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The Minister of Appeasement and the President Who Won’t Act

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Staff
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President Cirro’s Moment of Truth: Fire Him or Own the Failure

There comes a moment in every nation’s struggle for recognition when its own officials become the greatest obstacle to its dignity. That moment arrived this week when our Minister of the Presidency—a man entrusted with safeguarding the honor of our Republic—chose instead to bow, scrape, and genuflect before Qatar’s diplomatic insult with the enthusiasm of a colonial subject grateful for his master’s attention.

The facts are stark and shameful. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement dripping with contempt, referred to Somaliland as a mere “province of Somalia” and had the audacity to claim they discussed “Somalia affairs” with President Abdirahman Abdillahi “Cirro”—the duly elected President of the Republic of Somaliland. This was not a diplomatic mishap or translation error. This was a calculated humiliation, a deliberate erasure of our sovereignty delivered with the precision of a surgical knife.

Any self-respecting official would have demanded an immediate correction. Any patriot would have recalled our delegation or if the President truly thought this was a good idea resign on the spot. Any leader worthy of the title would have made it crystal clear that the Republic of Somaliland stands as an independent nation, not as some wayward province awaiting reconciliation with a failed state.

Instead, our Minister of the Presidency—let us now call him what he truly is, the Minister of Appeasement—returned from Doha with a statement so craven, so utterly devoid of national pride, that it belongs in a museum of diplomatic cowardice. “The statement from Qatar was okay,” he declared with the casual indifference of a man selling his birthright for a mess of pottage, “because Somaliland is not officially recognized.”

Not officially recognized? This is the pathetic mantra of a defeated mind, the white flag of surrender disguised as pragmatism. By this logic, we should accept every insult, endure every humiliation, and smile gratefully at every slight because some distant capitals have not yet acknowledged what we have built with our blood, sweat, and unwavering determination.

For thirty-three years, Somaliland has stood as a beacon of democracy, stability, and progress in a region torn apart by chaos. We have held free and fair elections while Somalia remained a playground for warlords and foreign interventions. We have built institutions while they collected aid money. We have secured our borders while they begged for peacekeepers. We have created a functioning state from the ashes of genocide while they perfected the art of failure.

Yet our Minister of Appeasement would have us believe that none of this matters because a few bureaucrats in foreign capitals have not yet rubber-stamped our existence. This is not realpolitik—this is capitulation. This is not diplomatic wisdom—this is the mentality of the colonized, forever seeking validation from masters who view them as subjects, not equals.

The President of Somaliland does not discuss “Somalia affairs” any more than the President of France discusses “German affairs” or the President of Kenya discusses “Ethiopian affairs.” He discusses Somaliland affairs, Horn of Africa affairs, regional affairs, and international affairs—but never the internal matters of a foreign nation with which we share nothing but a colonial border drawn by European powers who cared nothing for our distinct identity, culture, and aspirations.

Qatar’s foreign ministry knew exactly what they were doing when they issued that statement. They were testing our resolve, measuring our spine, and calculating whether we would defend our dignity or accept their contempt. Thanks to our Minister of Appeasement, they have their answer: we will not only accept their insults, we will thank them for the privilege of being insulted.

This is what happens when appeasement becomes policy, when the desperate desire for acceptance trumps self-respect, when officials mistake servility for diplomacy. The Minister of Appeasement has not advanced Somaliland’s cause—he has set it back by demonstrating that we can be bullied, dismissed, and humiliated without consequence.

The people of Somaliland deserve better than officials who treat their sovereignty as a negotiable commodity. They deserve leaders who understand that recognition is not a gift bestowed by benevolent powers but a right earned through struggle, sacrifice, and the unwavering defense of principle.

Every concession to those who would deny our existence makes the next concession easier. Every acceptance of diplomatic slight paves the way for greater humiliations. Every moment of appeasement delays the day when the world will have no choice but to acknowledge what we have always known: that Somaliland is a nation, not a province, and its people are citizens, not subjects.

But this is not the first time our Minister of Appeasement has displayed such breathtaking political tone-deafness. When he sat in opposition as Secretary General of Waddani party, pontificating about diplomatic wisdom and lecturing the government on proper statecraft, he demonstrated the same shocking inability to grasp the most basic principles of sovereignty that he now exhibits from the driver’s seat.

The incident remains seared in the memory of anyone who understands the stakes of our struggle. When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed floated the disastrous idea of bringing Somalia’s then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo to Somaliland—a scheme so transparently designed to legitimize Somalia’s claim over our territory that even a first-year political science student could see through it—the entire political establishment united in opposition.

The then-President Bihi, in a rare moment of genuine statesmanship, consulted with all relevant stakeholders. The Chairman of Parliament, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and leaders of both opposition parties understood immediately what was at stake. Allowing Farmajo to set foot on Somaliland soil would have handed Somalia’s beleaguered president the propaganda victory of a lifetime—the symbolic return of the “prodigal son” to the fold, regardless of the circumstances of his arrival.

The optics alone would have been devastating. Here was a man whose government controlled barely half of Mogadishu, whose authority was so weak that he couldn’t venture outside the Green Zone without an army of foreign peacekeepers, whose legitimacy was so questioned that he extended his own mandate by force—and we would have given him the gift of appearing as the president who brought Somaliland back into Somalia’s embrace.

The political establishment understood this. The intelligentsia understood this. The man on the street understood this. Even children playing in the streets of Hargeisa understood that you don’t invite those who deny your existence to tea in your living room.

Everyone understood except our current Minister of Appeasement, who responded to this grave threat to our sovereignty with the casual indifference of a man discussing the weather: “What is the big deal if Farmajo comes to Hargeisa?”

What is the big deal? The big deal, Mr. Khadar Loge, is that symbols matter in politics. The big deal is that perception shapes reality in international relations. The big deal is that we have spent three decades building a reputation as a sovereign nation, not a wayward province awaiting reconciliation with a failed state.

The big deal is that every photograph of Farmajo in Hargeisa would have been worth a thousand Somali propaganda pamphlets. Every handshake would have been transformed into evidence of Somalia’s benevolent leadership over its “northern regions.” Every moment of his visit would have been weaponized against our cause in every African Union summit, every Arab League meeting, every international forum where our recognition is debated.

But our Minister of Appeasement couldn’t see the big deal then, just as he can’t see it now when Qatar treats our President as a regional administrator discussing “Somalia affairs.” This is not growth in office—this is consistency in capitulation, a career-long dedication to missing the point of our struggle.

And if his casual dismissal of sovereignty weren’t damaging enough, the Minister of Appeasement has now ventured into the most sacred territory of our national narrative—the very foundation of our independence—with the delicacy of a bulldozer in a graveyard. In another moment of jaw-dropping insensitivity, he has declared that Somaliland is “not as fragile as an eggshell” and that we should not frame our exit from the ill-fated Somalia union on the genocide and catastrophic events that led to our destruction.

Let that sink in. The Minister of Appeasement wants us to forget the genocide. He wants us to whitewash the systematic destruction of our cities, the deliberate targeting of our civilians, the mass graves that still scar our landscape. He wants us to pretend that our independence was not born from the ashes of Siad Barre’s war machine but from some genteel philosophical disagreement about governance structures.

This is not just historical amnesia—this is historical vandalism of the most obscene kind. The Minister of Appeasement would have us erase the very foundation of our moral case for independence, the bedrock argument that no people should be forced to remain united with those who sought to exterminate them.

The bones of our martyrs in Hargeisa’s mass graves would turn if they could hear such words. The survivors of the concentration camps in Mandheera would weep at such betrayal. The mothers who lost their children to Siad Barre’s jets would curse the day they trusted their story to such hands.

“Not as fragile as an eggshell”? Tell that to the families who fled across the border with nothing but the clothes on their backs while their cities burned behind them. Tell that to the entire population of Somaliland—yes, the entire population—who were displaced, scattered like leaves in a hurricane, their lives shattered by a regime that viewed them as obstacles to be removed rather than citizens to be protected.

The Minister of Appeasement, in his infinite wisdom, believes we should downplay this “inconvenient” history. He thinks our case for independence would be stronger if we simply forgot why we needed to be independent in the first place. This is the logic of the colonized mind—the desperate desire to appear reasonable, moderate, and unthreatening to those who would deny our very right to exist.

