Investigative Reports

Inside Somalia’s Visa-for-Sale Cartel — Meet Somalia’s Human Smuggler MP

How Ayub Ismail Yusuf and a network of parliamentarians...

From Controversy to Cornerstone: DP World’s Lesson for Egal Airport

Many got DP World's Berbera deal wrong, but Berbera...

Another Fake Degree Scandal Rocks Somaliland Presidency: Director General Caught With Diploma Mill “Masters”

Repeat of 2022 Central Bank Fraud Scandal Exposes Somaliland...
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National Election Commission Announced Nine-Month Delay of Presidential Elections

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In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.

The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office. 

The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners

The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.

President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.

Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.

The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.

Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.

Dishonest Broker – Why Turkey Will Not Run Somaliland – Somalia Talks

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On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.

In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.

Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi

Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.

The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.

Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa

It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.

According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.

Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.

To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.

President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed

Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?

Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.

Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?

Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.

Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?

Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.

As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:


Turkey in Somalia

Security Influence

Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.

The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.

Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.

The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.

Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.

While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.

According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.

Economic Influence

Since September 21, 2014 Albayrak Group has been operating the Mogadishu Port on a 20 year concession where the company takes 45% of all revenues from the port.

Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.

Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.

Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.

Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.

Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport

Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.

Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.

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Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.

According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.

Despite the obvious economic gains Turkey is making in Somalia, it is gearing up to do even more business in that war-torn country.

Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.

Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.

One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.

Turkey in Somaliland

The most visible contribution of Turkey to Somaliland is a recent 216 medical machines donated by TIKA, the Turkish aid agency to Hargeisa Group Hospital.

Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.

There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.

One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.

No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.

Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.

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President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem

The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.

Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.

Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.

Jets Without Endurance: Why Turkey’s F-16s in Mogadishu Won’t Ground Somaliland’s Moment

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Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland on December 26, 2025 did not merely alter a diplomatic equation; it exposed a long-standing misreading of Somaliland itself. For years, regional and extra-regional actors, including Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, operated on a shared presumption: that Somaliland’s insistence on sovereignty was rhetorical rather than strategic, a posture meant to extract concessions rather than redraw alignments. Israel’s recognition shattered that assumption. What followed has been less a coordinated response than a series of improvised signals, none more conspicuous than Turkey’s deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft to Somalia.

The jets have drawn attention. They were meant to. But attention is not leverage, and signaling is not control.


A Miscalculation Years in the Making

The prevailing regional view treated Somaliland as a political problem that could be indefinitely deferred. Ankara invested in Mogadishu. Cairo saw Somalia through the prism of Nile politics and Ethiopian containment. Gulf capitals hedged, calculating that Somaliland’s isolation made it pliable. Even mediation efforts, particularly those involving Turkey, were premised on the belief that time was on Somalia’s side and that Somaliland’s leaders would eventually settle for autonomy rather than independence.

That misreading had consequences. When Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding in January 2024 that hinted at a deeper strategic relationship (Red Sea access for Addis Ababa in exchange for potential recognition) the response from Egypt and Turkey was swift and unmistakable. Diplomatic pressure, public saber-rattling, and quiet threats followed. Turkey positioned itself as mediator, but the resulting Ankara Declaration effectively nullified the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU by promoting direct Ethiopia-Somalia maritime arrangements. The message was clear: some alignments would not be tolerated. The MoU stalled not because it lacked logic, but because it ran headlong into a regional veto enforced through intimidation rather than engagement.

Israel is not Ethiopia.

That distinction is central to understanding why the current moment is different, and why Turkey’s air signaling is fundamentally mismatched to the challenge it faces. Israel is not vulnerable to Nile politics, Red Sea chokepoints managed by hostile neighbors, or African Union consensus-building. It operates on a different plane of risk and calculation. And notably, diplomatic sources now indicate that Israel’s recognition may have fundamentally altered Ethiopia’s own calculus. Rather than merely reinstating the original MoU, Addis Ababa reportedly sees an opportunity to negotiate what some describe as an “MoU 2.0,” a far more advantageous arrangement with a state that now carries the weight of formal recognition.


Turkey in Somalia: A Presence Without a Combat Record

Turkey’s footprint in Mogadishu is substantial, but its character is often misunderstood. Since 2011, Ankara has positioned itself as Somalia’s most visible external patron, blending humanitarian aid, infrastructure projects, port and airport management, and political symbolism into a coherent narrative of partnership. Turkish companies run key facilities. Turkish officers train Somali forces at Camp TURKSOM. Turkish diplomats speak fluently about sovereignty and solidarity.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with Somali President Hassan Sh Mahamoud

What Turkey does not have in Somalia is a track record of sustained military action.

