UAE’s Strategic Pivot? Cirro’s Visit Signals New Regional Dynamic

January 26, 2025

In a carefully orchestrated diplomatic gesture that speaks volumes about shifting alliances in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates rolled out the red carpet for Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Cirro today, dispatching a private Royal Jet to ferry the newly elected leader to Abu Dhabi for his first overseas visit since taking office. Beyond boilerplate statements about mutual interests from the Presidential spokesman, however, the specific agenda for this high-profile visit remains notably opaque, despite President Cirro’s campaign promises of transparency in foreign dealings.

As Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investor, the UAE’s commitment is most visibly demonstrated through Dubai-based DP World’s $442 million investment in Berbera Port, transforming it into an emerging regional trade hub. In his election campaign, Abdirahman Cirro was an outspoken critic of the DP World agreement, questioning its transparency and terms. His presence in Abu Dhabi now puts him in the delicate position of either maintaining that critical stance or potentially moderating his position to secure UAE support at a crucial moment in regional politics.

The timing of President Abdirahman Cirro’s visit suggests a potential watershed moment in UAE’s Horn of Africa strategy. Following a deadly Al-Shabab attack in February 2024 that killed three Emirati troops and a Bahraini officer, the UAE has largely withdrawn from its engagement with Mogadishu. This tragic incident, coming after years of strained relations marked by Somalia’s 2018 seizure of Emirati funds and pro-Qatar stance, appears to have pushed Abu Dhabi toward a definitive choice. The question now looms: Is the UAE finally abandoning its dual-track approach to embrace Somaliland exclusively, seeing in Berbera’s stability an alternative to Mogadishu’s volatility?

The timing of this diplomatic overture gains added significance amid the recent rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somaliland’s diplomatic capital has been tested by Ethiopia’s pivot back toward Somalia, effectively shelving the port access memorandum of understanding and strengthening Somalia’s post-ATMIS security architecture. This shifting landscape might paradoxically strengthen Cirro’s negotiating position with the UAE, as Abu Dhabi’s strategic interests in Berbera intersect with rapidly evolving regional dynamics.

Adding another layer of intrigue to the visit is the presence of Dr. Abdirahman Duale Beileh, Cirro’s newly appointed Economic Advisor. Beileh, Somalia’s former Finance Minister, received a presidential pardon from former President Muse Bihi before joining Cirro’s administration. Current government officials, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of internal arrangements, describe Beileh as operating as a de facto Finance Minister, though his formal appointment to the cabinet was likely avoided due to his recent Somalia government role and potential political sensitivities. The simultaneous presence of both the Finance Minister and Dr. Beileh in the delegation suggests substantive discussions about expanding UAE’s investment portfolio in Somaliland may be on the undisclosed agenda.

Hanging over these discussions is the unresolved status of Berbera Airport. The UAE secured parliamentary approval in 2017 to establish a military base at the facility, but under former President Bihi’s administration, contradictory statements emerged about its intended use – initially announced as a UAE military base, then later described as converted to civilian use after a supposed lease cancellation. Despite significant upgrades, the facility remains largely inactive, its future uncertain. The airport’s strategic significance is underscored by multiple inspection visits from AFRICOM, suggesting broader international interest in its potential military applications.

While the official agenda remains undisclosed, Cirro’s delegation composition hints at the visit’s scope and ambition. The presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Presidency, Minister of Finance and Economic Development, and notably, the Intelligence Chief suggests discussions will extend far beyond ceremonial pleasantries.

The three-day visit also includes scheduled meetings with the substantial Somaliland diaspora community in the UAE, whose remittances form a crucial pillar of Somaliland’s economy. Last year alone, remittances to Somaliland from overseas exceeded $1.3 billion, with a significant portion originating from the Gulf states.

The visit raises questions about the broader geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa. With China maintaining a military base in neighboring Djibouti, and various Gulf states jockeying for influence across the region, Somaliland’s strategic location and deep-water port have turned it into an increasingly important piece on the regional chessboard. The potential shift in U.S. foreign policy under a returning Trump administration, particularly with a more pragmatic State Department leadership, could present Somaliland with additional strategic options for military cooperation beyond current arrangements.

However, Somaliland’s leverage in these negotiations may depend on its ability to engage directly with potential partners, particularly the United States, rather than relying on intermediaries like the UAE. As regional dynamics shift and multiple powers express interest in Somaliland’s strategic assets, Hargeisa would be well-served to comprehensively evaluate its options before making binding commitments or overextending its strategic partnerships.

As President Abdirahman Cirro settles into his meetings in Abu Dhabi, the key questions remain unanswered, masked by diplomatic protocol and official silence. Will this visit mark the beginning of a deeper strategic partnership? Is the UAE preparing to go all-in on Somaliland? The answers may well shape the future of not just Somaliland, but the entire region.

