Somaliland, a self-declared but unrecognized state in the Horn of Africa, stands at a critical juncture. For three decades, it has defied the odds, building a stable, democratic society from the ashes of Somalia’s civil war. Yet, its economy remains fragile, largely dependent on livestock exports and remittances. However, beneath its sun-scorched earth lies a hidden treasure: a vast and diverse reserve of mineral resources, including high-value gemstones, precious metals, and strategic industrial minerals. The discovery and potential exploitation of this mineral wealth present Somaliland with a profound question: can it be a catalyst for sustained prosperity, or will it, like so many other resource-rich nations, fall prey to the “resource curse” and descend into conflict?
The Promise of Mineral Wealth for Prosperity
The promise is undeniable. Somaliland’s geological makeup, part of the highly productive Mozambique orogenic belt, suggests deposits of gold, platinum, tin, iron ore, and a dazzling array of gemstones such as emeralds, rubies, and sapphires. If responsibly managed, these resources could be a game-changer. Revenue from mining could fund essential infrastructure projects, from roads and schools to hospitals and energy grids. It could diversify the economy, create jobs, and lift thousands out of poverty. For a state yearning for international recognition, a thriving mining sector could also be a powerful diplomatic tool, attracting foreign investment and forging strategic partnerships that bolster its case for statehood. The recent expansion of the Berbera port, a key trade gateway for landlocked Ethiopia, demonstrates Somaliland’s strategic importance and its potential to become a regional economic hub.
However, the path from resource potential to national prosperity is fraught with peril. The history of natural resource extraction in the Horn of Africa and across the continent offers a sobering cautionary tale. The “resource curse” is a well-documented phenomenon where countries rich in natural resources experience lower economic growth, weak governance, and increased conflict. In Somaliland’s case, the risk factors are real and must be addressed head-on.
First and foremost is the challenge of governance. While Somaliland has a nascent legal framework, including the 2019 Mining Act, the capacity for effective oversight, regulation, and enforcement remains a concern. Weak institutions can lead to poor royalty collection systems, a lack of transparency, and the potential for corruption. The absence of a robust regulatory environment could allow foreign companies to exploit resources with little benefit to the local population and with devastating environmental consequences.
Secondly, the mineral wealth could exacerbate existing social and political tensions. The Horn of Africa is a region where borders are often ill-defined and natural resources have been a historical source of conflict. The competition for land and resources in Somaliland, particularly in border regions, could ignite disputes between clans and communities as recently happened in Mountains of Sanaag Region and Agabar area in Marodijeex Region which claims s. The presence of valuable minerals could also attract illicit artisanal mining, which is often unregulated and associated with environmental degradation, child labor, and social instability. Without clear and inclusive benefit-sharing mechanisms that ensure local communities receive a fair share of the profits, the potential for resentment and conflict is high.
Finally, Somaliland’s unrecognized status poses a unique set of challenges. Its diplomatic isolation limits its access to large-scale foreign investment and formal bilateral agreements, pushing it toward smaller, less transparent deals. While some see resource-based diplomacy as a path to recognition, it also creates a vulnerability to exploitation by powerful foreign actors seeking to secure resources without the encumbrance of international standards or scrutiny.
Historical and Regional Lessons
Somaliland can learn from other African nations where mineral wealth led to conflict (e.g., Sierra Leone’s blood diamonds, Niger Delta oil conflicts) or prosperity (e.g., Botswana’s diamond management). Key lessons include:
Transparent Revenue Management: Ensuring mining profits benefit the public through accountable institutions.
Community Involvement: Engaging local leaders and clans in decision-making to prevent disputes.
Conflict-Sensitive Policies: Implementing regulations that mitigate environmental and social risks.
Conclusion
Somaliland stands at a crossroads: its mineral wealth could either propel economic growth and political stability or deepen existing fractures. The difference lies in governance.
For Somaliland to turn its hidden treasure into a source of enduring prosperity, it must act with foresight and integrity. It needs to strengthen its legal and institutional frameworks to ensure transparency and accountability. It must develop a clear and equitable strategy for distributing wealth to its citizens, ensuring that mineral revenues benefit all regions and communities, not just a privileged few. This requires investing in geological surveys, building local capacity in the mining sector, and aligning with international initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Most importantly, Somaliland must foster a national dialogue that empowers its people and local communities to be active participants in the decision-making process, rather than passive recipients of a resource boom. Without these measures, Somaliland risks falling into the “resource curse” trap, where natural riches lead not to wealth, but to war. The choice is clear: Somaliland can either learn from the mistakes of others and build a sustainable and inclusive future, or it can risk having its hidden treasure become a source of division and instability. The stakes could not be higher.
About the Author
Abdillahi Mohamed Bile is a Security and Political analyst with a background in Security, Peace, Conflict, International Law and Diplomacy. A member of the Guul-Arag Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (GIPOSS). He focuses on Security, post-conflict governance, and political analysis of the Horn of Africa region and beyond.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Investment Ministry hosts Turkish firm fresh from sexual harassment scandal and UN condemnation
KEY POINTS
Somaliland’s government has held investment talks with Favori Airports, the same Turkish firm that operates the international airport in Mogadishu, a move critics argue undermines the nation’s sovereignty.
An investigation into public records reveals Favori was not legally authorized to manage airports when it signed its Mogadishu contract in 2013, amending its corporate charter only after the deal was secured.
A 2016 UN Security Council report described the company’s contract as a “technically poor deal” and a “case of potential abuse,” citing systematic financial manipulation.
The company is implicated in a 2023 scandal where a senior executive, arrested in Mogadishu for sexual harassment, was released following reported political intervention and a payoff to the victim’s family.
Favori is managed by the Kozuva family, known for its deep ties to Turkey’s ruling AKP party and President Erdoğan, whose government actively opposes Somaliland’s independence.
HARGEISA, SOMALILAND – Investment and Industry Minister Saeed Mohamed Burale rolled out the red carpet this week for executives from Turkish aviation company Favori Airports, welcoming them into government offices to discuss potential investment in Somaliland’s aviation infrastructure.
The warm reception comes despite Favori’s toxic reputation as the company behind Somalia’s airport operations, the very Favori that manages the Mogadishu Aden Ade Airport, where it stands accused of systematic corruption, labor exploitation, and covering up sexual crimes. The same firm that UN investigators condemned as running “a case of potential abuse” now sits across from Somaliland ministers discussing deals.
A Somaliland Chronicle investigation reveals the breathtaking scope of allegations against this company—from UN-documented financial theft to recent sexual harassment scandals hushed up with cash payments. The findings raise uncomfortable questions: Did anyone in government bother to Google these people before inviting them in?
THE FRAUDULENT FOUNDATION
Favori Airports didn’t earn its way into airport management—it simply declared itself qualified after the fact. The company, controlled by four brothers from the Kozuva family, had zero aviation experience when it somehow secured Somalia’s most strategic asset in 2013.
Turkish trade registry records expose the scam: the company wasn’t legally authorized to manage airports when it signed the contract in January 2013. No problem—they simply held a board meeting the next day to add “airport management” to their business activities. Corporate fraud masquerading as legitimate business.
The original company, established in 2005, focused on construction materials sales with initial capital of approximately $300,000 before expanding into airport operations.
WHEN THE UN CALLS YOU CRIMINALS
International investigators weren’t fooled by the corporate theater. A 2016 UN Monitoring Group report delivered a scathing verdict: Favori’s contract was “a technically poor deal for the FGS [federal government of Somalia] and a case of potential abuse by a private entity.”
The UN documented how Favori games the system, collecting 100% of airport revenues before inventing creative “expenses” to minimize government payments. Their favorite trick? A monthly $300,000 “depreciation deduction” that was never agreed upon—essentially stealing money through accounting manipulation.
In one example cited by the UN, Favori reported total revenue of $1.2 million for June 2016, with expenses of just over $600,000, including $300,000 in depreciation deductions, resulting in only $250,000 transferred to the government.
ONGOING FINANCIAL DISPUTES
Financial transparency remains a contentious issue. In August 2024, Somalia’s Auditor General Ahmed Issa Gutale publicly stated that Favori has failed to submit required financial reports following independent audits, making it impossible for the government to verify its share of airport revenues.
The revenue transferred to Somalia’s government during the 2022 financial year totaled $3.1 million, significantly below projections made by government financial advisors. A separate dispute has emerged over navigation fees, with the Somali Civil Aviation Authority claiming collection rights that Favori contests.
THE CASH-FOR-SILENCE SCANDAL
Fast-forward to 2024, and Favori’s ethical bankruptcy reached new depths. The company’s human resources manager, Ertuğrul Karaferiyeli, was arrested in Mogadishu on September 17 on serious charges: sexual harassment, threats, abuse of power, and labor law violations against Somali employees.
But money talks, and Turkish political muscle flexes harder. After frantic communications between Ankara and Mogadishu, Karaferiyeli walked free on October 2. The price of justice? A $20,000 payoff to silence the victim’s family. Criminal charges dropped, case closed, Turkish executive safely home.
