Investigative Reports

Inside Somalia’s Visa-for-Sale Cartel — Meet Somalia’s Human Smuggler MP

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From Controversy to Cornerstone: DP World’s Lesson for Egal Airport

Many got DP World's Berbera deal wrong, but Berbera...

Another Fake Degree Scandal Rocks Somaliland Presidency: Director General Caught With Diploma Mill “Masters”

Repeat of 2022 Central Bank Fraud Scandal Exposes Somaliland...
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leaders of Somalia & Somaliland Meeting in Djibouti

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In resuming talks between Somalia and Somaliland after 11 years, the governments of Djibouti and Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Somaliland’s president, Musa Bihi Abdi, are meeting today.

A team headed by President Bihi arrived in Djibouti to meet with the President of Somalia, according to a statement from the Somaliland Presidential Office.

“A delegation flew to the Republic of Djibouti on an official working visit, under the direction of HE. Muse Bihi Abdi, President of the Somaliland Republic”

According to a statement from the Somaliland Presidential Office, the goal of this official visit is to carry on the presidential-level negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia.

Dr. Saad Ali Shire – the Minister of Finance Development; Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Diriye (Toorno); Mr. Mohamed Kahin Ahmed – the Minister of Interior Affairs; Mr. Ahmed Adan Buxane, the Minister of Education and Science; and Mrs. Edna Adan Ismail – the Special Envoy of Somaliland overseeing the dialogue between Somaliland and Somaliland, will accompany him.

Minister of Information Daud Aweis stated in a statement that President Hassan’s visit is intended to “resume talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somalia and solve the conflict in the country.”

He said that the President is accompanied by his Envoy for the negotiations with Somaliland, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, the Minister of Interior of Somalia, Ahmed Mo’alim Fiqi, and the Minister of Commerce, Jabril Abdirashid. “The talks are being hosted by our sister country, Djibouti,” he said.

The presidents will talk over a wide variety of topics, including debt relief, the management of national projects, resource allocation, crises, and the recent Red Sea tensions, according to trustworthy sources.

This time, Somaliland will be discussed without SSC Khatumo present, and it is anticipated that the presidents would talk about peaceful resolutions to the disputes in the Sool area.

After winning reelection in May 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud designated an ambassador to oversee Somaliland matters in order to continue resolving this long-running problem.

In contrast to other parts of Somalia, Somaliland has maintained peace and stability while working for international recognition for more than 30 years.

After Somaliland declared its independence, 11 years have passed since the initial talks between the Transitional Government of Somalia and Somaliland. It has now been 32 years since the fall of the Somali government in 1991.

Heritage Institute’s 2023 conference run from December 19-21 in the city of Djibouti. The theme for this year’s conference was “Fostering a Culture of Peace in the Horn.”

Recently, the 7th Heritage Institute gathering came to an end in Djibouti City, bringing together intellectuals from Somaliland, Djibouti, and Somalia as well as politicians from such countries. The politics, economy, security, stability, and cohabitation of Somalis were examined in those forum discussions.

Although the government of Somaliland did not formally attend the 7th Heritage conference, it appears that its representation was done by the opposition leaders in an indirect capacity.

However, it might be argued that this encounter between the two presidents was brewed during the just concluded annual Heritage conference. The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies appears to be keenly interested in the dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland.

There have been special sessions at Heritage conferences in the past to address the Somaliland problem.

Because of their close ties, it is challenging to verify Heritage’s independence from the Somali government. In addition, the general consensus is that the institution is a UN vehicle, fully financed and pursuing UN objectives. It suffices to have a reasonable doubt about its lack of independence given that the prime minister of Somalia was the conference’s keynote speaker.

However, if we examine this matter in the context of the ongoing Red Sea situation, one may argue that it is a ploy by Ismail Omer Geleh to demonstrate his power in the region over Somalia and Somaliland, which are close to the problem-ridden area – the Red Sea maritime route. Any meaningful input from those two nations on the unrest in the Red Sea must go via me.

