Investigative Reports

Inside Somalia’s Visa-for-Sale Cartel — Meet Somalia’s Human Smuggler MP

How Ayub Ismail Yusuf and a network of parliamentarians...

From Controversy to Cornerstone: DP World’s Lesson for Egal Airport

Many got DP World's Berbera deal wrong, but Berbera...

Another Fake Degree Scandal Rocks Somaliland Presidency: Director General Caught With Diploma Mill “Masters”

Repeat of 2022 Central Bank Fraud Scandal Exposes Somaliland...
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National Election Commission Announced Nine-Month Delay of Presidential Elections

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In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.

The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office. 

The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners

The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.

President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.

Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.

The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.

Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.

Dishonest Broker – Why Turkey Will Not Run Somaliland – Somalia Talks

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On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.

In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.

Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi

Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.

The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.

Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa

It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.

According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.

Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.

To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.

President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed

Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?

Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.

Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?

Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.

Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?

Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.

As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:


Turkey in Somalia

Security Influence

Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.

The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.

Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.

The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.

Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.

While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.

According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.

Economic Influence

Since September 21, 2014 Albayrak Group has been operating the Mogadishu Port on a 20 year concession where the company takes 45% of all revenues from the port.

Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.

Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.

Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.

Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.

Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport

Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.

Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.

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Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.

According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.

Despite the obvious economic gains Turkey is making in Somalia, it is gearing up to do even more business in that war-torn country.

Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.

Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.

One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.

Turkey in Somaliland

The most visible contribution of Turkey to Somaliland is a recent 216 medical machines donated by TIKA, the Turkish aid agency to Hargeisa Group Hospital.

Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.

There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.

One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.

No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.

Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.

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President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem

The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.

Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.

Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.

Somaliland Is a Recognized Country. It is Time to Act Like One.

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Recognition demands reciprocity. That means expelling Turkey, regulating banks, and ending corruption.

History remembers bold moments: Anwar Sadat’s 1977 flight to Jerusalem. Nixon’s opening to China. De Klerk releasing Mandela. These weren’t just diplomatic breakthroughs—they were paradigm shifts that changed what seemed possible.

President Abdirahman “Irro” Mohamed Abdullahi just delivered Somaliland’s defining moment.

When he disappeared into Dubai and Tel Aviv for an extended overseas trip marked by complete radio silence, the nation wondered. Last month, when he returned with Israel’s historic recognition of the Republic of Somaliland, it became clear what the silence had been for. In our December 28 editorial, “The Quiet Diplomat Delivers for Somaliland,” we offered a mea culpa for questioning what turned out to be the most important diplomatic mission in Somaliland’s history.

We were right. But we were also only half right.

The bold gesture secured recognition and made the Republic of Somaliland the most strategic country in the region. What comes next determines whether recognition becomes statehood.

Recognition Is Leverage—But Only If Used

Israel’s recognition validates three decades of democratic governance and regional stability. It proves the impossible is merely difficult. But recognition alone builds nothing. It opens a door—Somaliland must walk through it.

The public deserves euphoria. After thirty-four years, they’ve earned the right to celebrate. But while flags wave in the streets, someone must be sweating in government offices—planning how to transform a diplomatic breakthrough into institutional reform, how to convert recognition into leverage, how to dismantle the architecture of dependency that served Somaliland as an unrecognized entity but will cripple it as a recognized state.

More recognition is coming. The dominoes are lined up. The question isn’t whether additional countries will follow Israel’s lead. The question is whether Somaliland will be ready when they do.

Recognition Is Binary, Not Cumulative

Let’s address the inevitable deflection: “It’s only Israel.”

Only?

Israel is a nuclear power. A top-15 global economy. The technological backbone of American defense systems. The state that turned desert into agricultural innovation, isolation into diplomatic leverage, and existential threats into strategic dominance.

Some countries are recognized by 100+ states and remain irrelevant. Others are recognized by a handful and reshape regions. Kosovo has roughly 100 recognitions and no UN seat. Palestine has 140+ and remains contested. Taiwan has fewer than 15 and manufactures the semiconductors that power the world.

Taiwan is the model not just because of its economy, but because it weaponized its indispensability. The world cannot function without Taiwanese chips, so the world ensures Taiwan survives. Somaliland must become equally indispensable to Red Sea security.

Recognition is not a headcount. It’s a threshold. And Israel—with its intelligence apparatus, its military-industrial integration, its diplomatic reach across Washington, Brussels, and beyond—is not “only” anything.

At the UN Security Council emergency session convened to condemn Somaliland’s recognition, US Deputy Ambassador Tammy Bruce cut through the hypocrisy: “Earlier this year, several countries, including members of this Council, made a unilateral decision to recognise a non-existent Palestinian state, and yet no emergency meeting was called to express this Council’s outrage.”

Israel’s Deputy UN Ambassador Jonathan Miller was equally direct: “Some countries are allowed to recognize a state that does not exist. Israel, by contrast, is denied the right to recognize a very real state.”

The Republic of Somaliland is no longer an unrecognized country. That status is binary, not cumulative. One serious recognition beats fifty symbolic ones. And Israel is nothing if not serious.

Readiness requires confronting three uncomfortable truths about how Somaliland has operated for three decades—and making decisions that will anger every entrenched interest that benefits from the status quo.

First Truth: Reciprocity Is Non-Negotiable

Somaliland is now a recognized country. It must behave like one.

Djibouti’s decision to close its Hargeisa office immediately after Israeli recognition was not an insult—it was honesty. Djibouti doesn’t recognize Somaliland, so it removed itself to continue its other subversion activities in the open. Clean. Clear. Reciprocal.

Now consider the others: The “UK Office in Hargeisa”—subsidiary of their Mogadishu embassy. The “Turkish Consulate in Hargeisa.” And many others. Diplomatic facades that maintain presence without granting recognition.

Turkey requires immediate attention.

Last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan gave a revealing interview to TRT Haber in which he openly celebrated Turkey’s multi-year campaign to prevent Somaliland’s international recognition. This wasn’t a leak. This wasn’t speculation. This was the Turkish Foreign Minister publicly boasting about blocking Somaliland recognition as a diplomatic achievement.

His exact words: “We have negotiated extensively with the West and made a serious effort to prevent any other country from recognizing [Somaliland]. Thankfully, none of the countries that were initially expected to recognize the entity did so.”

Fidan went further. He revealed that Turkey killed what he called the “Somaliland project” two years ago—preventing Ethiopia from recognizing Somaliland by mediating between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. He described Turkish diplomats working “behind the scenes to lock in commitments” from fence-sitting countries, framing recognition-prevention as “high-stakes diplomatic containment” necessary for “regional survival.”

He called Israeli recognition “the gravest setback” Somaliland could face and described it as “serious humiliation” and “punishment” for a Muslim society.

Now here’s the punchline: Turkey said all of this while operating a consulate in Hargeisa.

Think about that. Turkey maintains diplomatic presence on Somaliland soil—enjoying Somaliland’s stability, benefiting from Somaliland’s security, accessing Somaliland’s territory—while simultaneously:

  • Lobbying Western capitals to deny Somaliland recognition
  • Boasting about successfully preventing recognition “two years ago”
  • Describing recognition-prevention as a matter of “regional survival”
  • Calling Israeli recognition a form of “punishment” and “humiliation”

This is not diplomacy. This is hostile intelligence operations disguised as consular services. Turkey’s “consulate” exists to monitor Somaliland, influence Somaliland’s politics, and undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty—all while denying Somaliland the very legitimacy that consular presence implies.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must act. Issue a clear directive: any foreign mission in Hargeisa not accredited to the Republic of Somaliland has 72 hours to regularize their status or be declared persona non grata. Turkey has publicly declared itself hostile to Somaliland’s recognition. They’ve admitted to actively working against Somaliland’s sovereignty. They’ve celebrated blocking recognition as a diplomatic victory.

Why would Somaliland allow a foreign power that views its recognition as an existential threat to maintain operations on its territory?

Your business is 800 kilometers south, Minister Fidan. Pack your bags.

Somaliland tolerated this because unrecognized entities take what they can get. But that calculus just changed.

Recognized countries operate on reciprocity. You want an embassy in Hargeisa? Recognize Somaliland and we’ll open one in your capital. You want intelligence sharing, security cooperation, trade agreements? Excellent—let’s negotiate nation-to-nation, not patron-to-client.

Countries maintaining “offices” in Hargeisa while operating embassies in Mogadishu face an uncomfortable legal reality: they’re in the wrong country.

Their diplomatic credentials come from Somalia. Their immunity—if it exists—is granted by a government with no jurisdiction in Somaliland. They are foreign nationals conducting activities in a recognized sovereign state without accreditation from that state.

The implications are severe. No diplomatic immunity. No Vienna Convention protections. No special status under international law. Just foreign nationals operating without authorization on sovereign territory.

Want to operate here? Recognize Somaliland and obtain proper accreditation from Hargeisa. Don’t want to recognize? Your business is 800 kilometers south.

The diplomatic fiction they’ve enjoyed for three decades ended with Israeli recognition. Time to pick: accreditation or departure.

Every foreign office that refuses recognition while maintaining operations sends a message to potential recognizing states: “We don’t actually believe Somaliland is a country—we’re just here for access.” That undermines legitimacy with every nation calculating whether to follow Israel’s lead.

The era of diplomatic ambiguity is over. Recognize us, or leave. The status quo is no longer acceptable.

Second Truth: Developmental Colonialism Must End

The UN and its agencies have captured Somaliland’s government institutions—and they operate under the fiction that Somaliland is “Somalia.”

Walk into the Ministry of Education. The de facto authority isn’t the minister—it’s UNICEF. Health policy? WHO Somalia. Agriculture? FAO Somalia. They all brand themselves as operating in “Somalia,” coordinating through Mogadishu, treating Somaliland as a regional field office.

The results speak for themselves: dry pit latrines emblazoned with a dozen NGO logos. World Handwashing Day celebrations while schools crumble. Workshops on “capacity building” that build nothing but PowerPoint presentations. Meanwhile, the underlying systems remain weak, dependent, and incapable of functioning without external life support.

This is not development. This is developmental colonialism—foreign agencies making decisions, setting priorities, controlling budgets while Somaliland’s institutions become bureaucratic appendages incapable of functioning independently.

The “Somaliland Special Arrangement”

The World Bank and EU operate through what’s formally known as the “Somaliland Special Arrangement”: funds allocated to Mogadishu, a fraction earmarked for Somaliland, disbursement controlled by Somalia’s federal government.

Somaliland gets scraps. Somalia gets control.

For years, projects like the “Somali Electricity Sector Recovery Project” operated in Hargeisa under Somalia branding. Somaliland would swap “Somali” for “Somaliland” on local signs—same funding, same Mogadishu coordination, different billboard.