Despite years of insecurity, Ankara has avoided overt combat operations. Its military role has been deliberately bounded: training, advising, equipping, and projecting presence without assuming the risks that come with enforcement. Even against al-Shabaab, Turkey has preferred indirect involvement and deniability. The deployment of approximately 500 troops in April 2025, including commandos and drone operators, nearly tripled Turkey’s contingent. But sources familiar with Turkish operations emphasized that these troops were there “solely to protect Turkish assets and to train and advise Somali forces.” They would “only engage al-Shabaab if absolutely necessary and in self-defense.”

This history matters because it frames the F-16 deployment not as escalation along a familiar path, but as a sharp deviation from precedent.

The scale of the logistics effort underscores both the seriousness of Turkey’s intent and the constraints it faces. Open-source flight tracking in late January 2026 has documented an unusually high tempo of Turkish Air Force A400M Atlas transport flights to Mogadishu. These are heavy-lift aircraft capable of carrying disassembled fighter components, munitions, maintenance equipment, and the personnel needed to sustain combat aircraft far from home. Qatar Emiri Air Force C-17A Globemaster heavy transports have also been tracked flying from Qatar to Mogadishu, suggesting the Turkey-Qatar partnership that has long shaped Somalia policy is now extending to military logistics.

The reported deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft (possibly three, though the number remains speculative) represents Turkey’s most forward-leaning military posture in Somalia to date. Yet the very intensity of the logistics effort reveals the underlying problem: sustaining even a small fighter detachment at this distance requires continuous resupply. What arrives by airlift must keep arriving.


Berbera and the Geography of Stakes

Understanding why Turkey’s aerial posture matters less than Ankara hopes requires understanding what Israel actually sees in Somaliland. That begins with Berbera.

As two independent countries which recognise each other, with diplomatic relations, there is nothing that can stop us from having a security cooperation or a security pact.”
Bashir Goth, Somaliland Representative in the US
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The port city sits at the junction of the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, offering access to some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. The UAE has already invested heavily in Berbera’s development, and during Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s visit to Somaliland on January 6, 2026, the first high-level diplomatic visit since recognition, he made a point of including Berbera in his itinerary. In the readout following his trip, Sa’ar confirmed that security cooperation was on the agenda.

Somaliland’s representative to the United States, Bashir Goth, put the matter plainly: “As two independent countries which recognise each other, with diplomatic relations, there is nothing that can stop us from having a security cooperation or a security pact.”

This is what Turkey’s F-16s are meant to complicate. But geography imposes hard limits on what aerial signals can achieve.


Range, Endurance, and the Limits of Reach

From Mogadishu to Hargeisa, the distance is roughly 840 to 850 kilometers one way. On paper, that is within the reach of an F-16. In practice, it pushes the aircraft toward the edge of its unrefueled combat envelope. Transit alone consumes most of the available fuel margin, leaving little room for loiter, interception, or repeated presence.

Even under optimal conditions (external fuel tanks, light loadouts, high-altitude cruise) the operational reality is unforgiving. A jet that must immediately plan its return is not enforcing airspace. It is transiting it.

Berbera lies even farther, approximately 950 kilometers from Mogadishu. Any sustained presence over Somaliland’s strategic infrastructure would require tanker support that Turkey does not appear to have positioned in theater. Airpower coerces not through appearance, but through persistence. On that measure, aircraft operating at range offer symbolism, not control.

The airlift pattern visible in open-source tracking tells its own story. A400M transports and C-17 heavy lifters do not surge to this tempo to deliver a self-sustaining capability. They fly this frequently because the capability is not self-sustaining. Every heavy transport that lands in Mogadishu is an admission that what Turkey has positioned there cannot persist without an umbilical to Anatolia and the Gulf.

A small detachment, however many aircraft it comprises, is enough to generate sorties for a demonstration. It is not enough to maintain persistent presence, absorb maintenance downtime, or rotate crews through sustained operations. The logistics tail wagging behind this deployment is disproportionate to the combat power it delivers.


The Signaling Gap

Talk of no-fly zones has accompanied the deployment, but the concept collapses under scrutiny. No-fly zones are among the most resource-intensive military undertakings imaginable. They require continuous patrols, overlapping rotations, tanker support, early warning, intelligence coverage, legal authorization, and the willingness to escalate when challenged.

A limited deployment cannot provide this. It cannot sustain presence. It cannot rotate. It cannot absorb attrition, weather, or mechanical failure. At best, it can create a brief intercept window. At worst, it exposes assets without strategic depth.

The difference matters. A no-fly zone is a system. What Turkey has deployed is a punctuation mark.


The Sa’ar Visit: A Test Case in Risk Calculation

Consider the scenario that has already occurred: an Israeli foreign minister traveling to Hargeisa.

When Sa’ar landed in the Somaliland capital on January 6, video footage circulated on social media purporting to show fighter jets flying over the city during his visit, though the aircraft’s origin remained unclear. What is clear is that the visit proceeded without incident. Sa’ar met President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi at the presidential palace, the two signed agreements, and Abdullahi accepted Prime Minister Netanyahu’s invitation for an official visit to Israel.