EXPLOITING THE WORKFORCE
The Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU) has documented systematic labor abuse that reads like a colonial-era exploitation manual. Workers endure grueling 11-hour shifts from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. without overtime pay, are denied mandatory weekly rest days, and face arbitrary dismissals that ignore legal procedures. When injuries occur, workers discover there are no adequate medical facilities—they’re on their own.
Most damning is Favori’s racial pay hierarchy: identical work pays differently based on your passport. Somali workers earn significantly less than their Kenyan and Turkish counterparts for the same jobs, while union organizing is crushed through intimidation and termination threats. All this for wages of $200-300 per month that union representatives call starvation pay given Somalia’s cost of living. It’s systematic exploitation dressed up as employment.
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
The Kozuva family has maintained close relationships with Turkish political leadership. Nordic Monitor reporting indicates that Süleyman Kozuva has been frequently photographed alongside Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and ran for mayor of Çerkezköy under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2019.
President Erdoğan personally attended the airport’s partial reopening ceremony in Mogadishu in 2015. The same group was subsequently awarded a 25-year contract to operate Turkey’s Çukurova Airport in Adana in 2020.
THE RECKONING
So here we stand: Somaliland’s Investment Ministry opens its doors to a company that the United Nations condemned as abusive, whose executive just bought his way out of sexual harassment charges, and whose business model is systematic theft disguised as airport management.
Either Minister Buraale’s office conducted zero due diligence before this meeting—a dereliction of duty that borders on malpractice—or they knew exactly who they were welcoming and proceeded anyway. Both explanations are damning.
REGIONAL CONTEXT
Turkey maintains substantial political and military support for Somalia’s federal government, which continues to claim sovereignty over Somaliland territory. Turkish companies have become major economic players in Somalia across multiple sectors, often with direct government backing from Ankara.
The timing of discussions with a Turkish company managing Somalia’s primary airport has drawn attention from observers of regional diplomatic dynamics, particularly given ongoing tensions over Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition.
Attempt to get clarification from Ministry of Investment on the level of due diligence they have performed on Favori Airports or the extend of the discussions were unsuccessful.
HARGEISA – A clumsy attempt at state-sponsored disinformation has forced President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi “Cirro” into a humiliating public retreat, compelling Somaliland’s telecommunication oligarchy to suspend a coordinated price hike. The scandal, which saw the Ministry of Interior fabricate evidence to crush dissent, has exposed the rot of institutional capture and the government’s readiness to protect corporate interests over the constitutional rights of its citizens.
The crisis began when Somaliland’s three telecommunications giants—Telesom, SOMTEL, and Soltelco—executed a synchronized price increase for internet and mobile services on August 9th. The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology immediately endorsed the coordinated hikes in a statement citing the need for “quality services,” effectively rubber-stamping what consumers saw as corporate price-gouging.
When citizen Guleid Ahmed Jama (Guleid Dafac) filed a formal request with the Ministry of Interior to organize a peaceful demonstration against the price hikes on August 10th, the ministry responded with an outright lie, claiming no such request had been received. To compound the deception, the ministry simultaneously circulated an image of Dafac’s actual letter stamped with “FAKE” in red letters, contradicting their claim that no request existed.
The contradictory statements quickly spread on social media, generating widespread criticism of the ministry’s fabrication and raising fundamental questions about the government’s relationship with the telecommunications oligarchy.
Presidential Damage Control
Following mounting public pressure and exposure of the ministry’s lies, President Cirro met with executives from the three telecommunications companies and announced that the price increases would be suspended indefinitely.
“The president listened to the concerns of the people,” said a government spokesperson. The spokesperson tellingly declined to address questions about the ministry’s fabrication, an indefensible action for which the administration has yet to offer any explanation or accountability measures.
The reversal represents a significant retreat for both the companies and the government ministries that initially supported the price increases. Industry observers note that coordinated pricing moves by the three dominant firms are unprecedented and suggest extensive advance planning and government coordination.
The Oligarchy’s Corporate Web
The government’s initial willingness to back the price hikes and suppress protest does not exist in a vacuum. It is undergirded by a deep, systemic network of financial and personnel connections that blurs the line between regulator and regulated.
The three companies involved in the price coordination are subsidiaries of some of Somaliland’s largest business groups. SOMTEL is wholly owned by Dahabshiil Group, while Telesom operates under the Hormuud Group umbrella. Both parent companies have extensive holdings in banking, money transfer, and real estate sectors, electricity, transportation, forming a business oligarchy that touches virtually every aspect of Somaliland’s economy.
Dahabshiil Group’s 2021 initial public offering of SOMTEL shares drew scrutiny for charging investors a predatory 20% “service fee” and failing to provide basic financial information typically required for public stock offerings, according to previous Somaliland Chronicle reporting. The company refused to provide standard disclosure information such as company valuation, earnings data, or the total number of shares being offered to the public—practices that would constitute fraud in regulated markets.
The telecommunications sector operates with minimal regulatory oversight in Somaliland, with companies able to coordinate pricing and business practices with limited government interference. Industry analysts say the lack of independent regulatory authority makes consumer protection virtually impossible when the supposed regulators are captured by the regulated.
The Revolving Door System
A review of current government appointments reveals the systematic colonization of state institutions by the telecommunications oligarchy through strategic personnel placement.
The current Minister of Presidency previously worked for Telesom. The Head of Somaliland’s Intelligence agency is a former Dahabshiil employee. The Minister of Aviation built his career at SOMTEL, Dahabshiil’s telecommunications subsidiary. The Chairman of the ruling Waddani party also previously worked for Dahabshiil Group.
This pattern extends across multiple previous administrations, with former employees of both Dahabshiil and Telesom holding senior government positions across sectors including finance, telecommunications policy, and regulatory oversight. The result is a government where key decision-makers are often ruling on matters affecting their former employers, current business partners, and potential future employers.
Government officials contacted for this story did not respond to questions about potential conflicts of interest, recusal policies for former corporate employees, or whether current appointees maintain financial relationships with their previous employers.
Financial Capture: The State as a Hostage to Its Creditors
The final and perhaps most insidious mechanism of state capture is financial: the Somaliland government is deeply indebted to the very corporate oligarchs it is constitutionally mandated to regulate.
According to financial industry sources, these telecommunication companies and their parent groups function as a de facto lender of last resort for a government that is perpetually cash-strapped. This creditor relationship is not merely a conflict of interest; it is the primary instrument of corporate leverage over state policy. Any genuine attempt at robust regulation—be it enforcing fair competition, imposing penalties, or blocking collusive price hikes—carries the implicit threat of corporate retaliation.
The government is perpetually faced with the risk that its largest creditors could suspend credit lines or deny future financing, a move that could trigger a fiscal crisis. This dynamic transforms the state from a sovereign regulator into a hostage, forced to prioritize the financial demands of its creditors over the economic welfare of its citizens.
When combined with the systemic revolving door of personnel detailed previously, this financial dependency completes a perfect, unbreakable circle of capture. The government is staffed by former employees of the oligarchy and financed by the oligarchy itself. In such a system, independent oversight is not just difficult; it is a structural impossibility, and accountability is a concept with no practical meaning.
Parliamentary and Media Silence
Despite the significant constitutional issues raised by the Ministry of Interior’s fabrication of evidence against a citizen exercising protest rights, Parliament has not announced any investigations or hearings into the matter. Opposition MPs who frequently criticize government actions have issued no statements about the ministry’s lies regarding fundamental constitutional rights.
Major media outlets have provided limited coverage of the fabrication allegations, focusing primarily on the price hike suspension rather than the government’s systematic attempt to criminalize lawful dissent. Several journalists contacted for this story declined to comment on their outlets’ coverage decisions, suggesting the oligarchy’s influence extends deep into media institutions as well.
Analysis: The Hypocrisy of Power
The episode reveals more than just tensions within Somaliland’s governance system—it exposes the complete betrayal of democratic principles by leaders who built their careers defending those same principles.
President Cirro inherited a system where personnel exchanges between major corporations and government have been routine for decades. However, for an administration led by a party that masterfully utilized public protest during its long years in opposition, the turn towards suppressing those same rights represents a particularly stark betrayal of political principle.
Cirro and his Waddani party spent years positioning themselves as champions of constitutional rights, organizing demonstrations and challenging government overreach. They built their political identity on the sacred right of citizens to peaceful assembly and dissent. Now in power, their administration deployed fabricated evidence and threatened state violence to deny citizens the very rights they once claimed as sacrosanct.
The public’s ability to expose the ministry’s lies through social media demonstrates how information technology can serve as a check on government power, even as telecommunications companies seek to increase costs for these same services. The irony is perfect: citizens used the very services the oligarchy wanted to make more expensive to expose the government lies designed to protect that price increase.
The reversal of price hikes shows that public pressure can still influence government decisions, but it also raises fundamental questions about why such pressure was necessary to address what should have been prevented by existing regulatory mechanisms—if those mechanisms weren’t captured by the companies they’re supposed to regulate.
The Broader Implications
This scandal illuminates the reality of governance in Somaliland: a system where a small group of interconnected business families exercise effective control over state institutions through financial dependency, personnel placement, and systematic regulatory capture.
