‘No Prior Notice’: U.S. Contradicts Somalia’s ISIS Strike Claims

February 2, 2025

Senior U.S. government officials have contradicted Somalia’s claims about coordination with Washington following a U.S. airstrike targeting ISIS operatives in northern Somalia, raising questions about Mogadishu’s reliability as a security partner. Military experts note that operational security protocols would preclude sharing strike details with Somalia, given the documented infiltration of government institutions by militant groups. Past incidents where sensitive operational information leaked through compromised officials have demonstrated the risks of pre-strike coordination in regions with significant extremist penetration of state structures.

Conflicting Claims Over U.S. Airstrike

In a statement, Villa Somalia claimed “President Hassan was informed of the U.S. strike targeting senior ISIS leadership in northern Somalia this evening,” and praised “the continued commitment under the decisive leadership of President Donald Trump.” However, U.S. sources speaking to Somaliland Chronicle directly refuted this account, confirming no such coordination or prior notification took place.

“Coordination with Somalia was on paper, something AFRICOM would generally say as a matter of courtesy, but the United States does not need permission from anyone to neutralize threats anywhere in the world,” a former U.S. military official familiar with operations in the region told Somaliland Chronicle. The official added that operational security considerations would make such coordination unlikely, particularly given Somalia’s own admission of Al-Shabaab infiltration within its security apparatus. This makes Villa Somalia’s false claim of prior coordination not just misleading but potentially dangerous to operational integrity.

Pete Hegseth, United States Secretary of Defense

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the strikes in a statement, saying the military’s initial assessment was that “multiple operatives” in the remote Golis Mountains were killed. The operation involved Navy and Air Force warplanes, including F/A-18 fighter jets from the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman operating in the Red Sea, according to Defense Department officials. President Trump addressed the operation on social media, stating the strikes had killed a “Senior ISIS Attack Planner and other terrorists he recruited” who were “hiding in caves.”

Patterns in U.S. Military Operations in Somalia

This strike follows a pattern established during Trump’s previous administration, when he significantly expanded military operations in Somalia. In March 2017, Trump designated parts of Somalia as “areas of active hostilities,” granting commanders greater autonomy to conduct strikes. The escalation was dramatic: from just 14 strikes in 2016, operations increased nearly fourfold to 47 strikes in 2018, reaching 63 strikes in 2019. Notable operations included a November 2017 strike that killed over 100 al-Shabaab militants near Mogadishu and March 2019 strikes that eliminated senior al-Shabaab leaders in the Lower Shabelle region. However, despite these sustained efforts, extremist groups continue to maintain a foothold in Somalia.

Aid Suspension and Mogadishu’s Security Narrative

The conflicting narratives over this latest airstrike come as the U.S. has paused 90% of foreign aid spending, with only Israel and Egypt receiving exemptions, according to Reuters. The aid freeze has significant implications for Somalia, which received over $1.5 billion in U.S. foreign assistance between 2019 and 2023, making it one of the largest recipients of American aid in sub-Saharan Africa. A former U.S. State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, described this massive investment as “a cycle of unfulfilled commitments that has cost American taxpayers billions while failing to achieve lasting security improvements.”

Villa Somalia’s statement, which emphasized “the strong security partnership between Somalia and the United States,” and President Hassan Sheikh’s recent Washington Post op-ed positioning Somalia as a crucial ally in counterterrorism efforts, appear part of a broader campaign to preserve U.S. backing.

However, Somalia’s security assertions have faced mounting skepticism. Hassan Sheikh’s approach to Al-Shabaab has been notably contradictory. In November 2023, he declared Somalia had “one year to eliminate Al-Shabaab,” vowing to decisively defeat the militant group by the end of 2024. Yet on the same day, in an interview with The National, he expressed willingness to negotiate with the group, emphasizing that dialogue could be a path to peace. This dual approach of promising military victory while offering negotiations has undermined the government’s credibility in both military and diplomatic spheres, according to regional security analysts.

Puntland’s Role and the Persistence of Extremist Groups

The situation in Puntland, where the U.S. strike occurred, presents additional challenges to Somalia’s counterterrorism narrative. While the semi-autonomous region has maintained relative stability compared to southern Somalia, its mountainous terrain has provided refuge for both Al-Shabaab and ISIS elements.

Security experts have documented instances where captured militants later rejoined extremist ranks, leading to criticism of Puntland’s approach to handling terror suspects. The Golis Mountains, specifically targeted in this strike, have been a persistent safe haven for ISIS operatives despite repeated military operations in the area.

U.S. forces have previously conducted significant operations in Puntland, notably the January 2023 raid that eliminated Bilal al-Sudani, identified by the Pentagon as a key ISIS financier, along with 10 other operatives in the Cal Miskaad Mountains. That operation was particularly significant as U.S. officials confirmed al-Sudani’s influence extended across Africa into Europe and linked him to the ISIS branch in Afghanistan responsible for the August 2021 Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members. Despite such high-profile operations, extremist groups continue to exploit the region’s complex terrain, according to U.S. military assessments.

Shifting U.S. Policy Toward Somalia

As Somalia’s government struggles to establish effective control beyond Mogadishu, skepticism within the U.S. is growing. Newly trained Somali special forces units have been deployed, yet Al-Shabaab continues to carry out attacks in major cities. According to recent U.N. reports, the group maintains its operational capacity in areas the government claims to have secured.

Unlike previous administrations that largely maintained steady support despite Somalia’s security challenges, current U.S. officials appear increasingly willing to question Mogadishu’s narratives and aid utilization. “The era of taking Mogadishu’s claims at face value is over,” said a current U.S. defense official who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic matters.

With aid suspended and increasing scrutiny over Somalia’s security claims, Hassan Sheikh’s efforts to maintain U.S. support face significant challenges. The direct contradiction of Villa Somalia’s statements by U.S. officials marks a potential watershed moment in bilateral relations. This incident, combining false claims about military coordination with ongoing concerns about counterterrorism effectiveness, suggests a fundamental reassessment of U.S.-Somalia security cooperation may be underway. The implications could reshape not only the military partnership but also the broader relationship between Washington and Mogadishu in the years ahead.

