Investigative Reports

Ex-US Ambassador to Somalia Lobbies for Hormuud’s Access to American Banking System

Questions mount as André partners with Somali MP who...

Major Corruption Allegations Rock Somaliland Finance Ministry’s Recruitment for World Bank’s Public Resource Management Project

According to documents examined by Somaliland Chronicle, serious allegations...

Financial Turmoil and a New Questionable Venture Cast Shadows over Boodhari Mills’ Future

In our previous coverage, we explored Boodheri Mills, a...
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Sahra Halgan Rose to Prominence as One of Africa’s Top Rock Stars

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In the late 1980s, Sahra Halgan gave up her dreams of becoming a singer to join Somaliland’s secession movement, becoming a self-taught, gun-toting nurse tending to injured fighters.

But she soon realized that just as powerful as her newfound bandaging skills was the comfort she could provide with her voice.

“I don’t know why, but the people injured by gunshots – the pain was coming at night,” she recalls from her home in Hargeisa, the capital of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. “We didn’t have nothing at that time – no painkillers, no antibiotics. And I said we will sing together. Song is not just for the concerts, for the festivals, to become rich. The song becomes the medical supplies, it becomes the army, it’s everything.” 

It was during this time that Sahra Ahmed Mohamoud earned her moniker Halgan – meaning fighter – that she took as her stage name.

Her unbridled faith in the potency of performance is written through every note of her third album, released March 29. Titled Hiddo Dhawr (Preserve Culture) – the same name as the music venue she established a decade ago in her home city – it is a pulsating fusion of Somali folk and French rock, full of rough guitar riffs, palpitating percussion and vintage keys. 

Its first single – Sharaf – is, the 53-year-old singer says, “a hymn to the pride and dignity of the human being”. It opens with her waving her national flag, with “I [heart] Somaliland” printed along its central white stripe. The state is still unrecognized by the international community.

After gaining independence from the UK in 1960, Somaliland – a territory to the north of Somalia, in the Horn of Africa – only existed as a sovereign entity for five days before it was absorbed into the Republic of Somalia (which had also gained its independence, from Italy).

In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre took power via a military coup and by the late 1980s, a recession fuelled internal turmoil, while Barre’s regime became more authoritarian, bombing his own people. At the same time, the anti-Barre Somali National Movement (SNM) in Somaliland took up arms and fought for independence. 

Halgan supported the SNM rebels, but in 1991 – after Hargeisa was turned to rubble – she fled first to Djibouti, and then on to France.

Halgan had started to become famous in her home country, but in Europe, she was a nameless refugee. “No one knew who I was. I became a cleaner, I worked helping disabled people.”

She raised five children – now in their 20s and 30s – and formed a trio with drummer and percussionist Aymeric Krol (founder of French-Malian band BKO Quintet) and guitarist Maël Saletes, who she met in Lyon. All her songs are in Somali, but her French band-mates provide backing vocals. 

She returned in 2013 keen to help rebuild her homeland. But tensions in Somaliland have not disappeared. For the first couple of years after she opened Hiddo Dhawr – a complex of traditional Somali huts – it was the only music venue in the city and she had local religious men arriving to try to close her down. Her response was straightforward: “I said to them, ‘during the civil war, I was a singer and my song became a medical tool, and then where were you? At that time, we needed you – where were you?’ And he didn’t give me an answer. I said, ‘leave me alone.’”

Halgan – who began singing aged 13 – is used to people trying to silence her voice. Her mother’s father was a singer, but her father’s family “don’t like it – until now. They said ‘Now you have a child, you have a daughter, why you sing?’ And then I say, ‘I love to sing – it’s no problem.’ But they said, ‘When you stop to sing? I said, I tell you on that day.’” That day does not look like it will be coming very soon. 

Halgan mentions the UK’s history with Somaliland – the British protectorate was established in 1884 – and says: “The people of Britain, I demand support for our cause.” She asks whether it is attitudes to Islam that are delaying progress: “What is preventing us from being recognized? It is our right. We got our independence in 1960. We need a reason why we aren’t recognized, if it’s not because of religion. What is the world waiting for? We can do this but what are they waiting for from us? I don’t know. They must respond.”

However, she has lost none of her belief in the liberating capacity of music. “When you sing, everybody comes to see you and is laughing and dancing,” she says. “In this world now, everything divides people, [whether] it’s political, religion, [or] money. But we have only one thing to bring us together. It’s music.”

Sahra Halgan’s new album, Hiddo Dhawr, is released on 29 March

U.S. Influence in Africa Wanes Amid Somalia’s Crisis and Geopolitical Rivalry with China and Russia

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As Somalia faces escalating security threats and the resurgence of the militant organization al-Shabaab, the United States is encountering significant obstacles in maintaining its strategic interests in the region.

General Michael E. Langley, who assumed command of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2021, expressed apprehension regarding Somalia’s ability to counter terrorism during his tenure. Langley’s appointment to AFRICOM coincided with Somalia’s battle against the al-Shabaab threat, marking a critical period for security efforts in the country.

Nearly a year ago, General Michael E. Langley voiced optimism about Somalia’s potential to confront the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. He highlighted the Somali government’s adoption of a comprehensive “whole government approach,” emphasizing efforts beyond kinetic action. However, recent testimony from General Langley suggests that this optimism may have been premature, as Somalia continues to grapple with the challenge posed by Al-Shabaab.

