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Far from a benefactor, the Turkish government is exploiting Somalia’s fragility

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A decade has passed since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan landed in Mogadishu at the height of one of Somalia’s worst famines, announcing grandiose projects like the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to the Somali capital, the remodeling of a hospital, and the opening of the biggest embassy in Africa, all designed to show that Turkey’s mission goes well beyond aid and that Ankara is an alternative to Somalia’s traditional donors. Erdoğan’s historic visit earned him high praise throughout Somalia. Although his trip appeared to be a heartfelt humanitarian mission, in reality, it was part of a long-term, strategically planned effort. Erdoğan had been scouting out Somalia as early as 2007 when he met the former President of the Transitional Federal Government Abdullahi Yusuf and asked him to provide a list of what Somalia needs. His efforts were fruitless, however, until President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed came to power in 2008. Sharif visited Turkey three times between 2009 and 2011, reluctantly signing a military pact with Turkey, which asked to help Somalia with security.

If Turkey had come to Somalia before 2011, it would have been seen as a foreign occupying force, just like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but in 2011, amid the devastation of one of the worst famines in the country’s history, Turkey’s self-proclaimed humanitarian mission was perceived differently. Erdoğan’s historic visit to Somalia was well-orchestrated and well-timed: It came during the holy month of Ramadan, nine days before the Eid festival, after 250,000 Somalis had starved to death, and during an election year, at a time when Somalia’s donors were scrambling to address a major humanitarian crisis.

Ever since Erdoğan declared 2005 “the Year of Africa,” he has pursued every Muslim-majority African country that is widowed by conflict, locked out by the IMF, starved by man-made climate change, and neglected by the West; a fragile Somalia checks all the boxes.

A decade on, Somalis are starting to realize that Turkey has evolved from friend to foe, trade partner to trade protectionist, state builder to outright spoiler. Turkey is an opportunist just like any other country and has its own agenda focused on geoeconomics and geopolitics. Instead of facilitating Somalia’s development, Turkey has used state-sponsored corporations to exploit its assets, all as part of a development trap cloaked in the guise of religion.

The Turkish development trap

Post-2011, Turkey’s humanitarian mission gradually shifted from an emphasis on soft power to a more assertive, politicized state-building effort involving de facto and de jure exploitation of Somalia’s federal government development projects and monopolization of the economy in Mogadishu’s Benadir region. Turkish private companies Albayrak Group and Favori LLC were given lucrative no-bid contracts to run Mogadishu’s port and airport and protected by Ankara. As was documented in a 2016 U.N. monitoring report, these companies have allegedly been engaged in criminal practices ranging from bribery of government ministers to money laundering.

Predatory practices and trade barriers

In 2010, Somalia exported $1.36 million worth of goods to Turkey and imported $4.8 million, which was a manageable trade deficit. After Albayrak Group took over the management of Mogadishu Port, however, Turkish exports to Somalia increased exponentially, growing to $37.5 million in 2011 and reaching $256 million in 2019, even as Somalia’s exports to Turkey rose to just $6.7 million over the same period. By comparison, in 2019 Somalia exported $18 million and $195 million to China and the UAE respectively. Although Somalia has a port revenue-sharing agreement with Albayrak, which receives 45%, this has resulted in one-sided expansion of trade, with Turkish traders importing nearly 50 times as much to Somalia as Somali traders exported to Turkey in 2020.

In 2015, Somalia’s Financial Government Committee (FGC) published a detailed report reviewing public procurement and concessions; among the concessions reviewed in the report were the contracts for Albayrak Group and Favori LLC, which manage two of the largest domestic revenue generators for the Somalia government. The committee found several flaws in the Albayrak concession that resulted in uncompetitive port service costs, reduced revenues, labor disputes, and a lack of clarity on revenue sharing despite a general agreement laying out a 45-55% split. The FGC recommended that “the federal government seek an amicable renegotiation of the contract’s more troubling clauses.”

Albayrak Group concession

Since Albayrak Group was awarded a non-tendered, 20-year concession to manage Mogadishu Port, it has been embroiled in scandals over allegations of everything from predatory practices like wage theft from employees and attempts to cover up rape to bribing government ministers and artificially inflating port management and operating expenses (thereby reducing government revenues while boosting company profits). Based on existing data before Albayrak took over the port, the monthly revenue was $6 million, and it subsequently increased to $10 million to $12 million per month; however, in 2014 Albayrak Group only reported $2.7 million per month in revenue. This reduced the government’s revenue share from 55% to 16% while increasing the company’s from 45% to 84%. Something similar happened in Guinea when Alpha Condé, the now-deposed president and a friend of Erdoğan, awarded Albayrak a 25-year lease for the port of Conakry and 82% of duties in what was widely perceived to be a sweetheart deal.

Favori LLC concession

As with Albayrak’s Mogadishu Port contract, the FGC has also called for amendments to the concession of Favori LLC, a subsidiary of Turkey’s Kozuva Group that manages Mogadishu airport under a 15-year deal signed on June 30, 2013. According to an aviation expert who examined the concession, Favori violated its contractual obligations by collecting illegal fees that should have been passed on to the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (SCAMA). Separate from the general revenue sharing, these allegedly include but are not limited to fees for landing, air navigation, parking, passenger safety, freight, and fuel.

According to interviews with local aviation experts and former employees, Favori has also failed to reconstruct the airport’s main runway, hampered the development of local human resources by allocating key positions to non-Somalis, and neglected airport maintenance and safety, as required under its contract. Issues that should have been addressed in 2013 are only now being discussed. In addition, the company illegally built a hotel and shopping mall inside the airport property in a place that was supposed to be a parking lot for airport customers. It’s not clear if the revenue generated from the Decale Hotel, which is a Somalia government asset, is supplemental revenue for the government or for Favori LLC.

Furthermore, according to a 2016 U.N. report, Favori LLC has inflated its expenses to maximize its profits, reporting monthly revenue of $1.16 million and expenses of more than $500,000 in 2016, compared to revenue of an estimated $8 million per month before it took over management of the airport. This reduced the government’s share of the revenue from 45% to just 6%. Favori LLC even went so far as to claim asset depreciation as an expense, despite the fact that the assets in question are the Somalia government’s and not part of the contract. Rather than canceling the Favori LLC contract, the Somalia government re-negotiated terms with the company in May 2019, amid secrecy.

