In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
The pursuit of international recognition by Somaliland represents a pivotal moment that could reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This analysis examines how recognition could transform regional dynamics and serve broader international strategic interests, offering a comprehensive view of the potential implications for stability, security, and development in this critical region.
Regional Implications and Stability
Somaliland has emerged as a beacon of democratic governance in the Horn of Africa, consistently conducting peaceful elections and maintaining political stability since declaring independence in 1991. This democratic success story stands in marked contrast to the persistent instability in Somalia and several neighboring states. Recognition would not only validate these democratic achievements but could catalyze similar democratic transitions across the region, establishing a precedent for peaceful governance in an area historically plagued by conflict. The success of Somaliland’s democratic model could serve as a powerful example for other regions struggling with governance challenges, demonstrating that stable, representative government is achievable even in historically turbulent areas.
The security implications of recognition extend far beyond Somaliland’s borders. The territory’s proven track record in containing terrorist threats, particularly al-Shabaab, demonstrates its capability as a security partner. International recognition would significantly enhance these security capabilities through increased access to international support and resources. This would enable Somaliland to further develop its security infrastructure, participate in international security frameworks, and strengthen its intelligence-gathering capabilities. The resulting improvement in regional security would benefit not only Somaliland but the entire Horn of Africa, creating a more stable environment for economic development and social progress.
Despite operating without formal recognition, Somaliland has demonstrated remarkable economic resilience. The strategic port of Berbera exemplifies this potential, attracting substantial international investment and serving as a crucial gateway for regional trade. Recognition would unlock access to international financial institutions and development funding, enabling Somaliland to fully realize its economic potential. This would facilitate formal trade agreements and economic partnerships, attracting increased foreign direct investment while supporting broader regional economic integration initiatives. The economic benefits would extend throughout the region, creating new opportunities for trade and development that could help address the root causes of regional instability.
The current ambiguous status of Somaliland-Somalia relations perpetuates uncertainty and tension in the region. Recognition could establish a framework for resolving these long-standing issues through formal diplomatic channels. This would enable the establishment of clear jurisdictional boundaries and responsibilities, creating opportunities for resource sharing and economic cooperation. The resulting stability would benefit not only Somaliland and Somalia but the entire region, reducing the risk of armed conflict through increased international oversight and engagement.
United States Strategic Interests
The recognition of Somaliland presents several compelling opportunities for advancing U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s location near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea positions it as a crucial partner for American strategic objectives in the region. This geographic advantage, combined with Somaliland’s demonstrated commitment to democratic values, makes it an invaluable potential ally for the United States in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.
The United States stands to gain significant strategic advantages through formal recognition of Somaliland. The territory could serve as a vital base for naval operations, intelligence gathering, and securing maritime trade routes, particularly given the ongoing challenges in Yemen and increasing regional instability. This strategic partnership would enhance U.S. military and intelligence capabilities in a critical area where American influence needs strengthening. Furthermore, recognition would demonstrate concrete American support for democratic achievement in Africa, amplifying U.S. soft power and potentially encouraging other nations to pursue democratic reforms.
Perhaps most significantly, Somaliland’s strategic decision to align with Taiwan rather than China presents a unique opportunity for the United States to counter China’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa. While China has established a strong presence across the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative and military installations, Somaliland’s pro-Taiwan stance offers the U.S. a chance to strengthen its position in this vital region. Recognition would solidify Somaliland as a democratic partner, effectively creating a counterweight to China’s growing military and economic presence. This alignment would serve crucial U.S. interests in maintaining regional balance and preventing Chinese dominance of critical maritime routes.
The establishment of formal security and economic agreements with Somaliland would strengthen the U.S. alliance network in a region where reliable partnerships are increasingly valuable. These agreements could encompass joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism cooperation, and economic development initiatives. Such comprehensive engagement would not only serve immediate U.S. security interests but would also establish a long-term partnership in a geopolitically sensitive area. Beyond bilateral relations, recognition would enable the United States to facilitate stronger regional alliances, creating a network of partnerships that could enhance collective security and diplomatic cooperation throughout the Horn of Africa. This strengthened alliance system would serve as a cornerstone for regional stability while amplifying American influence in this strategically vital region.
Global Strategic Considerations
Somaliland’s strategic location along critical maritime corridors presents significant opportunities for international security cooperation. The territory’s position near the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea makes it an invaluable partner in securing vital international trade routes. Recognition would enhance maritime security operations, strengthening anti-piracy efforts and providing stable ports for naval operations. This would contribute to the safety and efficiency of international maritime trade, benefiting the global economy while advancing regional security interests.
In an era of increasing great power competition, Somaliland’s strategic alignment with democratic values and its relationship with Taiwan present unique opportunities for the international community. Recognition would strengthen democratic partnerships in the Horn of Africa, helping to counter growing authoritarian influence in the region. This would support independent foreign policy choices by African nations while promoting multilateral cooperation among democratic states. The resulting network of relationships would contribute to a more balanced and stable regional order.
The economic potential unlocked by recognition would transform Somaliland into a significant regional economic hub. Development of energy and mineral resources would accelerate, while expanded port facilities would enhance maritime trade capabilities. Investment in regional transportation infrastructure would improve connectivity, facilitating economic integration and growth. Integration into global financial systems would provide access to international markets and investment opportunities, creating a foundation for sustained economic development.
Policy Implications
Recognition of Somaliland would require a carefully coordinated international approach. This should begin with increased diplomatic engagement, gradually building toward formal recognition while addressing potential regional concerns. The process should include the development of comprehensive security cooperation agreements focusing on counter-terrorism, maritime security, and regional stability. Economic assistance programs would support Somaliland’s integration into the global economy, while diplomatic initiatives would build regional consensus and support for recognition.
Conclusion
The recognition of Somaliland represents more than a simple diplomatic decision; it offers a strategic opportunity to strengthen regional stability, promote democratic governance, and enhance international security cooperation in a critical region. The demonstrated success of Somaliland’s democratic institutions, combined with its strategic location and potential for economic growth, makes recognition a compelling policy choice that could yield significant benefits for regional and global security.
The advantages of recognition extend beyond immediate political considerations to encompass lasting improvements in regional security, economic development, and democratic governance. Recognition would simultaneously advance multiple strategic objectives: strengthening democracy in Africa, enhancing regional security cooperation, countering China’s expanding influence, securing vital maritime routes, and fostering economic development. As global attention increasingly focuses on the Horn of Africa, the recognition of Somaliland could serve as a transformative step toward a more stable, prosperous, and democratic region. The combination of Somaliland’s proven democratic track record, its strategic location, and its potential for economic growth makes recognition a compelling policy choice that could yield significant benefits for both regional stability and U.S. strategic interests. The potential benefits of recognition, from enhanced security cooperation to economic development and democratic consolidation, make a strong case for the international community to seriously consider this important step forward in regional development.
About the Author:
Mariam Robly is an independent journalist and political analyst based out of the MENA region.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
Questions mount as André partners with Somali MP who concealed government role in foreign agent filing
In a move that raises significant concerns about diplomatic integrity and national security, former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Larry André Jr. Jr. registered as a foreign agent (Registration Number: 7468) on September 25, 2024, for Hormuud Telecom. According to UN Security Council documents, this company emerged from the remnants of Al-Barakaat, a network previously dismantled by U.S. authorities for terrorist financing. André now serves as Strategic Advisor, with an explicit mission to correct what they term “unfair, inaccurate, and outdated perceptions or libelous accusations” about Hormuud.
Timeline of Key Events
2001 (November 7):U.S. authorities raid Al-Barakaat offices across eight states
2002: Formation of Hormuud Telecommunications by former Al-Barakaat leaders
2017 (October): Two Hormuud employees prosecuted for role in Somalia’s deadliest terror attack
2018: UN Security Council report details Hormuud employee dismissals for terror links
2019: Hormuud infrastructure allegedly linked to Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi
2023 (June): Larry André Jr.’s premature departure from ambassadorial post
2024 (September 25):André and Malik Abdalla register as foreign agents for Hormuud
The Al-Barakaat Legacy: Resurrecting a Terrorist Financial Network
Understanding André’s new role requires examining Hormuud’s documented emergence from Al-Barakaat, once among Al-Qaeda’s most sophisticated financial operations. By 2001, Al-Barakaat had built a global empire spanning 40 countries, moving approximately $140 million annually through its hawala network while operating telecommunications and internet services throughout Somalia. This integrated model – combining financial services with telecommunications infrastructure – proved invaluable for terrorist operations, allowing seamless communication and money movement across borders.
The UN Security Council Report S/2002/1209 highlights Al-Barakaat’s sophisticated and far-reaching involvement in financing terrorism. The organization skimmed percentages from legitimate remittances sent by the Somali diaspora, creating an informal and virtually untraceable value transfer system. The telecommunications infrastructure provided by Al-Barakaat facilitated real-time coordination of financial movements and enabled terrorist communications.
The operation’s sophistication became clear on November 7, 2001, when U.S. authorities launched coordinated raids across eight states, targeting Al-Barakaat’s American offices. Yet the 2001 crackdown, rather than dismantling the network, prompted its evolution. In 2002, just months after Al-Barakaat’s designation as a terrorist entity, key figures from the organization emerged behind a new venture: Hormuud Telecommunications. According to UN Security Council documents, “Hormuud Telecommunications was created by former leaders of Al-Barakaat in an attempt to reestablish themselves as a dominant telecom provider in Somalia.”