How, when, and in what manner Somalia will swallow the bitter pill of Somaliland’s independence would be the sole verdict and the last call that the people of Somaliland would accept and anticipate hearing from any encounter with Somalia politicians.

Guest article

Concerned Over Tensions in the Red Sea, Somaliland Asks for Collaborative Solutions

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Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has voiced serious concerns over the Red Sea tension, citing its detrimental effects on the regional and global economies.

The Ministry said in a news release on Tuesday Dec 26, 2023 that the security of the Red Sea, the stability of the surrounding region, and the lives of millions of people who depend on commercial ships passing through the area are all at risk due to the recent increase in tension in the area.

Somaliland government is still keeping an eye on the worsening Red Sea situation. Millions of people relying on the crucial trade routes in this area for their livelihoods are at risk, as well as marine security and regional stability, according to the statement.

In order to terminate the dispute and preserve international law, the statement further urged the parties to give priority to cooperation and peaceful solutions.

“We implore all sides to the conflict to give diplomacy, communication, and a peaceful conclusion first priority. We support a cooperative strategy that puts an emphasis on collective security, upholds international law, and deals with the underlying causes of the political unrest and conflict in the area.”

Part of the statement said, “We call on regional and international actors to play a constructive role in facilitating de-escalation and supporting diplomatic efforts.”

To guarantee that the Red Sea remains a secure channel through which all ships can sail without incident, Somaliland has pledged to accept friends who wish to take part in maritime security initiatives.

“To ensure that the Red Sea remains a safe and prosperous waterway for all, our government remains steadfast in welcoming partners who wish to engage in our maritime security efforts,” the statement said in its conclusion.

This occurs one day after Musa Bihi Abdi, the president of Somaliland, met with business leaders to talk about the negative effects of Red Sea tensions on the local economy and the region as a whole.

The purpose of the discussion was to develop methods to deal with the economic effects of the growing difficulties in transshipment across the Red Sea as a result of the Houthi group’s attacks and blockade of commercial ships at Bab Al-Mandab, Yemen.

It gathered ministers, business experts, businesspeople, and other government officials from the Chambers of Commerce in Somaliland.

Both parties concluded throughout the talks that a thorough plan was required to deal with persistent problems that could endanger communal life.

Leaders in business actively gave recommendations and concepts to address new economic issues.

Among these recommendations is the creation of a joint committee made up of businesspeople and government representatives whose goal would be to create long-term solutions for problems pertaining to commodities and trade at the port.

In addition, the leaders stressed the necessity of working together to increase domestic output in order to achieve self-sufficiency and less reliance on other nations.

Guest article

Cabinet Meeting Chaired by President Bihi Approves Somaliland Budget for 2024

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During their 122nd meeting on Wednesday, the Council of Somaliland Ministers approved the 2024 Annual Budget, placing a strong emphasis on the nation’s elections and defense. President Bihi presided over the meeting.

The Somaliland Ministry of Finance Development has published the country’s yearly budget for 2024, which comes with a total of 3,432,316,337,448 Somaliland shillings in shillings.

It consists of World Bank projects, independent institutions, local and provincial government budgets, and the central government budget.

Dr. Saad Ali Shire, Minister of Finance Development, carried out his obligations as specified in Article 55, Paragraph 1 of the Nation’s Constitution and Article 5 of the Financial Management Act No. 75/2016 by presenting the budget estimate to the council.

He outlined the main topics and anticipated revenue sources for the national budget for 2024. President Muse Bihi Abdi cast his vote in favor of approving the year’s budget estimate following a protracted debate and review by the ministries.

This budget, which will be delivered to the Somaliland House of Representatives for its constitutional obligations, is the 33rd budget since Somaliland declared its unilateral dissolution of the union with the Somali Republic thus resuming its sovereignty in 1991.