The same cringe-worthy gymnastics applied to foreign diplomats. Ambassadors to Somalia would arrive in Hargeisa, and Somaliland would quietly omit “Somalia” from their titles for local consumption. A face-saving exercise that fooled no one but avoided the contradiction.

Thank God that practice has largely stopped. But the World Bank and EU? Still playing pretend through the Special Arrangement.

The EU maintains significant presence here while actively opposing Israeli recognition. If the EU doesn’t recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty—and opposes those who do—what exactly is it doing here?

The answer: renegotiate or withdraw. Somaliland should demand direct bilateral programming outside Mogadishu frameworks, Somaliland-branded projects with Somaliland-controlled implementation, 24-month transition timelines for all “Special Arrangement” structures, and recognition of sovereignty as prerequisite for continued operations.

Will this be painful? Yes. Will donors complain? Loudly.

But here’s the secret the development industry doesn’t want you to know: Nations are not built by NGOs and UN agencies. The proof? Taiwan. Taiwan was isolated, unrecognized, left to fend for itself—and it built world-class institutions, a thriving economy, and a technological sector that manufactures the chips powering half the world’s electronics.

Somaliland has spent thirty-three years praised for “managing its affairs” while simultaneously having those affairs managed for it by foreign agencies that don’t recognize its existence.

The training wheels must come off.

Third Truth: Institutional Rot Will Kill Recognition’s Promise

Somaliland’s internal house is catastrophically disordered. The international community praised Somaliland’s governance compared to regional chaos, but the bar was so low it’s practically subterranean. Israeli recognition changes the equation—Somaliland now faces standards of statehood, not the patronizing soft bigotry of low expectations.

Those standards reveal uncomfortable realities.

The Corruption Cartel

As previously documented by this paper: Central Bank governors with diploma mill degrees. Presidential directors general holding fake credentials. Credible allegations of rigged World Bank procurement. Ministry budgets routed through private accounts with minimal oversight.

This is not incompetence. This is greed on wheels—public officials whose primary focus is ensuring they get their fill before they’re sacked. Two houses. A few SUVs. Perhaps a villa in Turkey. That’s the endgame. Not national development. Not institutional capacity building. Personal enrichment.

Here’s why this matters internationally: The United States has the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Israel—Somaliland’s newest partner—has Section 291A of the Penal Law criminalizing foreign bribery with seven-year prison terms. When Israeli and American businesses look at Somaliland and see systemic corruption, they cannot engage without legal liability.

Recognition opens doors. But those doors lead nowhere if corruption greets them on the other side.

The Extractive Bureaucracy

And it’s not just corruption. It’s the bureaucratic nightmare designed to vacuum money from the public’s pockets.

Try obtaining a business license in Somaliland. The process includes a mandatory step through the Attorney General’s office—a requirement so convoluted it almost seems the government is anti-business, intentionally placing hurdles to discourage entrepreneurship. But the unfortunate truth is simpler and more sinister: many processes are designed to ensure as many hands touch the process and assess a fee—legitimate or plain graft—to expedite things for you.

Getting a driver’s license? Nightmare. Registering a vehicle? Nightmare. Starting a business? Nightmare. Every single workflow is structured to maximize touchpoints, maximize fees, maximize opportunities for someone to demand a bribe.

This isn’t governance. This is extractive bureaucracy—a system designed not to deliver services but to extract rents.

Governments worldwide have streamlined these processes. Somaliland must do the same: digitize, simplify, eliminate corruption vectors. No serious investor tolerates systems where starting a business requires paying off half a dozen officials for paperwork stamps.

The Unregulated Financial Cartel

And then there are the business conglomerates that have grown so fat the government is indebted to them.

Let’s talk about Dahabshiil and Salama Bank—the twin pillars of Somaliland’s unregulated financial sector.

These are not banks in the traditional sense. They operate as monopolistic conglomerates that forced Islamic banking into the constitution only to charge exorbitant “halal” fees on collateralized loans. They act as the bank, the mortgage company, the builder that built the house. They’ll even finance your vehicle and your cellphone.

They’ve created digital payment systems operating in regulatory gray zones, without clear statutory oversight or independent supervision—free to move money and customer information between Somalia and Somaliland without meaningful accountability.

Let that sink in. Customer data—including financial records, transaction histories, and personal information—flows freely between Somaliland and Somalia with zero regulatory oversight.

For a nation asserting sovereignty, this is a catastrophic vulnerability. Somalia is, at best, indifferent to Somaliland’s sovereignty and, at worst, actively hostile. Allowing Somaliland’s financial data to be exfiltrated and potentially used by a hostile state is a national security disaster.

But more importantly, it makes Somaliland economically radioactive. Do you think Israeli banks will clear transactions with Dahabshiil or Salama if they cannot see who the end beneficiary is? Recognition brings Somaliland into the global financial grid—and the global grid has rules. AML/CFT compliance isn’t optional. Somaliland’s banks are currently unplayable. If we want to trade with Tel Aviv, New York, and London, the era of the unregulated hawala conglomerate must end.

This is not an indictment of individuals—it’s a regulatory failure. Somaliland has operated with extreme deregulation, abdicating governing responsibility. That must end.

Required reforms: AML/CFT compliance frameworks, data localization mandating Somaliland-only storage, independent financial sector supervision, and consumer protection against predatory practices.

Will this anger powerful business interests? Absolutely. Will Dahabshiil and Salama Bank push back? Guaranteed. But here’s the reality: recognized countries regulate their financial sectors. Countries that let foreign companies and local cartels operate without constraint remain perpetually vulnerable.

The Talent Hemorrhage

Somaliland has extraordinary human capital—diaspora professionals and domestic NGO veterans who manage complex donor-funded programs, coordinate multi-stakeholder initiatives, execute procurement processes, and deliver measurable development outcomes for foreign agencies.

These are people who have learned to navigate bureaucracies, manage budgets, implement programs, and deliver results. They’ve done it for UNICEF, for the World Bank, for Save the Children. They’ve built skills and expertise that Somaliland desperately needs.

It’s time to repurpose these professionals to work for God and country.

But let’s be clear: not all NGO experience is created equal. Some professionals need a metaphorical reeducation camp—meaning a hard reset away from jargon and toward measurable outcomes. “Monitoring and Evaluation” and “Cross-Cutting” vernaculars alone won’t cut it. The government must demand results, not jargon. Get a low performance rating in your own evaluation? You’ll be looking for work somewhere else.

The goal is to make public service so attractive that it becomes the place where talent wants to come. Competitive salaries. Merit-based advancement. Real responsibility. Meaningful work.

Stop building someone else’s portfolio. Start building Somaliland’s institutions. Stop implementing projects designed in New York or Geneva. Start designing policies for Hargeisa, Borama, Burao, and Erigavo—for Somaliland.

But here’s the problem: Why would competent people—diaspora or domestic—want to work for a government defined by patronage rather than performance? Why would a talented professional leave a well-paying NGO job to join a ministry where competence is secondary to clan affiliation? Where the best ideas die in bureaucratic limbo while the worst ideas flourish under political protection? Where corruption is rewarded and integrity is punished?

The Bloated Apparatus

Credible reports and internal audits suggest Somaliland’s 18,000-person civil service suffers from widespread ghost workers and absenteeism, with a substantial portion of payroll supporting non-performers. This isn’t governance—it’s patronage masquerading as administration.

President Irro must act decisively: eliminate ghost positions, slash non-performers, redirect Somaliland’s limited budget toward development rather than subsidizing political debts.

Brutal? Yes. Necessary? Absolutely. The alternative is institutional bankruptcy—not just financial, but institutional. A government that cannot afford to pay competent people competitive salaries because it’s subsidizing an army of non-performers is a government destined to fail.

The Herculean Task

None of this rot is President Irro’s creation. The corruption, bloated bureaucracy, extractive systems, financial cartels, UN dependency—all predate his presidency. These are institutional failures calcified over three decades into accepted practice, becoming the infrastructure of governance itself.

President Irro showed iron resolve securing Israeli recognition—doing what predecessors couldn’t or wouldn’t. He took the risk. He delivered the result.

But cleaning house is a far more monumental and Herculean task than securing recognition. Recognition required secrecy, diplomacy, and strategic patience. Reform requires something harder: sustained political courage under relentless scrutiny.

It means making enemies of powerful people. Breaking patronage networks that span clans and families. Telling hard truths to allies who expect favors. Regulatory confrontation with business interests that can mobilize resources against reform.

He cannot do it alone. President Irro needs the right team—not the politically convenient team, not the clan-balancing team, but the competent team. Professionals who will implement painful reforms, resist regulatory capture, prioritize national development over personal gain.

The defining questions of his presidency are whether he can demand reciprocity from partners treating Somaliland as convenient fiction, whether he can renegotiate UN mandates and World Bank arrangements requiring recognition as the price of operation, whether he can regulate the financial sector with international AML/CFT standards against the will of powerful oligarchs, whether he can dismantle extractive bureaucracy, whether he can build a merit-based civil service, and whether he can transform Somaliland from aid-dependent entity into recognized nation prepared for equal partnership.

These questions determine whether he’s remembered as the president who secured recognition—or the president who made recognition matter.

This Is Mobilization, Not Celebration

President Irro delivered what was thought unattainable. He made his people proud. He gave Somaliland something its detractors said would never come: proof that perseverance matters, that democracy counts, that a small nation with the courage of giants can bend the arc of history.

But history doesn’t stop bending just because you’ve moved it once.

The quiet diplomat won the war. Now Somaliland must win the peace through uncomfortable, disruptive, necessary choices.

Tell diplomatic partners: recognize us, or leave. Tell the UN, World Bank, EU: we govern ourselves now—partnership requires recognizing that sovereignty. Tell financial conglomerates: international regulatory standards apply, or operations cease. Tell civil servants: perform, or vacate positions for those who will. Tell political allies: competence precedes loyalty.

These decisions separate nations from aspirations. More recognition is coming—but Somaliland must deserve it, not just celebrate it.

Sun Tzu wrote: “Every battle is won before it is fought.” Somaliland won first. The war—the real war, the war of implementation, execution, and nation-building—begins now.

And unlike recognition—secured in silence—this war cannot be fought in silence or secured through secrecy. This war requires all of us.

The hard work begins now. And it begins with honesty: Somaliland has been running itself like a well-meaning refugee camp managed by foreign do-gooders and sustained by patronage, corruption, and unregulated cartels. That ends today.

Recognition is not the reward. It is the responsibility.

Let’s get to work.