Terror Links and Banking Ambitions
Hormuud’s operational history, marked by security breaches and financial irregularities, is particularly concerning. According to UN Security Council report S/2018/1002, in October 2017, two Hormuud employees were prosecuted for their role in facilitating what became Somalia’s deadliest terrorist attack, with prosecutors presenting evidence that the employees allowed bomb-laden vehicles through checkpoints. Intelligence reports subsequently linked the company to the 2019 Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi, where Hormuud’s office infrastructure allegedly provided logistical support to the attackers.
The attack involved a large VBIED, with an estimated TNT equivalence of over 1,200 kg, making it one of the largest explosive devices in Al-Shabaab’s history.
It is against this backdrop that André’s primary mission, according to FARA filings, becomes particularly alarming: gaining U.S. regulatory recognition for Hormuud’s subsidiary, Salaam Somali Bank. The scope of potential risk becomes clear when considering Al-Barakaat’s historical operations: a $140 million annual operation spanning 40 countries, demonstrating how quickly such networks can achieve global scale. While Hormuud seeks access to today’s more regulated financial infrastructure – including U.S. dollar clearing operations, correspondent banking relationships, and direct interface with SWIFT and ACH systems – the fundamental vulnerabilities remain.
Somalia’s limited regulatory capacity creates particular challenges. Even with U.S. regulatory frameworks like the Bank Secrecy Act and OFAC oversight, the integration of telecommunications and banking services poses unique monitoring challenges. Modern financial controls, designed for traditional banking operations, may struggle to effectively oversee a system where telecommunications, mobile money, and banking services blur traditional regulatory boundaries. The complex corporate structures and Somalia’s informal financial sector create opacity that could shield questionable transactions from scrutiny.
A Web of Political Connections
This banking initiative, advanced through a complex web of political connections, raises serious concerns. FARA registrations reveal that Malik Abdalla, a current member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, registered as a foreign agent alongside André. Before entering parliament in March 2022, Abdalla served as CEO of White Star Business Group from 2017 to 2022. His previous roles as Director of the Disengaged Combatants Program at the Ministry of Internal Security (2015-2017) and Senior Political Advisor to the Ministry of Defense (2011-2012) point to deep connections within Somalia’s intelligence apparatus, particularly with intelligence chief Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbalolshe”.
The structure of White Star Business Group itself presents red flags. CEO Amira Elmi’s rapid transition from corporate planning at Canada’s Meteorological Service to running a complex security and diplomatic consulting operation in Somalia strains credibility. White Star’s consulting agreement reveals a broader strategy targeting “regional and global capitals in priority countries,” suggesting this Washington lobbying effort is part of a larger campaign to expand Hormuud’s influence internationally.
Hidden Parliamentary Role Raises Legal Red Flags
Malik Abdalla’s involvement adds further layers of concern beyond political connections. FARA registration documents reveal that Abdalla, while serving as a member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, failed to disclose this role as a foreign government official when registering as a foreign agent (Registration Number: 7468) on September 25, 2024. The filings show Abdalla, who acquired U.S. citizenship through asylum in 2011, describing himself merely as a “Businessperson” and “Member” of White Star Business Group LLC – a company he wholly owns.
This omission becomes more significant given Abdalla’s U.S. citizenship status. His service in a foreign parliament while maintaining U.S. citizenship potentially violates 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A), which addresses loss of nationality through foreign government service. That he now operates as an undisclosed foreign government official while lobbying U.S. authorities raises serious national security concerns and appears to violate FARA’s explicit requirement to disclose all positions held with foreign governments.
Problematic Pattern of Diplomatic Service
In light of Mr. Abdalla’s undisclosed role as a current member of Somalia’s Parliament and possible intelligence connections, a critical question emerges: Given his position and access to classified intelligence, did André know that Malik Abdalla, his current employer, was a member of Somalia’s Parliament with extensive connections to Somalia’s intelligence services and its chief Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbalolshe”? The implications of this question reach beyond mere ethical concerns into the realm of potential security compromise.
The timing raises particular red flags. André’s premature departure from his ambassadorial post coincided with a period of intense scrutiny of Somalia’s financial networks. His immediate transition to representing interests he would have received classified briefings about – particularly through a firm run by a parliamentary figure with deep intelligence connections – suggests either a troubling lack of judgment or more concerning possibilities.
Throughout his diplomatic tenure, André faced criticism for appearing to act more as an advocate for Somali government interests than a representative of the United States. His unusually supportive stance toward Mogadishu, sometimes appearing to serve as an unofficial spokesperson for the administration, takes on new significance given this rapid transition to representing major Somali business interests.
The FARA filing’s deliberate omission of André’s specific salary details, while acknowledging his compensation is “not based solely on services rendered to the foreign principal,” adds another layer of opacity. This arrangement, combined with his abrupt departure and immediate alignment with figures of intelligence interest, raises profound questions about potential compromise.
National Security Implications
The gravity of this situation extends beyond typical concerns about the revolving door between diplomatic service and private consulting. André’s role represents a potential compromise of national security interests in the Horn of Africa, particularly given his access to classified intelligence about the very networks he now represents.
The precedent this sets is deeply troubling: a former U.S. Ambassador, having had access to classified intelligence about regional financial networks and their security implications, now works to integrate those same networks into the U.S. financial system. The implications for U.S. national security and regional stability could be severe if these efforts succeed in providing access to the American banking system without proper scrutiny of historical connections and current operations.
Hormuud’s ambitious strategy to expand its influence through “regional and global capitals in priority countries” suggests this Washington lobbying effort is part of a broader campaign to legitimize its operations internationally. Given the documented history of how such networks can rapidly achieve global scale and the challenges of effective oversight, the potential risks to U.S. financial security cannot be overstated.
Repeated attempts to reach Mr. Andre for comment on his transition from Ambassador to foreign agent were unsuccessful. Mr. Abdalla did not respond to detailed questions about his parliamentary role, U.S. citizenship status, and FARA filing omissions. White Star Business Group’s office in Washington declined to address questions about its broader lobbying strategy or the nature of Mr. Andre’s compensation arrangement.
In a landmark legislative milestone, Congress has introduced H.R. 10402, the “Somaliland Independence Act,” signaling a potential sea change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa. This bold initiative seeks to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state, ending decades of ambiguity and elevating its status as a strategic and democratic partner. The bill comes as Republicans consolidate their control of Congress and advance Project 2025, a sweeping blueprint to recalibrate U.S. foreign policy by prioritizing partnerships with democratic allies and countering authoritarian regimes.
Somaliland’s Recognition Gains Traction
The “Somaliland Independence Act” represents the most significant U.S. legislative push for Somaliland’s recognition to date. Spearheaded by Representative Scott Perry (R-PA-10) and co-sponsored by Andrew Ogles (R-TN-5), the bill builds on the foundation of previous measures, including the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act (H.R. 7170) and the Somaliland Partnership Act (S. 3861).
Notably, it draws heavily from the work of Senator James Risch (R-ID), whose Somaliland Partnership Act laid the groundwork for deepening U.S.-Somaliland ties in governance and security. While Risch’s earlier legislation stopped short of advocating outright recognition, it created a legislative framework that H.R. 10402 now seeks to expand into full diplomatic recognition, reflecting Somaliland’s progress as a model for stability in the Horn of Africa.
The Decline of Opposition and Shifting Policy Dynamics
The introduction of H.R. 10402 coincides with a waning of opposition to Somaliland’s recognition within U.S. policymaking circles. For years, Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN), a vocal critic of Somaliland’s independence, wielded significant influence through her position on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Omar, who has consistently advocated for Somalia’s federal government, leveraged her platform and close ties to key figures within the State Department’s Africa Bureau to bolster Somalia’s case against Somaliland’s recognition.
However, Omar’s removal from the Foreign Affairs Committee has curtailed her ability to influence policy. Furthermore, her allies within the State Department, many of whom resisted Somaliland’s recognition, are expected to vacate their positions as the department undergoes a Republican-led restructuring. These shifts present Somaliland’s advocates with an unprecedented opportunity to advance their case in a more favorable political environment.
Senator Marco Rubio and Somaliland’s Strategic Role
The involvement of Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) underscores the growing importance of Somaliland in U.S. foreign policy. A seasoned member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under Senator Risch, Rubio has long recognized Somaliland’s strategic value. His experience addressing regional stability, maritime security, and countering Chinese influence in Africa positions him as a key figure in rallying bipartisan support for H.R. 10402.
Aligned with the goals of Project 2025, Rubio’s advocacy reflects a Republican foreign policy vision that emphasizes democratic partnerships and strategic realignments. Recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state not only supports these objectives but also strengthens U.S. presence in the Horn of Africa—a region critical to global trade and counterterrorism efforts.
A Democratic and Strategic Partner
Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has built a robust democratic system characterized by free elections, peaceful power transitions, and a vibrant civil society. This record of stability and governance contrasts sharply with Somalia’s ongoing struggles with political turmoil and insecurity.
Strategically, Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden makes it indispensable for securing maritime trade routes and countering regional extremism. The Berbera Port, developed with Emirati investment, further enhances its potential as a logistical and naval hub for U.S. and allied forces. U.S. recognition would bolster Somaliland’s capacity to contribute to regional stability while cementing America’s commitment to democratic partners.
Timely Alignment with Domestic and Regional Changes
The introduction of this bill aligns with key political transitions in both Somaliland and the United States. Newly inaugurated President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Cirro’ has prioritized economic growth and national unity, presenting a strong case for international recognition. U.S. recognition would provide his administration with the diplomatic legitimacy and economic opportunities needed to strengthen Somaliland’s role as a democratic leader in the region.
