A delegation from England made up of members of the UK Parliament was received yesterday by MP Sayid Mire Farah (Gire), the First Deputy Chairman of the Somaliland House of Representatives who is also currently the Acting Chairman of that House, together with a number of other representatives.
The members of the UK Parliament, known for staunchly backing the Somaliland case for recognition, are accompanied by journalists from the British media and experts from the College Green Group firm.
London, England is home to the public relations company College Green Group. The company specializes in strategic campaigns and communication, assisting clients in influencing laws and achieving other political objectives.
According to a press release outlining the topics discussed at the meeting, the two sides discussed and exchanged ideas during the meeting at the House of Representatives Chamber. They also emphasized the close ties that exist between Somaliland and Great Britain as well as the role that the UK government can play in assisting Somaliland’s independence, particularly in light of global politics, the Horn of Africa, and the country’s democratic transition.
“Chairman Gire briefed the delegation on the journey of present-day Somaliland Republic for resuming its statehood and the eight one-vote-one-person elections that ensued since 2001 as well as the referendum on the Nation’s Constitution,” according to a statement from the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives in Somaliland is the lower house of the two houses of the Somaliland Parliament, and its role in legislating, monitoring, and representing the electorate is paramount.
The chairman went on to discuss the important laws that he approved during his tenure, including the “Amendment of the General Elections and Voter Registration Act, which made it possible to schedule holding joint elections for the President and the political organizations slated for later this year.”
According to the same press release, members of the ruling Conservative Party in the UK Parliament, Tim Loughton and Alexander Stafford, expressed their appreciation for the warm reception and pledged support for the Republic of Somaliland’s democracy and sound governance.
The delegates emphasized the significance of maintaining peace and commerce in this region for the benefit of the global community as well as the need to fortify the bonds of friendship and collaboration that bind Somaliland to its allies abroad.
“The MPs pointed out the need to work together in order to prevent obstacles that could derail the regaining of Somaliland’s independence by accelerating the international flirtation and highlighting the determination Somaliland people for recognition.”
To further enhance the role that members of both sides may play in strengthening the ties between the two nations, both sides decided to establish a joint forum that links members of the Somaliland Parliament and friends in the UK. This is what the press release stated.
The meeting was attended by MP Hussein Ismail Jama, the chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Somaliland House of Representatives; MP Abu Bakar Said Ali, the deputy chairman of the Finance and Economic Committees; and MP Ibrahim Ali Jama, MP Omar Jama Farah, MP Mubarak Muse Ismail, Prof. Hassan Mohamed Jama (Hasan-Hiis), the presidential advisor on development affairs and international relations, and MP Mohamed Osman Limo of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Investment, and International Relations.
When the Somaliland public went shopping for the impending Eid Fidri, which marks the end of the Holy Month of Ramadan, members of the UK parliament strolled with Mayor Mooge around the downtown area of the nation’s capital city of Hargeisa without fear of terrorist attacks or criminal activity.
Speaking last night on behalf of a visiting UK delegation to Somaliland was Honorable MP Alex_Stafford.
Ethiopia and Turkey, which have had cordial ties since the early 20th century, have drawn even closer in recent years as both battle criticism from the west over domestic policies. But new developments are putting the relationship to the test. These include Turkey assuming the role of protecting Somalia’s waters – deemed to include the Gulf of Aden – as well as efforts by Ethiopia to gain access to the sea through a deal with Somaliland.
Michael Bishku, a Middle Eastern and African history scholar who has recently researched Ethiopia-Turkey relations, explains why Turkey’s ties with Ethiopia are largely economic while those with Somalia are sentimental, in assisting an impoverished Muslim country.
What binds Ethiopia and Turkey historically?
Turkey and its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, have had a long history of interactions in the Horn of Africa, going back to the 16th century. But formal diplomatic ties between Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik II and the Ottoman Empire’s Sultan Abdul Hamid II were not initiated until 1896. At the time, the Ethiopians had just defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adwa. In 1889, the Italians began to occupy the largest share of Somalia, while the British established a protectorate in the Somaliland region in 1898. Ethiopia did not participate in the first world war and Britain and Italy were part of the victorious Entente. After the war, the Ottoman Empire, as part of the defeated Central Powers, was partitioned. Turkey, by 1923, asserted control over Turkish areas of the former empire.
The new Republic of Turkey opened its first embassy in sub-Saharan Africa in Addis Ababa in 1926. Ethiopia reciprocated by setting up its embassy in Ankara in 1933.
When Italy invaded Ethiopia between 1935 and 1937, Turkish soldiers volunteered for the Ethiopian army, with the Turkish government strongly supporting sanctions against Italy. During the occupation, which lasted until 1941, Ethiopia’s embassy in Turkey never closed. Turkey was neutral until the end of the second world war. But it embraced alliance with the United States after the war, as did Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia.
Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia remained close during the 1960s. At the time, both countries took the pragmatic approach of improving relations with both the Soviet bloc and the Arab world.
In 1974, Haile Selassie was overthrown by the military. The military then established a Marxist regime in Ethiopia which lasted until 1991. Relations were suspended by Turkey during this time.
