop Chinese weapons from flowing to proxy militias. That requires American action.
China Plays Itself
Beijing’s ham-fisted response has accomplished exactly what Cruz hoped for. Instead of keeping Somaliland recognition as a quiet policy discussion, China’s diplomatic temper tantrum has made it front-page news. International attention is now focused not just on Somaliland’s strategic value, but on China’s destabilizing behavior in the region.
The Chinese Embassy’s angry statements weren’t intimidation—they were confirmation. They confirmed that China sees Somaliland as a threat to their regional ambitions. They confirmed that Beijing will use economic pressure and proxy violence to get their way. And they confirmed that Cruz’s recommendation deserves serious consideration from the Trump administration.
Recent developments suggest the window for diplomatic solutions may be narrowing. As militia activity continues in eastern Somaliland and Chinese influence expands through proxy relationships, the strategic calculus becomes more complex for U.S. policymakers.
In trying to kill the idea of Somaliland recognition, China’s Wolf Diplomacy has instead made the strongest possible case for it.
United States Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) has formally urged President Donald Trump to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, placing Africa’s best-kept secret firmly at the center of U.S. foreign policy debate.
In a letter delivered to the White House today, Cruz called on Trump to “formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, with sovereignty within its 1960 borders,” framing the move as a strategic necessity for America’s national security interests.
While Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch has long championed Somaliland’s cause, Cruz’s decision to formalize his appeal directly to the president signals that Washington’s engagement with Somaliland is moving from quiet committee discussions to high-level executive action.
Strategic Partnership Demands Recognition
“The U.S.–Somaliland partnership is robust, and it is deepening,” Cruz wrote. “To do so to the greatest effect and the greatest benefit to American national security interests, it requires the status of a state.”
The Texas senator laid out Somaliland’s compelling strategic value proposition:
Cruz praised Somaliland’s remarkable democratic record since reclaiming independence in 1991, highlighting the territory’s consistent track record of peaceful elections, stable governance, and strong voter participation that stands out in a region often marked by conflict and instability. The senator emphasized how Somaliland has managed to build and maintain democratic institutions over more than three decades of effective self-rule.
The territory’s strategic location proved central to Cruz’s argument, with Somaliland commanding a crucial position on the Gulf of Aden that controls access to one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors. This geographic advantage places Somaliland at the heart of global shipping lanes that are vital to international commerce and American economic interests.
On security matters, Cruz noted Somaliland’s active contribution to regional stability through counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations conducted by its capable armed forces. These security partnerships have already proven valuable to U.S. interests in maintaining stability across the Horn of Africa and protecting critical shipping routes from both terrorist threats and maritime piracy.
The senator also highlighted Somaliland’s diplomatic alignment with American interests, particularly its bold decision to host Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa despite Chinese pressure. Cruz noted Somaliland’s support for the Abraham Accords and its efforts to strengthen ties with Israel, positioning the territory as a regional partner that shares American values and strategic objectives.
Finally, Cruz emphasized Somaliland’s openness to deeper military cooperation, including its willingness to host U.S. military assets near the Red Sea and pursue critical minerals agreements that would strengthen American supply chains. These proposals represent exactly the kind of strategic partnerships that Cruz argues require formal state-to-state diplomatic relations to fully realize.
China’s Coercion Campaign Exposed
Cruz didn’t pull punches in calling out Beijing’s pressure campaign against Somaliland. The senator warned that the territory faces mounting pressure from the Chinese Communist Party specifically for its partnership with Taiwan.
He cited China’s role in orchestrating Somalia’s April 2025 decision to block Taiwanese passport holders from entering Somaliland, calling it part of a broader campaign to undermine Hargeisa’s sovereignty. The letter warns that Chinese support to Somalia is directly benefiting anti-Somaliland groups working to erode the territory’s independence.
Perfect Timing Ahead of Presidential Summit
Cruz’s bombshell letter comes just days before Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Irro” arrives in Washington for historic meetings with senior U.S. officials. Talks are expected to focus on security cooperation at Berbera Port, potential U.S. access to Red Sea logistics hubs, and agreements on critical minerals — exactly the kind of discussions that could accelerate a shift toward formal diplomatic ties.
The timing creates a perfect storm of political momentum, with Cruz’s formal appeal providing crucial Senate backing just as President Irro sits down with administration officials.
Immediate Hargeisa Reaction
Somaliland’s Representative to the United States has thanked Senator Cruz for his intervention, writing on X:
“Thank you @SenTedCruz for your endorsement of U.S. recognition of our Somaliland, and your outreach on behalf of our noble cause to @realDonaldTrump. Tomorrow morning, Somaliland will wake up to learn that you have stood up to be counted as our ally. It will not be forgotten. Somaliland and the U.S. have so much to gain from a closer partnership, and we are privileged to have such friends in Congress at this critical time.”
Congressional Momentum Accelerating
Earlier this summer, the House Appropriations Committee broke precedent by directing the Secretary of State to submit a report within 120 days on expanding security, trade, and diplomatic engagement with Somaliland. The directive marked the first time the territory has been specifically named in official U.S. budgetary language.
Combined with Risch’s long-standing advocacy and now Cruz’s formal presidential appeal, the Senate’s foreign policy leadership has achieved remarkable alignment on the recognition issue — an alignment that could prove decisive in shifting administration policy.