Domestically, the Republican consolidation of Congress and the State Department’s expected overhaul provide a rare window to advance Somaliland’s recognition. Rubio’s influence, combined with the groundwork laid by Risch, ensures that Somaliland’s case will remain a foreign policy priority.
A Transformative Moment
If passed, the “Somaliland Independence Act” would mark a historic shift in U.S. foreign policy, reaffirming America’s commitment to democracy and strategic alliances in a volatile region. By recognizing Somaliland, the United States would not only stabilize the Horn of Africa but also project a strong countermeasure against authoritarian influence from China and Russia.
For Somaliland, U.S. recognition would open the door to international legitimacy, investment, and deeper bilateral ties. For the United States, it represents an opportunity to reaffirm its global leadership and its resolve to support democratic partners in strategic regions.
Editor’s Note: The Somaliland Chronicle will continue to provide updates as this story develops.
HARGEISA, Somaliland – In a carefully orchestrated announcement that signals both continuity and dramatic change, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” unveiled his inaugural cabinet on Saturday, December 14, 2024. The comprehensive restructuring of government portfolios and surprising ministerial choices reveal a complex balancing act between party loyalty, technocratic expertise, and political pragmatism.
Strategic Appointments and Notable Reforms
The appointment of Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has emerged as one of the most striking decisions in the new administration. At a crucial moment when Somaliland’s diplomatic efforts appear to be gaining traction—particularly amid speculation about potential shifts in U.S. foreign policy under a possible second Trump administration—the selection of Bakal represents an unconventional choice for this pivotal position.
The timing of this appointment is particularly significant as Somaliland’s strategic position in the Horn of Africa has never been more crucial. Bakal’s limited diplomatic experience stands in stark contrast to the complex international relationships Somaliland must navigate during this critical period. However, his extensive background in the private sector, particularly his role at Telesom, suggests a potential shift towards leveraging economic diplomacy to further Somaliland’s recognition efforts.
Party Loyalty and Administrative Experience
In a move that bridges party loyalty with administrative expertise, President Cirro appointed Khadar Hussein Abdi Loge as Minister of the Presidency. Loge’s selection is noteworthy given his long-standing role as Secretary-General of the Waddani Party, where he worked closely with Cirro during the party’s opposition years. This appointment suggests a strategic effort to maintain party cohesion while placing a trusted ally in a critical coordination role, ensuring that the president’s vision is effectively implemented across the government.
Structural Reforms and Governance Innovation
The new administration has introduced significant structural changes, most notably the division of the Interior Ministry into two distinct portfolios. Abdalle Mohamed Arab will head the Ministry of Internal Security, while Hassan Ahmed Duale takes charge of the Ministry of Local Governments and Urban Development. This bifurcation reflects a recognition of the distinct challenges facing Somaliland’s internal security and urban development sectors.
While Abdalle Mohamed Arab’s appointment as Minister of Internal Security signals the administration’s initial security sector reforms, President Cirro has yet to announce his choices for several crucial security positions. The heads of the police force, intelligence services, and military command remain undecided, leaving a significant gap in the security apparatus during a sensitive transition period. These positions, historically subject to intense political calculations, have often been seen as extensions of presidential power rather than independent security institutions. The intelligence services, in particular, have faced public scrutiny for functioning more as a law enforcement arm than a traditional intelligence agency.
President Cirro has previously accused law enforcement of extrajudicial actions, leaving it unclear how much reform he plans to institute. His administration’s approach to these appointments will be a key indicator of his commitment to addressing these concerns and reforming the security sector.
Notable Absences and Direction of Change
The most immediate challenge facing Cirro’s administration emerges in its personnel decisions, none more significant than the decision to avoid appointing Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar as Foreign Minister. As the architect of the Somaliland-Somalia talks during the Silanyo administration, Dr. Omar presided over what many consider the most damaging diplomatic initiative in Somaliland’s quest for recognition—a dialogue process that effectively reduced Somaliland’s international standing from an aspiring sovereign state to essentially a federal member of Somalia. By selecting Bakal instead, Cirro signals a clear break from past practices that many Somalilanders view as detrimental to their quest for international recognition.
The absence of other anticipated appointments has also drawn attention. Somalia’s former Finance Minister, Abdirahman Bayle, whose name had been widely circulated in political circles, was notably absent from the final lineup. Similarly, several prominent Waddani party figures who were expected to secure positions found themselves outside the cabinet.
Private Sector Influence and Expertise
Instead, the cabinet composition reveals strong ties to Somaliland’s private sector. Several appointees maintain significant connections to major businesses, marking a departure from traditional political appointments. Similarly, Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur, now Minister of Civil Aviation and Airports Development, brings extensive private sector experience from his leadership role at Dahabshiil Group, where he notably headed their Edahab digital currency division.
This notable presence of private sector leaders in key positions suggests a new direction in governance, blending business expertise with public service. However, it also raises questions about the balance between commercial interests and public accountability in crucial government portfolios. The influence of these business leaders within the government could lead to innovative public-private partnerships, but it also necessitates stringent measures to ensure transparency and prevent conflicts of interest.
Technical Expertise and Development Focus
The economic and development portfolios reflect a strong emphasis on technical expertise. Abdillahi Hassan Adan’s appointment as Minister of Finance and Economic Development, alongside Kaltun Sh Hassan Abdi Madar as Minister of Planning and National Development, suggests a focus on professional competence in these critical areas. Both ministers have extensive backgrounds in economic planning and financial management, indicating that the new administration is prioritizing fiscal responsibility and strategic development planning.
Inclusive Representation and Social Progress
In a landmark development, President Cirro has prioritized equitable divisions of positions among Somaliland tribes and has, for the first time, given ministerial posts to minority tribes, including the Gaboye community. This historic decision underscores Cirro’s dedication to fostering unity and ensuring that all segments of Somaliland society have a voice in the new government. The inclusion of minority tribes in key governmental roles not only enhances the legitimacy of his administration but also sets a new standard for future governance in Somaliland.
International Relations and Recognition Efforts
The restructuring of the foreign affairs portfolio comes at a pivotal moment for Somaliland’s international recognition efforts. With increasing global attention on the Horn of Africa and potential shifts in major powers’ regional policies, the effectiveness of Bakal’s unconventional appointment will be closely watched by the international community. His approach to diplomacy, particularly in leveraging Somaliland’s economic strengths, could redefine the region’s geopolitical dynamics.
Implementation Challenges
The new cabinet faces immediate challenges, with President Cirro directing outgoing ministers to complete their handover within three days. This aggressive timeline underscores the administration’s urgency in implementing its agenda but may pose practical challenges in ensuring smooth transitions. The effectiveness of these transitions will be critical in maintaining governmental stability and continuity.
Full Cabinet Composition
Abdalle Mohamed Arab – Minister of Internal Security
Hassan Ahmed Duale – Minister of Local Governments and Urban Development
Yonis Ahmed Yonis – Minister of Justice
Abdillahi Hassan Adan – Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal – Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Dr. Hussein Bashir Hersi Wahan – Minister of Health Development
Hussein Ahmed Aideed – Minister of Public Works, Housing and Reconstruction
Khadar Hussein Abdi Loge – Minister of the Presidency
Ali Jama Farah (Buureed) – Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources
Mohamed Yusuf Ali (Ilka-case) – Minister of Defense
Ahmed Jama Barre Roble – Minister of Energy and Minerals
Kaltun Sh Hassan Abdi Madar – Minister of Planning and National Development
Osman Ibrahim Nur (Af-gaab) – Minister of Transport and Roads Development
Professor Ismail Yusuf Duale – Minister of Education, Early Childhood and Science
Abubakar Abdirahman Good – Minister of Water Resources
Migo Mohamed (Sambaloolshe) – Minister of Labor, Social Affairs and Family
Mahmoud Egeh Yusuf – Minister of Agriculture Development
Fuad Ahmed Noah Nur – Minister of Civil Aviation and Airports Development
Ahmed Yasin Sh Ali Ayanle – Minister of Information, Awareness and Culture
Abdillahi Osman (Geel-jire) – Minister of Environment and Climate Change
Ahmed Aw-Dahir Haji Hassan – Minister of Parliamentary Relations and Constitutional Affairs
Jamal Mohamed Jama Ahmed – Minister of Telecommunications and Technology
Saleban Duale Haji Jama – Minister of Resettlement and Humanitarian Affairs
Ahmed Mohamed Farah Oofle – Minister of Youth and Sports Development
Omar Shuayb Mohamed – Minister of Livestock and Pastoral Development
Sheikh Abdillahi Dahir Jama – Minister of Religious Affairs and Endowment
Abdirahman Hassan Nur Furre – Minister of Commerce and Industry
Said Mohamed Burale Arrale – Minister of Investment Development and Industries
Looking Ahead
As Somaliland enters this new political chapter, the administration’s success hinges on the ability of this diverse cabinet to work cohesively. The combination of party loyalists, technical experts, and private sector leaders represents a calculated gamble on the president’s part.
The international community will be watching closely, particularly as Somaliland positions itself for potential diplomatic breakthroughs. The effectiveness of these appointments, especially in key portfolios like foreign affairs and the presidency, will be crucial in determining whether President Cirro can navigate the complex landscape of Somaliland’s political and developmental aspirations.
By charting a new course through his cabinet selections, President Cirro has set the stage for a potentially transformative era in Somaliland’s history. The success of this bold approach—combining private sector expertise, political experience, and inclusive representation—will ultimately be measured by its ability to advance Somaliland’s development and international recognition goals while maintaining domestic stability and social cohesion.