Favori LLC has faced repeated allegations of labor and human rights abuses against its employees, but the government has not taken action against the company. Favori LLC has allegedly bribed Somalia government officials with business class air tickets and free holiday stays in Turkey and seems to enjoy unlimited impunity. The Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU) has published a damming report documenting Favori LLC’s serious labor abuses that it says violate both Somalia’s constitution and International Labor Organization articles. FESTU filed a specific instance with the Turkish National Contact Point (NCP) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) against Favori LLC in February 2021.
 

Airport opening
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (C), his wife Emine Erdoğan (C-L), and Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud (2nd R) attend the Inauguration of Aden Abdulle International Airport Somalia in Mogadishu on Jan. 25, 2015. Photo by Kayhan Ozer/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Turkish concession risk and liabilities

From a legal perspective, both the Favori and Albayrak contracts were awarded under an opaque process and were not approved by the Somali parliament. As one legislator noted, “Any deal that is not approved by the parliament remains null and void.” This puts the Somali government at risk of liability in both cases.

Though the government finally inked a 14-year concession to streamline revenue sharing and port development with Albayrak Group in October 2020, this largely reinforced the company’s original concession obligations. In addition, the revised concession has so many ambiguities that it’s not clear if the new 14-year deal is an extension of the previous 20-year lease, if it requires Albayrak Group co-management as part of technical knowledge transfer, or if the Albayrak Group’s exclusive port financing rights provision prohibits using the port of Mogadishu as collateral to access international loans.

According to interviews with former employees, Favori LLC has allegedly repatriated its profits to Turkey in cash without making a transfer through the Somalia Central Bank, as required by Somalia’s finance laws, which would be a violation of the anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism act that was passed in 2016. This would also violate the Somalia government’s compliance with its debt relief obligations with the World Bank and IMF, including revenue mobilization and accountability requirements to reduce corruption and enhance monetary and financial sector governance.

Qatar-Turkey axis and geopolitical influence

Beyond the economic issues, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia has also entangled the African country in the broader regional geopolitical dispute between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE on the other for influence in the Horn of Africa. While this rivalry seems to be easing at present, as Turkey and Qatar are making efforts to mend relations with Gulf countries and their regional allies, it may flare up again in the future, with consequences for Somalia.

Turkey and Qatar are brothers in arms with joint ventures ranging from support for the Muslim Brotherhood to financing Islamists and proxy wars in fragile countries all over the Middle East. Their bond grew stronger during the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, which pushed them into a geopolitical and geoeconomic alliance. The GCC crisis also spilled over into Somalia, when the new government led by Mohammed Abdullahi (known as Farmaajo), whose election was financed by Qatar, confiscated $9 million from an Emirati plane at Mogadishu airport. In retaliation, the UAE cut off support for the Somalia government, including military training, a devastating blow for the newly elected government and for a fragile state still recovering from one of its worst famines.

Though Turkey steered clear of the bickering between the Gulf countries in Somalia at the time, it had earlier pursued a covert plan with Qatar, in 2011 during the post-Arab Spring era, to sway Somalia’s foreign policy away from the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union and align it with Egypt’s then-President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. This effort failed as Morsi was overthrown by the Egyptian military in 2013.

Since 2009, Qatar and Turkey have pressured Somalia’s government to negotiate with al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group based in Somalia. Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has been involved in negotiating the release of an Italian journalist kidnaped by al-Shabab in May 2020 in Somalia. The relationship between Turkish intelligence and al-Shabab was revealed by the Nordic Monitoring Group in 2021, which reported that MIT sent $600,000 to the group. This prompted Turkey’s government to block the Nordic Monitoring Group and Somalia media outlets like Hiiraan Online from being accessed in Turkey. Both Qatar and Turkey have gone to great lengths to use their geopolitical influence to shape Somalia’s foreign policy.

Turkey has also repeatedly tried to serve as an arbiter in Somalia-Somaliland talks, sending its ambassador Elgon Beker from Mogadishu to Somaliland in 2019. The ambassador’s efforts were dead on arrival. Somaliland does not see Turkey as an impartial and fair arbiter, but rather as a dishonest broker since Ankara believes in the preservation of Somalia’s territorial integrity based on the illegal union of 1960 between the two. Moreover, Somaliland is extremely wary of Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu, as the Somaliland government believes Farmaajo, who openly denied the Hargeisa genocide committed by former Somali dictator Siad Barre in his post-graduate thesis and has already waged an economic war against Somaliland, could use military forces trained by Turkey to invade Somaliland in an effort to bring about forceful reunification.

Turkey and militarization

To capitalize on Somalia’s geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean, Turkey signed multiple military pacts with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in 2009 and 2010 and continued to sign new agreements with Somalia’s federal government in 2012 and 2015. These pacts covered areas ranging from military training to defense industry cooperation and are aimed at gaining a foothold in the Indian Ocean.

The Turkish government invested $50 million to build the largest overseas Turkish military base with the goal of training 10,000 members of the Somali National Army (SNA), although Turkey officially refers to it as the largest embassy in the world. The Turkish “embassy” in Mogadishu, which is perhaps the only diplomatic compound where military training and exercises are held, sits on a vast, 400-hectare swath of prime beach-front real estate worth an estimated $1.5 billion based on local property prices. It is almost twice the size of the U.S. military base in Djibouti. But Turkey did not pay for the land and there is no sign that the military pact contained any stipulation for lease payment to the Somali people. In comparison, France not only provides military protection to Djibouti in exchange for hosting its military base, but it also pays annual rent of $70 million and offers budgetary support.
 

Somalia-Turkey military training
Somali soldiers are seen marching during training held by the Turkish Armed Forces at the Turkish Military Training Center in Mogadishu, Somalia on Jan. 15, 2018. Photo by Volkan Furuncu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

Training and indoctrination

Since its opening, the Turkish embassy in Somalia has graduated five battalions of SNA troops, 2,500 in total. As part of its training, the Somali troops are treated to a heavy dose of Turkish indoctrination that includes singing the Turkish national anthem with a background video showing Turkish army propaganda commemorating the Ottoman Empire.