But the genocide is not a liability to be hidden—it is the ultimate proof of why Somaliland can never, must never, and will never return to a union with Somalia. When a government turns its military machine against its own citizens, when it bombs cities into rubble, when it forces an entire population into exile, it forfeits forever any claim to legitimacy over those people.

The world understands this principle. It is why South Sudan gained independence. It is why Bangladesh exists. It is why the international community accepts that some unions are so poisoned by violence that they cannot be salvaged. But our Minister of Appeasement, in his eagerness to appear diplomatic, would throw away our strongest argument because it makes him uncomfortable at cocktail parties.

This is not pragmatism—this is capitulation to the oppressor’s narrative. This is not strategic thinking—this is the internalized shame of a man who believes our suffering was somehow our fault, that our genocide was somehow an embarrassment rather than a crime that cries out for justice.

The Minister of Appeasement has now crossed a line that no Somalilander should ever cross. He has not just failed to defend our sovereignty—he has actively undermined the moral foundation upon which that sovereignty rests. He has not just accepted insults from foreign powers—he has provided them with the arguments they need to dismiss our cause.

But the damage extends far beyond hurt feelings or wounded pride. Every act of appeasement, every acceptance of humiliation, every capitulation to those who would erase us sends a clear and devastating message to the international community: Somaliland itself is not convinced of its own sovereignty.

When potential suitors—those brave nations who might muster the courage to recognize Somaliland—witness our officials accepting insults with gratitude, they draw the obvious conclusion: if Somaliland’s own ministers don’t believe in their independence, why should we risk our diplomatic capital to support it?

Our Minister of Appeasement has been while in opposition and unfortunately, it has not been just an election rhetoric, he has become Somalia’s most effective ambassador. With every statement that downplays our independence, with every acceptance of being treated as a province, with every dismissal of our historical grievances, he telegraphs to the world that we are indeed still part of Somalia—perhaps just waiting for a better deal to be offered, a sweeter reunion package, a more palatable version of subjugation.

This is diplomatic suicide of the most sophisticated kind. The Minister of Appeasement has managed to convince potential allies that recognition would be premature, that Somaliland itself is ambivalent about its independence, that we might yet return to the fold if the terms were right.

Why would any nation risk Somalia’s wrath to recognize a state whose own officials suggest it might not be permanent? Why would any government expend political capital on a cause that Somaliland’s own representatives seem reluctant to champion? Why would any leader take the leap of recognition when Somaliland’s own ministers are building the arguments against it?

The international community takes its cues from our actions, not our aspirations. When we accept being called a province, they see a province. When we dismiss our genocide as irrelevant, they see a grievance without substance. When we treat our independence as negotiable, they see a temporary arrangement awaiting better terms.

The Minister of Appeasement has single-handedly convinced potential allies that Somaliland is playing hard-to-get rather than fighting for survival, that we are negotiating terms rather than defending principles, that we are waiting for a better Somalia rather than rejecting Somalia entirely.

This is not diplomacy—this is the slow-motion destruction of our international case. This is not strategic patience—this is the systematic demolition of everything our people have built with their sacrifice and determination.

Here lies the true tragedy of our Minister of Appeasement: he spends more time defending his asinine policies to outraged Somalilanders than he does defending Somaliland to the world. When Qatar insults our sovereignty, he rushes to defend Qatar’s position. When Ethiopians propose legitimizing Somalia’s claims over our territory, he asks “what’s the big deal?” When his own people cry out against his capitulation, he lectures them about not being “fragile as eggshells.”

This is a man who has perfected the art of fighting the wrong battles. He will argue passionately with patriotic Somalilanders who question his judgment, but he will not lift a finger to challenge foreign powers who deny our existence. He will spend hours explaining to his own people why they should accept humiliation, but he will not spend five minutes demanding respect from those who humiliate us.

The Minister of Appeasement has his priorities exactly backward. He treats his fellow Somalilanders as the enemy to be defeated and foreign powers as friends to be appeased. He has more fight in him when responding to criticism from Hargeisa than when defending Hargeisa’s honor abroad.

This is the ultimate betrayal of office: a minister who sees his own people as the problem and their oppressors as the solution. This is not diplomacy—this is collaboration with those who would erase us from the map.

The Minister of Appeasement has forgotten the most fundamental principle of sovereignty: possession is nine-tenths of the law. We possess our land—every hill, every valley, every grain of sand from Zeila to Las Anod. We possess our institutions—a functioning democracy, a professional military, a working bureaucracy. We possess our dignity—earned through three decades of self-governance and democratic progress.

Somalia possesses nothing but empty claims and faded maps. They cannot govern their own capital without foreign peacekeepers, yet they claim dominion over a nation that has governed itself successfully for over three decades. They cannot secure their own borders, yet they draw lines on our territory. They cannot feed their own people, yet they dream of ruling ours.

The world may debate recognition, but reality has already rendered its verdict. We are here. We are functioning. We are thriving. We possess what is ours—our country, our government, our future. No amount of diplomatic double-talk can change the fact that Somaliland exists as a sovereign nation while Somalia exists as a concept sustained by international life support.

Yet our Minister of Appeasement would have us beg for permission to exist from those who themselves exist only through the charity of others. He would have us seek validation from failed states and their enablers, as if our three decades of democratic governance count for nothing compared to a rubber stamp from bureaucrats who have never set foot in our country.

Possession is not just nine-tenths of the law—in our case, it is the entirety of the law. We possess our sovereignty not because anyone granted it to us, but because we built it with our own hands, defended it with our own blood, and sustained it with our own will. Those who would deny this reality are denying the evidence of their own eyes.

But ultimately, the Minister of Appeasement is not the one who stands before history as the guardian of our national destiny. That responsibility belongs to President Abdirahman Abdillahi “Cirro,” the man Somalilanders elected with a clear and decisive majority to lead them into the promised land of international recognition.

The President now faces a moment of truth that will define his legacy and determine whether he is the leader who finally delivers Somaliland to its rightful place among the world’s recognized nations or another chapter in the long litany of failed leadership.

If his Minister of the Presidency is truly compromised—if foreign influences have found in him a receptive ear for their narratives about Somaliland’s place in the world—then President Cirro’s failure to act reveals a fatal weakness in his own leadership. A minister operating under such influences is not just the minister’s shame; it is the President’s abdication of duty.

If, alternatively, his Minister of the Presidency genuinely believes this garbage through sheer ignorance—if his understanding of diplomacy comes from hastily reading leaflets or ChatGPT summaries rather than grasping the fundamental realities of statecraft—then what does that say about the President’s judgment in selecting such a man for such a critical role?

Either way, President Cirro stands condemned by his own choices. Either he lacks the strength to remove a minister who has lost his way, or he lacks the wisdom to recognize basic incompetence when it stares him in the face. Either he is too weak to act, or too blind to see. Neither bodes well for a president entrusted with the sacred mission of leading Somaliland to recognition.

The people of Somaliland did not elect President Cirro to manage decline or to oversee the systematic undermining of their cause by his own appointees. They elected him to be the president who would walk Somaliland into the community of nations as a respected and recognized member. They entrusted him with carrying their will—not appeasing their enemies.

Every day the Minister of Appeasement remains in office is another day that President Cirro fails the mandate he was given. Every capitulation his minister makes is a capitulation the President owns. Every insult his minister accepts is an insult the President endorses.

President Cirro, you cannot fulfill your destiny with a Minister of Appeasement who believes our strongest arguments should be hidden and our proudest achievements should be downplayed. You cannot lead Somaliland to recognition with an official who spends more energy defending our enemies than defending our interests. You cannot be the president who delivered recognition while tolerating a minister who delivers only excuses and humiliation.

The choice before you is stark and unforgiving: be the president who had the courage to remove those who betrayed the people’s trust, or be the president who will be remembered as the man who let appeasement destroy Somaliland’s destiny. History will not judge you kindly if you choose the latter. Neither will the people who believed in you enough to give you their votes.

The Republic of Somaliland deserves better than ministers who mistake surrender for sophistication. It deserves better than presidents who mistake loyalty to failed appointees for leadership. It deserves recognition, and it deserves leaders strong enough to demand it.