Correction: The previous version of this report inaccurately stated that the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Cabdiraxmaan Daahir Aadan Bakaal, serves on the board of Telesom, Somaliland’s leading telecommunications company. We apologize for this error and any confusion it may have caused.
At Somaliland Presidency, President Muse Bihi Abdi convened his 134th and final ministerial meeting, delivering pointed guidance to both successors and supporters as Somaliland enters a critical transition period.
“To those who were in opposition, I say: You have won the election, and we have congratulated you. Since our focus is on building a nation, the right to continue with opposition rhetoric and divisive speech is no longer yours – go back and reconsider your approach,” Bihi declared, his tone mixing concession with caution.
Foreign Policy Legacy
President Bihi’s tenure has been marked by bold diplomatic initiatives that challenged regional orthodoxy. His administration’s latest and most consequential move—the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia—appeared to redraw the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical map. The agreement, promising naval access in exchange for potential recognition, achieved what years of patient diplomacy could not: forcing global engagement with Somaliland’s sovereignty aspirations.
This was not Bihi’s first diplomatic gambit. His 2020 decision to establish formal ties with Taiwan, directly defying China’s opposition, marked a significant shift in Somaliland’s foreign policy. The move strengthened relations with Taiwan while positioning Somaliland against China’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa. Despite Beijing’s pressure and Somalia’s alignment with the “One-China” policy, the partnership has yielded dividends in health, education, and technology cooperation.
The administration’s independent foreign policy stance has found increasing resonance in Washington. Under President Trump, and now with a Republican-controlled Congress, there are growing indications of a potential shift away from the traditional “One-Somalia” policy. This reconsideration reflects broader strategic calculations in the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding competition with China and securing vital maritime routes.
Current Challenges
Yet these diplomatic gains face immediate tests. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s upcoming meeting with Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—who recently dropped demands for third-party mediation—suggests complex maneuvering ahead. Somalia’s response to the Ethiopia MoU has been particularly severe, mobilizing alliances with Turkey and Egypt while making unprecedented overtures to Al-Shabaab militants. Throughout January and February, pro-Somalia religious clerics and government officials declared holy war against both Somaliland and Ethiopia.
Regional Dynamics
The January 1st, 2024 Ethiopia MoU unleashed a diplomatic firestorm. Somalia’s response bordered on hysteria – mobilizing alliances with Turkey and Egypt while making unprecedented overtures to Al-Shabaab militants, all in desperate attempts to derail the agreement. Throughout January and February, pro-Somalia religious clerics and government officials declared holy war against both Somaliland and Ethiopia, marking an alarming escalation from a government claiming sovereignty over Somaliland.
In the wake of the Ethiopia MoU, the regional response has been varied, with Djibouti emerging as one of the most vocal critics. Interestingly, high-ranking members of the Waddani Party recently traveled to Djibouti and met with President Ismail Omar Guelleh. The delegation’s outreach raised eyebrows, especially given Guelleh’s antagonistic stance toward the MoU, which he views as a direct threat to Djibouti’s economic hegemony.
However, Waddani itself has remained notably silent on the delegation’s visit, leaving key questions unanswered. It is unclear whether these figures were acting in an official capacity as representatives of the party or as independent actors navigating the evolving regional dynamics. The lack of a formal position from Waddani adds an air of ambiguity, fueling speculation about the party’s posture toward Djibouti and the Ethiopia agreement.
Mogadishu’s diplomatic offensive reached new levels when President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud dropped his core precondition for direct talks with Prime Minister Abiy – namely, that Ethiopia must first repudiate the MoU. This dramatic concession, rather than signaling flexibility, underscores Somalia’s determination to prevent Somaliland’s diplomatic breakthrough through any means necessary.
Democratic Milestones and Governance Challenges
“We shouldered 90% of the electoral costs,” Bihi emphasized, referring to Somaliland’s successful execution of simultaneous presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections. This self-reliance, while strengthening democratic credentials, contrasted with his administration’s domestic governance record.
Critics point to frequent cabinet reshuffles and a governance style that often prioritized loyalty over expertise. Yet these shortcomings stand against significant achievements in elevating Somaliland’s international profile.
To his Kulmiye Party supporters, facing opposition status after 14 years in power (2010-2024), Bihi offered characteristically direct counsel: “Though we lost the election yesterday and the day before, we are still nation-building,” he stressed. “While we haven’t yet transferred power, when we do, we must observe a period of restraint. Just as a newborn needs forty days, new governments need their first hundred days – any destabilizing criticism from you is forbidden.”
Economic Stakes
The MoU’s implications for regional commerce are profound. Djibouti, which currently handles 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade worth an estimated $1.5 billion annually, faces unprecedented competition. The proposed development of Somaliland’s Berbera Port and Ethiopian naval facility promises to reshape regional trade dynamics. Conservative estimates suggest the deal could generate over $600 million in annual revenue for Somaliland’s economy.
However, the new administration faces complex challenges in implementation. Beyond managing diplomatic pressures, they must ensure equitable distribution of potential benefits across Somaliland’s regions. The experience of Djibouti, where port development created concentrated wealth without broad economic transformation, serves as both lesson and warning.
A Future Unwritten
“We remain custodians of this nation’s progress,” Bihi concluded—words carrying fresh significance as Somaliland navigates perhaps its most consequential diplomatic juncture since declaring independence. The upcoming Ethiopia-Somalia dialogue could validate his strategic vision or highlight the limitations of unilateral diplomacy in the complex Horn of Africa.
For a nation built on pragmatic diplomacy and democratic values, this peaceful transition marks another step toward maturity. Bihi’s successor inherits elevated international visibility alongside significant challenges—a legacy as complex as the leader himself.
HARGEISA, Republic of Somaliland — U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Richard H. Riley and Major General Brian Cashman, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), are set to arrive in Somaliland in the coming days for high-level talks with President-elect Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro.” The delegation, which will also attend Cirro’s inauguration ceremony alongside representatives from the U.S. Embassy and expected congressional staffers, marks an unprecedented level of U.S. diplomatic and military engagement with the Republic of Somaliland. While not confirmed, sources indicate the delegation may also meet with outgoing President Muse Bihi Abdi.
The upcoming visit marks a stark departure from previous U.S. engagement. Under Ambassador Riley’s predecessor Larry André, relations with Somaliland were hampered by an almost zealous adherence to the ‘One Somalia’ policy. André, along with Assistant Secretary Molly Phee, were often described by State Department colleagues as ‘more Catholic than the Pope’ in their rigid stance—seemingly prioritizing the ‘One Somalia’ policy over U.S. strategic interests in the region. Their approach appeared to go beyond diplomatic caution into active appeasement of Mogadishu, even when it potentially undermined U.S. security interests in the Horn of Africa.
Diplomatic sources suggest multiple interpretations of the visit’s timing. However, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy suggests a more straightforward diplomatic purpose. “Normally such a visit would signal U.S. officials’ interest in meeting with new heads-of-state to discuss U.S. engagement priorities,” Nagy noted, adding that under the current ‘one Somalia’ policy, such engagement falls under the U.S. Ambassador to Somalia’s responsibilities. Nagy emphasized that Somaliland should use this opportunity to “aggressively promote its priorities – including formal recognition and its value as a strategic partner of the U.S.”
The timing coincides with Somaliland’s inclusion in the Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025” roadmap, designed for a potential Republican administration, which explicitly supports Somaliland’s recognition. Additionally, Somaliland recently signed a landmark Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia, granting military and commercial access to its coastline in exchange for potential recognition.
General Cashman’s presence underscores AFRICOM’s evolving approach to regional security, particularly given China’s expanding presence in neighboring Djibouti. Berbera Port’s strategic location and modernized facilities have become central to these calculations, offering potential alternative access points for U.S. military operations in the region. In 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense conducted capability tests at Berbera Airport using C-130J Super Hercules aircraft. This was followed by a significant visit in 2022 from then-AFRICOM Commander General Stephen Townsend, who personally assessed Berbera’s strategic potential. These previous high-level military engagements have laid the groundwork for increased U.S.-Somaliland security cooperation.
For President-elect Cirro, U.S. engagement presents unprecedented opportunities amid complex challenges. The convergence of U.S. diplomatic interest, military engagement, and the potential for recognition through Project 2025 opens new possibilities for Somaliland’s international standing, even as his administration navigates the implementation of the Ethiopian agreement and domestic challenges.
AFRICOM, the U.S. Embassy in Somalia, and members of the Somaliland Presidential transition team did not respond to multiple requests for comment regarding this article.
Somaliland’s Democratic Triumph Faces Its Greatest Test
President-Elect Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro”’s sweeping electoral victory, securing over 60% of Somaliland’s presidential vote, represents more than a transfer of power – it marks a point of no return for both the victor and his nation. His mandate, built on promises of fundamental change and a decade of opposition politics, now collides with the entrenched interests that facilitated his rise to power. As Somalia seeks to exploit perceived weaknesses, Djibouti reacts with hostile maneuvers to protect its economic interests, and long-time political allies await their rewards, Cirro faces a stark reality: the very networks that enabled his victory now stand as the primary obstacles to the transformation his voters demanded. In this crucible of competing interests, appeasement – whether of regional adversaries or domestic powerbrokers and self-styled kings – offers no viable path forward. The fundamental question isn’t whether Cirro can maintain his political coalition, but whether he can transcend it to deliver the reforms Somaliland requires and secure the international recognition its people have long sought – their rightful place among the community of nations.
