In an interview with the Financial Times, the President of the Republic of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi has dismissed concerns raised by the United States regarding the recent memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The agreement, which involves leasing a strip of land near the Red Sea to Ethiopia, aims to enhance security and navigation freedom in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, areas recently plagued by attacks from Houthi rebels.
The Memorandum of Understanding, signed in January, exchanges access to territory on the Gulf of Aden for formal recognition from landlocked Ethiopia. President Bihi Abdi emphasized that the accord would support international efforts to secure these vital waterways.
“Ethiopia will build a naval military base and operate commercial ships, and in exchange, Ethiopia will give us recognition,” Bihi Abdi explained, highlighting the strategic benefits for both parties.
Despite strong opposition from Somalia, which claims sovereignty over Somaliland, President Bihi Abdi views the agreement as a crucial step towards achieving full independence and international recognition for Somaliland. He believes that the MoU with Ethiopia will provide a clear pathway to global acknowledgment of Somaliland’s status.
The deal has sparked concerns from international entities, including the US, EU, and the Arab League, who fear it could escalate regional conflicts. However, a senior Ethiopian official involved in the negotiations expressed optimism about reaching a final agreement, citing realpolitik and necessity.
Despite the headwinds, both Somaliland and Ethiopia view the agreement as a geopolitical necessity, according to the Financial Times report. For the landlocked Ethiopians, it presents an opportunity to gain coveted sea access independent of current dependence on Djibouti following Eritrea’s 1993 secession. A senior Ethiopian official involved in the talks expressed optimism a final deal would be reached to the FT, calling it “a matter of realpolitik and necessity.”
Somaliland has attracted significant investment from Dubai-based DP World into Berbera and its economic zone, aiming to transform it into a regional trade hub. The UAE, which controls Berbera’s airport and is establishing a naval base, has been a key player in these developments.
Despite the potential for increased investment and economic growth, the MoU has faced domestic opposition, including from Somaliland’s defense minister, who resigned in protest. However, Bihi Abdi insists that the people of Somaliland support the deal, which he argues could help prevent potential conflicts in the region by addressing Ethiopia’s need for sea access.
In response to Washington’s concerns that the agreement threatens to disrupt the fight against Islamist militancy, Bihi Abdi dismissed such claims as “baseless” and reaffirmed Somaliland’s commitment to securing stability and fostering international cooperation.
President Bihi Abdi, a former Somali military pilot turned rebel fighter who is standing for re-election in November, remains steadfast in his pursuit of international recognition for Somaliland. “We’ve been working towards international recognition of our independent status for over 33 years,” Bihi Abdi stated. “We’re ready.”
A report published by the Emirates Policy Center (EPC) states that the Islamic State (ISIS) is strengthening its foothold in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. This expansion is fueling renewed clashes with al-Shabaab, another prominent militant group, exacerbating the already volatile security situation in the country.
“The expansion of IS forces into Puntland will likely lead to another round of bloody jihadist infighting and create a new safe haven for the group,” said Abdul Khaliq Abdullah, Secretary General of the EPC, in the report published this week.
The report indicates that ISIS, whose Somalia province pledged allegiance in 2015, has been strategically expanding its operations in Puntland, leveraging the region’s political instability and rugged terrain along the “Golis Mountains stretching from Bari to Sanaag.” It also capitalizes on unfettered access to the Red Sea with proximity to Yemen and other restive regions. This move is seen as part of ISIS’s broader strategy to establish a significant presence in the Horn of Africa.
The increased ISIS activity has led to intensified confrontations with al-Shabaab, which has long dominated the jihadist landscape in Somalia. According to James Fenerty, the Horn of Africa director for the Crisis Group, the conflict between these two groups “is not merely territorial, but is part of a broader ideological struggle as each group seeks to assert dominance and project strength.”
Al-Shabaab, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, views the encroachment of ISIS as a direct challenge to its authority. “This makes al-Shabaab see ISIS’s arrival as an existential threat,” Fenerty added. This has resulted in violent skirmishes and targeted assassinations of commanders and foot soldiers from both groups. Just last month, at least 13 militants were killed in Puntland during fighting between ISIS and al-Shabaab, according to local officials.
The local population is caught in the deadly crossfire, facing threats from both ISIS and al-Shabaab. “Civilians face brutality from both sides in this scramble for control,” said Omar Mahmood, an International Crisis Group analyst. The Puntland authorities, alongside national and international partners, are struggling to contain the violence. Efforts to bolster local security forces and improve intelligence capabilities are ongoing, but the complex dynamics of jihadist rivalry complicate these initiatives.
However, the Puntland administration has faced widespread criticism for its handling of jihadist suspects. Accusations of a “catch and release” approach have surfaced, with reports suggesting that detained militants are often released without trial or adequate oversight.
“There have been credible reports of a ‘catch and release’ system where detained militants are freed without proper oversight,” said Rahma Abdulkadir, a researcher with Amnesty International. “This makes a mockery of counterterrorism efforts.”
Adding to the complexity, in March 2023, U.S. Special Forces conducted a high-profile operation in Puntland’s mountains, targeting key ISIS leaders and infrastructure. The operation with its direct deployment of U.S. troops in a rare Somalia raid shows a level of urgency and a sharp departure from the United States’ typical drone-based operations in the country.
“This direct deployment reflected the urgent need to disrupt ISIS’ spreading insurgency before it could further destabilize the region and imperil U.S. interests,” said a Defense Department official speaking on condition of anonymity.
Puntland has also been identified as a base of operations for several individuals like former al-Shabaab commander Abdulkadir Mumin, who is now a prominent ISIS leader in the region. These individuals are often involved in terrorist activities, piracy, and other illicit operations despite being targeted by international sanctions from the United Nations, United States and European Union.
In February 2022, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five leaders of the ISIS Somalia branch as Specially Designated Global Terrorists to disrupt the group’s efforts to expand into mainland Africa. The sanctions include asset freezes and prohibitions on transactions to degrade ISIS’s capacity for attacks.
However, enforcement of these sanctions has been challenging due to Puntland’s complex political and security landscape marked by porous borders and governance issues that make it a haven for those evading justice.