From Africa’s Best-Kept Secret to Open Washington Debate
For more than three decades, Somaliland has been a stable, self-governing democracy in a volatile region, yet largely overlooked in U.S. Africa policy. Cruz’s letter, coupled with bipartisan Congressional interest and an imminent presidential visit, suggests that recognition has moved from distant possibility to active agenda item.
“I urge you to grant it that recognition,” Cruz concluded his letter with characteristic directness.
The convergence of high-profile Senate advocacy, formal Congressional directives, and President Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro”‘s upcoming Washington visit creates the most significant moment yet in Somaliland’s long quest for U.S. recognition.
What was once Africa’s best-kept secret is now a visible factor in U.S. strategic calculations — and in Washington, the question increasingly appears to be not if recognition will come, but when.
The Recognition Equation
With Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership unified, Congressional budget language mandating deeper engagement, and a presidential visit focused on the very partnerships Cruz argues require state-to-state relations, all the pieces are aligning for a potential breakthrough.
For Somalilanders who have waited 34 years for this moment, Cruz’s formal letter represents Washington finally taking notice of their democratic success story and strategic value in an increasingly competitive Horn of Africa.
Somaliland, a country which has restored its independence, has forged a remarkable path towards stability and self-governance in a region often characterized by volatility. While its international status remains a subject of ongoing diplomatic discourse, with many nations maintaining a ‘one Somalia policy,’ Somaliland has demonstrably built robust governmental institutions, fostered relative peace, and held successive democratic elections since declaring its independence in 1991. This unique political context, however, also highlights the critical importance of internal cohesion for its continued progress and its aspirations for broader international recognition.
At this pivotal juncture in its journey, Somaliland faces an enduring internal challenge that, if left unaddressed, risks undermining the significant strides made in state-building and socio-economic development: tribalism. While clan structures have historically provided a foundational framework for social organization and mutual support within Somali society, their unbridled influence in contemporary governance, economic life, and public discourse is a potent force actively reversing the very development the populace strives to achieve. Tribalism, fundamentally, represents the prioritization of narrow clan affiliations over the collective national interest, hindering the establishment of a truly meritocratic, equitable, and unified society.
The Multi-faceted Impact of Tribalism on Development:
The corrosive effects of tribalism permeate every level of society, creating systemic impediments to sustainable development:
In a tribalistic environment, appointments to public office, positions within the civil service, and even judicial decisions are frequently influenced by clan affiliation rather than merit, competence, or qualifications. This deeply compromises the principles of good governance, fostering inefficiency, nurturing corruption, and eroding public trust in state institutions. When citizens perceive that access to justice or public services is predicated on their clan lineage rather than their rights as citizens, the legitimacy and authority of the state are severely weakened. This also discourages both domestic and foreign investment, as the unpredictability and lack of impartiality create an unfavorable business climate.
A thriving economy requires predictability, transparency, and a level playing field for all participants. Tribalism, however, introduces pervasive favoritism and nepotism that distort markets and deter legitimate enterprise. Resources are often mis-allocated to benefit specific clan interests, rather than being directed towards national developmental priorities or projects with the highest economic return. This can manifest in biased land allocations, preferential access to contracts, or discriminatory practices in employment. Such an environment creates significant barriers to internal trade and investment, fragmenting the national economy and hindering the free flow of capital and labor essential for broad-based prosperity. Entrepreneurs, both local and international, are naturally hesitant to invest where success is dictated by tribal connections rather than innovation, quality, or efficiency.
The bedrock of any successful nation is the unity and mutual trust among its people. Tribalism, conversely, fragments society, fostering suspicion, competition, and even overt animosity between different groups. This social discord can manifest in various forms, from localized resource conflicts to political instability, diverting valuable human and financial capital away from constructive development efforts. It fundamentally weakens the collective will to address national challenges, as individuals may prioritize their clan’s perceived well-being over the common good, thereby hindering the establishment of strong, inclusive community-driven initiatives in areas like education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
The equitable provision of fundamental services like quality education and healthcare is paramount for human development and national progress. Tribalistic tendencies often lead to an uneven distribution of resources and opportunities, with some regions or communities benefiting disproportionately while others are neglected. This perpetuates cycles of inequality and marginalization, denying future generations the skills and opportunities necessary to contribute to the nation’s growth and compromising the overall health and well-being of the populace. It directly contradicts the universal principle of equal citizenship.
Somaliland’s persistent pursuit of international recognition and robust partnerships is significantly impacted by internal divisions rooted in tribalism. External actors often perceive persistent clan-based politics as a sign of underlying instability and a lack of national cohesion. This can deter crucial foreign direct investment, limit access to development aid, and complicate diplomatic engagement, ultimately undermining Somaliland’s aspirations to solidify its position on the global stage. A united populace, demonstrating strong national identity and effective, inclusive governance, presents a far more compelling case for international recognition.
A Brighter, United Future:
Addressing the deep-seated challenge of tribalism requires a deliberate, sustained, and collective commitment from every individual and institution within Somaliland:
traditional, and religious leaders bear a primary responsibility to lead by example. They must actively champion national unity, unequivocally denounce tribalistic practices, and demonstrate unwavering impartiality in all their decisions and public actions. This includes ensuring that all appointments and resource allocations are based strictly on merit and national need.