President Abdirahman “Cirro” Appoints Military General to Police, Untested Commander to Lead Army

Staff

January 24, 2025

President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s appointment of Major General Abdurahman Abdullahi Hassan Allale “Abdi Dhere” as Police Commissioner and Lieutenant General Nimcaan Yusuf Osman Gahnug as Army Chief has sent shockwaves through Somaliland’s reform community, coming just 24 hours after launching what he called a transformative initiative to eliminate ghost personnel from security forces’ payrolls through biometric registration.

The timing of these appointments – which maintain military control over civilian law enforcement and place an untested commander at the helm of armed forces engaged in active combat – has raised profound questions about the new administration’s commitment to its campaign promises of institutional reform and professional security services.

“The appointment of a military general to head the Somaliland police is unexpected and sets back any possibility of police reform,” prominent human rights lawyer Guleid Jama told Somaliland Chronicle. “The police is not a military institution. It is currently affected and shaped by the history of the military regime under the brutal dictatorship of Siad Barre. The people of Somaliland decided in 1991 to end military rule over civilian institutions and created a civilian and republican government. It is an affront to democracy to militarize the police.”

While President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s young administration has maintained a commendable record of not detaining journalists or suppressing peaceful protests, the appointment of another military commander to head the police force threatens this brief honeymoon period. Critics argue that militarized policing has historically undermined public trust and accountability, perpetuating practices that the president himself condemned while in opposition.

The appointment of Lieutenant General Nim’an Yusuf Osman Gahnug to lead the National Army raises equally serious concerns about military preparedness. Despite formal military training in Taiwan and Ethiopia and experience commanding both the Presidential Guard Unit and Gamadiid Special Forces units, questions persist about his combat leadership experience at a critical moment in Somaliland’s security landscape.

This appointment comes as Somaliland faces its most serious security challenges in years. The conflict that began in Las Anod has now spread into the Sanaag hinterland, yet the new administration has failed to articulate any concrete strategy to address these expanding security threats. Military observers note that the new army chief faces the daunting task of proving his battlefield credentials while simultaneously implementing reforms to tackle systematic corruption that has drained military resources for years.

Perhaps most revealing of the administration’s priorities is President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s decision to name former Police Commissioner Brigadier General Mohamed Adan Sagadhi (Dabagale) as his advisor on police matters – the same official he repeatedly accused of orchestrating human rights violations while in opposition. “Surprisingly, the president made Dabagale his adviser on police issues,” Jama observed. “The president, when he was the opposition leader, is on the record accusing the police under the leadership of Dabagale of committing human rights violations. Dabagale is not a changed man.”

These appointments reflect deeper structural challenges within Somaliland’s governance system. The presidential decree mandating biometric registration by February 2025 aims to combat a longstanding practice where senior military and police officials allegedly inflate their salaries through non-existent personnel. However, the selection of leaders deeply embedded in this system raises questions about implementation.

“As the president recently admitted, his appointments are mostly driven by tribal quotas and pressure from powerful individuals,” Jama explained. “This negatively affects the appointment of qualified individuals and mostly excludes women. There is clearly a lack of preparation from the president’s side. It seems he was solely focused on getting to power. Now he is in power, and he does not have a plan.”

The implications extend far beyond personnel decisions. Human rights organizations have documented how militarized policing has historically facilitated excessive force during public demonstrations, while mechanisms for investigating and addressing police misconduct remain woefully inadequate. The force’s training continues to emphasize military-style tactics over civilian law enforcement practices, and attempts to establish meaningful civilian oversight have been consistently thwarted.

The success of the biometric registration initiative, which promises a 50% salary increase for security personnel, now rests in the hands of the very officials who have benefited from the system it aims to reform. Sources within the security sector, speaking on condition of anonymity, express skepticism about whether these appointments signal genuine reform or merely a reshuffling of familiar faces.

The Presidency did not respond to detailed questions about the selection criteria for these positions, their alignment with reform goals, or President Abdirahman “Cirro” government’s strategy for addressing mounting security challenges in the east. As Somaliland grapples with its most significant security crisis in years, the contrast between President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s campaign promises and his early appointments suggests a troubling continuity with the practices he once condemned.

Somaliland President Orders Security Forces Salary Increase and Biometric Registration

Staff

January 22, 2025

Fulfilling a key campaign pledge, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” has issued Presidential Decree No. 02/012025, mandating a 50% annual salary increase for Somaliland’s security forces contingent upon successful implementation of IRIS Biometric Registration. The reform package, aimed at modernizing the security sector, requires all personnel to complete biometric enrollment by February 2025.

The decree addresses longstanding concerns about payroll fraud and “ghost personnel” within Somaliland’s armed forces, custodial corps, and police. By linking compensation directly to verified identities, the administration aims to ensure public funds reach only legitimate security personnel. This technological approach mirrors successful implementations in countries like India, Nigeria, and Ghana, where biometric systems have proven effective in reducing payroll irregularities.

However, the administration’s retention of existing security leadership has raised questions about its commitment to comprehensive reform. Major General Nuh Ismail Tani continues as Chief of Staff of the Somaliland Armed Forces, despite criticism over the military’s declining operational capacity during his decade-long tenure. Similarly, Police Commissioner Brigadier General Mohamed Adan Saqadhi (Dabagale) remains in his position, notwithstanding past allegations of civil rights abuses—accusations President Abdirahman “Cirro” himself raised while in opposition.