In this analysis, we examine the multifaceted challenges confronting President-elect Cirro as he assumes leadership of Somaliland. From the potentially damaging return of figures associated with failed Somalia talks to the bloated civil service demanding reform, from the calculated exploitation of Las Anod by regional adversaries to the delicate balance of international partnerships, Cirro’s administration faces decisions that will define not just his presidency but Somaliland’s future. The moment demands an unflinching and ruthless pursuit of national interest over political accommodation. At each turn, the temptation of appeasement – whether through political appointments, policy compromises, or diplomatic concessions – threatens to undermine the very reforms his mandate demands. The stakes could not be higher: Somaliland’s democratic achievement now requires leadership that can disappoint allies, confront adversaries, and advance national interests with unwavering resolve.
The Weight of Political Debts and Personnel Choices
The most immediate challenge facing Cirro’s administration emerges in its personnel decisions, none more concerning than the rumored return of Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar as Foreign Minister. As the architect of the Somaliland-Somalia talks during the Silanyo administration, Dr. Omar presided over what many consider the most damaging diplomatic initiative in Somaliland’s quest for recognition – a dialogue process that was effectively hijacked by Somalia and billed as reconciliation there by reducing Somaliland’s international standing from an aspiring sovereign state to a essentially a federal member of Somalia.
More troubling still is that this potential appointment aligns with the Waddani Party’s explicit manifesto commitment to continue these same fruitless talks – a position that appears to disregard their demonstrably damaging impact on Somaliland’s sovereignty aspirations. This policy continuity raises fundamental questions about the administration’s capacity to deliver the change its electoral mandate demands.
The Civil Service Dilemma
The incoming administration inherits a civil service bloated by tribal patronage, where government positions function more as spoils to be distributed than professional roles serving public interest. Each administration since President Egal has added layers to this unwieldy bureaucracy, creating redundant positions to satisfy clan quotas. Cirro now faces an impossible choice: maintain an unsustainable system or risk backlash through reform.
The challenge here transcends simple administrative reform – it demands a fundamental reorientation of how public service is conceived and delivered. No amount of diplomatic finesse can resolve the fundamental contradiction between professional governance and tribal patronage.
Justice and Security Sector Reform: Promises versus Reality
While Cirro’s campaign effectively highlighted the outgoing administration’s record of extrajudicial arrests and political interference in the judiciary, his proposed reforms appear remarkably modest. The focus on salary increases for security personnel, while long overdue and necessary, fails to address the fundamental institutional dynamics that have enabled judicial interference and security service overreach. The absence of a comprehensive reform framework suggests a troubling continuity with past practices rather than the promised transformation of the justice sector.
The Las Anod Reality
The crisis in Las Anod, located on Somaliland’s eastern frontier, transcends local grievances; it is a calculated proxy battle orchestrated by Somalia to destabilize Somaliland and undermine its sovereignty. This conflict emerges against the backdrop of Somaliland’s growing geopolitical significance, highlighted by its inclusion in the U.S. Defense Authorization Act and multiple visits by U.S. military personnel to Berbera, cementing the port’s strategic importance in the Horn of Africa.
Somalia’s strategy is neither coincidental nor reactionary—it is a deliberate effort to export the instability of its southern regions into Somaliland’s territory. By providing material and diplomatic support to militia groups in Las Anod, Somalia seeks to delegitimize Somaliland’s long-standing narrative of stability and democratic governance. Internationally, Mogadishu amplifies its efforts by advancing a “civil war” narrative, reframing the crisis as internal unrest rather than external aggression. This dual approach aims to erode Somaliland’s claims to sovereignty while derailing its aspirations for international recognition.
Las Anod now serves as a litmus test for Somaliland’s ability to maintain both its territorial integrity and its global reputation for governance. For President-elect Cirro, the stakes are high: resolving the crisis requires more than neutralizing external threats; it demands consolidating internal unity and showcasing Somaliland’s institutional resilience.
The challenge is compounded by the fragmentation of SSC militias and the involvement of extremist elements, which create a volatile landscape resistant to traditional diplomatic solutions. Somalia’s orchestration of an intractable conflict—where fractured opposition leadership precludes meaningful negotiations and sustained violence tarnishes Somaliland’s reputation for stability—has made Las Anod a focal point of regional geopolitics.
For Cirro, the crisis is not merely a test of diplomatic skill but a fundamental threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty. His administration must navigate a delicate balance: confronting Somalia’s destabilization efforts while protecting civilian lives and reinforcing Somaliland’s territorial claims. This moment demands a strategic approach that transcends appeasement and addresses the root causes of the crisis, recognizing that those actively seeking Somaliland’s dissolution cannot be placated. The response must align with Somaliland’s broader objectives of sovereignty and stability, proving that the nation can withstand external aggression without compromising its democratic principles or governance standards.
International Recognition and Strategic Alignments
The international reaction to President-elect Cirro’s victory highlights the complex and nuanced diplomatic landscape his administration must navigate. Western democracies have responded positively, with the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Bureau, Senator Jim Risch, and Congressman Chris Smith applauding Somaliland’s successful democratic election and peaceful transition of power. These endorsements reinforce Somaliland’s narrative as an exceptional democracy in a region rife with instability. The alignment of both houses of the U.S. Congress and the presidency under Republican leadership adds momentum to Somaliland’s growing appeal in Washington, potentially opening new avenues for deeper engagement and support.
Ethiopia’s congratulatory message to both Somaliland and President-elect Cirro carries particular diplomatic significance. Despite Cirro’s campaign rhetoric questioning the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on January 1, 2024, between outgoing President Bihi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s outreach signals a commitment to continuity in bilateral relations. The swift meeting between Cirro and Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Somaliland underscores the importance Ethiopia places on maintaining strategic ties, suggesting that the MoU may evolve rather than be discarded. This reflects Ethiopia’s long-term interest in the Berbera Port and its recognition of Somaliland as a critical partner in securing regional stability and economic growth.
However, the reactions from Somaliland’s adversaries provide a stark contrast. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s conspicuous enthusiasm for Cirro’s victory reflects a calculated attempt to exploit perceived political transitions in Somaliland to Somalia’s advantage. This strategy aligns with Mogadishu’s broader efforts to destabilize Somaliland’s sovereignty narrative, using shifts in leadership as an opportunity to create discord.
Djibouti’s measured response further underscores its alignment with Somalia’s position, driven by economic self-interest. As Somaliland’s Berbera Port increasingly challenges Djibouti’s regional trade monopoly, Djibouti’s diplomatic stance appears carefully calibrated to protect its dominance. While congratulatory on the surface, Djibouti’s actions suggest an underlying wariness of Somaliland’s growing regional influence and Ethiopia’s deepening interest in Berbera.
For Cirro, these responses underscore the challenges of navigating a diplomatic landscape where allies and adversaries alike seek to influence Somaliland’s trajectory. Successfully managing these dynamics will require Cirro to balance the expectations of international partners with the need to assert Somaliland’s sovereignty and economic priorities.
The Ethiopian Question and Regional Hostility
The Ethiopian Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has triggered an unprecedented level of regional coordination against Somaliland’s interests. Djibouti’s reaction, notably hostile, has extended far beyond diplomatic disapproval to active measures aimed at isolating and destabilizing Somaliland. Having long profited from its monopoly over Ethiopia’s maritime trade through the Port of Djibouti, the MoU represents a direct challenge to Djibouti’s economic primacy. In response, Djibouti has reportedly engaged in punitive actions, including obstructing Somaliland’s regional initiatives. Its public reception of SSC leadership—a group actively opposing Somaliland’s territorial integrity—marks a provocative escalation, signaling Djibouti’s willingness to support destabilizing forces.
Somalia’s immediate diplomatic counteroffensive further underscores the regional stakes. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s swift outreach to regional capitals in the aftermath of the MoU reflects Somalia’s existential fear that a stable and democratic Somaliland would decisively dismantle the fiction of a unified Somalia. Mogadishu’s efforts to frame Somaliland’s agreements as destabilizing have been complemented by coordinated narratives in international forums, portraying Somaliland’s sovereignty efforts as a regional threat rather than an assertion of self-determination.
The alignment of Djibouti and Somalia in opposing the MoU illustrates the depth of regional resistance to Somaliland’s emergence as an independent and economically competitive state. For Djibouti, the prospect of Berbera Port competing for Ethiopian trade disrupts its lucrative monopoly, while for Somalia, Somaliland’s success as a sovereign entity presents a direct threat to its territorial claims. The Ethiopian MoU thus serves not only as a framework for Somaliland’s strategic partnerships but also as a litmus test for the region’s tolerance of its sovereignty ambitions.
For President-elect Cirro, the challenge will lie in leveraging Ethiopia’s continued interest in Berbera while countering the coordinated hostility from Somalia and Djibouti. This requires navigating complex regional dynamics to preserve Somaliland’s economic and political trajectory while safeguarding its sovereignty against external threats.
Foreign Policy Contradictions
The Cirro administration’s foreign policy reveals a web of paradoxes. During the campaign, Cirro signaled a preference for strengthening ties with China over Taiwan—a stance now complicated by Beijing’s steadfast support for Somalia’s territorial claims. In contrast, Somaliland’s relationship with Taiwan, fostered during Bihi’s administration, has yielded tangible benefits, including healthcare advancements and military training scholarships. More importantly, it has positioned Somaliland alongside democratic nations at a time when authoritarianism is surging across the Horn of Africa.