The following ideas serve as the foundation and focal points of the 2024 budget: rebuilding the nation’s defense and security infrastructure, providing the cost of election, refining revenue and expenses, controlling inflation, and promoting judicial service

Piece first published on SII

Career Opportunity with DP World Berbera, Somaliland

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Head of Technology and Digital Transformation – Horn of Africa

An exceptional career opportunity within DP World Horn of Africa, under the Sub-Saharan Africa Region. If you possess the relevant background and profile that aligns with the Head of Technology and Digital Transformation role apply without delay

JOB DESCRIPTION

1.  Strategic Leadership:
•   Develop and execute a comprehensive digital and technological strategy aligned with the overall business objectives.
•   Provide visionary leadership, fostering an environment of innovation and continuous improvement.
2.  Digital Transformation:
•   Drive the transformation agenda, ensuring the adoption of emerging technologies to optimize operations and customer experiences.
•   Enhance digital capabilities within the workforce through tailored training and development programs.
3.  Technology Integration:
•   Implement integrated technological solutions that enhance interoperability and efficiency across multi-company, multi-site operations.
•   Optimize the use of data, analytics, and artificial intelligence to inform decision-making and strategy.
4.  Stakeholder Management:
•   Collaborate with cross-functional teams, stakeholders, and external partners to drive the technology and transformation agenda.
•   Ensure that technology initiatives align with the organizational culture, values, and objectives.
5.  Risk Management:
•   Identify, assess, and mitigate risks associated with technology and digital transformation initiatives.
•   Ensure compliance with industry regulations, standards, and best practices.
 

  • Job Identification:             8819
  • Posting Date :               12/25/2023, 11:49 AM
  • Apply Before:                01/08/2024, 11:48 AM
  • Degree Level:                Master’s Degree
  • Job Schedule:                Full time
  • Location:                  BERBERA, Sahil Region, Somaliland

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Early Childhood Education Program in Somaliland

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Policy and Research Contributions from Pharo Foundation

Pharo Foundation’s Somaliland Early Childhood Education (ECE) Program hhas been a transformative force in shaping Somaliland’s education landscape, well beyond the mere provision of its teaching, into ECE policy and research. Pharo Foundation started the first-ever ECE centers in Somaliland public schools in 2016, allowing children from poor and middle-income families to access quality ECE. We now run 18 ECEs across the country, which cater to more than 1,000 children. Yet from a policy standpoint, we have also co-created the Somaliland National ECE Curriculum with the Ministry of Education, ensuring that all ECE centers follow the same standards and guidelines. From a global research point of view, we are also contributing to the production of global knowledge on ECEs, through the data we collect, as we have conducted the first study in Somaliland that provides evidence of the positive impact of ECE on Somaliland children.

Somaliland is a region that faces poverty and a lack of early childhood education opportunities for many children. Private kindergartens are too expensive for most families, and public schools do not have enough ECE centers. Our Early Childhood Education Program aims to address this gap by partnering with public schools and establishing ECE centers within them. However, the national diffusion of this approach to early years learning was always the ultimate aspiration for us. Hence as part of our mission to support early childhood education (ECE) in Somaliland, we have been working closely with the Ministry of Education and Sciences (Mo&ES) to develop a national ECE curriculum. Our collaboration started in 2015 when we funded the Horn Youth Services Foundation to create a provisional ECE curriculum. Pharo Foundation also trained the first cohort of 28 ECE teachers, who were ready to educate and nurture young Somali children. In 2022, we partnered with the Mo&ES to finalize the national ECE curriculum, which was written in English and made available for all ECE providers. In 2023, we translated the curriculum into Somali. We have been on the front lines of providing early childhood education to children across Somaliland as it is essential for their development and academic success.

Meanwhile, existing research has shown that ECEs can have a lasting impact on children’s educational and social outcomes, particularly children who come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. One such study is the High/Scope Perry Preschool Study.  This study is a “scientific experiment that has identified both the short- and long-term effects of a high-quality preschool education program for young children living in poverty.”

The High/Scope study followed 123 low-income African American children from ages 3 to 40. Half of the children received early education which was based on the High/Scope curriculum while the other half did not receive any preschool education.

Following the children, until they were 40, the study collected data on the effects early education had on their lives outcomes such as educational status, income, health and even on their behaviours.

The study found that “The program group significantly outperformed the non-program group on highest level of schooling completed,” and that more program groups were economically performing better.