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Israeli Foreign Minister Makes Historic Visit to Somaliland

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HARGEISA, SOMALILAND — Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar concluded a historic visit to Hargeisa on Tuesday, becoming the first foreign minister to visit Somaliland since the Republic regained its independence in 1991. Sa’ar’s delegation was received at the Presidential Palace by President Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro,” following Israel’s formal recognition of the Republic of Somaliland on December 26—a decision that has reshaped diplomatic calculations across the Horn of Africa.

Security across the capital was visibly heightened throughout the visit, with access restricted around key government installations.

In his remarks, President Abdirahman Irro thanked the government and people of Israel for the courageous decision to recognize the Republic of Somaliland, describing it as having profound diplomatic, economic, and developmental impact on the Republic of Somaliland, the Horn of Africa region, and the world. The President emphasized that today marks a significant day for Somaliland, noting that Israel’s recognition strengthens Somaliland’s role in maintaining peace, stability, democracy, and freedom of expression.

Foreign Minister Sa’ar affirmed that Israel’s recognition is based on the right of self-determination of the Somaliland people and the interests of long-term security and stability in the Horn of Africa. He praised Somaliland’s functioning democracy, internal peace and security, and its role in regional stability. Sa’ar stated clearly that Israel recognized Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and again on December 26, 2025, and will continue to stand with the Republic of Somaliland in the future.

Topics discussed included the opening of embassies in Hargeisa and Jerusalem, preparations for Dr. Irro’s official visit to Israel, and cooperation in investment, trade, technology, energy, water, minerals, agriculture, and economic infrastructure development. Representatives from MASHAV—Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation—were part of Minister Sa’ar’s delegation.

Although not explicitly discussed during the visit, the security and defense dimensions of the partnership carry profound implications. Israel’s expertise in counterterrorism, intelligence gathering, and maritime security aligns directly with Somaliland’s strategic imperatives in a region facing piracy and extremist threats. Somaliland’s coastline offers critical positioning for Red Sea monitoring, while Israeli capabilities in surveillance, cybersecurity, and border control could significantly enhance Somaliland’s defensive posture. The potential for intelligence sharing and maritime coordination represents a strategic asset for regional stability.

Recognition That Broke the Mold

Israel’s recognition landed with unusual force, stunning regional capitals while igniting public celebrations across Somaliland. Streets in Hargeisa and Berbera filled with spontaneous rallies, as citizens marked what many view as the first irreversible breach in a three-decade wall of diplomatic denial.

While the announcement appeared sudden, it was not improvised. The agreement was finalized during a video call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Irro, but multiple indicators suggest the groundwork was laid quietly over an extended period, beyond the scrutiny of regional and multilateral forums.

Israeli media outlets traveled to Somaliland in force following the announcement, documenting the public reaction and reporting from both the capital and the strategic port city of Berbera—coverage that further underscored the moment’s significance.

During their call, Netanyahu and Dr. Irro discussed a prospective presidential visit to Israel. No date has been confirmed.

Somaliland’s Legal Case, Long Settled

Somaliland’s claim to statehood is not novel, nor is it legally ambiguous. The Republic satisfies all four criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations. South Africa has gone further, formally acknowledging that Somaliland meets these international law standards.

The obstacle to recognition has never been juridical. It has been political—rooted in the African Union’s fixation on inherited colonial borders and reinforced by the preferences of external actors invested in maintaining the fiction of Somali unity. Israel’s decision punctures that consensus by treating Somaliland not as an exception to be managed, but as a reality to be acknowledged.

Strategic Weight Beyond Symbolism

Israel’s recognition is not merely declaratory. Somaliland occupies a commanding position along the Gulf of Aden, directly facing Yemen and overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, through which a significant share of global trade transits.

For Israel, engagement with Somaliland offers strategic depth in the Red Sea basin, with clear implications for maritime security and intelligence cooperation, particularly amid persistent Houthi threats. For Somaliland, the move confers long-sought validation of its governance record and strengthens its hand in courting further recognition.

Dr. Irro concluded the meeting by assuring Minister Sa’ar that Somaliland is a reliable partner located in a strategic position important for the future peace and security of the Horn of Africa and the world.

Diplomatic Shockwaves

The fallout was immediate. Relations with Djibouti deteriorated sharply in the days following the announcement. Both governments recalled diplomatic representatives, and Somaliland authorities suspended Air Djibouti flights effective Wednesday.

Elsewhere, reaction has taken the form of studied silence. Ethiopia—Somaliland’s principal trading partner and a pivotal regional power—has issued no public statement. Kenya and the United Arab Emirates have likewise refrained from comment, prompting speculation that internal consultations are underway, particularly in Addis Ababa, where the strategic implications of recognition are impossible to ignore.

Mogadishu, by contrast, moved swiftly to externalize its objections. Somalia’s foreign minister, Abdisalam Abdi Ali, traveled to Riyadh to meet Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud. Several Saudi-linked social media accounts echoed Mogadishu’s position, though no formal Saudi government statement has followed.

Mogadishu’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning what it termed an “unauthorized incursion,” deploying language reminiscent of Beijing’s rhetoric on Taiwan, including references to Hargeisa as an “inalienable” part of Somalia. The statement, like those before it, offers no mechanism to reverse developments on the ground. Somalia, which has exercised no authority over Somaliland since 1991, continues to rely on diplomatic theater to mask that reality.

What Comes Next

Israel’s move has reopened a question long deferred by international actors: whether continued non-recognition of Somaliland remains defensible, or merely habitual. Somaliland grounds its sovereignty claim in the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which gained independence in 1960 before entering a failed union with Somalia.

Foreign Minister Sa’ar’s visit to Somaliland sends a clear signal that Israel and Somaliland are moving ahead with their historic bilateral ties.

Somaliland Embraces Bold New Foreign Policy Era, Backs US Action Against Maduro

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In a clear break from decades of studied diplomatic caution, the Republic of Somaliland has publicly aligned itself with the United States following Washington’s decisive action against Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro—signaling a new, unapologetic era in Hargeisa’s foreign policy.

In a January 4, 2026 statement, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs endorsed what it described as “calibrated international action” by the United States to restore constitutional order and democratic legitimacy in Venezuela. The statement followed the dramatic US operation in Caracas that resulted in Maduro’s capture and transfer to the United States to face criminal charges.

The declaration was neither accidental nor abstract.

Just days earlier, Venezuela’s embassy in Nairobi reaffirmed its recognition of Somalia’s “sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity,” explicitly rejecting Somaliland’s independence. That position came after Caracas opposed Israel’s historic recognition of Somaliland—placing the Maduro regime squarely among those actively working against Somaliland’s sovereignty.

Hargeisa’s response was swift and unambiguous.

Israel’s Recognition and Strategic Realignment

On December 26, 2025, Israel formally recognized Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, with the declaration signed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar. The move shattered a longstanding diplomatic stalemate and injected momentum into Somaliland’s international standing.

Netanyahu’s subsequent visit to US President Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago only heightened speculation that Washington may be reassessing its own position. With Trump’s inner circle openly supportive of Somaliland, and given the President’s close relationship with the Israeli Prime Minister, many observers expect US recognition could be forthcoming.

Reciprocity Replaces Restraint

What emerges is a deliberate shift in doctrine. Somaliland is no longer offering diplomatic goodwill to states that deny its existence. Reciprocity—long discussed, rarely applied—has become policy.

States that undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty, Hargeisa is signaling, should not expect neutrality or support in return.

Domestically, the move has been widely welcomed. For many Somalilanders, this is overdue realism: a government finally willing to reward allies, confront adversaries, and act like the state it has been for more than three decades.

After years of quiet restraint, Somaliland has chosen a side—and, more importantly, chosen itself.

Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland: Why now and what next?

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By Mohamed Abdilahi Duale

A line has been crossed, and there is no going back. On 26 December, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland, an achievement that the Horn of African nation has been waiting for since 1991. More countries are sure to follow this policy change in due course. While Somalia and certain regional actors such as Turkey and Egypt have protested against this decision, the fact remains that Somaliland’s independence is the irrepressible will of its people, and Somaliland’s entry into the community of nations states has been a long time overdue. Rather than deny this reality, the international community must begin to envision what a new regional geopolitical and security order which includes Somaliland will look like, to maximize the benefits of this decision for regional trade, economic development, maritime security and interstate peace.

As part of the declaration signed between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar of Israel and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi of Somaliland, the two sides exchanged mutual recognition and established full diplomatic relations, with Somaliland immediately joining the Abraham Accords. On the same day, both Israel and Somaliland announced plans to open embassies.  Israel perceives its recognition of Somaliland as part of a strategy towards the realization of the Abraham Accords-a set of US brokered agreements that seek to normalise relations between Israel and Muslim states.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland will undoubtedly have regional and global implications. Somaliland, formerly a British Protectorate, became independent on 26 June 1960, united with Somalia on 1 July 1960 to form the Somali Republic, and reasserted its sovereignty on 18 May 1991. Despite operating as a democratic state for three decades and meeting the criteria for statehood, and presenting arguably the best case for recognition of any unrecognized contemporary entities, Somaliland has remained unrecognised internationally. Since 1991, its primary foreign policy objective has been gaining recognition, but successive administrations have not yet achieved this goal. With Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, this longstanding goal is finally beginning to be realized, with major implications for regional and international security.

Absence of International recognition, and the Politics of state recognition by Great Powers: Somaliland’s case.

For the past three and a half decades, Somaliland has existed independently from Somalia, which has remained mired in civil war and Islamist insurgency. Notwithstanding the absence of international recognition as an independent state, Somaliland’s successive administrations have built a viable democratic and functioning country with all the trappings of a state. Somaliland also succeeded in establishing bilateral relations with many countries, including with its African neighbors such as Ethiopia and Djibouti; western powers, like the USA and UK, and Gulf states like the UAE. However, these relations can be characterized as an engagement without recognition.

Failure to recognize Somaliland in the post-1990 era was primarily due to inadequate interest in the affairs of Somaliland. This contrasts with Kosovo, East Timor, and South Sudan, which received widespread or full recognition among the international community due to political calculations on the benefits of such recognition in terms of stemming conflict and pursuing great power interests. Until recently, Somaliland had no such powerful state sponsor. This all changed in 2017, however, when the major Emirati logistics company DP World refurbished and then began operating Somaliland’s Berbera port, which is now fully integrated into the UAE’s Jebel Ali shipping network. This development was itself the recognition of a more multipolar world, in which competition between the US and China, as well as among regional powers in the Gulf, saw Somaliland emerge as a key strategic partner in politics of the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.