In its report, the EPC warns that resolving the infighting between ISIS and al-Shabaab will be an “uphill battle” without addressing the underlying drivers feeding extremism in Somalia:
“The fragmentation of central authority, lack of economic opportunities and presence of ungoverned spaces have created fertile ground for the spread of extremist ideologies and recruitment of disenfranchised youth,” the report states.
The rise of ISIS in Puntland also poses broader implications for regional security beyond Somali borders. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, the group’s presence “could potentially attract foreign fighters and increase the flow of arms and resources into Somalia, further destabilizing the volatile Horn of Africa.”
Exacerbating the security challenges is the strained relationship between Puntland and Somalia’s Federal Government. The Puntland administration has suspended its cooperation with Mogadishu amid disputes over resource sharing, political representation, and administrative autonomy. This rift hampers coordinated counterterrorism efforts and undermines the unified response needed to address the jihadist threat effectively.
“Somalia desperately needs reliable security forces, good governance and economic development to counter extremist groups’ narratives,” Felbab-Brown said, warning that “the jihadist rivalry has made the tumult facing this region considerably more perilous.”
Meanwhile, al-Shabaab remains a formidable threat throughout Somalia, including in and around the capital. The group has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including bombings, assassinations, and armed assaults on government and civilian targets.
Notable incidents include the October 2017 truck bombing in Mogadishu, which killed over 500 civilians, one of the deadliest attacks in the country’s history. Al-Shabaab has also struck government buildings, hotels and military checkpoints in brazen assaults that expose its potent operational capabilities despite efforts to degrade the group.
“The people of Somalia find themselves once again caught between murderous factions, all while facing appalling drought, hunger and displacement from the violence,” said Samira Gaid, executive director of the Mogadishu-based Raag NGO providing humanitarian assistance. “The emergence of an ISIS stronghold will only amplify the anguish and suffering.”
Analysts warn that without a coordinated and robust international response, the expansion of ISIS in Puntland could lead to prolonged instability and offer a haven for global jihadist networks to further destabilize the region. The international community is urged to ramp up support for Somali security forces while addressing the underlying political, economic and social grievances that fuel such insurgencies.
“Resolving the competition between ISIS and al-Shabaab will ultimately require going beyond a kinetic approach to promote governance, economic opportunities and nationalism that undercuts the appeal of extremist groups,” the EPC report concludes.
As the bloody conflict unfolds, Somalia’s path to peace faces new and daunting challenges. Robust international engagement and a holistic strategy tackling both military and civilian pillars will be crucial to mitigating the impact of this renewed jihadist infighting across the fragile Horn of Africa.
China has reacted with hostility after a high-level delegation from the Republic of Somaliland attended Taiwan’s Presidential inauguration ceremony in Taipei. Its embassy in Somalia issued a strident statement, revealing inconsistencies in Beijing’s stance on the matter. The remarks from the Chinese Embassy reiterated China’s commitment to the “one-China principle” regarding Taiwan, likely sanctioned by China’s Foreign Ministry.
However, the embassy’s claims of unified global support for China’s position were contradicted by the reality of Taiwan maintaining robust ties with many nations including the with the United States and European countries. These relationships persist despite Beijing’s frequent condemnations and warnings regarding engagement with the island nation it claims as its own territory.
The statement targeted the Somaliland delegation’s presence at the inauguration ceremony in Taiwan on May 20. Although the Republic of Somaliland declared itself an independent nation after regaining independence from Somalia in 1991, it remains unrecognized internationally. Despite this lack of recognition, the Republic of Somaliland has maintained a stable democracy for 33 years and is considered a beacon of democracy in the region.
Domestically, the bilateral ties between the Republic of Somaliland and Taiwan have sparked debate , with the Waddani opposition party questioning the wisdom of siding with Taiwan over China and advocating for improved relations with China instead.
Following the Chinese Embassy’s statement, a response left by Waddani Chairman Dr. Abdirahman Abdillahi Cirro’s official account simply said “ok,” sparking widespread discussion and speculation about its meaning and the party’s position on the matter.
In a stance seemingly contradicting reality on the ground and the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereign status, China insisted that the “Federal Government of Somalia” is the sole authority with jurisdiction over the Republic of Somaliland, considering it part of Somalia’s territory. This directly undermines the Republic of Somaliland’s self-declared independence aspirations, which China fears could embolden Taiwan’s independence movement.
In 2020, the Republic of Somaliland and Taiwan established formal bilateral ties, drawing immediate, forceful condemnation from Beijing as an infringement on its territorial claims. China attempted to sway the Republic of Somaliland away from Taiwan with promises of development aid and investment from a high-level delegation. However, when those overtures failed, Beijing shifted to a “hostile stance” toward the region, according to multiple reports.
Immediately following the establishment of bilateral ties between Somaliland and Taiwan, Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi rejected an offer from a Chinese delegation that included a conditional development package. The offer, which proposed infrastructure projects in exchange for Somaliland severing its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, was declined. Instead, President Bihi reaffirmed Somaliland’s commitment to strengthening its relationship with Taiwan. This move was seen as prioritizing Somaliland’s strategic interests and diplomatic independence over China’s economic incentives.
“China’s aggressive tactics to isolate Taiwan and pressure the Republic of Somaliland are counterproductive and alarming,” said U.S. Congressman Mike Smith, echoing US government concern concerns over Beijing’s coercion and confrontation approach in international diplomacy.
While the Taiwanese government has yet to officially respond, it has indicated it will continue its policy of pursuing relations with the dwindling number of entities that recognize it diplomatically, including the Republic of Somaliland.
The harshly-worded statement from China’s Somalia embassy, likely reflecting a stance sanctioned by Beijing, underscores China’s erratic behavior as it seeks to restrict Taiwan’s engagement globally. This has included issuing threats and staging provocative military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, even over routine diplomatic visits and meetings.
As China intensifies its stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty claims, its extreme rhetoric and actions from its embassies and Foreign Ministry risk inflaming tensions and further alienating it on the international stage, analysts say. Its opposition to the Republic of Somaliland’s outreach to Taiwan demonstrates an unwillingness to embrace geopolitical reality, which could destabilize the broader region.