The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study provides strong evidence on the importance of early education and its everlasting impact. The study concludes that “high-quality preschool programs for young children living in poverty contribute to their intellectual and social development in childhood and their school success, [and] economic performance.”

However, there has been no evidence of the importance of early education in Somaliland. Hence Pharo Foundation decided to carry out a quasi-experimental study to measure the impact and effectiveness of our Early Childhood Education Program in Berbera, Somaliland. The study used the International Development Educational Learning Assessment (IDELA), a standardized tool that measures the outcomes of a child’s learning and development in the areas of emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, social-emotional development, and executive functions.

In this experiment, 85 students in a control group were compared with 80 students in the treatment group, measuring their IDELA scores at the beginning and end of the program. The results showed that the treatment group had scored higher in tests. Relative to the comparison group, enrolled children demonstrated a 15 p.p. increase in average scores (equivalent to a standard deviation), with the largest gains occurring along the emergent literacy dimension. Although this effect is derived from a small sample in a single school (in its first year of operation), its magnitude is larger than those documented in much of the education research literature. We expect to release a detailed summary of findings in 2024.

YEMEN | America’s New Threat?

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While largely neglected for the past decade, the situation in Yemen and the Red Sea has suddenly received considerable attention. But while Houthi attacks pose a danger to international trade, tackling that problem threatens to reignite the war in Yemen, thus making the world’s worst humanitarian crisis even worse. So, what should be done about the situation? Is it really such a threat? And should other Red Sea and Aran states be getting involved?

In December 2023, the United States announced the creation of a new naval task force in the Red Sea: Operation Prosperity Guardian. This will tackle the rising threat posed to shipping by the Iranian-backed Houthi Movement based in Yemen. However, the mission faces many challenges. Quite apart from limited international support, there is a danger that it could undermine efforts to resolve the civil war in Yemen. In addition, it could destabilize relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have been recently improving. So, what exactly is the threat all about?

Yemen is one of the most war-torn countries in the world. Having emerged as two separate countries, the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), they merged in May 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen. For many years, this was ruled by Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, in 2012, he was forced to resign after mass protests erupted as part of the Arab Spring. This sparked a brutal civil war as the northern-based Houthi Movement seized power in much of the country. This, in turn, led to a Saudi Arabia intervention. But since 2022, the level of fighting has dropped significantly, and there are hopes that a peace agreement may be found. And it’s this that is causing so much concern. Many fear that the new US-led naval mission, Operation Prosperity Guardian, while crucial for protecting the international economy, may upset the delicate search for peace, plunge Yemen back into conflict, and re-ignite Saudi and Iranian tensions – thus aggravating the situation in the broader Middle East.

Somaliland President Reshuffles Again His Cabinet Members

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On Sunday, December 10, Somaliland’s president – H.E. Musa Bihi Abdi – announced significant cabinet changes with the goal of improving his performance as a president. It is anticipated that this reshuffle will happen right away.

President Bihi removed a minister and a deputy minister from their positions – Abdinasir Omar Jama, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and Abdirahman Hersi Jama Dhooble, the former Minister of Youth and Sports – in a presidential decree that was released today.

“Having been aware that the privilege to serve the nation is in turns and always got entrusted with the capable, I hereby announce your removal from your cabinet posts as the Minister of Youth and Sports and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, respectively,” the presidential decree read while thanking them for their services and dedication during their tenure.

Along with this reshuffle, the president also named a new minister and deputy ministers who will start serving right away.

The president appointed the following officials in accordance with Article 90 of the Republic of Somaliland Constitution, after taking into consideration their knowledge, skills, and experience, as well as basis on consultations from others and recommendations received that they can handle their responsibilities diligently,” the presidential degree further added.

As of right now, Abdirisak Musa Farah Awad is the Minister of Youth and Sports.
Roda Jama Elmi, the current deputy minister of the ministry of financial development, will assume a new position as the deputy minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation
With effect from today, Saleban Jama Diriye will serve as the Ministry of Financial Development’s deputy minister.