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Qatar’s Hypocrisy on Somaliland

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Staff
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By Michael Rubin

On June 30, 2025, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro arrived in Qatar to meet Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, who serves jointly as the Gulf emirate’s prime minister and foreign minister.  While previous Somaliland presidents have visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the visit to Qatar appeared a diplomatic breakthrough as it marked an expansion of Somaliland’s diplomatic reach.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affair’s subsequent statement was an insult, one that should disqualify Qatar from any future role mediating conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Qatari press release stated that it was “the State of Qatar’s belief that Somalia’s future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”

Put aside the fact that neither under President Mohamed Farmaajo nor Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has the Federal Republic of Somalia respected constitutional federalism. Under both unelected leaders, the federal government in Mogadishu has encroached on the constitutional rights of Puntland, Jubaland, and the South West State. Both Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh divert international aid both to their own supporters in Mogadishu and into their own personal bank accounts in countries and territories like Switzerland and Gibraltar or property holdings in Türkiye. The two presidents have hijacked security assistance meant to counter Al-Shabaab in order to target their own political opponents. Meanwhile, both leaders have repeatedly sold Somalia’s sovereignty to the highest bidder, be it Chinese fishing concessions or land grants and construction contracts to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. How does Qatar expect anyone to respect Somalia’s sovereignty when its own leaders make a mockery of it?

Greater Somalia is as much a dream as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Kenya’s former North Eastern Province will never return to Mogadishu’s control. To state that is not to be anti-Somali; after all, more Somalis live outside Mogadishu’s control than inside it and have no desire to be under Mogadishu’s control. Why would they wish to join the least successful, most corrupt, and most dysfunctional government of all Somali-populated regions? If Qatar is not going to share its gas wealth with Egypt’s impoverished Arab population or subject itself to Baghdad’s corrupt leadership, why does Qatar believe Somaliland should give Somalia title over its scant resources?

The real hypocrisy, however, is in any comparison of historical grounds by which Qatar justifies its independence with its own hostility toward Somaliland’s case. After Arabs ended Persian rule over Bahrain in the 18th century AD, the Khalifa family took control not only ruling Bahrain’s main island, but also the Qatar peninsula. Over subsequent decades, the ancestors of Qatar’s current rulers staged a number of rebellions, most unsuccessful. In 1861, Bahrain and British Indian authorities signed a treaty recognizing Qatar as a dependent of Bahrain. In the 1867 Bahrain-Qatar War, Bahraini forces completely destroyed Doha and Wakrah, much as Somali dictator Siad Barre would do just over a century later to Hargeisa. The following year, the British government imposed a settlement that recognized Qatar as a separate entity. In effect, British forces confirmed Qatar’s distinctness less than two decades before they did the same thing in Somaliland.

While Qatar appears to buy the logic of Somali irredentists who say that clan identity should not be enough to justify Somaliland’s independence, the only difference between Qatar, Bahrain’s ruling family, and the United Arab Emirates is tribal identity. Qataris may argue that the Khalifa’s family’s persecution of the Thani shaped Qatari identity, but even the worst Bahraini persecution of Qatari tribes was orders of magnitude less than what Siad Barre and his Darod clan did to Somaliland’s Isaaq.

Qatar’s hypocrisy gets worse, however. While the British may have recognized the Qataris as a distinct entity in 1868, independence did not come for more than a century. Prior to the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain, and the seven Trucial State were part of a joint Federation of Arab Emirates that the British envisioned maintaining control. Qatar and Bahrain ultimately refused to cede political and economic autonomy to the new entity; both unilaterally declared their independence leaving the Trucial States to form the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar today enjoys full independence. Its history shows its willingness to take up arms to prevent outside powers from forcing it into an unwanted union with either Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates. How ironic, then, that its approach to Somaliland forgets its own origins and negates the principles upon which its independence rests.

About the Author

Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.

Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).

Dr. Rubin has a PhD and an MA in history from Yale University, where he also obtained a BS in biology.

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The Doha Directive: Inside Qatar’s Mission to Scuttle the Somaliland-US Alliance

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Staff
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An $8 Billion Air Base, a Terror Portfolio, and Qatar’s High-Stakes Pressure Campaign to Keep the US Out of Berbera

What appeared to be a diplomatic breakthrough for Somaliland has unmasked what senior officials describe as a sophisticated diplomatic campaign by Qatar aimed at one primary objective: preventing the establishment of a US military base in Berbera.

Instead of issuing an outright warning, the unprecedented visit was dominated by a subtle but unmistakable focus from Qatari officials on Somaliland’s future intentions regarding a potential United States military base in Berbera. Through a persistent and highly specific line of questioning, Qatari officials sought to extract the precise nature of Somaliland’s security consultations with the United States. This penetrating focus on the Berbera base stunned the delegation, according to a senior Somaliland official who was present, revealing the true strategic intent behind Qatar’s sudden diplomatic outreach: to preempt a security partnership that could fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region. The message, though never stated as an explicit warning, was unmistakable: any move by Somaliland to host American forces would be viewed by Doha as a direct challenge to its own strategic position.

The Al Udeid Strategic Imperative

Qatar’s sudden interest in Somaliland cannot be separated from its existential interest in protecting Al Udeid Air Base—its single most valuable geopolitical asset. Since 2003, Doha has poured more than $8 billion into the sprawling desert facility, which hosts over 10,000 U.S. personnel and serves as the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Al Udeid is not just a military hub; it is Qatar’s insurance policy—one that has shielded it from regional isolation, granted it disproportionate diplomatic weight, and bound U.S. policy interests tightly to its survival.

But that calculus begins to fall apart when Berbera enters the frame.

Unlike landlocked Al Udeid, Berbera offers direct access to the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—one of the most vital maritime corridors in the world. It is the only potential U.S. partner location between Diego Garcia and the Suez Canal with that level of strategic access. From a power-projection standpoint, Berbera can do what Al Udeid never could: impose influence over both flanks of the Red Sea. It would also place U.S. surveillance assets within striking range of China’s military base in Djibouti, creating a direct counterweight to Beijing’s creeping dominance.

That prospect is especially relevant now. With China having all but squeezed the U.S. military presence out of Djibouti—AFRICOM operations increasingly marginalized and confined—the United States is in urgent need of an alternative forward operating position. The strategic implications are not lost on Qatar. A permanent U.S. military presence in Berbera would not only devalue Al Udeid, it would also dilute Qatar’s influence over U.S. regional posture. No longer the indispensable host, Qatar would find its monopoly on American dependence broken. For Doha, this isn’t just about geography. It is about leverage, prestige, and survival.

That is why the Berbera question was not just a curiosity during President Cirro’s visit—it was the point.

Diplomatic Sleight of Hand and Public Backlash

Qatar’s handling of the visit reveals a calculated diplomatic strategy that was widely seen in Somaliland as designed to discredit and embarrass the President of the Republic of Somaliland and his delegation. While the high-level meeting between President Cirro and Qatar’s Prime Minister offered a significant platform for Somaliland, the official statement released by Doha immediately afterward seemed engineered to erase that very status.

The Qatari Foreign Ministry press release conspicuously described the meeting as covering “the latest developments in Somalia,” and concluded with an unambiguous reaffirmation of “respect for the sovereignty and unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”

This linguistic sleight of hand—using the prestige of a prime ministerial meeting as a backdrop for a political rebuke—was interpreted in Hargeisa as a deliberate affront. Across social media and in commentary by political analysts, the prevailing view was clear: Qatar had staged a high-level photo-op for the sole purpose of reaffirming its hostility toward Somaliland’s political identity in the most public way possible.

“It was diplomatic pageantry with a political knife,” remarked one prominent politician and a member of the President’s party who did not want to be quoted for speaking on the president’s visit. “You don’t grant a president that level of access just to write him out of the story in your press release, this was intentional.” The fallout has only reinforced growing skepticism among Somalilanders about the value of engaging regional powers who remain tethered to the political fiction of Somali unity.

The Double Threat: How Berbera Undermines Qatar’s Entire Regional Strategy

Qatar’s alleged willingness to mediate with Al-Shabaab while propping up the internationally recognized government in Mogadishu is central to its “whole pie” strategy: controlling all major factions to make itself indispensable. According to two regional intelligence analysts and one senior Horn of Africa diplomat, this entire edifice of influence is directly threatened by the emergence of a stable, democratic, and pro-Western Somaliland as a strategic U.S. ally.

A formal U.S.–Somaliland security partnership presents what one source called a “double threat” for Doha. First, it represents a complete rejection of Doha’s Somalia-centric architecture, as a robust U.S. military presence in Berbera would operate entirely outside its influence network. Second, and just as critically, a U.S. base in Berbera would devalue Al Udeid—Qatar’s crown jewel—reducing the Gulf state’s leverage over Washington on a global scale.