The Somali Ministry of Defense does not exercise any oversight, is not part of the training, and is oblivious to what the troops are learning. Worse still, it does not seem to understand the challenges of integrating the Turkish-trained units with the larger SNA. There are further concerns over the role played by SADAT, a notorious Turkish private military contractor, which has been confirmed to be involved in training Somali troops. Founded by an Erdoğan ally, SADAT has been heavily involved in conflicts in Syria and Libya and has been accused of providing training and weapons to the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.

(Dis)integration with the SNA

Turkey is equipping the SNA units it trains with Turkish-made weapons such as the MPT-76 and other HK G3 variants made by MKEK with 7.62×51 NATO ammunition. This creates a dangerous incompatibility that prevents these units from being integrated into the larger SNA. In addition, there are also signs of a disconnect from command and control that may stem from Turkish-provided communications equipment, according to members of the SNA. By contrast, the U.S. and the U.K., which have trained and equipped effective units, opt to retrofit Kalashnikovs and other weapons widely available in Somalia to outfit the units they train, instead of the M4s or Enfields used by their armies. Turkey is thereby creating a market for its weapons manufacturers such as MKEK at the expense of building a cohesive army that is capable of carrying out joint operations between various branches and units.

Politicization of the SNA

On Feb. 19, 2021, the Turkish-trained Somali special forces known as Gorgor (“Eagle”) used live ammunition on unarmed civilians peacefully protesting the extension of Farmaajo’s term in office as president, which had expired on Feb. 8 2021. On April 27, the Turkish-trained Haramcad (“Cheetah”) special police unit was implicated in the illegal arrest of journalists and an attack on a former Somali president. Despite repeated pleas by the Somali Opposition Council to the Turkish government to avoid sending weapons and military hardware during Somalia’s election dispute, Turkey continued to supply weapons to a president intent on staying in power at all costs.

This was a turning point that changed how many Somalis perceived Turkey, especially the residents of Mogadishu. Having welcomed Turkey with open arms in 2011 as a peacemaker and state builder, they were now shocked by its indifference to their plight, as Turkey openly took Farmaajo’s side and the troops it trained turned their guns on local residents instead of fighting al-Shabab. The U.N. Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) has repeatedly warned Turkey for violating the U.N. arms embargo by equipping Somali police forces without notifying and getting approval from SMEG.

Erdoğan’s “neo-Ottoman” threat to Somalia

Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia in 2011 and the provision of assistance by multiple Turkish aid agencies at the height of the famine made Turkey a godsend in the eyes of many Somalis, who were yearning for an alternative to the failed Western-backed Somalia government. These overtures served as a litmus test of Erdoğan’s soft power, putting Turkey on the map as a humanitarian actor and an emerging donor.

In reality, however, the Turkish model has been a form of humanitarian enterprise diplomacy aimed at winning destitute Somali hearts and the backing of corrupt political elites who benefit from aid dependency on the West. However, the branding of Turkish aid has had a damaging impact on public perception, creating high expectations that the Turkish government would invest in state-building and provide protection. This perception is predictable when political elites have oversold expectations of the Turkish government and its economic strength. These elites are not happy with the EU and U.S.; even though they provide the majority of Somalia’s budget support and developmental aid, this comes with rules, regulations, and bureaucratic accountability, while the Turkish government has a different approach that meets their long-standing principal demand of “what’s in it for me.”

Erdoğan has said he believes Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was a good omen for the African country, writing in a piece published in Foreign Policy in October 2011, “In Turkish culture, it is believed that something good will come out of all bad experiences.” A decade later the only thing Somalia has gained from the Turkish model is costly bad experience stemming from imported autocracy, democratic backsliding, and a development trap.

Turkish state-sponsored private companies Albayrak and Favori resemble the Italian colonial enterprise Benadir Company, and over the past 10 years they have benefitted from illegal long-term concessions and political impunity that has cost Somalia’s government and investors as much as $5 billion in lost revenue due to trade barriers and exploitation of state resources, according to estimates from the author confirmed by former government finance officials. Turkey’s bilateral trade relationship with Somalia has put its economy in a stranglehold, turning Somalia’s assets into dead capital that has weakened the government and private sector’s financial footing and ability to attract foreign direct investment, limiting its sovereignty, and creating an addiction to Turkey’s artificial aid and its development trap.

Turkey has used Somalia to incubate its private sector companies and build a portfolio and track record it can pitch to other African or low-income countries with the deceptive marketing that “if it works in Somalia, it can work in your country too.” An African country that cannot access stringent World Bank loans or Chinese soft loans could easily be tempted to accept such an offer and risk falling into a development trap. This is especially true for countries with authoritarian regimes, fragile states, and weak government institutions, like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya.

Rather than reforming and strengthening Somalia’s weak government institutions to reduce corruption, the Turkish government chose to corrupt Somalia government ministries to reap the benefits of lucrative concessions in an effort to maintain its prestige at home and polish its credentials as an international actor abroad, all at the expense of Mogadishu’s taxpayers.

If future Somalia leaders do not hedge against Erdoğan’s irredentism and neo-Ottoman expansionism by taking a page from Tunisia, which imposed a 27% tariff on Turkish goods to reduce the trade deficit, in the next 10 years Turkey may expand its hold on the economy and take over Somalia’s agricultural sector as well, just like the Italian colonialists did when they realized that the Benadir coastal ports and towns depend on a hinterland (Shabelle River belt) supply chain.

Turkey is using its military base in Somalia to expand its influence and gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa, all without paying a cent in rent, and it has become clear that the government’s goal is not to protect Somalia from the scourge of al-Shabab or provide any meaningful security assistance.

Perhaps Erdoğan has no interest in seeing a secure and peaceful Somalia and the units that Turkey is training, whose record in combat against al-Shabab is dismal compared to the other units like the Danab (“Lightning Brigade”), may instead be a backstop to ensure that any future occupant of Villa Somalia does not go against Ankara’s interests. If so, Erdoğan could be providing the kindling for future conflicts in Somalia.