President of the Republic of Somaliland Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi "Irro" with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar in Hargeisa.

From Israel’s perspective, the presence of Turkish F-16s in Mogadishu did not fundamentally alter the threat environment. Israeli planners assess risk through detection timelines, escalation thresholds, adversary sustainment, and response options, not aircraft counts alone. A Turkish jet operating at the edge of its range, with no depth behind it, is a known quantity. It is visible early, tracked continuously, and politically exposed the moment it deviates from routine behavior.

“If Turkey opts to militarily challenge Israel’s engagement with Somaliland, that could tip scale, trigger direct conflict.”

More importantly, interference with a diplomatic flight carrying a sitting Israeli foreign minister would collapse deniability instantly. It would transform symbolic signaling into direct confrontation with a state that has built its security doctrine around escalation dominance. Ankara would be assuming costs far out of proportion to any plausible gain.

Sa’ar himself seemed aware of this dynamic. In his post-visit statement, he noted: “Only Israel will decide whom it recognises and with whom it maintains diplomatic relations.”

Regional analysts have noted the mismatch in stark terms. Rashid Abdi, a prominent Horn of Africa security analyst, observed that “it is not clear what Turkey’s rapid deployment of lethal air assets in Somalia means.” But the implications of miscalculation are clear enough: “If Turkey opts to militarily challenge Israel’s engagement with Somaliland, that could tip scale, trigger direct conflict.” His assessment of the balance was blunt. Turkey “ought to be careful not to challenge the world’s best second air force in a new air war.”

The warning captures something the deployment’s optics obscure. Turkey has positioned aircraft. It has not positioned itself for a confrontation it could win.


The Houthi Dimension

There is another actor watching Somaliland’s emergence onto the diplomatic stage: Yemen’s Houthis. Following Israel’s recognition, Houthi leader Abdel-Malik al-Houthi described the move as a “hostile stance” and warned that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as a military target.

This threat is not empty posturing. The Houthis have launched missiles and drones at Israel since October 2023, and Somaliland’s position across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen places it squarely within the geography of Red Sea tensions. For Israel, this is precisely why Somaliland matters: not as a provocation, but as part of a broader architecture for managing threats to maritime traffic and regional stability.

For Turkey, the Houthi factor complicates rather than simplifies. Ankara’s Somalia posture is premised on partnership with Mogadishu and regional legitimacy. Aligning even implicitly with Houthi threats against Israeli interests would carry costs Turkey has shown no willingness to bear.


Addressing the Disinformation

Any serious analysis must also contend with the allegations that have surrounded Israel’s recognition. Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud claimed that Israel’s decision was conditioned on three demands: the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza in Somaliland, the establishment of Israeli military bases, and Somaliland’s accession to the Abraham Accords.

Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected these claims categorically: “The Government of the Republic of Somaliland firmly rejects false claims alleging the resettlement of Palestinians or the establishment of military bases in Somaliland.”

The Palestinian resettlement allegation deserves particular scrutiny. Forced population transfer is a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute. No such proposal exists within any legitimate diplomatic framework, and the claim circulated for months before Israel’s recognition, suggesting its purpose was preemptive disinformation rather than response to actual events.

That these allegations gained traction speaks to the information environment surrounding Somaliland’s breakthrough. But they do not withstand factual examination.


Airspace Shortcuts and Strategic Dead Ends

Some have suggested that Turkish aircraft could mitigate range constraints by transiting Ethiopian airspace. In purely geometric terms, such routing could marginally improve fuel margins. Politically and strategically, it changes little. Military overflight requires explicit permission. Ethiopia has little incentive to entangle itself in coercive air signaling aimed at Somaliland, particularly after its own experience with external pressure over the January 2024 MoU, and particularly now, when its own recognition of Somaliland may be under internal deliberation.

Even if permission were granted, routing efficiency does not create persistence. It does not solve the sustainment problem. Reach is not control.


The NATO Assumption

Underlying much of the speculation is an assumption that Turkey’s NATO membership provides a safety net. It does not. NATO offers no automatic backing for unilateral operations unrelated to collective defense. There is no appetite within the alliance to underwrite coercive air activity in the Horn of Africa, especially when it risks entanglement with Israel and key Gulf partners.

Ankara knows this. That knowledge constrains it more than public statements ever will.


What This Moment Actually Reveals

The reaction to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has laid bare a deeper reality: several regional actors mistook Somaliland’s patience for pliability. When that assumption collapsed, the response defaulted to signaling. Jets, statements, mediation efforts heavy on pressure and light on incentives.

Israel’s move is different precisely because it does not hinge on regional approval. Somaliland diplomat Ismail Shirwac captured the shift when he described Sa’ar’s visit as “a defining moment in the deepening relations between two democratic nations operating in a strategically critical region.” He characterized the diplomatic partnership as “not only significant, it is irreversible.”