The reform’s ambitious 30-day implementation timeline faces significant challenges, particularly in registering personnel in remote and conflict-affected areas. Resistance from entrenched interests benefiting from current payroll practices may further complicate the process. Critics point to deteriorating equipment, logistical inefficiencies, and low troop morale as evidence of systemic neglect under the current leadership’s watch.

The phased salary increase over President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s first term marks a significant shift in the management of Somaliland’s security forces. However, without addressing fundamental leadership concerns, these financial incentives and technological reforms risk being undermined by the same institutional weaknesses they aim to correct.

The initiative represents a critical test of President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s governance agenda. While the salary increases acknowledge the security forces’ vital role, the emphasis on biometric registration signals a broader push for institutional modernization. Success will depend on the administration’s ability to overcome logistical hurdles and navigate resistance from within the security establishment.

Somaliland has conducted a successful pilot program in its most recent election that was held in November 2024 but this will be the first time a similar system is being used to ensure integrity and eliminate ghost personnel from the security services.

The retention of controversial leadership figures, however, casts doubt on whether these reforms can achieve their intended impact without addressing deeper institutional challenges. As implementation begins, observers will closely monitor whether the administration can balance its promises of reform with the practical challenges of governance in Somaliland’s complex security landscape.

The success of this initiative will not only determine the effectiveness of the security sector reforms but also shape public perception of President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s broader governance capabilities. As Somaliland strives for increased transparency and accountability, the coming months will reveal whether these reforms represent genuine change or merely surface-level adjustments to long-standing institutional problems.

Trump’s Aid Freeze: Will Somalia Sink or Swim Without U.S. Support?

Staff

January 21, 2025

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first remarks in office laid bare the new administration’s litmus test for foreign aid: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Or does it make America more prosperous?” By these metrics, U.S. assistance to Somalia represents a catastrophic failure on all three counts. President Trump’s executive order suspending foreign assistance exposes the bankruptcy of America’s most expensive state-building experiment in Africa.

“Does it make America safer?
Does it make America stronger?
Or does it make America more prosperous?”

— Secretary of State Marco Rubio

The scale of American taxpayer exposure in Somalia is staggering. In fiscal year 2023, U.S. aid totaled $1.21 billion, creating an elaborate ecosystem of international organizations, contractors, and NGOs that have transformed aid dependency into an industry. The UN system alone received $897.7 million of these funds, demonstrating how international bureaucracies have positioned themselves as permanent intermediaries between donor funds and Somali recipients.

Somalia exemplifies what Secretary Rubio termed the “dangerous delusion” of post-Cold War foreign policy, where “serving the liberal world order” replaced genuine national interests. The humanitarian aid sector perfectly illustrates this dysfunction. In 2023, International Disaster Assistance consumed $873.3 million, flowing primarily through UN agencies that have perfected the art of transforming emergency assistance into permanent institutional infrastructure, with pristine compounds and luxury vehicles becoming the most visible symbols of aid in Mogadishu.

Want to Explore the Source Data?

All the data in this report comes from ForeignAssistance.gov, the U.S. government’s official foreign aid tracker. You can explore:

Detailed transaction records
Implementing partner information
Project-specific data
Historical aid patterns

The security sector epitomizes this dysfunctional aid architecture. In 2023, U.S. security assistance reached $159.6 million, including $128.2 million for peacekeeping operations, yet produced no discernible improvement in Somalia’s security situation. While the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations absorbed the lion’s share of these funds, actual military training of Somali forces received a mere $349,826. This imbalance has created the perverse outcome where Al-Shabaab demonstrates more effective governance and revenue collection than the government itself in territories under its control.

Food assistance tells an equally troubling story, with $88.8 million allocated through Title II grants. This massive investment flows through a labyrinth of intermediaries: U.S.-based NGOs received $152.5 million in total across all sectors, while multilateral organizations consumed $933.9 million. Private contractors collected $77.4 million, while direct support to Somali government institutions amounted to just $18.3 million – a telling indication of donor trust after decades of “capacity building.”

The aid industry’s entrenchment in Somalia has created a parallel economy that serves international organizations rather than local needs. Mogadishu’s real estate market exemplifies this distortion: neighborhoods surrounding NGO compounds and international organization offices have seen property values skyrocket, while basic services remain nonexistent for most residents. The city has effectively been divided into two economies: the aid economy, characterized by high-end restaurants, luxury SUVs, and expensive housing compounds, and the actual Somali economy, where most citizens struggle to access basic services.

Somalia’s government has perfected the use of international aid narratives, often framing crises as existential threats to global security. A striking example is the defunct Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somalia and Ethiopia, which Somali officials portrayed as energizing Al-Shabaab and terrorist networks—conveniently omitting their own incendiary rhetoric. Notably, Somali government leaders have hinted at waging jihad against Ethiopia and Somaliland, further exposing the contradictions in their narrative. Such strategies ensure the uninterrupted flow of aid while deflecting scrutiny of Somalia’s internal governance failures.