Somaliland: A pillar of stability, economic potential, and strategic relevance in the Horn of Africa

Staff

January 31, 2025

Set apart by its home-grown democratic governance, coherent foreign policy, great economic potential, and strategic maritime relevance, Somaliland has become a singular and indispensable actor in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland has maintained peace, promoted democracy, and created a strong economic foundation for more than three decades, so defying the volatility that defines most of the region. Its dedication to responsible government and capacity to effectively organise peaceful elections define it as a political mature model in Africa. Unlike many of the surrounding countries, Somaliland regularly holds free and fair elections whereby people choose their leaders and manages power transitions free from conflict. The combination of conventional and modern governance systems has produced a strong and stable political system that guarantees state institutions operate as they should, and people stay involved in the political process. The people of Somaliland define their government’s legitimacy, therefore strengthening a system whereby the state stays answerable to the voters.
Driven by a philosophy that gives regional security, mutual economic advantage, and dependable international partnerships first priority, Somaliland’s foreign policy has remained surprisingly constant for the past three decades.

Somaliland has developed its ties based on respect, cooperation, and a clear strategic goal unlike many other states in the Horn of Africa that routinely find themselves caught in diplomatic conflicts. Its position as a reliable security partner has been crucial in guaranteeing the stability of the Gulf of Aden and beyond. By combating piracy, stopping illegal cargo, and securing international trade routes, Somaliland has actively contributed to maritime security by means of well-trained security troops and a competent coast guard. Somaliland’s foreign policy is important because it can reconcile national goals with global expectations, therefore rendering it a desirable and dependable ally for security and economic projects. Somaliland has instead promoted trade-driven alliances ensuring mutual development and prosperity by rejecting the conventional reliance on foreign aid that defines most of the African continent.
With its rich key mineral deposits, prospective oil and gas reserves, and wide blue economy prospects, Somaliland has great economic potential but mostly untapped capacity.

Significant stocks of vital minerals including lithium, uranium, and rare earth elements—all of which are vital for high-tech sectors, renewable energy development, and worldwide supply chains—have been confirmed by geological studies of Somaliland. Somaliland’s critical importance in the global economy is positioned by the rising demand for these resources from all across the world. Attracting growing interest from investors and energy corporations looking to investigate Somaliland’s petroleum potential, the undeveloped oil and gas reserves also present a transforming economic possibility. Somaliland might become a major energy supplier with the correct infrastructure and investment, therefore lowering regional reliance on imported foreign fuels and greatly increasing its own economic development. Another underused resource is the blue economy; Somaliland’s lengthy coastline along the Gulf of Aden has great possibilities in logistics, marine trade, and fisheries. Although the sector has one of the best fishing zones in the area, infrastructure and little investment keep it mainly underdeveloped. Somaliland may generate jobs, improve food security, and increase exports by releasing this potential, therefore helping to contribute greatly to national economic development.

The strategic maritime location of Somaliland at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden increases its worldwide trade importance. Somaliland, acting as a gateway between Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, has great potential to develop as a significant commerce and logistical centre. Thanks in great part to DP World’s development of the Berbera Port, Somaliland’s position in regional trade has been much enhanced—especially by providing landlocked Ethiopia with a substitute path for imports and exports. Along with diversifying Ethiopia’s trade reliance, this development puts Somaliland as a major East African transit hub. Somaliland’s strategic advantage still mostly consists of maritime security. Its stability in the Gulf of Aden guarantees the secure passage of world energy shipments and international trade, therefore promoting regional and worldwide economic security.

Maintaining a steady, piracy-free coastline helps Somaliland to safeguard one of the busiest maritime routes worldwide, therefore supporting its importance as a global partner.
Unlike many African nations dependent mostly on foreign assistance, Somaliland has developed a strong and essentially self-reliant economy. By means of taxes, customs fees, and trade, it creates income guaranteeing financial independence and stability. Although aid reliance sometimes results in foreign political influence and economic vulnerabilities, Somaliland’s model of economic self-sufficiency improves its autonomy and negotiating position in international interactions. With laws that guarantee that investment corresponds with national development goals and helps to create a business-friendly environment, foreign direct investment is increasingly important in Somaliland’s economic plan.

Somaliland promotes long-term national development and progress by giving investment top priority over aid, hence fostering sustainable economic alliances. This realistic economic strategy guarantees that international cooperation stays mutually beneficial, therefore avoiding predatory economic systems that can afflict countries depending on help.
Globally trade, security, and development depend on Somaliland’s geopolitical importance, economic potential, and democratic government. Unlike many other African countries, Somaliland has effectively instituted democratic institutions ensuring political stability and peaceful power transitions. Built on reliability and strategic alliances, its foreign strategy guarantees that it stays a trustworthy actor in regional and international events. The undeveloped economic resources of the nation—including important minerals, oil, gas, and maritime sectors—offer investors and worldwide markets a chance to profit from its resources while also helping the nation to grow economically. The strategic location of Somaliland increases its significance as a trade and security centre, therefore guaranteeing effective and safe worldwide trade.

Somaliland presents itself as a viable and self-reliant country able to create fair and profitable international ties by keeping financial independence and following trade-driven economic policies. Somaliland’s global involvement should be deepened, so it is essential that the world community appreciates its sovereignty and contributions. The values of Somaliland—democracy, economic development, and regional stability—align with those of world powers and international organisations. Interacting with Somaliland serves not only a political but also a strategic need for improving security, economic development, and stability in the Horn of Africa. Not only would recognition and integration into the global economic and diplomatic system help Somaliland, but it would also improve the larger geopolitical scene by guaranteeing a trustworthy friend in a territory vital for world trade and security. The moment has arrived for the world to honour Somaliland’s achievements, respect its sovereignty, and include it into the international community as an autonomous and indispensable actor in world events.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mohamed Hagi (PhD) is a diplomat, politician and academic currently serving as the Advisor to the President for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. He was formerly the Somaliland Ambassador to Taiwan. Dr. Mohamed Hagi holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Department of History, Politics and Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

“The Era of Photo-Ops is Over”—Except When It Isn’t

Staff

January 31, 2025

Inside President Cirro’s Enigmatic UAE Visit

In his first major foreign visit since taking office, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” embarked on a high-stakes trip to the United Arab Emirates—an engagement that, under normal circumstances, would serve as a defining moment for his administration’s diplomatic posture. Instead, the visit has generated more questions than answers, veiled in an unusual level of secrecy that contrasts sharply with Somaliland’s traditionally public approach to foreign relations.

For a leader who campaigned on promises of change, the trip presented an opportunity to showcase a fresh direction for Somaliland’s international engagement. However, the near-total absence of official communication during the visit—coupled with a belated and carefully curated media rollout upon the delegation’s return—has left many Somalilanders wondering: Is this the dawn of a new, results-driven diplomacy, or a worrying shift toward opacity in governance?