Taiwan and Somaliland have taken a major step forward in their digital partnership. On May 22, 2024, they signed an Implementing Arrangement for Phase II of their information technology (IT) cooperation project, aimed at boosting Somaliland’s e-government infrastructure and cybersecurity over the next four years.
At the signing ceremony, the Taiwanese Ambassador highlighted the successes of Phase I, which spanned from 2020 to 2023. This initial phase saw the launch of a government portal, the development of a data exchange system called S-Road, and the establishment of the Somaliland Innovation Zone (SIZ). Since its creation in 2021, the SIZ has trained over 1,200 individuals in 56 different IT courses.
“I’m thrilled to see the launch of Phase II of our IT project, which will run from 2024 to 2027,” said the Ambassador.
The focus of Phase II will be on building a strong government IT framework and enhancing cybersecurity. A significant part of this effort is the construction of a Data Center with an integrated Cybersecurity Center. The Ambassador stressed the importance of the SIZ and the government portal, assuring continued support for these initiatives.
In addition to infrastructure, the partnership will offer IT training, scholarships, and work visits to promote knowledge transfer and capacity building within Somaliland’s IT sector.
The Ambassador expressed confidence in Somaliland’s Ministry of IT to make full use of the resources provided by Taiwan, highlighting the strong bond between the two nations. “The relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland is thriving, supported by friendship and partnership. Together, we can achieve great things.”
He outlined Taiwan’s vision for IT cooperation in Africa, focusing on a people-centric approach that balances knowledge transfer with the necessary hardware and software. Referring to the saying, “If you teach a man to fish, you feed him for life,” the Ambassador affirmed Taiwan’s commitment to “Developing the country with Information, Connecting the world with Communication, and Building hope with Technology” – the core of their ICT vision.
Taiwan is globally recognized for its leadership in the latest technological innovations, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor manufacturing. The country’s dominance in the semiconductor industry, led by companies like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), underpins its pivotal role in the global tech ecosystem. TSMC’s cutting-edge chip designs are critical to the development of AI technologies, driving advancements across various sectors from healthcare to autonomous vehicles. This technological prowess not only cements Taiwan’s status as a global innovation hub but also ensures its strategic importance in the worldwide IT landscape.
Somaliland and Taiwan established official bilateral ties in July 2020, marking a significant step for both entities. Despite pressure from China, which views Taiwan as a breakaway province, Somaliland has maintained its relationship with Taiwan, seeing it as mutually beneficial.
Since establishing ties, the two have signed several key agreements. These include partnerships in agriculture, education, and healthcare. A notable collaboration is a major oil drilling operation in Somaliland, where Taiwan’s state-owned CPC Corporation has been involved in exploring and developing potential oil reserves, further strengthening the economic bonds between the two regions.
As Somaliland progresses on its digital transformation journey, this enhanced partnership with Taiwan promises to strengthen the nation’s e-government capabilities, improve cybersecurity, and develop a skilled IT workforce, setting the stage for sustainable growth and global connectivity.
On May 18, 2024, the people of Somaliland, both at home and abroad, are joyfully commemorating the 33rd anniversary of their hard-won independence.
Somaliland, a self-governing and self-proclaimed state situated in the tumultuous Horn of Africa, celebrates the 33rd anniversary of its restoration of independence on May 18, 1991, following its separation from the ill-fated union with Somalia.
After nearly a decade of armed struggle, the resilient people of Somaliland successfully reclaimed their independence and, unaided by external forces, embarked on a remarkable journey of nation-building. Since 1991, Somaliland has thrived, effectively fostering peace, establishing a robust state infrastructure, nurturing democracy, and achieving notable economic progress. Despite its location in a troubled region, Somaliland has skillfully navigated the challenges it faces.
Our unyielding dedication to democracy, peace, and stability has yielded a flourishing society characterized by sustainable economic growth, social harmony, and self-sufficiency.
In accordance with the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Somaliland has fulfilled all the prerequisites for statehood, including defined territory, a permanent population, a functioning government, and the capacity to engage in international agreements.
In stark contrast to its neighboring Somalia, Somaliland stands as a beacon of peace, stability, and democracy, free from the scourge of piracy, terrorism, and other outlawed activities.
Somaliland’s strategic positioning in the Horn of Africa carries significant importance. Positioned alongside the Gulf of Aden, it functions as a crucial maritime trade pathway linking Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Its close proximity to the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, a critical choke point, provides it with influence in matters concerning regional security and trade. The stability it enjoys plays a part in upholding stability in the region, while its untapped natural resources present economic prospects. Furthermore, its collaboration in combatting terrorism and piracy bolsters regional security. These elements establish Somaliland as a prominent participant in regional political, security, and trade realms, drawing interest from global and regional stakeholders.
Therefore, I confidently assert that Somaliland’s unique case grants it an international recognition more than any other nation. Unlike some recognized countries that pose security, economic, and political burdens to the world, Somaliland presents a different scenario. Recognition of Somaliland would undoubtedly contribute positively to regional peace, security, and the realms of politics and economics.
About the Author
Abdifatah Ahmed Hurre is the Togdher Region Coordinator of Somaliland Quality Control Commission and has a MSc in Economics and an in project Management.
On May 7, 2024, the much-awaited Consultation Workshop on Improving Employment and Job Creation by the Pharo Foundation was held at the Maansoor Hotel in Hargeisa. With the active participation of government ministries and prestigious Senior Experts from Pharo, the event was a great success.
The meeting served as a venue for fruitful discussions, where innovative strategies were explored to address pressing challenges in education, agriculture, health, water, livestock, investment, and finance. Collaborative efforts and information sharing were at the forefront, fostering a dynamic exchange of ideas and expertise.
The workshop served as a pivotal platform for stakeholders from government bodies and senior management of Pharo Foundation and Pharo Ventures to convene and deliberate on crucial strategies for fostering job creation across public and private sectors.
The workshop focused on addressing key obstacles to productivity and employment, with a particular emphasis on health barriers, financial constraints hindering entrepreneurship and innovation, and structural impediments.
It shed light on the disconnect between the burgeoning number of graduates and the scarcity of employment opportunities, underscoring the pressing need to bridge the gap between educational outputs and the demands of the job market.