The Terror Portfolio: A Lever for Coercive Control

This alleged use of militant proxies fits into a broader, more audacious regional pattern. According to multiple sources in the region’s security community—including one diplomat formerly stationed in Doha—Qatar is actively mediating between Al-Shabaab and elements of the Somali federal government. These sources allege that Doha’s strategy involves using its influence to modulate the group’s operations: easing the tempo of attacks to reward compliance and ramping up violence to punish political defiance. Qatar has previously denied any ties to Al-Shabaab or involvement in Somalia’s internal security dynamics.

Gulf Rivalry and a Trail of Blood

The intense focus on a potential US base in Berbera carries ominous weight when seen through the lens of the Gulf proxy war. A chilling precedent is the assassination of a DP World contractor in Puntland. On February 4, 2019, Paul Anthony Formosa, manager for P&O Ports—a DP World subsidiary—was gunned down at the Bosaso port. While Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, a high-profile leak later suggested a more sinister backstory. In July 2019, The New York Times published a report on a leaked phone call in which a Qatari businessman bragged that violence in Bosaso had been carried out by “our friends” to “make Dubai people run away from there.” While the Qatari government quickly disavowed the individual, the incident underscored the blurred lines between commercial rivalry and sanctioned destabilization.

Escalation Calculus: The Real Cost of Strategic Obstruction

The evidence is mounting that Doha views a U.S. base in Berbera not as a diplomatic inconvenience, but as a direct threat to the heart of its regional strategy. The carefully choreographed outreach to Hargeisa—followed by a calculated public embarrassment—were not missteps. They were the opening moves in what appears to be a broader campaign of obstruction.

Given Qatar’s documented playbook—from alleged backchannel dealings with Al-Shabaab to its reported role in fomenting violence against commercial competitors—the question is no longer if Doha will escalate, but how.

If Qatar was allegedly willing to flirt with sanctioned terror networks and tolerate bloodshed to preserve its influence in Somalia, what measures might it now be willing to employ to shield an $8 billion military asset and salvage its waning relevance in the Horn of Africa? The stakes are exponentially higher, and so too is the potential for coercive interference cloaked in diplomacy.

The Somaliland government did not provide an official, on-the-record comment for this story. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also sent a detailed list of questions regarding the strategic threat a Berbera base poses to Al Udeid, the contradiction between hosting President of the Republic of Somaliland while officially reaffirming Somalia’s unity, and its alleged role as a mediator for the Al-Shabaab terror group. No response was received by press time

DRC Rwanda Peace Agreement 2025: Historic Deal Ends 30-Year Conflict in Great Lakes Region

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Staff
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ANALYSIS | Washington Brokers DRC–Rwanda Peace After 30 Years of War
Based on the U.S. Department of State Weekly Digest Bulletin – June 29, 2025

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a comprehensive peace agreement on June 27, 2025, ending three decades of conflict that has devastated the Great Lakes region of Africa. The signing ceremony at the U.S. State Department, witnessed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, caps months of difficult negotiations and represents a significant diplomatic achievement for the Trump administration.

The DRC-Rwanda peace agreement goes beyond previous failed attempts by establishing concrete mechanisms for implementation, including a joint security coordination system and specific timelines for disarming rebel groups. Most importantly, the 2025 peace deal addresses the central issue that has fueled the Great Lakes conflict: the presence of FDLR militants in eastern Congo, remnants of the forces responsible for Rwanda’s 1994 genocide.

DRC Rwanda Peace Agreement Details: Key Provisions and Implementation

Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, who led the U.S. negotiating team for the DRC-Rwanda peace talks, structured the discussions around specific operational details rather than broad promises. The comprehensive peace agreement includes provisions for territorial integrity, cessation of hostilities, disarmament of non-state armed groups, and the establishment of a Joint Security Coordination Mechanism building on existing frameworks from the Luanda Process.

The key breakthrough in the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement involves Rwanda’s commitment to lift defensive measures along its border in exchange for concrete action against the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe emphasized that the FDLR “is no ordinary militia” but rather “the remnant of the forces which committed the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994.”

Qatar’s role in the DRC-Rwanda peace process proved crucial despite its official status as an observer. Qatari officials facilitated the initial meetings that broke the diplomatic deadlock in the Great Lakes conflict. Minister of State Mohammed Al-Khulaifi continues separate negotiations between the DRC government and the M23 rebel group, creating parallel tracks that could prove essential for lasting peace in the region.

U.S. Africa Policy 2025: Strategic Partnerships and Diplomatic Engagement

The DRC-Rwanda peace agreement signing coincided with several other African diplomatic engagements that reveal broader U.S. Africa policy priorities under the Trump administration. Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued statements marking independence celebrations for Mozambique, Madagascar, and Djibouti—each highlighting different aspects of American strategic interests in Africa.

Mozambique’s 50th independence anniversary statement emphasized U.S.-Africa partnerships in critical minerals, natural gas, and agriculture. Madagascar’s 65th independence celebration focused on maritime security and cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and African nations. Djibouti, marking 48 years of independence, was praised for its role in Horn of Africa regional stability and its hosting of American military facilities.

These diplomatic statements, while ceremonial, indicate which African partnerships the U.S. considers most valuable: resource-rich countries, maritime security partners, and strategic military hosts in key regions like the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes.

Statement from Senator Jim Risch: “A Real Chance for Lasting Change”

In a strong show of bipartisan support, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Senator Jim Risch (R-ID), who attended the signing, issued the following statement:

“President Trump and Secretary Rubio have shown crucial leadership in working to end the brutal conflict in Eastern Congo, a conflict that has driven regional instability and immense human suffering for decades. While the signing of this agreement does not guarantee immediate peace, it creates a real chance for lasting change. Now, it is up to the parties to honor and fulfill their commitments.

It is in America’s national security interest to see this agreement fully implemented without delay. There must be consequences if the parties fail to deliver, or spoilers undermine its implementation.”

Great Lakes Conflict Resolution: Implementation Challenges Ahead

Both foreign ministers acknowledged the significant challenges facing DRC-Rwanda peace agreement implementation during the signing ceremony. DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner warned that “no text, however carefully negotiated, can carry on its own the weight of peace.” She referenced feedback from Congolese women’s organizations demanding “a peace that is real, lived, shared, and built with us.”

The Great Lakes peace agreement’s immediate test will come with the planned White House summit in the coming weeks, where DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwanda President Paul Kagame will meet to finalize implementation details. More challenging will be the actual disarmament of armed groups and the return of displaced populations—processes that have derailed previous Great Lakes conflict resolution efforts.

Rwanda has already indicated it will begin implementing the neutralization of FDLR forces, while the DRC has committed to facilitating the return of Rwandan refugees. These parallel processes will require sustained international monitoring and support to succeed in ending the decades-long Great Lakes conflict.

Congressional support for the DRC-Rwanda peace process has been notable, with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch and Senator Mike Rounds attending the signing ceremony. This bipartisan backing may prove crucial for maintaining American engagement during the difficult implementation phase of the Great Lakes peace agreement.

African Conflict Resolution 2025: Regional Impact and Future Prospects

The Great Lakes conflict has affected far more than just the DRC and Rwanda over the past three decades. Millions of people have been displaced by the DRC-Rwanda conflict, regional trade has been disrupted, and armed groups have proliferated across Central and East African borders. The 2025 peace agreement could unlock significant economic potential in a Great Lakes region rich in minerals essential for global technology production.

Success in DRC-Rwanda peace agreement implementation might also influence other African conflict resolution efforts. Senior Advisor Boulos has already indicated that Sudan represents the next target for similar U.S. mediation efforts, suggesting the Trump administration sees this as a replicable model for American diplomatic engagement in African conflicts.

However, the Great Lakes region’s history of failed peace agreements suggests caution about long-term success. Previous DRC-Rwanda peace efforts have collapsed when international attention shifted elsewhere or when domestic political calculations changed. The presence of multiple armed groups like M23 and FDLR, weak state institutions, and competing economic interests all pose ongoing threats to sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region.

The involvement of Qatar in African diplomacy adds another significant dimension to conflict resolution efforts. Gulf states have been expanding their diplomatic and economic presence across Africa, often in coordination with rather than competition against Western powers. This U.S.-Qatar cooperation in the DRC-Rwanda peace process could become a template for future diplomatic initiatives across the African continent.