This diplomatic crossroads becomes even more consequential amid the looming possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Trump’s previous term was marked by a combative approach toward China and unwavering support for Taiwan—a policy stance likely to sharpen in a second term. Should Cirro pivot too far toward China, his administration risks alienating key Western allies at a critical moment for Somaliland’s recognition aspirations.
Despite these challenges, Somaliland’s diplomatic mission in Washington has quietly cultivated enduring relationships that transcend partisan shifts in U.S. politics. This rare instance of consistent and effective representation highlights the value of institutional continuity—a contrast to the perils of abrupt policy reversals.
Economic Entrenchment and Reform Challenges
Key sectors of Somaliland’s economy, from the strategic Berbera Port to the crucial livestock export sector, remain dominated by entrenched interests that backed Cirro’s rise to power. His ability to reform these sectors while maintaining political stability will be severely tested by the expectations of long-term supporters who view their backing as an investment requiring returns.
The True Price of Reform
The mandate for change that swept Cirro to power now faces its greatest test not in opposition to his critics, but in his willingness to disappoint his closest allies. The fundamental challenge of his presidency lies not in managing external opposition – which is inevitable – but in asserting the primacy of his constitutional mandate over the expectations of even his most influential supporters. His closest allies, despite their political gravitas and contributions to his decade-long journey to the presidency, must understand a crucial truth: the voters elected Cirro alone to the presidency, not a coalition of interests or powerbrokers.
The historical weight of this moment demands more than symbolic changes or carefully negotiated compromises. True reform requires the courage to disappoint those who consider themselves architects of his victory. While his diplomatic skills may help soften the impact of necessary changes, they cannot substitute for the fundamental assertion of presidential authority in service of the public good.
The voters who delivered Cirro’s landslide victory have demonstrated both their desire for change and their power to enforce it. This same electorate, having shown its willingness to decisively reject the status quo, stands ready to render judgment on his presidency. The choice facing Cirro is stark: risk disappointing powerful allies in pursuit of genuine reform, or risk becoming a one-term president who sacrificed his mandate for political accommodation.
Looking Forward: Beyond Appeasement to Leadership
The true test of Cirro’s leadership will be his ability to transform from opposition leader to national statesman. This requires not just managing policy transitions but having the courage to disappoint some supporters in service of the national good. His diplomatic skills must now serve a higher purpose: advancing Somaliland’s strategic interests in a region fundamentally opposed to its success.
Somaliland’s democratic miracle, its strategic position, and its people’s unwavering determination to secure their sovereignty provide the foundation for this transition. The path forward cannot lie in appeasing those who fundamentally oppose Somaliland’s existence as a sovereign state, but in building strategic partnerships with those who recognize its value as a stable, democratic partner in an increasingly volatile region.
The road ahead demands more than just administrative skill or diplomatic finesse. It requires strategic clarity about friends and adversaries, the courage to pursue national interests despite regional opposition, and the vision to help Somaliland’s people understand that true independence requires difficult choices. This is the profound challenge facing Cirro’s presidency – not just managing change or reducing tensions, but leading Somaliland toward its destiny as a sovereign, democratic state in a hostile region.
Somaliland Chronicle is responsible for the content of this editorial.
The formal establishment of Somaliland-Taiwan relationship in 2020 is a watershed moment that demonstrates the countries’ innovative and pragmatic approaches to international cooperation. Both Somaliland and Taiwan have a special position as nations seeking more respect on the international scene, which has inevitably brought them together. This alignment is about a deeper link based on mutual respect for democratic government, the rule of law, and the will of their people rather than only about common challenges for international legitimacy. Despite their exclusion from major world forums, Somaliland and Taiwan have beaten the odds to create strong political systems. Their bilateral partnership is typical of a forward-looking foreign policy aimed at creating alliances based on shared ideals and complimentary strengths. Recognising each other’s sovereignty in reality, if not formally, Somaliland and Taiwan have opened new avenues for cooperation especially in areas vital to the growth of both nations including education, energy, critical minerals, agriculture, promotion of democracy, trade, technology, and healthcare. Along with bringing them closer, this diplomatic link has given both sides more credibility and exposure on the world scene.
The founding of the Taiwan Medical Centre in Somaliland, which marks a major advance in healthcare collaboration between the two governments, is among the most noteworthy results of this alliance. This project will help Somaliland close a significant gap in its healthcare system, which has long suffered from poor finances, inadequate contemporary facilities, and restricted access to specialist treatment. Offering Somaliland residents access to hitherto unattainable services, the Taiwan Medical Centre will bring modern medical equipment and techniques. This progress not only raises Somaliland’s general capacity to control public health crises, enhance mother and child health outcomes, and treat chronic and infectious diseases but also raises the quality of healthcare in the nation. For Taiwan, the building of this medical centre represents a strategic political investment in East Africa rather than only the urgent relief offering. Taiwan strengthens its reputation as a conscientious global actor by proving that it can help its foreign partners to be healthy and well-off. This project highlights Taiwan’s dedication to significant development that benefits both sides of the alliance by strengthening its diplomatic power and increasing its influence in an area where it has rather few allies. By means of this cooperation, Taiwan not only aids the healthcare system of Somaliland but also achieves its more general foreign policy goals, hence reinforcing the reciprocal advantages of this special diplomatic partnership.
The Twofold Impact of the Taiwan Medical Centre
Dealing with the chronic health issues that have dogged Somaliland for decades, the Taiwan Medical Centre is likely to be a transforming agent. The nation has had ongoing problems including high rates of mother and infant mortality, poor access to basic healthcare services, and the predominance of avoidable diseases brought on by inadequate medical facilities and a dearth of qualified healthcare workers. The Taiwan Medical Centre will help Somaliland to experience significant changes in the provision of healthcare. Apart from giving instant access to cutting-edge medical technologies and treatments, the Centre will help local healthcare professionals grow and train, so building a sustainable paradigm for the provision of health services. Moreover, by combining contemporary healthcare methods with public health education, the Centre will enable Somaliland’s people to participate actively in their own health management, therefore improving the health results and increasing public confidence in the healthcare system. This project can greatly ease the load on already-existing healthcare institutions, raise the standard of treatment, and offer the required infrastructure to more successfully fight endemic health problems.
Concurrent with this growth of the Taiwan Medical Centre offers Taiwan a strategic chance to increase its diplomatic and developmental footprint in East Africa. Investing in Somaliland’s healthcare industry helps Taiwan not only be a friend but also strengthen its reputation as a consistent partner dedicated to humanitarian relief and sustainable development. This initiative complements Taiwan’s more general foreign policy objectives of increasing its global profile and promoting goodwill by means of medical diplomacy. Taiwan’s dedication to enhance health outcomes in Somaliland distinguishes it as a caring and responsible actor in a geopolitical environment where many nations are fighting for dominance in Africa. With the help of the Taiwan Medical Centre, Somaliland’s healthcare system starts to grow and Taiwan stands to get both real diplomatic advantages and intangible benefits in the form of more soft power. This mutually beneficial connection shows how larger collaboration in sectors including trade, education, and technology may be based on healthcare projects, therefore strengthening Taiwan’s strategic interests and enhancing the quality of life of Somalilanders.
The building of a medical centre as advanced as Taiwan marks a turning point for Somaliland’s healthcare scene, thereby drastically changing it from a mostly primitive system to a more modern and effective model. Modern diagnostics techniques and treatment approaches help to greatly reduce the load of infectious diseases, which have long afflicuted the population. Using cutting-edge diagnostic tools, for example, will help to early identify diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, therefore enabling quick intervention and treatment. Taiwan’s knowledge of family planning, mother care, neonatal medicine, and maternal health could help to drastically lower mortality rates and maybe save thousands of lives annually. Moreover, the Centre is meant to be a research centre where local researchers and medical practitioners may work with Taiwanese specialists to investigate and control diseases unique to the area. This cooperation can result in creative ideas and locally relevant answers to public health issues, therefore improving the capacity of Somaliland’s healthcare system to properly meet its particular demands.
Apart from the immediate medical advantages, one should not undervalue the psychological and social influence of the Taiwan Medical Centre. Its construction will be a potent emblem of optimism and progress for Somalilanders, therefore fostering national pride and raising community morale about their healthcare system. Furthermore, this program is probably going to boost the expansion of ancillary businesses such medical supplies and drugs, therefore generating employment and supporting economic development. The Centre’s founding will have wider social and economic development in Somaliland, therefore transcending the health industry. The general well-being of the people will improve as the healthcare system develops, hence raising output and a better workforce. All things considered, the Taiwan Medical Centre positions Somaliland as a progressive participant in the area and provides the foundation for a more sustainable future, therefore catalysing major improvements in health, social cohesiveness, and economic vigour.
On the other hand, even though Somaliland stands to benefit much from the opening of the Taiwan Medical Centre, Taiwan’s contribution to this alliance is as vital and varied. The idea of mutual benefit is fundamental in modern diplomacy in helping to create lasting world relations; Taiwan’s foreign policy approach best illustrates this idea. Through developmental aid, Taiwan shows its capacity as a responsible global actor dedicated to assist its diplomatic allies and partners. Beyond simple medical treatment, the Taiwan Medical Centre is a strategic project strengthening Taiwan’s profile internationally and thereby confirming its position in East Africa. Taiwan not only meets urgent medical needs in Somaliland but also supports its character as a country that cherishes human welfare and development, especially in areas where health systems are weak by offering modern medical infrastructure and expertise.