The telecommunications episode is likely just the visible tip of a much larger iceberg. If government ministries will fabricate evidence to protect telecom price hikes, what other corporate interests are they willing to defend through deception and state power?
For President Cirro, the episode presents both a political opportunity and a test of character. Public support for his intervention in the price hike dispute could provide political capital to address the broader structural issues that made the scandal possible. The question is whether he will use this rare moment of public awakening to tackle the oligarchy system that compromises governance, or whether he will settle for managing individual scandals while leaving the underlying capture intact.
Questions That Demand Answers
The incident leaves several critical issues unresolved that warrant continued investigation:
Will any government officials face consequences for fabricating evidence against a citizen exercising constitutional rights?
Why has Parliament remained silent on such a clear violation of democratic norms?
What other policy decisions have been influenced by the financial relationships between these companies and the government?
How extensive is the oligarchy’s personnel placement across government institutions?
Will President Cirro use his political capital from this episode to address systematic state capture, or will existing patterns of corporate influence remain intact?
The telecommunications companies have not explained their coordination on pricing or addressed questions about their extensive relationships with government officials. Their silence, combined with the government’s fabrication scandal, suggests an oligarchy confident that temporary public pressure will pass while their structural advantages remain untouched.
The broader question for Somaliland is whether democratic institutions can survive when major corporations maintain such extensive financial and personnel control over government agencies. This week’s events suggest the current system may be fundamentally inadequate for that task.
Unless this moment of public awakening translates into systematic reform of the relationships between corporate power and government authority, similar scandals are inevitable. The oligarchy that sought to increase phone bills while criminalizing protest will simply wait for public attention to move elsewhere, then continue operating as they always have.
On June 20, former President Donald Trump claimed on his social media channel, Truth Social, that the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was “stupidly financed by the United States,” adding that he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize for “keeping the peace between Egypt and Ethiopia.” This remark came during celebrations of the Congo–Rwanda agreement. Then, on July 14, Trump reiterated his stance on the GERD dispute, stating during a White House meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte: “I think if I am Egypt, I want to have water in the Nile, and we are working on that.” He further described the dam as “closing up water going to the Nile,” which Egypt relies on for 97% of its water. Trump added, “I think the United States funded the dam. I do not know why they didn’t solve the problem before they built the dam. But it is nice when the Nile River has water,” and concluded that “closing up water… is pretty incredible. But we think we are going to have that solved very quickly.”
This statement, while controversial, is seen by some in Addis Ababa as a possible opening for engagement with a future Trump administration—contrasting with his 2020 remarks that Egypt might “blow up” the dam. However, Trump’s claim lacks factual basis: GERD was financed domestically by the Ethiopian government, loan from China, and diaspora buying government bonds, amounting to $5 billion. Unless Trump was referring to Ethiopia’s broader development aid—roughly $1.2 billion annually from the U.S as of 2024. —or the indirect effect of World Bank support freeing domestic funds, there is no evidence of direct U.S. financing. In fact, the U.S. withheld $100 million in 2020 to pressure Ethiopia during GERD negotiations. Ethiopia government has yet to respond officially to Trump’s latest comments, though the government is reportedly observing public reaction.
Trump’s renewed focus on the GERD dispute reflects his signature geo-transactional diplomacy—a strategy rooted in deal-making that leverages U.S. influence to extract concessions in exchange for tangible benefits, often backed by implicit pressure. This approach shaped past efforts such as Trump’s recent backchannel deal with Ukraine, where future military aid was reportedly discussed alongside access to critical mineral extraction rights for U.S. companies—blurring the lines between strategic support and commercial gain. Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, Trump-era envoys signaled potential de-escalation with the Houthis in exchange for guarantees of unimpeded maritime navigation, effectively pausing military operations to broker regional security through informal channels. In 2020, the Trump administration proposed a deal requiring Ethiopia to release 37 (billion cubic meter) BCM of water annually during drought years—a plan ultimately rejected by Addis Ababa, citing sovereignty and hydrological uncertainties. But under a second Trump term, this proposal might be revisited through a broader transactional lens: Ethiopia may be pressured to accept the 37 BCM threshold in exchange for U.S. support on Red Sea maritime access. In turn, Egypt might be expected to grant favorable treatment to U.S. military or commercial operations in the Suez Canal. While the approach carries risks inherent to asymmetric negotiation, it also presents a rare opportunity: if successful, a Trump-brokered deal could realign competing national interests into a durable, mutually beneficial settlement—transforming a source of tension into a platform for cooperation.
GERD Energy-Water Trade-off Delima
While Ethiopia’s GERD boasts an installed capacity of 6,000 MW (6 GW), the 2013 International Panel of Experts (IPoE) report clearly cautioned that such levels are not scientifically or hydrologically sustainable under normal or conservative flow conditions. The panel stated that “the full 6,000 MW will not be generated under 90% hydrological reliability” (Section 5.3.4.1, p. 38), and criticized the lack of validated modeling and reliable estimates of annual energy production. With a mean annual flow of around 49 BCM at the GERD site—corresponding to a 50% probability of exceedance in hydrology, meaning there’s an equal chance that yearly flow will be above or below this level—GERD’s power output is subject to natural variability. Unlike most dams, which are designed using a 90% exceedance threshold to ensure reliable generation during dry years, GERD was not. As a result, its 6 GW power target is not sustainable year-round and is likely achievable only during three peak-flow months, with the rest of the year realistically limited to a maximum of 3 GW. In drought years, with flows around 40–42 BCM, generation may drop further to 1.5–2 GW, even without water release obligations.
In 2020, the Trump administration proposed a U.S.-brokered agreement requiring Ethiopia to release 37 BCM annually to Egypt during drought periods. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government rejected the proposal outright, but this decision—framed as a defense of national sovereignty—was more politically motivated than grounded in scientific or hydrological analysis. Ethiopia never publicly disclosed the internal water flow scenarios or power generation models referenced by the IPoE, which criticized the lack of transparency. Had Ethiopia accepted the 37 BCM drought release condition, only a few BCM would remain for power generation during dry years—reducing output to under 1 GW, with dire implications for domestic electrification and export ambitions. The GERD thus embodies a core energy–water trade-off, where Ethiopia’s developmental narrative clashes with the river’s physical constraints and Egypt’s survival-based demands—a dilemma that any future mediation, including a geo-transactional one, must confront.
While Ethiopia’s decision to reject the 2020 U.S.-drafted GERD agreement was prudent—given the lack of clarity about the dam’s actual operational performance post-construction—it is now imperative for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to engage in the current mitigation talks with transparency and good faith. Acknowledging the hydrological constraints highlighted by the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) and other technical studies would not weaken Ethiopia’s position but rather strengthen its credibility.
Such a shift would help de-politicize the negotiation process and pave the way for a science-based solution. By aligning its diplomatic posture with the realistic operational limitations of GERD—particularly the seasonal and probabilistic variability of Nile flows—Ethiopia can create space for a win–win outcome: safeguarding downstream water security while maximizing its own energy and economic interests under a sustainable and cooperative regional framework.
Trump Geo-transactional Approach to GERD
During Trump’s first administration, serious efforts were made to resolve the GERD dispute between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt. However, the 2020 U.S.-drafted GERD deal collapsed due to core disagreements between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt demanded a 10–15-year filling timeline and a guaranteed annual water release of 40–42 BCM, while Ethiopia proposed a shorter 3–4-year fill (later offering five years) with a flexible 31 BCM release. The U.S. compromise suggested a 5–7-year fill and a fixed annual release of 37 BCM, even during drought periods—something Ethiopia rejected, arguing it would limit its power generation capacity and infringe on its sovereignty. Ethiopia also objected to provisions requiring large releases during dry years and strongly opposed being excluded from the final drafting phase, which it viewed as a breach of good-faith negotiations and a process biased in Egypt’s favor.
Fast forward five years: the GERD has been completed after five rounds of filling without major incident and is scheduled for inauguration in September. Meanwhile, Ethiopia has pursued maritime access by signing an MoU with the unrecognized Somaliland government, securing a 50-year lease on a 20 km coastal strip for commercial and naval development, in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The Biden administration opposed the move, citing “national security,” while Egypt and Arab states sided with Somalia in protest. In hindsight, Ethiopia’s decision to reject the original deal may have been prudent—now that the dam is operational, Trump could leverage this new geopolitical landscape to pursue a geo-transactional solution. By linking Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions with water-sharing guarantees for Egypt, Trump could facilitate a win–win compromise that also aligns with broader U.S. interests in the region.
A Trump-style geo-transactional deal might involve granting Ethiopia the green light to fully implement the Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding, including formal recognition of Somaliland. In return, Ethiopia would agree to withdraw from BRICS and restrict access to its new naval installations, ensuring that adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and China are excluded from both access to and the use of such facilities. Meanwhile, Somaliland could permit the establishment of a U.S. military base in Berbera and enter a critical minerals partnership. As recently reported by Bloomberg, such an arrangement would help address U.S. challenges in securing access to critical materials vital for the development of artificial intelligence and semiconductor technologies—resources essential to U.S. national security interests.