The continuous development and empowerment of strong, independent, and merit-based institutions across all sectors—from the civil service and security forces to the judiciary—is paramount. This entails implementing transparent recruitment and promotion processes, strictly enforcing accountability mechanisms, and fostering professional ethics that transcend clan loyalties.
Education systems must play a transformative role in fostering a shared national identity that transcends narrow clan loyalties. Curricula should emphasize Somaliland’s common history, shared values, and collective aspirations as a unified people. Public awareness campaigns, national media initiatives, and cultural programs can also significantly contribute to this narrative of inclusive nationhood.
Every citizen has a vital role to play. This involves actively challenging tribalistic rhetoric, holding leaders accountable for their actions, and consciously prioritizing national interests in daily interactions and choices. This means supporting businesses and initiatives based on their quality and value, not the clan affiliation of their founders, and making electoral choices based on a candidate’s competence, vision, and commitment to national service, rather than their lineage.
Somaliland’s vibrant youth are its most valuable asset. Investing in their education, skill development, and instilling in them a strong sense of shared national purpose is crucial. As they are often less entrenched in traditional tribal structures, the youth can be powerful catalysts for change, driving forward a more unified and merit-based society.
Somaliland has demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a profound commitment to self-determination. The dream of a prosperous, stable, and internationally recognized nation can only be fully realized when its people stand united, not as members of disparate clans, but as proud Somalilanders, collectively dedicated to building a shared and equitable future for all. It is time to decisively cast aside the divisive chains of tribalism and embrace the boundless opportunities that await a truly unified nation.
Somaliland, a self-declared but unrecognized state in the Horn of Africa, stands at a critical juncture. For three decades, it has defied the odds, building a stable, democratic society from the ashes of Somalia’s civil war. Yet, its economy remains fragile, largely dependent on livestock exports and remittances. However, beneath its sun-scorched earth lies a hidden treasure: a vast and diverse reserve of mineral resources, including high-value gemstones, precious metals, and strategic industrial minerals. The discovery and potential exploitation of this mineral wealth present Somaliland with a profound question: can it be a catalyst for sustained prosperity, or will it, like so many other resource-rich nations, fall prey to the “resource curse” and descend into conflict?
The Promise of Mineral Wealth for Prosperity
The promise is undeniable. Somaliland’s geological makeup, part of the highly productive Mozambique orogenic belt, suggests deposits of gold, platinum, tin, iron ore, and a dazzling array of gemstones such as emeralds, rubies, and sapphires. If responsibly managed, these resources could be a game-changer. Revenue from mining could fund essential infrastructure projects, from roads and schools to hospitals and energy grids. It could diversify the economy, create jobs, and lift thousands out of poverty. For a state yearning for international recognition, a thriving mining sector could also be a powerful diplomatic tool, attracting foreign investment and forging strategic partnerships that bolster its case for statehood. The recent expansion of the Berbera port, a key trade gateway for landlocked Ethiopia, demonstrates Somaliland’s strategic importance and its potential to become a regional economic hub.
However, the path from resource potential to national prosperity is fraught with peril. The history of natural resource extraction in the Horn of Africa and across the continent offers a sobering cautionary tale. The “resource curse” is a well-documented phenomenon where countries rich in natural resources experience lower economic growth, weak governance, and increased conflict. In Somaliland’s case, the risk factors are real and must be addressed head-on.
First and foremost is the challenge of governance. While Somaliland has a nascent legal framework, including the 2019 Mining Act, the capacity for effective oversight, regulation, and enforcement remains a concern. Weak institutions can lead to poor royalty collection systems, a lack of transparency, and the potential for corruption. The absence of a robust regulatory environment could allow foreign companies to exploit resources with little benefit to the local population and with devastating environmental consequences.
Secondly, the mineral wealth could exacerbate existing social and political tensions. The Horn of Africa is a region where borders are often ill-defined and natural resources have been a historical source of conflict. The competition for land and resources in Somaliland, particularly in border regions, could ignite disputes between clans and communities as recently happened in Mountains of Sanaag Region and Agabar area in Marodijeex Region which claims s. The presence of valuable minerals could also attract illicit artisanal mining, which is often unregulated and associated with environmental degradation, child labor, and social instability. Without clear and inclusive benefit-sharing mechanisms that ensure local communities receive a fair share of the profits, the potential for resentment and conflict is high.
Finally, Somaliland’s unrecognized status poses a unique set of challenges. Its diplomatic isolation limits its access to large-scale foreign investment and formal bilateral agreements, pushing it toward smaller, less transparent deals. While some see resource-based diplomacy as a path to recognition, it also creates a vulnerability to exploitation by powerful foreign actors seeking to secure resources without the encumbrance of international standards or scrutiny.
Historical and Regional Lessons
Somaliland can learn from other African nations where mineral wealth led to conflict (e.g., Sierra Leone’s blood diamonds, Niger Delta oil conflicts) or prosperity (e.g., Botswana’s diamond management). Key lessons include:
Transparent Revenue Management: Ensuring mining profits benefit the public through accountable institutions.
Community Involvement: Engaging local leaders and clans in decision-making to prevent disputes.
Conflict-Sensitive Policies: Implementing regulations that mitigate environmental and social risks.