Moreover, the opening of the Taiwan Medical Centre will help African nations—especially those in the East African area—to see and maybe replicate Taiwan’s unique growth strategy. Taiwan’s approach emphasises capacity building and sustainable development rather than conventional Western aid models that can include strict conditions or the Chinese debt trap method that might trap nations in unsustainable financial commitments. Emphasising cheap information transfer and skill development, Taiwan’s approach speaks to the cliché “teaching a man to fish” instead of just “giving him a fish.” This strategy gives local people the tools they need to enhance their own livelihoods and healthcare results, therefore empowering them. Such a methodology promotes resilience and self-reliance among the receiving nations by starkly contrasting with the dependency that sometimes defines other foreign aid policies.
The Taiwan Medical Centre will be a live illustration of this development concept in action as it opens operations, drawing interest from surrounding nations looking for other routes for their development. Taiwan can establish credibility in Africa’s development story by proving its dedication to training local healthcare practitioners and building a strong healthcare infrastructure. The success of the Centre could encourage other African countries to implement similar cooperative models, emphasising local capacity development and sustainable alliances instead of depending just on foreign handouts or crushing debts. Therefore, Taiwan’s model not only improves its own worldwide reputation but also supports a more diverse and balanced approach to development aid in the area, so stressing the empowerment of African countries and so fostering long-term stability and prosperity.
Taiwan’s Healthcare Diplomacy
Since its establishment, Taiwan has been acknowledged for having one of the strongest healthcare systems in the world. This is mostly attributable to its effective universal health coverage, state-of-the-art medical technologies, and strong public health infrastructure. This amazing system is distinguished by its accessibility and cost, which offers all people, from all backgrounds thorough treatment. Taiwan is a model for healthcare systems worldwide since the combination of modern medical research and the encouragement of preventative healthcare policies has greatly enhanced health outcomes in the island. Taiwan shows its ability for international leadership in a field essential to human growth by sharing its healthcare knowledge to nations like Somaliland. A shining example of healthcare diplomacy, the Taiwan Medical Centre in Somaliland uses its medical expertise to build closer relationships with its partners by leveraging Initiatives such as this not only highlight Taiwan’s will to improve world health but also reveal its strategic use of healthcare as a tool for establishing and strengthening diplomatic ties with countries that might lack enough health facilities and resources.
Along with strengthening diplomatic relations with Somaliland, the Taiwan Medical Centre will further improve Taiwan’s standing as a top humanitarian aid provider and advocate of African sustainable development. This project is a concrete manifestation of Taiwan’s soft power, proving its capacity to significantly support world public health issues and concurrently build goodwill among its allies. By means of this initiative, Taiwan is not only exporting medical treatments but also a transforming alliance emphasising training of local healthcare workers, raising health literacy, and implementing sustainable healthcare practices. This approach not only attends to current health issues but also encourages a long-term dedication to raise Somaliland’s health standards. Thus, the Centre will act as a catalyst for more general social and economic growth, so creating good knock-on effects all around the society and defining Taiwan as a cherished friend in the area.
Moreover, by presenting itself as a conscientious global actor with an eye on healthcare development, Taiwan can build closer ties with other countries including African ones. The Taiwan Medical Centre shows how health projects may provide a forum for more general discussions on governance, economic development, and social stability, therefore transcending conventional diplomatic activities and highlighting the possibility for cooperation. This strategy not only improves Taiwan’s international profile but also lets it actively contribute to solve urgent worldwide issues including public health crises, pandemics, and the necessity of fair access to healthcare. As Taiwan keeps funding healthcare diplomacy, it may use its achievements to encourage like-minded cooperation in other fields, so establishing itself as a model of responsible and successful global participation. In the end, the Taiwan Medical Centre in Somaliland makes a strategic investment in public health as well as diplomatic relations, therefore creating a mutually advantageous cooperation that advances regional links and development.
Taiwan’s Contribution to Foreign Aid and Development Models
Foreign aid is sometimes used strategically in the field of international relations to build alliances and show a country’s commitment to world progress. One striking example of this dynamic is Taiwan’s involvement in the healthcare system of Somaliland. Through the transmission of medical knowledge and the building of necessary healthcare infrastructure, Taiwan is not only addressing urgent health concerns but also strengthening its position as a responsible and proactive participant to world well-being by providing necessary aid. Emphasising the need of creating local capacities and encouraging self-sufficiency rather than only providing financial aid, the Taiwan Medical Centre is evidence of Taiwan’s dedication to sustainable development. This all-encompassing strategy seeks to build a healthcare system capable of running autonomously and efficiently, therefore improving the long-term resilience of Somaliland’s health services.
Taiwan’s development model stands out even more for its emphasis on creating real alliances that give sustained development top priority over transient benefits. Unlike other development partners who might give immediate cash rewards or geopolitical influence first priority, Taiwan’s programs stress the growth of local knowledge and infrastructure. The Taiwan Medical Centre fosters a culture of self-reliance and resilience inside the healthcare system by arming Somaliland with the required resources, training, and medical technologies. This capacity-building program not only enables Somalilanders to take control of their health results but also produces long-lasting effects beyond the terms of any aid agreement. By doing this, Taiwan is not only improving its reputation abroad as a kind friend but also establishing itself as an example for other countries trying to participate in meaningful and successful development aid. Based on common values of mutual respect and a dedication to raise the quality of life for all people engaged, this all-encompassing framework helps to strengthen ties between Taiwan and Somaliland.
Benefits for Taiwan’s Diplomatic Image in East Africa
Given its closeness to important international trade routes, Taiwan’s strategic position in East Africa—a area progressively acknowledged for its geopolitical relevance—is poised to be enhanced in great part by the Taiwan Medical Centre. Establishing a strong diplomatic presence in Somaliland helps Taiwan not only strengthens its ties there but also helps it to project itself as a major actor in East African growth. Focused on healthcare projects addressing immediate public health needs and promoting long-term stability, the Taiwan Medical Centre offers a proactive approach to international relations in a scene sometimes dominated by the more dominating nations’ more major economic aspirations. Leading the charge in healthcare development will help Taiwan to clearly demonstrate its dedication to raising regional health standards, hence strengthening its strategic impact among surrounding nations and global players both.
Moreover, Taiwan’s participation through the Medical Centre presents a special chance to balance China’s growing impact in Africa. Taiwan’s focus on healthcare stands out as an alternative form of development aid—one that gives human wellbeing top priority alongside economic growth—as China increases its engagement in the continent through massive infrastructure projects and business alliances. The clear indication that Taiwan’s strategy to participation in Africa is based on humanitarian concern and public health improvement rather than simple commercial necessity is the Taiwan Medical Centre. This program enables Taiwan to carve out a unique niche in healthcare diplomacy, therefore proving its ability to significantly improve the welfare of nearby people. By stressing this dedication, Taiwan not only improves its global reputation but also increases its influence in East Africa, so supporting the idea that sustainable development can be attained by health-oriented alliances stressing the well-being of people over essentially commercial transactions.
Strengthening Somaliland-Taiwan Relations
For Somaliland, the Taiwan Medical Centre marks a turning point since it embodies a strategic cooperation transcending simple medical treatment. The building of this institution marks a significant investment in Somaliland’s healthcare system, therefore helping the nation to solve urgent health issues like high rates of mother and newborn death as well as endemic diseases such malaria and tuberculosis. The Centre will provide local healthcare workers necessary training and capacity-building in addition to modern medical treatments and technologies. This all-encompassing strategy seeks to build a self-sustaining healthcare system, therefore enabling better health results for the Somaliland people. Somaliland shows its dedication to the welfare of its people by giving healthcare first priority and presents itself as a forward-looking country ready to welcome sensible and sustainable answers to its health problems.
Reiterating Taiwan’s leadership in healthcare diplomacy, the Medical Centre is a potent expression of its dedication to world health and development assistance. This project shows Taiwan’s ability to interact meaningfully with its partners, therefore proving its capacity to provide real advantages outside of its boundaries. Taiwan may strengthen its reputation abroad as a responsible player dedicated to bettering public health in underdeveloped areas by building a relationship based on mutual respect and shared democratic values. Moreover, the cooperation with Somaliland highlights Taiwan’s special development strategy, which gives sustainable development, capacity building, and community empowerment top priority over temporary financial advantage. Somaliland’s engagement with Taiwan marks a new era of cooperation that fits both sides’ goals for self-reliance, creativity, and human development as it declares its sovereignty and independence in the Horn of Africa. Together, they are not only enhancing life inside their boundaries but also creating a model for worldwide alliances based on common values and goals, so helping to ensure regional security and growth in East Africa.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Mohamed Hagi is a diplomat, politician and academic currently serving as the Chief Representative of the Republic of Somaliland Representative Office in Taiwan.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
In a landmark development that marks the most significant investment in Somaliland’s healthcare infrastructure since the colonial era, Taiwan has committed $22 million to construct a state-of-the-art medical center at Hargeisa Group Hospital (HGH). This project, announced yesterday, represents the largest single upgrade to the facility since its construction by the British administration in 1951. The investment not only underscores growing ties between Taiwan and Somaliland but also promises to address critical healthcare challenges that have long plagued Somaliland.
Hargeisa Group Hospital, originally built to serve a population of no more than 50,000, has struggled to keep pace with Hargeisa’s explosive growth. Today, the city’s population is estimated at one million, placing immense strain on the aging hospital’s resources. This growth has been compounded by chronic underfunding, rampant corruption and a severe shortage of qualified medical personnel.
The planned Taiwan Medical Center, a two-storey structure, promises to dramatically expand the Hospital’s capabilities. According to the hospital’s director Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Osman, the bulk of the funding is allocated for advanced medical equipment, signaling a quantum leap in the facility’s technological capacity.