Moreover, the event facilitated fruitful exchanges between 14 ministries, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and Family, Ministry of Health Development, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Ministry of Livestock Development, Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Ministry of Investment Development, Ministry of Information Technology, and Ministry of Fishery.
Each ministry representative discussed their contribution to national production and employment and the multifaceted challenges encountered in their respective domains.
This collaborative effort aimed to foster alignment and pave the way for concerted action towards overcoming barriers to employment and unlocking new pathways for sustainable economic growth and job creation
In 8 days, Somaliland will be celebrating its 33rd year since it reclaimed its sovereignty, and for those 33 years, Somaliland has peacefully sought re-recognition as a dejure state, a status that it rightfully gained in 1960.
However the International Community and the UN have shied away from taking the lead in re-recognizing Somaliland, in the hope that the African Union advocates of “African Solutions for African Problems” would lead the way. The African Union in 2005 showed interest, dispatched a fact finding mission to Somaliland who determined in light of its history, the Somaliland case was unique and built on solid grounds. But since that report was published, nothing substantive has emerged from the African Union Headquarters.
The assumption is, the African Union believes their continued silence will quietly resolve this issue but it hasn’t.
Meanwhile Somaliland has reinforced their desire for re-recognition through a referendum, followed by multiple democratic elections, and peaceful activism.
Yet the African Union still ignores Simaliland and watches as Somalia continues to falsely claim sovereignty, despite the clear realities of the day and their shortcomings.
All Somaliland seeks is a right that’s universally enshrined in various international laws and conventions, such as the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. All these rights are paramount in respecting the autonomy and dignity of individuals and communities, allowing them to shape their own destiny according to their aspirations and needs.
The recent events in the Gulf of Aden have reignited the case of Somaliland, due to its geo-strategic importance. There is now a growing demand once again for Africa and the African Union to take the initiative to acknowledge Somaliland’s quest for re-recognition.
To do so, it requires boldness on the part of the AU to settle an issue that’s happening barely an hours flight away from their Addis Ababa Headquarters. And to be successful in their mission, the African Union needs to recognize, Somaliland was the 17th African nation to gain independence on June 26th, 1960 before most African nations.
Ambassador Roda J Elmi
Somaliland Deputy Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Over 19 high schools comprising 174 girls across Somaliland recently participated in a speed reading competition in the capital, Hargeysa, using ‘’Daariz,’’ a free language app. Daariz means study in Arabic.
The contest organized by education non-profit, the Sahamiye Foundation, is focused on helping students improve their Somali language while honoring ‘’the joy of reading,’’ a statement to the VOA said.
‘’In each round, students engaged in timed reading challenges in the app to determine the quickest reader with a high comprehension rate,’’ it said.
‘’Daariz uses a unique speed meter reader to help learners build confidence and reading automaticity, while the app’s virtual ‘camel’ badges reward students for each literacy milestone achieved.’’
60 students made it to the semi-final stage as each round gained momentum. The statement added that: ‘’on average, students displayed an impressive reading speed of 166 words per minute, with one young student named Cabdirashiid displaying an incredible reading speed of 469 words per minute.’’
In the end, 14-year-old Hibo from Noradin Girls High School took the first place with a score of 292 words per minute, earning her the top prize of $500.
“My emotions are beyond words; I’m truly so happy… I am delighted that I was among the winners of the Daariz program,” Hibo said.
The second and third place runners-up were awarded prizes of $200 and $300 dollars respectively.
Hayat Arteh, founder of the Sahamiye Foundation said she was ‘’thrilled’’ about the patronage of the competition.
“The event is a celebration of literacy and its transformative potential for young people. With Daariz, we hope to empower as many people as possible to read and write in their mother tongue language,” Arteh noted.
Sahamiye Foundation is a charity founded by Ismail Ahmed, a Somaliland-born business mogul, which according to its website is “dedicated to transforming lives through the promotion of literacy and education.”
As Kenya’s neighbors forge ahead with the expansion and modernization of their port infrastructure, the country risks losing its place as the regional logistics hub because of the ascendance of political considerations over economic interests.
The Port of Mombasa was lucky to survive the mistakes that had been made in the years before 2007, in particular the failure to develop the facility’s infrastructure in order to keep up with the growth in the quantity of cargo handled. This may not hold going forward given recent Geo-economic and political developments. Unlike Kenya, our competing regional ports may have learned a vital lesson about the need to develop sufficient port infrastructure to keep up with future developments. They have been keen to create linkages with private sector capital. In Kenya, on the contrary, efforts to concession infrastructure development for ports in Kenya have been met with intense opposition from various actors.
Previously without an alternative, the landlocked countries of Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had no option but to pay dearly for Kenya’s failure to develop its port infrastructure to keep up with the growth cargo. The lack of capacity reached crisis point in 2007 when the port experienced immense operational challenges.
Dar es Salaam Port was then in a dire situation and had, indeed, relied on Mombasa Port to address its congestion problems by using Kenya as a transshipment port to avoid long delays for cargo destined for the Central Corridor – largely mainland Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, and Zambia.
The wake-up call came in 2007 when shipping lines threatened to designate Mombasa a demurrage port. This would justify liners calling at the port to charge the unpopular Vessel Delays Surcharge (VDS) – a punitive fine for an inordinately long delay that can be as high as KSh35 million per day depending on the vessel’s size or the type of cargo on board. Although in reality VDS was not claimed – except by oil and LPG vessels that faced storage capacity constraints – the threats were numerous.
However, it is the growth of cargo volumes for the region – and consequently the shrinking capacity at the Mombasa Port – and the emergence of competing ports that should worry Kenyan policymakers who should urgently fast-track the remaining port capacity infrastructure development as well as keenly focus on the other underdeveloped hinterland infrastructure for Lamu Port.
The Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) has proposed a number of projects that must be fast-tracked in order to deal with the growing volume in both domestic and transit cargo.
There is a market of over 385 million people in Eastern Africa, huge unexploited economic opportunities, and a growing demand for port infrastructure to drive growth. Cargo throughput – the total volume of cargo discharged and loaded at the port – has been registering impressive growth. For instance, the port moved 18,063,051 tons between January and June 2023, up from 17,474,311 during the same period in 2022 tons, a 3.4 per cent increase.