While these geopolitical shifts have meant greater international engagement for Somaliland, the lack of  recognition has meant that the country remains fundamentally encumbered by severe state-building and developmental constraints. Non-recognition limits Somaliland’s access to foreign investment, international development assistance and engagement with international development partners and financial institutions. It also carries a deep psychological and moral weight, by fostering feelings of isolation and decreased national morale among Somaliland’s population. Deferring recognition has also not had the desired effect of avoiding conflict between Somaliland and Somalia, with the latter using its de jure authority over Somaliland to punish it with imposed restrictions on airspace management and e-visa allocations, while stoking proxy wars in Somaliland’s eastern regions, which has taken many lives. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland now puts greater impetus on the international community to put an end to these legal ambiguities so that both the Somaliland and Somalia people can move on to a brighter future.

What does Somaliland gain from these developments?

For Somaliland, Israel’s recognition is a game-changer. Experts have argued that Somaliland’s biggest challenge to recognition is finding the first country to take the leap, after which the dam would finally break. For Israel to be that country offers certain advantages and dangers. As many Western nations, particularly in Europe, remain at a loss over how to deal with Trump’s upending of the liberal international order, Israel has responded by taking the initiative and rewriting the geopolitical playbook. In this, it has the backing of the US, which, through the Abraham Accords, aims to consolidate these changes into a new greater Middle Eastern partnership free from the destabilizing influence of Iran and its proxy forces. Through Israel, Somaliland will presumably be able to garner the diplomatic backing for recognition among other members of this alliance, including the US, while also drawing on Israel’s influence among African nations.

On a more practical level, Somaliland will capitalise Israel’s technological expertise, particularly in the fields such as agriculture, water management, and security frameworks – areas significant for Somaliland’s development and stability. Somaliland’s accession to the Abraham Accords will create a new diplomatic pathway that will allow it to enhance its economic and security cooperation acrodd the region and the globe. Opportunities for intelligence sharing and security cooperation with Israel and other Abraham Accord members can equally serve as a major asset for Somaliland in its efforts at countering and preventing threats from terrorist organizations in the region, such as Al Shabaab. At the same time, Somaliland will also likely require security guarantees from these new partners, given the opposition to Somaliland’s relationship with Israel from amongst extremist groups such as the Houthis and Al Shabaab. 

What does Israel gain from these developments?

Israel’s action is at least in part informed by Somaliland’s geo-strategic location along the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait on the Red Sea. This is an important sea route for international commercial shipments. Oil, gas, agricultural and industrial products to and from Europe and Asia pass through this route. DP World’s takeover of Berbera port has already enhanced Somaliland’s logistical integration into this network. Berbera also plays host to the longest runway in Horn Africa, while Somaliland’s coastline has already been identified by the UAE, the US and Ethiopia as an attractive place for one of their military bases. For Israel to tap into these strategic assets and facilities will greatly serve its regional security interests, particularly in countering Iran and the Houthis’ influence in the Red Sea.

Furthermore, Somaliland’s ascension to the Abraham Accords reenergizes momentum for the agreement following a period of diplomatic deadlock in the aftermath of the war in Gaza. With the dust settling on a period of immense destruction and tragic loss of life, it is time for the greater Middle East and North African region to begin envisioning what a new era of peace and stability might look like. With these recent diplomatic developments, Somaliland has shown that it is willing to sign up and contribute to the consolidation of this new order, in partnership with Israel and not in opposition. Furthermore, an alliance with Somaliland will enable Israel to counter the influence of Turkey and Qatar along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, given their longstanding and sizable support to the Somalia government in Mogadishu. Equally important is the potential of Somaliland’s untapped natural resources, including in petroleum deposits, minerals, gemstones and agricultural land.

What are the benefits of this agreement for the international community at large?

The recognition of Somaliland by Israel comes at a time of great volatility in the international system, with various regional and global actors increasingly seeking to take advantage of this political uncertainty to stake their own claim to leadership. Old diplomatic pieties are being revisited, including over the sanctity of Mogadishu’s claim to sole authority over the territory formerly known as Somali Republic. The Federal Government of Somalia’s failure to quell clan-based conflict and establish electoral legitimacy, or to eradicate the threats of Al Shabaab and ISIS, despite significant investment from the US and Europe and significant manpower from Africa, has made it clear that the dream of a political settlement or any future negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia is a dream whose time has long past.

Recognizing Somaliland not only affirms this reality, but offers a fresh opportunity to work with a reliable international partner such as Somaliland. When piracy was tormenting the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it was Somaliland who the international community looked to for cooperation, after Somalia had let them down. Now, with the Houthis posing a danger to maritime trade through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Somaliland is again poised to play a critical role in maintaining maritime security and thus reducing the cost of shipping at a time of heightened inflation. And where the Somalia government has unequivocably failed to contain or degrade Al-Shabaab and ISIS, the Somaliland government is ready to work alongside Israel, the US and Europe to guarantee security and fight terrorism. 

What next for Somaliland?

The biggest obstacle standing in the way of realizing these international benefits is a lack of political will on the part of those nations who have not yet signed up to the US and Israel’s new vision for the region. Some, like Somalia itself, who have already protested the decision, may never come on board. Others, like Djibouti, Turkey and Egypt, are also likely to stubbornly reject these developments, either due to self-interested calculations around economic and political competition, or because expanding Israeli influence serves as a counterweight to their self-appointed designs of dominance over the Horn. For now, the Arab League have followed such a lead, claiming an opposition to any redrawing of borders.

However, never has there been a better time to revisit the judgement produced by a 2005 African Union fact-finding mission to Somaliland, in which a panel of experts concluded that “Somaliland’s search for recognition [is] historically unique and self-justified in African political history,” and that, “objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box.’” This was due to the fact that the union of former British Protectorate Somaliland and Somalia that created Somali Republic in 1960 was both conducted under dubious legal circumstances and was regardless legally dissolved through popular referendum among Somalilanders in 2001. This places it in the same camp as Senegal and the Gambia and Syria and Egypt, two cases of precedent for the dissolving of a political union.

In short, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not a reckless act of political realignment, but merely a prudent acceptance of political and legal realities. Other major powers, including the UK and Europe, would do well to follow suit, if only to help make their neighbourhood safer against commercial sabotage and extremist threat. Given the stakes, now is not the time to retreat into the diplomatic paralysis that has contributed to making the Horn of Africa one of the most deadly, conflict-prone regions in the world today. Whatever side one is on in Israel’s politics regarding Palestine, this should not cloud our judgement regarding what is politically rational and morally responsible regarding Somaliland, a country which has long deserved to join the community of nation-states.

About the Author

Mohamed Abdilahi Duale is the former Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Somaliland. Mr. Duale has extensive experience in public policy, humanitarian work, and development, with a focus on institutional building, climate governance, and Somaliland’s international relations.  Previously, he held the same position in both the Ministry of Planning and Development and the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. He holds an MA in International Law from the Bristol Law School, University of the West of England.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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RECOGNITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND IS FAIT ACCOMPLI.

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From Three Decades of Non-Recognition to a Historic Breakthrough.

After 34 years of state-building and institutional and human capital development, Somaliland has remained without international recognition. During this period, the country successfully prevented problems such as migration, piracy, and terrorism, but struggled to improve economic conditions, address high unemployment, rehabilitate chronic infrastructure, and enhance government services. Lacking the fiscal capacity to tackle these challenges, the absence of international recognition further exacerbated the situation. Despite these challenges, Somaliland has adopted a democratic political system, held elections, and witnessed number of peaceful transfer of powers. Situated in a strategic yet highly volatile region, Somaliland ensured the safeguarding of the 850 km long coast bordering Gulf of Aden and the borders it has with other neighbouring countries. Yet, despite these efforts, international recognition remained absent.

The six million Somaliland citizens remained resilient, believing in the statehood against all odds. Throughout the past 34 years, Somaliland citizens endured economic embargo, diplomatic isolation, community tensions, economic crises, lack of development, and the difficult situation of living in a diplomatic limbo. But that did not lead to despair and chaos; Somaliland people showed resilience and refused to give up hope. They continue to support their successive governments, democratic process, and, when needed, relying on a trusted hybrid governing system in which traditional elders supported government institutions during the period of crises.

The Guurti system, the official council of elders or the upper house of parliament, assumed the role of the institution responsible for conflict resolutions and has been instrumental in ensuring the lasting stability of this young state. However, a growing, and educated youth with limited opportunities available at home, has growingly became a significant challenge for Somaliland authorities, and without a formal recognition, and access to global markets and multilateral institutions, the government had no means to introduce policies to mitigate these growing societal challenges.

The newly elected President and his government have made the issue of gaining international recognition their priority from day one, when the new government assumed office a year ago. The current president, Mr Abdirahman M. Abdullahi (Irro), approached 40 heads of states, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and leaders, and sent each one of them a personal letter urging them to recognise Somaliland. The current government under President Irro, unlike previous administrations, adopted a new strategy of “Win vs Win” negotiations, making partnership and cooperation the centre of the government message to foreign partners and abandoning the tradition of “donor vs recipient” negotiation culture. It strongly showcased what Somaliland is offering (strategic location, infrastructure, stable country in a volatile region, natural resources, western leaning policies, and potential gateway to Africa) in exchange for international recognition.

First country that responded this direct appeal from the Somaliland President became the state of Israel, which offered the long-awaited recognition, after 34 years of search and after 65 years from the first time that this young nation Republic of Somaliland gained its first recognition from Britain, Israel recognised Somaliland as an independent and sovereign nation on the 26th of December 2025.

A long and frustrating diplomatic journey.

Many countries and actors that are criticising Somaliland’s direct approach to Israel, ignore the fact that Somaliland did not prioritise Israel in its pursuit of international recognition during the early decades. Instead, Somaliland focused on engaging negotiations with Federal Government of Somalia, a country it voluntarily united with in July 1960 and  withdrew voluntarily from that union in May 1991, when it reinstated its independence and statehood as independent Republic of Somaliland. Dialogue with Somalia were held in London UK, Ankara Turkey, Djibouti, all these talks ended up failure and with no results. For the past three decades, Somaliland also reached out to the African Union and several African countries, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, Ethiopia and others, yet without pointable results.

African Union fact finding mission, which conducted a rigorous study regarding Somaliland’s quest for international recognition in 2005 concluded, The fact that the ‘’union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action between 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African Political history” ( African fact finding mission to Somaliland 2005). More recently Ethiopia came close to recognising the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent country in January 2024, in exchange for a proposed ‘’ Sea-Access Deal”, however, following pressure from regional blocks and from some western powers, Ethiopia decided to step back from that deal.

Throughout the past two decades Western countries including Britain, US and other countries consistently maintained that they prefer to wait until regional organisations, regional countries, and other countries grant recognition to Somaliland, implying none of them were against the quest for international recognition for Somaliland in principle.