Significant changes were made to the cabinet by Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi in November 2023. He removed four ministers and appointed five new ones, hoping this would improve the government’s performance and the public’s complaints over corruption and economic stagnation.

The piece was first published on SII

Dire Warning Ignored by President Bihi on Weapons Embargo on Somalia

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On September 2019, Mr. Mahmoud Adam Jama “Galaal’, current Spokesperson for Waddani opposition party and former Deputy Minister of Health who also served as Somaliland’s Ambassador to the UK and Ethiopia, sent below message to the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi on the Somalia’s weapon’s embargo and its annual review by the United Nation’s Security Council and its implication for Somaliland and the whole region. The United Nations Security Council has lifted the weapons embargo on Somalia and Somaliland has since condemned and protested the action. Below is the message from Ambassador Galaal in verbatim.


To: H.E Muse Bihi Abdi - President of the RSL

From: Mahmoud Adam Jama “Galaal’
Subject: Arms Embargo on Somalia
Date: 28 September 2019
Summary of background – Arms Embargo on Somalia

Security Council Resolution 733 first established the arms embargo on Somalia in 1992. Since the partial lifting of the embargo in 2013 there has been more than 20,000 weapons and 75 million rounds of ammunition delivered to Somalia and donated by a number of states including China, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti amongst others. A sizeable number of these weapons have found their way to Al Shabab and arms dealers in Puntland, Yemen, and Mogadishu as a result of non-compliance with the United Nations sanctions on arms to Somalia. There is a United Nations Somalia Sanctions Committee which is supported by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and a Panel of Experts (PoE) mandated under various resolutions including 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012), 2093 (2013) and 2182 (2014) and 2444 (2018). The mandate is to monitor and ensure compliance. 

Concerns on current situation Corruption and a lack of accountability continue to undermine the arms embargo and consequently security and stability of the region. It is important to highlight that whilst international financial institutions have praised the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for implementing financial reforms, between 2017 and 2018, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia expressed serious concerns with regard to corruption and misappropriation. This included specific allegations against some ministries as well of misuse of funds in the Benadir regional administration. In addition, the UN Monitoring Group of Somalia found a lack of transparency regarding Federal Government contracts and there have been reports of significant off-budget income and expenditure. A review found misappropriation and a lack of accountability of the Somali National Army and the security sector. 

Mr. President, the disparity between international financial institutions and the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia on issue of misappropriation and corruption should be of serious concern to the international community both in the context of the arms embargo and a wider unholy collusion between FGS and international financial institutions. Non-compliance to the arms embargo and institutional corruption create unfavourable conditions for regional security and must therefore be of grave concern to the government of the Republic of Somaliland. 

It is also very important we are able to contest allegations made by the Monitoring Group. For example, the Monitoring Group claims it had not received a response to correspondence sent to Somaliland on 6 September 2018, requesting confirmation of the circumstances of the alleged torture and execution of the four detainees from Puntland (Tukaraq conflict) and details of the steps taken, if any, to investigate these allegations. 

The Monitoring Group further claims to have sent the government of the Republic of Somaliland correspondence on 2 February 2018, stating the establishment of a foreign military base in Berbera would constitute a violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, and that any support to Somaliland’s security sector would require the notification of and approval by the Committee, in accordance to the UN Security Council resolutions, specifically paragraph 11 (a) of Security Council resolution 2111 (2013). The Monitoring Group further claims Somaliland has not responded to the correspondence.

Conclusion and recommendation 

Mr. President, | hope you will agree that it’s essential we formulate a clear policy on the United Nations Arms Embargo and a strategy to influence and engage with the UN Sanctions Committee. Whilst the arms embargo is the principal aim of the Monitoring Group’s reporting, there are often detailed regional political, economic and security related information and analysis, which includes the Republic of Somaliland, contained in their reports. 

The arms embargo does not differentiate the Republic of Somaliland from the Federal Government of Somalia. It is therefore imperative we observe and scrutinise the work of the Monitoring Group so we may be in a position to provide robust written challenges to incorrect, inaccurate and unfavourable findings of its interim reports in order to ensure our position and views are represented in the final reports to the UN Security Council. We should also use political, diplomatic, and public relations opportunities to augment our written submissions for maximum impact. 