Globally, vessels are growing bigger as ship owners seek to maximize profits by carrying more cargo while running fewer ships, and shippers want to get lower freight costs through economies of scale. The biggest ships in the market, such as Maersk Emma, MSC Oscar, and others, are now almost 20,000 TEUS in capacity. Ports thus face the challenge of providing space to accommodate these behemoths. Also, global ship operators are seeking partnerships to provide seamless services – from the source to the end market – and port development plays a key role in this new supply chain.
Ethiopia, Lamu Port’s key target, has turned its focus on Berbera Port in Somaliland, which is set to become the most modern port in the Horn of Africa once it is completed. The Gulf states’ growing interest in the Horn of Africa region due to geopolitical and strategic considerations saw DP World enter into an agreement to develop and manage the facility for 30 years in May 2016. The total investment of the two-phase project will reach US$442 million. DP World will also create a free economic zone in the surrounding area, targeting a range of companies in sectors from logistics to manufacturing, and a road-based economic corridor connecting Berbera with Ethiopia.
The port deal with Somaliland – that declared detached from Somalia in 1991 but which is still not internationally recognized by the international community – has increased Somaliland’s credibility as an independent state. Port Berbera is now the closest sea route to Ethiopia, an 11-hour journey by road. The port opens up opportunities for huge growth in the import and export of livestock and agricultural produce. DP World Group Port officials say that the port, which can currently handle 150,000 TEUs, will expand into handling one million TEUs of 20 and 40-foot mixed units.
This interim report focuses on some of the consequences of the conflict in Somalia: specifically, the causes for the flight of refugees from Somalia, the extent of destruction that occurred in Hargeisa, the use of US. assistance during the conflict, and the role of the UNHCR in distributing U.S. assistance and its reaction to the arming of Ogadeni refugees. In addition, we attempted to determine under what conditions the Somali refugees would return to their homes. We will address all of the objectives of the review in a later report.
In Somalia, we met with U.S. government officials, high-level current and former Somali ministry officials, and informed Somalis to discuss the situation in Somalia. We interviewed staff of UNHCR, the World Food Program, the National Refugee Commission, and private voluntary organizations. We also visited Mogadishu and the military facilities at Berbera and toured Hargeisa to assess the extent of destruction.
In Ethiopia, we interviewed 60 refugees residing at all five refugee camps of Hartashiek, Harshin, Daror, Rabasso, and Kam Abokar. These camps are located along the Ethiopia-Somalia border. At each camp we interviewed approximately 12 randomly selected heads of household in hour-long sessions. Forty-two of the respondents were former residents of Hargeisa, 16 were residents of Burao, and 2 were residents of Shiekh (a village 40 miles northwest of Burao). In addition, at each of the camps we held discussions with UNHCR expatriates and Ethiopian staff, refugee committee officials, and bilateral donor and private voluntary organization relief workers.
Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards between September 1988 and March 1989.
May 4,1989
We are examining the US. role in assisting Somalia in light of recent reports of increased human rights violations in the northern part of the country. As part of our review, we visited Somalia and Ethiopia between February 25 and March 10, 1989.
In this report we focus on the causes for the flight of Isaak refugees to Ethiopia and the conditions for their return to Somalia, the extent of destruction that occurred in the northern city of Hargeisa, the use of U.S. assistance during the conflict, and the role of the United Nations High Commissioner for efugees (UNHCR) in distributing U.S. assistance and its reaction to the arming of Ogadeni refugees.’ In addition, we have provided information on the Somali government’s response to the conflict.
The Ogaden a territory m Ethiopia to which Somalia has made irredentist claims. It IS populated largely by ethnic Somalis During the 1977-78 Ogaden War, Ethiopm retook the Ogaden. and Somalia became the host to over 800,000 refugees who fled the territory Over the years. voluntary repatriation has reduced the refugee population by more than half. This group of people as referred to as Ogadeni refugees throughout the report.
Background:
Somalia is strategically located on the east coast of Africa and, along with Ethiopia and Djibouti, is often referred to as the Horn of Africa. Since a 1969 coup, President Siyad Barre has ruled Somalia with the strong support of the military. Those viewed as opponents of the government have been subjected to arrest and imprisonment and on occasion to torture and execution, In the mid-1980% the State Department and various human rights groups reported increased human rights abuses by the Somali government against civilians, particularly the civilian population in the north.
For years, the more affluent and independent Isaak clan (the largest clan in northern Somalia) has been the target of a wide range of abuses by the government, due in part to its support for the anti-regime Somali National Movement (S&M). The abuses have ranged from imprisonment and detainment without charge or trial to summary executions of suspected SNM members and sympathizers. Many civilians were forced to make payments to gain their release from jail.
In late May 1988, the SNM, in retaliation against the government for these abuses, launched attacks on government officials in the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burao. The Somali army reportedly responded to the SNM attacks in May 1988 with extreme force, inflicting heavy civilian casualties and damage to Hargeisa and Burao. As a result, 350,000 Isaaks fled to Ethiopia, and others fled to neighboring countries and other parts of Somalia. Also during the conflict, Ogadenis fought against the SNM alongside the Somali army. Some Ogadeni refugees, who were settled in camps on Isaak land after their unsuccessful attempt to reclaim the Ogaden desert in 1978, were armed. thereby becoming party to the conflict and ineligible for continued international assistance under U.N. rules
Results in Brief
Of the Isaak refugees we interviewed in Ethiopia, a majority said that their homes had been destroyed and family members killed by government forces during the conflict between May and June 1988. It is not likely that the Isaak refugees will return until they are confident it is safe to do so. Most of those we interviewed indicated that the military would have to be removed from northern Somalia before the area would be secure.
Most of Hargeisa, the second largest city in Somalia, was destroyed or damaged during the conflict from artillery and aerial shelling. Basic infrastructure, such as electricity and water, is still inoperable. Although the Somali government has not begun repairs in the cities, government officials are actively soliciting donors for reconstruction assistance
A shipment of U.S. arms and ammunition, which had been authorized more than 18 months prior to the conflict, arrived in late June 1988 and was used by the government during the conflict. The shipment, valued at about $1.4 million, was distributed to Somali troops in the northern region.
