Ethiopia Must Now Compete: President Cirro Departs for Addis After UAE Marathon as Congress Authorizes Hargeisa Office

October 14, 2025

HARGEISA – President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” of the Republic of Somaliland has departed for Addis Ababa on an official visit to Ethiopia, marking his first trip to the neighboring country since assuming office in January 2025. The high-stakes diplomatic mission arrives at a critical juncture for Horn of Africa geopolitics, nine months after Ethiopia signed the Ankara Declaration with Somalia—a move that left the future of the landmark Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding hanging in the balance.

The timing of the visit is particularly intriguing. President Cirro departed for Ethiopia just one day after returning from his third trip to the United Arab Emirates this year—a visit that lasted more than two weeks. Sources familiar with the President’s UAE engagements, speaking on strict condition of anonymity, confirmed that Cirro held meetings with high-level Emirati officials during his extended stay. Whether the immediate pivot to Addis Ababa is connected to these UAE discussions remains unclear, but the sequencing has not escaped the attention of regional analysts.

The President’s delegation, which departed from Hargeisa today aboard a chartered aircraft, includes the Ministers of Finance, Public Works, and Investment. Notably, several key officials had already traveled to Addis Ababa in advance of the President’s arrival, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Presidency, the Chief of the National Armed Forces, and the Director of National Intelligence. This advance team’s presence underscores the meticulous preparation surrounding what promises to be consequential talks.

The UAE Factor: A Diplomatic Puzzle

The elephant in the room is the UAE connection. President Cirro’s three trips to Abu Dhabi since taking office—with the most recent lasting over two weeks—represent an unusually intense diplomatic engagement with the Gulf state. The UAE has positioned itself as a critical player in Horn of Africa dynamics, with massive investments in both Somaliland’s Berbera Port (managed by DP World) and the Berbera Corridor connecting the port to Ethiopia’s industrial heartland.

The Emirati government also maintains close ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, having supported his administration through various domestic and regional challenges. As one analyst noted in a previous Somaliland Chronicle piece, “The rise of Abiy Ahmed as the prime minister of Ethiopia solidified Addis Ababa’s relations with Abu Dhabi. UAE supported Abiy’s major domestic and foreign policy objectives.”

Could the UAE be facilitating a diplomatic reset between Somaliland and Ethiopia? The timing—departing for Addis just 24 hours after returning from a lengthy Abu Dhabi stay—suggests coordination at the highest levels. The UAE has both the economic interests and the political capital to broker a revival of the Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership, particularly given its substantial investments in infrastructure projects that would benefit enormously from stable bilateral relations.

Sources who spoke to Somaliland Chronicle refused to confirm any direct connection between the UAE meetings and the Addis visit, but the circumstantial evidence is compelling. The UAE has consistently demonstrated a preference for pragmatic, business-oriented diplomacy over ideological posturing—exactly the kind of approach that could unlock the strategic gridlock that has paralyzed the Ethiopia-Somaliland relationship since the Ankara Declaration.

The High-Wire Act of Horn Diplomacy

The prolonged delay in President Cirro’s first visit to Ethiopia breaks with historical precedent and has raised eyebrows in both Hargeisa and Addis Ababa. Traditionally, Somaliland presidents have made Ethiopia one of their first foreign destinations after taking office, reflecting the critical nature of the bilateral relationship. That President Cirro waited nearly ten months before making the journey—choosing instead to visit the UAE three times—has fueled speculation about the state of Ethiopia-Somaliland relations.

Whether the delay originated from Somaliland’s side or Ethiopia’s remains unclear, but the resulting perception gap has proven damaging. In a candid January interview with The Reporter Ethiopia, Dr. Dareskedar Taye of Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs remarked that “the new administration in Somaliland appears to prefer aligning with the Somali government rather than asserting itself as an independent state.” Such perceptions from Ethiopian officials, warranted or not, underscore how the absence of high-level engagement can breed misunderstanding and mistrust.

Such perceptions have real consequences. Ethiopia’s pivot toward Somalia through Turkish-mediated talks—culminating in the December 2024 Ankara Declaration—effectively shelved the original MoU that promised Ethiopian recognition in exchange for naval access to Berbera. For many Somalilanders, watching Ethiopia pursue alternative arrangements through Mogadishu felt like a betrayal of the strategic partnership that had been decades in the making.

Yet the fundamental realities that made the January 2024 MoU inevitable remain unchanged. Ethiopia’s landlocked status, its crippling dependency on Djibouti (which handles 95 percent of its trade at a cost of over $1.5 billion annually), and the geographic proximity of its industrial heartland to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast create an inescapable strategic logic. The Turkish-led mediation’s failure to produce a viable alternative through Somalia has, if anything, vindicated the original Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership.

What’s on the Table?

According to the presidential statement, discussions will focus on “strengthening historical ties, strategic cooperation, and mutual interests, particularly in security, economy, trade, and movement between the two countries.” But the real question is whether this visit will breathe new life into the original MoU or forge an entirely new framework for cooperation.

In an exclusive interview with Somaliland Chronicle last month, former President Muse Bihi Abdi of the Republic of Somaliland offered a candid assessment of why the original MoU failed to materialize. Bihi indicated that Ethiopia succumbed to intense international and regional pressure, ultimately retreating from its commitments to Somaliland. His remarks provide crucial context for understanding what’s at stake in President Cirro’s current mission: is this trip a genuine opportunity for Ethiopia to attempt a reset—pursuing Red Sea access and recognition through an “MoU 2.0” framework—or merely a diplomatic courtesy call between new partners?

The answer could define the trajectory of Horn of Africa geopolitics for the next generation.

Reconsidering the Partnership: Has Ethiopia Proven Itself Worthy?

The original MoU’s failure raises uncomfortable questions that President Cirro’s administration must confront head-on: Is Ethiopia a reliable partner, or merely a fair-weather friend that retreats at the first sign of external pressure?

The evidence suggests the latter. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s January 2024 agreement with President Bihi was heralded as a historic breakthrough—Ethiopia’s quest for sea access finally aligned with Somaliland’s three-decade pursuit of recognition. Yet within months, as regional pushback intensified, Abiy pivoted. Rather than standing by his commitments to Somaliland, he pursued the Ankara Declaration with Somalia, effectively abandoning his Hargeisa partners in favor of appeasing Mogadishu, Ankara, and Cairo.

Former President Bihi’s assessment in his exclusive Somaliland Chronicle interview was damning but diplomatic: Ethiopia “succumbed to intense international and regional pressure, ultimately retreating from its commitments to Somaliland.” A more blunt reading would be that when tested, Abiy folded. The question facing Cirro is whether any “MoU 2.0” would fare differently, or if Somaliland would again find itself jilted once Egypt applies pressure through the GERD negotiations, or Turkey threatens to cut development finance, or Somalia mobilizes another regional coalition.

The strategic landscape has fundamentally shifted since January 2024, and not in Ethiopia’s favor. Then, Addis Ababa was Somaliland’s most promising suitor—the only regional power with both the motivation and the means to offer recognition. Today, Somaliland faces an embarrassment of riches. The United States Congress is actively legislating direct bilateral ties through a representative office in Hargeisa. Senator Cruz, who chairs the Africa subcommittee, is personally lobbying President Trump for full recognition. American strategic interest in countering China, accessing Berbera’s port and 4-kilometer airstrip, and establishing a foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has never been higher.

This shifts the negotiating calculus entirely. Somaliland no longer needs to offer Ethiopia a sweetheart deal in exchange for recognition that may or may not materialize depending on Abiy’s domestic political calculations or his willingness to weather regional pressure. Instead, Hargeisa can negotiate from a position of strength: If Ethiopia wants preferential access to Berbera over Djibouti, what is Addis Ababa prepared to offer beyond vague promises that crumbled once before?

Any MoU 2.0 discussion must include ironclad guarantees that were absent from the original agreement. Ethiopia must commit to immediate, not gradual, recognition—with a clear timeline and public announcements that preclude backtracking. The terms must be structured to survive external pressure: legally binding treaties ratified by both parliaments, not memoranda that can be quietly shelved when convenient. And crucially, Somaliland must secure concurrent commitments from other partners—the UAE, potentially the United States—that create a web of relationships too costly for any single party to abandon.