Irreversibility is exactly what Turkey’s deployment cannot address. Airpower can delay. It can complicate. It can raise costs at the margins. What it cannot do is reverse a diplomatic fact that both parties have committed to institutionalizing.

The jets arrived. They announced Turkish displeasure. They reassured Mogadishu. They demonstrated relevance.

What they did not do is alter outcomes.

Airpower without endurance does not coerce. It announces, and then it leaves.

A Critique of Sheikh Mustafe’s False Equivalency: From Defending Siad Barre (Afweyne) to Opposing Somaliland Recognition

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An Open Response by Hassan Dahir (Weedhsame)

At the outset, two points: First, Sheikh Mustafe Haji Ismail is entitled to his views on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Second, he is not an infallible prophet immune from criticism. While respecting his dignity, we retain our right to challenge his arguments.

Understanding the profound historical blindness in Sheikh Mustafe’s recent Friday sermon requires examining the genocidal regime he now defends. Speaking from the pulpit—a sacred space where Islamic tradition forbids congregation challenge—he posed a question: How would Somalilanders feel if, during their persecution, they were replaced with a transplant population? He intended this as emotional appeal against the false claim that Somaliland would resettle Palestinians—a claim the Somaliland government has explicitly and repeatedly rejected as baseless propaganda.

The crushing irony? What he described as hypothetical horror was precisely Siad Barre’s documented plan—a plan the United Nations recognized in 2001 as the Isaaq Genocide.

Before examining his specific claims, we must identify the logical fallacies undermining his argument. First, the Sheikh commits a false equivalency—equating Barre’s rhetorical opposition to foreign colonialism with actual moral principle, while treating his domestic genocide as somehow categorically different. Second, he exploits an appeal to authority: delivering these revisionist claims from the Friday pulpit, where Islamic tradition forbids challenge, lending religious credibility to what are fundamentally political and historical assertions. These fallacies demand exposure before addressing the substance.

The Sheikh stated:

“Siad Barre, himself an oppressor, nevertheless understood that the oppression of colonialism or settler rule was unacceptable. That is why he opposed Ian Smith and South Africa. He believed that Black people subjugated by white colonial masters should be liberated, and in this he was right.”

This argument presents fundamental problems.

First, he conflates contradictory positions: acknowledging Siad as dictator while claiming he “understood that colonial oppression was unacceptable.” Consider the moral incoherence: A father who brutalizes his own children yet weeps when witnessing a stranger harm another child—is this compassion or hypocrisy? The Sheikh would have us believe oppression is categorized by the oppressor’s identity—foreign or domestic—rather than being an absolute wrong regardless of perpetrator

Second, his argument contradicts indisputable historical fact. While Barre publicly condemned Ian Smith’s racist oppression of Black Rhodesians, he simultaneously orchestrated what the UN concluded was a genocide “conceived, planned and perpetrated by the Somalia Government against the Isaaq people” of modern-day Somaliland.

Between 1987 and 1989, Barre’s forces massacred an estimated 50,000 to 200,000 civilians. In May 1988, his regime unleashed bombardments so devastating that Hargeisa earned the name “the Dresden of Africa”—90% destroyed, over 40,000 killed. Burao was 70% razed. The pilots? The very same Rhodesian and South African mercenaries Barre claimed to oppose—each paid $2,000 per sortie to commit genocide.

How can the Sheikh claim a man who hired Ian Smith’s soldiers—forces that oppressed Zimbabweans—to perpetrate genocide against Somalilanders “understood that colonial oppression was unacceptable”? This wasn’t principle; it was genocidal opportunism.

This is moral bankruptcy: condemning mercenaries for oppressing others while hiring those same mercenaries to commit genocide against your own people.

Third, and most damningly, his own question about population replacement—delivered from a pulpit permitting no challenge—exposes either profound ignorance or deliberate deception.

This was not hypothetical. This was documented policy.

On January 11, 1987, General Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan—Barre’s son-in-law, the “Butcher of Hargeisa”—submitted a classified memorandum outlining a “final solution” to Somalia’s “Isaaq problem,” advocating complete “obliteration” of the Isaaq people.

Morgan’s “remedies” included explicit demographic replacement:

– “Dilution of the school population with an infusion of [Ogaden] children from the Refugee Camps” – “Reconstruction of Local Councils to balance membership which is exclusively from [the Isaaq]” – “Balancing the well-to-do to eliminate concentration of wealth [in Isaaq hands]”

These weren’t suggestions. They were implemented policy. UN inspection teams documented in 1988 that Ogaden refugees, armed by the Somali Army, looted towns across modern-day Somaliland—the first phase of planned demographic replacement.