Following the outbreak of fighting in May 1988, the UNHCR was unable to restore monitoring over the distribution of food commodities. The NHCR has continued to distribute food aid, albeit with reduced frequency and quantities, to all refugee camps in the north even though, in July 1988. UKHCR and others noted that some of the Ogadeni refugees were armed. UNHCR halted food deliveries to Ogadeni refugees for a short period, preceding an agreement with the government of Somalia to resolve the armed Ogadeni refugee situation. In February 1989, the UNHCR reached an agreement with the Somali government on disarming the refugees and began the process of relocating the Ogadeni refugees from the conflict area.
Prelude to the Conflict
The refugees from northern Somalia that we interviewed in Ethiopia recounted stories of harassment by the army-looting, jailing, beating, and rape-dating back to 1982. While the refugees could not point to specific events that led to a government crackdown on the Isaak community, the majority of the refugees interviewed furnished detailed accounts of abuses that they or their immediate families had experienced at the hands of the Somali army. Many of the Isaak refugees we interviewed who had worked as merchants or professionals and were therefore more prosperous than other Somalis said that they were frequent victims of human rights abuses. Many of them said that the Somali army had jailed them and that beatings of the men and rape of the women were common occurrences. Families of the detainees were forced to pay for their release. In none of these cases had the army brought charges against the detainees. Merchants complained that soldiers helped themselves to their shops’ wares and cash. Confiscation of goats, sheep, and other domestic livestock was also a common occurrence.
Many of the Isaak refugees we interviewed also mentioned the radicalization of the student community around 1984 and the brutal response of the army to students’ periodic demonstrations. According to the refugees, government harassment intensified in 1986, reaching its apex in 1987 when the army instituted a dusk-to-dawn curfew.
Conclusion of Peace Accord with Ethiopia
On April 3, 1988, the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia concluded a peace accord that resulted in, among other things, troops being withdrawn from the borders, cessation of assistance for each other’s rebels, prisoners of war exchanged, and diplomatic relations resumed. The peace accord was designed to ease relations between Somalia and Ethiopia and promote economic development by redirecting resources. Some observers believe it exacerbated the conflict. With peace between the countries, the Isaak community saw little hope of removing Ogadeni refugees from its territory. Furthermore, the demilitarization of the borders enabled the SKM to infiltrate Somalia unimpeded.
Somali National Movement
The SNM, which had its base of operations in Ethiopia, started fighting against the government’s mistreatment of the Isaak community in the early 1980s. However, the SNM’S political agenda remains unclear. Some observers believe that the SNM wants increased autonomy for the northern Isaak clan; others believe that it simply wants President Siyad Barre out of power.
None of the Isaak refugees we interviewed said that they had direct contact with the SNM prior to the fighting in 1988, and only a few actually knew SNM members. Many of the refugees from Burao knew of SNM attacks on military outposts but generally were not aware of its activities. These refugees stated, however, that the army’s response to these attacks was one of swift and brutal retribution against the entire Isaak community. The Burao refugees stated that the government shut off utilities, randomly beat Isaak clansmen, and jailed and sometimes executed those who the army believed to be SNM members or who were suspected of supporting the SNM.
The Conflict
The SNM launched armed attacks in northern Somalia in late May 1988, assassinating government officials and suspected opponents. The SNM had control of the northern town of Burao until Somali forces retook it on May 30 and forced the SNM to evacuate the city. The SNM attacked Hargeisa on May 31, which it controlled until July 13 when the Somali military recaptured the city. A map in appendix I shows the locations of these towns, the Ogadeni refugee camps in Somalia, and the Isaak refugee camps in Ethiopia.
Also during this period, the SNM attacked several Ogadeni refugee camps, which forced the inhabitants of one refugee camp to flee farther north. For more than 10 years, the Isaaks and Ogadeni refugees have been competing for the same scarce agricultural and grazing land. During this period, the government has not reached a durable solution to the Ogadeni refugee situation, such as repatriating the refugees to Ethiopia or settling them permanently. The presence of armed Ogadeni refugees on the Isaaks’ land has added to the tension in the region.
During the relatively short period of conventional warfare (May 27 to July 13), the S&M succeeded in attracting a significant number of supporters and sympathizers, making it more difficult for the government to retake Hargeisa. Although the Somali army used its regular forces during the conflict, a bulk of the fighting force consisted of Ogadenis. The Somali military resorted to using artillery and aerial shelling in heavily populated urban centers in its effort to retake Burao and Hargeisa. A majority of the refugees we interviewed stated that their homes were destroyed by shelling despite the absence of SKM combatants from their neighborhoods. They also reported that Somali aircraft bombed several settlements inside Ethiopia, south of Harshin, in mid July.
The refugees stated that they were caught by surprise by the scope and intensity of the fighting in both Hargeisa and Burao. Although a majority of them stated that SNM forces were never in their neighborhoods during the battle, those refugees who saw SNM forces in their neighborhoods during the fighting supported the SNM combatants with food, water. and shelter.
The refugees told similar stories of bombings, strafings, and artillery shelling in both cities and, in Burao, the use of armored tanks. The majority saw their houses either damaged or destroyed by the shelling. Many reported seeing members of their families killed in the barrage. A few of the refugees were quite specific in their recollections; they mentioned that the military aircraft would start shelling at 8 a.m. and stop at 5 p.m.
Flight to Ethiopia
The Isaak refugees began evacuating the cities of Hargeisa and Burao by the end of the first week of fighting (early June), and it appears that the evacuation was completed by the end of the month. UNHCR estimates the refugee population at 350,000. The refugees reported remaining in Hargeisa and Burao until the last possible moment and then fleeing in a panic with only those possessions they could carry on their backs. The refugees gathered by the thousands on the outskirts of the cities, assembling their families and relatives. A number of the refugees we interviewed indicated that, while gathering their families and deciding what course to follow, they were strafed by Somali military aircraft.
Breaking into smaller groups of 300 to 500 the refugees began a 10- to 40-day trek to Ethiopia. Shortly after they reached the outskirts of the cities, the refugee columns were stopped by the Somali army, which had formed a ring around the cities. Refugees reported that at military checkpoints and ambushes, they were robbed and men suspected of being SNM members were summarily executed. The refugees from Hargeisa and Burao said they walked by night and hid by day to avoid aircraft strafing, carrying what remained of their belongings with them.