This analysis of the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement is based on official U.S. Department of State documents and statements from the June 29, 2025 Weekly Digest covering African diplomatic developments.

Unlocking Economic Potential: How Somaliland Can Attract Ethiopian Trade and Investment

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1. Strategic Location and Geopolitical Leverage

Somaliland, with its prime location on the Gulf of Aden and immediate proximity to Ethiopia, holds unparalleled potential as a trade and logistics gateway for the landlocked East African giant. Currently, over 90% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade is channeled through Djibouti, a logistical overreliance that raises costs and exposes the country to potential supply chain vulnerabilities (AfDB, 2019). Somaliland’s Berbera Port and the Berbera Corridor, backed by substantial investments from DP World and the UAE, offer an efficient and competitive alternative, reducing both distance and time for goods traveling from Ethiopia’s highlands to international markets (DP World Berbera, 2022). Furthermore, the historical, cultural, and commercial ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland lay a strong foundation for deepening trade relations. As emphasized by the World Bank (2020), landlocked economies benefit significantly from diversified trade corridors. To capitalize on this, Somaliland must actively present itself as a politically stable and business-ready partner, an image it can sustain given its track record of relative peace in a volatile region.

2. Infrastructure, Connectivity, and Trade Facilitation

Infrastructure remains the cornerstone of Somaliland’s ambitions to attract Ethiopian trade. The modernization of Berbera Port, equipped with a new container terminal and extended quays, has enhanced its capacity and global appeal. In parallel, the Berbera Corridor has already facilitated increased goods movement, while plans for rail connectivity with Ethiopia could unlock bulk freight opportunities, reduce road congestion, and enhance efficiency (AfDB, 2021). Logistics infrastructure like dry ports, bonded warehouses, and cold storage facilities near the Tog Wajale border is essential to manage cargo effectively and expand perishable goods trade. Harmonized customs procedures and digitized trade systems, as advocated by the World Economic Forum (2020), can reduce border delays by up to 40%, further boosting trade competitiveness. Moreover, energy security through potential Ethiopia–Somaliland cooperation in renewable power can support industrial zones and processing plants. Establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along the corridor will offer Ethiopian manufacturers tax incentives, simplified regulations, and a strategic location to re-export to Gulf markets.

3. Regulatory Reforms and Investment Climate Improvement

Attracting sustained Ethiopian investment requires a transparent, efficient, and legally secure business environment. Somaliland must prioritize reforms to ease business registration, ensure contract enforcement, protect investor rights, and reduce tariffs on capital goods (World Bank Doing Business Report, 2021). A bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Ethiopia, even under Somaliland’s unrecognized status, could offer Ethiopian investors legal certainty and arbitration frameworks. Lessons from the East African Community (EAC Report, 2020) show that trade agreements and regulatory harmonization can increase intra-regional trade by up to 30%. Institutional capacity must also be strengthened: customs officers, port personnel, and investment promotion agencies require technical training and resourcing. The establishment of a Somaliland-Ethiopia Joint Trade Commission could serve as a formal mechanism to resolve disputes, coordinate investment initiatives, and evaluate cross-border bottlenecks. Additionally, international agencies like UNCTAD (2021) underscore the importance of anti-corruption policies and public-private partnerships in building investor trust areas, where Somaliland must show consistent progress.

4. Investment Opportunities and Sectoral Diversification

Somaliland’s economic transformation depends on diversifying investment inflows beyond ports and livestock. Ethiopian entrepreneurs and firms can explore untapped sectors such as agro-processing, fisheries, renewable energy, tourism, and financial services. The Berbera Corridor provides an ideal base for agro-processing ventures that add value to farm produce from both Ethiopia and Somaliland, targeting export markets (ITC, 2021). Ethiopia’s proven success in renewable energy projects, especially hydropower and wind, offers an opportunity for technology transfer and grid interconnectivity to support Somaliland’s industrial ambitions (IRENA, 2020). The livestock sector, long a regional staple, can also be formalized with joint quarantine, veterinary, and export systems aimed at Gulf consumers. As Ethiopia’s urban middle class grows, Somaliland’s tourism industry, featuring coastal sites and cultural heritage, could attract leisure and business travelers, particularly with improved connectivity. Moreover, investment in services such as telecom, education, and banking would enhance both economies and foster regional interdependence (World Tourism Organization, 2019).

5. Partnerships, Risk Management, and Future Outlook

To unlock its full economic potential, Somaliland must strategically engage regional and global partners. Collaborating with IGAD, the African Union, and financial institutions like the World Bank and AfDB will provide technical assistance, capacity building, and infrastructure financing (AfDB, 2020). The UAE’s investments in Berbera signal international confidence in Somaliland’s trade proposition, which can be used to attract Ethiopian firms seeking a stable logistics partner with global linkages (Gulf News, 2021). Diaspora networks from both countries, particularly in Addis Ababa and Hargeisa, can play a pivotal role in mobilizing capital, building trust, and facilitating market entry. However, challenges remain: political non-recognition restricts access to some multilateral mechanisms; infrastructure must be maintained; and trade must be secured from smuggling and conflict. Risk mitigation strategies such as trade insurance, customs cooperation, and environmental safeguards are necessary for sustainability (UNODC, 2019). With a visionary approach blending diplomacy, reform, and cross-border cooperation, Somaliland is poised to become Ethiopia’s second major trade lifeline, reshaping the economic map of the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Somaliland stands at a pivotal moment in its economic development trajectory, uniquely positioned to emerge as Ethiopia’s strategic trade partner in the Horn of Africa. Its proximity, political stability, and ongoing infrastructure upgrades—especially through the Berbera Port and Corridor have laid the foundation for a mutually beneficial trade and investment partnership. As documented by the World Bank (2020), diversified trade routes are essential for landlocked countries like Ethiopia to reduce dependency, enhance resilience, and drive down transaction costs. Somaliland’s offer of a competitive logistics alternative supports this goal, while also boosting its economic profile.

Furthermore, the African Development Bank (2021) and UNCTAD (2021) emphasize that infrastructure must be complemented by institutional reform, investment-friendly policies, and regional cooperation to unlock true trade potential. Somaliland’s efforts to modernize customs, implement regulatory reforms, and engage in bilateral diplomacy are aligned with these recommendations. The successful expansion of the Berbera Port under DP World’s management also mirrors findings from Gulf News (2021), which show that international partnerships significantly enhance investor confidence and operational efficiency in emerging markets.

Most importantly, the economic synergy between Ethiopia and Somaliland can go beyond logistics. As shown in studies by the International Trade Centre (2021) and IRENA (2020), sectoral integration in agro-processing, renewable energy, and services can create value chains that benefit both nations. By leveraging these sectoral complementarities, Somaliland can position itself not just as a transit hub, but as an active contributor to regional industrialization and economic diversification.

To realize this vision, however, Somaliland must maintain momentum in infrastructure development, invest in institutional capacity, and adopt risk mitigation mechanisms against political and economic uncertainties echoing policy recommendations from the International Crisis Group (2020) and UNODC (2019). If coordinated effectively, these strategies can transform the Ethiopia Somaliland corridor into a model for trade-led regional integration, offering a resilient, efficient, and inclusive economic bridge that benefits millions across the Horn of Africa.

References

  • African Development Bank (AfDB). (2019–2021). Regional Infrastructure & Trade Reports.
  • DP World Berbera. (2022). Port Development Briefings.
  • World Bank. (2018–2022). Trade Corridors and Doing Business Reports.
  • International Trade Centre (ITC). (2021). Trade Facilitation in Africa.
  • UNCTAD. (2019, 2021). Investment Promotion and Legal Framework Reports.
  • World Economic Forum. (2020). Trade Digitalization Insights.
  • IRENA. (2020). Renewable Energy in the Horn of Africa.
  • Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perception Index.
  • Gulf News. (2021). UAE–Horn of Africa Trade Projects.
  • UNODC. (2019). Illicit Trade and Border Security Reports.
  • East African Community (EAC). (2020). Trade Integration Reports.
  • World Tourism Organization. (2019). Regional Tourism Trends.

About the Author

Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali is an infrastructure analyst based in Somaliland, specializing in regional development across the Horn of Africa with particular expertise in Somaliland’s infrastructure landscape. Drawing from more than ten years of hands-on experience in project leadership and infrastructure development, he combines practical field knowledge with academic excellence as both a researcher and senior lecturer. Eng. Mouktar Yusuf holds a Master of Science degree in Project and Programme Management and Construction Management, positioning him as a leading voice on infrastructure policy and development in the region.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Qatar’s Somaliland Gambit: Strategic Masterstroke or Trojan Horse?