Why Israel’s Recognition Matters

Fig 2 Geographic location of horn of Africa (Source MENAFN.com)

Although formally bilateral act between Israel and Republic of Somaliland, the recognition carries implications far beyond the two states. Its significance lies less in immediate material benefits than in the symbolic breach of a three-decades of international consensus of non-recognition. This is where Somaliland places its hope, the FIRST MOVER EFFECT. The expectation is that Israel’s recognition will lead to a diplomatic domino effect, encouraging countries previously afraid of the condemnation and blame, to follow suit. It is reasonable to expect that these countries will still wait and observe short term repercussions, and reactions from countries like US before making final decisions, this could take months or longer. Somaliland believes that the US administration under President Trump is fully aware of the strategic benefits of recognising Somaliland, and its expected relationship between the US and Somaliland will improve significantly during Trump Presidency.

US’s recent response during UN security council suggests, if any, that US has no problem Israel recognising a territory it sees, it has a strategic interest. During the last security council meeting where members discussed the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland by Israel, there was no condemnation at all, not from the US or other western Security permanent members.

Tangible and Intangible Gains from Somaliland Recognition

Tangible and intangible gains, both Somaliland and Israel have signalled their intention to collaborate through bilateral agreements, development and investment partnerships, with particular emphasis on infrastructure, agriculture, technology. Yet for Somaliland, the main point is that recognition will make its negotiation with non-recognising countries and international actors more credible. Also, a less reported and yet crucial effect is the psychological boost among Somalilanders Increased public confidence of their country is likely to mean increased national capital, greater economic activity and return from the diaspora to invest and start businesses in the Country. In this sense, diplomatic recognition may serve as a powerful economic multiplier.

Risks, Exposure, and Strategic Vulnerabilities

Recognition also brings risks. Somaliland’s exposure to regional threats may increase but that is a calculated risk that Somaliland government has carefully studied. Somaliland, however, acknowledges the security risks linked to regional conflicts and threats from regional actors who are against the recognition and religious extremists cannot be dismissed.

Regional and political fallout is inevitable, though the diplomatic backlash for both Somaliland and Israel are expected to be relatively low cost. Both countries are aware of the disunity among Arab states and other regional actors. While the short term will likely be noisy and marked by strong reactions, both Somaliland and Israel believe the outcome is worth the price. For Somaliland, the reward is one of immediate and long-cherished recognition. For Israel, it is the invaluable benefit of a friendly, stable democratic ally in Africa, strategically located near the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb.

In response to this, Somalia had already been gathering regional players and members who oppose the recent Somaliland recognition and the previous MoU with Ethiopia. Egypt, Turkey, Djibouti, AU as well as Arab League are part of this coalition. But this latest recognition is far more complex than the previous MoU with Ethiopia, and it’s unlikely these objections will force any changes from the original decision (from the Israel side).

The main reason this latest adventure differs significantly from the previous MOU with Ethiopia is, that Somaliland had some valuable lessons to learn. This time, the negotiations took place quietly, with no flamboyant or public announcements. The government has demonstrated maturity, discipline and ability to maintain a complete secrecy till the date of announcement. Recognition has happened and while there are complaints, condemnations and diplomatic taking place in the African Union and Arab League, it is highly unlikely that these efforts will alter the reality on the ground or prompt Israel to withdraw its firm recognition. RECOGNITION OF SOMALILAND is a FAIT ACCOMPLI.

Who Might Follow Israel?

Somaliland believes that more countries will follow Israel’s lead. India, the United States, Britain, Ethiopia, Kenya and perhaps UAE, are likely countries to recognise Republic of Somaliland or will upgrade their diplomatic relationship with Republic of Somaliland in the coming months. In the short term, Somaliland may experience a period of isolated recognition. Subsequent recognitions are likely to be driven by geopolitics. In a multipolar world of competing powers, Somaliland’s geography gives it exceptional strategic value. It is at the mouth of the Red Sea, opposite Yemen and near Bab el‐Mandeb, one of the world’s busiest maritime areas, with a world class ports and airports makes Somaliland a focus of global attention. More countries are likely to seek a presence and influence in Somaliland, leading to further recognition in the medium and long term.

From Unrecognized entity to Active and recognized State

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a historic break with three decades of international non-recognition. It is an affirmation of a robust state that placed stability, democratic process and institutional longevity in one of the world’s most difficult regions. The shift provides a real diplomatic and psychological dividends, with potentially more recognitions down the line, but also puts Somaliland in a world of increased geopolitical competition and security challenges. Importantly, such a recognition turns Somaliland from being just another neglected unrecognised state to part of an active test case in a multipolar world.

 What happens next will be determined less by international juridical arguments than by strategic interests, regional pressures and Somaliland’s ability to translate recognition into long-term international engagement and a diplomatic domino effect. In summary, Somaliland is no longer an unrecognised state, it is a partially recognised state, located in very strategic location.

About the Author

Mr. Awale.I. Shirwac, is Horn of Africa Political Economy Analyst. A Former Minister of Planning and National Development for Somaliland. He holds MSc from London School of Economics and Political Science, MPhil from University of Surrey United Kingdom

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

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Somaliland Calls Out Somalia’s Fabrications Over Israel Recognition

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dismisses Allegations as Mogadishu’s Own Abraham Accords Lobbying Comes to Light

Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs moved quickly on January 1 to shut down what it described—accurately—as a campaign of fabrication emanating from Mogadishu following Israel’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.

As Somalia’s government condemned the recognition, U.S. lobbying records revealed an inconvenient truth: Mogadishu had spent months pursuing admission to the very same Abraham Accords it now weaponizes against its northern neighbor.

Somalia’s president claimed that Israel’s decision was conditioned on three demands: the resettlement of Palestinians in Somaliland, the establishment of Israeli military bases, and Somaliland’s accession to the Abraham Accords. None of the claims withstand even cursory scrutiny.

“The Government of the Republic of Somaliland firmly rejects false claims alleging the resettlement of Palestinians or the establishment of military bases in Somaliland,” the Ministry stated on X. Somaliland’s engagement with Israel, it emphasized, is diplomatic, lawful, and rooted in mutual sovereign interests.

The allegations are not merely incorrect. They are constructed to inflame, distract, and derail a diplomatic breakthrough Mogadishu neither anticipated nor controls.

The Palestinian Smokescreen

The claim that Somaliland would participate in the forced transfer of Palestinians is legally impossible and morally unserious. Forced population transfer is a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute. No such proposal exists, nor could it exist within any legitimate diplomatic framework.

That this rumor circulated months before Israel’s recognition only underscores its purpose: preemptive disinformation, not response.

What is striking is how casually “Palestinian solidarity” is invoked by governments whose own policies belie the posture. Egypt maintains full diplomatic relations with Israel while sealing Gaza behind one of the world’s most militarized borders. Turkey trades with Israel, coordinates security, and hosts Israeli diplomatic missions—yet deploys Palestinian rhetoric when it suits Ankara’s regional ambitions.

In this context, Somalia’s sudden moral outrage is less solidarity than theater.

Territorial Integrity as Fiction

Even more hollow is Mogadishu’s invocation of “Somalia’s territorial integrity.” Somalia has not governed Somaliland since 1991. It has exercised no authority there for 34 years. It cannot secure its own territory against al-Shabaab and depends on African Union forces (ATMIS) to sustain basic governance in the capital.

Yet this same state is treated as the custodian of Somaliland’s political fate.

Under the Montevideo Convention, statehood is grounded in population, territory, government, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations. Somaliland satisfies all four in practice. Somalia, increasingly, does not—at least not beyond Mogadishu.

The insistence that Somaliland remains subject to a state that has never governed it is not law. It is politics—enforced by regional organizations that have converted recognition into a veto weapon.

The Military Base Fantasy

The allegation of Israeli military bases is equally detached from reality. Israel does not maintain permanent overseas bases. Its defense doctrine is inward-facing and regionally concentrated, focused on immediate threats—not power projection in the Horn of Africa.

Security cooperation, however, is another matter—and entirely normal.

Intelligence sharing, counterterrorism coordination, training, and technology transfer are standard components of Israeli partnerships worldwide. For Somaliland, which has maintained stability in proximity to al-Shabaab and regional extremist networks without foreign troops, such cooperation is rational, defensive, and overdue.

The Abraham Accords—The One Serious Point

Of the three claims, Somaliland’s potential engagement with the Abraham Accords is the only one grounded in diplomatic reality. Even here, Somalia misrepresents the issue.

The Accords are not coercive instruments. They are frameworks for normalization between Israel and Muslim-majority nations—currently the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—that have delivered measurable benefits while signatories maintain their stated positions on Palestinian rights.

The results have been substantial. The UAE and Israel signed agreements worth over $3 billion in the first two years, spanning defense, technology, and energy. Direct flights now connect Dubai and Tel Aviv. Morocco reported tens of thousands of Israeli tourists in the first year, generating millions in revenue. Israeli expertise in water conservation and agricultural technology—critical for developing nations—has flowed to partners through the framework.

For Somaliland, locked out of the African Union and Arab League due to Somalia’s objections, the Accords offer something regional bodies have systematically denied: a path to legitimacy based on performance, not inheritance. After 34 years of maintaining democratic governance, peaceful transitions of power, and security without foreign military dependence, Somaliland has earned what it has been denied.

Somalia’s Quiet Contradiction

Somalia’s outrage is further undercut by its own behavior. In December 2024, Somalia’s Embassy in Washington retained BGR Government Affairs—a prominent lobbying firm with ties to the Trump administration—for $600,000 to advance its interests with U.S. policymakers.

Foreign Agents Registration Act filings reveal the extent of Mogadishu’s efforts. According to BGR’s supplemental statement filed in July 2025 (Registration #5430), Somalia’s lobbyists contacted senior U.S. officials repeatedly in spring 2025 specifically to discuss “Abraham Accords agreement.” The disclosure documents show multiple outreach attempts to National Security Council Africa Director Brendan McNamara, Senate Foreign Relations Committee senior staff, and House Foreign Affairs Committee Africa Subcommittee personnel—all focused on Abraham Accords engagement.

In other words, Somalia spent months lobbying to join the very framework it now characterizes as a Zionist conspiracy when Somaliland pursues membership. The same Abraham Accords that Mogadishu’s president claims are conditions for forced Palestinian displacement were, until recently, the subject of Somalia’s own diplomatic overtures to Washington.

The contradiction is stark: Somalia sought legitimacy through normalization with Israel, failed to offer anything Israel or other Accords signatories might value from a partner mired in instability, and now attacks Somaliland for succeeding where it could not.

The hypocrisy runs deeper. Somaliland Chronicle has documented instances of Somali government officials deploying antisemitic rhetoric in public statements, undermining any claim that opposition to Israel’s recognition stems from principled foreign policy rather than political opportunism and envy.

A Familiar Pattern

Somalia’s response follows a pattern. The same arguments—destabilization, extremism, regional chaos—were deployed against the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding. None were borne out by facts on the ground.