What’s the history of Turkey’s relations with Somalia?
A united Somalia, including former British Somaliland, achieved independence in 1960. The enlarged state coveted the Somali-populated Ogaden region in Ethiopia. Turkey did not establish an embassy in Somalia until 1979, when that country shifted away from close ties to the Soviet bloc in the midst of a war against Ethiopia when it attempted unsuccessfully to occupy Ogaden (1977-1978).
Somalia’s President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991 and the country fell into chaos. The Turkish embassy closed until 2011. Turkey participated in the two United Nations operations in Somalia, the first one between 1992 and 1993 and the second one from 1993 to 1995.
In 2011 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was then Turkey’s prime minister and whose government regarded itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests, became the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in two decades. Five years later, he visited the country again as president, to open Turkey’s largest embassy complex in the world. Mogadishu’s airport and seaport are run by Turkish companies. https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9xTxL/1/
In 2017, Turkey opened a military base in Mogadishu to train Somali soldiers. It has also built hospitals and infrastructure though the offices of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) as well as providing scholarships for Somalis to study in Turkey.
Turkey has provided more than US$1 billion in humanitarian aid since 2011, part of which came from Muslim NGOs.
Both Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) support the efforts of the Somali government against the threat of al-Shabaab.
The UAE’s assistance to Somalia has been far less than that of Turkey. However, it’s been involved in the country in other ways. In 2015, it also participated in the second UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and set up a military training facility in Mogadishu. It also upgraded Berbera airport in Somaliland and manages two Somali ports: Berbera and Bosaso. Bosaso Port is in Puntland, another breakaway Somali territory.
These moves were regarded as a means to increase security against Iran and its Houthi ally in Yemen.
How does Somaliland complicate matters?
Somaliland declared its independence in 1991. But it is still internationally recognised as a de jure part of Somalia.
Ethiopia, Turkey and Djibouti have established consulates in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital city. Other countries such as Kenya and the UAE have liaison offices there. But only the UAE and Ethiopia have bypassed Mogadishu to make deals directly with the Somaliland government even though the UAE publicly supports the territorial integrity of Somalia.
The UAE’s deal involved setting up a military base in Somaliland and training Somaliland’s security forces.
In January 2024 Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding under which Somaliland has offered Ethiopia port access through a lease for 50 years of 20km of Somaliland’s coastline. In return, Ethiopia would give Somaliland diplomatic recognition.
Somalia countered the announcement of this deal by making Turkey a key security partner. Turkey is to train and equip Somalia’s naval force and help patrol the Somalia’s coastline.
The recent developments in the Somali region, including Puntland’s decision to assert autonomy and Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of independence, present an opportunity to reshape the regional landscape positively. Far from signaling the “crumble” of greater Somalia, these developments underscore the resilience and agency of Somali communities in shaping their own destinies. Embracing diversity and recognizing the unique aspirations of each region can pave the way for a more peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for all.
Puntland’s move towards greater autonomy reflects a desire among its people to assert their identity and govern themselves effectively. By withdrawing recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia and seeking to engage directly with the international community, Puntland is taking steps towards greater self-determination and independence. This shift can be a catalyst for stronger governance structures, enhance local decision-making, and empower communities to address their own needs and challenges.
Similarly, Somaliland’s pursuit of independence, spanning over three decades, demonstrates the resilience and determination of its people to chart their own course. Despite facing numerous obstacles and enduring years of unrecognized statehood, Somaliland has maintained stability, built democratic institutions, and fostered economic development. The recent proposal for an Ethiopian naval base in Somaliland in reciprocal to its statehood recognition presents an opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation, enhance maritime security, and bolster economic ties.
By embracing the diversity of the Somalis in horn of Africa region and recognizing the legitimacy of diverse governance structures, regional actors can unlock the full potential of the Somali people. Djibouti, Somaliland, Puntland, and South Somalia each have unique strengths, resources, and contributions to offer. By fostering dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect among these entities, the Somali region can harness its collective potential to address shared challenges, promote economic growth, and build a more stable and prosperous future.
Regional and international stakeholders play a crucial role in supporting the positive trajectory of the Somali region. By respecting the sovereignty and autonomy of each entity, supporting inclusive dialogue, and facilitating cooperation, the international community can contribute to peace, security, and development in the region. Moreover, investments in infrastructure, education, and economic development can create opportunities for all Somali communities, promoting shared prosperity and reducing the drivers of conflict and instability.
As greater Somali region navigates its path towards peace, stability, and prosperity, there is much to be gleaned from the success story of the Gulf countries. The Gulf region, encompassing nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, stands as a shining example of how diversity, cooperation, and visionary leadership can transform societies and propel them towards unprecedented growth and development. By embracing the Gulf model, greater Somalia has the opportunity to chart a course towards a brighter future, characterized by economic prosperity, social progress, and regional cooperation.