Despite substantial resources and ongoing support allocated to Somalia’s security sector, recent events underscore the failure of both the Somali government and its international allies, including the United States, to effectively address the country’s security challenges.

The latest posture statement from USAFRICOM, presented to the House Armed Services Committee on March 21, 2024, sheds light on the escalating security crisis in Somalia. General Langley highlighted the persistent threat posed by al-Shabaab, whose attacks continue to target civilians and government officials. Despite U.S. support and military assistance, Somalia’s security forces have struggled to contain the insurgency, raising questions about their capacity and effectiveness.

Furthermore, the emergence of military juntas in West Africa further complicates U.S. efforts to promote security and stability on the continent. While the United States aims to counter the influence of China and Russia in East Africa, internal instability and governance failures in key partner countries undermine these efforts.

During his testimony, General Langley expressed deep concern about the escalating competition between the United States and China in Africa. He highlighted China’s aggressive economic investments and strategic partnerships on the continent as a direct challenge to U.S. interests. Additionally, General Langley raised alarms about the potential Russian military base in Eritrea, emphasizing the growing influence of strategic competitors in Africa. These developments underscore the urgency for the United States to reassess its approach and strengthen its engagement to counter the expanding presence of China and Russia in Africa.

China has significantly expanded its presence in Somalia, securing extensive concessions such as exclusive fishing licenses for Somali waters. However, despite these economic engagements, China’s contribution to the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia is notably limited compared to other actors, particularly the United States, which has poured billions in humanitarian aid and has been actively involved in providing military support and assistance.

Moreover, recent events, such as the Al-Shabaab attack on a Mogadishu hotel and the civilian deaths resulting from a Turkish drone strike, highlight the complexities of Somalia’s security challenges and the risks associated with military interventions in densely populated areas.

The apparent inconsistency in U.S. policy towards the Somaliland-Ethiopian Memorandum of Understanding, highlighted by the State Department’s Africa Bureau’s opposition juxtaposed with support for Somalia’s objections, has raised doubts about the coherence of American strategic decisions in the region. This skepticism is exacerbated by the fact that Rep Ilhan Omar, who has been removed from her post in the Foreign Affairs Committee, still holds significant influence in shaping U.S. policy towards Somalia, as evidenced by her involvement in the U.S. Africa Policy Working Group meeting with the Assistant Secretary of State. Critics argue that this situation risks neglecting evolving geopolitical realities on the ground and jeopardizing U.S. interests in the region.

In late January, Representative Ilhan Omar claimed an unprecedented influence over U.S. policy regarding the Somaliland-Ethiopian Naval Base Agreement. Omar, facing increased scrutiny due to her recent removal from the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee, stirred further controversy by referring to Somalilanders as “Somali imposters” These blatantly racist remarks, delivered with fervent nationalism, have prompted concerns about her suitability in handling international matters.

Dr. J. Peter Pham, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and Sahel, has warned of the consequences of Washington’s “One Somalia” policy. Pham’s analysis emphasizes the failure of the U.S. approach to Somalia and underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of the country’s complex dynamics. With militant groups like al-Shabaab gaining ground and military juntas rising in neighboring West Africa, Somalia’s crisis poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests in the region.

Furthermore, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Posture Statement for 2024, presented to the House Armed Services Committee, highlights the growing influence of China and Russia in East Africa. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia’s expanding military presence in the region present new challenges to U.S. dominance, complicating efforts to counter their influence effectively.

As Somalia’s security situation continues to deteriorate, experts call for a recalibration of U.S. policy towards the region, with a pivot towards recognizing the strategic importance of Somaliland. Without a comprehensive strategy addressing the root causes of insecurity and governance challenges, U.S. influence in East Africa is likely to further decline, leaving Somalia and the region vulnerable to exploitation by extremist groups and rival powers.

Civilian Deaths in Turkish Drone Strike Could Pose Legal Challenges for Turkey and Qatar

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A drone strike outside of Mogadishu has resulted in the tragic loss of over 22 lives and left 21 others wounded, many of whom are children. According to The Washington Post, citing two anonymous security sources, the attack was executed by a Turkish drone.

The strike targeted a residential dwelling in Baghdad village in an agricultural district about 25 kilometers northeast of the Somali capital, during the evening after Ramadan Iftar. The area was reportedly quiet at the time, following clashes on the preceding day between NISA forces and Somali armed forces. Eyewitness accounts describe a harrowing scene as multiple strikes continued to hit, even as rescuers attempted to aid the initial victims of the trike, leading to a devastating toll on women and children in particular. At the time of reporting, neither the Somali nor the Turkish government had provided comments on the strike, while the U.S. Africa Command has refuted any involvement.

Turkey’s military presence in Somalia has been increasing, with forces there to train and bolster the Somali government’s campaign against Al-Shabab. This incident is likely to heighten scrutiny over Somalia’s dependency on drones from international allies in the fight against Al-Shabab and the consequences for civilian casualty. Marking a significant escalation, this is the first reported case of a Turkish-backed operation resulting in a massive civilian casualty. Human rights organizations and investigative journalists have previously documented civilian losses due to Pentagon-operated drones in Somalia.