The Fighting Continues
The SNM has prevented stabilization of the northern region as fighting continues. Transportation through the region is risky and is usually accomplished in convoys with the assistance of armed escorts. The Somali army has retained effective control of Hargeisa and Burao, while the SNM operates freely throughout the countryside.
The SNM has continued its attacks on Ogadeni refugees. During our visit to Somalia in early March 1989, 11 Ogadeni refugees (5 men, 3 women, 3 children) were killed and 16 were wounded during an SNM attack on a truck carrying Ogadeni refugees. We were told that incidents of this type were characteristic of an emerging SNM pattern of terrorizing the Ogadeni refugees to force their removal from traditional Isaak territory.
Conditions in Hargeisa
Hargeisa, the second largest city in Somalia, has suffered extensive damage from artillery and aerial shelling. The most extensive damage appeared to be in the residential areas where the concentration of civilians was highest, in the marketplace, and in public buildings in the downtown area. During a tour of the city, we noted that whole sections of residential areas were still full of rubble and debris. The U.S.
Embassy estimated that 70 percent of the city has been damaged or destroyed. Our rough visual inspection confirms this estimate. Much of Hargeisa appears to be a “ghost town,” and many homes and buildings are virtually empty. Extensive looting has taken place even though the military has controlled the city since late July 1988. We were told that private property was taken from homes by the military in Hargeisa. Homes are devoid of doors, window frames, appliances, clothes, and furniture. The looting has resulted in the opening of what are called “Hargeisa markets” throughout the region, including Mogadishu and Ethiopia, where former residents have spotted their possessions. One observer remarked that Hargeisa is being dismantled piece by piece. We were told that long lines of trucks heavily laden with Hargeisa goods could be seen leaving the city, heading south towards Mogadishu after the heavy fighting had stopped.
The Governor of Hargeisa estimates the present population to be around 70,000, down from a pre-conflict population figure of 370,000. However, the current residents of Hargeisa are not believed to be the former Isaak residents. Observers believe that Hargeisa is now composed largely of dependents of the military, which has a substantial, visible presence in Hargeisa, a significant number of Ogadeni refugees, and squatters who are using the properties of those who fled.
Presently, Hargeisa is without electricity and a functioning water system. The water system’s pumping station (installed and operated by the Chinese) is out of commission. Spare parts are nonexistent, and the Chinese refuse to send technicians due to the insecure environment still existing in Hargeisa and its surroundings. One of the Chinese crew members was killed during the fighting.
There are no indications that the Somali government has taken any steps to restore services or to clean the city of debris. However, Somali government officials are actively soliciting multilateral and bilateral donors for reconstruction assistance.
US Assistance Provided During the Conflict
Starting in August 1988, the U.S. government responded to the emergency with $1.9 million in disaster assistance to help the victims of the conflict. This assistance included $1 million for a field hospital unit and $350,000 for food for displaced persons and refugees. In March 1989, the Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance approved an additional $630,000 for 10 tanker trucks to supplement Hargeisa’s water supply system.
As part of the administration’s ongoing military assistance program, $1.4 million worth of small arms and ammunition was provided to the government of Somalia during the height of the conflict. Since July 1988, the administration has voluntarily limited the military assistance program to nonlethal items, including spare parts for previously supplied weapons.
US-Donated Hospital Unit
The most expensive item of emergency assistance was the $1 million disaster hospital unit, which was set up in Berbera. The hospital unit was donated from the Defense Department’s Humanitarian Affairs Office to assist the victims of the conflict. The government of Somalia provided the building, and the Defense Department provided the medicines, medical equipment, cots, linens, and basic hospital supplies. The hospital is located in Berbera because it was considered a secure area to which supplies and patients could be quickly transported, if necessary. More serious injuries are treated at Somalia’s main hospital in Mogadishu. During our visit to the hospital, we noted that the hospital was providing assistance to military personnel, Ogadeni refugees, and local townspeople.
Emergency Relief Assistance
In addition to the hospital, other U.S. support included plastic sheeting, blankets, vegetable oil, wheat, and sugar for displaced persons and, Ogadeni refugees. All of this assistance is distributed through the Somali government and is intended for the displaced population in Somalia. Detailed information about displaced persons who are to receive this assistance, such as location and estimated population, was unavailable. U.S. Embassy officials estimated that 10,000 former residents of Hargeisa and Burao now live in northwest Somalia. Another large population of displaced persons is believed to be living with relatives throughout Somalia. As indicated earlier, approximately 350,000 Isaaks are currently residing in refugee camps inside Ethiopia
Lethal Assistance
Lethal U.S. military assistance consisting of 1,200 Ml6 automatic rifles and 2 million rounds of Ml6 ammunition, plus 300,000 rounds of 30 caliber and 500,000 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition, valued at about $1.4 million, was shipped on June 9, 1988, with approval of the Departments of State and Defense, to the Somali army under the Foreign Military Sales program. The shipment, initially authorized in November 1986, was repeatedly delayed due to the reluctance of carriers to transport small quantities of low-density ammunition to Somalia. It finally arrived on June 28 at the port of Berbera and was used by the government at a critical point in the conflict. From Berbera. the city of Hargeisa is typically less than a 3-hour trip by car. The fighting was heaviest in this relatively small area. During this period, the Somali government supplied arms to an undetermined number of refugees to fight the SNM insurgents in the north. A senior Somali military official confirmed that the U.S. equipment was distributed to troops in the north and was used during the conflict.
UN Response to the Emergency
The UNHCR assistance program in northwest Somalia was seriously disrupted following the outbreak of the conflict. When the fighting broke out in late May, the UNHCR initially halted deliveries of food in northern Somalia but resumed them on a reduced scale by the end of June. The United States contributes about 40 percent of the food aid through the World Food Program, which is distributed by the UNHCR. U.S. assistance amounted to about $18 million in 1988. The fighting caused severe damage to UKHCR’S operation. Trucks, trailers, commodities, office equipment, and buildings worth about $10 million were destroyed or confiscated by the Somali military and the SNM.