Erdoğan has exploited Somalia’s fragility to pursue his ambition of making Turkey an international power and furthering his “neo-Ottoman” aspirations. Erdoğan’s new empire is a thinly veiled feudal system that depends on militarism and economic exploitation for its survival. It is a threat to Somalia’s stability and prosperity, and if replicated elsewhere, it could destabilize other countries too.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Guled Ahmed is a non-resident scholar at MEI, renewable energy and water infrastructure expert, and an entrepreneur. The views expressed in this piece are his own.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs Arrives in the United States for Official Visit

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A delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Dr. Essa Kayd has arrived in the United States on an official visit. According to a statement by the Ministry and Somaliland’s Representative Office, Dr. Kayd is accompanied by Dr. Edna Adan and will meet with various United States government officials.

Under President Bihi, Somaliland has been on overdrive in its quest for international recognition and its profile has been on the rise internationally and in the United States following its successful parliamentary and local elections and has received tacit support for its case for recognition from current and former government officials.

Dr. Kayd, a US-educated neurologist has been appointed to the post of Foreign Minister by President Bihi on September 2nd, is on his first official visit to the United States.

Drowning in Red Ink – President Bihi’s Government lied about the size of Debt inherited from His Predecessor

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According to Somaliland government records examined by the Somaliland Chronicle, President Bihi’s government has inherited a sizeable debt from the previous administration of President Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo and that officials from both administrations have publicly sought to downplay and at times outright lie about the size and gravity of the national debt.

Records show that some of the debt was incurred at the tail end of President Siilanyo’s term with a Presidential decree signed by the former President instructing the Minister of Finance at the time Ms. Samsam Abdi to include the borrowed funds in the 2018 budget. Some of the debt holders are banking and telecom giants of Dahabshiil, Telesom, and the parent company of Somcable MSG.

Publicly, however, the current Minister of Finance Development, Dr. Saad Ali Shire, and his predecessor Ms. Samsam Abdi have vehemently disputed the facts surrounding the debt President Bihi’s government has inherited.

In addition to the debt inherited from President Silanyo’s government, records show that President Bihi has borrowed millions from MSG owned by Mr. Mohamed Said Guedi.

Mr. Mohamed Said Guedi

Although records do not have enough detail to determine the nature of the debt and how it was used, it includes a massive 90,000 US dollar electric bill by the Ministry of Interior. The Minister of Interior has pleaded with the Finance Ministry for swift settlement of the bill to avoid disruption of service to the nation’s vital records systems housed at the Ministry of Interior.

Soon after taking the helm, President Bihi has re-nationalized and withdrew from multiple lucrative contracts that have been awarded by his predecessor to well-connected private parties to operate public services including managing the Berbera Oil Terminal and motor vehicle records administration. Records show that negotiated settlements with these private operators have added to the already burgeoning national debt.

It is unclear if the debt passed on by the previous government of President Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo and the subsequent borrowing of President Bihi has gone through the proper legal channels, if the newly elected parliament will look into it or how it affects the government’s ability to regulate Dahabshil and Telesom—Somaliland’s largest banks and telecom operators—while it owes them huge sums of money.

Government officials did not respond to repeated requests for clarification on the size and nature of the national debt passed on by the previous government or how much exactly President Bihi’s government has borrowed since taking office.

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Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

The Future of Somaliland’s Recognition

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by Max Webb

Thirty years after declaring its independence from Somalia, the Republic of Somaliland seems to be strategically positioning itself to make a strong push for international recognition. Though it checks nearly every box for statehood, its pursuit of independence has been largely ignored, leaving the region stable, but isolated and without a voice in international forums and debates. Now, it is combining its track record of self-governance and democratic consolidation with a more shrewd and strategic foreign policy that capitalizes on the geopolitical rivalries that are roiling the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. Whether it will ultimately be successful yet to be seen, but with a strong case, powerful new friends, and a neighborhood in turmoil, its chances appear to be improving significantly.

Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in May 1991, and has now existed as a self-declared independent state for longer than its opted union with Somalia. Multiple generations of Somalilanders now know nothing different than an independent Somaliland. Their sense of national identity is steadfast and deep-seated and the goal of realizing de jure sovereignty is stronger than ever. Even if independence remains unrecognized, the possibility of reunification with Somalia is extremely unlikely. Thus, this year’s May anniversary of the dissolution of the union with Somalia serves as an important moment that reignites Somaliland’s independence struggle, and the validity of its cause, on an international level. 

Flag_of_Somaliland.jpg
Flag of the Republic of Somaliland, which remains largely unrecognized despite its relative stability.

Somalilanders also point to their record of democratic progress as further basis for separation from politically unstable Somalia. Since the ratification of Somaliland’s constitution in 2001, there have been eight successful elections ranging from the municipal level to the presidential level. Parliamentary elections have been more problematic, with polls in the Lower House postponed for over a decade because of disagreements over the composition of the electoral commission. After years of delays, Somaliland’s democracy was in need of a reboot— something to reinvigorate its young population and political systems. This year, Somalilanders did just that, restoring credibility to democratic institutions and bringing in a new generation of Somaliland leaders. Not long after independence day celebrations, long-delayed parliamentary elections were held, in a process widely praised by African and other international observers as free, fair, and credible. Moreover, the two opposition parties, Waddani and UCID, together won the majority of seats, marking a power shift away from the ruling Kulmiye party. While a political shift of this character might have sparked conflict in some of Somaliland’s neighbors, this development was marked by peace and calm as the new government assumes power. The success of the recent election sits in stark contrast to Somalia, which has found itself in the midst of an election crisis in recent months that ultimately led to violent clashes between clan militias and security forces in the streets of Mogadishu.

Map of the political situation in Somalia and Somaliland.

Alongside these internal political developments, Somaliland is pursuing a more strategic foreign policy, building economic and political alliances with more powerful players that may eventually support its case for international recognition. Over the past several years, Somaliland has found itself in the midst of a whirlwind of geopolitical activity that has brought it into contact with both regional and great powers. Its relative stability and physical location at the epicenter of the greater Red Sea arena has made it an asset to many. It has found itself strategically placed in the middle of major international rivalries–such as the Persian Gulf conflict, the rivalry between China and Taiwan, and regional conflicts between Kenya and Somalia and Ethiopia and Egypt—and it has used those rivalries to further its own foreign policy agenda. Somaliland has seen unparalleled economic engagement from the UAE, with Dubai-based developer DP World investing $442 million into the port of Berbera, Somaliland’s commercial center on the Gulf of Aden.