Qatar’s Support to Drone Operations in Somalia 

Information obtained by The Somaliland Chronicle suggests that Qatari military personnel have been actively involved in drone operations in Somalia, collaborating with Turkish and Somali forces in training and execution of both surveillance and active strikes. It’s not clear if any Qatar personnel were involved in this specific operation. The United Nations panel of experts indicated that Turkey delivered Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu on December 6, 2021 via two Airbus A400M military cargo planes operated by the Turkish Air Force.

Two sources familiar with the operations disclosed to Somaliland Chronicle that Turkey supplies the drone technology and associated training, while Qatar finances the cost of operations, enabling Qatari military personnel to train in active combat operations to acquire hands-on combat experience. Meanwhile, the Somali Armed Forces receive training and contribute intelligence for the operations. As Somalia contends with a lingering conflict, this approach of international support—potentially more effective—raises complex issues of transparency and accountability. 

The UN investigators alleged that Turkey violated international sanctions on Somalia by supplying armed drones without notification to and approval of the UN. In response to letters of inquiry from the UN, Turkey claimed it had delivered the drones to a Turkish base in Mogadishu and that the goal was to contribute to the fight against terrorism. “Turkey informed the Panel that it has not delivered any type of unmanned combat aerial vehicles to the Somali authorities and that the systems in question are assigned to be used by Türkiye in the fight against terrorism in Somalia,” the report issued by the UN experts on October 18, 2022 stated. After 2017 diplomatic crisis between Qatar and other Gulf countries, Turkey and Qatar increased joint effort to compete with other Gulf countries by funding and supporting different political factions in Somalia. 

Since 2011, Somali military forces have been heavily reliant on U.S. aerial support. While this assistance saw a temporary halt in the final year of President Trump’s administration, President Biden’s resumption of military support in mid 2022, including drone strikes, has been cautious and measured to prevent civilian casualties. Somalia lobbied for more aerial support and other force multipliers from Turkey and other countries as it started a major offensive against Al-shabab. 

The accidental harm to civilians by drone strikes, involving forces from multiple nations, muddies accountability and legal compliance. International law requires combatants to differentiate between military and civilian targets. When non-combatants are inadvertently caught in the crossfire, the legality and culpability of these actions are fiercely debated. With the rules of engagement for these operations unclear, such incidents only deepen the existing complexities of warfare legality.

Ethiopia’s interest in recognising Somaliland.

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Let’s leave out the “he said, she said” of Bloomberg’s fake news and discuss real geopolitics.

Having a navy near Bab Al Mandab signifies Ethiopia’s emergence as a major regional military power, while its leadership in recognising Somaliland serves as a diplomatic aspect of this emergence. Together, this puts an end to the vacuum filled by Houthi rebels as a result of Somalian anarchy and the lack of recognition of Somaliland.

The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) causes short-term pain but is not a new phenomenon in international relations. That short-term pain often leads to rewarding gains, and that is why it is a power move reserved for major countries. Those who advocate for “territorial integrity” need to understand the ICJ ruling on Kosovo and review Wikipedia’s list of successful UDIs, which includes Greece, the United States, Indonesia, Namibia, and Bangladesh.

In that list, I use the Bangladesh example although Somaliland is not a case of secession but rather a case of state continuity, similar to the Baltic republics. However, I picked Bangladesh due to the geopolitical implications in the Horn of Africa, which mirror the tensions in the Indian subcontinent during the ’70s.

Bangladesh did not beg Pakistan for recognition and took the UDI route. India was the first major country to recognise Bangladesh. Tensions initially escalated but eventually eased after all countries recognised Bangladesh, with Pakistan being the last. That short-term pain is now part of the past, but it has left a lasting impact: reaffirming India’s hegemony in the subcontinent.

Similarly, Ethiopia’s interest in recognising Somaliland represents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to establish an African hegemony in the Horn. As Africans, we should all rise together with Ethiopia rather than watch the Horn fall under the influence of Iran, Turkey, or the Arab Gulf states in a disordered, competitive, and neo-colonial manner.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

Somaliland Cabinet Reshuffled Again

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Muse Bihi Abdi, the Somaliland president, reshuffled, dismissed, and made new appointments to his Council of Ministers on Sunday.

Suleiman Awad Ali Bukhari, the Minister of Transport and Road Development, was sacked by President Bihi, who then named Rabbi Abdi Mohamed in his place.

In addition, Mohamud Warsame Jama has been named as the new Fisheries Minister.

President Bihi picked Faisal Mohamud Said Abdulle as Somaliland’s Deputy Minister of Trade and Tourism and Abdinasir Aydid Mohamed Farah as the nation’s Deputy Minister of Agricultural Development.

Finally, Muse Ibrahim Yusuf Salaf was named to hold the position of Deputy Minister of Road Development and Transportation.

One day after President Bihi signed into law two crucial revised election laws – the Regulation of Organizations and Political Parties Law (No. 14/2023) and the Election and Voter Registration Law (No. 91/2023), the new ministries were appointed.

This legislation calls for the integration of Somaliland’s November 2024 presidential and political association elections, which were previously authorized by the Parliament.

For the past two years, the topic of election legislation has dominated political discourse in Somaliland, and sparked a divisive national conversation that pitted different facets of society against one another.