At the heart of the Gulf model lies a commitment to unity amidst diversity. Despite being comprised of distinct nations with varying cultures, traditions, and governance structures, the Gulf countries have forged strong bonds of cooperation and collaboration. This unity has been instrumental in driving economic diversification, attracting foreign investment, and fostering innovation across sectors such as finance, technology, and infrastructure. Similarly, greater Somalia, with its diverse countries and communities, can harness the power of unity to overcome historical divisions and build a more inclusive and cohesive society.
Lastly, the recent developments in the Somali region offer a unique opportunity to redefine the narrative from one of fragmentation and discord to one of unity, resilience, and progress. By embracing diversity, respecting the rights and aspirations of all Somali communities, and fostering cooperation and dialogue, the region can overcome its challenges and build a future of peace, security, and prosperity for generations to come.
About the Author
Mr. Mohamed Aideed, co-founder of the BARWAAQO Party in Somaliland and the founder of Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organization (SOYDAVO). Mr. Aideed holds a Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from Kampala University. Mr. Aideed is a commentator on on East and Horn of Africa politics, he has published notable work on the Somaliland-Somalia Talks.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
In the late 1980s, Sahra Halgan gave up her dreams of becoming a singer to join Somaliland’s secession movement, becoming a self-taught, gun-toting nurse tending to injured fighters.
But she soon realized that just as powerful as her newfound bandaging skills was the comfort she could provide with her voice.
“I don’t know why, but the people injured by gunshots – the pain was coming at night,” she recalls from her home in Hargeisa, the capital of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. “We didn’t have nothing at that time – no painkillers, no antibiotics. And I said we will sing together. Song is not just for the concerts, for the festivals, to become rich. The song becomes the medical supplies, it becomes the army, it’s everything.”
It was during this time that Sahra Ahmed Mohamoud earned her moniker Halgan – meaning fighter – that she took as her stage name.
Her unbridled faith in the potency of performance is written through every note of her third album, released March 29. Titled Hiddo Dhawr (Preserve Culture) – the same name as the music venue she established a decade ago in her home city – it is a pulsating fusion of Somali folk and French rock, full of rough guitar riffs, palpitating percussion and vintage keys.
Its first single – Sharaf – is, the 53-year-old singer says, “a hymn to the pride and dignity of the human being”. It opens with her waving her national flag, with “I [heart] Somaliland” printed along its central white stripe. The state is still unrecognized by the international community.
After gaining independence from the UK in 1960, Somaliland – a territory to the north of Somalia, in the Horn of Africa – only existed as a sovereign entity for five days before it was absorbed into the Republic of Somalia (which had also gained its independence, from Italy).
In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre took power via a military coup and by the late 1980s, a recession fuelled internal turmoil, while Barre’s regime became more authoritarian, bombing his own people. At the same time, the anti-Barre Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somaliland took up arms and fought for independence.
Halgan supported the SNM rebels, but in 1991 – after Hargeisa was turned to rubble – she fled first to Djibouti, and then on to France.
Halgan had started to become famous in her home country, but in Europe, she was a nameless refugee. “No one knew who I was. I became a cleaner, I worked helping disabled people.”
She raised five children – now in their 20s and 30s – and formed a trio with drummer and percussionist Aymeric Krol (founder of French-Malian band BKO Quintet) and guitarist Maël Saletes, who she met in Lyon. All her songs are in Somali, but her French band-mates provide backing vocals.
She returned in 2013 keen to help rebuild her homeland. But tensions in Somaliland have not disappeared. For the first couple of years after she opened Hiddo Dhawr – a complex of traditional Somali huts – it was the only music venue in the city and she had local religious men arriving to try to close her down. Her response was straightforward: “I said to them, ‘during the civil war, I was a singer and my song became a medical tool, and then where were you? At that time, we needed you – where were you?’ And he didn’t give me an answer. I said, ‘leave me alone.’”
Halgan – who began singing aged 13 – is used to people trying to silence her voice. Her mother’s father was a singer, but her father’s family “don’t like it – until now. They said ‘Now you have a child, you have a daughter, why you sing?’ And then I say, ‘I love to sing – it’s no problem.’ But they said, ‘When you stop to sing? I said, I tell you on that day.’” That day does not look like it will be coming very soon.
Halgan mentions the UK’s history with Somaliland – the British protectorate was established in 1884 – and says: “The people of Britain, I demand support for our cause.” She asks whether it is attitudes to Islam that are delaying progress: “What is preventing us from being recognized? It is our right. We got our independence in 1960. We need a reason why we aren’t recognized, if it’s not because of religion. What is the world waiting for? We can do this but what are they waiting for from us? I don’t know. They must respond.”
However, she has lost none of her belief in the liberating capacity of music. “When you sing, everybody comes to see you and is laughing and dancing,” she says. “In this world now, everything divides people, [whether] it’s political, religion, [or] money. But we have only one thing to bring us together. It’s music.”
Sahra Halgan’s new album, Hiddo Dhawr, is released on 29 March
As Somalia faces escalating security threats and the resurgence of the militant organization al-Shabaab, the United States is encountering significant obstacles in maintaining its strategic interests in the region.
General Michael E. Langley, who assumed command of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2021, expressed apprehension regarding Somalia’s ability to counter terrorism during his tenure. Langley’s appointment to AFRICOM coincided with Somalia’s battle against the al-Shabaab threat, marking a critical period for security efforts in the country.