The Specter of Past Leadership

The visit’s controversy began a day after the delegation departed, as rumors circulated about the departure of former Presidents Muse Bihi Abdi and Dahir Riyale Kahin to UAE to join the President’s delegation. While further investigation revealed that only Bihi had traveled to the UAE, his concurrent presence and vague social media explanations citing a “personal visit” created an unnecessary political distraction. Sources close to the matter suggest Bihi’s travel timing was coincidental, possibly health-related, though this remains unconfirmed. The overlap, whether intentional or not, cast a shadow over the official proceedings and sparked speculation about potential behind-the-scenes involvement.

Streets of Somaliland's capital adorned with flags of Guinea-Conakry

A Diplomatic Black Box

The stark contrast between this visit and previous diplomatic engagements couldn’t be more pronounced. Where past administrations maintained—and at times overplayed—their diplomatic engagements, as evidenced by former President Bihi’s controversial visit to Guinea-Conakry, complete with banners of their since-deposed leader Alpha Condé adorning the capital, President Cirro’s three-day UAE stay was marked by an unprecedented information vacuum. The sole official visual documentation emerged not from Somaliland’s government but from the Abu Dhabi Fund, which released a single photograph of its chairman’s meeting with the President.

Multiple sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, have confirmed that the delegation engaged in extensive high-level discussions focused primarily on expanding UAE investments in Somaliland. Given the UAE’s position as Somaliland’s premier foreign investor, these talks were expected to strengthen existing economic ties. However, the presence of Somaliland’s intelligence chief in the delegation and reported meetings with UAE security counterparts suggests a broader agenda, potentially encompassing enhanced military cooperation and intelligence sharing arrangements.

The Paradox of Transparency

The administration’s messaging upon return created its own contradictions. The delegation’s return to Egal International Airport finally broke the silence, though the substance remained thin. Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Aden Bakaal detailed meetings with UAE’s top leadership, including the Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, as well as ministers of foreign affairs, economy, and labor. He emphasized the UAE’s unique position as Somaliland’s primary investor, citing DP World as their largest investment project to date.

“We had very productive discussions and achieved tangible outcomes that will bring progress and development to our country,” Minister Bakaal assured the press, though specific details remained notably absent. He outlined broad areas of potential cooperation including livestock, agriculture, natural resources, minerals, and oil exploration, while highlighting discussions about employment opportunities for Somaliland’s youth, who comprise 70% of the population.

The Minister of Presidency, Khadar Hussein Abdi, went further in framing the administration’s new approach: “We want to tell the Somaliland people that this government is working to deliver tangible results for the public, not to show them pictures.” Yet this declaration was immediately undermined by the government’s release of numerous photographs documenting the delegation’s return—a striking contrast to their media blackout during the actual visit.

President Cirro’s notable absence from the public briefing raised additional questions, as his ministers delivered broad assurances without substantial detail. The administration’s selective approach to transparency—extensively documenting the departure while maintaining silence during the visit—has led many to question whether this strategy reflects careful diplomatic maneuvering or masks a lack of concrete achievements.

The False Choice of Secrecy vs Success

Defenders of the administration’s approach, including Presidential Advisor for Foreign Affairs Dr. Mohamed Hagi, Somaliland’s former Representative to Taiwan, have advanced an argument that presents a false dichotomy between diplomatic success and public transparency. Their position—that covert diplomacy is a strategic necessity for unrecognized states—attempts to draw parallels with historical breakthroughs like the Camp David Accords and U.S.-China rapprochement.

However, this comparison fundamentally misunderstands both the nature of those diplomatic achievements and Somaliland’s current context. The Camp David Accords and Nixon’s China opening required initial secrecy precisely because they represented radical departures from established policy between adversaries. The UAE, by contrast, is already Somaliland’s closest ally and premier foreign investor. The argument that standard diplomatic engagement with an existing partner requires the same level of secrecy as historic peace negotiations between adversaries strains credibility.

Transparency vs Opacity: The Somaliland – Ethiopia MoU Lesson

The administration’s secretive approach becomes even more questionable when contrasted with the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia. That agreement, though ultimately unrealized, sent shockwaves through the Horn of Africa and beyond, catapulting Somaliland into an unprecedented international spotlight. Like a diplomatic meteor, the MoU’s announcement transformed Somaliland overnight from a regional actor into a subject of global strategic discourse. Major international media outlets, think tanks, and foreign policy establishments that had long relegated Somaliland to footnotes suddenly found themselves analyzing its strategic significance. The publicity surrounding the MoU, more than its substantive mechanics, achieved what years of quiet diplomacy could not—it forced Somalia and the international community to engage with Somaliland on the diplomatic stage rather than ignore its existence.

Former President Bihi with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at the signing of Somaliland - Ethiopia MoU on January 1st, 2024

In contrast, Cirro’s UAE visit, shrouded in secrecy, has diminished its potential diplomatic impact. For a newly elected president tasked with reinforcing Somaliland’s democratic credentials, this approach risks undermining the very principles that have distinguished Somaliland in its pursuit of international recognition. The suggestion that diplomatic success requires opacity presents a false choice—Somaliland’s most successful international engagements have historically benefited from public scrutiny and debate.

As Somaliland continues its journey toward international recognition, the balance between diplomatic discretion and public accountability becomes increasingly crucial. While every negotiation may have elements that require confidentiality, the wholesale embrace of diplomatic opacity threatens to undermine the democratic transparency that has long set Somaliland apart. The administration’s promise that “details will eventually be disclosed” offers little comfort in a democracy where public oversight should be the foundation, not an afterthought.

Somaliland: Trump’s Realist Foreign Policy in Action

Staff

January 27, 2025

Trump’s recognition of Somaliland goes beyond just countering Chinese influence. It reflects a practical need to bring back realism – a foreign policy approach that emphasizes U.S. national interests and addresses the limits of relying too heavily on international institutions through the lens of Liberalism.

The Shortcomings of Liberalism in the Horn of Africa

Liberalism has worked well for Europe with the creation of the EU. It sets a high standard that inspires other regions like Africa with the African Union. However, this worldview has been damaging to both the United States and Somaliland. Globalization has allowed China to use trade as a weapon through pressure tactics, while not living up to the liberal expectation that China would be a fair player globally. Somaliland, with its Berbera port and relatively large population, could have benefited from a decentralized international system driven by shared trade. However, due to the strict application of the liberal theory of international law, their trade is invisibly labelled as Somalia’s, with all the negative failed state connotations that come with it. The focus on cooperation between many parties has also put Somaliland at a disadvantage, leading to its isolation and hindering both its human capital and hard-won sovereignty and freedom.