Chairman and CEO  of DP World Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem (right) shakes hands to finalize the investment of $442 million into developing the port of Berbera. Source: The National

Militarily, Somaliland has been approached by former adversaries, such as Egypt, and global powerhouses, such as Russia and China, about the establishment of bases along its coastline. Diplomatically, Somaliland has established formal relations with Taiwan, which only has one other friend in Africa (Eswatini), while rejecting support for China, a bold move for an unrecognized entity seeking support in the international community. Somaliland has also strengthened relations with Kenya, and aggressively expanded its ties with other nations across sub-Saharan Africa. While doing all of this, Somaliland has demonstrated a degree of agency never seen before in its foreign policy, leveraging the power it poses to make meaningful strides towards its goal of recognition and independence. Somaliland’s choices indicate strategic depth and maturity in its foreign policy. For a polity of its status, Somaliland has become a player in regional developments.

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Foreign ministers of Taiwan and Somaliland met to establish representative offices in Taipei and Hargeisa. Source: Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

These positive developments are not to say that Somaliland is without problems. There are currently no women in the parliament, freedom of speech and freedom of the press have seen significant setbacks, and minorities still struggle for proper representation. Furthermore, there is a long-standing border dispute with the neighboring Puntland region of Somalia, drought and locusts have plagued the countryside, and Somaliland remains very poor and underdeveloped. Somalia is unlikely to agree to a full split, and the African Union and broader international community are still hesitant to fully engage with the question of Somaliland independence. The sanctity of established borders and the fear of a proliferation of secession demands by aggrieved regions and communities remain formidable obstacles to Somaliland’s ambitions for full sovereignty.

SomalilandFR2.png
Map of Somaliland’s Foreign Relations. Source: Onero Institute, based on a map by Siirski

Nevertheless, Somaliland’s recent democratic successes, significant independence milestones, and dramatically increased international presence mark a paradigm shift for the proto-state as it seeks to gain attention for its independence cause around the world. In a region marred by conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, Somaliland stands out as a relatively peaceful and stable country, whose cause it is hard not to be sympathetic to. From the countless conversations I have had with Somaliland citizens and officials, this air of optimism for their future is alive and well. Somaliland is no longer just a blip on the radar of the international community, but rather a geopolitical vessel, growing in might, and making waves in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea arenas. Change is afoot for this self-declared republic; keep your eye on Somaliland.

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The DP World Berbera New Port will serve as a cornerstone of Somaliland’s economic growth and is symbolic of the cautious optimism of things to come. Source DP World

Acknowledgments

So many people were critical to my research on Somaliland this year. I’d like to specifically thank the Honorable Bashir Goth, the Honorable Mohammed Yonis, and Mr. Nicholas Hasko for their guidance, support, and regional insight as I dove into the depths of Somaliland politics. I’d also like to thank Jennifer Cooke, Director of the Institute for African Studies at GW and my thesis mentor, for her hands-on and personal mentorship, guidance, support, and friendship as I conducted my thesis research. She was critical in helping me complete my research, and I am very thankful for her.

About the Author

Originally from Dallas, Max Webb graduated from The George Washington University in May of 2021 with a BA in International Affairs with a dual concentration in Conflict Resolution and International Development as well as a regional focus on the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. During his time in college, Max studied and wrote extensively on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as conflict in the greater Somali region of the Horn. He has previously served as an intern for the project on Arab-Israeli relations at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the diplomatic intern for the Kurdistan Regional Government representative office in DC, a research intern at Antioquia Presente in Medellín, Colombia, and a research aid at Reut in Tel Aviv. Currently, Max serves as the National Organizing Fellow for New York based policy group, Israel Policy Forum.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.

 Taiwan Demonstration Farm in Somaliland opens

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News Release

His Excellency Ambassador Allen Chenhwa Lou, Taiwan Representative in the Republic of Somaliland, and Hon. Mohamed Haji Osman, Minister of Agricultural Development of the Republic of Somaliland, co-hosts the opening ceremony of the Demonstration Farm in Agamse, Arabsiyo on 4th October 2021.

The Demonstration Farm is the “fruit” of the joint efforts of the Taiwan Technical Mission and Ministry of Agricultural Development for the Improving Production and Quality of Vegetables and Fruits Project.

The demonstration farm was assigned to the Taiwan Technical Mission to use in April this year. After 6 months’ hard work, the farm has reached a functional status and is ready to do the extension work with local farmers. This farm is designed to be a technique exchange platform. Techniques and know-how related will be tested in the farm and will be extended to local farmers if it is applicable.

Considering the constraints of farming resources of Somaliland, such as water availability, soil fertility, high evaporation, and lack of diversity of products. Some tactics such as protection farming, dripping irrigation, mulching, varieties introduction, soil-improving will be introduced in the demonstration farm.

The Demonstration Farm is a venue for training and extensions work. The Demonstration Farm is the benchmark of the Improving Production and Quality of Vegetables and Fruits Project. Many elements such as capacity-building and value-chain facilitation are to be channeled to the Demonstration Farm and to be implemented together by the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Taiwan Technical Mission.

Moreover, the Demonstration Farm is showcasing the vision of the Taiwan Model of agriculture cooperation in Africa to benefit local farmers directly.

Taiwan donates oxygen generators to Somaliland to fight together against COVID-19

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NEWS RELEASE

COVID-19 continues to spread globally to threaten people’s lives and cause massive economic losses. In order to assist Somaliland to increase its related capability to combat this pandemic, the Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland represents the Taiwan Government to donate Taiwanese-made oxygen generators to the Ministry of Health Development of the Republic of Somaliland on 3rd October 2021.

Taiwan has been side by side with Somaliland to combat COVID-19 by sharing various Taiwanese-made high-quality medical supplies including masks, PPE, antigen rapid tests, PCR machines and reagents, and many others since the outbreak of COVID-19. Taiwan will continue to share the medical resources and work together with Somaliland to combat COVID-19. “Taiwan can help” and “Taiwan is helping” are not only slogans, they also show the brotherly friendship between Taiwan and Somaliland.