Mr. President, | would like to discuss the above matters with you in detail, however the most urgent and pressing at this time is we formulate a comprehensive submission document which clearly articulates our staunch opposition to the easing of the arms embargo when the matter is reviewed on 15 November 2019.  

Breaking – Somaliland Government and High-Level Chinese Delegation Held Talks in Hargeisa

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A Chinese government delegation visited Hargeisa last week and engaged in confidential discussions with Somaliland government officials. The composition of the Chinese delegation and the content of the discussion with the government of Somaliland has not been disclosed.

The Republic of Somaliland and the People’s Republic of China clashed from the outset when, on September 9, 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland formed bilateral ties, staunchly rejecting Chinese attempts to alter their decision concerning Taiwan.

The circumstances surrounding the latest contact between China and Somaliland, the nature of their talks, and whether Somaliland has reconsidered its alliance with Taiwan remain unclear. Interestingly, this meeting followed the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Essa Kayd’s recent visit to the United States, where he engaged with various U.S. government officials from State, Defense, and other departments. It is uncertain if the Chinese delegation’s visit and Minister Kayd’s U.S. trip are related.

Although Somaliland’s decision to form bilateral ties with Taiwan was lauded by US government including the White House Security Council and members at the time, Department of State’s and particularly the Bureau of African Affairs’ attitude towards Somaliland remained lukewarm at best. Multiple visit by the United States Africa Command to Somaliland and particularly Berbera have raised the specter of US base and military presence in Somaliland.

It is unknown if the President of the Republic of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi met with the Chinese delegation in Hargeisa, and the potential rapprochement between China and Somaliland raises questions about the future of Somaliland’s ties with Taiwan. What is evident, however, is that if China succeeds in swaying Somaliland away from its West-ward alignment, it will mark a significant diplomatic victory, strengthening China’s position in the Red Sea and ensures success of its Belt and Road Initiative and potentially impacting the U.S.’s aspirations for a military base in Berbera.

In a significant foreign policy address in November 2021, Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro,” the Chairman of Waddani, Somaliland’s main opposition party and Presidential candidate, voiced strong criticism of President Bihi’s government. The focal point of Cirro’s critique was the government’s decision to align with Taiwan instead of China. He advocated for a reassessment of diplomatic ties, emphasizing the need for a more positive relationship with the People’s Republic of China.

Despite inquiries, officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the President’s office, Taiwan’s Representative Office in Somaliland, and China’s Embassy in Somalia have not responded to questions about the Chinese delegation’s visit to Hargeisa, the nature of the talks, and whether Somaliland intends to maintain bilateral ties with both China and Taiwan. The lack of clarity surrounding these developments underscores their sensitivity and strategic importance.

Somaliland: Berbera city’s growth is being held back by a power supply monopoly

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Nasir M. Ali, University of Hargeisa; Ayan Yusuf Ali, University of Hargeisa, and Jutta Bakonyi, Durham University

Somaliland’s main port, at the city of Berbera, accounted for two-thirds of the country’s revenues in 2020. Over the years, these revenues have mostly gone into the central state coffers, while the development of Berbera has been neglected.

When we visited the city for our research project on port infrastructure, international politics, and everyday life, this neglect was immediately visible. Buildings in the city centre were abandoned and dilapidated. Physical and social infrastructure – ranging from roads, water and electricity to health and schooling – were lacking.

Berbera port consumes a lot of energy while most city dwellers lack affordable electricity. ED RAM/AFP via Getty Images

Infrastructure development carries modernity’s promise of progress and development. But it relies on affordable and reliable energy. That is what is lacking for most of Somaliland’s residents. The electricity access rate is estimated at 15%. Eighty percent of the population use biomass fuel, mostly charcoal and firewood, to fulfil their daily energy needs.

The Somaliland government has mainly left the energy market to its own devices. Lack of regulation, and collaboration between the government and private businesses have spawned a monopoly of energy provision in Berbera. This in turn makes electricity unaffordable for most residents.