When Sheikh Mustafe asks, “How would you feel if replaced with transplant populations?”—the answer is: We know exactly. Siad Barre attempted precisely that. Over 200 mass graves across Somaliland bear witness. More than 300,000 fled to Ethiopia as refugees, strafed by fighter jets.

The man the Sheikh praises documented plans to colonize Somaliland and exterminate the Isaaq people. How is this not the ultimate hypocrisy?

The False Narrative

Sheikh Mustafe’s opposition to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not rooted in theology but in debunked political narrative. The claim that Somaliland agreed to resettle 2 million Palestinians has been explicitly denied.

On January 1, 2026, Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry stated: “The Government firmly rejects false claims alleging resettlement of Palestinians or establishment of military bases. These baseless allegations mislead the international community and undermine our diplomatic progress.”

The logistics alone expose absurdity: 5 million people absorbing 2 million refugees? This propaganda began circulating months before recognition, propagated through Qatar-funded Al Jazeera and weaponized by Somalia’s president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—a government aligned with Hamas and Turkey. Textbook information warfare designed to make Somaliland “radioactive” before any diplomatic breakthrough.

Somaliland’s engagement with Israel is purely diplomatic and lawful. Yet the Sheikh weaponizes false narrative, demanding outrage over fiction while defending a dictator who actually attempted demographic replacement during genocide.

Unlike a Sheikh proselytizing from a pulpit that permits no rebuttal, or despotic regimes like Qatar and Egypt that silence dissent while profiting from Israeli gas and trade, the Republic of Somaliland is a functioning democracy—a government of the people, by the people, for the people, in every sense of those words. That popular sovereignty manifested spectacularly when thousands rallied in Hargeisa’s streets celebrating Israel’s recognition—not in protest, but in jubilation. Our government answers to the ballot box, not to imams or autocrats. Should our leadership betray its explicit commitment that no Palestinian resettlement forms part of any agreement, our citizens will exercise the ultimate democratic power: voting them out. This is what separates democracies from dictatorships and theocracies—accountability runs upward from the people, not downward from pulpits or palaces. The people decide. The people choose. The people govern. So when the Sheikh, speaking from his position of religious authority, presumes to lecture Somalilanders on what diplomatic ties we may pursue based on debunked propaganda, he must understand a fundamental truth: we are not bound to silent acceptance of claims—whether they originate from Mogadishu, Doha, or anywhere else. We are free citizens of a sovereign republic who will determine our own future, answer to our own conscience, and chart our own course. Those who oppose our diplomatic choices possess no vote in Somaliland. We do. And we have spoken.

The Staggering Hypocrisy

The orchestrated outrage against Israel’s recognition reveals rank hypocrisy. Muslim-majority nations condemning this milestone maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel and conduct billions in trade—often while publicly denouncing it.

Turkey epitomizes this duplicity. First Muslim-majority nation to recognize Israel (1949), yet Erdoğan condemns Somaliland’s ties loudest. While calling Netanyahu a “modern Hitler” and accusing Israel of “genocide,” UN trade data reveals Turkey was Israel’s fifth-largest supplier in 2024, exporting $2.86 billion—routed through Greece and Palestinian Authority shell companies despite announced embargo. Pre-embargo bilateral trade exceeded $9 billion annually via a 1996 Free Trade Agreement.

The pattern: inflammatory rhetoric for domestic consumption while doing brisk business with Israel and maintaining full diplomatic ties.

Egypt presents equal hypocrisy. Since Camp David (1979), Egypt maintains full relations—the first Arab nation to do so—receiving $1.3 billion annually in U.S. aid as consequence. In 2018, Egypt signed a $15 billion natural gas deal with Israel, recently extended to $35 billion. Egypt imports 40% of its natural gas from Israel.

Yet when Somaliland—democratic, stable for three decades without recognition—receives diplomatic recognition, Egypt joins condemnation. The message: Egypt may normalize and profit handsomely, but Somaliland must be denied sovereign rights.

Turkey and Egypt—with Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan—maintain diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, conducting tens of billions in annual trade, yet condemn Somaliland for identical engagement. Somaliland, having earned recognition through democratic governance and stability, becomes pariah for the same diplomacy.

Where was outrage when these nations signed agreements? When Turkey conducted $9 billion in trade? When Egypt signed multi-billion gas deals?

The answer: this selective outrage concerns geopolitics, not Palestine. Somalia’s government, supported by Turkey and aligned with Qatar and Hamas, wields the Palestinian cause to delegitimize Somaliland’s independence. The Sheikh, wittingly or not, validates this cynical strategy.

If Sheikh Mustafe truly cared for Islamic solidarity and Palestinian welfare, he would direct Friday sermons toward massive Muslim nations profiting from Israel while doing little for Palestinians. Instead, he reserves indignation for Somaliland—a tiny, unrecognized nation seeking merely to exist.