Conclusion
Somaliland stands at a crossroads: its mineral wealth could either propel economic growth and political stability or deepen existing fractures. The difference lies in governance.
For Somaliland to turn its hidden treasure into a source of enduring prosperity, it must act with foresight and integrity. It needs to strengthen its legal and institutional frameworks to ensure transparency and accountability. It must develop a clear and equitable strategy for distributing wealth to its citizens, ensuring that mineral revenues benefit all regions and communities, not just a privileged few. This requires investing in geological surveys, building local capacity in the mining sector, and aligning with international initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Most importantly, Somaliland must foster a national dialogue that empowers its people and local communities to be active participants in the decision-making process, rather than passive recipients of a resource boom. Without these measures, Somaliland risks falling into the “resource curse” trap, where natural riches lead not to wealth, but to war. The choice is clear: Somaliland can either learn from the mistakes of others and build a sustainable and inclusive future, or it can risk having its hidden treasure become a source of division and instability. The stakes could not be higher.
About the Author
Abdillahi Mohamed Bile is a Security and Political analyst with a background in Security, Peace, Conflict, International Law and Diplomacy. A member of the Guul-Arag Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (GIPOSS). He focuses on Security, post-conflict governance, and political analysis of the Horn of Africa region and beyond.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Investment Ministry hosts Turkish firm fresh from sexual harassment scandal and UN condemnation
KEY POINTS
Somaliland’s government has held investment talks with Favori Airports, the same Turkish firm that operates the international airport in Mogadishu, a move critics argue undermines the nation’s sovereignty.
An investigation into public records reveals Favori was not legally authorized to manage airports when it signed its Mogadishu contract in 2013, amending its corporate charter only after the deal was secured.
A 2016 UN Security Council report described the company’s contract as a “technically poor deal” and a “case of potential abuse,” citing systematic financial manipulation.
The company is implicated in a 2023 scandal where a senior executive, arrested in Mogadishu for sexual harassment, was released following reported political intervention and a payoff to the victim’s family.
Favori is managed by the Kozuva family, known for its deep ties to Turkey’s ruling AKP party and President Erdoğan, whose government actively opposes Somaliland’s independence.
HARGEISA, SOMALILAND – Investment and Industry Minister Saeed Mohamed Burale rolled out the red carpet this week for executives from Turkish aviation company Favori Airports, welcoming them into government offices to discuss potential investment in Somaliland’s aviation infrastructure.
The warm reception comes despite Favori’s toxic reputation as the company behind Somalia’s airport operations, the very Favori that manages the Mogadishu Aden Ade Airport, where it stands accused of systematic corruption, labor exploitation, and covering up sexual crimes. The same firm that UN investigators condemned as running “a case of potential abuse” now sits across from Somaliland ministers discussing deals.
A Somaliland Chronicle investigation reveals the breathtaking scope of allegations against this company—from UN-documented financial theft to recent sexual harassment scandals hushed up with cash payments. The findings raise uncomfortable questions: Did anyone in government bother to Google these people before inviting them in?
THE FRAUDULENT FOUNDATION
Favori Airports didn’t earn its way into airport management—it simply declared itself qualified after the fact. The company, controlled by four brothers from the Kozuva family, had zero aviation experience when it somehow secured Somalia’s most strategic asset in 2013.
Turkish trade registry records expose the scam: the company wasn’t legally authorized to manage airports when it signed the contract in January 2013. No problem—they simply held a board meeting the next day to add “airport management” to their business activities. Corporate fraud masquerading as legitimate business.
The original company, established in 2005, focused on construction materials sales with initial capital of approximately $300,000 before expanding into airport operations.
WHEN THE UN CALLS YOU CRIMINALS
International investigators weren’t fooled by the corporate theater. A 2016 UN Monitoring Group report delivered a scathing verdict: Favori’s contract was “a technically poor deal for the FGS [federal government of Somalia] and a case of potential abuse by a private entity.”
The UN documented how Favori games the system, collecting 100% of airport revenues before inventing creative “expenses” to minimize government payments. Their favorite trick? A monthly $300,000 “depreciation deduction” that was never agreed upon—essentially stealing money through accounting manipulation.
In one example cited by the UN, Favori reported total revenue of $1.2 million for June 2016, with expenses of just over $600,000, including $300,000 in depreciation deductions, resulting in only $250,000 transferred to the government.
ONGOING FINANCIAL DISPUTES
Financial transparency remains a contentious issue. In August 2024, Somalia’s Auditor General Ahmed Issa Gutale publicly stated that Favori has failed to submit required financial reports following independent audits, making it impossible for the government to verify its share of airport revenues.
The revenue transferred to Somalia’s government during the 2022 financial year totaled $3.1 million, significantly below projections made by government financial advisors. A separate dispute has emerged over navigation fees, with the Somali Civil Aviation Authority claiming collection rights that Favori contests.
THE CASH-FOR-SILENCE SCANDAL
Fast-forward to 2024, and Favori’s ethical bankruptcy reached new depths. The company’s human resources manager, Ertuğrul Karaferiyeli, was arrested in Mogadishu on September 17 on serious charges: sexual harassment, threats, abuse of power, and labor law violations against Somali employees.