Most troubling is Somalia’s cynical exploitation of Western aid while actively courting China’s strategic ambitions in the Horn of Africa. While absorbing over a billion dollars in U.S. assistance in 2023, Mogadishu simultaneously deepened its engagement with Beijing through the Belt and Road Initiative, granted Chinese vessels privileged fishing rights in its territorial waters, and engaged in preliminary discussions about hosting Chinese military facilities. This diplomatic duplicity epitomizes Secretary Rubio’s warning about how the post-war global order has become “a weapon being used against us.”

Critics warning of Chinese or Russian influence filling any aid vacuum fundamentally misread both history and current realities. Despite its diplomatic overtures, Somalia has failed to secure Chinese commitments matching Western assistance levels. Beijing’s engagement in East Africa focuses on countries with stronger institutions and more valuable resources, preferring transactional relationships that deliver concrete benefits rather than open-ended commitments. Similarly, Russia’s limited presence in Somalia serves primarily to extract diplomatic concessions and expand its influence at minimal cost, with no indication that Moscow would shoulder the massive burden of replacing Western aid.

Somalia has mastered the art of leveraging Western humanitarian concerns while pursuing strategic relationships with rival powers. The current aid model has created not a functional state but a sophisticated mechanism for transforming international assistance into institutional maintenance for an aid industry that measures success by money spent rather than results achieved. The $1.21 billion spent in 2023 represents not investment in Somalia’s future but subsidies for an international aid architecture that perpetuates dependency.

The Trump administration’s aid freeze forces a confrontation with uncomfortable truths about America’s post-Cold War approach to foreign assistance. The fundamental question isn’t whether Somalia will face hardship – it will – but whether this might finally break a cycle of dependency that has made Somalia the world’s most expensive failed state. The coming months will reveal whether Somalia’s political class can develop genuine governance capacity or whether three decades of international assistance have created institutions too hollowed out to survive without constant external life support.

In the end, as Secretary Rubio asked in his first address, “How can America promote the cause of peace on Earth if it is not first safe at home?” Somalia’s aid dependency offers a clear answer: it cannot.

Why Somaliland welcomes an “America First” Africa Policy under President Trump

Staff

January 20, 2025

Across Somaliland, a nation with a rich history of resilience and self-sufficiency, 6.2 million citizens celebrate the return of President Trump with enthusiasm. But why is this small, relatively unknown country in East Africa rallying behind Trump’s “America First” agenda?

A History of Struggle and Sovereignty

The Republic of Somaliland is an East African state, roughly the size of Texas which gained its independence from the British on June 26^th, 1960, and restored its sovereignty on May 18, 1991, following a 30-year illegal annexation by what many know as Somalia.

Following a brutal genocide perpetrated by Somalia under dictator Siad Barre, Somalilanders managed to not only restore self-rule, but they have built a flourishing democracy with little help from the international community.

Many media outlets have been struggling to pin-down why this east African nation – which most Americans probably know little if anything of – are today celebrating the return of President Trump.

Somaliland’s Alignment with the “America First” Agenda

Many Somalilanders hope that Trump’s “America First” policy will signal a shift in U.S. African policy, moving away from supporting the failed Somalian government in Mogadishu towards building a strategic partnership with Somaliland.

The belief across Somaliland is that this new direction is an opportunity to align U.S. and Somaliland interests more closely, with a focus on mutual benefits such as regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and economic growth.

Like the United States, Somaliland has recently elected a new President, with the month-old administration banking on the countries positive track record translating into a mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S.

Somaliland’s government believes that if America prioritises its national interests, it will recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty and bolster direct engagement.

Somaliland’s Strategic Importance

Somaliland’s “Trump” card is that it offers the U.S. an alternative to the heavily congested tiny African state of Djibouti. Its port at Berbera, located at the mouth of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, is crucial for global trade and security. Additionally, as the regions only functioning democracy, its strategic location and close ties to Taiwan positions Somaliland as a natural strategic ally for the U.S. in countering China’s growing influence in Africa.

Despite tensions with China over its relations with Taiwan, Somaliland continues to stand firm, despite continuous Chinese threats as well as reports suggesting China is actively arming terrorist groups in Somaliland at the behest of Somalia to destabilise the country.

Frustration with the Biden Administration’s Africa Policy

Somalilanders have been left perplexed by the Biden administrations insistence on a ‘One Somalia’ policy, which by any metric, has been a catastrophic failure, resulting in American taxpayers pouring billions into a black whole, leaving Somaliland feeling sidelined despite its stability and democratic progress.

Somalia’s politicians have successfully influenced American policymakers under President Biden, weaponizing the threat of terrorism from Somalia to justify sidelining Somaliland.

By utilising the likes of Congresswomen Ilhan Omar, Somalia has succeeded in doing the unthinkable, persuading America to adopt policies that diverge from its strategic national interests. This divergence appears to be driven by a fear of potential security related reprisals from a country that depends on international donor funding for 70% of its budget, raising questions about the effectiveness of current U.S. policy in the region.