November 2024 is the date set by the chairman of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) for the dual elections.

Taiwan and Somaliland Deepen Ties with the Expanded Military Scholarship Program

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The expansion of Taiwan’s military scholarship program to Somaliland signifies a concrete step toward bolstering the latter’s defense capabilities while deepening bilateral relations. Taiwan’s commitment to regional security and partnership with the Republic of Somaliland is underscored by this announcement, building upon the program’s initiation in 2023.

The expanded program offers high school graduates from Somaliland the opportunity to undertake four-year academic military studies in Taiwan, covering specialized fields such as War College Courses, Command and Staff Courses, and Navy Academy programs. This training will be provided by Taiwan’s prestigious National Defense University (NDU), known for its excellence in military education and research.

Ambassador Lou, Taiwan’s Representative in Somaliland, emphasized the importance of capacity building and knowledge transfer in the field of security and national defense. “Through this program, Somaliland will move toward peace, stability, and prosperity,” remarked Ambassador Lou. “Taiwan remains committed to supporting Somaliland and exploring further opportunities for regional security cooperation.”

Ambassador Lou also highlighted a notable development within the program, stating, “It is thrilling to see 2 female military officers awarded for Taiwan Military Scholarship to study Master English Program on International Security this year. As the African proverb says, ‘If you educate a man, you educate an individual, but if you educate a woman, you educate a nation.’ We expect there will be more and more female awardees to study in Taiwan.”

NDU’s curriculum incorporates the latest advancements in modern military command and control (C2), emphasizing networked warfare and information dominance. This approach prioritizes empowering lower-level commanders to make crucial decisions based on real-time information, leading to faster and more adaptable responses on the ground. Additionally, advanced communication and sensor technology provide commanders with a comprehensive picture of the battlefield, enabling informed strategic planning and execution. Seamless information sharing between commanders, units, and intelligence agencies fosters collaboration and coordinated operations.

210203-N-PC620-0010 JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, Va. (Feb. 3, 2021) Joint Task Force Civil Support Commanding General Maj. Gen. Jeff Van listens to a brief during a Joint All-Domain Command & Control System demonstration. Joint All-Domain Command & Control System, also known as JADC2, proactively provides support capabilities exactly where JTF-CS may need it during Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations by synergizing multiple data feeds through real-time end-user reporting and collaborative planning. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael H. Lehman/Released)

Ambassador Lou, Taiwan’s Representative in Somaliland, emphasized the program’s potential for long-term progress. He highlighted the inclusion of two female military officers pursuing Master’s degrees in International Security this year, expressing optimism for increasing female representation in future cohorts.

Beyond defense, Taiwan and Somaliland collaborate across various sectors, including economic development, healthcare, and technology transfer. Cultural exchanges and educational partnerships further solidify understanding and mutual respect between the two nations.

Somaliland has previously sought military and security training from regional partners like Ethiopia and Djibouti, demonstrating its commitment to enhancing defense capabilities through international cooperation. Taiwan’s program offers valuable expertise in modern warfare and defense strategies, with potential for knowledge transfer and collaborative efforts in defense technology development.

However, amidst this cooperation, the unresolved airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland looms large. Somalia’s disruptive actions, including conflicting directives to pilots and jeopardizing air travel safety, highlight the urgent need for effective airspace management solutions. It remains uncertain if Somaliland has sought Taiwan’s assistance in managing its airspace, especially in light of Somalia’s efforts to disrupt the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia.

A Journey Through Somaliland: A compilation of my observations and experiences in East Africa 

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Mogadishu 

Descending on Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle International Airport (MGQ) you’re immediately taken aback by the vastness of the Indian ocean. On the horizon stands the unmistakable silhouette of Ali Jimale, a Turkish style mosque and an obvious symbol of Turkish influence in the region. MGQ, itself a Turkish project, is a modern airport teeming with UN brandished aircraft. From UN Aid helicopters and private jets, it’s clear you’re in humanitarian mecca. 

Despite its challenges, the potential in Mogadishu is undeniable. Mogadishu is the second most populous coastal city in East Africa. The weather is humid but tempered with a cool coastal breeze. The greenery that surrounds the airport is a reminder that Africa is not the stereotype of a barren desert wilderness devoid of water and life. 

Despite the great potential for what could be the greatest city in east Africa given its location, climate, population, and natural beauty; Mogadishu is shackled by a decades-long history of corruption, violence, and insecurity. The insecurity is clearest in the over the top security precautions as we disembark from the plane and walk through several stages of security checks. The security personnel’s faces betray a subtle nervousness. There also seems to be a level of petty politics at play as we enter the airport international arrivals section only to walk to domestic travel one building over and return to the very same plane moments later. Why passengers would disembark only to come out a different door that reads ‘domestic travel’ seems like a tacit attempt to remind travelers that Hargeisa is domestic and that Somaliland is Somalia. Speculation aside, the airport is a modern one. I remember calling a friend who hails from the Mogadishu area, about the impressiveness of MGQ. This was in contrast to Hargeisa’s Egal International Airport (HGA). 