President Cirro’s challenge is not simply to resurrect the MoU, but to determine whether Ethiopia has learned from its failure and is prepared to act like a serious partner—or whether Somaliland’s future lies not in Addis Ababa’s uncertain promises, but in Washington’s legislative momentum and Abu Dhabi’s patient capital. The fact that Cirro spent two weeks in the UAE before flying to Ethiopia for what may be only a 2-3 day visit speaks volumes about where Somaliland’s strategic priorities—and expectations—now lie.

Ethiopia had its chance to be the historic first. Now it must compete for the privilege.

The original January 2024 agreement—signed by President Muse Bihi Abdi and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed—granted Ethiopia a 50-year lease on 20 kilometers of Somaliland coastline for commercial and military purposes, with the understanding that Addis Ababa would recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state. The deal also included provisions for Somaliland to acquire stakes in Ethiopian Airlines and deepened security cooperation, including a comprehensive training program for approximately 8,000 Somaliland commandos.

President Cirro, who opposed aspects of the deal during his time as opposition leader, has been characteristically measured in his public statements about the MoU. His April address to Parliament conspicuously omitted any reference to the agreement, leading some observers to question his commitment to the partnership. This visit to Addis Ababa will either dispel those doubts or confirm Ethiopia’s worst fears.

The American Factor: Washington’s Growing Embrace

While Ethiopia hedged and Somalia raged, a seismic shift has been unfolding in Washington that could fundamentally alter the calculus for all parties involved. The United States—long content to maintain studied ambiguity on Somaliland’s status—appears to be abandoning its traditional posture in favor of direct engagement that stops just short of formal recognition.

In August 2025, Senator Ted Cruz, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, sent a formal letter to President Trump urging immediate recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The letter was notable not just for its unequivocal stance, but for the strategic framework Cruz outlined: “Somaliland has emerged as a critical security and diplomatic partner for the United States, helping America advance our national security interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.”

Cruz’s letter emphasized Somaliland’s strategic location “along the Gulf of Aden, putting it near one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors,” and highlighted a crucial geopolitical dimension that directly threatens Somaliland’s partnership with both Ethiopia and the UAE: “The Chinese Communist Party is using economic and diplomatic coercion to punish Somaliland for its support for Taiwan, as well as to undermine that support.”

But the most significant development came one month later. In September 2025, the House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced H.R. 5300, the Department of State Policy Provisions Act, which includes Section 305: “Ensuring smooth travel and investment in Somaliland.” The language is bureaucratic, but its implications are revolutionary.

The bill explicitly directs the Secretary of State to consider “establishing a representative office in Hargeisa, Somaliland” and creating separate “bifurcation of travel advisory warnings between Somalia and Somaliland.” This isn’t mere symbolism—it represents the legislative groundwork for direct bilateral diplomatic relations between the United States and Somaliland, independent of Mogadishu.

A U.S. representative office in Hargeisa would constitute de facto recognition, creating a direct diplomatic channel that bypasses Somalia entirely. It would make the United States the first major power to establish such a presence, fundamentally legitimizing Somaliland’s claim to statehood in ways that decades of functional independence could not achieve alone. For context, this is the exact pathway the United States used to maintain relations with Taiwan—a representative office that functions as an embassy in all but name.

The timing of this American interest creates both opportunity and urgency for President Cirro’s Ethiopia visit. If Washington beats Addis Ababa to the punch by establishing that representative office and offering Somaliland security guarantees—perhaps including access to Berbera for U.S. naval operations—Ethiopia’s unique leverage evaporates overnight. The port-for-recognition equation only works if Ethiopia is the first mover. If America moves first, Somaliland gains recognition without needing to offer Ethiopia anything beyond continued trade access.

This emerging American interest may explain the UAE connection. Abu Dhabi, which maintains close ties with both Washington and Addis Ababa, has every incentive to coordinate between the three parties to ensure their massive infrastructure investments in Berbera and the corridor to Ethiopia don’t become casualties of competing recognition bids. Could President Cirro’s extended UAE consultations have been aimed at orchestrating a synchronized approach—one where American diplomatic support, Ethiopian recognition, and Emirati economic backing all converge to create an irresistible momentum toward Somaliland’s emergence as the world’s newest nation?

The Regional Chess Game

The stakes extend far beyond bilateral relations. The Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership triggered a diplomatic tantrum from Somalia, which mobilized support from Egypt, Turkey, and increasingly, China in a single-minded campaign to prevent Somaliland’s recognition at any cost. Somalia’s approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active proxy warfare, including fueling the Las Anod crisis in a calculated attempt to destabilize Somaliland from within. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s inflammatory rhetoric—reportedly declaring “jihad” from mosque pulpits and threatening alignment with Al-Shabaab—underscores how Mogadishu has prioritized blocking Somaliland over governing its own territory.

Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Turkey’s February 2024 defense pact with Somalia established a naval presence explicitly designed to counter Ethiopian maritime ambitions. For these actors, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than addressing terrorism, state failure, or economic development.

Meanwhile, Djibouti—which stands to lose billions in port revenue from any Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership—has taken increasingly hostile actions, including closing Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills. The move was widely interpreted as retaliation for the MoU.

A Closing Window of Opportunity

The legal architecture of any Ethiopian naval base requires a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—a binding international treaty that can only be negotiated between sovereign entities. This creates a de facto recognition pathway that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels, similar to precedents ranging from the US lease of Guantanamo Bay to the progressive recognition of Kosovo.

However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage may be time-limited. Long-standing US strategic interest in Berbera’s airport and port facilities could translate into direct American military presence under a future administration, providing Somaliland an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage. For Addis Ababa, the question is whether to seize this moment or risk watching another power claim the prize.

For President Cirro, the visit represents an opportunity to demonstrate that Somaliland’s new leadership remains committed to the independence project—not through inflammatory rhetoric, but through calculated strategic partnerships. His administration faces a fundamental choice: continue the previous government’s bold gambit for recognition through the Ethiopian partnership, or pursue a more cautious approach that risks squandering three decades of de facto statehood.

The Verdict Awaits

As President Cirro’s aircraft touches down in Addis Ababa, the Horn of Africa holds its breath. This visit could mark the resurrection of the MoU and a decisive step toward Somaliland’s long-sought recognition. Or it could represent another chapter in the endless cycle of diplomatic positioning that has characterized the region for generations.

What is clear is that the geographic and strategic realities haven’t changed. Ethiopia needs reliable sea access. Somaliland needs international recognition. And the alternative—continued dependency on Djibouti, continued isolation for Somaliland, continued instability in Somalia—serves no one’s interests except those actively working to maintain the dysfunctional status quo.

The next 48 hours will reveal whether two leaders with the courage to reshape the Horn’s diplomatic architecture can overcome domestic skeptics, regional spoilers, and international pressure to forge a partnership that reflects geographic reality rather than diplomatic fiction.

Stay tuned to Somaliland Chronicle for comprehensive coverage of President Cirro’s historic visit to Ethiopia.

Presidential Press Release issued by Hussein Adan Cigaal (Deyr), Spokesperson for the President of the Republic of Somaliland

From Antagonism to Accord: The Nairobi Agreement and the New Reality Between Republic of Somaliland and Puntland Federal Member State

Staff

October 6, 2025

Key Points

Historic Agreement: On October 4-5, 2025, in Nairobi, the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland Federal Member State of Somalia signed a landmark security and cooperation accord aimed at ending decades of conflict.
Core Provisions: The deal establishes joint cooperation in counter-terrorism, maritime security, trade, and a cooperative approach to peace in Erigavo.
Major Political Development: In a significant political statement within the communiqué, Puntland formally welcomed the Republic of Somaliland’s “progress in Governance and its right to its self-determination”.
Domestic Opposition: The accord faces opposition within Somaliland, with critics citing constitutional concerns over sovereignty, while the government defends it as a pragmatic solution to inherited problems.
Strategic Challenge: A central test for Hargeisa will be managing the asymmetric risks of the agreement, particularly how to leverage cooperation in regions like Sool without inadvertently ceding further influence to Puntland.