Somaliland has maintained stability for 34 years in one of the world’s most volatile regions while conducting peaceful democratic transitions and avoiding the extremist infiltration that plagues southern Somalia. Regional instability stems from governance failures in Mogadishu, not from Somaliland’s pursuit of international partnerships.

For 34 years, Somaliland has done what the international system claims to reward: governed itself, held elections, transferred power peacefully, and secured its territory without foreign occupation. Somalia has done the opposite—and demands veto power all the same.

Israel’s recognition did not destabilize the Horn of Africa. It merely exposed an uncomfortable truth: Somaliland behaves like a state, while Somalia behaves like a claimant.

After three decades, the distinction is no longer theoretical. It is diplomatic reality catching up with political denial.

Ethiopia Weighs Following Israel’s Lead as Somaliland Recognition Gains Momentum

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Hargeisa, Somaliland – President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” announced Wednesday that “many countries will soon recognize the Republic of Somaliland,” signaling confidence that Israel’s historic December 26 recognition marks the beginning of a cascade that could fundamentally reshape the Horn of Africa.

The announcement came during an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting, where President Cirro urged citizens to uphold national unity as the republic enters what may be the most consequential period in its 34-year quest for international legitimacy. U.S. Deputy Ambassador Dorothy Camille Shea acknowledged the move at the UN Security Council, stressing Israel’s right to establish diplomatic relations as any sovereign state. This defense signals potential American openness and delivered a significant blow to opponents’ arguments.

Ethiopia’s Strategic Calculation

While Israel’s decision has drawn condemnations from predictable quarters, the most significant response may be what has not been said. Ethiopia, Somaliland’s neighbor and longstanding strategic partner, has exercised studied silence that diplomatic sources interpret as strategic ambiguity preceding potential recognition.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed

According to multiple diplomatic sources, Ethiopia is now internally consulting and contemplating becoming the second country after Israel to recognize Somaliland. Israel’s recognition fundamentally alters the calculus. Rather than merely reinstating the original January 2024 memorandum, Addis Ababa now has the opportunity to negotiate what diplomatic sources describe as an MoU 2.0. This would represent a far more advantageous arrangement with a recognized state, granting Ethiopia the Red Sea access it has sought since losing its coastline with Eritrean independence in 1993, but under terms that reflect Somaliland’s enhanced international standing and bargaining position.

Ethiopia’s calculation is being driven by escalating security concerns. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation highlights Addis Ababa’s growing alarm over security cooperation between Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea. Ethiopia views this triangle as designed to undermine its efforts to secure maritime access and encircle the country strategically. These anxieties are compounded by the long-standing Nile River dispute with Egypt and recent rapprochement between Mogadishu and Cairo, where Somalia reportedly requested Egyptian military assistance in “safeguarding its maritime waters.” The request represents transparent code for blocking Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somaliland.

One Ethiopian state minister broke the government’s official silence. Tarekegn Bululta Godana described Israel’s recognition as “a notable diplomatic move that could shape the future trajectory of the Horn of Africa.” The comment, though unofficial, signals internal debates within Ethiopia’s government about seizing the diplomatic opening Israel has created.

Ethiopian recognition would carry seismic implications. As a major regional power and African Union member state, such a move would shatter the pretense that Somaliland’s status is settled. It would validate the 2005 AU fact-finding mission’s conclusions that Somaliland’s case is “historically unique and self-justified.” Most importantly, it would trigger economic and security cooperation serving both countries’ core interests while fundamentally undermining Djibouti’s economic stranglehold on Ethiopian trade.

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has amplified this contradiction by sharing the AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission report, which concluded that “the fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history.” The Israeli government’s decision to publicize the AU’s institutional findings underscores the hypocrisy of current AU opposition to recognition when the organization’s own experts validated Somaliland’s case two decades ago.

The UAE, as both Ethiopia and Somaliland’s largest investor, has maintained strategic silence. When Arab League members convened an emergency session chaired by UAE Ambassador Hamad Obaid Al Zaabi to condemn Israel’s recognition, the UAE government issued no independent statement. This ambiguity allows Abu Dhabi to preserve its $442 million Berbera Port investment through DP World while assessing how the recognition cascade unfolds. As an Abraham Accords signatory, the UAE may find Israel’s recognition provides diplomatic cover for its own eventual acknowledgment of Somaliland.

The Recognition Cascade

Beyond Ethiopia and the UAE, speculation has reached fever pitch. South Sudan, which achieved independence in 2011, is mentioned frequently as a likely early adopter. Kenya faces growing domestic pressure to formalize ties given Berbera’s potential to compete with Mombasa. Taiwan could convert its representative office into a full embassy.

The United States represents the most consequential potential domino. Republican control of Congress and bipartisan support for countering Chinese influence create favorable conditions. Recent satellite imagery shows major upgrades to Berbera Airport, suggesting Washington may be establishing facts on the ground ahead of policy shifts. General Michael Langley’s reported AFRICOM visit to Somaliland in December 2024, along with multiple U.S. military delegations evaluating Berbera’s capabilities, indicate Pentagon planning increasingly assumes Somaliland recognition as inevitable. With Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti facing operational constraints from Chinese military proximity, Berbera offers strategic alternatives.

Djibouti’s Predictable Response

Djibouti has responded with characteristic hostility. On December 29, Djibouti unilaterally closed its land border with Somaliland and began refusing Somaliland passports. In response, Somaliland recalled its representative, Abdillahi Mohamed Dahir (Cukuse), for consultations. Djibouti’s representative, Ambassador Hussein Omar Kawaliyeh, has also departed Hargeisa.

The pattern is familiar. When Somaliland and Ethiopia signed their January 2024 MoU, Djibouti shuttered Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills, armed border communities, and supported separatist movements within Somaliland. The World Bank’s 2023 Container Port Performance Index ranked Berbera 103rd globally while Djibouti plummeted to 379th out of 405 ports, exposing the economic desperation driving Djiboutian aggression.

Questions about reciprocity are emerging. Sources indicate discussions about implementing reciprocal measures, including whether Turkey’s substantial presence in Somaliland should face consequences given Ankara’s strident opposition to recognition and military support for Somalia.

The Armageddon Myth

The chorus of condemnations invariably invokes apocalyptic language: threats to “regional stability,” risks of “continental fragmentation.” The argument is propaganda, not analysis.

Somaliland’s recognition threatens no continent-wide catastrophe. It threatens specific economic interests: Djibouti’s port monopoly, Somalia’s territorial pretensions, Egypt’s leverage against Ethiopia, Turkey’s military positioning. The manufactured hysteria serves one purpose: maintaining a status quo that benefits those making the arguments while condemning Somaliland’s population to indefinite statelessness.

Somaliland has governed itself successfully for 34 years, held multiple democratic elections certified as free and fair, and demonstrated state capacity exceeding many recognized African nations. The 2005 AU fact-finding mission confirmed Somaliland’s case is historically unique because it is not creating new borders but restoring the boundaries of a state that achieved independence on June 26, 1960, five days before joining Somalia in a voluntary union that was never legally ratified.

The truth is simpler. Somaliland’s 6 million people are being held hostage, not to principle, but to economics. Djibouti needs them unrecognized to preserve port monopoly. Somalia needs them unrecognized to maintain territorial claims over resources and coastline it cannot control. Egypt needs them unrecognized to maintain leverage against Ethiopia. Turkey needs them unrecognized to justify its military expansion in Somalia.

The African Union’s position cannot be considered objective when articulated by a Djiboutian chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose country has billions of dollars at stake in maintaining the status quo. Under Djiboutian chairmanship, the AU has rejected any reconsideration of Somaliland’s status despite its own 2005 findings, protecting Djibouti’s economic interests while abandoning institutional integrity.

What Lies Ahead

President Cirro’s announcement that “many countries will soon recognize the Republic of Somaliland” reflects informed confidence. The strategic pieces are aligning in ways that make a recognition cascade increasingly probable.

Ethiopia faces the clearest calculation. Israel’s recognition provides Ethiopia the diplomatic cover to negotiate an MoU 2.0. If Addis Ababa becomes the second country to recognize Somaliland (and the first African nation to do so), it would fundamentally alter the diplomatic landscape. Other African states would face pressure to reconsider positions based on reflexive support for “territorial integrity” rather than actual strategic interests.

For the United States, the question is not if but when. Pentagon planners have already concluded that Berbera offers strategic advantages that Camp Lemonnier cannot match. Congressional support exists. The renovations at Berbera facilities suggest preparations are underway.

The Djibouti border closure, while significant, represents a sideshow to the larger drama. President Guelleh’s regime can close borders, pressure clans, and condemn Israel’s recognition at the UN. None of it addresses the fundamental reality: Djibouti’s economic model is unsustainable, its port performance is catastrophic, and its leverage over Ethiopia is eroding.

Somaliland’s path forward demands precisely what President Cirro emphasized: vigilance, unity, and resilience. The recognition cascade will unfold over weeks and months, not days. Each country will calculate its own interests and timeline. But the momentum is building in ways that opponents cannot reverse through condemnations or border closures.

The question facing the Horn of Africa is no longer whether Somaliland’s 34-year quest for recognition will succeed. Israel has answered that question. The question now is how many nations recognize the strategic logic, how quickly they move, and how the regional order adapts.

Will Ethiopia be next? The world is watching. Addis Ababa’s decision may come within weeks. When it does, the recognition cascade will become unstoppable. For Somaliland, the new chapter in its diplomatic journey has begun. For Djibouti, the reckoning for decades of sabotage is at hand. For the Horn of Africa, the future is being written in Hargeisa, not Mogadishu or Djibouti City.

Africa Must Join Israel in Recognizing the Republic of Somaliland

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By H.E. Dr Mohamed A. Omar
Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland in Kenya
Email – rep@somalilandinkenya.com

Some political questions refuse to go away, not because they are complicated, but because answering them would require a degree of honesty we often overlook. Somaliland is one such case. For more than three decades, it has governed itself, held elections, maintained security, and managed its affairs with little outside assistance. And yet, officially, it remains unseen.

Israel’s decision on December 26, 2025, to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, the first country in more than three decades to extend such recognition, has brought that contradiction back into view.

There has been a tendency to frame Israel’s move as new or unprecedented. In fact, it is neither. When Somaliland briefly gained independence in 1960 after British decolonization, Israel was among the first 35 countries to recognize it. That period was, however, short-lived. Somaliland soon entered into a voluntary union with Somalia, in the hopes of a stronger, unified state. A “Greater Somalia”, they called it. The outcome is well known. The union failed, repression followed, and the Somali state eventually collapsed into prolonged conflict.

It is important to be clear that Somaliland is not a territory that broke away through force. It is a former sovereign entity that entered a union voluntarily in 1960 and withdrew from it in 1991 when that union ceased to function to protect its people.