Hargeisa 

Here the airport is modest by comparison. The TV screens show ads for Ambassador Hotel, Dahabshiil’s EVC e-Dahab, and SO GASHO mobile. Below the ads are prompts reflecting the incompetence of whomever set up the ads with subtext captions. Messages that read “Final Version” “MP4 Cut” “This Version is not compatible…” cascade across the dusty and dated television screens throughout the airport. A small example of the overall shortcomings of an airport that has been the center of attention as Mogadishu and Hargeisa wrestle for control over Somaliland airspace. This latest saga follows Mogadishu’s recent attempts to politicize air traffic control in light of the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU. In Hargeisa the climate is noticeably harsher.  In Hargeisa the climate is noticeably harsher. The climate bears significant resemblance to the people. Tough and unrelenting; traits Somalis have been known for in writings of Ibn Batuta and early British colonialists. Traits that have served us well in war and resistance but fail us today. In Japan a culture of excellence or “kaizen” has helped earn them a reputation for discipline, excellence, and duty. This could not be further from the case here. Minutes from HGA is the sight of littered plastic bags, water bottles, and of course farm animals competing for a share of the road. Goats, pedestrians and cars snake around one another in a choreographed dance everyone here is all too familiar with. This is not unique to Hargeisa, however. The same applies in places like Cairo and Karachi. I’m told by friends that the problem of garbage and congestion is especially pronounced in Mogadishu.

On first glance, Hargeisa-the capital of Somaliland, does not say Africa’s 55th state. “You judge too quickly”, I’m often reminded by friends. Many of my earliest impressions of people and places have been deeply misplaced, I would later discover. Somaliand would prove no exception. In the days and weeks since the underwhelming welcome I’ve come to appreciate the emphasis on function and substance over beauty. With a host of challenges facing the unrecognized country, captions on screens or goats on streets do not factor highly. Hargeisa in 1988 was reduced to rubble. The UN reported there was not a free standing structure in the city with most of its inhabitants displaced by carpet bombing from the Barre government. Thirty years later, high rises can be found across the city and many new buildings sprout up as men in green overalls scaffold the sides of buildings. Men in “Hargeisa Municipality” labeled overalls can be seen during the day excavating ground where water pipes are being laid, trees planted, and traffic lights installed. New roads are being paved and there is an energy for a new chapter in the city that many credit the young new mayor with a famous last name for. When I last visited Hargeisa in 2020 even the downtown had rocky gravel roads. Today, you can travel to every corner of the city on recently paved roads. These seemingly small projects make a city function. City services like street cleaners, infrastructure projects like Waheen market, and brand new government buildings to better serve the local population are a testament to the resilience of a people in an unrecognized country operating primarily on tax and port revenue. 

The new mayor and council have capitalized on their election victory on a wave of anti-tribalism support and have inspired in local residents a renewed appreciation for the role of government in improving their lives. While in Hargeisa, I discovered, the same goodwill does not extend to the Somaliland government overall. In many ways Somaliland operates like a nonprofit, using only what funds it can generate from services it can charge for and grants from NGOs. Without access to debt financing and foreign investment capital, many of its accomplishments are made more commendable. Still I am surprised to learn people, seemingly universally, dislike Somaliland president Musa Bihi. He is seen by many as divisive, dictatorial, and heavy-handed. People are especially enraged by his handling of the Las Anod crisis, current inter-Isaaq tribal tensions, and perhaps most surprisingly his deal with Ethiopia and the infamous MOU. People by and large oppose the MOU not on grounds some on Twitter would have you believe (i.e. imagined aspirations for unity with Somalia) but a fear that Ethiopia, with its much larger population will overtake the country. 

Borama 

In the early days of my journey I had the opportunity to visit Borama. A place where a disproportionate number of my friends come from (you know who you are). Only an hour and half away from the capital it was an easy place to visit. Here, too, my preconceptions were challenged. On the road to Borama we find a well-paved highway as tree canopies line the road. When we pass Arabsiyo and Gabiley and reach the interpass between Tog Wajale and Borama something changes. If you go left to the Ethiopian border city you see the familiar well-paved road with its white and yellow markings. If you go right towards the road to Borama suddenly it gets a bit bumpier. The markings are gone and trees are few and far between. Worse yet as you enter the city road conditions worsen as we sway side to side navigating pot holes on a gravel path. I’m overcome with disappointment. How could this be? Both I and my friend suddenly find ourselves sympathetic to the Awdal state Cause making the rounds online. This too on further

inspection owes a simple explanation. The road we were traveling on was built by the UAE, it is a trade corridor from Ethiopia to Berbera. The road to Borama was built by the Somaliland government. These roads resemble the road to Burco and Ceerigaabo. In Hargeisa new roads have been a keystone and well celebrated accomplishment of the new mayor. Roads within cities are the purview of local governments. With new young mayors in Hargeisa, Burco,and Borama there is a lot to be hopeful for. 