Supporters of liberalism believe they can change the international system by promoting democracy through engaging non-governmental organizations, the diaspora, and sometimes war. However, this approach has had negative impacts on Somaliland. Somaliland’s homegrown democracy has not only been disregarded but actively undermined by UN agencies directly in the early 1990s and later indirectly by offering weapons and full recognition to Somalia but not to Somaliland. In contrast, realism starts with the view that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no central authority governing relations between states, and that states act mainly in their own national interest. This, for example, better explains Turkish involvement in Somalia; it is not primarily about global collaboration and trade but about securing 30% of Somalia’s resources as a neo-colonial power. The issue is not with liberalism itself but with how it conceals the ongoing geopolitical dynamics.

The rigid application of liberal internationalism in Somalia has produced measurable policy failures. Since 1991, international interventions guided by liberal institutional frameworks have cost tens of billions in US assistance, yet key measures of state functionality have declined. Most of southern Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab terrorists. This is unsurprising as the World Bank’s governance indicators show Somalia’s government effectiveness score has decreased sharply since 2000, while Transparency International consistently ranks it among the world’s most corrupt states. These outcomes reflect a fundamental flaw in the liberal approach: the assumption that external support and institution-building can replace organic state development. This systemic failure demands a recalibration of international engagement strategies in the region.

A Realistic Alternative for The Horn

From a realist perspective, Somalia’s failed state status stems from its fundamental inability to define and pursue consistent national interests. It does not support the influx of foreign aid and intervention that has created a dependency that erodes both domestic accountability and the state’s capacity for self-governance in Somalia. In a realist view, international relations should prioritize state capacity over external intervention.

A realist foreign policy shift, shown by Trump’s proposed withdrawal from Somalia and recognition of Somaliland, could spark Somalia’s transformation toward genuine self-governance. This dual approach serves multiple strategic interests: it pressures Somalia to establish effective control over its territory while acknowledging Somaliland’s successful state-building model. Somaliland’s economic self-sufficiency and democratic stability align with America’s vision of an Africa built on strategic partnerships rather than aid dependency. This creates a blueprint for U.S. engagement that enhances regional stability while advancing American interests.

Building Consensus Through Strategic Realism

Far from being a spur-of-the-moment decision, the recognition of Somaliland emerges from years of careful policy development within America’s foreign policy establishment. This methodical approach is evidenced by sustained efforts ranging from several bills to recognize Somaliland, to Senator James Risch’s successful incorporation of the Somaliland Partnership Act into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act – marking Somaliland’s first formal recognition in U.S. law. This builds upon the groundwork laid by former Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, whose earlier diplomatic initiatives for Somaliland recognition were constrained primarily by institutional deference to the African Union.

The implementation of this policy represents the culmination of long-term strategic planning rather than a sudden shift in U.S. foreign policy. The Somaliland-US partnership has been developed through extensive consultation with policy institutions, national security experts, and diplomatic professionals, demonstrating how strategic realism can unite different political actors behind well-researched foreign policy objectives.

State Recognition: Restoring Sovereign Prerogative

The recognition of states remains fundamentally a sovereign prerogative, not subject to institutional vetoes. This principle holds particular relevance for Somaliland, whose independence predates both the African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. While multilateral institutions serve valuable purposes, their recent effective monopoly over state recognition has created a rigid international system that fails to address legitimate cases of state formation. This institutional gridlock ignores historical precedent – the emergence of nations like Ireland, Bangladesh, and the United States itself demonstrates that state formation often requires bilateral recognition outside multilateral frameworks. The current system’s rigidity perpetuates regional instability by denying diplomatic solutions to unique cases that fall outside conventional parameters.

Realism provides a more nuanced approach to state recognition that aligns with U.S. strategic interests. It enables the United States to distinguish between unique cases like Somaliland and separatist movements. This secures two national US interests: preserving independence-era borders in Africa and recognizing Somaliland. On the other hand, the vulnerability of liberalism is already evident: China has leveraged institutional frameworks to advance its regional influence, particularly through its growing sway over non-democratic states within the African Union. This reality demonstrates how rigid multilateralism can weaken rather than protect genuine African decision-making.

To illustrate, the United States brings a unique historical perspective and diplomatic expertise in understanding state formation. This expertise stems from both its founding history and its extensive diplomatic record worldwide. U.S. State Department archives document America’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence in 26 June 1960, predating the existence of many modern African states. This historical precedent is particularly significant because it established a clear U.S. position: that the legitimacy of any union between Somaliland and Somalia would depend on the popular consent of both people and not just Mogadishu. While subsequent State Department interpretations have attempted to reframe this history through a liberal institutional lens, the original diplomatic record provides a clear foundation for contemporary U.S. policy considerations.

Numerous historical events and documents demonstrate that Somalilanders have rejected the final Act of Union and that it was never ratified. Academic literature consistently highlights that the union was not legitimately established. The African Union’s own fact-finding mission in 2005 confirmed this assessment, though the organization failed to act—a shortcoming that underscores the limitations of multilateral institutions compared to the institutional memory of sovereign states like the United States.

The U.S. has precedent in addressing forced unions, as seen in its stance on the Baltic states. In such cases, the United States did not view the situation as secession, but as a matter of state continuity. Just as the Baltic states were illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union, Somaliland was similarly incorporated into the now-collapsed Somali Republic. This will not be the first time the U.S. adjusts its diplomatic positions, as evidenced by its previous shift in recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The U.S. experience in navigating complex cases of state formation highlights the soft power that allows it to lead Somaliland’s recognition more effectively than the African Union.

The Horn of Africa in the Indo-Pacific Century

The Horn of Africa stands distinctly apart from the rest of the continent, characterized by its unique geopolitical landscape and openness to external interventions. Recent diplomatic developments, such as Turkey’s mediation of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, underscore this region’s complex international dynamics. Somaliland’s strategic position becomes even more significant in this context, transcending traditional regional boundaries. Its connections to Taiwan and its location place it at the intersection of African and Indo-Pacific geopolitical interests, as outlined in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The strategic imperative is clear: diversify regional influence and prevent Chinese monopolization. By expanding diplomatic and strategic relationships with Somaliland, and potentially extending similar engagements to Ethiopia and Kenya, the United States can offer African nations a meaningful alternative to China’s growing economic and political influence. This approach empowers African states by providing them with more strategic options and reducing dependency on a single global power.

Strategic Timing and Military Implications

The current global landscape makes this strategic pivot to realism particularly timely. The limitations of liberal internationalism are increasingly evident across multiple strategic theatres: protracted conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine’s complex relationship with international institutions, and the deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea.