The joint security and cooperation accord concluded in Nairobi on October 4-5, 2025, constitutes a watershed moment in the relationship between the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland Federal Member State. The Somaliland delegation, led by the Minister of Presidency, Mr. Khadar Abdi Loge, met with Puntland officials to finalize the historic agreement. After decades defined by territorial disputes, military confrontations, and mutual recrimination, these two historically antagonistic polities have committed to a framework of security cooperation, economic facilitation, and reconciliation support. This rapprochement is rendered all the more significant by its timing, coinciding with Puntland’s profound estrangement from the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu.

SL_PL_joint_commnique Download

While the accord marks a significant diplomatic achievement in de-escalating regional tensions, its implementation presents a formidable test for President Cirro’s administration. The agreement’s success hinges on Hargeisa’s ability to navigate fierce domestic opposition, manage the strategic risks of an asymmetric relationship with Puntland, and translate diplomatic text into tangible security and economic progress on the ground.

Puntland’s Strategic Drift from Mogadishu

A nuanced understanding of the Nairobi accord’s significance necessitates an appreciation of the Puntland Federal Member State’s increasingly fraught relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia. In March 2024, Puntland initiated a fundamental rupture with the federal system, the culmination of protracted disputes over constitutional amendments, electoral processes, and what its leadership perceived as systemic federal encroachment. This has created a strategic environment wherein Puntland increasingly functions as a de facto autonomous entity, pursuing its own diplomatic and security relationships.

The Geopolitical Undercurrents: The US and UAE Connection

Both the Republic of Somaliland and Puntland have cultivated extensive security and economic partnerships with the United Arab Emirates. These parallel relationships have engendered similar institutional frameworks and furnished discreet backchannels for coordination. The United States also maintains security cooperation with both entities, and its strategic imperatives in the Horn of Africa are advanced by a de-escalation of tensions. The selection of Nairobi as the venue provided a neutral setting for the negotiations. The communiqué itself welcomes the international community’s support for peace and notes both parties’ readiness for “fruitful cooperation”.

Competing Principles: The Dialectic of Borders and Bloodlines

Any substantive assessment must contend with the fundamental ideological cleavage that has animated conflict in the eastern regions. The Republic of Somaliland’s territorial claims are anchored in the principle of uti possidetis juris (the inheritance of colonial borders). Puntland, conversely, has articulated claims predicated on clan genealogy. The Nairobi accord does not resolve this philosophical tension. However, it introduces a significant development with the clause stating that Puntland formally welcomes the Republic of Somaliland’s “right to its self-determination”.

The Reality of SSC-Khatumo’s Circumscribed Authority

In truth, SSC-Khatumo’s effective governance is confined primarily to Las Anod and its environs. While the Sanaag region is constitutionally part of Somaliland, it is characterized by a fragmented political landscape. Puntland maintains significant influence with certain communities there, an element that Hargeisa may view as a potentially useful factor in resolving local divisions and fostering broader stability. This complex reality underscores why Mogadishu’s recognition of SSC-Khatumo, while politically symbolic, has failed to materialize into the administrative capacity required to project governance across all its claimed territories.

It is within this fragmented and contested landscape that the Nairobi accord attempts to introduce a new paradigm of cooperation.

From a Paradigm of Confrontation to One of Cooperation

The Nairobi accord signifies a paradigmatic shift away from a zero-sum calculus. The commitment to joint operations against al-Shabab acknowledges a common threat. The agreement to facilitate cross-border trade addresses economic realities long obscured by political antagonism. Perhaps most significantly, the pledge to support reconciliation in Erigavo—a process initiated by Somaliland’s president and supported by Puntland—indicates an evolution toward a more nuanced conception of governance.

Implications for the Regional Order

The accord carries implications that reverberate well beyond the immediate bilateral relationship. For the Republic of Somaliland, it represents diplomatic progress at a moment of significant traction within the United States Congress. The agreement demonstrates Somaliland’s capacity for sophisticated statecraft—simultaneously managing complex regional relationships while advancing its broader strategic objectives. For Puntland, the accord is a manifestation of its increasingly independent foreign policy trajectory.

Domestic Political Controversy: Constitutional Questions and Status Anxiety

The Nairobi accord has generated considerable domestic controversy. A widely circulated statement attributed to former minister Dr. Abdiweli Soufi articulated specific constitutional and strategic concerns, identifying Puntland’s designated role in Erigavo peace efforts and provisions on airspace management as potential violations of the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty. The critique voices a broader anxiety that entering into an agreement with a Federal Member State of Somalia fundamentally obscures Somaliland’s claimed status as an independent republic.

In responses across social media and political forums, government supporters have argued that this criticism ignores the profound irony of the opposition raising alarms over territorial integrity. Their central counterargument is anchored in the Las Anod crisis that unfolded under the previous Kulmiye administration, which they contend was a far more grievous compromise of Somaliland’s territory than any diplomatic engagement. This counter-narrative posits that the Nairobi accord is a pragmatic attempt to manage the consequences of past failures.

The Sool Dilemma: Strategic Opportunity versus Asymmetric Risk

While the accord focuses on cooperation in Sanaag, its implicit consequences for the Sool region present both an opportunity and a risk for Somaliland. The new framework could create a pathway for Hargeisa to rebuild influence, but this is complicated by Puntland’s deep historical connection to the area. This creates a fundamental asymmetry: the Puntland Federal Member State wields socio-political leverage within communities inside Somaliland’s constitutional borders, whereas Somaliland possesses no reciprocal influence inside Puntland proper. The challenge for Hargeisa will be to leverage the accord’s cooperative spirit without inadvertently ceding further ground in territories Puntland already claims.

A Foundation for Peace

Despite formidable challenges, the Nairobi accord represents the most significant diplomatic progress between the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland Federal Member State in decades. It signals a mutual recognition of the strategic bankruptcy inherent in previous policies of confrontation. The ultimate metric of its success, however, will not be the diplomatic fanfare surrounding its inception, but rather its capacity to yield tangible improvements in the lives of the region’s inhabitants. The coming months will be the crucible of implementation, testing whether the political will that produced this agreement can sustain the arduous work of translating commitments into reality.

A Tale of Two Capitals: Hargeisa Rises as Mogadishu Falls

Staff

October 5, 2025

By Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal
Representative of the Republic of Somaliland to the Republic of China (Taiwan)

Yesterday’s assault on Godka Jilacow Prison in Mogadishu has once again exposed the depth of dysfunction within Somalia’s federal government. A facility long regarded as one of the most secure in the country was overrun by Al Shabaab militants in a coordinated attack involving suicide bombers and gunmen that freed prisoners and humiliated the authorities.

#ALERT: Explosions, Gunfire, and Casualties: Somali Spy Agency Compound Under Siege. Somali Intelligence Headquarters Hit by Devastating Attack.

Reports from Mogadishu confirm that a powerful car bomb has exploded at the main gate of Godka Jilicoow, the detention and… pic.twitter.com/ps7BRVOGMQ
— Baidoa Online (@BaidoaOnline) October 4, 2025

The timing of the assault was painfully symbolic. Only hours earlier, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration had declared that Mogadishu was “fully secured” and celebrated the reopening of roads that had been closed for years due to insecurity. By nightfall, the claim collapsed in flames. What unfolded was not merely a terrorist incident but the unmasking of a government trapped between illusion and failure.

On Saturday morning Somali PM Barre and spy chief Mahad Salad launched "Mogadishu is safe" campaign.

40 roads closed for security reasons were reopened.

PM and NISA DG toured some of roads being cleared of concrete barriers.

On Saturday evening, barely hours after fanfare,… pic.twitter.com/gBml1oD8RB
— Rashid Abdi (@RAbdiAnalyst) October 4, 2025

Somalia’s leadership has become a theatre of contradictions. While its citizens live under daily threat, the administration remains consumed by political ambition, corruption, and an unhealthy preoccupation with Somaliland. Instead of confronting the crisis consuming its own capital, President Hassan Sheikh and his Prime Minister, Hamza Barre, have diverted their limited resources to antagonising Somaliland through inflammatory rhetoric and covert interference.