On the topic of nationalism, it’s worth noting I use the various Somali bracelets as a proxy for gauging support for pro-Somaliland or pro-Somalia positions. In Hargeisa it was not strange to see sky-blue bracelets with white diamonds in neighborhoods and restaurants. It was even more common in Ceerigaabo where tensions are especially tense. In Borama there are no Somalia bracelets in sight. Arguably, and this is perhaps heretical to some ears, there are more Somaliland bracelets and flags than in Hargeisa. There is of course no replacement for real polls and qualitative studies but this is an unrecognized third world country with little capacity or desire on the part of the government or the private sector to explore. I do believe much of the brouhaha around Awdal state is a diaspora project encouraged and given new life by the Mogadishu government. For Samaaroon who left the region in the early 90s, amidst tensions with the SNM, they remain locked in time. For locals that trade and travel to Hargeisa, ship goods and cattle through Berbera, and conduct both business and politics in the country, Somalia has little on offer. State institutions collect taxes, regulate business, resolve disputes, and of course create and enforce laws set to ensure a stable business and political environment. 

Ceerigaabo 

I arrive in Ceerigaabo, the capital of the Sanaag region on a small propeller plane. I head straight to my hotel. In my Hargeisa hotel there is a sign that reads “la ma ogola siigaar iyo khaatka” (smoking and khat is prohibited). In Ceerigaabo, my hotel door reads “no smoking, no khat, no guns, no bombs, no weapons of any kind.” Here one local tells me everyone has two priorities: own a home and own a gun. He tells me every establishment and home is flush with guns of every size. It is no wonder the city hosts a large Somaliland military presence. Given the history of violence and potential for violence the ratio of soldier to citizen I would assume is unparalleled in the country. Ironically, it was because of this military presence in 2020 I became a Somaliland nationalist. On this go around it’s a reminder of the country’s failure. The tension between tribes is felt everywhere. Here in Ceerigaabo, Somalia or SSC wristbands can be seen competing with Somaliland bracelets in some parts of the city. Cars and doors have etched out or spray painted SSC on them. On one quiet afternoon as the city took its post dhur siesta, I ventured towards my aunt’s school minutes from my hotel. Given my poor sense of direction, I found myself lost and surrounded by houses that all resemble one another. In a weak attempt at speaking Somali, I ask a man roughly my age for directions. He steps away from his house towards me and asks if I’m local or from the diaspora. I tell him I’m from the latter. He admits to being one as well. He asks me about my tribe. “Are you Isaaq or Harti”, he says. From the framing of his question I know he is likely Warsangeeli. Were he Isaaq he would be more specific. ‘Isaaq’, is not what any Isaaq in Somaliland would identify as. I tell him I’m Isaaq and suddenly his face and demeanour shift. It’s as if I’m now looking at a different man. The look of curiosity fades to concern. His eyes darting left to right. “You need to leave this area”, he tells me. “This is Harti area and its not safe for you”, he goes on. “Let me escort you back”. I’m in disbelief. I’ve walked into the Somali equivalent of Compton’s Crips and Bloods. My friend listens to the interaction on the phone every bit as amazed by the interaction as I am. This was the first of many incidents that made it clear to me Somaliland (at least in its eastern provinces) has a tribal problem. 

Berbera 

The final days of my time in Somaliland, I visit Berbera. The coastal city and a focal point of dispute between Somalia and Somaliland in the recent past. A corollary issue of port access for Ethiopia’s navy is the latest controversy. Known for its major port, the largest in Somaliland and Somalia, Berbera is one of, if not, the largest economic drivers in Somaliland. Berbera’s young mayor (a two-time incumbent) is credited for making the city the cleanest and arguably most progressive in the country. Farm animals are banned within city limits, garbage bins are found on street corners, and there are even sidewalks! A simple amenity in most western cities but sorely missed in places like Cairo, Hargeisa, and car haven Houston! There is hardly any traffic here; it’s quiet. I can hear the breeze, the ocean, the cawing of the seagulls. The beach has elevated lifeguard stations to overlook swimmers. There are swings used by young men likely unaware of the swings intended users. I cannot get over the fact there are no goats gnawing at littered cardboard boxes or chewing khat left on the floor. No chickens. No cows. Just silence and empty streets. 

Addis Ababa 

It’s the end of my sojourn in Somaliland. I’m at Addis Ababa’s Bole International Airport (ADD) waiting to return to Canada. ADD is grand and rivals Pearson, Abu Hamad, and Changi in its modernism. Passengers pass by Ethiopian women brewing traditional coffee and burning incense as they stop at one upscale restaurant or another. I need to change my sim card and ask a woman at a mobile stand for help. Before helping she asks where I’m from. “Somaliland,” I say. She grins, gives me a high five, and states, “we’re new allies now.” The interaction leaves me confused. Allies against whom? In any case it’s time for my flight.

About the Author

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Mustafa Ali is a Somali Canadian based in Edmonton, Alberta. He is a Founder Liaison and Tech Lead at Edmonton Unlimited, and a former stakeholder relations manager for the premier of Alberta. He holds a Masters in Business Administration (MBA) and a Bachelors in Political Science, both from the University of Alberta.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

Creative Commons License

Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle and is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

Somalia’s Deal With Turkey Is Aimed at Ethiopia

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Somalia announced yesterday it had signed a defense and economic cooperation deal with Turkey that reportedly includes maritime security support, authorizing Ankara to train and equip the Somali navy so it can better defend its territorial waters. The deal was signed earlier this month and will reportedly be in force for the next decade. (AP)

Our Take

The Somalia-Turkey agreement is just the latest development in the continued fallout from a deal signed on Jan. 1 between Ethiopia and Somaliland, that remains unrecognized internationally. That agreement grants Ethiopia, which is landlocked, access to some of Somaliland’s coastline and use of its port, potentially in exchange for diplomatic recognition of Somaliland.