Let it also be known that Israel’s recognition today does not invent a new relationship; it revisits one interrupted by political failure.

Since reclaiming its independence in 1991, Somaliland has governed itself continuously, without international recognition, peacekeeping forces, or inherited state institutions. The systems that exist today were built from the ground up. Elections were organized repeatedly, power changed hands peacefully, and internal stability was preserved in a region where instability became the norm.

These are not abstract claims. Over the years, Somaliland has drawn professionals from across the African continent, individuals who would not relocate or commit their expertise in the absence of functioning systems. This goes to show that our institutions work and that contracts are honored. Aren’t these markers of a functioning State?

Additionally, Somaliland has shown itself to be a credible partner in regional security, counterterrorism cooperation, and maritime stability along vital global trade routes. It offers opportunities in renewable energy, fisheries, logistics, and digital infrastructure, all of which have been sustained without external trusteeship.

Yet Somaliland remains unrecognized, particularly by African states. The explanation mostly given is adherence to the principle of territorial integrity. This principle, understandably, is not arbitrary; it emerged from Africa’s post-independence experience as a safeguard against fragmentation and instability. For a time, it served an essential purpose.

But principles are not ends in themselves. In the case of Somaliland, this rigidity produces an uneasy contradiction: a polity that has built peace, institutions, and democratic practice is disregarded, while a state that has long struggled to exercise authority retains unquestioned legal standing.

Israel’s recognition comes at a time of heightened global attention to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean corridors, a region whose stability now carries implications far beyond its immediate neighborhood. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s forthcoming visit to the White House is likely to further elevate Somaliland’s diplomatic profile and place the question of its status more firmly on the international agenda.

Africa, however, need not wait for external actors to validate what the evidence already demonstrates. The African Union, IGAD, and individual states, from Kenya and Ethiopia to Rwanda and Ghana, possess both the mandate and the institutional maturity to engage Somaliland based on facts rather than inherited assumptions, and after thirty-four years of self-governance, that acknowledgment is overdue.

About the Author

By H.E. Dr Mohamed A. Omar
Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland in Kenya
Email – rep@somalilandinkenya.com

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The Quiet Diplomat Delivers for Somaliland

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Mea Culpa: We Questioned His Silence. He Was Making History.

They said it couldn’t be done. They said Somaliland would wait another generation—perhaps two—before any state would dare extend formal recognition. The politics were too complex, the risks too high, the opposition too entrenched.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” wasn’t listening.

On the anniversary of his inauguration, Somaliland’s soft‑spoken president delivered a geopolitical thunderclap that reverberated from Hargeisa to Jerusalem, from Washington to Mogadishu: the State of Israel has formally recognized the Republic of Somaliland. Not a memorandum. Not a framework. Full. Official. Recognition.

After thirty‑three years of democratic governance, security, and institutional continuity in one of the world’s most volatile regions, Somaliland has finally secured what it earned long ago—a seat at the table. And it was delivered not by bombast or spectacle, but by a career diplomat who understands that history is often made in silence.

The Silence That Spoke Volumes

Six weeks ago, President Irro departed for Dubai. At first glance, it appeared routine. Then the days stretched into weeks. No press briefings. No photo opportunities. No diplomatic platitudes about “fruitful engagements.”

Even this publication began asking uncomfortable questions. Where the hell was he? What was taking so long? In an age of performative transparency, the blackout was striking. Speculation flourished.

The explanation, revealed only yesterday, was as simple as it was consequential: Dubai was merely the opening move.

A single photograph released by Israel’s foreign ministry told the real story. President Irro was not in a conference hotel in the Gulf; he was in Israel itself. Negotiations of historic consequence were underway—talks so sensitive that secrecy was not a preference but a prerequisite.

A small, disciplined circle of advisers kept the process sealed. No leaks. No theatrics. No premature triumphalism. While critics muttered about transparency and rivals fumed in ignorance, Somaliland’s president was quietly doing what no administration before him had managed: converting legitimacy into recognition.

Somaliland’s Henry Kissinger

Those who know Abdirahman “Irro” know he is not a man of slogans. He is deliberate, analytical, and unflashy—a diplomat shaped by process rather than applause. He understands that trust is built privately, that leverage is accumulated patiently, and that results matter more than rhetoric.

Somaliland has found its Henry Kissinger—a practitioner of real statecraft who operates in the shadows, who understands that the most consequential diplomacy happens behind closed doors, who knows when to speak and when silence is the most powerful weapon in the arsenal.

Like the great strategists of the twentieth century, Irro grasped a lesson too often forgotten in Hargeisa: transformative diplomacy is not crowdsourced. It is executed quietly, protected ruthlessly, and revealed only when irreversible.

Where others hesitated—paralyzed by imagined backlash or regional sensitivities—Irro calculated differently. He understood that waiting for the “perfect moment” is merely another way of choosing permanent deferral. Sovereignty is not granted by consensus; it is asserted and defended.

The Risk Others Refused to Take

The strategic case for Israeli recognition was never in doubt. Technology transfer, agricultural innovation, security cooperation, diplomatic amplification—every serious administration understood the upside.

What stopped them was fear: of clerical outrage, of Arab League condemnation, of predictable denunciations from Mogadishu, of domestic critics cloaked in piety and caution.

So they did nothing. They studied the issue. They formed committees. They engaged in “quiet diplomacy” that was so quiet it never made a sound.

Irro reached a harder, more honest conclusion: inaction carried greater risk than action. Somaliland’s future could not remain hostage to hypothetical reactions from actors who had denied its existence for three decades. And so he acted—decisively, discreetly, and without apology.

This was cold‑eyed realism, not recklessness. Strategic patience, not timidity. A recognition that diplomacy at this level cannot survive leaks or vetoes from those invested in Somaliland’s stagnation.

When Reality Arrived

The formal exchange between Jerusalem and Hargeisa was restrained, professional, and historic. Two governments acknowledging a reality long obvious to anyone paying attention.

The public reaction confounded every cynic.

There were no riots, no religious conflagrations, no national unraveling. Instead, Somaliland celebrated—spontaneously and joyfully. Israeli flags appeared alongside Somaliland’s green, white, and red banner with its black star and shahada. Fireworks lit Hargeisa’s skyline. Across Berbera, Burao, Borama, and beyond, citizens marked the end of a thirty‑three‑year diplomatic purgatory.

This was not manufactured enthusiasm. It was release.

The lesson was unmistakable: results unite more effectively than rhetoric ever could. The quiet diplomat had done what the loud ones couldn’t.

The Predictable Chorus of Hypocrites

Predictably, the familiar chorus assembled.

Palestinian officials echoed Mogadishu, recycling Al Jazeera propaganda about alleged plans to displace Palestinians to Somaliland Al Jazeera. Let’s be clear: Somaliland’s bilateral relationship with Israel has absolutely nothing to do with conspiracy theories or anyone else’s manufactured outrage. Somaliland has welcomed thousands of refugees—Yemenis, Syrians, and others who have built thriving communities here. Our foreign policy is not subject to veto by external actors, however loudly they protest.

Egypt coordinated objections with Somalia, Turkey, and Djibouti The Times of Israel—despite maintaining its own long‑standing peace treaty with Israel since 1979 and receiving billions in U.S. aid as a result. Moral lectures from beneficiaries of the very relationship they condemn carry limited weight.

Turkey’s denunciation was particularly theatrical. Ankara condemned recognition as Israel’s “expansionist policies” and “explicit intervention in Somalia’s internal affairs” The Times of Israel—while maintaining extensive diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel. Turkey, which signed a Free Trade Agreement with Israel in 1996 and has seen bilateral trade grow from $1.41 billion in 2002 to nearly $9 billion by 2022. Turkey, which despite Erdoğan’s fiery anti-Israel rhetoric, was Israel’s fifth-largest supplier in 2024, with exports totaling $2.86 billion.

The hypocrisy is breathtaking.

But here’s where Turkey’s moral lecture truly falls apart: this is a country with massive human rights violations and an outright massacre of Kurds in its own backyard. Turkey has no moral ground whatsoever to lecture Somaliland and Israel about sovereignty, self-determination, or human rights. The performative outrage may serve domestic audiences, but it does not substitute for credibility.

Somaliland will not outsource its sovereignty to states that reconcile with Israel in practice while condemning others in public.

Who Hesitated—and What It Cost Them

This moment also exposes the opportunity cost of hesitation—most notably for Ethiopia.

Addis Ababa once grasped what others refused to acknowledge: Somaliland is not a theoretical entity, but a strategic reality. The now‑defunct Somaliland–Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding reflected a hard‑nosed assessment of Ethiopian interests—access to the Red Sea, diversification away from Djibouti, and partnership with a stable, democratic neighbor rather than a perpetually fragile Somalia.

Then Mogadishu kicked dust in Ethiopia’s face.

Somalia responded to the MOU not with negotiation or compromise, but with diplomatic tantrums, threats, and manufactured outrage—despite lacking sovereignty over Somaliland and lacking the capacity to offer Ethiopia anything comparable. Faced with noise and pressure, Addis Ababa blinked. The MOU was shelved. Strategic clarity gave way to short‑term risk aversion.

That hesitation now carries a measurable cost.

The Somaliland Ethiopia courted under an MOU was an unrecognized polity willing to trade access, concessions, and flexibility for political backing. The Somaliland that now exists—recognized by a sovereign state with global reach—is categorically different. Recognition changes the balance sheet. It raises the price of entry. It formalizes expectations. It reduces the need for asymmetrical concessions.

From this point forward, Somaliland does not negotiate from isolation. It negotiates from legitimacy.

There is also a Washington factor that shaped Addis Ababa’s caution. For the past several years, Ethiopian officials have operated under the assumption—fair or not—that U.S. policy space on Somaliland was constrained by a State Department culture unusually sympathetic to Mogadishu’s narrative, amplified by influential congressional voices hostile to Somaliland’s recognition. That perception mattered. It discouraged risk‑taking and made de‑escalation seem prudent, even when Ethiopian interests argued otherwise.

That era is ending.

The geopolitical environment has shifted. Washington’s internal debates no longer freeze policy by default, and recognition by Israel punctures the illusion that Somaliland remains diplomatically radioactive. The signal to Addis Ababa—and to every capital that hesitated—is unmistakable: the train has left the station, and it is not stopping.

Ethiopia still has a seat. But it is no longer boarding at the MOU price. Engagement now means formal recognition of reality, serious state‑to‑state arrangements, and the acceptance that a recognized Somaliland bargains as an equal, not as a petitioner.