This is not religious principle. This is political opportunism in religious garb.

Despite suffering under Siad Barre’s prison brutality, I cannot fathom what compels Sheikh Mustafe to lionize the Father of the Revolution—a man who desecrated the Quran and executed religious scholars.

About the Author

Mr. Hassan Dahir (Weedhsame) is a prominent poet and writer, and the author of his recently published poetry collection titled Dugyar. He was educated at Amoud University, where he earned a BSc in Mathematics and an MSc in Applied Statistics. For the past 20 years, he has been politically active as a firm Somaliland-first advocate and a vocal activist against corruption and the mismanagement of public resources.


Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Breaking the Cycle of Foreign Assistance Enabling Corruption

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U.S. Department of State
Ambassador Michael C. Gonzales
Senior Foreign Service Officer & U.S. Ambassador to Zambia
January 21, 2026

Moral Hazard – A situation where one party assumes greater risk because it understands that another will remedy the harmful effects.

While the hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. foreign assistance spent over the years have dramatically improved many people’s lives and livelihoods around the world, too often the United States’ approach to foreign assistance failed to advance U.S. interests, failed to spur systematic development, and enabled and perpetuated dependence and corruption by leaders in recipient countries. Since 1991, the United States has provided more than $200 billion in foreign assistance to Africa, yet the African Union reports that African countries lose an estimated $88 billion each year through tax evasion, money laundering, and corruption. Too often, what is needed for economic growth and development is not more money, but sound reforms that incentivize enduring private investment and growth.

Instead of insisting on mutual accountability to use U.S. assistance to address the causes of poverty and underdevelopment, too often we funded outputs to allay the symptoms. In so doing, we failed both the American taxpayer and the citizens of developing countries who looked to their governments and ours to help create the conditions to realize a better future.

For decades, the United States did not have a consistent policy as to even whether assistance was charity or a foreign policy tool. We did not require a committed partner, a coherent business plan, equity collateral at risk, or funding subject to performance-based disbursements. We infantilized recipient governments instead of having candid discussions on mutual performance expectations. Too often our approach to developing countries – frequently perpetuated by the excuses of those same governments – reflected the soft bigotry of low expectations. We excused away the lack of political will as “capacity constraints,” dismissed it with “we shouldn’t expect too much,” and did not challenge them when governments acted in contrast to their professed commitments.

Too often, we were content to confuse governments’ commitments for actions. We misinterpreted our access to leaders as influence with those leaders. We mischaracterized aid projects’ outputs as outcomes and program objectives as results. We misconstrued governments’ permission for us to expend aid as evidence that they shared a commitment to advance professed objectives. Perhaps worst, we failed to acknowledge when leaders of aid recipient countries demonstrated over and over through their actions that they prioritized their personal interests over, and at the expense of, the interests of their own country and citizens. Virtually never did we withhold assistance funds because host governments failed to deliver on their commitments, instead we responded by providing even more aid “because they have needs.” By trying to save people from bearing the brunt of the bad governance and corruption of their leaders, we helped perpetuate that very same corruption and bad governance.

Quite simply, we violated the central maxim of international development: the donor cannot want development more than the recipient. By doing so, we fueled moral hazard. From the pure greed of Malawi’s “Cashgate” scandal under Joyce Banda to the systematic kleptocracies of Bangladesh or South Sudan, by back filling health and social service needs recklessly created by bad governance, we have enabled and underwritten government corruption. In the worst cases, such as the predatory abuses of Mali’s Ibrahim Keita or Guinea’s Alpha Conde against their own populations, corruption and the failure to deliver basic public services needs led to military coups and incursions by terrorist organizations.

American foreign assistance is not charity but a tool to advance American diplomacy, security, and prosperity. To accomplish these goals, we must focus our assistance and insist on administering it with host-government buy-in and mutual accountability for outcomes. This, in turn, will leave space for market driven growth that will also help close off the means by which malign international actors exploit developing economies and workers. We should not be dissuaded by detractors who will attempt to vilify a more transactional approach as “neocolonialism.” Quite the opposite is true. By insisting on systematic reforms that spur transparent and accountable growth and allow governments to retain funds to support their people, the United States can do more to catalyze actual economic development and the upliftment of developing countries’ societies – and advance tangible U.S. interests – better than we have in recent decades. It is the dependency-oriented, NGO-driven old model of development that is fundamentally colonial in mindset – refusing to respect development nation sovereignty, determinism, or agency.