Until this year, the Somaliland situation, while an irritant for Mogadishu, had largely been static. Somaliland had enjoyed de facto independence for decades without having made any progress on international recognition, while Somalia focused more attention on its war against the Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab. Now, Ethiopia’s reported pledge to recognize Somaliland—notably at a time when quasi-states appear to have more leverage in the global order—has set off a cascade of regional effects, including some saber-rattling.

For its part, Somalia remains particularly suspicious of the potential role that the United Arab Emirates played in the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement. That’s because the Horn of Africa has increasingly become an epicenter of geopolitical competition among Middle East powers. The UAE, in particular, has become a major player in the Horn and has previously facilitated ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland. So Somalia’s suspicion is not unfounded.

It makes sense, in this context, that Somalia would seek to strengthen its partnership with Turkey, which has become an increasingly close ally. Turkey already provides development aid and military training to Somalia, and in 2017 opened its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu.

With this new agreement, that partnership extends to Somalia’s territorial waters, potentially serving as a deterrent to Ethiopia’s use of Somaliland’s coastline. At the same time, however, the Turkey-Somalia deal is sure to escalate tensions in the region and further entangle the Horn in longstanding Middle East rivalries.

What the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal Means for Washington’s Strategy in the Red Sea

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Tensions from the Israel-Hamas war have spilled into the Red Sea. But while global leaders are focusing intently on everything happening in the waters of the Red Sea and to the north of it, they’ll also need to monitor geopolitical developments to the south—on the Horn of Africa.

Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A Communique with Somalia

The first agreement is a communique, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communique, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communique referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MoU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group Al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MoU, with Al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The Global Response Begins to Take Shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MoU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MoU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MoU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MoU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering Al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communique signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against Al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counter-terrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.


Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

The Somalia-Somaliland Airspace Dispute: A Historical Overview and the Path Forward

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Introduction

The longstanding and complex airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland has been marked by a series of broken agreements, escalating tensions, and growing concerns over regional security and aviation safety. This article explores the historical background of the United Nations-mediated agreements, examines Somalia’s subsequent deviation from these agreements, analyzes recent incidents that have further intensified the dispute, and discusses the implications for the safety and management of the airspace in the region.

Historical Background

The origins of the airspace dispute date back to the early 1990s, when Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia following the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. The resulting state of lawlessness, with various factions vying for control, raised concerns over the safety and security of the airspace. In response, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, assumed responsibility for managing the airspace. Due to the security concerns within Somalia, the ICAO initially based its operations in Nairobi, Kenya.

Since 1993, the UN program tasked with these duties has been the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS), which operates out of Nairobi. For over 27 years, the ICAO has had overall responsibility for the skies over the country, processing civilian aircraft movements and overflights in the Horn of Africa without any dispute. This period of stability stands in stark contrast to the recent developments since Mogadishu took control a few years ago. In this short span, Somalia has already violated agreements, casting doubt on its ability to manage this vital aspect of regional security responsibly.

Somalia’s Departure from Agreements

In an effort to establish a cooperative framework for airspace management, the ICAO facilitated negotiations between Somalia and Somaliland. Since 2012, there have been several meetings and talks between the two parties, including the Istanbul II Communiqué in June 2013, where they concurred on establishing the Air Traffic Control Board (headquartered in Hargeisa, Somaliland) and a four-member technical committee (two from Somaliland and two from Somalia). The pact received support from the United Nations envoy in Somalia/Somaliland and the head of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia at the time, Nicholas Kay, who described it as a model for other areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.

The accord was hailed as a significant step towards collaborative management and was expected to pave the way for a sustainable resolution to the dispute. However, it began to unravel as Somalia reneged on its commitments, opting for unilateral control of the airspace. Somalia’s move was perceived by Somaliland as a breach of the Istanbul II Communiqué and a violation of all the agreed-upon terms, further infringing on its autonomy.

The situation was further complicated by Somalia’s unilateral actions, such as the revocation of previously issued flight permissions and the imposition of new regulations without consultation with Somaliland. This has led to increased tensions between the two entities and has raised concerns about the safety and security of the airspace in the region.

Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi has publicly criticized Somalia’s failure to uphold its commitments under the accord, particularly regarding the distribution of international aid and educational grants. The Somaliland Civil Aviation and Airports Authority (SL-CAAA) has accused successive Mogadishu governments of failing to honor agreements on air traffic management, leading to Somalia’s unilateral control over the Air Traffic Management Authority since 2018.

Latest Dispute and Recent Incidents

The recent incidents in the airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland have exacerbated tensions and raised concerns about the politicization of airspace management, often referred to as “air piracy.” This phenomenon, often referred to as ‘air piracy,’ involves the use of airspace control for political leverage or as a means of exerting pressure, akin to how piracy at sea is used to control maritime routes.

Increased Tensions

The dispute has seen a series of incidents that have further strained relations between the two entities. A notable event occurred on January 17, 2024, when an unscheduled Ethiopian Airlines flight carrying senior Ethiopian officials to Somaliland was denied entry into Somali airspace and forced to return to Addis Ababa. This incident underscored the operational rifts and the politicization of the airspace.