The timing for Somaliland recognition is critically opportune. The potential shock of such a move has been minimized by recent diplomatic developments, including Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. This approach naturally aligns with the strategic imperative to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia, positioning Somaliland’s recognition as a signature foreign policy move that reestablishes realism as the cornerstone of future American diplomatic strategy.

Militarily, a presence in Somaliland would provide exceptional strategic value. Its geographic position offers a unique opportunity to reduce U.S. dependence on bases in the Arab Gulf while simultaneously securing American interests across three critical regions: the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea corridor, and the sphere of Iranian influence in these regions.

Conclusion

Recognizing Somaliland presents a defining opportunity to cement a realist approach to foreign policy. The Somaliland case demonstrates how realist foreign policy can achieve what decades of liberal internationalism could not: supporting genuine African democracy without creating aid dependency or requiring military intervention. This strategic realignment would not only reshape the Horn of Africa’s political landscape but also provide an opportunity to reexamine our understanding of the international system.

About the Author:

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

UAE’s Strategic Pivot? Cirro’s Visit Signals New Regional Dynamic

Staff

January 26, 2025

In a carefully orchestrated diplomatic gesture that speaks volumes about shifting alliances in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates rolled out the red carpet for Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Cirro today, dispatching a private Royal Jet to ferry the newly elected leader to Abu Dhabi for his first overseas visit since taking office. Beyond boilerplate statements about mutual interests from the Presidential spokesman, however, the specific agenda for this high-profile visit remains notably opaque, despite President Cirro’s campaign promises of transparency in foreign dealings.

As Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investor, the UAE’s commitment is most visibly demonstrated through Dubai-based DP World’s $442 million investment in Berbera Port, transforming it into an emerging regional trade hub. In his election campaign, Abdirahman Cirro was an outspoken critic of the DP World agreement, questioning its transparency and terms. His presence in Abu Dhabi now puts him in the delicate position of either maintaining that critical stance or potentially moderating his position to secure UAE support at a crucial moment in regional politics.

The timing of President Abdirahman Cirro’s visit suggests a potential watershed moment in UAE’s Horn of Africa strategy. Following a deadly Al-Shabab attack in February 2024 that killed three Emirati troops and a Bahraini officer, the UAE has largely withdrawn from its engagement with Mogadishu. This tragic incident, coming after years of strained relations marked by Somalia’s 2018 seizure of Emirati funds and pro-Qatar stance, appears to have pushed Abu Dhabi toward a definitive choice. The question now looms: Is the UAE finally abandoning its dual-track approach to embrace Somaliland exclusively, seeing in Berbera’s stability an alternative to Mogadishu’s volatility?

The timing of this diplomatic overture gains added significance amid the recent rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somaliland’s diplomatic capital has been tested by Ethiopia’s pivot back toward Somalia, effectively shelving the port access memorandum of understanding and strengthening Somalia’s post-ATMIS security architecture. This shifting landscape might paradoxically strengthen Cirro’s negotiating position with the UAE, as Abu Dhabi’s strategic interests in Berbera intersect with rapidly evolving regional dynamics.

Adding another layer of intrigue to the visit is the presence of Dr. Abdirahman Duale Beileh, Cirro’s newly appointed Economic Advisor. Beileh, Somalia’s former Finance Minister, received a presidential pardon from former President Muse Bihi before joining Cirro’s administration. Current government officials, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of internal arrangements, describe Beileh as operating as a de facto Finance Minister, though his formal appointment to the cabinet was likely avoided due to his recent Somalia government role and potential political sensitivities. The simultaneous presence of both the Finance Minister and Dr. Beileh in the delegation suggests substantive discussions about expanding UAE’s investment portfolio in Somaliland may be on the undisclosed agenda.

Hanging over these discussions is the unresolved status of Berbera Airport. The UAE secured parliamentary approval in 2017 to establish a military base at the facility, but under former President Bihi’s administration, contradictory statements emerged about its intended use – initially announced as a UAE military base, then later described as converted to civilian use after a supposed lease cancellation. Despite significant upgrades, the facility remains largely inactive, its future uncertain. The airport’s strategic significance is underscored by multiple inspection visits from AFRICOM, suggesting broader international interest in its potential military applications.

While the official agenda remains undisclosed, Cirro’s delegation composition hints at the visit’s scope and ambition. The presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Presidency, Minister of Finance and Economic Development, and notably, the Intelligence Chief suggests discussions will extend far beyond ceremonial pleasantries.

The three-day visit also includes scheduled meetings with the substantial Somaliland diaspora community in the UAE, whose remittances form a crucial pillar of Somaliland’s economy. Last year alone, remittances to Somaliland from overseas exceeded $1.3 billion, with a significant portion originating from the Gulf states.

The visit raises questions about the broader geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa. With China maintaining a military base in neighboring Djibouti, and various Gulf states jockeying for influence across the region, Somaliland’s strategic location and deep-water port have turned it into an increasingly important piece on the regional chessboard. The potential shift in U.S. foreign policy under a returning Trump administration, particularly with a more pragmatic State Department leadership, could present Somaliland with additional strategic options for military cooperation beyond current arrangements.

However, Somaliland’s leverage in these negotiations may depend on its ability to engage directly with potential partners, particularly the United States, rather than relying on intermediaries like the UAE. As regional dynamics shift and multiple powers express interest in Somaliland’s strategic assets, Hargeisa would be well-served to comprehensively evaluate its options before making binding commitments or overextending its strategic partnerships.

As President Abdirahman Cirro settles into his meetings in Abu Dhabi, the key questions remain unanswered, masked by diplomatic protocol and official silence. Will this visit mark the beginning of a deeper strategic partnership? Is the UAE preparing to go all-in on Somaliland? The answers may well shape the future of not just Somaliland, but the entire region.

President Abdirahman “Cirro” Appoints Military General to Police, Untested Commander to Lead Army

Staff

January 24, 2025

President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s appointment of Major General Abdurahman Abdullahi Hassan Allale “Abdi Dhere” as Police Commissioner and Lieutenant General Nimcaan Yusuf Osman Gahnug as Army Chief has sent shockwaves through Somaliland’s reform community, coming just 24 hours after launching what he called a transformative initiative to eliminate ghost personnel from security forces’ payrolls through biometric registration.

The timing of these appointments – which maintain military control over civilian law enforcement and place an untested commander at the helm of armed forces engaged in active combat – has raised profound questions about the new administration’s commitment to its campaign promises of institutional reform and professional security services.