This would be consistent with Trump’s precedent of bold diplomatic moves, such as moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Venezuela’s opposition leader as interim president or Trump reversed longstanding U.S. policy in North Africa by declaring American recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. To compensate for Ethiopia’s potential power export losses from meeting Egypt’s 37 BCM water release demand (in line with the original 2020 U.S. proposal), the U.S. could offer expanded AGOA trade benefits, increasing Ethiopia’s exports to the U.S. from $ 267 million to $2 billion annually. Egypt, in turn, could receive enhanced trade agreements and military support, while granting U.S. commercial and naval vessels free passage through the Suez Canal—a transactional deal in true Trump fashion.
However, for this deal to succeed, several contentious issues and housekeeping matters must be resolved among the three parties. Back in 2020, Egypt demanded the principle of “equitable dams,” proposing that the operation of the GERD be coordinated with the High Aswan Dam, due to concerns over its impact on Egypt’s power generation and irrigation as a result of reduced water allocations. This issue was partially addressed under the Declaration of Principles signed in 2015 in Khartoum by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Egypt also proposed a framework for hydrological data sharing and the implementation of a joint monitoring program—both of which were acknowledged in the 2015 agreement. However, Ethiopia rejected these terms on the basis of sovereignty concerns, although the World Bank had offered a neutral plan to facilitate implementation.
In addition, Sudan requested guarantees on the structural integrity and flood management of GERD. With the dam now completed and proven to be stable, incorporating a flood management protocol into the agreement is both feasible and necessary. Operational housekeeping for this deal would require at least six months of verified hydrological data and river flow monitoring. Though some may view the proposal as controversial, it represents a bold and transformative approach—one that could liberate over 120 million Ethiopians from geographic isolation by granting maritime access, while also securing the water rights of more than 100 million Egyptians for generations to come. In a region historically plagued by cycles of drought and instability—where neither globalization nor multilateralism has offered durable solutions—this deal offers a realistic geopolitical reset. It also recalibrates U.S. strategic posture in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, countering the growing influence of China and Russia through economic and security cooperation rooted in the principle of “peace through strength.”
About the Author
Guled Ahmed is an author of Al-Shabaab Mafia Inc.: Uncovering the Hidden Economy of the Wealthiest Global Terrorist in Africa and Affiliate Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., specializing in Horn of Africa geopolitics, terrorist financing, and climate security. His work has been published by major outlets like CNN, The National Interest, and Al Arabiya, and recognized by institutions including Harvard, Georgetown, and Johns Hopkins.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
How Somaliland Can Leverage Public Protests to Strengthen Fair Competition and Inclusive Growth
Introduction
Somaliland’s constitutional commitment to a free-market economy, as enshrined in Article 11, seeks to foster prosperity, equitable wealth distribution, and the attraction of private investment. Yet, recent public protests against coordinated price-fixing by telecom giants Telesom and Somtel have exposed deep-seated gaps in market regulation. These events have opened a rare window for Somaliland to realign its economic policies with its constitutional principles, ensuring that markets function in the public interest without undermining private sector dynamism.
This analysis examines the private sector’s historic role in Somaliland’s post-war recovery alongside its structural challenges, the government’s constrained regulatory capacity, lessons from international experiences where public protests catalyzed reforms, and a roadmap for creating a balanced economic environment that safeguards public welfare while nurturing business growth.
Somaliland’s Private Sector: Engine of Growth and Exclusion
The Post-War Economic Miracle: Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland’s private sector has been the central driver of its remarkable economic revival. Contributing over 90% of GDP and operating largely without foreign aid or direct government intervention, private enterprises have fuelled national resilience. The telecom sector, for instance, has delivered world-class innovations in mobile money services such as Zaad and Edahab platforms, which have achieved global recognition for their penetration in both urban and rural communities. The diaspora has played a pivotal role, with remittances sustaining nearly 40% the households and funding critical gaps in social services like healthcare and education that the state cannot yet provide, according to the World Bank. Additionally, Somaliland’s informal economy rooted in clan-based trust networks has provided reliable access to credit and supply chains, offering a form of social and commercial stability in the absence and fragile of formal systems.
Challenges Threatening Inclusive Growth: Somaliland’s private sector success story is marred by self-inflicted and systemic obstacles that hinder inclusive growth. Monopolistic practices have taken root, with dominant firms in sectors such as telecommunications and trade engaging in anti-competitive practices with impunity. Market leaders routinely coordinate price hikes, engage in predatory pricing, supply chain barriers and other tactics to eliminate competitors, block new entrants and leverage their capital to dominate multiple sectors and in all scale from importer and final retailer, creating an economic oligarchy. This concentration of power is exacerbated by political capture, as corporate actors openly fund electoral campaigns and lobby against regulatory reforms.
Moreover, an entrenched short-term outlook has led to overinvestment in import-based trade monopolies rather than value-added production, stifling job creation in manufacturing and processing industries. The trade and telecom sectors, for example, have exploited weak oversight to raise prices in tandem, operating without quality checking, full taxed, with technological sophistications and not openly regulated mobile money operations with potential to influence the monetary policy leverage of the government. While consumer protection and environmental safeguards remain afterthoughts. These distortions persist because Somaliland’s regulatory framework never caught up with its rapid private sector growth a legacy of post-conflict institutional building that prioritized basic governance over economic oversight.
The Government’s Dilemma: Mediator or Spectator?
Limited Capacity and Limited Leverage: The Somaliland government faces considerable challenges in regulating markets effectively. Fiscal constraints are acute, with revenues amounting to only about 5% of GDP, leaving little room for robust enforcement. Institutional gaps, including the absence of a dedicated competition commission and outdated commercial laws drafted before the mobile money revolution, and a tax administration that struggles to track corporate earnings across interconnected businesses. This institutional vacuum creates perverse incentives: firms that initially filled governance gaps now resist oversight, having grown accustomed to operating without checks on their market power.
The prevailing political economy further complicates reform realizations. Corporate actors have become kingmakers in Somaliland’s competitive democracy, financing campaigns and leveraging clan networks to block legislation that might threaten their dominance. This dynamic was evident during the past administrations’ failed attempt to introduce meaningful corporate taxation and approval regulatory and competition safeguarding bills and acts, for example commercial banks act, which is persistent with the current administration of Cirro, despite trials and formation of dedicated committees.
Recent Efforts – Little and Late: The current administration’s introduction of Goods and Services Tax (GST) marked a tentative step toward formalizing the private sector, but the system remains riddled with enforcement loopholes, making it unattained, yet. Along this, the administration now faces another major economic crisis with the telecom protests, responding with ad hoc price negotiations that treat symptoms rather than the disease of market concentration.
What’s missing is strategic vision. Somaliland needs more than reactive price controls it requires a comprehensive competition policy framework that realigns private sector growth with national development goals. The government’s current approach of case-by-case intervention resembles whack-a-mole, unable to address the systemic nature of anti-competitive behaviours across sectors.
The Current Telecom Protests: A Watershed Moment
This Crisis Uniqueness: Past episodes of inflation, particularly in food and fuel prices, have not succeeded in uniting the public. The telecom protests, however, have proven to be different in both scale and impact. This time, the collusion was visible: firms raised prices simultaneously, making coordination undeniable. The repercussions were cross through as telecommunications and mobile money services are used by virtually every citizen, unlike price hikes confined to specific sectors. Moreover, the protests were largely youth-led mobilization through social media platforms circumvented traditional clan and regional divisions, creating Somaliland’s first truly national consumer rights movement.
Global Precedents: How Protests Drove Reform: International examples show that public mobilization can be a decisive catalyst for policy change. In South Africa in 2017, revelations of bread price-fixing by Tiger Brands triggered widespread boycotts, ultimately leading to antitrust fines and market liberalization. In Kenya in 2022, public outcry over Safaricom’s dominance in mobile money services resulted in fee caps and policies to open the market to new competitors. These precedents underscore a critical lesson for Somaliland: public outrage, if organized into clear policy demands, can break entrenched patterns of regulatory inertia, so it presents structural solutions rather than temporary price rollbacks.
A Roadmap for Reform: Balancing Markets and Public Interest
Realizing systemic reform demands more than momentary outrage, it requires sustained, coordinated efforts across all sectors of society, with each actor playing complementary roles. The media, often termed the “fourth estate,” must amplify public awareness, scrutinize power imbalances, and hold both corporations and regulators accountable. Without this ecosystem-wide engagement, even well-designed policies risk stagnation or capture by vested interests.
For the public, sustaining pressure through lawful and strategic means remains essential. Beyond street protests, citizens must channel energy into formal mechanisms: petitioning for a competition law, participating in regulatory consultations, and leveraging local councils to demand transparency. Grassroots movements should document and publicize market abuses from price-fixing to exclusionary contracts to build an irrefutable case for reform. Most crucially, elected representatives and political bodies with public mandates must take leadership in advancing this agenda. They should develop clear policy positions, communicate them consistently to constituents, and drive legislative action to address market distortions
The government’s response must be phased yet decisive. Immediate actions should include a freeze on telecom price hikes pending an independent audit of market concentration, coupled with a nationwide campaign to educate citizens on antitrust principles. Medium-term priorities must focus on drafting a Somaliland Competition Act, drawing lessons from Kenya’s 2021 framework and South Africa’s antitrust reforms. Establishing an independent Somaliland Competition Commission with investigative powers and judicial authority will be pivotal to enforcement. Long-term institutionalization requires formalizing the informal sector through simplified registration and tax incentives, diluting monopolies’ grip while expanding the revenue base.