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The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro’s” departure for Qatar aboard a private jet, following an official invitation from Doha, has ignited a critical question that cuts to the heart of Horn of Africa geopolitics: What does Qatar, long considered Somalia’s primary patron state, truly want with Somaliland?

This unprecedented diplomatic overture arrives at a moment when global discourse on Somaliland’s recognition has reached a fever pitch. The invitation represents either a breakthrough that finally acknowledges Somaliland’s strategic value, or a calculated maneuver to drag Somaliland back into the Somali quagmire that Qatar has spent years cultivating.

The Qatar-Somalia Nexus: Following the Money

Qatar emerged as the main backer of former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo,” with opposition figures and international observers alleging that Qatari influence shaped the 2012 and 2017 election outcomes through financial incentives. This established Doha as the power broker behind Mogadishu’s political theater. Farmajo’s current residence in Doha—following reports of his 2019 renunciation of U.S. citizenship—serves as a permanent reminder of Qatar’s deep investment in Somali political figures.

For over a decade, Qatar has poured resources into Somalia, positioning itself as the indispensable mediator in a failed nation that exists only in headlines and the occasional complaint about violation of its territorial integrity. Yet here stands Qatar, extending a formal invitation to the very entity that represents Somalia’s greatest existential challenge.

The contradiction is stark: Why would Somalia’s primary benefactor legitimize the leadership of a territory that Mogadishu claims as its own? The answer may lie in Qatar’s broader agenda—controlling the entire “Somali” equation by maintaining influence in both Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

Uncle Sam: The Elephant in the Bab-al-Mandeb

The United States may be the geopolitical force driving Qatar’s sudden interest more than any Gulf rivalry. Washington’s engagement with Somaliland has moved well beyond diplomatic courtesy calls.

A recent U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley and Gen. Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command, traveled to Somaliland to meet with President Cirro and discuss “shared security, maritime, and defense interests.” The delegation’s assessment of infrastructure capabilities at Berbera port signaled concrete steps towards deeper military cooperation.

Outgoing AFRICOM Chief, General Langley with Somaliland Military Chief and US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley in Hargeisa, Somaliland

This strategic pivot reflects America’s escalating competition with China. Somaliland represents a rare opportunity: a stable, pro-Western partner in a region where Beijing has made significant inroads. While Somalia maintains complex relations with China, Somaliland’s formal bilateral ties with Taiwan position it as a natural ally in America’s strategic competition.

The shift is becoming explicit at the highest levels of U.S. policymaking. “I believe that a serious conversation about U.S. recognition of Somaliland is both necessary… and is long overdue,” stated Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He emphasized that a stable partnership would make Somaliland “a strong economic partner committed to integrating into the American global security system.”

Qatar, serving as Washington’s go-to mediator in complex regional disputes, likely possesses greater insight into American strategic thinking than even Somaliland’s government. If the U.S. is moving toward recognition—driven by the imperative of securing the Bab-al-Mandeb chokepoint and countering Chinese influence—Qatar must position itself advantageously before that decision crystallizes.

UAE President, Emir of Qatar meet in Doha to discuss close bilateral ties, regional developments

The UAE Factor: Gulf Rivalry Spills into Africa

Qatar’s overture cannot be separated from its bitter rivalry with the UAE. Despite being Somaliland’s largest foreign investor through DP World’s development of the Berbera port, the UAE has remained cautious about offering political concessions. Abu Dhabi has consistently stopped short of providing the diplomatic recognition that Somaliland seeks most desperately.

If Abu Dhabi won’t provide political legitimacy to match its economic investments, Doha may seize the opportunity to outflank its Gulf rival by offering what the UAE won’t: genuine diplomatic engagement at the highest levels. This invitation represents the latest move in a proxy chess game that has transformed the Horn of Africa into another theater for Gulf competition.

The Recognition Trap: Mediation or Manipulation?

The central question remains: Is this genuine outreach or a sophisticated gambit designed to revive the dormant Somaliland-Somalia dialogue under Qatari mediation?

Qatar has brokered agreements in the Horn before, consistently working to strengthen central government structures. If Doha’s objective is to restart what Mogadishu calls “reconciliation talks,” President Cirro’s government must proceed with extreme caution. This concern is particularly acute following Somaliland’s formal suspension of all dialogue with Somalia in April 2025, a move made in response to what it termed “calculated provocation” from Mogadishu.

Somaliland - Somalia talks from President's Ahmed Mahamoud Siilanyo to President Muse Bihi Abdi

These talks have served Somalia’s devious yet brilliantly simple purpose: convincing the international community and the world at large that Somaliland is not serious about recognition and is, in fact, working to “reconcile” with Mogadishu. While achieving nothing substantive, these talks have been a masterpiece of Somali diplomatic deception. Somalia frames the process as reconciliation between estranged brothers, while Somaliland politicians have repeatedly fallen into the trap of repackaging them as a “dialogue for separation”—a contradiction that has only muddied Somaliland’s narrative on the global stage.

The psychological effect has been devastating. Every time Somaliland leaders sit down for these talks, they inadvertently signal to the world that perhaps their independence isn’t so final after all. International observers see these discussions and conclude that even Somaliland’s own leadership believes unity remains possible—why else would they keep talking? Meanwhile, Somalia gets to play the patient, reasonable party always willing to welcome its “wayward region” back home.

The Qatar invitation could represent an attempt to revive this diplomatic theater, with Doha positioning itself as the indispensable mediator.

Strategic Implications: The Whole Pie Strategy

Qatar’s approach suggests a “whole pie” strategy—rather than backing either Somaliland or Somalia exclusively, Doha may be positioning itself to control both sides of the equation. By maintaining its traditional support for Mogadishu while simultaneously courting Hargeisa, Qatar could emerge as the indispensable external power regardless of how the recognition question ultimately resolves.

This strategy would mirror Qatar’s broader Middle Eastern approach, where it maintains warm relations with Iran while serving as a key American ally, playing all sides to maximize its leverage and influence.

For Somaliland, the calculation is complex. At a time when recognition momentum appears stronger than ever, with international attention at unprecedented levels, any engagement that could be perceived as legitimizing renewed union talks carries enormous risks.

Official Positions: Exploration, Not Expectations

According to multiple government and diplomatic sources briefed on the matter, the Qatar visit is exploratory in nature and may not yield major visible breakthroughs. “Somaliland is open for business and is willing to explore ways to work with other nations even if there are divergent views on certain areas,” one senior official stated, emphasizing Hargeisa’s pragmatic approach to international engagement.

When pressed about the potential restart of Somaliland-Somalia talks, one source was dismissive: “That is not a thing at the moment and we all know Somalia is not in a position to negotiate anything at the moment, so it may or may not come up during the visit, but our position on the matter is clear.”

This official stance suggests that while Somaliland remains open to dialogue, it recognizes the reality that Somalia’s current state makes meaningful negotiations virtually impossible.

The Moment of Truth

President Cirro’s Qatar visit will be measured not by ceremonial gestures, but by tangible outcomes. If Qatar genuinely recognizes Somaliland’s strategic value and offers meaningful political support, this could mark a historic breakthrough.

However, if the invitation masks an attempt to resurrect failed unity talks under Qatari mediation, it may represent one of the most perilous diplomatic challenges Somaliland has navigated in over three decades.

The question is no longer what Qatar wants with Somaliland—it’s whether Somaliland can get what it needs from Qatar without getting dragged back into the cesspool that has consumed Somalia for generations. The stakes could not be higher, and the margin for error has never been smaller.

THE TIME TO RECOGNISE SOMALILAND IS NOW

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23/06/2025 for immediate release  

The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland will launch a report to mark the 65th anniversary of Somaliland’s independence and call for the UK Government to recognise it as an independent nation.

The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG), chaired by Sir Gavin Williamson, will formally launch its report on Thursday 26th June in the House of Commons. The APPG was formed with the goal of promoting an understanding of and support for Somaliland’s achievements in building peace, democratic governance and a sovereign state in the Horn of Africa. It is chaired by the Rt Hon Sir Gavin Williamson CBE MP, with Kim Johnson MP as co-chair, Abtisam Mohamed MP as vice chair and Lord Udny-Lister as an officer.