“The appointment of a military general to head the Somaliland police is unexpected and sets back any possibility of police reform,” prominent human rights lawyer Guleid Jama told Somaliland Chronicle. “The police is not a military institution. It is currently affected and shaped by the history of the military regime under the brutal dictatorship of Siad Barre. The people of Somaliland decided in 1991 to end military rule over civilian institutions and created a civilian and republican government. It is an affront to democracy to militarize the police.”

While President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s young administration has maintained a commendable record of not detaining journalists or suppressing peaceful protests, the appointment of another military commander to head the police force threatens this brief honeymoon period. Critics argue that militarized policing has historically undermined public trust and accountability, perpetuating practices that the president himself condemned while in opposition.

The appointment of Lieutenant General Nim’an Yusuf Osman Gahnug to lead the National Army raises equally serious concerns about military preparedness. Despite formal military training in Taiwan and Ethiopia and experience commanding both the Presidential Guard Unit and Gamadiid Special Forces units, questions persist about his combat leadership experience at a critical moment in Somaliland’s security landscape.

This appointment comes as Somaliland faces its most serious security challenges in years. The conflict that began in Las Anod has now spread into the Sanaag hinterland, yet the new administration has failed to articulate any concrete strategy to address these expanding security threats. Military observers note that the new army chief faces the daunting task of proving his battlefield credentials while simultaneously implementing reforms to tackle systematic corruption that has drained military resources for years.

Perhaps most revealing of the administration’s priorities is President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s decision to name former Police Commissioner Brigadier General Mohamed Adan Sagadhi (Dabagale) as his advisor on police matters – the same official he repeatedly accused of orchestrating human rights violations while in opposition. “Surprisingly, the president made Dabagale his adviser on police issues,” Jama observed. “The president, when he was the opposition leader, is on the record accusing the police under the leadership of Dabagale of committing human rights violations. Dabagale is not a changed man.”

These appointments reflect deeper structural challenges within Somaliland’s governance system. The presidential decree mandating biometric registration by February 2025 aims to combat a longstanding practice where senior military and police officials allegedly inflate their salaries through non-existent personnel. However, the selection of leaders deeply embedded in this system raises questions about implementation.

“As the president recently admitted, his appointments are mostly driven by tribal quotas and pressure from powerful individuals,” Jama explained. “This negatively affects the appointment of qualified individuals and mostly excludes women. There is clearly a lack of preparation from the president’s side. It seems he was solely focused on getting to power. Now he is in power, and he does not have a plan.”

The implications extend far beyond personnel decisions. Human rights organizations have documented how militarized policing has historically facilitated excessive force during public demonstrations, while mechanisms for investigating and addressing police misconduct remain woefully inadequate. The force’s training continues to emphasize military-style tactics over civilian law enforcement practices, and attempts to establish meaningful civilian oversight have been consistently thwarted.

The success of the biometric registration initiative, which promises a 50% salary increase for security personnel, now rests in the hands of the very officials who have benefited from the system it aims to reform. Sources within the security sector, speaking on condition of anonymity, express skepticism about whether these appointments signal genuine reform or merely a reshuffling of familiar faces.

The Presidency did not respond to detailed questions about the selection criteria for these positions, their alignment with reform goals, or President Abdirahman “Cirro” government’s strategy for addressing mounting security challenges in the east. As Somaliland grapples with its most significant security crisis in years, the contrast between President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s campaign promises and his early appointments suggests a troubling continuity with the practices he once condemned.

Somaliland President Orders Security Forces Salary Increase and Biometric Registration

Staff

January 22, 2025

Fulfilling a key campaign pledge, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” has issued Presidential Decree No. 02/012025, mandating a 50% annual salary increase for Somaliland’s security forces contingent upon successful implementation of IRIS Biometric Registration. The reform package, aimed at modernizing the security sector, requires all personnel to complete biometric enrollment by February 2025.

The decree addresses longstanding concerns about payroll fraud and “ghost personnel” within Somaliland’s armed forces, custodial corps, and police. By linking compensation directly to verified identities, the administration aims to ensure public funds reach only legitimate security personnel. This technological approach mirrors successful implementations in countries like India, Nigeria, and Ghana, where biometric systems have proven effective in reducing payroll irregularities.

However, the administration’s retention of existing security leadership has raised questions about its commitment to comprehensive reform. Major General Nuh Ismail Tani continues as Chief of Staff of the Somaliland Armed Forces, despite criticism over the military’s declining operational capacity during his decade-long tenure. Similarly, Police Commissioner Brigadier General Mohamed Adan Saqadhi (Dabagale) remains in his position, notwithstanding past allegations of civil rights abuses—accusations President Abdirahman “Cirro” himself raised while in opposition.

The reform’s ambitious 30-day implementation timeline faces significant challenges, particularly in registering personnel in remote and conflict-affected areas. Resistance from entrenched interests benefiting from current payroll practices may further complicate the process. Critics point to deteriorating equipment, logistical inefficiencies, and low troop morale as evidence of systemic neglect under the current leadership’s watch.

The phased salary increase over President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s first term marks a significant shift in the management of Somaliland’s security forces. However, without addressing fundamental leadership concerns, these financial incentives and technological reforms risk being undermined by the same institutional weaknesses they aim to correct.

The initiative represents a critical test of President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s governance agenda. While the salary increases acknowledge the security forces’ vital role, the emphasis on biometric registration signals a broader push for institutional modernization. Success will depend on the administration’s ability to overcome logistical hurdles and navigate resistance from within the security establishment.

Somaliland has conducted a successful pilot program in its most recent election that was held in November 2024 but this will be the first time a similar system is being used to ensure integrity and eliminate ghost personnel from the security services.

The retention of controversial leadership figures, however, casts doubt on whether these reforms can achieve their intended impact without addressing deeper institutional challenges. As implementation begins, observers will closely monitor whether the administration can balance its promises of reform with the practical challenges of governance in Somaliland’s complex security landscape.

The success of this initiative will not only determine the effectiveness of the security sector reforms but also shape public perception of President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s broader governance capabilities. As Somaliland strives for increased transparency and accountability, the coming months will reveal whether these reforms represent genuine change or merely surface-level adjustments to long-standing institutional problems.

Trump’s Aid Freeze: Will Somalia Sink or Swim Without U.S. Support?

Staff

January 21, 2025

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first remarks in office laid bare the new administration’s litmus test for foreign aid: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Or does it make America more prosperous?” By these metrics, U.S. assistance to Somalia represents a catastrophic failure on all three counts. President Trump’s executive order suspending foreign assistance exposes the bankruptcy of America’s most expensive state-building experiment in Africa.