For Ethiopia, the lesson is stark: early movers shape terms; late adopters pay premiums. What could have been secured through quiet bilateral alignment will now require formal treaties, multilateral scrutiny, and harder bargaining. A recognized Somaliland is not less available to Ethiopia—but it is far more expensive.

This is the broader warning to every capital that hesitated when confronted by Mogadishu’s bluster. The cost of denial compounds. Somaliland’s recognition did not merely reward patience; it penalized indecision.

Who Stood Up—and Who Did Not

For three decades, Somaliland has governed responsibly, conducted peaceful elections, secured its territory, countered extremism, and built institutions from scratch. In return, it was told—endlessly—to wait.

Israel declined to participate in that fiction.

It assessed Somaliland as it exists, not as others wish it away. It recognized a functioning democracy exercising de facto and de jure independence. No permission sought from Mogadishu. No indulgence in diplomatic euphemism.

That’s a friend. That’s an ally. That’s a partner who checks the box with a big fat marker.

That distinction matters.

What This Moment Signals—and Who’s Next

This recognition is not an endpoint. It is a breach in a diplomatic dam.

Israel brings tangible advantages—technology, security cooperation, agricultural expertise, and access to international corridors long closed to Somaliland. More importantly, it establishes precedent. The taboo has been broken. The cost of continued denial has just risen for every capital that quietly acknowledges Somaliland’s reality while publicly denying it.

The world did not collapse. The region did not ignite. A democratic state recognized another democratic state. That’s it. That’s the whole story.

And it changes everything.

Now we’re in the world community. Other countries are already lining up.

The United Arab Emirates stands out as the most likely Gulf state to formalize what has long been reality. The UAE has already recognized Somaliland—informally, quietly, but unmistakably—through its massive investment in Berbera Port and the corridor. DP World’s multimillion-dollar commitment to Berbera was not charity. It was a calculated bet on Somaliland’s stability, sovereignty, and future. The infrastructure speaks louder than any diplomatic cable: the UAE has been treating Somaliland as a viable partner for years.

Formal recognition would merely align Abu Dhabi’s diplomatic posture with its economic reality. The infrastructure is already built. The investment is already made. The relationship is already functional. What remains is paperwork—and in the post-Israel recognition environment, that paperwork just became significantly easier to justify.

The floodgates have opened. The precedent has been set. The impossible has become inevitable.

The Work Ahead

But let’s be clear-eyed: recognition confers opportunity, not absolution. The real test begins now—converting diplomatic legitimacy into economic growth, strategic depth, and institutional resilience.

This will require unity, discipline, and seriousness of purpose. We must stand behind President Irro and let him take us to the promised land we have been seeking for thirty-four years. Internal distractions, factional politics, and performative outrage are luxuries Somaliland can no longer afford.

President Irro forced the door open. Walking through it—deliberately and together—is the national task.

A Moment Earned

There will be time for critique and debate. That is the privilege of a democracy. But history also demands moments of clarity.

This is one of them.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” delivered what generations were told was unattainable. He did so quietly, methodically, and without theatrics. He has made his people proud. He has made his nation proud. Somaliland is stronger for it.

The celebration will fade. The work will not.

Somaliland has entered a new era—and the hard work begins now.


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Taiwan Office Rejects Somalia President’s Remarks as China Tightens Grip on the Horn of Africa

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Hassan Sheikh Mohamud praised Beijing’s military might against Taiwan in state media interview as U.S. recalls ambassador

HARGEISA, Somaliland — Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa issued a sharp rebuke this week after Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appeared on Chinese state television to praise Beijing’s “capacity and military might” to forcibly reunify with Taiwan.

The December 21 interview on China Global Television Network—aired to mark 65 years of China–Somalia diplomatic relations—saw Hassan Sheikh endorse potential Chinese military action against the self-governing island democracy. “China has the capacity and military might to bring back Taiwan,” the Somali president said, echoing language typically reserved for Chinese Communist Party officials rather than the leader of a fragile, aid-dependent state.

Taiwan’s Representative Office in Somaliland responded on December 23, stating that “the R.O.C. (Taiwan), which governs itself independently and maintains its own democratic institutions, is a sovereign and independent country,” and that neither Taiwan nor China is subordinate to the other. The statement urged Somalia to “focus on its national development and other internal priorities, not to be China’s cheerleader in geopolitical competition.”

Notably, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development also remained silent. At a moment when international attention on Somaliland is rising—particularly in the United States—the ministry issued no statement addressing Somalia’s president publicly endorsing the use of military force to “reunify” a self-governing polity with a stronger central state. The implication was not abstract. By validating force as a legitimate tool to resolve Taiwan’s status, Hassan Sheikh implicitly endorsed the same logic Somalia has long asserted against Somaliland. The ministry’s passivity, in this context, reflected a failure to confront a dangerous precedent: that sovereignty disputes may be settled not by consent or political reality on the ground, but by coercion—precisely the argument Mogadishu has never abandoned with respect to Somaliland.

“Issuing military threats from Mogadishu against a third party is not diplomacy—it is coercion by proxy.”

China’s embassy in Mogadishu released its own statement, titled “Response to Fallacy from an Illegal ‘Office’ in Hargeisa,” focusing primarily on attacking Taiwan rather than defending Hassan Sheikh’s remarks. The embassy thanked Somalia for upholding the “one-China principle” and repeated Beijing’s standard position that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China’s territory.”

The statement went further, issuing explicit military threats. “We will never pledge to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary,” the embassy declared, accusing Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party of pursuing a “secessionist agenda in Somalia’s territory.” Issuing such threats against a third party from a host nation’s capital violates long-standing diplomatic norms, which discourage embassies from using their host country’s territory to menace other states.

Notably absent from the embassy’s statement was any mention of the financial arrangements underpinning Somalia’s alignment with Beijing. According to Somali government announcements and Chinese state media releases, Hassan Sheikh secured a $28 million grant from Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2024 when the two countries elevated relations to a “strategic partnership,” along with 1,300 tonnes of food aid and deliveries of military equipment ostensibly intended for counterterrorism operations. The embassy’s resort to open threats appeared to validate Taiwan’s description of Beijing’s approach as political coercion and distortive propaganda.

A Pattern of Alignment

The interview is the latest example of Somalia’s alignment with Chinese strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding Taiwan’s relationship with Somaliland.

In April, Somalia imposed a blanket ban on holders of Taiwanese passports, barring them from entry, transit, and exit through Somali-controlled airspace. The directive, issued by Somalia’s Civil Aviation Authority, cited adherence to the so-called “one-China” policy and a contested interpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. Although Somaliland was not party to the decision, the ban had immediate practical effects on travel to Hargeisa because Mogadishu controls internationally recognized flight permissions. Following sustained diplomatic pressure—particularly from the United States—the ban was later reversed.

When Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister Wu Chih-chung attended Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi’s inauguration in December 2024, China dispatched special envoy Xue Bing to Mogadishu. In an interview with Somalia’s state news agency, Xue issued one of Beijing’s most aggressive warnings on the Taiwan issue: “We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.

We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.
Chinese Special Envoy Xue Bing

Taiwan’s foreign ministry condemned the remarks immediately, describing them as an example of Beijing’s “grey-zone tactics” and its use of proxy states to exert diplomatic pressure without direct confrontation.

China has also opposed the memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland that would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the Red Sea via the port of Berbera. Beijing endorsed Somalia’s claim that the agreement violated its territorial integrity, despite Somalia exercising no administrative, security, or judicial control over Somaliland’s territory.

American Support for a Chinese-Aligned Government

This alignment has created an increasingly awkward situation for Washington. The United States conducted more than 25 airstrikes in Somalia in 2025 to support Hassan Sheikh’s government in its campaign against al-Shabaab, according to data compiled by Airwars and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. These strikes continued even as Mogadishu publicly aligned itself with Chinese positions on Taiwan and regional geopolitics.

Until recently, during the latter Trump administration period, the U.S. provided $400 monthly salary supplements to Somali security forces along with extensive logistical support. Audits later exposed what American officials described as padded requisitions and widespread misuse of funds, prompting cuts in assistance. As U.S. backing declined, Somali forces struggled to hold territory. In April, elite Danab units abandoned a base at Adan Yabal during an al-Shabaab offensive, leaving behind American-supplied weapons and equipment.

Competing Partnerships

The contrast with Somaliland’s approach is stark. Since establishing representative offices in each other’s capitals in 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland have cultivated a partnership rooted in shared democratic values. Taiwan has committed $22 million to construct a medical center in Hargeisa, signed energy and mineral cooperation agreements, and provided scholarships for Somaliland military officers. As the world’s leading producer of advanced semiconductors, Taiwan occupies a central position in global technology supply chains—underscoring the strategic weight of the relationship.

Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognized internationally, conducts regular multiparty elections and maintains internal stability. By contrast, Hassan Sheikh’s government controls little territory beyond Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab operates within roughly 50 kilometers of the presidential palace. The militant group controls large swathes of the country—by some UN estimates, a majority of Somalia’s territory. Despite this reality, Hassan Sheikh has pledged to hold “one-person, one-vote” elections in 2026, the first since 1967. Puntland and Jubaland, two federal member states, have rejected the plan and no longer recognize federal authority.

Turkey also maintains significant influence in Somalia, operating a military base near Mogadishu and training Somali forces. The dual patronage of China and Turkey has raised growing questions about Somalia’s sovereignty, according to diplomats familiar with the situation who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Ambassador Recalled

On December 18, the Trump administration notified U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Richard Riley that he would be recalled effective January 15. Riley was among 29 career diplomats removed from posts worldwide, with Africa disproportionately affected: Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, and Uganda all lost ambassadors.

A State Department official described the move as part of ensuring ambassadors “advance the America First agenda.” For Somalia, the timing was pointed. The government has accepted billions of dollars in U.S. military assistance while aligning itself with Chinese strategic objectives and, until recently, enforcing a ban on Taiwanese passport holders—policies that run counter to stated American interests in the region.

The American Foreign Service Association criticized the recalls as unprecedented. “Removing senior diplomats without cause undermines U.S. credibility abroad,” the organization said.

For Somalia, Riley’s recall raises deeper questions about the future of U.S. engagement with a government that receives American military support while advancing Beijing’s diplomatic agenda. Somalia’s formal recognition by the United States in 2013—granted when Hillary Clinton served as secretary of state under President Obama—was premised on the expectation of a partner aligned with American values. Whether the Trump administration is reconsidering that assumption, or preparing to pivot toward recognizing Somaliland as some Republican lawmakers have urged, remains unclear.

Taiwan’s statement this week left little ambiguity about how Taipei views Mogadishu’s trajectory. “We will continue to work with diplomatic allies and like-minded nations to jointly preserve regional and global democracy, peace, and stability,” the representative office said, “regardless of political coercion, diplomatic suppression, and distortive propaganda orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party regime.”