Growing Support for Somaliland in the U.S.

In recent years, many influential Republicans aligned with President Trump have recognised the shortcomings of the current U.S. approach to Africa, frequently highlighting Somaliland’s credentials as a viable, long-term strategic partner. They argue that recognition of Somaliland could better align U.S. interests in the region, offering stability, counterterrorism collaboration, and a reliable ally in the Horn of Africa.

One recent notable example is Congressman John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, who wrote a letter to outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken, calling for the U.S. to open a representative office in Somaliland, to counter rising Chinese influence in the region.

Additionally, the potential appointment of pro-Somaliland officials like Ambassadors Tibor Nagy and J. Peter Pham in a second Trump administration could lead to a more sympathetic U.S. policy toward Somaliland, aligning U.S. foreign policy with the realities on the ground.

A Hopeful Future

As President Trump’s second term begins, Somalilanders remain optimistic that the “America First” agenda will lead to a more pragmatic U.S. foreign policy, one that prioritises American interests in a way that aligns closely with Somaliland’s own goals of international recognition.

Somaliland’s enthusiasm for Trump’s return is captured in President Abdirahman Irro’s congratulatory message on X, in which he expressed, “We look forward to aligning our partnership with your great country in achieving our shared values of world peace, democracy, and economic growth.” This statement captures Somaliland’s hope for a strengthened relationship with the U.S., built on mutual aspirations and shared interests.

About the Author:

Sharmake Abyan is a London-based political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

Somaliland President Thanks U.S. Legislators, Welcomes Prospect of Diplomatic Ties with the United States

Staff

January 20, 2025

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” welcomed growing U.S. congressional support for establishing a diplomatic office in Somaliland, describing it as a milestone in relations between the two nations. In an address to Somaliland’s House of Elders, Cirro specifically praised American legislators’ efforts to strengthen ties with the democratic enclave in the strategic Horn of Africa.

“We commend the American legislators and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress for calling on the United States to open a diplomatic office in Somaliland,” Cirro declared. “Every avenue will be pursued to further solidify this relationship.”

The president’s remarks come amid significant developments in Washington that could reshape U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa. The State Department’s Africa Bureau appears poised for a transformation with the departure of Assistant Secretary Molly Phee. Sources familiar with the matter indicate that Dr. J. Peter Pham, a former U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel Region and Great Lakes Region of Africa, could be her successor. Dr. Pham, who served as the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center Director and Vice President for Research and Regional Initiatives, has been a vocal advocate for reconsidering U.S. policy toward Somalia and strengthening ties with Somaliland.

Adding to the potential shifts, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and career diplomat with over 30 years of experience in African affairs, may return to the State Department. Nagy, who previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia and Guinea, has consistently emphasized the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and demonstrated a deep understanding of Somaliland’s unique position in the region.

Ambassadors Nagy and Pham with then Presidential Candidate Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro” with other officials including Bashir Goth, Somaliland Representative to the United States.

These diplomatic developments parallel growing congressional support. Representative John Moolenaar, Chair of the House Select Committee on the CCP, recently urged outgoing U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to establish a diplomatic presence in Hargeisa. The initiative reflects growing recognition of Somaliland’s strategic importance in countering China’s expanding influence in the region.

The bipartisan push gained additional momentum with the introduction of H.R. 10402 by Representatives Scott Perry and Andy Ogles. The legislation advocates for enhanced U.S. engagement with Somaliland, citing its three decades of stability and democratic governance in a historically volatile region.

These initiatives build on earlier efforts, including a significant amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) introduced by Senator Jim Risch, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The amendment emphasized Somaliland’s crucial role in promoting regional stability and countering security threats.

Other nations have already established diplomatic footholds in Somaliland. The United Kingdom, Kenya, and Taiwan maintain offices in Hargeisa, providing a precedent for increased international engagement without compromising existing relationships with Somalia.

“Somaliland remains the beacon of peace and democracy in the Horn of Africa,” Cirro emphasized, outlining his vision for expanded international partnerships. His administration’s pursuit of closer U.S. ties comes at a critical moment for regional diplomacy, as various global powers seek to strengthen their presence in the strategically vital Horn of Africa.

However, challenges remain. Somalia’s Federal Government has launched a counter-campaign through a $50,000-per-month Washington lobbying effort, attempting to portray U.S. engagement with Somaliland as neocolonial interference. Critics have also raised concerns about President Cirro’s previous statements regarding potential talks with Somalia, warning that such negotiations could undermine Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition.

The potential appointments of both Pham and Nagy, combined with broader policy shifts expected under a possible Trump administration, could mark a significant realignment of U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa. Their extensive diplomatic experience and regional expertise suggest a more nuanced approach to Somaliland’s international status may be forthcoming.

As President Cirro’s administration navigates these diplomatic opportunities, the confluence of congressional support and potential State Department changes suggests an evolving relationship between the two nations. Success will require careful balancing of regional sensitivities with strategic imperatives, but the foundation for stronger U.S.-Somaliland relations appears increasingly solid.