“Does it make America safer?
Does it make America stronger?
Or does it make America more prosperous?”

— Secretary of State Marco Rubio

The scale of American taxpayer exposure in Somalia is staggering. In fiscal year 2023, U.S. aid totaled $1.21 billion, creating an elaborate ecosystem of international organizations, contractors, and NGOs that have transformed aid dependency into an industry. The UN system alone received $897.7 million of these funds, demonstrating how international bureaucracies have positioned themselves as permanent intermediaries between donor funds and Somali recipients.

Somalia exemplifies what Secretary Rubio termed the “dangerous delusion” of post-Cold War foreign policy, where “serving the liberal world order” replaced genuine national interests. The humanitarian aid sector perfectly illustrates this dysfunction. In 2023, International Disaster Assistance consumed $873.3 million, flowing primarily through UN agencies that have perfected the art of transforming emergency assistance into permanent institutional infrastructure, with pristine compounds and luxury vehicles becoming the most visible symbols of aid in Mogadishu.

Want to Explore the Source Data?

All the data in this report comes from ForeignAssistance.gov, the U.S. government’s official foreign aid tracker. You can explore:

Detailed transaction records
Implementing partner information
Project-specific data
Historical aid patterns

The security sector epitomizes this dysfunctional aid architecture. In 2023, U.S. security assistance reached $159.6 million, including $128.2 million for peacekeeping operations, yet produced no discernible improvement in Somalia’s security situation. While the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations absorbed the lion’s share of these funds, actual military training of Somali forces received a mere $349,826. This imbalance has created the perverse outcome where Al-Shabaab demonstrates more effective governance and revenue collection than the government itself in territories under its control.

Food assistance tells an equally troubling story, with $88.8 million allocated through Title II grants. This massive investment flows through a labyrinth of intermediaries: U.S.-based NGOs received $152.5 million in total across all sectors, while multilateral organizations consumed $933.9 million. Private contractors collected $77.4 million, while direct support to Somali government institutions amounted to just $18.3 million – a telling indication of donor trust after decades of “capacity building.”

The aid industry’s entrenchment in Somalia has created a parallel economy that serves international organizations rather than local needs. Mogadishu’s real estate market exemplifies this distortion: neighborhoods surrounding NGO compounds and international organization offices have seen property values skyrocket, while basic services remain nonexistent for most residents. The city has effectively been divided into two economies: the aid economy, characterized by high-end restaurants, luxury SUVs, and expensive housing compounds, and the actual Somali economy, where most citizens struggle to access basic services.

Somalia’s government has perfected the use of international aid narratives, often framing crises as existential threats to global security. A striking example is the defunct Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somalia and Ethiopia, which Somali officials portrayed as energizing Al-Shabaab and terrorist networks—conveniently omitting their own incendiary rhetoric. Notably, Somali government leaders have hinted at waging jihad against Ethiopia and Somaliland, further exposing the contradictions in their narrative. Such strategies ensure the uninterrupted flow of aid while deflecting scrutiny of Somalia’s internal governance failures.

Most troubling is Somalia’s cynical exploitation of Western aid while actively courting China’s strategic ambitions in the Horn of Africa. While absorbing over a billion dollars in U.S. assistance in 2023, Mogadishu simultaneously deepened its engagement with Beijing through the Belt and Road Initiative, granted Chinese vessels privileged fishing rights in its territorial waters, and engaged in preliminary discussions about hosting Chinese military facilities. This diplomatic duplicity epitomizes Secretary Rubio’s warning about how the post-war global order has become “a weapon being used against us.”

Critics warning of Chinese or Russian influence filling any aid vacuum fundamentally misread both history and current realities. Despite its diplomatic overtures, Somalia has failed to secure Chinese commitments matching Western assistance levels. Beijing’s engagement in East Africa focuses on countries with stronger institutions and more valuable resources, preferring transactional relationships that deliver concrete benefits rather than open-ended commitments. Similarly, Russia’s limited presence in Somalia serves primarily to extract diplomatic concessions and expand its influence at minimal cost, with no indication that Moscow would shoulder the massive burden of replacing Western aid.

Somalia has mastered the art of leveraging Western humanitarian concerns while pursuing strategic relationships with rival powers. The current aid model has created not a functional state but a sophisticated mechanism for transforming international assistance into institutional maintenance for an aid industry that measures success by money spent rather than results achieved. The $1.21 billion spent in 2023 represents not investment in Somalia’s future but subsidies for an international aid architecture that perpetuates dependency.

The Trump administration’s aid freeze forces a confrontation with uncomfortable truths about America’s post-Cold War approach to foreign assistance. The fundamental question isn’t whether Somalia will face hardship – it will – but whether this might finally break a cycle of dependency that has made Somalia the world’s most expensive failed state. The coming months will reveal whether Somalia’s political class can develop genuine governance capacity or whether three decades of international assistance have created institutions too hollowed out to survive without constant external life support.

In the end, as Secretary Rubio asked in his first address, “How can America promote the cause of peace on Earth if it is not first safe at home?” Somalia’s aid dependency offers a clear answer: it cannot.

Why Somaliland welcomes an “America First” Africa Policy under President Trump

Staff

January 20, 2025

Across Somaliland, a nation with a rich history of resilience and self-sufficiency, 6.2 million citizens celebrate the return of President Trump with enthusiasm. But why is this small, relatively unknown country in East Africa rallying behind Trump’s “America First” agenda?

A History of Struggle and Sovereignty

The Republic of Somaliland is an East African state, roughly the size of Texas which gained its independence from the British on June 26^th, 1960, and restored its sovereignty on May 18, 1991, following a 30-year illegal annexation by what many know as Somalia.

Following a brutal genocide perpetrated by Somalia under dictator Siad Barre, Somalilanders managed to not only restore self-rule, but they have built a flourishing democracy with little help from the international community.

Many media outlets have been struggling to pin-down why this east African nation – which most Americans probably know little if anything of – are today celebrating the return of President Trump.

Somaliland’s Alignment with the “America First” Agenda

Many Somalilanders hope that Trump’s “America First” policy will signal a shift in U.S. African policy, moving away from supporting the failed Somalian government in Mogadishu towards building a strategic partnership with Somaliland.

The belief across Somaliland is that this new direction is an opportunity to align U.S. and Somaliland interests more closely, with a focus on mutual benefits such as regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and economic growth.

Like the United States, Somaliland has recently elected a new President, with the month-old administration banking on the countries positive track record translating into a mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S.