Nearly a year ago, General Michael E. Langley voiced optimism about Somalia’s potential to confront the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. He highlighted the Somali government’s adoption of a comprehensive “whole government approach,” emphasizing efforts beyond kinetic action. However, recent testimony from General Langley suggests that this optimism may have been premature, as Somalia continues to grapple with the challenge posed by Al-Shabaab.
Despite substantial resources and ongoing support allocated to Somalia’s security sector, recent events underscore the failure of both the Somali government and its international allies, including the United States, to effectively address the country’s security challenges.
The latest posture statement from USAFRICOM, presented to the House Armed Services Committee on March 21, 2024, sheds light on the escalating security crisis in Somalia. General Langley highlighted the persistent threat posed by al-Shabaab, whose attacks continue to target civilians and government officials. Despite U.S. support and military assistance, Somalia’s security forces have struggled to contain the insurgency, raising questions about their capacity and effectiveness.
Furthermore, the emergence of military juntas in West Africa further complicates U.S. efforts to promote security and stability on the continent. While the United States aims to counter the influence of China and Russia in East Africa, internal instability and governance failures in key partner countries undermine these efforts.
During his testimony, General Langley expressed deep concern about the escalating competition between the United States and China in Africa. He highlighted China’s aggressive economic investments and strategic partnerships on the continent as a direct challenge to U.S. interests. Additionally, General Langley raised alarms about the potential Russian military base in Eritrea, emphasizing the growing influence of strategic competitors in Africa. These developments underscore the urgency for the United States to reassess its approach and strengthen its engagement to counter the expanding presence of China and Russia in Africa.
China has significantly expanded its presence in Somalia, securing extensive concessions such as exclusive fishing licenses for Somali waters. However, despite these economic engagements, China’s contribution to the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia is notably limited compared to other actors, particularly the United States, which has poured billions in humanitarian aid and has been actively involved in providing military support and assistance.
Moreover, recent events, such as the Al-Shabaab attack on a Mogadishu hotel and the civilian deaths resulting from a Turkish drone strike, highlight the complexities of Somalia’s security challenges and the risks associated with military interventions in densely populated areas.
The apparent inconsistency in U.S. policy towards the Somaliland-Ethiopian Memorandum of Understanding, highlighted by the State Department’s Africa Bureau’s opposition juxtaposed with support for Somalia’s objections, has raised doubts about the coherence of American strategic decisions in the region. This skepticism is exacerbated by the fact that Rep Ilhan Omar, who has been removed from her post in the Foreign Affairs Committee, still holds significant influence in shaping U.S. policy towards Somalia, as evidenced by her involvement in the U.S. Africa Policy Working Group meeting with the Assistant Secretary of State. Critics argue that this situation risks neglecting evolving geopolitical realities on the ground and jeopardizing U.S. interests in the region.
In late January, Representative Ilhan Omar claimed an unprecedented influence over U.S. policy regarding the Somaliland-Ethiopian Naval Base Agreement. Omar, facing increased scrutiny due to her recent removal from the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee, stirred further controversy by referring to Somalilanders as “Somali imposters” These blatantly racist remarks, delivered with fervent nationalism, have prompted concerns about her suitability in handling international matters.
Dr. J. Peter Pham, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and Sahel, has warned of the consequences of Washington’s “One Somalia” policy. Pham’s analysis emphasizes the failure of the U.S. approach to Somalia and underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the country’s complex dynamics. With militant groups like al-Shabaab gaining ground and military juntas rising in neighboring West Africa, Somalia’s crisis poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests in the region.
Furthermore, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Posture Statement for 2024, presented to the House Armed Services Committee, highlights the growing influence of China and Russia in East Africa. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s expanding military presence in the region present new challenges to U.S. dominance, complicating efforts to counter their influence effectively.
As Somalia’s security situation continues to deteriorate, experts call for a recalibration of U.S. policy towards the region, with a pivot towards recognizing the strategic importance of Somaliland. Without a comprehensive strategy addressing the root causes of insecurity and governance challenges, U.S. influence in East Africa is likely to further decline, leaving Somalia and the region vulnerable to exploitation by extremist groups and rival powers.
A drone strike outside of Mogadishu has resulted in the tragic loss of over 22 lives and left 21 others wounded, many of whom are children. According to The Washington Post, citing two anonymous security sources, the attack was executed by a Turkish drone.
The strike targeted a residential dwelling in Baghdad village in an agricultural district about 25 kilometers northeast of the Somali capital, during the evening after Ramadan Iftar. The area was reportedly quiet at the time, following clashes on the preceding day between NISA forces and Somali armed forces. Eyewitness accounts describe a harrowing scene as multiple strikes continued to hit, even as rescuers attempted to aid the initial victims of the trike, leading to a devastating toll on women and children in particular. At the time of reporting, neither the Somali nor the Turkish government had provided comments on the strike, while the U.S. Africa Command has refuted any involvement.