Ethiopia’s Perception of Somaliland’s New Government and the Implications for Statehood

Staff

January 20, 2025

Guleid Ahmed Jama

In a recent interview with The Reporter Ethiopia, Dr. Dareskedar Taye, a researcher at Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), shared insights into Ethiopia’s perception of Somaliland under its newly elected President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi. As the IFA operates under Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Taye’s remarks carry significant weight and suggest a shift in the dynamics between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s Perspective on Somaliland

Dr. Taye noted that while Ethiopia’s position on Somaliland remains consistent, Somaliland’s foreign policy appears to have shifted under the new administration. He stated, “The new administration in Somaliland appears to prefer aligning with the Somali government rather than asserting itself as an independent state.”

This observation is striking, given Somaliland’s long-standing aspiration for international recognition as a sovereign state.

Context: The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU

On 1^st January 2024, Somaliland’s previous administration, led by President Muse Bihi Abdi, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia. The deal granted Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports, with an understanding that Ethiopia would support Somaliland’s bid for statehood. While controversial domestically and regionally, the MoU symbolised Somaliland’s commitment to leveraging its strategic location to gain recognition.

However, following President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi’s election on 13^th November 2024, Ethiopia moved swiftly to sign a separate deal with Somalia. Dr. Taye’s remarks suggest that this shift reflects Ethiopia’s perception of Somaliland’s new government as being more aligned with Mogadishu than with its longstanding independence agenda.

Signals of a Policy Shift in Somaliland

Several developments under the new administration raise questions about its priorities. Somaliland’s newly appointed foreign minister publicly criticised the MoU.

The president appointed a special envoy widely believed to be tasked with resuming talks with Somalia, a move that fuels suspicions of closer ties with Mogadishu.

These actions have sparked internal concerns about the government’s commitment to Somaliland’s quest for recognition.

Risks of Internal Division and Destabilisation

Somaliland’s statehood aspirations are a unifying force for its people. A government perceived as compromising this goal risks igniting internal divisions, potentially destabilising the country. The shift in foreign policy also comes at a critical juncture, as there is speculation that the new U.S. administration may be open to engaging with Somaliland.

Conclusion

Regardless of whether Dr. Taye’s assessment of Somaliland’s new government is accurate, the perception itself highlights a failure in the government’s foreign affairs approach. This perceived pivot towards Mogadishu undermines Somaliland’s long-standing strategy of seeking recognition and could weaken its internal cohesion.

For Somaliland to maintain its unity and advance its aspirations, the new administration must reaffirm its commitment to statehood and carefully navigate its foreign relations.

About the Author

Guleid Ahmed Jama is a Lawyer and political analyst based in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The Danger in the Horn: Somaliland’s defense against instability funded and fueled by China and the Somalian government

Staff

January 19, 2025

There are dangerous developments in the Horn of Africa where the Chinese government and the Somalian government in tandem are using proxies to destabilize Somaliland particularly by infiltrating the far eastern regions of Somaliland, as armed militias have with the support and funding of China and Somalia by supplying weapons and ammunition have taken to ferment violence and instability. the Chinese embassy in Somalia has chosen to directly fund and support these militias in the far east of Somaliland.

The involvement of China in funding proxies to destabilize Somaliland has been discussed in various analyses and reports. Here’s a summary based on available information:

Proxy Conflict:

There are suggestions that the violence in Las Anod, Somaliland, might be a proxy conflict launched by China to punish Somaliland for its recognition of Taiwan. This perspective is discussed by the American Enterprise Institute, which highlights the strategic motivations of China in this region due to Somaliland’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Diplomatic Maneuvering:

China has expressed support for Somalia’s government, which is seen as a move to counteract Somaliland’s recognition of Taiwan. A visit by China’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa to Somalia was reported to affirm China’s stance on Somalia’s sovereignty, which indirectly pressures Somaliland. This is covered by the South China Morning Post.

Ties with Militant Groups:

Posts on X (formerly Twitter) have mentioned that China is allegedly supplying weapons and logistical support to militia groups like militias in Laas Anod, Somaliland. These claims are echoed in discussions around China’s broader strategy in the region, particularly in areas where Somaliland and Somalia have overlapping claims.

Strategic Interests:

Reports from sources like 19FortyFive and the American Enterprise Institute suggest that China’s interest in oil-rich regions of Somaliland, coupled with its resentment towards Somaliland’s recognition of Taiwan, might be motivating its actions in fostering instability. This includes potential support for groups that challenge Somaliland’s authority.

The conclusion of these troubling actions is that China has chosen to destabilize Somaliland not only because of Somaliland’s pro-democracy and western friendly disposition but also due to Somaliland’s openness towards providing the United States with a base in the gulf of Aden Chinas plan as it looks for now is to outmaneuver the United States and force them to have no strategic maneuverability in the red sea to counteract the Houthis and to further destabilize the world’s busiest shipping route. This plan by the Chinese regime takes help from their major ally Iran’s and its proxy the Houthi terrorist Organization as well as Somalia and its northern region of Puntland as well as the head of the militias in far eastern Somaliland.