Somaliland’s government believes that if America prioritises its national interests, it will recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty and bolster direct engagement.

Somaliland’s Strategic Importance

Somaliland’s “Trump” card is that it offers the U.S. an alternative to the heavily congested tiny African state of Djibouti. Its port at Berbera, located at the mouth of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, is crucial for global trade and security. Additionally, as the regions only functioning democracy, its strategic location and close ties to Taiwan positions Somaliland as a natural strategic ally for the U.S. in countering China’s growing influence in Africa.

Despite tensions with China over its relations with Taiwan, Somaliland continues to stand firm, despite continuous Chinese threats as well as reports suggesting China is actively arming terrorist groups in Somaliland at the behest of Somalia to destabilise the country.

Frustration with the Biden Administration’s Africa Policy

Somalilanders have been left perplexed by the Biden administrations insistence on a ‘One Somalia’ policy, which by any metric, has been a catastrophic failure, resulting in American taxpayers pouring billions into a black whole, leaving Somaliland feeling sidelined despite its stability and democratic progress.

Somalia’s politicians have successfully influenced American policymakers under President Biden, weaponizing the threat of terrorism from Somalia to justify sidelining Somaliland.

By utilising the likes of Congresswomen Ilhan Omar, Somalia has succeeded in doing the unthinkable, persuading America to adopt policies that diverge from its strategic national interests. This divergence appears to be driven by a fear of potential security related reprisals from a country that depends on international donor funding for 70% of its budget, raising questions about the effectiveness of current U.S. policy in the region.

Growing Support for Somaliland in the U.S.

In recent years, many influential Republicans aligned with President Trump have recognised the shortcomings of the current U.S. approach to Africa, frequently highlighting Somaliland’s credentials as a viable, long-term strategic partner. They argue that recognition of Somaliland could better align U.S. interests in the region, offering stability, counterterrorism collaboration, and a reliable ally in the Horn of Africa.

One recent notable example is Congressman John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, who wrote a letter to outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken, calling for the U.S. to open a representative office in Somaliland, to counter rising Chinese influence in the region.

Additionally, the potential appointment of pro-Somaliland officials like Ambassadors Tibor Nagy and J. Peter Pham in a second Trump administration could lead to a more sympathetic U.S. policy toward Somaliland, aligning U.S. foreign policy with the realities on the ground.

A Hopeful Future

As President Trump’s second term begins, Somalilanders remain optimistic that the “America First” agenda will lead to a more pragmatic U.S. foreign policy, one that prioritises American interests in a way that aligns closely with Somaliland’s own goals of international recognition.

Somaliland’s enthusiasm for Trump’s return is captured in President Abdirahman Irro’s congratulatory message on X, in which he expressed, “We look forward to aligning our partnership with your great country in achieving our shared values of world peace, democracy, and economic growth.” This statement captures Somaliland’s hope for a strengthened relationship with the U.S., built on mutual aspirations and shared interests.

About the Author:

Sharmake Abyan is a London-based political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Somaliland President Thanks U.S. Legislators, Welcomes Prospect of Diplomatic Ties with the United States

Staff

January 20, 2025

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” welcomed growing U.S. congressional support for establishing a diplomatic office in Somaliland, describing it as a milestone in relations between the two nations. In an address to Somaliland’s House of Elders, Cirro specifically praised American legislators’ efforts to strengthen ties with the democratic enclave in the strategic Horn of Africa.

“We commend the American legislators and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress for calling on the United States to open a diplomatic office in Somaliland,” Cirro declared. “Every avenue will be pursued to further solidify this relationship.”

The president’s remarks come amid significant developments in Washington that could reshape U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa. The State Department’s Africa Bureau appears poised for a transformation with the departure of Assistant Secretary Molly Phee. Sources familiar with the matter indicate that Dr. J. Peter Pham, a former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel Region and Great Lakes Region of Africa, could be her successor. Dr. Pham, who served as the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center Director and Vice President for Research and Regional Initiatives, has been a vocal advocate for reconsidering U.S. policy toward Somalia and strengthening ties with Somaliland.

Adding to the potential shifts, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and career diplomat with over 30 years of experience in African affairs, may return to the State Department. Nagy, who previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Guinea, has consistently emphasized the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and demonstrated a deep understanding of Somaliland’s unique position in the region.

Ambassadors Nagy and Pham with then Presidential Candidate Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro” with other officials including Bashir Goth, Somaliland Representative to the United States.

These diplomatic developments parallel growing congressional support. Representative John Moolenaar, Chair of the House Select Committee on the CCP, recently urged outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to establish a diplomatic presence in Hargeisa. The initiative reflects growing recognition of Somaliland’s strategic importance in countering China’s expanding influence in the region.

The bipartisan push gained additional momentum with the introduction of H.R. 10402 by Representatives Scott Perry and Andy Ogles. The legislation advocates for enhanced U.S. engagement with Somaliland, citing its three decades of stability and democratic governance in a historically volatile region.

These initiatives build on earlier efforts, including a significant amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) introduced by Senator Jim Risch, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The amendment emphasized Somaliland’s crucial role in promoting regional stability and countering security threats.

Other nations have already established diplomatic footholds in Somaliland. The United Kingdom, Kenya, and Taiwan maintain offices in Hargeisa, providing a precedent for increased international engagement without compromising existing relationships with Somalia.

“Somaliland remains the beacon of peace and democracy in the Horn of Africa,” Cirro emphasized, outlining his vision for expanded international partnerships. His administration’s pursuit of closer U.S. ties comes at a critical moment for regional diplomacy, as various global powers seek to strengthen their presence in the strategically vital Horn of Africa.

However, challenges remain. Somalia’s Federal Government has launched a counter-campaign through a $50,000-per-month Washington lobbying effort, attempting to portray U.S. engagement with Somaliland as neocolonial interference. Critics have also raised concerns about President Cirro’s previous statements regarding potential talks with Somalia, warning that such negotiations could undermine Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition.

The potential appointments of both Pham and Nagy, combined with broader policy shifts expected under a possible Trump administration, could mark a significant realignment of U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa. Their extensive diplomatic experience and regional expertise suggest a more nuanced approach to Somaliland’s international status may be forthcoming.

As President Cirro’s administration navigates these diplomatic opportunities, the confluence of congressional support and potential State Department changes suggests an evolving relationship between the two nations. Success will require careful balancing of regional sensitivities with strategic imperatives, but the foundation for stronger U.S.-Somaliland relations appears increasingly solid.

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