Turkey’s military presence in Somalia has been increasing, with forces there to train and bolster the Somali government’s campaign against Al-Shabab. This incident is likely to heighten scrutiny over Somalia’s dependency on drones from international allies in the fight against Al-Shabab and the consequences for civilian casualty. Marking a significant escalation, this is the first reported case of a Turkish-backed operation resulting in a massive civilian casualty. Human rights organizations and investigative journalists have previously documented civilian losses due to Pentagon-operated drones in Somalia.
Qatar’s Support to Drone Operations in Somalia
Information obtained by The Somaliland Chronicle suggests that Qatari military personnel have been actively involved in drone operations in Somalia, collaborating with Turkish and Somali forces in training and execution of both surveillance and active strikes. It’s not clear if any Qatar personnel were involved in this specific operation. The United Nations panel of experts indicated that Turkey delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu on December 6, 2021 via two Airbus A400M military cargo planes operated by the Turkish Air Force.
#BREAKING#Turkey#Somalia Turkish Bayraktar TB2 in Mogadishu, Somalia. The Turkish army is participating in the Somali civil war by providing air support to the local army in its campaigns against Al-Shabab thanks to its drones. pic.twitter.com/rz1EUiOOCJ
— The National Independent (@NationalIndNews) August 9, 2023
Two sources familiar with the operations disclosed to Somaliland Chronicle that Turkey supplies the drone technology and associated training, while Qatar finances the cost of operations, enabling Qatari military personnel to train in active combat operations to acquire hands-on combat experience. Meanwhile, the Somali Armed Forces receive training and contribute intelligence for the operations. As Somalia contends with a lingering conflict, this approach of international support—potentially more effective—raises complex issues of transparency and accountability.
The UN investigators alleged that Turkey violated international sanctions on Somalia by supplying armed drones without notification to and approval of the UN. In response to letters of inquiry from the UN, Turkey claimed it had delivered the drones to a Turkish base in Mogadishu and that the goal was to contribute to the fight against terrorism. “Turkey informed the Panel that it has not delivered any type of unmanned combat aerial vehicles to the Somali authorities and that the systems in question are assigned to be used by Türkiye in the fight against terrorism in Somalia,” the report issued by the UN experts on October 18, 2022 stated. After 2017 diplomatic crisis between Qatar and other Gulf countries, Turkey and Qatar increased joint effort to compete with other Gulf countries by funding and supporting different political factions in Somalia.
The accidental harm to civilians by drone strikes, involving forces from multiple nations, muddies accountability and legal compliance. International law requires combatants to differentiate between military and civilian targets. When non-combatants are inadvertently caught in the crossfire, the legality and culpability of these actions are fiercely debated. With the rules of engagement for these operations unclear, such incidents only deepen the existing complexities of warfare legality.
Let’s leave out the “he said, she said” of Bloomberg’s fake news and discuss real geopolitics.
Having a navy near Bab Al Mandab signifies Ethiopia’s emergence as a major regional military power, while its leadership in recognising Somaliland serves as a diplomatic aspect of this emergence. Together, this puts an end to the vacuum filled by Houthi rebels as a result of Somalian anarchy and the lack of recognition of Somaliland.
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) causes short-term pain but is not a new phenomenon in international relations. That short-term pain often leads to rewarding gains, and that is why it is a power move reserved for major countries. Those who advocate for “territorial integrity” need to understand the ICJ ruling on Kosovo and review Wikipedia’s list of successful UDIs, which includes Greece, the United States, Indonesia, Namibia, and Bangladesh.
In that list, I use the Bangladesh example although Somaliland is not a case of secession but rather a case of state continuity, similar to the Baltic republics. However, I picked Bangladesh due to the geopolitical implications in the Horn of Africa, which mirror the tensions in the Indian subcontinent during the ’70s.
Bangladesh did not beg Pakistan for recognition and took the UDI route. India was the first major country to recognise Bangladesh. Tensions initially escalated but eventually eased after all countries recognised Bangladesh, with Pakistan being the last. That short-term pain is now part of the past, but it has left a lasting impact: reaffirming India’s hegemony in the subcontinent.
Similarly, Ethiopia’s interest in recognising Somaliland represents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to establish an African hegemony in the Horn. As Africans, we should all rise together with Ethiopia rather than watch the Horn fall under the influence of Iran, Turkey, or the Arab Gulf states in a disordered, competitive, and neo-colonial manner.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Muse Bihi Abdi, the Somaliland president, reshuffled, dismissed, and made new appointments to his Council of Ministers on Sunday.
Suleiman Awad Ali Bukhari, the Minister of Transport and Road Development, was sacked by President Bihi, who then named Rabbi Abdi Mohamed in his place.
In addition, Mohamud Warsame Jama has been named as the new Fisheries Minister.
President Bihi picked Faisal Mohamud Said Abdulle as Somaliland’s Deputy Minister of Trade and Tourism and Abdinasir Aydid Mohamed Farah as the nation’s Deputy Minister of Agricultural Development.
Finally, Muse Ibrahim Yusuf Salaf was named to hold the position of Deputy Minister of Road Development and Transportation.