Why does Somaliland need political reform, and what might it look like?

Staff

January 9, 2025

By Guleid Ahmed Jama

Introduction

Somaliland is a thriving democracy that has demonstrated a successful bottom-up approach to governance rooted in the will and aspirations of its people. In 2001, Somalilanders overwhelmingly voted in favour of a constitution that firmly established sovereignty as residing with the people. This constitution mandates that the president, members of the bicameral parliament, regional councils, and district representatives be elected through free and fair elections.

Two decades later, while Somaliland’s democratic journey offers many successes, there are valuable lessons to build upon and areas requiring meaningful reforms to ensure continued progress.

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the constitution states that “the political system of the Republic of Somaliland shall be based on peace, co-operation, democracy and plurality of political parties.” However, Article 2 contradicts this plurality and states that “the number of political parties in the Republic of Somaliland shall not exceed three (3).”

The Act for the Registration of Political Associations and Certification of Political Parties, known as Law Number 14, was enacted to regulate the formation of political parties. The Act has undergone several changes, but its foundation remains: the number of political parties shall not exceed three. With limited guidance in the constitution, determining how parties should be formed (while not exceeding three) and avoiding parties based on regionalism and clannism became a challenge. To address these issues, the drafters of Law No. 14 proposed two solutions:

Political associations would be formed initially, and only three of these associations, after a competitive process, would qualify as political parties.
In 2012, the Act introduced a ten-year license for political parties, limiting the registration of political associations or parties to once every ten years.

In 2022, Somaliland faced political instability and violence due to these restrictions. The former president, Muse Bihi Abdi, sought an extension of his expired term and proposed opening new political associations to compete for the three-party slots. The opposition rejected this move, perceiving it as a threat to their existence. Given that clans back political parties, the disagreement quickly escalated into clan violence. A rebel group clashed with security forces, resulting in the deaths of nine police officers and numerous injuries. The dispute was eventually resolved when clan leaders intervened, proposing that political party elections and the presidential election be held on the same day. The then-president reluctantly accepted this compromise, having no other viable options as he faced multiple challenges, including defeat in Las Anod and the presence of a rebel group stationed near the capital.

The crises of 2022 and 2023 exposed the vulnerabilities of Somaliland’s political system. Factors contributing to this fragility include a weak judiciary, clan-based political parties, poverty, and a polarised society. The closed political system, with its restrictions, exacerbates tensions and hinders political stability.

Reform the System

The new president has pledged to reform the political system and propose constitutional amendments. Such reforms could lead to a dialogue on lifting the restrictions on the number of political parties. However, the slow progress of the new administration and the poor quality of its ministers indicate that constitutional amendments are not an immediate priority.

To address Somaliland’s flawed political system, the government could reduce the licensing cycle for political associations from ten years to five. This change would allow citizens to organise and challenge existing parties more frequently, revitalising the political landscape without requiring constitutional amendments.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi’s recent announcement that he may not seek re-election may weaken his leadership, as many politicians, including his cabinet members, are likely to align themselves with potential presidential candidates. This unexpected position could also provide an incentive for him to push for systemic reforms, potentially shaping his legacy.

Politicised Electoral Body

Another destabilising factor is the composition of the National Electoral Commission, which is dominated by political appointees. Since 2008, the commission has lacked neutrality, with most members being politicians appointed by the president. To address this, Somaliland should conduct a comparative study of electoral bodies in other countries and adopt a model suited to its unique needs. This would help depoliticise the commission and build a strong, functional, and independent electoral body.

Conclusion

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi is not known as a reformist, as evidenced by his track record as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, his experience as an opposition leader has likely provided him with insights into the fragility of Somaliland’s political system. If the president wants to leave a lasting legacy, he must prioritise reforming the political system. Resistance will likely come not from the public but from party leaders and opposition figures who supported his election and expect rewards at the expense of national stability. Ultimately, the president must choose between securing his legacy and yielding to the political ambitions of others, which could undermine Somaliland’s stability and progress.

About the Author

Guleid Ahmed Jama is a Lawyer and political analyst based in Hargeisa, Somaliland.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The Diplomacy of Gullibility: How Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry Keeps Falling for International Fraudsters

Staff

January 5, 2025

In what has become a familiar scene in Somaliland’s corridors of power, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently played host to yet another dubious diplomatic visitor. The reception of Amb. Dr. Hajj Alhousseni E. B. Banao – whose credentials crumble under basic scrutiny – marks the latest chapter in a long-running saga that raises fundamental questions about the nation’s diplomatic protocols and institutional safeguards.

A Somaliland Chronicle investigation reveals Dr. Banao’s organizations – AGIC Foundation, Africa Gulf International Corporation, and Salone International Airlines – exist primarily as hastily assembled websites sharing identical templates and stock photos, some so carelessly deployed that male executives appear with female names. His claimed airline shows no evidence of aircraft or aviation licenses, while his supposed humanitarian commission lacks any verifiable operations. This digital Potemkin village extends to his carefully curated social media presence, where Dr. Banao presents himself as the epitome of diplomatic grandeur through staged videos titled “Leaving my residence” and “Entering my residence,” featuring luxury vehicles and security details – calculated displays meant to reinforce his claims of influence and wealth.