Operationalizing this approach involves adopting investment-oriented goals, requirements, and incentives:

  • A Serious Host Nation: Secretary Rubio has been clear, “Americans should not fund failed governments in faraway lands…we will favor those nations that have demonstrated both the ability and the willingness to help themselves.” If a government is not already taking steps to stem corruption and grow the economy when its own funds are at stake, we should have no expectation that they will be better stewards of U.S. funds. Without an aligned host-government, we should focus our resources elsewhere.
  • The Right Focus: Our purpose is not to give money away, but to catalyze systemic reforms that enable sustainable growth and opportunities for the U.S. and recipient country. Neither governments nor donors create growth; instead, our roles are to foster conditions for the private sector to invest, create jobs, spur growth, and pay taxes to fund public services. Hence, U.S. foreign assistance should focus on curbing corruption and overcoming and remediating binding constraints to growth to lay the foundation for a transparent, level, and accountable business enabling environment.
  • Confidence in The Business Plan: Most developing countries have national development plans, but too often they are unresourced and unprioritized works of fantasy, and seldom do governments enforce accountability for their actual implementation. What President Trump explained in clearly delineating America’s national interests in this year’s National Security Strategy is equally true of developing countries: when everything is supposedly a priority, nothing really can be. We should help sincere host governments develop focused, realistic strategies based on core sectors and targeting key constraints that are founded on candid analysis and include specific, tailored tactics.
  • Skin in the Game: If a country is not going to put its own resources behind an effort, it is either not really a priority, they are not really serious, or they don’t have confidence in their plan. Few investors would engage where the owner hasn’t put collateral down or his own equity at risk. Why should foreign assistance not require the same? Here, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has demonstrated two key best practices that ensure buy-in. The first is a requirement for co-financing by the host government. The second is conditions precedent: tangible reform actions a host government takes before funding even begins, to enable the success of the project outcomes.
  • The Right Resources: Again, our purpose is not to give assistance away, and the history of both corruption and assistance has shown that money is not what is most lacking to spur development. So, building on an analysis of binding constraints to growth and a business plan that we have confidence in, it is incumbent on the United States and the recipient government to craft a bespoke package of technical assistance interventions to inform and enable the reforms needed. This should not be an approach of letting a thousand flowers bloom, and it must not be built around the question of “how can we help?” Instead, we must start with the questions “what are the outcomes we want to achieve in the American interest and what needs to happen to realize them?” and build an assistance program around that.
  • Have a Contract: Unlike the Development Objective Agreements (DOAGs) of USAID that bound the U.S. to fund sectors but seldom included host governments’ performance commitments, the MCC model again provides a best practice. Explicitly detailing shared objectives and commitments by both governments – typically ratified by the legislature to carry the force of law – reduces uncertainty and improves accountability by enshrining the binding obligations of both parties.
  • Performance-Based Funding: Too often, once development projects were approved, donors’ focus turned inward to implementation, achieving outputs, and keeping funds flowing even if receiving governments actively undermined them. Gradually, funding agencies have begun shifting to performance-based disbursements. By requiring a host government to demonstrate – through its actions, not merely its rhetoric – that it remains politically and financially committed to achieve professed objectives, we ensure that U.S. assistance achieves greater impacts.

Under President Trump and Secretary Rubio’s leadership, we have the opportunity and courage to acknowledge our mistakes, to embrace candid lessons learned, and to do better. America’s generosity in doing business with those who help themselves remains as strong as ever. We are not turning away from less developed nations, instead now is the time to lean in to lend a useful hand to those who are sincere and treat them as mature stakeholders. In engaging valued, sincere nations, nothing should be imposed, hidden, given as ultimatums, or come at the partner’s expense; we are not China. Foreign assistance that delivers for the American people and our partners must be founded on sincere, voluntary, and transparent engagement. But it must be backed by tangible action and, if a recipient nation proves through their actions that they are not committed to our professed shared objectives, our allegiance must first be to the American people to be stewards of their resources.

Having dedicated my life and career to Africa and the developing world, I am invigorated by the massive potential these nations possess, and I have witnessed how the United States can help turn that potential into a reality that benefits both nations. By restructuring our approach to foreign assistance and engaging developing countries based on national interest, we can help curb the corruption that deprives families of the hope of that better future. We can deliver lasting and systematic growth alongside recipient countries. And, we can deliver tangible value for the American people through a more secure and prosperous world.

About the Author

Michael C. Gonzales is the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Zambia and the U.S. Special Representative to the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). He has held senior posts throughout Africa and Asia over his career.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

Somaliland President Attends Davos as Recognition Momentum Builds

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President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Irro” is attending the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026 at a moment of rare diplomatic velocity for the Republic of Somaliland. His presence in Davos comes just weeks after Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland, a decision that has fundamentally altered the country’s international position.

Images released by the Presidency confirming President Irro’s arrival in Switzerland ended days of speculation and made clear that Somaliland is no longer operating on the margins of global diplomacy. Davos is not a ceremonial venue. It is where power is exercised discreetly, alignments are tested quietly, and future policy directions are often shaped long before they are announced.