The involvement of Somali intelligence operatives and senior officials in fuelling the conflict in the Sool region last year is well documented. Their actions prolonged violence and sought to undermine Somaliland’s peace and stability. The same destructive agenda is now being advanced in the Awdal region, with Somalia’s Minister of Defence, Ahmed Fiqi, recently declaring that Somalia’s flag would soon fly in Awdal, Burao, and other parts of Somaliland. His statements, utterly detached from reality, reveal a desperate attempt to manufacture tension and mischief for political gain.

While Mogadishu’s leadership interferes beyond its borders, the federal system it presides over continues to unravel. Relations with Puntland and Jubaland are effectively non-existent, exposing the fallacy of a federal structure that exists only in name. The fallout with its own federal member states is a direct consequence of Mogadishu’s reckless policy of attempting to subvert Somaliland, a policy that has instead fuelled fragmentation and accelerated the Balkanisation of Somalia’s internal political order. Western diplomats have described such reckless behaviour as an act of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. The National Consultative Council has degenerated into a stage for political rivalry rather than coordination, and the federal member states now pursue independent agendas with little reference to the centre. Even within Mogadishu, infighting between ministries, factions, and security organs has paralysed governance and eroded public confidence.

Corruption has become the defining hallmark of the administration. Public lands are sold in secret deals. Development funds disappear into private accounts. The appointment of President Hassan Sheikh’s own daughter to a senior advisory position at Villa Somalia epitomises a culture where nepotism displaces merit and loyalty outweighs competence. Donor nations have grown increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with the continuous injection of taxpayers’ money into what has become a bottomless pit, where stagnation replaces progress and a financial lifeline has become both a crutch and a curse. The system now sustains a political elite that prospers through dependency and deceit. US lawmakers have reported that USAID, once regarded as a cornerstone of American development assistance and a vital source of support for many deserving nations, has been abolished in response to corruption, mismanagement, and pilfering in countries such as Somalia.

The institutions entrusted with defending the state are themselves compromised. The National Intelligence and Security Agency, which controls Godka Jilacow Prison, has long been infiltrated by Al Shabaab and its sympathisers. Senior officers are implicated in illicit trade, corruption, and the deliberate leakage of sensitive information. When those charged with safeguarding a nation become complicit in its subversion, the concept of sovereignty loses all meaning.

The international community must now confront an undeniable truth. After decades of investment, training, and diplomatic backing, Somalia remains in a state of perpetual crisis. Its government survives not on legitimacy but on foreign subsidy. The international approach to Somalia has become the equivalent of “flogging a dead horse”, an exercise in futility that rewards dysfunction and punishes accountability.

For the people of Somaliland, these events offer no cause for celebration but stand as a powerful vindication of the choice made in 1991. When Somalia descended into chaos, Somaliland exercised its right to withdraw from an illegitimate union, a decision that was not only consistent with the legal principle of Remedial Right to Self Determination but also served as a necessary remedy for decades of injustice and oppression. The passage of time and history of the past thirty-three years has fully exonerated that decision. Had Somaliland not chosen that path, it would almost certainly be facing the same turmoil and instability that grips Mogadishu today. By reaffirming its independence, Somaliland charted a course towards peace, democracy, and institution building.

While Somalia’s leaders issue empty threats about flags, Somaliland builds schools and roads. Through determination and sacrifice, it has created a state founded on accountable governance and national discipline. Today, it maintains its own security, conducts credible elections, and engages confidently with international partners from London and Washington to Taipei, achieving stability not through dependency or slogans but through vision, hard work, and integrity.

The contrast is striking. Every explosion in the south reinforces the wisdom of Somaliland’s decision to stand apart. Every scandal in Mogadishu strengthens the case for recognising Somaliland’s sovereignty. The international community should draw the only logical conclusion. Stability and progress are not found in fragile states sustained by aid but in capable governments that earn legitimacy through service. Somaliland has done precisely that. It is time for policymakers around the world to recognise and reward competence rather than failure. It is time to increase engagement with Somaliland as a credible and responsible partner.

Hassan Sheikh’s government may continue to issue proclamations and provocations, but it cannot conceal the truth. The Somali state it claims to lead is fragmented, infiltrated, and adrift. A leadership that cannot protect its prisons or its people has forfeited any moral authority to lecture others about unity or sovereignty.

History will remember that while Mogadishu’s rulers pursued the politics of illusion, Somaliland quietly built a functioning State. The lesson is clear: legitimacy is earned through performance, not proclaimed by decree. In the Horn of Africa, it is Somaliland that stands as the genuine example of resilience, governance, and national dignity.

About the Author

Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal currently serves as the Republic of Somaliland’s Representative to Taiwan. A seasoned diplomat and politician with extensive experience in African and Asian geopolitics. Ambassador Galaal has held multiple senior government positions,

including Ambassador to Ethiopia, State Minister for Planning and National Development, and State Minister for Health. He has represented Somaliland in high-level negotiations across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and is widely recognised for his expertise in regional security and development strategy. His work draws on a strong background in law, governance, public policy, and international advocacy.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

From Controversy to Cornerstone: DP World’s Lesson for Egal Airport

Staff

September 22, 2025

Many got DP World’s Berbera deal wrong, but Berbera thrived. Maharat could reshape Somaliland’s skies too—but only if scrutiny, not hope, carries the day.

Each evening as dusk falls, Egal International Airport — Somaliland’s lone international gateway — is forced to shut down. This is not because of security threats or curfew protocols, but because the country’s most vital infrastructure asset still lacks the lighting and navigation systems required to operate safely after dark. For a nation that markets itself as the stable, business-friendly alternative in the Horn of Africa, this daily closure is more than a nuisance. It is a glaring symbol of institutional neglect and decades of serial mismanagement.

But this nightly shutdown is only the surface-level humiliation. Beneath it lies a more urgent and potentially catastrophic crisis: the very runway on which Somaliland’s economic lifeline depends is rapidly collapsing. Designed to last ten years, it has not even made it to its midpoint before exhibiting signs of critical failure. Aviation professionals warn the surface could become unusable within months, not years, effectively severing Somaliland from the world.

At the center of this crisis is the Minister of Aviation himself, Fuad Ahmed Nuh, an official who has cultivated a meticulous public image through slickly produced social media videos showcasing a lavishly furnished office and an air of modern competence. Though he has only held the post for nine months and inherited an airport in a state of advanced decay, he has unequivocally chosen this controversial $70 million deal as his signature initiative. Instead of launching a transparent, competitive international tender process to attract proven operators, he has staked his entire political reputation on the success of this single, opaque agreement with a phantom consortium. This deal, for better or for worse, will now be the defining measure of his tenure.

"This is not a photo-op government," declared the #Somaliland Minister of Presidency @khadarlooge. Yet, while Minister Fuad Nuh invests in professionally directed slow-mo videos for TikTok from his lavish office, #Hargeisa's #Egal International closes at sunset for lack of basic… pic.twitter.com/gZRbJ2m6RV
— Somaliland Chronicle (@SomalilandChro1) June 19, 2025

Faced with this looming crisis, the government has scrambled to sign a $70 million concession agreement with an entity calling itself International Maharat Investment. The problem? The public has been given no reason to trust that the government has competently vetted this ghost firm. This is not merely a story about one airport deal; it is a case study of a government that, despite commanding over half a billion dollars annually, consistently delivers substandard results while blaming external factors for failures rooted in its own institutional incompetence and a well-documented history of corruption.

A Company with No Past — and a $70M Future

Corporate registry searches reveal only a single trace of Maharat’s existence: an Omani registration dated August 13, 2023, listing one Mohammed Oday Fahad Al Mutar. Beyond this document, there is no record of Maharat ever completing an infrastructure project, let alone one as technically demanding as a major airport.

To be clear, this is not Favori LLC, the controversial Turkish company that manages Mogadishu’s airport and whose representatives recently met with Somaliland’s Investment Minister, sparking separate sovereignty concerns. The Maharat deal is an entirely different arrangement, yet it carries its own profound risks tied to the consortium’s complete lack of a verifiable track record.

Sources describe Maharat as “a consortium of wealthy Middle Eastern businesspeople,” but this does not excuse the fundamental questions: Why was there no competitive tender? What credible criteria were used to evaluate Maharat’s financial capacity and technical competence?