“Currently, we have only one ICU unit,” the director stated in interview to MMTV. “The new facility will house seven ICU units, multiplying our capacity to handle critical cases sevenfold.” This expansion includes ten emergency rooms and a modern pharmacy, bringing HGH’s total bed capacity to nearly 600.
Taiwan’s Ambassador to Somaliland, Allen Lou, framed the investment as part of his country’s commitment to long-term, sustainable development in the region. “Taiwan shares its best, and Taiwan shares what it is good at,” he stated, referencing Taiwan’s globally recognized excellence in healthcare. “With every step forward that Taiwan takes, the world takes a step forward with us. We bravely set the course for the new world, so the world may embrace the new Taiwan.”
Dr. Mohamed Haji, Somaliland’s representative in Taiwan, emphasized the project’s significance. “For the people of Somaliland, the Taiwan Medical Centre is more than just a hospital—it’s a ray of hope,” he said. “The centre will be vital to expanding access to healthcare and tackling urgent medical issues.”
The investment comes at a critical time for Somaliland’s healthcare system, which has long struggled with regulatory challenges. The National Health Professions Commission has faced difficulties in enforcing licensing standards, with only a small percentage of practitioners holding valid licenses. This regulatory gap has contributed to a trust deficit in the healthcare system, pushing many Somalilanders to seek medical treatment abroad at great expense.
However, HGH’s past difficulties with resource management raise questions about the long-term sustainability of this new investment. These systemic issues pose significant challenges to the successful implementation and operation of the new Taiwan Medical Center.
The challenges at HGH are further complicated by frequent changes in leadership. Since President Muse Bihi Abdi took office, the hospital has seen at least three different directors, part of a broader government effort to improve public service delivery and address governance issues. These changes, often occurring during larger cabinet reshuffles, reflect the administration’s attempts to reform the healthcare sector. However, such frequent turnover in key management positions has also raised concerns about continuity and long-term planning at the hospital.
“Every year, millions of dollars drain from our economy as patients travel overseas for medical care,” noted a health ministry official. “This new facility could help retain some of that spending within Somaliland, benefiting both patients and our economy. However, we must also address underlying issues to ensure the center’s long-term success.”
The exodus of patients seeking treatment abroad has not only strained individual finances but has also highlighted the dire need for improved local healthcare services. Many Somalilanders, faced with a lack of specialized care and advanced medical technology at home, have been forced to travel to India and Turkey for treatments ranging from complex surgeries to advanced diagnostic procedures.
Taiwan’s involvement extends beyond this new construction. They have already collaborated with HGH to introduce a Health Information Management System, digitizing patient records to improve efficiency and reduce errors. This aligns with the broader goal of modernizing Somaliland’s healthcare infrastructure and bringing it into the digital age.
Questions remain about the operational aspects of the new center. It’s unclear whether Taiwan will bring in medical professionals to help boost the sector and provide skills transfer to local practitioners, or if the facility will be immediately handed over to the Ministry of Health. These logistics will be crucial in determining the long-term impact of the investment.
As Taiwan and Somaliland deepen their bilateral ties, the healthcare sector stands to benefit from this growing partnership. However, experts caution that while substantial, this investment is just one step in Somaliland’s journey towards comprehensive healthcare reform.
As Ambassador LOU aptly quoted an African proverb, “If you want to walk fast, walk alone. But if you want to walk far, walk together.” This sentiment captures the essence of the Taiwan-Somaliland partnership, rooted in mutual respect, shared values, and a vision for sustainable development.
Dr. Haji highlighted the broader implications: “The Taiwan Medical Centre serves as an excellent example of Taiwan’s cooperative model in Africa. Taiwan’s strategy, based on sincere cooperation and progress, is a model for the continent.”
The project also comes at a time of increasing private sector involvement in Somaliland’s healthcare. While private clinics and hospitals have helped fill some gaps in service provision, concerns persist about the quality and affordability of care in these facilities. The enhanced public healthcare infrastructure represented by the new Taiwan Medical Center could help balance this landscape, providing high-quality care accessible to a broader segment of the population.
As construction begins, both governments express optimism about the center’s potential impact. While significant challenges remain, including the need to improve overall healthcare governance and address the shortage of qualified medical professionals, this investment marks a crucial milestone in Somaliland’s efforts to build a more robust healthcare system.
The success of this project could serve as a catalyst for further improvements in Somaliland’s healthcare sector. However, its true impact will depend on how effectively it can be integrated into the broader healthcare system and whether it can help address the underlying issues that have long hampered healthcare delivery in the country.
As Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s once-iron grip on Djibouti loosens, the Horn of Africa teeters on the brink of upheaval. Whispers of the president’s failing health have begun to circulate through diplomatic channels, lending an air of urgency to discussions about the country’s future. While such rumors are often exaggerated in the world of geopolitics, they serve as a stark reminder of an immutable truth: Guelleh, like all mortals, will one day depart the stage. This inescapable reality casts a long shadow over Djibouti’s political landscape, forcing regional and global powers to confront the implications of a post-Guelleh era.
The potential power vacuum left by Guelleh’s eventual exit threatens to unleash a perfect storm of domestic instability and international power plays that could reshape the geopolitical landscape far beyond Djibouti’s borders. Guelleh’s regime, while repressive, has maintained a delicate balance between ethnic factions, foreign interests, and economic pressures. However, Guelleh’s failure to craft a coherent succession plan—a political testament—has left Djibouti exposed to chaos. This oversight leaves the nation vulnerable to chaos and opportunism in the wake of his departure, whether through natural causes or political upheaval.
In the aftermath of Guelleh, both the U.S. and China will likely vie to install their favored proxies at the helm of the government. Yet this power struggle will only serve to exacerbate Djibouti’s already volatile domestic situation. As these giants compete for influence, the country risks descending into political fragmentation, economic stagnation, and potentially, civil unrest. The U.S., having focused solely on maintaining military dominance without investing in local governance or economic resilience, could find itself marginalized in Djibouti’s next chapter. China, with its calculated approach, may exploit this vacuum, tightening its grip on the region.
The fragility of Djibouti’s political system cannot be overstated. Guelleh’s iron-fisted rule has systematically eroded the country’s institutions, leaving them ill-equipped to manage a transfer of power. The judiciary is a tool of the regime. The electoral commission is a mere rubber stamp. Even the military, traditionally a stabilizing force in many African nations, is a wild card. Guelleh has cultivated personal loyalty among its leadership, raising the specter of factional infighting or even a coup in his absence.
Lurking beneath the surface are simmering ethnic tensions. The majority Issa and minority Afar communities have a history of conflict, kept in check by Guelleh’s calculated balance of power. His exit could reignite these divisions, plunging the country into unrest. The stakes extend far beyond Djibouti’s borders, threatening regional stability and global trade routes.
Djibouti’s escalating debt to China, now over 70% of its GDP, has shackled the nation to Beijing’s economic will, placing it on the brink of economic collapse. Despite IMF warnings, Guelleh’s borrowing spree continues, playing into China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ through projects like the Doraleh Port. This strategic asset could fall under Beijing’s control, granting China unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s most crucial maritime chokepoints. The ability to monitor or potentially interfere with maritime traffic at the mouth of the Red Sea would be a strategic coup for China, shifting power dynamics not just in the Horn of Africa, but across the Middle East and beyond.
Meanwhile, the U.S. now stands on the verge of strategic obsolescence, its influence fading in the shadow of China’s rise. Years of myopic focus on counterterrorism in Somalia have left Washington unprepared for the complexities of a post-Guelleh Djibouti. The State Department’s Africa Affairs division and AFRICOM’s lack of strategic foresight have resulted in a policy vacuum. While the U.S. has been fixated on maintaining its military foothold at Camp Lemonnier, China has been playing a long game of economic and political influence.
France, long Djibouti’s primary ally and protector, finds itself treading a delicate line between maintaining its foothold and resisting China’s expanding reach. Recent developments underscore the precariousness of America’s position. Djibouti’s increasingly erratic foreign policy moves, particularly its tacit support for Houthi forces, have sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles. This apparent realignment threatens to transform Djibouti from a stabilizing force in the region to a potential enabler of maritime insecurity. Rumors of Guelleh’s government imposing restrictions on AFRICOM’s operational capabilities suggest a deliberate effort to constrain the U.S. military’s ability to project power.
Adding to this complex tableau is the rise of the Republic of Somaliland, Djibouti’s neighbor to the south. Somaliland’s ascent threatens to redraw the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical map. With Ethiopia poised to reroute trade to Berbera, Djibouti’s lifeblood—its control over regional commerce—could be drained. The UAE’s investment in Berbera is as much about countering Turkish influence in Somalia as it is about economic opportunity. As Somaliland gains clout, pressure for international recognition may grow, potentially redrawing the political map of the Horn of Africa.
As Djibouti approaches the inevitable end of Guelleh’s rule, the stakes could not be higher. What happens next will ripple across the region, shaping the balance of power not only in the Horn of Africa but in the global corridors of trade and influence. The battle for Djibouti’s future will be fought on multiple fronts – political, economic, and strategic. The outcome of this struggle will have profound implications not just for the Horn of Africa, but for global trade and power dynamics. As Guelleh’s reign draws to a close, the world must brace for turbulence in this small but pivotal nation. The question is not whether change will come to Djibouti, but what form it will take and who will shape it. The answer may well determine the future of East Africa and beyond.
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Somaliland Chronicle is responsible for the content of this editorial.