The APPG’s report, entitled “Roadmap to Recognition” argues that the UK should recognise Somaliland for economic, strategic, and moral reasons, and underlines Somaliland’s potential to be a key democratic partner in what is a volatile yet geopolitically significant region.

In particular, the report highlights the leading role the UK should play in recognising Somaliland, considering its deep historical ties with the country, the presence of a large Somaliland diaspora in the UK, and the UK’s role as UN penholder for Somalia.

The report also proposes the establishment of an “Independence Institution” to provide the government with independent and technical advice; ideas for and the development of government policy; and overarching implementation of government-agreed policy and initiatives.

Sir Gavin said: “In a world that is becoming more unpredictable and unstable, the United Kingdom needs all the friends and allies it can get. Somaliland has built a stable and democratic society against all the odds, and is a bastion of good governance in an otherwise volatile region.

Not only would recognising Somaliland grant the UK an immense strategic advantage in the Horn of Africa, but it would also open up new commercial opportunities and new markets. Moreover, recognising Somaliland’s efforts to promote democratic governance would send a strong signal to other developing nations.

Somaliland deserved recognition when it re-established its independence from Somalia in 1991. The next best time to recognise Somaliland is now.”

ENDS

A Strategic Pivot: Why Recognizing Somaliland Counters China’s Silent Conquest of Africa

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By Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal

China’s growing dominance in Africa is rarely overt. Instead of military bases or flag waving infrastructure inaugurations, it proceeds quietly through economic encroachment and strategic debt. This is China’s “silent conquest” of Africa.

Although in the Indian subcontinent, Sri Lanka offers the most vivid warning. In 2017, unable to repay a billion-dollar Chinese loan, the Sri Lankan government was compelled to lease Hambantota Port and adjacent lands to a Chinese state enterprise for 99 years. This was not simply a financial deal; it was the ceding of sovereign territory with latent military implications. In Africa, similar patterns are emerging with alarming frequency.

Zambia’s debt to China has surpassed six billion dollars. Concerns have mounted that ZESCO, the national electricity utility, may be collateralized in the event of default. Leaked documents and stalled audits reinforce fears of strategic asset forfeiture. In Nigeria, over five billion dollars in Chinese loans have funded critical infrastructure under agreements that often bypass the nation’s legal syatem, granting China considerable leverage in the event of disputes. These clauses are opaque and rarely debated in public forums. Civil society and lawmakers are rightfully worried that national autonomy is being sold off in increments.

In Somalia, Chinese support for road construction and urban development is intertwined with limited public transparency and weak institutional oversight. Chinese influence in Mogadishu, closely aligned with that of Turkey, has formed an axis of external control in a state that cannot meet its own security or budgetary needs. Allegations of unexplained wealth surrounding President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his inner circle further illustrate the risks of unchecked foreign entanglements.

China’s political leverage was also evident in Somalia’s decision to ban Taiwanese citizens from entering Somaliland’s airspace—a move widely viewed as Chinese effort to undermine the burgeoning relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. The move was met with condemnation from the United States, which invoked the Taipei Act to register its disapproval. The ban also placed Somalia at odds with democratic donors, jeopardizing development assistance and isolating the country further.

Beijing’s strategy extends beyond bilateral engagements. Its economic influence has translated into political capital within global institutions. In the United Nations General Assembly, the African voting bloc—increasingly indebted to China—often aligns with Beijing on key resolutions, challenging the institution’s ability to uphold democratic values and norms.

To respond to these challenges, the United States must act with precision and principle. America’s strategic interests require deeper, more equitable engagement across the African continent. That includes strengthening the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), not as a vague ambition, but as a defined, funded and continent specific program. In addition, a similar dedicated US Africa initiative could provide a better focused, reliable alternative for infrastructure development, digital ecosystems and credible security partnerships.

Nowhere is this engagement more urgent than in the Horn of Africa, and no country in the region offers the US a clearer opportunity than the Republic of Somaliland. A politically stable and democratically governed country that occupies a geostrategic position of vital importance. It lies along the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a maritime route through which nearly 10 percent of global trade flows. Its location alone makes it a valuable partner in ensuring freedom of navigation and countering authoritarian expansion.

Equally important, Somaliland is rich in untapped hydrocarbons and rare earth minerals, including gold, lithium, copper and silver. Although unrecognized, it holds regular multiparty elections and has maintained internal stability for over three decades. Somaliland also fulfills the universally accepted criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention in that it has a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The former British protectorate gained independence on June 26, 1960 and was recognized by the international community. Its subsequent union with Somalia was never ratified, violating Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. After years of violence, genocide and state collapse, Somaliland reclaimed its independence in 1991. A 2001 national referendum reaffirmed that decision.

For the US, formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty could represent a diplomatic masterstroke, a strategic pivot in offsetting China’s influence across Africa. A strong US-Somaliland relationship would provide a vital counterweight to Beijing’s growing presence in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the region. It would also create a base of democratic cooperation along one of the world’s most strategic and sensitive shipping corridors. Recognition would also signal America’s commitment to rewarding democratic governance and stability. Somaliland has held regular multiparty elections for over three decades and maintained internal peace in one of the world’s most volatile regions. It offers the United States an opportunity to support a self-reliant, democratic partner rather than an aid-dependent state vulnerable to external manipulation.

China’s expanding presence in Africa is not unstoppable. Across the continent, reformers, civil society groups and citizens are pushing back, demanding accountability, transparency and genuine partnership. Africa does not need tokenism or symbolic engagement, but a credible alternative to China’s debt driven model.

If the United States is to reclaim its relevance in Africa, it must bring vision and commitment to the table. The defining measure of great influence in the coming decades will not be hard power or military engagement, which undermines both economic progress and political stability, but rather the policies and partnerships each of these two major contenders has to offer Africa. A principled US-Somaliland relationship, grounded on democratic values and mutual respect, would be a credible and enduring place to begin.

In this context, Congressman Scott Perry’s introduction of the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act in the United States House of Representatives represents a timely and strategic development. It affirms that recognition of Somaliland is not only morally sound and legally justified, but also fully aligned with the national interests of the United States. The proposed legislation offers a clear and credible congressional pathway toward formal diplomatic recognition and merits broad bipartisan support.

This moment also presents a strategic opportunity for Somaliland’s close partner, the Republic of China (Taiwan), to discreetly lobby the 229 member Congressional Taiwan Caucus, the largest caucus in the U.S. Congress, in support of the bill.

For its part, the Republic of Somaliland must launch a focused public diplomacy and media outreach campaign in Washington to build the necessary momentum and ensure the legislation gains meaningful traction.

About the Author

Ambassador Mahmoud Adam Jama Galaal currently serves as the Republic of Somaliland’s Representative to Taiwan. A seasoned diplomat and politician with extensive experience in African and Asian geopolitics. Ambassador Galaal has held multiple senior government positions,

including Ambassador to Ethiopia, State Minister for Planning and National Development, and State Minister for Health. He has represented Somaliland in high-level negotiations across the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and is widely recognised for his expertise in regional security and development strategy. His work draws on a strong background in law, governance, public policy, and international advocacy.

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.

Somaliland Forges Key Alliances In Mombasa to Build National Deposit Insurance System

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Central Bank delegation secures foundational partnership with Taiwan and technical support from African counterparts at International Association of Deposit Insurers conference

A delegation from the Central Bank of the Republic of Somaliland, led by Deputy Chairman Hamse Khayre has secured critical partnerships to establish a national deposit insurance system, a foundational step toward strengthening the country’s banking sector. The progress was made at the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) Africa Regional Committee conference, held in Mombasa, Kenya, from June 16-19, 2025.

The event, co-hosted by the Kenya Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), focused on building resilient financial safety nets across the continent. For the Somaliland team, the objective was clear: learn from established systems and forge the alliances needed to build its own.

“Confidence in banking begins with trust—and trust begins with strong institutions like deposit insurance,” said Deputy Chairman Hamse Khayre, who led the Somaliland delegation. “This forum brought together Africa’s financial safety net leaders to tackle the big questions: how to prepare for crisis before it strikes, and how to protect depositors with confidence.”

A Foundational Partnership with Taiwan

The most significant outcome was a bilateral meeting between Deputy Chairman Khayre and Ms. Yvonne Fan, an IADI Board member and Executive Vice President of Taiwan’s Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). The discussion focused on direct collaboration to create a Deposit Insurance Unit within Somaliland’s Central Bank.