A Runway Built on Corruption

This crisis stems directly from corruption, with roots leading back to prominent political figures still active today. The last major runway reconstruction in 2013 was funded by a $10 million Kuwait Fund grant and overseen by Mr. Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, who at the time was the Minister of Aviation and later a powerful Minister of the Presidency. Mr. Hashi, now the chairman of the Kaah political party and a presidential hopeful, presided over a project that was designed to guarantee a decade of safe operations. Instead, contractors reportedly used substandard materials and thinner asphalt, cutting the lifespan nearly in half.

The current concession process shows identical rot. Sources claim former Airport Director Omar Sayid Abdilahi, allegedly with partners from the previous President’s office, demanded $3 million to sign the project’s Memorandum of Understanding. Current officials dispute this account, stating their negotiations with Maharat began independently when representatives met President Cirro during his Dubai visit.

Current officials claim extensive verification over several months, including visits to every country where Maharat reportedly operates. They describe the final agreement as resulting from major renegotiations. However, our investigation cannot verify these claims until the government shares project mechanics and especially details about Maharat itself—providing the public assurance their most precious asset is secure.

Then there’s the unresolved $3.25 million deposited in Somaliland’s UAE investment account for the now-cancelled presidential palace project. Only $2.7 million reportedly remains. The unexplained disappearance of $550,000, vaguely attributed by former UAE Representative Badmaax to “18th of May celebrations,” has never been credibly accounted for.

Somaliland’s Habit of Falling for Transformational Mirages

This pattern of questionable deals is tragically familiar. The much-hyped Singapore-backed New Silk Oil Refinery and the billion-dollar Chinese bank both evaporated because minimal verification would have revealed them as fraudulent schemes. The sole counterexample remains DP World’s Berbera Port concession, which succeeded precisely because it brought transparency and proven competence. Ironically, President Cirro, then in opposition, denounced that deal as treasonous. His administration now champions an airport deal that would collapse under a fraction of the scrutiny DP World endured.

Due Diligence and the Anatomy of a Disaster

Somaliland’s diplomatic isolation limits its investor pool, but limited options do not grant the government a license to abandon its most fundamental duty: to protect the nation’s assets through rigorous due diligence. Due diligence isn’t bureaucratic theater; it’s the firewall between a successful project and a catastrophic failure. What expertise does Aviation Minister Fuad Ahmed Nuh or the Presidency possess to navigate the balance between necessary secrecy and essential verification? This isn’t routine contract management—it requires sophisticated intelligence gathering and financial forensics that challenge even recognized states.

The Laforug Lesson

For those who consider this a hypothetical risk, the wreckage of the Laforug bridge offers a chilling lesson in the real-world cost of failed oversight. Washed away by floods on the vital Berbera corridor, this was a key component of a project funded by the highly reputable Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. This presents the central, damning question: If a project backed by a world-class institution can collapse due to a complete failure of local supervision, what hope exists for an airport built by an unvetted ghost firm? The Laforug disaster proves that the government’s watchdog role is non-negotiable.

The President’s Absence: A Calculated Distance?

Adding another layer of intrigue to the deal is the conspicuous absence of President Cirro himself from the final signing ceremony. Instead, the Presidency was represented by the all-powerful Minister of the Presidency, Mr. Khadar Loge. For a head of state known to be deeply concerned with cementing his legacy, and who is often present for far more trivial ribbon-cutting ceremonies, the decision to distance himself from the signing of what is being touted as a cornerstone project is telling. It raises an unavoidable question: Is the President hedging his bets, creating plausible deniability for a deal he knows is deeply flawed?

The Final Test: A New Runway, Old Interests, and the Courage to Govern

The litany of red flags surrounding this deal—the phantom firm, the tainted process, the history of failed oversight—all lead to a final, unavoidable test. The success or failure of this $70 million gamble will not be determined by press conferences, but by the government’s ability to navigate the complex and politically explosive realities on the ground. Before this project proceeds, the administration must provide a clear and binding plan for two critical challenges:

1. The Question of Land and Livelihoods: A New Runway According to sources familiar with the agreement, the deal’s primary component is the construction of an entirely new runway, not just a repair of the existing one. It is this new construction that will require additional land to be cleared and annexed to the airport, necessitating the acquisition of privately owned land and potentially the relocation of residents. This raises the critical and sensitive question of eminent domain: What is the government’s plan to ensure that citizens whose land is absorbed for this national project are compensated fairly, transparently, and swiftly, so that they are made whole? A failure to handle this with grace and justice will doom the project’s public legitimacy before the first shovel hits the ground.

2. The Question of Entrenched Interests: An Iron Backbone Egal International Airport is an ecosystem of established, powerful interests, from the current ground handling provider, NASHA, to the existing fuel suppliers and other concession holders. A new operator cannot simply wish them away. What is the government’s strategy for managing these entrenched interests? Will existing contracts be honored, bought out, or steamrolled? This will require not just a clear legal framework, but an iron backbone to stand up to powerful local players who will fight to protect their turf. A failure to manage this transition with clarity and strength will mire the project in years of legal battles and political infighting.

Ultimately, the questions about Maharat’s background, while critical, are secondary to the question of our own government’s capacity. Can it be trusted to protect its citizens’ property? Does it have the courage to manage the powerful interests that have long benefited from the status quo?

Without a credible plan for these real-world challenges, this isn’t a solution to Somaliland’s aviation crisis—it is a $70 million catalyst for a new one.

The Ministries of of Aviation, Presidency and Somaliland’s former UAE Representative, Osman Mohamed Badmaax, did not respond to detailed questions by publication deadline.

As evening approaches and Egal International prepares for its daily shutdown, the lights that should guide aircraft home remain uninstalled—much like the institutional safeguards that should protect Somaliland’s future. The shutdown at dusk isn’t just an operational failure; it’s a metaphor for a government that consistently chooses darkness over transparency. Half a billion dollars in annual budgets should be enough to keep the lights on. That they remain dark speaks to a crisis far deeper than any single airport deal.

Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

The Difference Between Somalia “ E-Visa “ system and Somaliland’s “Visa on Arrival” system

Staff

September 13, 2025

During the last 10 days , many circles—particularly those in the diaspora—have expressed confusion between two announcements: the E-Visa system launched by President Hassan Sheikh of Somalia on September 1, 2025, and “ Visa on Arrival “ policy announced by Somaliland on September 9, 2025. While the timing of these announcements may have contributed to the confusion, it is essential to understand that these two systems are different systems, implemented by two separate jurisdictions .

1. Somalia’s E-Visa System

A foreign visitor to Somalia must apply online before traveling.
The application requires completing a digital form, uploading supporting documents (such as a passport copy and travel itinerary), and paying a fee of $64.
Once processed and approved, the applicant receives an electronic visa (E-Visa) by email, which must be presented upon arrival at Somali entry points.
While convenient for some, this process requires internet access, advance planning, and prior approval, which can discourage spontaneous or last-minute travelers.

2. Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival System

A foreign visitor to Somaliland does not need to apply online.
The traveler simply boards a flight and receives a visa directly upon arrival at airports or border checkpoints.
Requirements include a valid passport, supporting documents (such as a return ticket and accommodation details), and payment of the applicable fee.

Previous Policy of Somaliland Visa System.

Historically, Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival privilege was restricted to citizens of 49 countries, grouped as follows:

• European Union (27 countries)
• Gulf States (6 countries): Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait
• IGAD States (6 countries): Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda
• Other key countries (10): Canada, USA, Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia

New Somaliland Visa System.

Under the updated framework, citizens of all 193 United Nations member states are now eligible for Visa on Arrival in Somaliland. This represents a dramatic expansion of accessibility and inclusivity.

Broader Economic & Diplomatic Impact of Somaliland’s “Visa on Arrival” system

Tourism and Foreign Currency Inflows – Easier Visa access will encourage international tourists, generating revenue for hotels, transport, restaurants, and heritage sites.
Attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – Simplified entry procedures send a welcoming signal to global investors who often value streamlined travel formalities as part of the business environment.
Strengthening of Diplomatic and Social Ties – By welcoming travelers from all UN member states, Somaliland expands its international visibility, fosters cultural exchange, and underscores its political maturity as a self-governing entity.
Soft Power and Recognition – Visa liberalization is a tool of statecraft. It demonstrates Somaliland’s openness, capacity for governance, and readiness to interact with the global community—an important step in its pursuit of international recognition.