But money talks, and Turkish political muscle flexes harder. After frantic communications between Ankara and Mogadishu, Karaferiyeli walked free on October 2. The price of justice? A $20,000 payoff to silence the victim’s family. Criminal charges dropped, case closed, Turkish executive safely home.
EXPLOITING THE WORKFORCE
The Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU) has documented systematic labor abuse that reads like a colonial-era exploitation manual. Workers endure grueling 11-hour shifts from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. without overtime pay, are denied mandatory weekly rest days, and face arbitrary dismissals that ignore legal procedures. When injuries occur, workers discover there are no adequate medical facilities—they’re on their own.
Most damning is Favori’s racial pay hierarchy: identical work pays differently based on your passport. Somali workers earn significantly less than their Kenyan and Turkish counterparts for the same jobs, while union organizing is crushed through intimidation and termination threats. All this for wages of $200-300 per month that union representatives call starvation pay given Somalia’s cost of living. It’s systematic exploitation dressed up as employment.
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
The Kozuva family has maintained close relationships with Turkish political leadership. Nordic Monitor reporting indicates that Süleyman Kozuva has been frequently photographed alongside Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and ran for mayor of Çerkezköy under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2019.
President Erdoğan personally attended the airport’s partial reopening ceremony in Mogadishu in 2015. The same group was subsequently awarded a 25-year contract to operate Turkey’s Çukurova Airport in Adana in 2020.
THE RECKONING
So here we stand: Somaliland’s Investment Ministry opens its doors to a company that the United Nations condemned as abusive, whose executive just bought his way out of sexual harassment charges, and whose business model is systematic theft disguised as airport management.
Either Minister Buraale’s office conducted zero due diligence before this meeting—a dereliction of duty that borders on malpractice—or they knew exactly who they were welcoming and proceeded anyway. Both explanations are damning.
REGIONAL CONTEXT
Turkey maintains substantial political and military support for Somalia’s federal government, which continues to claim sovereignty over Somaliland territory. Turkish companies have become major economic players in Somalia across multiple sectors, often with direct government backing from Ankara.
The timing of discussions with a Turkish company managing Somalia’s primary airport has drawn attention from observers of regional diplomatic dynamics, particularly given ongoing tensions over Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition.
Attempt to get clarification from Ministry of Investment on the level of due diligence they have performed on Favori Airports or the extend of the discussions were unsuccessful.
HARGEISA – A clumsy attempt at state-sponsored disinformation has forced President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi “Cirro” into a humiliating public retreat, compelling Somaliland’s telecommunication oligarchy to suspend a coordinated price hike. The scandal, which saw the Ministry of Interior fabricate evidence to crush dissent, has exposed the rot of institutional capture and the government’s readiness to protect corporate interests over the constitutional rights of its citizens.
The crisis began when Somaliland’s three telecommunications giants—Telesom, SOMTEL, and Soltelco—executed a synchronized price increase for internet and mobile services on August 9th. The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology immediately endorsed the coordinated hikes in a statement citing the need for “quality services,” effectively rubber-stamping what consumers saw as corporate price-gouging.
When citizen Guleid Ahmed Jama (Guleid Dafac) filed a formal request with the Ministry of Interior to organize a peaceful demonstration against the price hikes on August 10th, the ministry responded with an outright lie, claiming no such request had been received. To compound the deception, the ministry simultaneously circulated an image of Dafac’s actual letter stamped with “FAKE” in red letters, contradicting their claim that no request existed.
The contradictory statements quickly spread on social media, generating widespread criticism of the ministry’s fabrication and raising fundamental questions about the government’s relationship with the telecommunications oligarchy.
Presidential Damage Control
Following mounting public pressure and exposure of the ministry’s lies, President Cirro met with executives from the three telecommunications companies and announced that the price increases would be suspended indefinitely.
“The president listened to the concerns of the people,” said a government spokesperson. The spokesperson tellingly declined to address questions about the ministry’s fabrication, an indefensible action for which the administration has yet to offer any explanation or accountability measures.
The reversal represents a significant retreat for both the companies and the government ministries that initially supported the price increases. Industry observers note that coordinated pricing moves by the three dominant firms are unprecedented and suggest extensive advance planning and government coordination.
The Oligarchy’s Corporate Web
The government’s initial willingness to back the price hikes and suppress protest does not exist in a vacuum. It is undergirded by a deep, systemic network of financial and personnel connections that blurs the line between regulator and regulated.
The three companies involved in the price coordination are subsidiaries of some of Somaliland’s largest business groups. SOMTEL is wholly owned by Dahabshiil Group, while Telesom operates under the Hormuud Group umbrella. Both parent companies have extensive holdings in banking, money transfer, and real estate sectors, electricity, transportation, forming a business oligarchy that touches virtually every aspect of Somaliland’s economy.
Dahabshiil Group’s 2021 initial public offering of SOMTEL shares drew scrutiny for charging investors a predatory 20% “service fee” and failing to provide basic financial information typically required for public stock offerings, according to previous Somaliland Chronicle reporting. The company refused to provide standard disclosure information such as company valuation, earnings data, or the total number of shares being offered to the public—practices that would constitute fraud in regulated markets.
The telecommunications sector operates with minimal regulatory oversight in Somaliland, with companies able to coordinate pricing and business practices with limited government interference. Industry analysts say the lack of independent regulatory authority makes consumer protection virtually impossible when the supposed regulators are captured by the regulated.