Corporates must recognize that self-regulation is not charity it’s self-preservation. Leading firms should adopt transparent pricing methodologies, publish annual competition compliance reports, and invest in productive sectors like agro-processing to diversify the economy.
Academia, Elite and think tanks must bridge the knowledge gap through rigorous research and contextualized knowledge generation. Universities should host public forums linking antitrust reforms to Somaliland’s constitutional goals, while legal clinics assist SMEs in navigating new regulations.
The media’s role is existential. Investigative journalism must expose backroom deals between politicians and corporates, while op-eds translate complex market concepts into public discourse. Social media influencers and traditional leaders, often gatekeepers of public opinion, should be engaged to disseminate reform messaging.
This multi-front effort public vigilance, government action, corporate accountability, academic rigor, and media scrutiny forms the only viable path to transform protests into enduring institutional change. No single actor can succeed alone, but together, they can recalibrate Somaliland’s market ecosystem to serve the many, not the few.
Conclusion: A Defining Moment for Somaliland’s Economy
The telecom protests are not solely about price increases; they represent a broader referendum on economic justice in Somaliland. The private sector’s post-war achievements risk being undermined by unchecked monopolies, while the credibility of the government depends on its willingness and ability to act decisively.
History has shown that public outrage can be transformed into meaningful reform but only when paired with strategic policymaking, empowering regulatory bodies, and fostering a culture of corporate accountability, Somaliland can honor its constitutional vision of a thriving and equitable market. The choice is clear: safeguard the public interest to ensure the sustainability of the market itself.
About the Author
Roble Museis a Somaliland-based economic analyst, development strategist and policy researcher specializing in economic policy, development, and governance. Currently, he is pursuing doctoral research on pastoral economies and climate change, with a focus on Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
New AFRICOM Chief: Gen. Anderson was confirmed on July 31, 2025, and is tasked to confront the “convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism”.
Strategic Shift: AFRICOM’s reported move to Africa signals a major reinvestment, requiring stable continental partners.
Failed Somalia Strategy: After 30+ years and billions spent with little progress, the U.S. strategy in Somalia is in tatters, positioning the Republic of Somaliland as the logical alternative.
China’s Direct Threat: Beijing actively pressures Somaliland over its Taiwan ties, alarming U.S. legislators.
Somaliland’s Proactive Offer: A security pact with Taiwan and a direct offer of a U.S. military base showcase Somaliland as a proactive ally.
Ten days after a nomination hearing on July 22, 2025, where he laid out the strategic challenges facing the continent, the U.S. Senate on July 31, 2025, confirmed General Dagvin R.M. Anderson as the new commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). He now formally takes charge of a command grappling with what he describes as a continent “at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism”. His confirmation, combined with his predecessor’s historic, final state visit to Hargeisa, signals a significant evolution in U.S. policy—one that increasingly recognizes the Republic of Somaliland as a critical partner in this new contest.
This renewed focus is underscored by recent reports that AFRICOM headquarters will relocate from Stuttgart, Germany, to Africa itself. Such a move would represent the most significant strategic reinvestment in the continent’s security architecture in a generation. Contrary to any narrative that Africa has been deprioritized, relocating the command center to the continent signals an elevation of its strategic importance. An AFRICOM headquarters in Africa dramatically increases the strategic value of having stable and well-governed partners on the ground, placing a premium on nations that can offer a secure anchor for U.S. presence and policy.
Nowhere is the need for a new approach more apparent than in Somalia. As the former “Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF)”, General Anderson has firsthand knowledge of the deep-seated issues. His praise for the “capable” U.S.-trained Danab special forces during his hearing is now starkly contrasted by reports that the unit is faltering. Due to alleged corruption within the Somali government—a government that consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt in the world on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index—U.S. support has been slashed, crippling the force’s morale and effectiveness. This leaves the 30-year, multi-billion-dollar U.S. strategy in tatters, a failure underscored by recent battlefield losses. As reported by the Somaliland Chronicle, Al-Shabaab has retaken the strategic town of El-Bur in the Galgaduud region, a major blow to the government’s offensive, along with several other villages from which government forces have withdrawn.
This institutional shift is no longer subtle. In his final days as commander, General Michael Langley made a historic visit to the Republic of Somaliland on July 28-29, meeting with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” in Hargeisa and touring the strategic port at Berbera. The visit followed his blunt admission that U.S. policy in Somalia has struggled, with Al-Shabaab remaining “entrenched, wealthy, and large.” Langley’s trip, a clear signal of AFRICOM’s search for more reliable partners, builds on a precedent set by former AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend, who also toured the Berbera corridor in 2022. For General Anderson, the value of such reliable allies is paramount. He powerfully illustrated this point by recounting a successful hostage rescue in Niger: “Within 96 hours, we located him, coordinated with multiple African partners and European allies, and executed the rescue”. His conclusion was a lesson for the entire command: “When we called in the middle of the night, our partners answered”.
This American interest is driven by an intensifying strategic competition that has become a direct threat to the Republic of Somaliland itself. China has reportedly engaged in a campaign to undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty as a direct consequence of its democratic partnership with Taiwan. This has not gone unnoticed in Washington. U.S. legislators, including Senator Ted Cruz, have expressed alarm over what they see as a concerted effort by Beijing to undermine democracies in the Horn of Africa. Senator Cruz praised the Republic of Somaliland’s partnership with Taiwan as a courageous stand against Chinese pressure and has warned that Beijing uses its Belt and Road Initiative to "trap African nations in debt", leveraging that debt to erode their sovereignty and gain control over critical resources.
In the corridors of the Pentagon, a new and alarming scenario is being considered: that the Horn of Africa is becoming the laboratory for China’s first overseas kinetic action. The concern is that Beijing, frustrated by diplomatic and economic pressure, is now experimenting with proxy warfare to achieve its goals. Reports suggest a quiet funneling of arms and funds to shadowy regional militias, designed not for outright conquest, but to bleed and pressure the Republic of Somaliland, punishing it for its democratic alliance with Taiwan. For the new AFRICOM commander, this represents a dangerous evolution—a cold war turning hot on the shores of the Red Sea.
In the face of these threats, Somaliland has demonstrated its value as a proactive security partner. As reported by the Somaliland Chronicle on July 24, 2025, Hargeisa signed a landmark maritime security pact with Taiwan, explicitly designed to safeguard international shipping lanes and counter shared threats in the Red Sea. This was followed by a direct offer to Washington. In a Bloomberg interview, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” made an explicit and compelling offer to the United States: full partnership in exchange for recognition. He put access to a strategic military base on the Red Sea and deals for critical minerals squarely on the table, stating, “If the US is interested to land in Somaliland they are most welcome.” This is not an appeal for aid; it is a direct proposal for a security-for-recognition agreement that aligns perfectly with Washington’s need to counter Chinese influence.
With a newly-confirmed commander who has direct experience with the pitfalls of past policy, and a predecessor who made a historic visit to Hargeisa, the stage is set for a significant evolution in U.S. strategy. The facts on the ground—from the crumbling of the Danab force to the direct threat from China and Somaliland’s tangible offer of partnership—make a robust, strategic alliance with the Republic of Somaliland the logical and necessary conclusion.
After 32 years of self-declared independence, Somaliland has made remarkable progress in many areas peacebuilding, elections, and private-sector growth. Cities like Hargeisa, Burao, and Borama are expanding fast, with new roads, buildings, and businesses appearing every year. But amid this urban growth, one basic question remains unanswered: Where are the sidewalks?
In cities across Somaliland, pedestrians are being forgotten. Roads are built for cars, not for people. Sidewalks if they exist at all are narrow, broken, or blocked. There is little room for people to walk safely, freely, or comfortably.
This isn’t just about convenience. Walking is a basic form of mobility and a foundation of healthy urban life. Sidewalks reduce road accidents, promote physical and mental health, and encourage community interaction. In a country where many people cannot afford private cars, walking is not a choice it’s a necessity.
Hargeisa: A Capital Built for Cars, Not People
Take Hargeisa, Somaliland’s political and economic capital. The city is growing rapidly, with new highways and overpasses funded by public and private investment. But few of these road projects include proper walkways. Pedestrians are forced to walk along busy traffic lanes, dodging vehicles, breathing in dust and exhaust.
If you want to walk peacefully in Hargeisa, your options are shockingly limited. Most people end up in private hotel compounds like Guled Hotel or Grand Hadi, which offer some green space. But these are not truly public spaces. Some require entrance fees, and others are too small or exclusive to serve a wider public. This reflects a bigger issue: basic urban needs are being commercialized, when they should be publicly accessible to all.