Conclusion

While Somalia’s E-Visa represents a controlled, pre-arranged system of digital approvals, Somaliland’s Visa on Arrival offers flexibility, inclusivity, and an immediate gateway for travelers from around the world. The latter positions Somaliland as a welcoming hub for tourism, investment, and diplomacy, while reinforcing its status as a distinct and self-administered nation.

About the Author

Mr. Ali Ibrahim “Baqdaadi“ is the former Governor of Somaliland Central Bank, Hargeisa.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

“Chip in with Taiwan” for Global Peace and Prosperity

Staff

September 13, 2025

Lin Chia-lung, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan (Republic of China)

Today, the world faces mounting uncertainties and challenges—from prolonged conflicts and democratic backsliding to economic coercion and disinformation campaigns. Authoritarian regimes increasingly employ gray-zone tactics that undermine the rules-based international order. In this fragile global environment, peace cannot be taken for granted. Democracies must unite to bolster resilience and safeguard our cherished values and way of life.

Taiwan is a key player and an indispensable partner in the Indo-Pacific region, working toward global peace, stability, and prosperity. It stands on the front line of the Indo-Pacific’s first island chain, defending democracy and freedom from authoritarian expansionism. Taiwan also contributes significantly to stability and prosperity through its robust economy and semiconductor ecosystem. As the 21st-largest economy, Taiwan leads in artificial intelligence and semiconductors—producing over 60 percent of the world’s chips and 90 percent of its most advanced ones. This economic strength fuels global growth and makes Taiwan an indispensable partner for global development in various fields.

Taiwan is determined to defend democratic values, both at home and abroad. President Lai Ching-te launched the Four Pillars of Peace action plan last year, which commits to raising Taiwan’s defense spending and boosting whole-of-society resilience. Taiwan does not seek conflict with China and will not provoke it. In fact, Taiwan is urging Beijing to resume dialogue on the basis of parity and dignity.

In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted an “Integrated Diplomacy” to leverage Taiwan’s diplomatic, defense, technological, and economic strengths. With this smart power approach, Taiwan is navigating complex international relations, enhancing its global presence, and contributing to a more stable and prosperous world.

Through the global democratic values chain, Taiwan strengthens partnership with democracies facing uncertain geopolitical risks to resist authoritarian influence, promote human rights, advance digital governance, and uphold the rules-based international order. Taiwan’s resilience in the face of authoritarian threats proves that democracy can endure and thrive under pressure.

As a thriving economic powerhouse, Taiwan leads in semiconductor production and advanced technologies. Its economic strengths fuel innovation and growth in sectors of AI, digitalization and healthcare. To reinforce this position, Taiwan has launched an economic diplomacy strategy focused on non-red supply chains, aiming to build trusted and transparent networks that safeguard critical industries from authoritarian interference.

Taiwan also actively advances the Diplomatic Allies Prosperity Project, harnessing public-private collaboration to consolidate government resources and leverage Taiwan’s industrial strengths to promote mutually beneficial development. Initiatives include collaborating with Paraguay to develop an integrated hospital information system (HIS) to enhance nationwide medical information management; partnering with Eswatini on an oil reserve facility project to strengthen energy security and stimulate local industry; and assisting Palau in becoming a smart and sustainable island nation to exemplify Taiwan’s commitment to sustainable international cooperation.

Regrettably, despite Taiwan’s significant global contributions, it remains largely unrecognized by the international community and is unable to participate in the United Nations system. Taiwan’s unwarranted exclusion stems from China’s deliberate misrepresentation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. The resolution is falsely linked with the so-called “one China principle” and continues to be wrongfully weaponized to block Taiwan’s participation.

However, UNGA Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan at all—it merely addresses China’s representation in the United Nations. The resolution does not state that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), nor does it grant the PRC the right to represent Taiwan in the UN system. Nevertheless, the United Nations has yielded to China’s political pressure, using the resolution as a pretext to exclude Taiwan from the international community.

In response, Taiwan is speaking out against this injustice and garnering ever-more support. As international backing for Taiwan grows, countries worldwide are increasingly emphasizing the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait at bilateral and multilateral forums such as the Group of Seven (G7) summit. And the executive and legislative branches of numerous nations have publicly clarified that UNGA Resolution 2758 neither determines Taiwan’s status nor precludes its participation in the international organizations, including the UN system.

As the United Nations celebrates its 80th anniversary—and with only five years remaining to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—it is time for it to fulfill its vision of “leaving no one behind” and becoming “better together’’ by including Taiwan.

Taiwan invites the world to “chip in” and help by recognizing Taiwan’s rightful place on the world stage and embracing the contributions it has to offer. Only by working together can we create a better and brighter future for the Indo-Pacific region and the world.

Tribute to the Late Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees: A Physicist Who Became a Leader

Staff

September 1, 2025

By Dr. Jamal Ali Hussein

At dawn, on August 24th, 2025, after finishing my morning prayers, I made my way to Boston’s Logan Airport. My destination was Washington, D.C./Virginia, where I would attend the funeral of a man whose name and legacy are etched into the history of Somaliland: Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees. As I traveled, I felt compelled to reflect, to put into words the profound impact this remarkable man had on his people, his nation, and on me personally.

Imagine a nation emerging from the ashes of war—a land stripped bare, with no functioning institutions, no electricity, no running water, no schools, no hospitals. Only ruins, despair, and fractured communities. That was Somaliland in the early 1990s, after the collapse of Somalia’s central government and the declaration of Somaliland’s independence. Rebuilding such a devastated land required vision, resilience, and leaders of rare caliber. Among those who stepped forward, few embodied the spirit of selflessness, intellect, and commitment more fully than Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees.

For more than two decades, Professor Gees gave his life’s work to Somaliland. He was a peacebuilder in the troubled Sanaag region, a mediator who helped heal wounds between clans, and later a statesman who served with distinction in the government of President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. In his hands, some of the nation’s most sensitive portfolios—Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Planning—were not just ministerial titles, but instruments for laying the foundations of a functioning state. His fingerprints remain on many of the critical decisions that gave Somaliland stability and legitimacy in its formative years.

After his years in government, Professor Gees continued his service as the Executive Director of the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) from 2004. Succeeding the work of Dr. Hussein Abdillahi Bulhan (the founder), he expanded the Academy’s role as a center for dialogue, research, and reconciliation. In doing so, he helped institutionalize peacebuilding as a permanent feature of Somaliland’s governance. What others saw as an experiment, he transformed into a living case study of how nations can rise from ruins when wisdom and integrity lead the way.

Yet to reduce Professor Gees’s contributions merely to offices he held would be to miss the essence of the man. Trained as a physicist, he carried into politics the discipline, clarity, and rigor of scientific thought. Physics, as he often reminded his colleagues, teaches one to think methodically, to respect evidence, to see patterns in chaos. He brought that same discipline into governance—approaching challenges not with arrogance, but with humility and reason. His leadership was not loud or domineering; it was persuasive, thoughtful, and deeply human.

Those who worked alongside him often spoke of his respect for every individual, no matter their rank or role. He was, in the truest sense, an intellectual—one who valued knowledge not for personal prestige, but for the collective good.

On a personal note, I was fortunate to grow close to him in the last five years of his life, particularly during my time in Washington, D.C. and Virginia. He welcomed me with warmth and generosity, and when I interviewed him for my doctoral research on peacebuilding and state-building in Somaliland, he shared not just history, but wisdom. His stories, insights, and reflections enriched my understanding of my country and its journey—and revealed the depth of his character as a humble, selfless servant of the people.

Professor Mohamed Saeed Gees was many things: a physicist, a professor, a merchant, a minister, a peacemaker, a state-builder, and above all, a noble human being. He proved that serving in office is temporary, but leaving an impact on people—that is eternal.

May Allah bless his soul, forgive his shortcomings, and grant him the highest place in paradise. Somaliland has lost a guiding light, but his legacy will continue to inspire generations to come.