Viruses know no borders and no one is safe until everyone is.  No country can remain on the sidelines and should be all integrated into the international community to fight against this pandemic that threatens all mankind. Taiwan is willing and ready to contribute and share more with the international community.  The G7 foreign ministers, government leaders, or high-level officials of diplomatic allies as well as Japan, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, and the United States have publicly expressed their rock-solid support for Taiwan to participate in the related international activities. Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland would also like to express heartfelt gratitude to Somaliland Government’s support in this regard.

The core principles of the “Taiwan Model” of cooperation are based on “mutual assistance and mutual benefits” (MAMB). Taiwan and Somaliland are together to shape this new WIN-WIN cooperation model.

US Congressman Chris Smith Urges State Department and USAID to Recognize Somaliland

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In a hearing by the House Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee for Africa, held on September 28, ranking member Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey once again highlighted Somaliland’s peace, security, and stability and referred to it as an ‘oasis of stability’ relative to Somalia, Eritrea and the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.

Speaking at the House Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee for Africa’ hearing on September 28, Rep Chris Smith said: “I want to recognize that amid the forces creating division and discord in the Horn in Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea, such as under Isaias Afwerki’s regime, which is responsible for so much suffering in both Eritrea as well as in Tigray, there is one oasis of stability and that is Somaliland, which is a de facto, independent area from Somalia. I would like to hear comments from both State and USAID as to how to better recognize Somaliland in the global community with an eye towards building sustainable peace.”.

The witnesses of the hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Bureau of African Affairs Mr. Michael Gonzales and USAID Assistant to the Administrator for the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization Mr. Robert W. Jenkins did not directly address Representative Smith’s question on recognition of Somaliland, both have been candid on the issues in the region and especially the deteriorating security situation and Al-Shabaab’s resurgence in Somalia.

Speaking of Somalia, Mr. Gonzales said “Somalia-based al-Shabaab is al-Qaeda’s largest and best-financed affiliate in the world and represents a threat to U.S. interests and allies throughout East Africa.”.

“Elsewhere, in Somalia, Al Shabab continues to make territorial and financial gains in the backdrop of a deeply fractured political environment, evidenced most recently by election delays, dire humanitarian conditions, and continued inter-communal conflict. Al Shabab’s increasing revenue stream and growth in power has allowed for more sophisticated attacks. The group has shown itself able to collect tax and revenue streams regardless of whether it owns territory, signaling that a security-driven response with the aim of holding territory will be insufficient to degrade Al Shabab.” said Mr. Robert Jenkins about Somalia.

This is the second time Representative Smith has brought up Somaliland in a committee hearing, previously he praised the Somaliland Republic for its parliamentary and local elections held on May 31st and has questioned why the US government has failed to support the election efforts in Somaliland.

Somaliland reminds the international community that is not part of Somalia

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Somaliland issued a statement to remind the international community that it is not part of the selections being held in Somalia which the Federal Government of Somalia claims includes Somaliland. Below is the Press Release as translated by Somaliland Chronicle.

Somaliland reminds the international community that it is an independent and sovereign country that has nothing to do with the elections of the dysfunctional regime of Somalia.

In a statement issued today and addressed to the UN, the AU, the EU, and the international community as a whole, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation said that since it regained its sovereignty in 1991 Somaliland is an independent and democratic country in which the people elect their representatives in the executive and legislative branches of the government and the local councils through countrywide one-person-one-vote elections.

“Therefore, Somaliland warns the Somalia regime and its politicians against their false and fantasy claims aimed at misleading the international community.”

“Somaliland, which is one of the leading democratic countries in Africa will not accept its name to be included in any way in the elections in Somalia.”.

Below is the Somali Language version of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Exclusive Interview with Stephen M. Schwartz — The Former US Ambassador to Somalia

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In this interview, we are speaking with Mr. Stephen M. Schwartz, the former United States Ambassador to Somalia, about the many challenges and opportunities facing countries in the Horn of Africa, including Somaliland.

Somaliland Chronicle: Let’s start with Ethiopia: You have been in the U.S. Foreign Service since 1992 and have been a diplomat in many countries around the world and served as ambassador to Somalia. Is the United States able to exert any pressure including sanctions on the warring parties to cease hostilities and reach a negotiated settlement especially in light of the horrific human rights violations that are being reported from Tigray and possibly other parts of Ethiopia?

Schwartz: From what I see in the public domain the United States government is very concerned about the conflict in Ethiopia, the incendiary language, and the number of people killed, injured, raped, displaced, and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Secretary Blinken, USAID Administrator Power, and Special Envoy Feltman have pushed the parties to end hostilities. Unfortunately, it appears that Prime Minister Abiy and some of his allies are unwilling to take a constructive approach to dealing with whatever issue they had with Tigray and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I expect the United States will continue to look for ways to pressure and persuade Abiy to seek a negotiated solution, and with continued stalemate internally and greater multilateral pressure they might succeed.

Somaliland Chronicle: Ethiopia has been viewed as the elder state in the Horn of Africa and a stabilizing force. Given the current trajectory of the conflict and how it is spreading to other regions such as Amhara and Afar, what implications does the conflict in Ethiopia could have on fragile states such as Somalia where Ethiopian forces are stationed as part of AMISOM/AU peace-keeping missions?

Schwartz: The situation in Ethiopia is very concerning. Ethiopia is a large, populous, and important country which is at risk of breaking apart and destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa. It is important to remember that Ethiopia is unique. It remains, in effect, an empire created in the late 1800s under Menelik II. It does not have a tradition of peaceful transfer of political power. Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by the Dergue led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, and the Dergue was ousted by rebel movements led by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the TPLF. Now Abiy has been trying to destroy the TPLF even though it was no longer the predominant political power in the country but had already been reduced to running Tigray.

The TPLF-led government in the early 1990s established ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Abiy’s government is now trying to crush one of those federal states, and by bringing other ethnic state militias into the contest, he risks creating ethnic nationalist forces he, his Prosperity Party, and the central government cannot manage. The conflict’s impact on Somalia has been limited thus far but that could change.