“Meeting with Taiwan’s CDIC Executive Vice President Yvonne Fan was a turning point in our journey to establish a unit that protects our people’s savings,” Khayre stated, emphasizing the breakthrough.

This financial collaboration deepens the existing relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. “The shared values between Taiwan and Somaliland continue to open new pathways, not only in diplomacy but also in financial sector development,” Khayre noted.

The delegation also held productive sessions with deposit insurance agencies from Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Namibia, and Turkey to discuss best practices and potential technical support.

“We are not starting from scratch,” Khayre reflected. “With the right partners, Somaliland can design a deposit insurance system that is both homegrown and globally respected.”

“From Ghana to Namibia, South Africa to Turkey — every meeting was a reminder that financial resilience is not built in isolation, but through shared experiences and mutual support,” he added.

Why Deposit Insurance Matters for Somaliland

Establishing a deposit insurance system is a core part of the Central Bank’s strategy to modernize Somaliland’s financial architecture. For an emerging economy, such a system encourages citizens to move their savings from informal methods into the regulated banking system, providing banks with a stable capital base for lending and investment. The psychological impact cannot be understated – when people trust that their deposits are protected, they participate more actively in the formal financial system.

The global standard-bearer remains the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), established in 1933 following the Great Depression. The FDIC’s guarantee of deposits up to $250,000 per account has virtually eliminated bank runs in America for over nine decades. When Americans see the “FDIC Insured” sign, they know their money is safe regardless of economic turbulence. This confidence translates directly into economic stability and growth.

For Somaliland, the need is particularly acute given the territory’s unique position. Its lack of formal international recognition creates barriers that force reliance on traditional hawala money transfer systems for international transactions. These networks, while historically important, typically charge fees of 8-15% compared to the 1-3% seen in standard international banking. Building robust, internationally recognized financial frameworks represents a pathway toward overcoming these barriers and reducing transaction costs for citizens and businesses.

The territory has seen significant growth in mobile payment systems, with services like ZAAD and eDahab becoming widely adopted. However, these innovations exist alongside regulatory challenges that the Central Bank continues to address as part of its broader modernization efforts.

The Somaliland delegation included Mohamed Abdullahi Ali (Director, Financial Institutions Supervision), Abshir Abdi Mohamed (Director, Monetary Policy), and Mahmoud (Senior Advisor, Bank Deposit Insurance). Their participation reflects a targeted effort under the leadership of Central Bank Governor Abdinasir Ahmed Hirsi to implement comprehensive financial reforms.

“Deposit insurance isn’t just a policy—it’s a promise. And Somaliland is preparing to make that promise to its people,” Khayre declared.

As the delegation returns to Hargeisa, the focus will shift from diplomacy to policy implementation. The partnerships forged in Mombasa provide a roadmap for a system that could strengthen Somaliland’s banking sector while building the institutional credibility needed for broader economic development.

One-Somalia Policy Under Review as US Turns to Somaliland

By
Staff
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0

Ambassador Riley’s diplomatic mission signals Washington’s growing interest in direct engagement

Key Points

  • U.S. Ambassador Riley led a rare full-team visit to Hargeisa, signaling deepening ties.
  • Washington is reviewing its One-Somalia policy and considering a diplomatic office in Somaliland.
  • Media misreported visit as military-related—no U.S. military officials were present.
  • Berbera featured prominently in talks amid growing U.S. interest in regional security.
  • Somaliland Presidency and Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the visit.

HARGEISA – In a visit described by insiders as anything but routine, US Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley brought his full senior team to Hargeisa this week for closed-door meetings with Somaliland’s leadership. The high-level delegation included Deputy Chief of Mission Steven Gillen and senior Political, Economic, and Military Affairs officers—essentially the entire top brass of the US mission to Somalia. After spending the night in Hargeisa, the group flew to Berbera the next morning. No public statements were issued by either side.

“This wasn’t a courtesy call,” said one Somaliland government source, speaking on condition of anonymity. “When the entire embassy leadership comes and stays the night, something significant is happening.”

Multiple sources confirmed to the Chronicle that Washington is quietly reassessing its decades-old One-Somalia policy—a diplomatic framework that treats Somalia as a single territorial entity and has long precluded formal US engagement with Somaliland. Officials are now weighing the possibility of opening a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, akin to the UK’s arrangement, as part of a shift toward what sources describe as a “reality-based approach.”

For decades, the One-Somalia policy has served as the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the Horn of Africa. Under this framework, the United States has recognized the sovereignty of Somalia as a unified state, avoiding any bilateral dealings with Somaliland to avoid legitimizing its independence claim. The approach has long frustrated Somaliland officials, who argue that their democratic governance and relative stability warrant separate recognition.

This would mark a clear departure from the approach of previous ambassadors—such as Donald Yamamoto and Larry André—whom a retired U.S. official described as “more Catholic than the Pope” in their rigid adherence to Mogadishu-centric diplomacy.

Ambassador Riley, a 30-year career diplomat who assumed his post almost a year ago, appears to be charting a new course. His decision to bring the full embassy leadership signals that the discussions were treated as a strategic priority. The visit also comes just days ahead of AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley’s expected trip to Somaliland—his final stop before stepping down—a move that adds military weight to the evolving relationship.

Although some media outlets rushed to frame the visit as AFRICOM-centric—fueled by social media clips of V-22 Osprey helicopters hovering over Berbera—there were no U.S. military officials present in this delegation. The coverage largely missed the fact that this was a full-spectrum diplomatic mission led by Ambassador Riley, not a defense-driven operation. The real story was in Hargeisa, behind closed doors.

“The Americans are clearly interested in more than development assistance,” said a second source familiar with the talks. “Berbera came up repeatedly.”

Berbera Port, now operated by DP World, has grown into a strategic logistics hub serving Ethiopia’s trade and sitting along critical Red Sea shipping lanes—where Chinese influence has surged. Defense analysts have identified it as a prime location for projecting U.S. power in the region and countering emerging threats.

Details of the Hargeisa meetings with President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” and his senior team remain closely guarded. A Somaliland official would only describe the discussions as “seeking engagement in areas of mutual interest”—a diplomatic phrase that has done little to quell speculation.

That speculation has only intensified following public statements by Somaliland officials expressing openness to hosting U.S. forces. Sources suggest the talks included discussion of long-term military and strategic cooperation, potentially including a U.S. presence in Berbera.

The shift in U.S. posture comes amid signs of growing frustration with Somalia’s federal government. In recent months, Somalia has pivoted to China and Washington has significantly slashed funding particularly in the security sector, imposed new travel restrictions on Somali travellers, and quietly scaled down its presence in Mogadishu due to persistent security and governance concerns. These moves reflect what some analysts see as a broader recalibration of U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa.

In what may be a further sign of deepening engagement, sources indicate that President Cirro is preparing for an official visit to the United States, although the timeline remains unclear. While Somaliland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Washington just last month—meeting with multiple U.S. legislators including Ted Cruz of Texas and Scott Perry—there is still no confirmation on which figures from President Trump’s adminstration in State or Defense the Somaliland delegation might engage.

The contrast in diplomatic posture is becoming impossible to ignore. For decades, the U.S. has funneled aid and engagement through federal institutions in Mogadishu. Now, Riley’s direct outreach to Hargeisa—backed by possible military coordination—signals a break with that status quo.

“They’re talking about something more permanent,” one source said, referring to the proposed diplomatic presence. Privately, some U.S. officials describe the idea of Somali unity as a “fiction,” and see Somaliland as a functional, stable partner worth engaging on its own terms.

Recent shifts in American policy—reduced aid flows, travel restrictions, and a more restrained presence in Mogadishu—have further highlighted the growing appeal of Somaliland’s relative stability and functioning institutions.

Somaliland’s foreign ministry did not respond to multiple requests for comment. The Office of the President also declined to engage, despite repeated inquiries. The silence from both institutions has only fueled speculation about the depth and direction of this new chapter in US-Somaliland relations.

The upcoming visit by General Langley may serve as a litmus test for whether defense cooperation will form a pillar of this emerging relationship. If the military angle takes shape, it would represent not just a diplomatic shift—but a significant recalibration of American strategic posture in the Horn of Africa.

After thirty years of wishful thinking in Mogadishu, Washington may finally be ready to deal with the Horn’s realities—not its illusions.

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