Somaliland Must Reclaim Its Sovereignty by Expelling Turkey

Staff

August 19, 2025

The time has come for the Republic of Somaliland to reassess and decisively terminate the presence of Turkey in Hargeisa. The continuation of Turkish representation within our capital is a glaring diplomatic anomaly that not only undermines our sovereignty but also enables a hostile power to operate against our national interests from within our own territory.

Diplomacy is built on reciprocity, respect, and the recognition of mutual interests. Yet in Somaliland, Turkey has been allowed to maintain a diplomatic mission that violates these fundamental principles. The time has come for Somaliland to end this dangerous anomaly.

Turkey has positioned itself in open opposition to Somaliland’s independence and sovereignty. It has been a staunch supporter of the temporary and externally sustained administration in Mogadishu, aligning with China to use Somalia as a platform for its own geopolitical ambitions in the Horn of Africa. This policy directly challenges Somaliland’s right to self-determination and recognition under international law.

At the core of diplomatic relations lies the principle of reciprocity. Where one state establishes a mission, the other is expected to enjoy the same rights and presence. Yet Turkey maintains a fully operational diplomatic mission in Hargeisa, complete with the Turkish flag raised over its compound and the protection of Somaliland’s special diplomatic police, while Somaliland has no reciprocal representation in Ankara.

This one-sided arrangement is not merely unbalanced. It is a staggering violation of diplomatic norms. Nowhere else in the world would such asymmetry be tolerated. The absence of reciprocity underscores the contemptuous approach that Turkey adopts toward Somaliland, which is nothing short of open hostility disguised as diplomacy.

Turkey’s presence in Hargeisa is not benign. Its diplomatic footprint in Hargeisa is not genuine state-to-state relations but a platform for subversive activity. Their mission is primarily engaged in espionage, interference in domestic political affairs, and coercive measures that weaken Somaliland’s international standing. Far from respecting the norms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Turkey’s conduct represents a deliberate abuse of diplomatic privileges to undermine Somaliland’s very existence as a sovereign state.

It is impossible to point to a single advantage Somaliland derives from Turkey’s presence. Instead, the costs are heavy and ongoing. Somaliland citizens encounter immense difficulties in securing Turkish visas, particularly for those seeking medical treatment in Turkey. The supposed humanitarian dimension of Turkish engagement is revealed to be hollow when citizens are treated with such bureaucratic hostility and obstruction.

The citizens of Somaliland are justifiably angered by Turkey’s persistent interference in our internal affairs. Their sentiment is not marginal but overwhelming. The expulsion of Turkey would therefore not only reflect the will of the people but also send an unmistakable signal to the international community that Somaliland is fully capable of exercising its sovereign prerogatives. Such an act would demonstrate resolve, dignity, and the ability to uphold the standards of statecraft expected of any responsible member of the international order.

Expelling Turkey is not a rash or reactionary act but a measured step rooted in sound legal and diplomatic reasoning. Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations explicitly allows the declaration of foreign diplomats as persona non grata if their presence is inconsistent with the interests of the host state. Turkey’s activities in Hargeisa have long surpassed that threshold.

Furthermore, in international practice, no country is expected to tolerate within its borders a mission that openly undermines its sovereignty. The current arrangement is not merely disadvantageous. It is dangerous, for it allows a foreign power opposed to Somaliland’s independence to collect intelligence, exert pressure, and reinforce narratives that deny our right to recognition.

The Republic of Somaliland has nothing to gain and everything to lose from the continuation of the Turkish presence in Hargeisa. By maintaining a one-sided, hostile mission, Turkey violates the principles of reciprocity, exploits our openness, and works actively against our statehood. Their expulsion would bring an end to this abnormal situation and affirm Somaliland’s dignity as a sovereign state.

Such a step would be universally welcomed by the public, respected by international observers, and would underscore Somaliland’s determination to uphold international norms in the face of persistent external hostility. It would demonstrate that Somaliland is not merely capable of governing itself but also capable of conducting diplomacy in a manner consistent with sovereignty, reciprocity, and the universally accepted standards of international relations.

China’s Wolf Diplomacy and Proxy Tactics Prove Senator Cruz’s Point, Bolstering Case for Somaliland Recognition

Staff

August 16, 2025

The People’s Republic of China seems determined to prove Senator Ted Cruz right. After the Chinese Embassy in Somalia unleashed a torrent of angry statements over Cruz’s call to recognize Somaliland, the Texas Republican fired back with typical bluntness: “The fact that the CCP is this upset is even further reason that the Administration should recognize Somaliland.“

That response has turned what was already a diplomatic mess into something much bigger—a window into China’s broader campaign of arm-twisting and what mounting evidence shows is outright proxy warfare in the Horn of Africa. Beijing’s furious overreaction hasn’t intimidated anyone. Instead, it’s made Cruz’s argument for him while the clock ticks on China’s escalating campaign of destabilization.

Wolf Diplomacy Backfires

Cruz wrote to President Trump on August 14, urging recognition of Somaliland “as an independent state, with sovereignty within its 1960 borders.” The Chinese response was predictably hysterical. Their embassy in Somalia cranked out statement after statement, calling Cruz’s letter a “baseless attack” and “serious interference.” They even branded Taiwan’s office in Hargeisa an “illegal” presence.

This is classic Wolf Diplomacy—Beijing’s preferred method of diplomatic intimidation through aggressive rhetoric and barely concealed threats. But Cruz’s comeback has reframed the entire episode. China’s meltdown isn’t just diplomatic protest anymore. It’s proof of how much they fear losing control in this critical region.

Blood Money and Proxy Violence

The pressure campaign goes well beyond angry press releases. Cruz’s letter documented China’s “economic and diplomatic coercion” designed to punish Somaliland for maintaining ties with Taiwan. In April, Beijing got Somalia to ban Taiwanese passport holders from even transiting through to Somaliland—collective punishment disguised as immigration policy.

But the real story is much darker. As this publication reported just weeks ago, “the Chinese embassy in Somalia has chosen to directly fund and support these militias in the far east of Somaliland” with weapons and ammunition to foment violence. The bloody conflict in Las Anod isn’t some organic tribal dispute—it’s a Chinese-funded proxy war designed to punish Somaliland for its Taiwan ties and prevent any American military presence.

China’s plan “is to outmaneuver the United States and force them to have no strategic maneuverability in the red sea to counteract the Houthis and to further destabilize the world’s busiest shipping route.” This isn’t just about Taiwan anymore. It’s about control of global shipping lanes and America’s ability to project power in one of the world’s most critical waterways.

The timing couldn’t be worse. While American policymakers debate and deliberate, Chinese weapons are flowing to militants in eastern Somaliland right now. Every day of delay gives Beijing more time to consolidate its proxy forces and create facts on the ground that will be harder to reverse.

Strategic Nightmare for Beijing

China’s panic makes perfect sense when you map out their “String of Pearls” strategy across the Indian Ocean. They’ve spent years building this network of ports and bases to control critical shipping lanes. The jewel of the whole operation sits in Djibouti—a massive naval base that gives them dominant influence over the approaches to the Red Sea.

Somaliland sits right across the water from that base. As Cruz noted in his letter, Somaliland occupies prime real estate “along the Gulf of Aden, putting it near one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors.” Even better from an American perspective, Somaliland “has proposed hosting a U.S. military presence near the Red Sea.”

For China, this represents their worst-case scenario. A sovereign, U.S.-aligned Somaliland hosting American forces would put a competitor right at the chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Their carefully constructed String of Pearls would have a major weak link, and Chinese naval dominance in the region would be broken.

No wonder they’re throwing a diplomatic tantrum while simultaneously funding militias to prevent that outcome.

Somalia Joins the Pressure Campaign

Somalia’s government has now joined China’s pressure campaign with equally desperate tactics. In an August 14 letter to the Trump administration, Somalia’s Embassy in Washington attempted to hold U.S. counterterrorism efforts hostage, claiming that recognizing Somaliland “would only embolden extremists and threaten the stability of the entire Horn of Africa.”

The argument is absurd on its face. Somalia is essentially claiming that recognizing the most stable, democratic territory in the Horn of Africa would somehow benefit Al-Shabaab terrorists. This from a government that loses territory to Al-Shabaab on a near-daily basis while Somaliland has been successfully fighting both Al-Shabaab and ISIS for years with minimal international support.