Somaliland Chronicle: The outgoing President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Mr. Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, took office during your tenure as the US Ambassador to Somalia. You have worked with him. What is your view on how things have turned out in Somalia given that he is still in power past his mandate and seems intent on instigating constitutional crises to remain in office?

Schwartz: Mr. Farmaajo came to office in 2017 with tremendous popular support from Somalis across the Horn of Africa. Under his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh Mohammed, Somalia completed the establishment of its new federal character and the government developed further from being “transitional.” Somalis and the international community had high hopes that as president, Mr. Farmaajo would strengthen Somalia’s new and weak institutions, both civilian and military. Sadly, this did not occur. Al Shabaab controls at least as much territory today as it did when Mr. Farmaajo took office. Rather than strengthen the federal system, he did everything he could to control, ignore, and weaken the federal member states. He failed to finalize the negotiated national security architecture to reform the Somali National Army and Police and clarify federal and member state authorities and responsibilities. He made no progress on reconciliation – including with Somaliland – or ratification of the constitution. And he made no progress creating the conditions for One Person One Vote, or a vote of any kind. Three and a half years into his four-year presidency he was forced to accept an electoral process that is almost identical to the one used in 2016. Since then, he continues to try to influence the process – including through the appointment of loyal or vulnerable people to various electoral bodies – to extend his time in office and improve his chances of retaining the presidency.

Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest piece “Somalia’s Leaders Need to Seize Immediately the Lessons of Afghanistan“ you have drawn a parallel to the spectacular implosion of the Afghan army following the US withdrawal and you have warned about a similar outcome in Somalia as you have written on the eve of the US’s withdrawal from Somalia in January. Your main argument is that the problem lies not in the equipment or the size of the army but the fact that the government institutions are hollowed out by rampant corruption. Is it fair to say that the United States and its successive Ambassadors bear some responsibility by not holding the Somali government and particularly President Farmaajo accountable to ensure their taxpayer’s funds are spent as intended?

Schwartz: I can only speak for what occurred during my tenure as ambassador, though I believe the general approach has some relevance to how things were managed after I left. As best as I can recall, no U.S. funding went directly to the Somali government to support its military effort. The U.S. directly funded the recruitment, training, and equipping the Danab special operations battalion and provided salary stipends and food rations to about 1/3 of the SNA. In 2017, after failing to get an adequate accounting of which SNA soldiers were receiving the stipends, the U.S. suspended the payments. The U.S. investment in Danab has been extremely successful and provided Somalia with a multi-clan, capable force that operates nationally and in three of the four southern and central member states. It is worth noting that the U.S. government helped create the Puntland Security Force and conducted operations with it for a number of years, and now it operates successfully and is independent of the U.S. or other external support.

Somaliland Chronicle: Although Mr. Farmaajo has renounced his US citizenship, many in his inner circle have dual citizenship and may include US citizens. Is there anything that the United States and possibly other countries can do to hold their citizens accountable for corruption and allegations of human rights violations in a foreign territory?

Schwartz: I am not an attorney, but I believe the United States and most western governments can investigate and hold accountable their citizens for at least some crimes committed outside of their country of nationality. Those citizens often have family and property in their adopted country and would seek to travel to that country whether or not they retain its citizenship. If, like Mr. Farmaajo, they have renounced their foreign citizenship, presumably they would need to apply for a visa to visit that country and the visa-issuance process has many laws and procedures governing who can travel to the United States and for what reason. Personally, I have no idea whether Mr. Farmaajo has committed crimes, or whether sufficient evidence exists of such possible crimes, for him to be held accountable in the United States. Ideally, if such evidence exists, he should be tried in a Somali court under Somali law for crimes committed in Somalia.

Somaliland Chronicle: Now on to Djibouti, an extremely important ally of the United States that is currently hosting a U.S. military base in addition to other countries’ militaries including China. General Townsend’s predecessor General Thomas D Waldhauser testified to the US Senate on concerns “preponderance of foreign forces”. Do you see any long-term strategic risks to the United States in maintaining a foothold in Djibouti given China’s huge investments in the country?

Schwartz: Djibouti has been an important partner for the United States since its independence and for the U.S. military for almost 20 years. Its location, stability, and infrastructure have served U.S. strategic interests well over this period. In general, there should be no reason why the United States and China cannot maintain military facilities in Djibouti that serve their respective interests. Unfortunately, China has not been content to co-exist with the U.S. in Djibouti but has undertaken a number of acts hostile to the United States. One well-publicized act was the repeated use by China of lasers to blind pilots flying military jets. To address your question, I think it would be advantageous for the United States to have alternate sites in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden region which would be used to base some of the military personnel and equipment currently in Djibouti. Having options increases U.S. negotiating power, adds flexibility, and reduces the negative impact on U.S. capabilities if an external shock develops.

Somaliland Chronicle: In contrast to his concern over the presence of multiple foreign armies in Djibouti, General Waldhauser has said “Berbera’s location, close to the entry and exit point of the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, will be strategically valuable for both Somaliland and with whomever they choose to partner.” What is your thought on this and how much value do you think the US should place in Somaliland’s strategic location in the Red Sea?

Schwartz: Berbera appears to offer a desirable location and infrastructure for any country looking for military basing in a strategic part of the world. That said, Berbera featured as a potentially useful deep water port for both the Soviet Union and then the United States during the Cold War, but its potential was never needed or developed. Also, as attractive a strategic location as Somaliland and Berbera might be, their value would be affected by what other possible sites exist in the area and what their attributes might be.

Somaliland Chronicle: We have recently reported a United States Air Force C-130J-30 Super Hercules transport aircraft that landed in the recently renovated Berbera Airport and a high-level meeting between Somaliland and US military personnel has taken place, both sides have declined to shed any light on the flight and the meeting but as someone who understands the dynamics of the region and the United States strategic interests, what do you make of this? To

Schwartz: I have not had any discussions on this topic with anyone in the U.S. government, so I have no actual idea what the purpose of the trip was. That said, it would be smart and prudent for the United States military to visit and assess all sites anywhere with potential military use. In most cases that use would be relatively short notice and there would not be time to conduct a full assessment before the operation. Such eventualities could be an emergency humanitarian operation, aircraft landing, ship visit, or hundreds of other possible contingencies.