Other Cities, Same Problem
This lack of pedestrian planning is not unique to Hargeisa. The same pattern exists in nearly every major city across Somaliland — from Burao and Erigavo to Laascaanood and Borama. Urban planning is heavily vehicle-centered. Public parks and walkways are rare. Sidewalks are often overlooked in favor of wider roads and new construction that prioritizes cars over people.
Meanwhile, Berbera offers a glimpse of what’s possible. In some parts of the city, walkways have been included in urban planning efforts, especially near the beach and central areas. While not perfect, Berbera shows that walkable cities can exist in Somaliland if they are prioritized.
Why Sidewalks Matter
Investing in sidewalks may seem secondary to major infrastructure projects like highways or ports, but their impact on daily urban life is profound and far-reaching. Sidewalks are not just physical structures; they are essential to creating healthier, safer, and more inclusive cities.
First and foremost, sidewalks promote public health. They encourage walking, which helps prevent chronic illnesses such as heart disease and obesity, while also supporting mental well-being by reducing stress and anxiety. A safe and accessible walking environment motivates people to incorporate physical activity into their daily lives.
Sidewalks also contribute to economic and social vitality. When streets are walkable, small businesses and street vendors benefit from increased foot traffic. Local economies thrive when people feel safe and comfortable exploring neighborhoods on foot. In addition, sidewalks support equity by serving the many residents especially in Somaliland who rely on walking as their primary mode of transportation.
Beyond their practical function, sidewalks help build stronger communities. They create shared public spaces where people can connect, socialize, and feel a sense of belonging. In this way, walkable cities become more vibrant, inclusive, and humane. Simply put, sidewalks matterbecause cities are for people, and people need space to walk, safely and with dignity.
Time for Action
If Somaliland is serious about sustainable development and inclusive urban growth, then walkability must become a core part of national planning. As cities expand and new roads are built, the needs of pedestrians are often ignored. Sidewalks are not a luxury or an afterthought—they are essential infrastructure that ensures safety, accessibility, and dignity for all citizens, especially children, the elderly, and those without cars.
Incorporating sidewalks into every new road project should be a requirement. Pedestrian-friendly spaces such as walking paths, shaded walkways, and public parks must be developed and maintained in all neighborhoods, not just affluent areas. Walkable cities reduce traffic congestion, improve public health, and encourage stronger community interaction.
To support this shift, there must also be public education campaigns that raise awareness about the value of walkable spaces. When people understand the personal and collective benefits—such as improved health, safety, and a cleaner environment—they are more likely to support city planning that includes pedestrian infrastructure.
Ultimately, sidewalks reflect how much we value people in our cities. A city without sidewalks is a city that has forgotten its people. If we want urban spaces that are healthy, safe, and inclusive, then we must make room for people to walknot in the distant future, but starting now. Walkability is not just a planning issue; it is a human right.
About the Author
Kaltun Osman is a humanitarian worker and gender activist who has dedicated her career to advancing women’s rights, political participation, and governance across the Horn of Africa. She brings a unique perspective that bridges grassroots activism with policy advocacy, focusing on inclusive governance and the strategic use of digital tools to empower women in their communities.
Kaltun holds Master’s degrees in Governance and Regional Integration, and Project Planning and Management. As a 2025 I AM NALA Fellow, she has been recognized as one of Africa’s emerging women leaders in peace and security. Her work spans from community-level organizing to policy development, consistently advocating for systems that ensure women’s voices are heard in decision-making processes that affect their lives.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Between 1981 and 1991, the Somali military in which Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, served as a senior officer executed a brutal and systematic campaign of genocide targeting the Isaaq people of the modern day Republic of Somaliland.
This dark chapter in Africa’s history, which was known as the Isaaq Genocide, was a merciless military campaign that resulted in the killing of over 200,000 Isaaq civilians. It also involved widespread forced displacement, scorched‑earth destruction of the second and third largest cities (Hargeisa and Burao), aerial bombardement of almost every other single city, town and village in Somaliland, and two decades of large‑scale red-terror style tactics against the civilian population of Somaliland.
It was carried out through relentless aerial bombardments – planes repeatedly strafed fleeing refugees – summary executions, burning of entire villages, deportations, land‑mining of water sources and homes, Holodomor style government enforced man-made famines (the Dabadheer Drought) and the use of paramilitary units such as the Somali Armed Forces’ “Dabar Goynta Isaaqa” (The Isaaq Exterminators), composed exclusively of non-ethnically Isaaq soldiers, to enact mass killings under Somalia’s military direction.
Eyewitness testimonies documented “mass executions by firing squad, forced disappearances, looting, mass torture, mass surveillance, rape used as a weapon, curfews and mass killings of civilians even in areas with limited resistance or lawful liberation movement activities, such in Berbera where thousands of government soldiers were stationed. Isaaq civilians across what was then the Somalia Republic, were detained and executed en-mass by Somalia government execution squads led by Colonels like Ilhan Omar’s father.
Across the country civilians were forced from their homes into dehumanising conditions, including many kept in dungeons, underground prisons and pits. Even famous Isaaqs such as Somaliland’s most renowned poet ‘Hadraawi’ did not escape this torture and years of detention under the most brutal and unsanitary conditions imaginable. Even in Mogadishu, deep inside neighbouring Somalia – and almosr 1,500KM from Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa – Isaaq civilians were being killed in their homes, in the city and on Mogadishu’s beaches. The Jazeera massacre of 1989 is a particularly brutal example that is etched in history.
At the heart of this brutal military regime was Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father. His rank, authority, membership of the regime Daarood clan, and 10+ years of having climbed the hierarchy in Somalia military to the rank of Colonel, placed him squarely in the Somali military’s command hierarchy during and at the height of its Isaaq genocide campaign. Based on his position, loyalty to the regime, and his role in the military, it is virtually certain that he had intimate knowledge of and involvement in the planning, conception, direction and execution of the genocide.
By both legal and historical standards, despite Ilhan Omar’s team’s spin in numerous recent articles which have been placed in left-leaning online publications, the logical conclusion that Ilhan Omar’s father was almost certainly intimately involved in the Isaaq Genocide is unmistakable. It is supported on the balance of probabilities and the totality of circumstantial and inferential evidence available indicates, more critically, that it meets the threshold that this was the case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
What Human Rights Reports Show
Investigations from Africa Watch, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN‑commissioned Mburu Report, articles from the Washington Post and New York Times are clear: the Isaaq Genocide was conceived, planned, and executed using official state machinery. The Somalian military directed attacks such as the scorched‑earth campaign, the mining of grazing areas and waterholes, and mass destruction of homes; entire cities were intentionally razed to eliminate Isaaq presence.
The numerous reports and newspaper articles detail how the military in which Ilhan Omar’s father was a Colonel, based on government directives such as the notorious “Letter of Death” attributed to General Morgan, advocated a campaign of obliteration and extermination of ethnically Isaaq civilians who form the absolute majority of the population in Somaliland – demonstrating that genocide was national policy, not the act of rogue units. The Somalian military deployed the most heinous an inhumane propaganda to justify and enable their genocide. Ilhan Omar’s father was at one point in charge of propaganda and during his 10+ year tenure with Somalia’s military between 1981 and 1991 – a timeline which coincides with the timeline of when Somalia’s military was perpetrating the Isaaq Genocide – would almost certainly have been involved in conceiving and disseminating Isaaq Genocide propaganda. Propaganda which would have got hundreds of thousands of innocent Somalilanders, ethnic Isaaq civilians, killed.
Colonels like Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, would have operated within the command structure of Somalia’s military during the Isaaq Genocide. As a Colonel he would have been overseeing operations in Hargeisa, Oodweyne, Burao, El‑Afweyn, Gebiley, Berbera, Garadag, Erigabo, Sheikh and else where in Somaliland where mass arrests, executions, and infrastructure destruction were used to terrorise, ethnically cleanse and exterminate the Isaaq people of Somaliland.
Taken together, these findings show that it is extremely likely that Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, played a direct or enabling role in the genocide. This conclusion aligns with command responsibility in law and meets the legal standard of being demonstrably proven, both on the balance of probability under civil law, and beyond reasonable doubt under criminal law. The idea that a Colonel in Somalia’s military in a brutal dictatorship did not participate in the pervasive and ubiquitous genocidal activities his military was carry out in every city, town and village in the decade in which he was serving in and leading the military, is implausible, illogical and does not stand up to scrutiny. It is high time that Ilhan Omar comes clean about her father’s role in the Isaaq Genocide.