The Revolving Door System
A review of current government appointments reveals the systematic colonization of state institutions by the telecommunications oligarchy through strategic personnel placement.
The current Minister of Presidency previously worked for Telesom. The Head of Somaliland’s Intelligence agency is a former Dahabshiil employee. The Minister of Aviation built his career at SOMTEL, Dahabshiil’s telecommunications subsidiary. The Chairman of the ruling Waddani party also previously worked for Dahabshiil Group.
This pattern extends across multiple previous administrations, with former employees of both Dahabshiil and Telesom holding senior government positions across sectors including finance, telecommunications policy, and regulatory oversight. The result is a government where key decision-makers are often ruling on matters affecting their former employers, current business partners, and potential future employers.
Government officials contacted for this story did not respond to questions about potential conflicts of interest, recusal policies for former corporate employees, or whether current appointees maintain financial relationships with their previous employers.
Financial Capture: The State as a Hostage to Its Creditors
The final and perhaps most insidious mechanism of state capture is financial: the Somaliland government is deeply indebted to the very corporate oligarchs it is constitutionally mandated to regulate.
According to financial industry sources, these telecommunication companies and their parent groups function as a de facto lender of last resort for a government that is perpetually cash-strapped. This creditor relationship is not merely a conflict of interest; it is the primary instrument of corporate leverage over state policy. Any genuine attempt at robust regulation—be it enforcing fair competition, imposing penalties, or blocking collusive price hikes—carries the implicit threat of corporate retaliation.
The government is perpetually faced with the risk that its largest creditors could suspend credit lines or deny future financing, a move that could trigger a fiscal crisis. This dynamic transforms the state from a sovereign regulator into a hostage, forced to prioritize the financial demands of its creditors over the economic welfare of its citizens.
When combined with the systemic revolving door of personnel detailed previously, this financial dependency completes a perfect, unbreakable circle of capture. The government is staffed by former employees of the oligarchy and financed by the oligarchy itself. In such a system, independent oversight is not just difficult; it is a structural impossibility, and accountability is a concept with no practical meaning.
Parliamentary and Media Silence
Despite the significant constitutional issues raised by the Ministry of Interior’s fabrication of evidence against a citizen exercising protest rights, Parliament has not announced any investigations or hearings into the matter. Opposition MPs who frequently criticize government actions have issued no statements about the ministry’s lies regarding fundamental constitutional rights.
Major media outlets have provided limited coverage of the fabrication allegations, focusing primarily on the price hike suspension rather than the government’s systematic attempt to criminalize lawful dissent. Several journalists contacted for this story declined to comment on their outlets’ coverage decisions, suggesting the oligarchy’s influence extends deep into media institutions as well.
Analysis: The Hypocrisy of Power
The episode reveals more than just tensions within Somaliland’s governance system—it exposes the complete betrayal of democratic principles by leaders who built their careers defending those same principles.
President Cirro inherited a system where personnel exchanges between major corporations and government have been routine for decades. However, for an administration led by a party that masterfully utilized public protest during its long years in opposition, the turn towards suppressing those same rights represents a particularly stark betrayal of political principle.
Cirro and his Waddani party spent years positioning themselves as champions of constitutional rights, organizing demonstrations and challenging government overreach. They built their political identity on the sacred right of citizens to peaceful assembly and dissent. Now in power, their administration deployed fabricated evidence and threatened state violence to deny citizens the very rights they once claimed as sacrosanct.
The public’s ability to expose the ministry’s lies through social media demonstrates how information technology can serve as a check on government power, even as telecommunications companies seek to increase costs for these same services. The irony is perfect: citizens used the very services the oligarchy wanted to make more expensive to expose the government lies designed to protect that price increase.
The reversal of price hikes shows that public pressure can still influence government decisions, but it also raises fundamental questions about why such pressure was necessary to address what should have been prevented by existing regulatory mechanisms—if those mechanisms weren’t captured by the companies they’re supposed to regulate.
The Broader Implications
This scandal illuminates the reality of governance in Somaliland: a system where a small group of interconnected business families exercise effective control over state institutions through financial dependency, personnel placement, and systematic regulatory capture.
The telecommunications episode is likely just the visible tip of a much larger iceberg. If government ministries will fabricate evidence to protect telecom price hikes, what other corporate interests are they willing to defend through deception and state power?
For President Cirro, the episode presents both a political opportunity and a test of character. Public support for his intervention in the price hike dispute could provide political capital to address the broader structural issues that made the scandal possible. The question is whether he will use this rare moment of public awakening to tackle the oligarchy system that compromises governance, or whether he will settle for managing individual scandals while leaving the underlying capture intact.
Questions That Demand Answers
The incident leaves several critical issues unresolved that warrant continued investigation:
Will any government officials face consequences for fabricating evidence against a citizen exercising constitutional rights?
Why has Parliament remained silent on such a clear violation of democratic norms?
What other policy decisions have been influenced by the financial relationships between these companies and the government?
How extensive is the oligarchy’s personnel placement across government institutions?
Will President Cirro use his political capital from this episode to address systematic state capture, or will existing patterns of corporate influence remain intact?