Somaliland Chronicle: Somaliland and Taiwan diplomatic ties which the People’s Republic of China was unsuccessful in unraveling was viewed as good news by the former U.S. administration’s NSC and many current US government officials, how do you see this particular nexus between Taiwan and Somaliland? And in your view why hasn’t Somaliland benefited from the TAIPEI Act?

Schwartz: I collaborated with Taiwan officials while working on some issues related to the Pacific Island nations and believe Taiwan can offer useful assistance. This would appear to be the same conclusion reached by Somaliland officials. The TAIPEI act became U.S. law well after I retired and I am unfamiliar with its provisions and application so cannot address that aspect of your question.

Somaliland Chronicle: What is your view on Somaliland’s offer to host some Afghan SIVs temporarily?

Schwartz: It was a generous humanitarian gesture. It also portrays Somaliland authorities as responsible international partners willing to work constructively to address global challenges.

Somaliland Chronicle: As the former US Ambassador to Somalia, you were able to work with the government of Somaliland to a certain degree without presenting credentials due to its lack of recognition, and this is the case for every foreign Ambassador to Somalia, in your view what signal does this send to you, your government about the seriousness of Somaliland in terms of its independence and quest for recognition?

Schwartz: Somaliland has done a tremendous job creating, financing, and sustaining the full array of government functions. As a result, anyone wanting to do business with Somaliland must deal with its authorities and jurisdiction. During my tenure, the embassy staff and I worked well with Somaliland officials on a range of issues. We dealt with the officials and institutions that had effective authority and control over the situations we were working on. I recall one important issue involving assisting American citizens in Somaliland in which a number of Somaliland officials provided critical assistance.

The question of Somaliland’s sovereignty being recognized internationally is obviously a top priority for Somaliland officials and has been for 30 years. My view, which I have shared with senior Somaliland officials, is that the best way to pursue their goal is through a negotiated agreement with the Somalia government. All new states that have attained a seat in the United Nations – the ultimate determination of international recognition – have obtained their sovereignty with the consent of the former state to which it belonged. Some recent examples are Ethiopia consented to Eritrea’s independence, Sudan consented to South Sudan’s independence, Indonesia consented to Timor Leste’s independence, and Serbia consented to Montenegro’s independence. By contrast, Serbia has not consented to Kosovo’s declaration of independence and despite being recognized by about 100 countries, Kosovo is not seated in the United Nations and struggles to achieve full independence. Whether negotiations with authorities in Mogadishu leads to independence or some form of association is entirely up to the negotiators. What should not occur is that Mogadishu prolong a resolution of Somaliland’s status by refusing to enter undertake serious negotiations.

Somaliland Chronicle: Lastly, as a career and seasoned diplomat who knows the region very well, what advice would you give Somaliland in terms of how it engages with the world and particularly the United States.

Schwartz: I think the best thing Somaliland can do to engage with the world is to continue to improve its internal situation. Building a state with security and the rule of law, a strong and growing economy, a healthy well-educated population, and productive physical infrastructure would be a huge service to the people of Somaliland and a worthy end in itself. It would also attract increasing attention from people, businesses, and governments outside. Somaliland has very capable representation in the United States. This could be boosted by occasional high-level visits by leaders from both governments.

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Normalise it: Somalia and Somaliland talks will never end

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After 10 years of fruitless talks with Somalia, the Somaliland government has expressed its frustration and adopted a new policy: talks with Somalia will be limited to addressing Somaliland sovereignty.

This is an important development for Somaliland and a balanced position between not recognising the Somalian government (1991-2012) and an open dialogue that lasted between 2012 and 2021. In this article, I will explain what this new policy really means for both countries and their allies and partners.

The Somaliland and Somalia talks’ table has four pillars that will never change:

Pillar 1: Somaliland statehood is based on aspects that require international intervention; not Mogadishu’s sympathy.

Somaliland statehood is based on the following aspects: respecting colonial boundaries and historical independence as old as 1884, the genocide of 100,000 people, supporting 20 years of democracy, and preserving 30 years of peace (which is longer than the 29 years of unratified union with Somalia).

The figures behind these aspects are beyond the comprehension of Somalia or any other African country alone. Despite what it thinks, Somalia is not the parent country of a secessionist Somaliland. Anarchy is to expect Mogadishu, which cannot govern itself, to deal with aspects that are by nature for every sovereign country to collectively take a stand (international recognition). These are the main highlights of the African Union fact-finding mission on Somaliland.

Pillar 2: Somaliland and Somalia talks are bilateral agenda; not a pre-condition to Somaliland’s recognition.

This pillar is a natural consequence of Pillar 1. It is important to concede that Somaliland talks with Somalia are strictly biliteral and should not affect the relationship between Somaliland and the rest of the world. It is unacceptable to make Somaliland recognition, for example, conditional on an agreement with Somalia. This is denying Somaliland’s historical independence and unfairly treating it as a region seeking secession (see Pillar 1). Somaliland is not asking for a special arrangement here. The world demands Kosovo and Serbia to resolve their conflict. That did not stop over 100 countries to recognise Kosovo already (note Somaliland is not a secessionist case).

Pillar 3: Somalia will recognise Somaliland only after all countries do

In a previous article, I have explained how Somalia will be the last country to recognise Somaliland mainly due to fear of other federal states seceding. We should not see this as a problem at all. There are precedents for this: Pakistan was the last to recognise Bangladesh’s sovereignty (note again Somaliland is not a secessionist case).

Pillar 4: The talks will never end

Similar to Senegal and Gambia, Maylasia and Singapore, and all other countries that ended their biliteral unions, Somaliland and Somalia will forever be two countries that will enjoy some sort of relations. Our target should be to normalise these relations as soon as possible for the benefit of both countries. Before we reach our target, however, there will be breakdowns, pauses, and breakthroughs similar to any other two sovereign countries with territorial disputes.

In conclusion, the new policy of restricting talks to only cover Somaliland sovereignty is in line with all the four pillars above. It absolutely does not pause Somaliland recognition efforts. In fact, the sooner countries recognise Somaliland, the sooner Somalia and Somaliland can fast-track their relations into a mature normalised brotherly bond.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer in a fintech company. Melbourne, Australia

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.