Further tensions arose with allegations of the Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) obstructing an air ambulance from entering Somali airspace en route to Hargeisa. Although the SCAA refuted these claims, stating that the aircraft lacked the necessary permits, the incident highlighted the human cost of the ongoing dispute.

Moreover, a recent incident involving Qatar Airways highlighted the complexities of airspace management in the region. The airline received contradictory instructions from air traffic controllers in Mogadishu and Hargeisa, leading to formal safety complaints. This incident underscores the challenges of securing the airspace amidst the ongoing dispute between Somalia and Somaliland and raises serious doubts about Somalia’s ability to manage air traffic safety and navigation effectively.

Politicization of Airspace

Somalia’s actions are perceived as using airspace management as a political tool. By denying flights and imposing unilateral regulations, Somalia is seen as leveraging its control over the airspace to assert its authority over Somaliland and to influence regional dynamics. This approach is akin to “air piracy,” where airspace control is weaponized for political ends, undermining the principles of international cooperation and aviation safety.

The use of airspace as a political tool not only exacerbates tensions between Somalia and Somaliland but also poses a threat to regional stability and aviation safety. It underscores the need for a resolution that respects the sovereignty of both entities and ensures the safe and efficient management of the airspace.

Implications of Weaponizing Air Traffic Control

If airspace management continues to be used as a political weapon, it could lead to the shutdown of air traffic in the region. This would have serious implications for civil aviation, including disruptions to commercial flights, humanitarian aid, and medical evacuations. It would also have economic repercussions, as the loss of overflight fees and the rerouting of flights would impact both Somalia and Somaliland. Failure to address this issue could have dire consequences for aviation security, regional stability, and economic well-being in the Horn of Africa.

Moreover, this threat could indicate that Somalia’s airspace is an unsafe conflict zone, and thousands of commercial flights that currently use the airspace could be rerouted. This rerouting would result in the loss of overfly revenues and may give reason for ICAO and FISS to step in and manage Somali airspace for as long as possible. The political exploitation of airspace control by Mogadishu has led to a situation where there is no win-win outcome. If the dispute continues, the airspace may be shut down, which would have dire consequences for civilian airlines and humanitarian operations.

The Threat of Airspace Control by Al-Shabab

The recent deadly attack by the al-Qaida-linked militant group Al-Shabab, resulting in the deaths of four Emirati troops and a Bahraini military officer, underscores the ongoing instability and unpredictability in Somalia. The assault, carried out by a Somali federal soldier recruited by Al-Shabab, breached the highly secure General Gordon Military Base, leading to the loss of nine military personnel. This incident effectively highlights Al-Shabab’s ability to infiltrate security systems.

Moreover, the airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland has far-reaching implications for regional security. The potential for Al-Shabab to exploit this dispute and gain control over the airspace is alarming, considering the group’s history of exploiting governmental vulnerabilities and ambitions to expand its influence.

The recent attack emphasizes Somalia’s ongoing instability. Al-Shabab’s capacity to infiltrate secure areas raises concerns about regional security, particularly in light of the ongoing airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland. This dispute could provide Al-Shabab with opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities and expand its influence. Urgent attention from national and international actors is essential to address this risk and ensure the safety and security of the region’s airspace through a unified management system.

The Way Forward: ICAO Intervention and International Mediation

Given the escalating tensions and potential risks to civil aviation safety, there is a pressing need for the re-engagement of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in managing the airspace. The ICAO’s expertise and neutrality could provide a framework for resolving the dispute, ensuring compliance with international aviation standards, and restoring confidence in the safety and security of the airspace over Somaliland and Somalia. The involvement of ICAO is not only crucial for technical reasons but also for its potential to act as an impartial mediator in a politically charged conflict.

Conclusion

The ongoing airspace dispute between Somalia and Somaliland is a multifaceted issue that involves historical agreements, sovereignty claims, and regional geopolitics. It transcends mere technicalities of air traffic control to touch upon deeper issues of national identity, territorial integrity, and regional power dynamics. As such, it demands the immediate attention of the international community, particularly the United Nations.

The potential for the airspace to fall into the hands of extremist groups like Al-Shabab is a grave concern that underscores the urgency of the situation. The security implications of such a scenario would be far-reaching, not only for Somalia and Somaliland but for the entire Horn of Africa region.

Therefore, a resolution that respects the interests and sovereignty of all parties involved is crucial for the stability and security of the Horn of Africa. This requires careful negotiation and dialogue, underpinned by a genuine commitment to regional cooperation and peace. By reaffirming and implementing historical agreements, engaging in constructive dialogue, and building the necessary legal and institutional frameworks, Somaliland and Somalia can overcome current challenges. This approach not only ensures the safe and efficient management of the airspace but also contributes to broader regional stability and economic development, benefiting all Somali citizens.

About the Author:

Khalif Nur is a writer and analyst with a keen interest in East African politics, particularly the dynamics between Somalia and Somaliland. With a background in banking and social science.

Noor’s work focuses on regional stability, governance, and conflict resolution. Noor’s insights have been featured in various publications, shedding light on the complexities of statehood and sovereignty in the Horn of Africa.


Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

Creative Commons License

Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle and is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.