One day after President Bihi signed into law two crucial revised election laws – the Regulation of Organizations and Political Parties Law (No. 14/2023) and the Election and Voter Registration Law (No. 91/2023), the new ministries were appointed.
This legislation calls for the integration of Somaliland’s November 2024 presidential and political association elections, which were previously authorized by the Parliament.
For the past two years, the topic of election legislation has dominated political discourse in Somaliland, and sparked a divisive national conversation that pitted different facets of society against one another.
November 2024 is the date set by the chairman of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) for the dual elections.
The expansion of Taiwan’s military scholarship program to Somaliland signifies a concrete step toward bolstering the latter’s defense capabilities while deepening bilateral relations. Taiwan’s commitment to regional security and partnership with the Republic of Somaliland is underscored by this announcement, building upon the program’s initiation in 2023.
The expanded program offers high school graduates from Somaliland the opportunity to undertake four-year academic military studies in Taiwan, covering specialized fields such as War College Courses, Command and Staff Courses, and Navy Academy programs. This training will be provided by Taiwan’s prestigious National Defense University (NDU), known for its excellence in military education and research.
Ambassador Lou, Taiwan’s Representative in Somaliland, emphasized the importance of capacity building and knowledge transfer in the field of security and national defense. “Through this program, Somaliland will move toward peace, stability, and prosperity,” remarked Ambassador Lou. “Taiwan remains committed to supporting Somaliland and exploring further opportunities for regional security cooperation.”
Ambassador Lou also highlighted a notable development within the program, stating, “It is thrilling to see 2 female military officers awarded for Taiwan Military Scholarship to study Master English Program on International Security this year. As the African proverb says, ‘If you educate a man, you educate an individual, but if you educate a woman, you educate a nation.’ We expect there will be more and more female awardees to study in Taiwan.”
NDU’s curriculum incorporates the latest advancements in modern military command and control (C2), emphasizing networked warfare and information dominance. This approach prioritizes empowering lower-level commanders to make crucial decisions based on real-time information, leading to faster and more adaptable responses on the ground. Additionally, advanced communication and sensor technology provide commanders with a comprehensive picture of the battlefield, enabling informed strategic planning and execution. Seamless information sharing between commanders, units, and intelligence agencies fosters collaboration and coordinated operations.
210203-N-PC620-0010 JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, Va. (Feb. 3, 2021) Joint Task Force Civil Support Commanding General Maj. Gen. Jeff Van listens to a brief during a Joint All-Domain Command & Control System demonstration. Joint All-Domain Command & Control System, also known as JADC2, proactively provides support capabilities exactly where JTF-CS may need it during Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations by synergizing multiple data feeds through real-time end-user reporting and collaborative planning. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael H. Lehman/Released)
Ambassador Lou, Taiwan’s Representative in Somaliland, emphasized the program’s potential for long-term progress. He highlighted the inclusion of two female military officers pursuing Master’s degrees in International Security this year, expressing optimism for increasing female representation in future cohorts.
Beyond defense, Taiwan and Somaliland collaborate across various sectors, including economic development, healthcare, and technology transfer. Cultural exchanges and educational partnerships further solidify understanding and mutual respect between the two nations.
Somaliland has previously sought military and security training from regional partners like Ethiopia and Djibouti, demonstrating its commitment to enhancing defense capabilities through international cooperation. Taiwan’s program offers valuable expertise in modern warfare and defense strategies, with potential for knowledge transfer and collaborative efforts in defense technology development.
However, amidst this cooperation, the unresolved airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland looms large. Somalia’s disruptive actions, including conflicting directives to pilots and jeopardizing air travel safety, highlight the urgent need for effective airspace management solutions. It remains uncertain if Somaliland has sought Taiwan’s assistance in managing its airspace, especially in light of Somalia’s efforts to disrupt the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia.
Descending on Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle International Airport (MGQ) you’re immediately taken aback by the vastness of the Indian ocean. On the horizon stands the unmistakable silhouette of Ali Jimale, a Turkish style mosque and an obvious symbol of Turkish influence in the region. MGQ, itself a Turkish project, is a modern airport teeming with UN brandished aircraft. From UN Aid helicopters and private jets, it’s clear you’re in humanitarian mecca.
Despite its challenges, the potential in Mogadishu is undeniable. Mogadishu is the second most populous coastal city in East Africa. The weather is humid but tempered with a cool coastal breeze. The greenery that surrounds the airport is a reminder that Africa is not the stereotype of a barren desert wilderness devoid of water and life.
Despite the great potential for what could be the greatest city in east Africa given its location, climate, population, and natural beauty; Mogadishu is shackled by a decades-long history of corruption, violence, and insecurity. The insecurity is clearest in the over the top security precautions as we disembark from the plane and walk through several stages of security checks. The security personnel’s faces betray a subtle nervousness. There also seems to be a level of petty politics at play as we enter the airport international arrivals section only to walk to domestic travel one building over and return to the very same plane moments later. Why passengers would disembark only to come out a different door that reads ‘domestic travel’ seems like a tacit attempt to remind travelers that Hargeisa is domestic and that Somaliland is Somalia. Speculation aside, the airport is a modern one. I remember calling a friend who hails from the Mogadishu area, about the impressiveness of MGQ. This was in contrast to Hargeisa’s Egal International Airport (HGA).