The telecommunications companies have not explained their coordination on pricing or addressed questions about their extensive relationships with government officials. Their silence, combined with the government’s fabrication scandal, suggests an oligarchy confident that temporary public pressure will pass while their structural advantages remain untouched.
The broader question for Somaliland is whether democratic institutions can survive when major corporations maintain such extensive financial and personnel control over government agencies. This week’s events suggest the current system may be fundamentally inadequate for that task.
Unless this moment of public awakening translates into systematic reform of the relationships between corporate power and government authority, similar scandals are inevitable. The oligarchy that sought to increase phone bills while criminalizing protest will simply wait for public attention to move elsewhere, then continue operating as they always have.
On June 20, former President Donald Trump claimed on his social media channel, Truth Social, that the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was “stupidly financed by the United States,” adding that he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize for “keeping the peace between Egypt and Ethiopia.” This remark came during celebrations of the Congo–Rwanda agreement. Then, on July 14, Trump reiterated his stance on the GERD dispute, stating during a White House meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte: “I think if I am Egypt, I want to have water in the Nile, and we are working on that.” He further described the dam as “closing up water going to the Nile,” which Egypt relies on for 97% of its water. Trump added, “I think the United States funded the dam. I do not know why they didn’t solve the problem before they built the dam. But it is nice when the Nile River has water,” and concluded that “closing up water… is pretty incredible. But we think we are going to have that solved very quickly.”
This statement, while controversial, is seen by some in Addis Ababa as a possible opening for engagement with a future Trump administration—contrasting with his 2020 remarks that Egypt might “blow up” the dam. However, Trump’s claim lacks factual basis: GERD was financed domestically by the Ethiopian government, loan from China, and diaspora buying government bonds, amounting to $5 billion. Unless Trump was referring to Ethiopia’s broader development aid—roughly $1.2 billion annually from the U.S as of 2024. —or the indirect effect of World Bank support freeing domestic funds, there is no evidence of direct U.S. financing. In fact, the U.S. withheld $100 million in 2020 to pressure Ethiopia during GERD negotiations. Ethiopia government has yet to respond officially to Trump’s latest comments, though the government is reportedly observing public reaction.
Trump’s renewed focus on the GERD dispute reflects his signature geo-transactional diplomacy—a strategy rooted in deal-making that leverages U.S. influence to extract concessions in exchange for tangible benefits, often backed by implicit pressure. This approach shaped past efforts such as Trump’s recent backchannel deal with Ukraine, where future military aid was reportedly discussed alongside access to critical mineral extraction rights for U.S. companies—blurring the lines between strategic support and commercial gain. Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, Trump-era envoys signaled potential de-escalation with the Houthis in exchange for guarantees of unimpeded maritime navigation, effectively pausing military operations to broker regional security through informal channels. In 2020, the Trump administration proposed a deal requiring Ethiopia to release 37 (billion cubic meter) BCM of water annually during drought years—a plan ultimately rejected by Addis Ababa, citing sovereignty and hydrological uncertainties. But under a second Trump term, this proposal might be revisited through a broader transactional lens: Ethiopia may be pressured to accept the 37 BCM threshold in exchange for U.S. support on Red Sea maritime access. In turn, Egypt might be expected to grant favorable treatment to U.S. military or commercial operations in the Suez Canal. While the approach carries risks inherent to asymmetric negotiation, it also presents a rare opportunity: if successful, a Trump-brokered deal could realign competing national interests into a durable, mutually beneficial settlement—transforming a source of tension into a platform for cooperation.
GERD Energy-Water Trade-off Delima
While Ethiopia’s GERD boasts an installed capacity of 6,000 MW (6 GW), the 2013 International Panel of Experts (IPoE) report clearly cautioned that such levels are not scientifically or hydrologically sustainable under normal or conservative flow conditions. The panel stated that “the full 6,000 MW will not be generated under 90% hydrological reliability” (Section 5.3.4.1, p. 38), and criticized the lack of validated modeling and reliable estimates of annual energy production. With a mean annual flow of around 49 BCM at the GERD site—corresponding to a 50% probability of exceedance in hydrology, meaning there’s an equal chance that yearly flow will be above or below this level—GERD’s power output is subject to natural variability. Unlike most dams, which are designed using a 90% exceedance threshold to ensure reliable generation during dry years, GERD was not. As a result, its 6 GW power target is not sustainable year-round and is likely achievable only during three peak-flow months, with the rest of the year realistically limited to a maximum of 3 GW. In drought years, with flows around 40–42 BCM, generation may drop further to 1.5–2 GW, even without water release obligations.
In 2020, the Trump administration proposed a U.S.-brokered agreement requiring Ethiopia to release 37 BCM annually to Egypt during drought periods. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government rejected the proposal outright, but this decision—framed as a defense of national sovereignty—was more politically motivated than grounded in scientific or hydrological analysis. Ethiopia never publicly disclosed the internal water flow scenarios or power generation models referenced by the IPoE, which criticized the lack of transparency. Had Ethiopia accepted the 37 BCM drought release condition, only a few BCM would remain for power generation during dry years—reducing output to under 1 GW, with dire implications for domestic electrification and export ambitions. The GERD thus embodies a core energy–water trade-off, where Ethiopia’s developmental narrative clashes with the river’s physical constraints and Egypt’s survival-based demands—a dilemma that any future mediation, including a geo-transactional one, must confront.