The uneven development of Berbera city manifests in the contrast between the large amounts of energy consumed by the port and the lack of affordable electricity for most urban dwellers. These inequalities challenge the expectation that Somaliland’s further integration into the globalised chains of production and consumption – through its modern port – will greatly benefit its citizens.

Berbera and other cities in Somaliland need policies that ensure energy becomes affordable for the urban poor. Without such policies, the gap between the rich and the poor is likely to widen further, with access to energy being but one of the indicators of this inequality.

Berbera port and development

The neglect of Berbera city stands in stark contrast to the modern technologies and equipment at its port. Since 2017 the port has been managed by the Dubai-based logistics giant DP World. The company brought in new transport technologies and modernised the port’s infrastructure to handle containerised trade.

A special economic zone has been established to attract investors. And a transport corridor that links the port with Ethiopia is nearly complete.

A DP World representative explained to us that the port had established its own energy source to meet the huge power demands of the new container terminal. Sudden energy cuts and blackouts would risk damaging the new technologies and undermine the port’s ability to become a global trade hub.

Somaliland’s government acknowledges the lack of reliable energy provision as a major constraint to development. The government plans to ensure that all citizens have access to affordable energy from local and renewable sources by 2030.

This goal is ambitious. Electricity across Somaliland is privatised and relies on fossil fuel, mainly diesel, which is imported from the Arabian peninsula. Energy is, therefore, costly and unsustainable. Somaliland has one of the world’s highest energy prices punctuated with frequent and often long-lasting power cuts.

So far, only limited investments have been made into the generation of clean energy, among them a solar mini grid in Berbera, funded by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development.

The privatisation of energy

Somaliland withdrew from Somalia in May 1991, after more than two years of civil war. When the country started to build its state apparatus, the private sector was already flourishing. The state relied, to a large extent, on financial support from private businesses. It therefore adopted a policy of minimal government involvement in the economy.

The energy sector, for example, started with private business people who initially used generators for their own consumption. The businesses eventually provided their neighbourhoods with excess energy. Some of these small scale, informal businesses grew into large enterprises which are providing thousands of customers with electricity today.

At least four major energy suppliers are competing for customers in Somaliland’s capital city, Hargeisa.

But in contrast, the market in Berbera is dominated by the Berbera Power House, a private company that has established a monopoly position in the city. With no competition, prices are up, and only the wealthy people can afford electricity in Berbera city.

Mini grid solar power plant

The concession for DP World was accompanied by expectations of closer cooperation between Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, for example, provides financial and technical support for the transport corridor from Berbera to Ethiopia. It has also initiated social projects for the urban poor in Berbera, like building schools and providing green and affordable energy. It financed a 7MW solar power plant which was inaugurated in January 2021.

This was considered a significant step towards providing energy to poorer households and reducing Somaliland’s dependence on fossil fuels.

But immediately after the launch of the project, the Somaliland Ministry of Mines and Energy handed over the solar facility to Berbera Power House. The move further entrenched the company’s electricity monopoly in the city.

During the inauguration of the mini grid solar power plant, the finance minister proposed that electricity prices in Berbera would be reduced to US$0.1 per unit compared to US$0.6 per unit before the investment.

The interviews that we conducted with Berbera city residents in February and March 2023 revealed that electricity prices had not come down. We also found that the reliability of energy services had not improved.

It seems that the company lacks incentives and pressure from the government to improve its services and cut down energy prices. The company refused our requests for interviews.

Currently, a number of international organisations are exploring the potential for green energy in Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa. These initiatives primarily aim to overcome environmental limits of the globally rising energy demand. Whether they will eventually benefit the population depend, among others, on how they are regulated and governed.

Abdiqadir A. Ismail, a researcher at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Hargeisa, contributed to this article.

Nasir M. Ali, Lecturer of Political Science and International Relations, University of Hargeisa; Ayan Yusuf Ali, Research Manager at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Hargeisa, and Jutta Bakonyi, Professor in Development and Conflict, Durham University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.