What the Isaaq Genocide entailed and the role of Colonels in the genocide
Contemporaneous reporting from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Guardian in 1988‑1989 described systematic aerial bombardments, civilian casualties, mass evacuations, and city‑scale destruction. Eyewitnesses at the time compared Hargeisa’s devastation to “the Dresden of Africa,” with over 90 percent of the city destroyed, widespread displacement, and the use of mercenary pilots for bombing runs. These independent accounts support the historical record and reinforce that senior military officers – including Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father – under a strict command and control structure, could not have remained passive much less or uninvolved. Nor is there any evidence of him refusing to carry out or resisting the military orders of genocide which the commander in chief, dictator Siad Barre, had issued. In fact, Ilhan Omar and her family only fled the country when the regime was toppled in January 1991, when his last enclave in the capital of Mogadishu was overrun by the resistance movements. This suggests her Colonel father was loyal to the dictator to the end, and fought alongside him to perpetrate the genocide, only leaving his side when the regime was toppled. A disloyal Colonel also would not have shot up through the ranks, having been promoted in quick succession, having joined as a cadet in 1981 and left as a loyal Colonel by 1991 upon the regime’s fall. This begs the question, why would a brutal dictator elevate and promote a disloyal Colonel? Of course the reality is that he would not have. Therefore her father must have been a loyal and faithful servant, who executed the orders of Genocide to the letter, and was likely handsomely rewarded for this.
While Ilhan Omar’s camp has recently pivoted to portraying her Colonel father as a “teacher trainer”, this kind of fiction and verbal acrobatics is far removed from reality. The hint of the nature of his job and the rank he held is clear from his title: Colonel. He clearly held senior military responsibilities. In the genocide perpetrated by the Somalian military, Colonels oversaw planning, command, logistics, and ideological enforcement and practical execution of the Genocide. Their commands were clear and their role was clear. In one well publicised example of such military orders to commit genocide, issued by General Mohammed Said Hersi aka ‘General Morgan’ to all military units, was caught on video, and was later reported by Al Jazeera in their later documentary about the Isaaq Genocide titled “Kill All But the Crows”. The military orders were as follows: “Attack and eliminate them all. Destroy water sources, reservoirs. Burn villages, pillage, kill residents allow no life no activity. kill even the wounded. Kill all but the crows”. Deserters, defectors and those who went AWOL would be found and summarily executed (yet of course this does not excuse being complicit in a Genocide). It is therefore inconceivable that Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, did not carry out or did not authorise key military activities that facilitated, enabled or directly executed genocidal acts. His contributions as a high ranking Colonel likely included:
Ideological indoctrination, tactical training and direct military orders aligned with anti‑Isaaq policies.
Coordination of logistics, troop deployment, and use of Somali Airlines and military aircraft.
Enforcement of loyalty and genocide directives among officers and units.
These responsibilities parallel documented roles described in human rights investigations and reports on command operations during the genocide, and are reflected in US case law based on the legal cases against Colonel Tuken and General Samantar in relation crimes against humanity of which they were accused and which were proven after being brought by US citizens who are survivors of the Isaaq Genocide Ilhan Omar’s father’s military committed.
The “Teacher Trainer” Narrative
The portrayal of Ilhan Omar’s father as a mere “teacher trainer” – advanced in diaspora media and sympathetic Western outlets by Ilhan Omar’s PR machine – is contradicted by multiple authoritative obituaries and by Ilhan Omar’s own account referencing his Colonel rank and military service. This narrative serves to minimise his involvement and sanitise the genocide. But the scale, coordination, and leadership structure of the Somali military confirm that officers of his rank—including Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father—were integral to executing genocidal policy.
Legal Responsibility and U.S. Precedent
Under command responsibility, senior officers are liable when atrocities occur under their command and they fail to prevent or punish the perpetrators. U.S. courts have upheld this principle in landmark cases. The two aforementioned cases were one against General Samantar, where a U.S. federal court awarded damages to Isaaq survivor, and recognized top Somali officials as legally responsible for genocide, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In a more recent legal case Colonel Tukeh was investigated as part of deportation case, where a U.S. judge determined in a US court that Colonel Yusuf Abdi Ali’s involvement in the genocide and therefore warranted immediate deportation from the US. These are irrefutable legal judgments, not opinion pieces. They confirm genocide occurred and that Colonels comparable in rank, role and responsibility to during Ilhan Omar’s father’s Nur Omar Mohamed’s activities in the Somalia military were found culpable under US and international law. Since Ilhan Omar’s father is now deceased, the absence of a legal case with his name attached does not prove his innocence. It simply proves that he was never held accountable for his crimes.
Ilhan Omar’s Deafening Silence on the Isaaq Genocide
Despite this overwhelming historical and legal record of the Isaaq Genocide – and the fact that Ilhan Omar will be intimately aware that her father served as a senior Colonel in the military that perpetrated the Isaaq Genocide and everything that entailed – Ilhan Omar has remained silent on this. She has never issued a public condemnation of her father’s actions, nor acknowledged the genocide in any official capacity. In contrast to her vocal advocacy on various other issues of human rights, she has carefully and skilfully avoided addressing grave issue of immense human rights violations by her own father. Her silence on the topic speaks volumes, is deafening, stands in stark contradiction to her professed values. It exposes her real political focus: virtue signalling, race-baiting and political opportunism in the U.S. while lauding praise on Somalia, the world’s most comprehensively failed state, and covering up her father’s role in its destruction.
Ilhan Omar frequently speaks about Gaza and Palestine, championing genocide recognition and accountability daily, presumably to chase headlines and media attention. Yet she has never once acknowledged the genocide associated with the military commanded by her own father. This glaring omission underscores profound hypocrisy – she condemns atrocities abroad but refuses to address atrocities connected to her own family. Her vote against recognition of the Armenian Genocide further suggests a pattern- a reluctance to support formal acknowledgment of genocide, lest it implicate and shed light on her own father’s former regime. If one considers that the genocide her own father’s military was responsible for remains unaddressed, this may explain her opposition to Armenian recognition as part of a broader attempt to quietly and tacitly lend support to broader genocide denial.
A Gilded Childhood and Inherited Privilege & Ethnic Hatred
Ilhan Omar’s early life was spent Somalia, in an environment she often remarks about gleefully and with fondness, suggesting a sheltered and privileged upbringing. As the daughter of a Colonel in Siad Barre’s military, she likely benefited from the regime’s elite status. Regime officials included Colonels, and their immediate family members like Ilhan Omar, lived gilded lifestyles and were probably in many ways indirect beneficiaries of the Genocide. It is highly plausible that she, even as a child, benefited materially or socially from the outcomes of the genocide: the seizure of Isaaq assets, the redistribution of power and wealth to regime cronies like her Colonel father, and consolidation of power by non‑Isaaq elites. In fact, Ilhan Omar is named in that context in the Palgrave Handbook on Left Wing Extremism where serious and unanswered questions are raised about her claim to be a valid refugee. It is increasingly becoming apparent that a more accurate reinterpretation of her personal history is the daughter of a Genocidaire and war criminal, who lived a gilded lifestyle as a child of the regime elite who was potentially a beneficiary of Genocide, but once in the west reinvented herself as a liberal refugee victim.
Ilhan Omar presents herself as a champion of justice, minority rights, accountability, and anti-imperialism. Her refusal to recognise or condemn the genocide her father’s military executed is irreconcilable with this public brand. Her silence is not neutral—it is an affront to survivors who endured collective persecution and loss. To inherit privilege built on systemic violence yet actively ignore that historical legacy is an insult to the hundreds of thousands of victims and millions of survivors of the Isaaq Genocide her father’s military committed.
Why Ilhan Omar Must Now Come Clean
Ilhan Omar must publicly acknowledge her father’s role in the Isaaq Genocide, issue a formal condemnation of this atrocity, and actively support international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Only through transparency and public moral accountability and redemption can she reconcile her public advocacy with her personal history. Failing to do so makes her an electoral liability to the Democratic Party, as she continuous to bring them into disrepute and cost them votes.
About the Author
Dr Adali Warsame is a political commentator and public policy professional, who is a long time observer of Somaliland politics. He writing focuses on standing up for the dignity of Somaliland’s citizens, who appear to be forgotten in the melee that is everyday Somaliland and Horn of Africa politics.
Adali is an unapologetic Somalilander. He is passionate about achieving justice for the forgotten Isaaq Genocide victims, stopping the doomed Somaliland-Somalia talks and international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.
The Pact: Somaliland and Taiwan have signed a landmark maritime security pact, deepening their strategic alliance in the Horn of Africa.
Mutual Benefit: The deal enhances Somaliland’s maritime sovereignty while providing Taiwan a key democratic and economic partner in the strategic Red Sea corridor.
The China Angle: The partnership directly challenges China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” and its regional strategy of using Somalia to isolate both nations.
Signal to the West: The alliance serves as a model for the U.S. and other Western powers on how to pragmatically engage Somaliland to counter regional instability.
HARGEISA, SOMALILAND – The deepening strategic partnership between Somaliland and Taiwan has been formalized through a landmark ‘Coast Guard Cooperation Agreement,’ an alliance that signals a decisive policy pivot by the current administration and cements Somaliland’s role as an indispensable security partner in the Horn of Africa. The pact not only enhances national security but moves the bilateral relationship into a new phase of operational cooperation.
The agreement marks a significant policy evolution for President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro)’s government. It moves past the skepticism expressed during his time in opposition, when the value of the relationship was questioned, into a new phase of strategic cooperation. This deepening of ties now serves as a powerful demonstration of both nations proving their mutual value: Somaliland as a steadfast democratic partner in a critical region, and Taiwan as a capable ally that delivers tangible security benefits.