UNHCR continued food shipments based on humanitarian concerns. However, the UNHCR was unable to effectively monitor the distribution of commodities largely due to the security situation in the north. Officials in charge of food distribution and other observers stated that some food was misappropriated by Ogadeni refugees and diverted by the Somali military. In addition, as a result of the reduced number of trucks available for deliveries, some food spoiled at the Berbera port.
Armed Ogadeni Ruled Ineligible Assistance Refugees for
A triangle section encompassing Berbera, Hargeisa, and Burao formed the area where the heaviest concentration of fighting occurred. Within this area and to the northwest, the UNHCR managed 14 Ogadeni refugee camps. In July 1988, UNHCR and others noticed that some of the refugees at six of the 14 refugee camps in Somalia were carrying arms. The six-armed refugee camps are Gallikar, Bihm. Adi Addeys, Daam, Sabad, and Arabsiyo. The government of Somalia told the UNHCR that the refugees were armed for their own protection. While acknowledging that Ogadeni refugees and refugee camps had been attacked by the SNM and lives had been lost, the UNHCR believed that the Ogadeni refugees had become a party to the conflict and thus were ineligible to receive international humanitarian assistance.
UN and Somali Government Agreement
On October 5, 1988, and again on December 23, 1988, the UNHCR wrote the government of Somalia to express serious concerns about the lack of monitoring over the use of humanitarian assistance and about the arming of the refugees. Considering UKHCR’S strictly humanitarian and nonpolitical mandate, the High Commissioner noted that in these circumstances it could continue to assist only those refugees who had not taken part in the conflict. (UNHCR estimated that population to be 140,000.) For humanitarian reasons, however, relief assistance continued at the original planning levels of 370,000 refugees, albeit with reduced quantities and frequency, until an agreement could be reached between the Somali government and UNHCR. It was not until February 23, 1989, after the UNHCR had halted deliveries of food assistance in northern Somalia, that the government of Somalia and the UNHCR reached an agreement in principle to resolve the armed Ogadeni refugee situation. The government of Somalia and the UHCR agreed to:
Remove refugees from the six-armed camps to locations in Borama in northwest Somalia,
Require the Somali government to disarm the Ogadeni refugees of weapons acquired during the disturbance, and
Re-register them in the northwest camps. UKHCR agreed to resume food deliveries to all camps for a period of 3 months.
The agreement also mentioned that emphasis would be placed on voluntary repatriation.
In March 1989, the process of re-registering and removing the refugees from the conflict zone began. Plans were underway to move refugees from two of the six camps near Berbera to an existing camp, Darbi Hor, located near Borama. The population of Darbi Hor is estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000, which is considerably less than its full capacity of 36,000. Merging the refugee settlements should be possible, since the total camp population to be moved is estimated to be around 12,000.
The United Nations will not likely provide assistance to help rebuild the cities in the north until:
The security conditions are adequate for international representatives to monitor the program and
A screening process is established to certify that the persons living in these cities are former residents.
A rebuilding program without resettlement controls could result in former residents being replaced by people in the area who have been friendly to the government during the conflict and could hinder the return of former residents.
Isaak Refugee Repatriation Unlikely
The Issak refugees we interviewed in Ethiopia expressed a clear reluctance to return to Somalia in the near future. The majority indicated that a precondition for their return would be the removal of the army from northern Somalia. A smaller number of respondents stated that they would accept SKM assurances that it was safe to return. Most refugees expressed their willingness to stay in the camps, despite the harsh conditions, for the indefinite future. Indeed, many of the refugees expect to remain in Ethiopia for several years. The refugees exhibited alarm when questioned about returning home; fear remains the single largest factor in their decision to stay.
We saw no evidence that any repatriation had started. All the respondents indicated that they knew of no one who had returned to Burao or Hargeisa. Both the UNHCR and Ethiopian staff confirmed that repatriation had not begun. The only movement to northern Somalia, apart from SNM members returning from visiting relatives in the camps and smugglers, was from women trying to retrieve belongings left behind.
We also noticed that the camps were virtually devoid of young men, especially Daror, Rabasso, and Kam Abokar. Many of the respondents indicated that most of the men had returned to Somalia to join the SNM in the fight. The interviewees also indicated that a majority of the young men immediately took up arms with the SNM when the refugees were assembling outside of Hargeisa and Burao for the trek to Ethiopia. The SNM is very popular among the camp population. The respondents stated that they trust the SKM. It appears that most of the information within the camps on the status of the war originates with the SNM and works its way through “the grapevine.” When asked if government assurances of safety and gestures of goodwill (such as cross-border food or water deliveries) would convince the Isaak population that it is safe to return, the universal response was incredulity. The refugees emphasized that
President Siyad Barre could not be trusted and that any cosmetic steps at rapprochement were meaningless in light of the trauma they had endured.
Somali Government’s Response to the Conflict
During meetings with high level Somali officials, the U.S. Ambassador has continually urged the government to undertake political reforms and seek reconciliation in the north. At the time of our visit, the Somali government had announced several measures that it planned to take in this regard; however, only limited steps had been taken toward reconciliation. As of March 1989, the Somali government had provided amnesty to those involved in the northern conflict and had released some 300 of an
estimated 1,000 political prisoners.’ Of the released prisoners, many were among the most prominent, as identified by some members of Congress and the National Academy of Sciences. The other prisoners. however, have not yet been affected by the President’s amnesty.
In August 1988, the President appointed a committee to investigate the problems in the northern region, probe its causes, and find peaceful solutions. In December 1988, the committee released its report, which recommended, among other things, that the government undertake a major, organized, and concerted reconstruction program for the war torn north with the help of friendly donors; allow regions and localities a greater voice and role in local government; release from detention all persons arrested with or without formal charges in connection with the northern insurgency; and restore constitutional guarantees against arbitrary arrest and unlimited detention by state security forces.
On March 6, 1989, the government announced the formation of a three-person committee, composed of government officials, to deal with the problems in the northern region. This includes rehabilitating the destroyed properties “caused by the bandits,” restoring security and stability, revitalizing livestock export, and opening a dialogue with intellectuals, elders, and religious leaders in these areas at an opportune moment. The committee has implied powers, including authority over army commanders in the region. Some observers have criticized the committee’s membership as being too closely aligned with the government. In addition, implementing these measures will likely be a slow process.
National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 20548 United States.