While Ethiopia’s decision to reject the 2020 U.S.-drafted GERD agreement was prudent—given the lack of clarity about the dam’s actual operational performance post-construction—it is now imperative for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to engage in the current mitigation talks with transparency and good faith. Acknowledging the hydrological constraints highlighted by the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) and other technical studies would not weaken Ethiopia’s position but rather strengthen its credibility.
Such a shift would help de-politicize the negotiation process and pave the way for a science-based solution. By aligning its diplomatic posture with the realistic operational limitations of GERD—particularly the seasonal and probabilistic variability of Nile flows—Ethiopia can create space for a win–win outcome: safeguarding downstream water security while maximizing its own energy and economic interests under a sustainable and cooperative regional framework.
Trump Geo-transactional Approach to GERD
During Trump’s first administration, serious efforts were made to resolve the GERD dispute between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt. However, the 2020 U.S.-drafted GERD deal collapsed due to core disagreements between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt demanded a 10–15-year filling timeline and a guaranteed annual water release of 40–42 BCM, while Ethiopia proposed a shorter 3–4-year fill (later offering five years) with a flexible 31 BCM release. The U.S. compromise suggested a 5–7-year fill and a fixed annual release of 37 BCM, even during drought periods—something Ethiopia rejected, arguing it would limit its power generation capacity and infringe on its sovereignty. Ethiopia also objected to provisions requiring large releases during dry years and strongly opposed being excluded from the final drafting phase, which it viewed as a breach of good-faith negotiations and a process biased in Egypt’s favor.
Fast forward five years: the GERD has been completed after five rounds of filling without major incident and is scheduled for inauguration in September. Meanwhile, Ethiopia has pursued maritime access by signing an MoU with the unrecognized Somaliland government, securing a 50-year lease on a 20 km coastal strip for commercial and naval development, in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The Biden administration opposed the move, citing “national security,” while Egypt and Arab states sided with Somalia in protest. In hindsight, Ethiopia’s decision to reject the original deal may have been prudent—now that the dam is operational, Trump could leverage this new geopolitical landscape to pursue a geo-transactional solution. By linking Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions with water-sharing guarantees for Egypt, Trump could facilitate a win–win compromise that also aligns with broader U.S. interests in the region.
A Trump-style geo-transactional deal might involve granting Ethiopia the green light to fully implement the Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding, including formal recognition of Somaliland. In return, Ethiopia would agree to withdraw from BRICS and restrict access to its new naval installations, ensuring that adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and China are excluded from both access to and the use of such facilities. Meanwhile, Somaliland could permit the establishment of a U.S. military base in Berbera and enter a critical minerals partnership. As recently reported by Bloomberg, such an arrangement would help address U.S. challenges in securing access to critical materials vital for the development of artificial intelligence and semiconductor technologies—resources essential to U.S. national security interests.
This would be consistent with Trump’s precedent of bold diplomatic moves, such as moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Venezuela’s opposition leader as interim president or Trump reversed longstanding U.S. policy in North Africa by declaring American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. To compensate for Ethiopia’s potential power export losses from meeting Egypt’s 37 BCM water release demand (in line with the original 2020 U.S. proposal), the U.S. could offer expanded AGOA trade benefits, increasing Ethiopia’s exports to the U.S. from $ 267 million to $2 billion annually. Egypt, in turn, could receive enhanced trade agreements and military support, while granting U.S. commercial and naval vessels free passage through the Suez Canal—a transactional deal in true Trump fashion.
However, for this deal to succeed, several contentious issues and housekeeping matters must be resolved among the three parties. Back in 2020, Egypt demanded the principle of “equitable dams,” proposing that the operation of the GERD be coordinated with the High Aswan Dam, due to concerns over its impact on Egypt’s power generation and irrigation as a result of reduced water allocations. This issue was partially addressed under the Declaration of Principles signed in 2015 in Khartoum by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Egypt also proposed a framework for hydrological data sharing and the implementation of a joint monitoring program—both of which were acknowledged in the 2015 agreement. However, Ethiopia rejected these terms on the basis of sovereignty concerns, although the World Bank had offered a neutral plan to facilitate implementation.
In addition, Sudan requested guarantees on the structural integrity and flood management of GERD. With the dam now completed and proven to be stable, incorporating a flood management protocol into the agreement is both feasible and necessary. Operational housekeeping for this deal would require at least six months of verified hydrological data and river flow monitoring. Though some may view the proposal as controversial, it represents a bold and transformative approach—one that could liberate over 120 million Ethiopians from geographic isolation by granting maritime access, while also securing the water rights of more than 100 million Egyptians for generations to come. In a region historically plagued by cycles of drought and instability—where neither globalization nor multilateralism has offered durable solutions—this deal offers a realistic geopolitical reset. It also recalibrates U.S. strategic posture in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, countering the growing influence of China and Russia through economic and security cooperation rooted in the principle of “peace through strength.”
About the Author
Guled Ahmed is an author of Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc.: Uncovering the Hidden Economy of the Wealthiest Global Terrorist in Africa and Affiliate Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., specializing in Horn of Africa geopolitics, terrorist financing, and climate security. His work has been published by major outlets like CNN, The National Interest, and Al Arabiya, and recognized by institutions including Harvard, Georgetown, and Johns Hopkins.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