Hargeisa
Here the airport is modest by comparison. The TV screens show ads for Ambassador Hotel, Dahabshiil’s EVC e-Dahab, and SO GASHO mobile. Below the ads are prompts reflecting the incompetence of whomever set up the ads with subtext captions. Messages that read “Final Version” “MP4 Cut” “This Version is not compatible…” cascade across the dusty and dated television screens throughout the airport. A small example of the overall shortcomings of an airport that has been the center of attention as Mogadishu and Hargeisa wrestle for control over Somaliland airspace. This latest saga follows Mogadishu’s recent attempts to politicize air traffic control in light of the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU. In Hargeisa the climate is noticeably harsher. In Hargeisa the climate is noticeably harsher. The climate bears significant resemblance to the people. Tough and unrelenting; traits Somalis have been known for in writings of Ibn Batuta and early British colonialists. Traits that have served us well in war and resistance but fail us today. In Japan a culture of excellence or “kaizen” has helped earn them a reputation for discipline, excellence, and duty. This could not be further from the case here. Minutes from HGA is the sight of littered plastic bags, water bottles, and of course farm animals competing for a share of the road. Goats, pedestrians and cars snake around one another in a choreographed dance everyone here is all too familiar with. This is not unique to Hargeisa, however. The same applies in places like Cairo and Karachi. I’m told by friends that the problem of garbage and congestion is especially pronounced in Mogadishu.
On first glance, Hargeisa-the capital of Somaliland, does not say Africa’s 55th state. “You judge too quickly”, I’m often reminded by friends. Many of my earliest impressions of people and places have been deeply misplaced, I would later discover. Somaliand would prove no exception. In the days and weeks since the underwhelming welcome I’ve come to appreciate the emphasis on function and substance over beauty. With a host of challenges facing the unrecognized country, captions on screens or goats on streets do not factor highly. Hargeisa in 1988 was reduced to rubble. The UN reported there was not a free standing structure in the city with most of its inhabitants displaced by carpet bombing from the Barre government. Thirty years later, high rises can be found across the city and many new buildings sprout up as men in green overalls scaffold the sides of buildings. Men in “Hargeisa Municipality” labeled overalls can be seen during the day excavating ground where water pipes are being laid, trees planted, and traffic lights installed. New roads are being paved and there is an energy for a new chapter in the city that many credit the young new mayor with a famous last name for. When I last visited Hargeisa in 2020 even the downtown had rocky gravel roads. Today, you can travel to every corner of the city on recently paved roads. These seemingly small projects make a city function. City services like street cleaners, infrastructure projects like Waheen market, and brand new government buildings to better serve the local population are a testament to the resilience of a people in an unrecognized country operating primarily on tax and port revenue.
The new mayor and council have capitalized on their election victory on a wave of anti-tribalism support and have inspired in local residents a renewed appreciation for the role of government in improving their lives. While in Hargeisa, I discovered, the same goodwill does not extend to the Somaliland government overall. In many ways Somaliland operates like a nonprofit, using only what funds it can generate from services it can charge for and grants from NGOs. Without access to debt financing and foreign investment capital, many of its accomplishments are made more commendable. Still I am surprised to learn people, seemingly universally, dislike Somaliland president Musa Bihi. He is seen by many as divisive, dictatorial, and heavy-handed. People are especially enraged by his handling of the Las Anod crisis, current inter-Isaaq tribal tensions, and perhaps most surprisingly his deal with Ethiopia and the infamous MOU. People by and large oppose the MOU not on grounds some on Twitter would have you believe (i.e. imagined aspirations for unity with Somalia) but a fear that Ethiopia, with its much larger population will overtake the country.
Borama
In the early days of my journey I had the opportunity to visit Borama. A place where a disproportionate number of my friends come from (you know who you are). Only an hour and half away from the capital it was an easy place to visit. Here, too, my preconceptions were challenged. On the road to Borama we find a well-paved highway as tree canopies line the road. When we pass Arabsiyo and Gabiley and reach the interpass between Tog Wajale and Borama something changes. If you go left to the Ethiopian border city you see the familiar well-paved road with its white and yellow markings. If you go right towards the road to Borama suddenly it gets a bit bumpier. The markings are gone and trees are few and far between. Worse yet as you enter the city road conditions worsen as we sway side to side navigating pot holes on a gravel path. I’m overcome with disappointment. How could this be? Both I and my friend suddenly find ourselves sympathetic to the Awdal state Cause making the rounds online. This too on further
inspection owes a simple explanation. The road we were traveling on was built by the UAE, it is a trade corridor from Ethiopia to Berbera. The road to Borama was built by the Somaliland government. These roads resemble the road to Burco and Ceerigaabo. In Hargeisa new roads have been a keystone and well celebrated accomplishment of the new mayor. Roads within cities are the purview of local governments. With new young mayors in Hargeisa, Burco,and Borama there is a lot to be hopeful for.