📍Taipei | The Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation of the Republic of #Somaliland, Hon. Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal, and his delegation met with H.E. President Lai Ching-te at the Presidential Palace of #Taiwan. 🤝 pic.twitter.com/RDrBJYWJ2E
The historic agreement was signed by Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard Admiral Ahmed Hurre Hariye and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration Director-General Chang Chung-lung during Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Bakal’s visit to Taipei—his first official trip to Taiwan since assuming office in December 2024. The visit was warmly welcomed by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung, who said it “reflects the strength, resilience & shared values of our democratic partnership.”
Minister @chia_lung warmly welcomed #Somaliland FM @min_abdirahman & delegation to #Taiwan. His visit—the first by a cabinet minister since Somaliland’s new government took office—reflects the strength, resilience & shared values of our democratic partnership. pic.twitter.com/YJoyQ3uWQt
— 外交部 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC (Taiwan) 🇹🇼 (@MOFA_Taiwan) July 24, 2025
The agreement itself, according to the official text, aims “to promote cooperation between the coast guard authorities of the Parties” on a range of critical security areas, building upon the formal relationship established when both nations opened mutual representative offices in 2020.
Alliance Anchored in Shared Values and Strategic Gain
The benefits for both nations are substantial. For Somaliland, the pact delivers an immediate and tangible boost to national security. Cooperation on maritime law enforcement and anti-piracy measures will empower the Coast Guard to better protect the nation’s 850-kilometer coastline, safeguarding sovereignty and its burgeoning blue economy.
For Taiwan, the alliance serves as a cornerstone of its global strategy. The agreement gives Taipei a reliable democratic partner situated at the strategic chokepoint of the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which approximately 12% of global trade passes. This positioning provides Taiwan with enhanced influence in one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.
The strategic calculus for Taipei also extends deep into the economic sphere, positioning Somaliland as a vital beachhead for Taiwanese commercial expansion into Africa. This partnership grants Taiwan a significant first-mover advantage, allowing it to establish a friendly and reliable gateway into the continent’s rapidly growing markets. Through Somaliland’s stability and its strategic Port of Berbera, Taiwanese enterprises can pilot resilient supply chains and investment models for the Horn of Africa. This approach stands in stark contrast to the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ model employed by Beijing across the continent. Monuments to that strategy’s failures are numerous, from Kenya’s costly Standard Gauge Railway, which has struggled with crushing debt and questionable economic returns, to the cautionary tale of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. Taiwan’s model, by focusing on building genuine local capacity and sustainable commerce, presents a partnership designed to empower, not indebt.
A New Model: From Project Partner to Strategic Ally
This direct state-to-state agreement marks a significant strategic diversification for Somaliland. Historically, the Coast Guard has received support from international missions like EUCAP Somalia. However, engagement with such “Somalia-centric” entities—often focused on administrative workshops rather than operational capability building—has long been a point of political friction, seen by many as inadvertently diluting Somaliland’s case for independence.
The Taiwan agreement operates on a fundamentally different plane, building sovereign capability through a partnership of equals. It focuses on operational cooperation, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer—the hallmarks of a genuine state-to-state partnership. This shift reflects broader changes in Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy, diversifying beyond traditional partners who are constrained by recognition politics.
Challenging Beijing’s Red Sea Ambitions
This agreement arrives at a pivotal moment, directly challenging China’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. Beijing has systematically leveraged its relationship with Somalia to pressure both Somaliland and Taiwan, most notably through Mogadishu’s recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders in April 2025.
The Taiwan-Somaliland coast guard agreement represents a direct counter to this strategy. By deepening practical cooperation between two democratic entities that Beijing seeks to isolate, the pact signals that China’s pressure tactics may be backfiring. More significantly, it establishes a precedent for other partners to accelerate their own bilateral engagement with Somaliland.
Opening Doors for Western Partners
The timing is particularly significant given the growing US-China competition in the Red Sea corridor. This Taiwan partnership essentially provides diplomatic cover for other democratic allies to deepen ties with Hargeisa. This is particularly relevant for the United States, which has shown significant interest in partnering with Somaliland, evidenced by high-level congressional visits and discussions within the Pentagon. Washington is most likely paying close attention to this development, viewing it as a test case for how a robust partnership can flourish and serve as a bulwark against Chinese influence in the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. If Beijing responds aggressively, it may inadvertently demonstrate to Washington and European capitals that engaging Somaliland is not only strategically valuable but also an effective way to counter Chinese influence.
The Next Frontier: A Question for the Skies?
With the maritime domain now on a path to being secured, a crucial question arises for the partnership’s future: what is the next frontier? For a nation hampered by Somalia’s control over its airspace, attention may naturally turn to the skies. The potential for a future agreement focused on Air Traffic Control is significant, leveraging Taiwan’s world-class aviation expertise to help Somaliland develop autonomous management of its Flight Information Region (FIR)—a monumental step in affirming practical statehood.
As Somaliland secures its seas, the foundation is being laid for a comprehensive alliance that could reshape both nations’ strategic positions. This pact proves that in the modern world, practical cooperation and shared values often matter more than formal recognition.
The recent collapse of Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia has inadvertently proven the strategic indispensability of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. Ankara’s attempt to resolve the crisis that erupted after the MoU was signed—by exploring alternatives for Ethiopia through Mogadishu—was a critical test of diplomatic and geographic realities and most importantly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s resolve. It was a test that the Somalia option failed spectacularly. This failure has shattered the illusion that a third way exists, paving a direct path back to the only viable solution. Now, amid intensifying speculation of an imminent visit by Somaliland’s President Abdirahman “Cirro” to Addis Ababa, the revival of the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding has shifted from a possibility to a geopolitical necessity.
The Geographic and Security Imperative
Ethiopia’s strategic vulnerability stems from its landlocked status and overwhelming dependency on a single trade corridor. With 95 percent of its trade flowing through Djibouti, the nation hemorrhages over $1.5 billion annually in port fees while remaining strategically vulnerable. Recent disruptions in Red Sea shipping lanes have further exposed the fragility of this dependency, making alternative access routes existentially necessary. The geographic reality is immutable: Ethiopia’s industrial heartland lies adjacent to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast. The port of Berbera, whose capacity has been significantly expanded under a management deal with the UAE’s DP World, creates the only viable logistical alternative. Somalia’s Indian Ocean ports, by contrast, are a logistical fiction that solves neither the dependency problem nor the strategic vulnerability.
Beyond these logistical absurdities, any Ethiopian route through Somalia presents an insurmountable security risk. Somalia remains a deeply unstable state where vast territories are controlled not by the federal government, but by Al-Shabaab and a multitude of other terror networks. An Ethiopian naval base on its coast or a commercial trade corridor transiting its lands would immediately become a high-value, symbolic target. The constant threat of attacks on Ethiopian goods, infrastructure, and personnel would require a massive and perpetual security commitment, effectively dragging Ethiopia into Somalia’s internal quagmire. No responsible government would stake its national economic lifeline on a route that passes through one of the world’s most complex security emergencies. This stark reality contrasts sharply with Somaliland’s three decades of proven stability and effective internal security, making the choice for Addis Ababa not just one of convenience, but of fundamental risk management.
The Coalition of Containment
This stark geographic and security logic is precisely why the opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is so fierce. The sophisticated containment strategy reveals the high stakes involved, with Somalia serving as the linchpin. Its approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active warfare, including fueling the Las Anod Crisis in a bid to dismember Somaliland from within. This has been accompanied by a terrifying rhetorical escalation from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who has reportedly taken to mosque pulpits to declare a ‘Jihad’ and threatened to align with Al-Shabaab.
This proxy warfare has attracted broader regional support. Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Similarly, the February 2024 Turkey-Somalia defense pact establishes a Turkish naval presence as a direct counter to Ethiopian maritime ambitions. More troubling is the emerging China factor, with Beijing making strategic calculations about countering American influence by engaging with anti-recognition forces. The tragic irony is that for Somalia’s government, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than defeating the terrorists who control its own country.
The Legal Architecture and the Strategic Opportunity
The current alignment of forces creates a historic, but fleeting, window for this pact. The failure of the Turkish-led mediation has provided both nations with the political justification for renewed bilateral engagement. A new US administration guided by transactional realpolitik creates a permissive international environment. However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage carries an expiration date. Long-standing US strategic interest in the Berbera airport and port could translate into a direct US military presence, providing Hargeisa an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage.
The Inevitable Crystallization of a New Reality
The failure of the Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia was not a crisis for the MoU; it was its ultimate vindication. It removed the final illusion that a viable alternative could be found through Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the experiment proved that the solution to its vulnerability lies not in placating its adversaries but in an alliance with a reliable partner. For Somaliland, its strategic indispensability has been demonstrated for all to see. The question facing both leaderships is no longer whether to act, but how decisively they can capitalize on this historic alignment of interests. The revival of their MoU represents the crystallization of a new strategic reality in the Horn of Africa—one where geographic logic and mutual security triumph over diplomatic fiction.