The timing reveals the coordination. While China deploys Wolf Diplomacy and funds proxy militias, Somalia resorts to terrorism scaremongering—the one argument Mogadishu’s handlers believe might work with American policymakers. The message is clear: stick with the failed state that’s actively hemorrhaging ground to extremists rather than recognize the functioning democracy that’s actually containing them.

Somalia’s letter boasts of “more than twenty successful joint strikes conducted in 2025 alone” against terrorists, inadvertently highlighting the problem. After decades of international support and military intervention, Somalia still needs constant American airstrikes just to slow its territorial losses to Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, Somaliland has maintained stability and expanded its control without requiring U.S. military intervention at all.

The Iranian Connection

The proxy warfare gets even more complex. China’s destabilization plan “takes help from their major ally Iran’s and its proxy the Houthi terrorist Organization as well as Somalia and its northern region of Puntland.” This isn’t just China versus Taiwan—it’s part of a broader axis of authoritarian powers working to strangle maritime trade and limit American influence.

The Houthis have already shown they can disrupt Red Sea shipping with relatively crude weapons. Imagine what they could accomplish with Chinese-backed militias controlling territory on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb strait. The global economy runs through that chokepoint, and China is systematically working to control it.

Standing Firm Against Intimidation

Somaliland and Taiwan haven’t blinked despite the escalating pressure. The Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan reaffirmed their nation’s “inalienable right to self-determination.” Taiwan’s office in Hargeisa was equally defiant, rejecting China’s “false claims of territorial sovereignty” and declaring that “Neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other.”

These responses highlight something important: China’s Wolf Diplomacy doesn’t work when countries refuse to be intimidated. But defiance alone won’t stop Chinese weapons from flowing to proxy militias. That requires American action.

China Plays Itself

Beijing’s ham-fisted response has accomplished exactly what Cruz hoped for. Instead of keeping Somaliland recognition as a quiet policy discussion, China’s diplomatic temper tantrum has made it front-page news. International attention is now focused not just on Somaliland’s strategic value, but on China’s destabilizing behavior in the region.

The Chinese Embassy’s angry statements weren’t intimidation—they were confirmation. They confirmed that China sees Somaliland as a threat to their regional ambitions. They confirmed that Beijing will use economic pressure and proxy violence to get their way. And they confirmed that Cruz’s recommendation deserves serious consideration from the Trump administration.

Recent developments suggest the window for diplomatic solutions may be narrowing. As militia activity continues in eastern Somaliland and Chinese influence expands through proxy relationships, the strategic calculus becomes more complex for U.S. policymakers.

In trying to kill the idea of Somaliland recognition, China’s Wolf Diplomacy has instead made the strongest possible case for it.

BREAKING: Senate Heavyweight Cruz Throws Full Weight Behind Somaliland Recognition

Staff

August 14, 2025

United States Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) has formally urged President Donald Trump to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, placing Africa’s best-kept secret firmly at the center of U.S. foreign policy debate.

In a letter delivered to the White House today, Cruz called on Trump to “formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, with sovereignty within its 1960 borders,” framing the move as a strategic necessity for America’s national security interests.

While Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch has long championed Somaliland’s cause, Cruz’s decision to formalize his appeal directly to the president signals that Washington’s engagement with Somaliland is moving from quiet committee discussions to high-level executive action.

Strategic Partnership Demands Recognition

“The U.S.–Somaliland partnership is robust, and it is deepening,” Cruz wrote. “To do so to the greatest effect and the greatest benefit to American national security interests, it requires the status of a state.”

The Texas senator laid out Somaliland’s compelling strategic value proposition:

Cruz praised Somaliland’s remarkable democratic record since reclaiming independence in 1991, highlighting the territory’s consistent track record of peaceful elections, stable governance, and strong voter participation that stands out in a region often marked by conflict and instability. The senator emphasized how Somaliland has managed to build and maintain democratic institutions over more than three decades of effective self-rule.

The territory’s strategic location proved central to Cruz’s argument, with Somaliland commanding a crucial position on the Gulf of Aden that controls access to one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors. This geographic advantage places Somaliland at the heart of global shipping lanes that are vital to international commerce and American economic interests.

On security matters, Cruz noted Somaliland’s active contribution to regional stability through counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations conducted by its capable armed forces. These security partnerships have already proven valuable to U.S. interests in maintaining stability across the Horn of Africa and protecting critical shipping routes from both terrorist threats and maritime piracy.

The senator also highlighted Somaliland’s diplomatic alignment with American interests, particularly its bold decision to host Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa despite Chinese pressure. Cruz noted Somaliland’s support for the Abraham Accords and its efforts to strengthen ties with Israel, positioning the territory as a regional partner that shares American values and strategic objectives.

Finally, Cruz emphasized Somaliland’s openness to deeper military cooperation, including its willingness to host U.S. military assets near the Red Sea and pursue critical minerals agreements that would strengthen American supply chains. These proposals represent exactly the kind of strategic partnerships that Cruz argues require formal state-to-state diplomatic relations to fully realize.

China’s Coercion Campaign Exposed

Cruz didn’t pull punches in calling out Beijing’s pressure campaign against Somaliland. The senator warned that the territory faces mounting pressure from the Chinese Communist Party specifically for its partnership with Taiwan.

He cited China’s role in orchestrating Somalia’s April 2025 decision to block Taiwanese passport holders from entering Somaliland, calling it part of a broader campaign to undermine Hargeisa’s sovereignty. The letter warns that Chinese support to Somalia is directly benefiting anti-Somaliland groups working to erode the territory’s independence.

Perfect Timing Ahead of Presidential Summit

Cruz’s bombshell letter comes just days before Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Irro” arrives in Washington for historic meetings with senior U.S. officials. Talks are expected to focus on security cooperation at Berbera Port, potential U.S. access to Red Sea logistics hubs, and agreements on critical minerals — exactly the kind of discussions that could accelerate a shift toward formal diplomatic ties.

The timing creates a perfect storm of political momentum, with Cruz’s formal appeal providing crucial Senate backing just as President Irro sits down with administration officials.

Immediate Hargeisa Reaction

Somaliland’s Representative to the United States has thanked Senator Cruz for his intervention, writing on X:

“Thank you @SenTedCruz for your endorsement of U.S. recognition of our Somaliland, and your outreach on behalf of our noble cause to @realDonaldTrump. Tomorrow morning, Somaliland will wake up to learn that you have stood up to be counted as our ally. It will not be forgotten. Somaliland and the U.S. have so much to gain from a closer partnership, and we are privileged to have such friends in Congress at this critical time.”

Congressional Momentum Accelerating

Earlier this summer, the House Appropriations Committee broke precedent by directing the Secretary of State to submit a report within 120 days on expanding security, trade, and diplomatic engagement with Somaliland. The directive marked the first time the territory has been specifically named in official U.S. budgetary language.

Combined with Risch’s long-standing advocacy and now Cruz’s formal presidential appeal, the Senate’s foreign policy leadership has achieved remarkable alignment on the recognition issue — an alignment that could prove decisive in shifting administration policy.

From Africa’s Best-Kept Secret to Open Washington Debate

For more than three decades, Somaliland has been a stable, self-governing democracy in a volatile region, yet largely overlooked in U.S. Africa policy. Cruz’s letter, coupled with bipartisan Congressional interest and an imminent presidential visit, suggests that recognition has moved from distant possibility to active agenda item.

“I urge you to grant it that recognition,” Cruz concluded his letter with characteristic directness.

The convergence of high-profile Senate advocacy, formal Congressional directives, and President Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro”‘s upcoming Washington visit creates the most significant moment yet in Somaliland’s long quest for U.S. recognition.

What was once Africa’s best-kept secret is now a visible factor in U.S. strategic calculations — and in Washington, the question increasingly appears to be not if recognition will come, but when.

The Recognition Equation

With Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership unified, Congressional budget language mandating deeper engagement, and a presidential visit focused on the very partnerships Cruz argues require state-to-state relations, all the pieces are aligning for a potential breakthrough.

For Somalilanders who have waited 34 years for this moment, Cruz’s formal letter represents Washington finally taking notice of their democratic success story and strategic value in an increasingly competitive Horn of Africa.

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