On the topic of nationalism, it’s worth noting I use the various Somali bracelets as a proxy for gauging support for pro-Somaliland or pro-Somalia positions. In Hargeisa it was not strange to see sky-blue bracelets with white diamonds in neighborhoods and restaurants. It was even more common in Ceerigaabo where tensions are especially tense. In Borama there are no Somalia bracelets in sight. Arguably, and this is perhaps heretical to some ears, there are more Somaliland bracelets and flags than in Hargeisa. There is of course no replacement for real polls and qualitative studies but this is an unrecognized third world country with little capacity or desire on the part of the government or the private sector to explore. I do believe much of the brouhaha around Awdal state is a diaspora project encouraged and given new life by the Mogadishu government. For Samaaroon who left the region in the early 90s, amidst tensions with the SNM, they remain locked in time. For locals that trade and travel to Hargeisa, ship goods and cattle through Berbera, and conduct both business and politics in the country, Somalia has little on offer. State institutions collect taxes, regulate business, resolve disputes, and of course create and enforce laws set to ensure a stable business and political environment.
Ceerigaabo
I arrive in Ceerigaabo, the capital of the Sanaag region on a small propeller plane. I head straight to my hotel. In my Hargeisa hotel there is a sign that reads “la ma ogola siigaar iyo khaatka” (smoking and khat is prohibited). In Ceerigaabo, my hotel door reads “no smoking, no khat, no guns, no bombs, no weapons of any kind.” Here one local tells me everyone has two priorities: own a home and own a gun. He tells me every establishment and home is flush with guns of every size. It is no wonder the city hosts a large Somaliland military presence. Given the history of violence and potential for violence the ratio of soldier to citizen I would assume is unparalleled in the country. Ironically, it was because of this military presence in 2020 I became a Somaliland nationalist. On this go around it’s a reminder of the country’s failure. The tension between tribes is felt everywhere. Here in Ceerigaabo, Somalia or SSC wristbands can be seen competing with Somaliland bracelets in some parts of the city. Cars and doors have etched out or spray painted SSC on them. On one quiet afternoon as the city took its post dhur siesta, I ventured towards my aunt’s school minutes from my hotel. Given my poor sense of direction, I found myself lost and surrounded by houses that all resemble one another. In a weak attempt at speaking Somali, I ask a man roughly my age for directions. He steps away from his house towards me and asks if I’m local or from the diaspora. I tell him I’m from the latter. He admits to being one as well. He asks me about my tribe. “Are you Isaaq or Harti”, he says. From the framing of his question I know he is likely Warsangeeli. Were he Isaaq he would be more specific. ‘Isaaq’, is not what any Isaaq in Somaliland would identify as. I tell him I’m Isaaq and suddenly his face and demeanour shift. It’s as if I’m now looking at a different man. The look of curiosity fades to concern. His eyes darting left to right. “You need to leave this area”, he tells me. “This is Harti area and its not safe for you”, he goes on. “Let me escort you back”. I’m in disbelief. I’ve walked into the Somali equivalent of Compton’s Crips and Bloods. My friend listens to the interaction on the phone every bit as amazed by the interaction as I am. This was the first of many incidents that made it clear to me Somaliland (at least in its eastern provinces) has a tribal problem.
Berbera
The final days of my time in Somaliland, I visit Berbera. The coastal city and a focal point of dispute between Somalia and Somaliland in the recent past. A corollary issue of port access for Ethiopia’s navy is the latest controversy. Known for its major port, the largest in Somaliland and Somalia, Berbera is one of, if not, the largest economic drivers in Somaliland. Berbera’s young mayor (a two-time incumbent) is credited for making the city the cleanest and arguably most progressive in the country. Farm animals are banned within city limits, garbage bins are found on street corners, and there are even sidewalks! A simple amenity in most western cities but sorely missed in places like Cairo, Hargeisa, and car haven Houston! There is hardly any traffic here; it’s quiet. I can hear the breeze, the ocean, the cawing of the seagulls. The beach has elevated lifeguard stations to overlook swimmers. There are swings used by young men likely unaware of the swings intended users. I cannot get over the fact there are no goats gnawing at littered cardboard boxes or chewing khat left on the floor. No chickens. No cows. Just silence and empty streets.
Addis Ababa
It’s the end of my sojourn in Somaliland. I’m at Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport (ADD) waiting to return to Canada. ADD is grand and rivals Pearson, Abu Hamad, and Changi in its modernism. Passengers pass by Ethiopian women brewing traditional coffee and burning incense as they stop at one upscale restaurant or another. I need to change my sim card and ask a woman at a mobile stand for help. Before helping she asks where I’m from. “Somaliland,” I say. She grins, gives me a high five, and states, “we’re new allies now.” The interaction leaves me confused. Allies against whom? In any case it’s time for my flight.
About the Author
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Mustafa Ali is a Somali Canadian based in Edmonton, Alberta. He is a Founder Liaison and Tech Lead at Edmonton Unlimited, and a former stakeholder relations manager for the premier of Alberta. He holds a Masters in Business Administration (MBA) and a Bachelors in Political Science, both from the University of Alberta.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