“Arriving Home”

The facade becomes more elaborate on LinkedIn, where Dr. Banao claims an astonishing array of simultaneous high-level positions: Chairman of Endora Digital Solutions (since 2007), CEO of ENDORA HOLDINGS GROUP INTERNATIONAL (since 2008), Founder-President of International Aviation Services for Africa (since 2008), Board Member of ZHONG JIA ELECTRONICS LTD HONG KONG (since 2002), and Chairman of Salone International Airlines Corporation (since 2020). Each organization, under scrutiny, proves as substantial as a desert mirage.

His supposed airline in Sierra Leone lacks any aviation authority registration, while the International Aviation Services for Africa (IASA), which he claims to have led since 2008 from Bamako, Mali, shows no trace in regional aviation records. His “World Humanity Commission” appears in no international NGO databases, and even his educational credentials from “Academy Royale des Armees” (2000-2005) prove untraceable.

Dr. Banao’s path to Somaliland’s corridors of power appears to have been paved through Eswatini, where he has been photographed meeting officials. This connection coincides with former Somaliland Foreign Minister Dr. Essa Kayd’s diplomatic efforts in the country as part of Somaliland’s alliance with Taiwan. While this might explain his access to Somaliland’s institutions, efforts to reach Dr. Kayd to verify any previous encounters with Dr. Banao were unsuccessful. This pattern of exploiting legitimate diplomatic channels to gain credibility has become a recurring theme in Somaliland’s international relations.

When confronted about the meeting, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Mr. Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal offered a defense that inadvertently highlighted the very problem at hand. “We are not gullible,” the Minister insisted to the Somaliland Chronicle. “Our doors are open, and we will meet with everyone, but at the end of the day, people will need to prove what they claim they can do. The burden of proof is on the visitors to show us what they can do.” He emphasized that the ministry has not signed any agreements with Dr. Banao, adding that “our doors are open to everyone.”

This response reveals a profound misunderstanding of diplomatic protocol. The Minister’s stance – that verification should follow rather than precede high-level meetings – inverts basic diplomatic practice. The controversy has already claimed its first casualties within the ministry, with all ministerial advisors reportedly dismissed following a heated internal debate about Dr. Banao’s credentials. Notably, Director General Ahmed Abokor, who defended Dr. Banao’s credentials much like he insisted that Maxtor Bank was all too real, is no stranger to such controversies.

During his tenure at the Ministry of Investment in 2018, Abokor orchestrated the infamous Maxtor Bank affair – embracing a phantom Chinese financial institution promising billion-dollar investments. Even after Chinese officials confirmed they had never heard of the bank, his ministry attempted to justify their due diligence by presenting a three-month-old Colorado company registration for an entity operating from a parking lot. His current defense of Dr. Banao suggests a troubling continuity in institutional judgment.

The implications extend far beyond mere embarrassment. Each fraudulent engagement creates potential “squatters” – individuals or entities with dubious claims that could later complicate or litigate against legitimate investors. Several potential European investors have already cited concerns about competing claims from unverified actors who previously secured ministerial audiences and photo opportunities. While Somaliland’s diplomats chase phantoms, genuine diplomatic and investment opportunities wither.

The institutional vulnerability to fraudsters has manifested across multiple administrations. The 2019 Singapore New Silk Oil Refinery project saw multiple ministers, including Vice President Abdirahman Saylici, preside over elaborate ceremonies for a purported multi-billion dollar investment without basic verification of the proponents’ capabilities. Similarly, Swedish citizen Mikael Thorstensson, despite running failing businesses and being evicted from his Hargeisa residence, managed to orchestrate a massive “marine conservation project” that would have handed control of 35% of Somaliland’s coastline to a tombstone seller and his associates.

For a nation seeking international recognition, Somaliland’s inability to perform even rudimentary verification of diplomatic contacts isn’t just embarrassing—it’s suicidal. While officials defend their “open door” policy as showcasing diplomatic accessibility, they’ve instead transformed government offices into a carousel of con artists, where anyone with a template website and stock photos can secure ministerial audiences. The real cost isn’t just wasted time and resources—it’s the growing perception of Somaliland as an easy mark on the international stage, driving away legitimate partners while attracting an endless parade of fraudsters.

President Cirro’s administration now faces a choice that will define its legacy: Will it continue the ruinous tradition of embracing anyone brandishing an impressive business card and flashy social media presence, or will it finally install the basic verification procedures that every functioning state maintains? Somaliland’s diplomatic future hangs in the balance – between continued exploitation by international fraudsters and the professional credibility required of a nation seeking its rightful place in the world. The cost of maintaining “open doors” to obvious confidence tricksters may ultimately be the closing of doors to legitimate international partners.

Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

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