The timing matters. Israel’s recognition on December 26, 2025 marked a decisive break with three decades of diplomatic paralysis. Under President Irro, Somaliland moved from standstill to warp speed, securing official recognition where years of cautious engagement failed to produce results. The move shattered the assumption that Somaliland’s status was politically untouchable and demonstrated that recognition is no longer hypothetical.

Equally significant has been the manner in which this shift has unfolded. President Irro’s foreign policy has been defined by discipline, restraint, and strategic ambiguity. Engagements are advanced quietly. Signals are limited. Outcomes arrive before narratives can be contested. The result has been visible uncertainty among Somaliland’s detractors and a recalibration among observers who now recognize that Hargeisa is setting tempo rather than responding to it.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog at Davos

Sources with knowledge of the Davos program confirm that President Irro has held a series of high-level sideline engagements during the forum. Details remain tightly held, reflecting both diplomatic sensitivity and the seriousness of the discussions underway. The leaders present in Davos this year (senior figures from Israel, the United States, and major economic powers) have only intensified speculation about the scope and significance of these meetings.

Somaliland’s strategic relevance is no longer in question.

Positioned along the Gulf of Aden and overlooking one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors, Somaliland occupies geography that global actors increasingly view through a security and trade lens. In an era of Red Sea instability and great-power competition, stability has become a strategic asset, and Somaliland possesses it.

Somalia proper, by contrast, received its harshest assessment yet on January 21, when U.S. President Donald Trump told the Davos audience that Somalia simply does not qualify as a functioning state. “I mean, we’re taking people from Somalia, and Somalia is a failed — it’s not a nation — got no government, got no police … got no nothing,” Trump stated. He continued: “Somalia is not even a country. They don’t have anything that resembles a country. And if it is a country, it’s considered just about the worst in the world.”

I mean, we’re taking people from Somalia, and Somalia is a failed — it’s not a nation — got no government, got no police … got no nothing, Somalia is not even a country. They don’t have anything that resembles a country. And if it is a country, it’s considered just about the worst in the world.

President of the United States Donald J Trump

Trump’s characterization, delivered before assembled world leaders and global economic elites, was unambiguous. While his comments focused on immigration policy and fraud investigations in Minnesota rather than diplomatic recognition, the effect was to formalize what many international actors have long understood privately: Somalia does not meet baseline criteria for statehood functionality.

The timing could not have been better for Somaliland. As Trump described Somalia as lacking fundamental governance structures, President Irro sat among heads of state at the same forum, representing a territory that has maintained democratic elections, functional institutions, and territorial control for over three decades. The contrast speaks for itself.

Israel’s recognition aligns Somaliland with the broader logic of the Abraham Accords, which privilege pragmatic cooperation over inherited diplomatic taboos. Within that framework, Somaliland is no longer an anomaly but a potential partner: stable, cooperative, and strategically located at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East.

Diplomatic sources indicate that Israel’s move has prompted quiet reassessments in multiple capitals. The question now being asked is not whether Somaliland can be recognized, but how rapidly the precedent set in December will propagate.

President Irro arrives in Davos not as a petitioner seeking acknowledgment, but as a leader presiding over momentum. In diplomacy, visibility follows leverage, and Somaliland now has both.


This is a developing story. Somaliland Chronicle will continue to report as further details emerge.

State Recognition Is Not a Group Order: The Somaliland Case

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I recently watched someone on TikTok argue that Israel’s recognition can only be explained through realism. That observation misses an important point: Somaliland’s case for recognition fits both liberalism and realism. Understanding this matters, because the discourse around state recognition has been reduced to a propaganda.

The Oxymoron of “Unilateral Recognition”

When people say Israel recognition of Somaliland is unilateral, I laugh. It is an oxymoron. Recognition, by definition, involves two parties: the recognising state and the recognised state. The very act requires bilateral (not unilateral) acknowledgement. What critics really mean when they complain about “unilateral recognition” is that they were not consulted, which reveals their fundamental misunderstanding of how international law works.

Only Two Options Exist

In state recognition, there are only two options:

  1. Recognition
  2. No recognition

There is no third option such as condemnation, whining, tantrums, or international outcry. These theatrical responses carry no legal weight. A state either recognises another state or it does not. Everything else is political noise designed to distract from this simple reality.

Imagine going to a food court with friends. Everyone orders what they like. Now imagine one big guy getting upset that people did not order pizza like him. That is how immature it sounds when states condemn other states for their recognition decisions.

Each state makes its own choice. The idea that one state’s decision should require the approval of others fundamentally misunderstands the decentralised nature of the international system.

People seem to forget history and how early states were recognised. The process was never centralised. It evolved organically through bilateral relationships and mutual acknowledgement. That is literally why the Montevideo Convention exists. By design, it is a decentralised process with a few guidelines, so we have some level of predictability.

The Turkey-Cyprus Red Herring

People often bring up Turkey and its invasion of Cyprus as a cautionary tale. But that situation is blocked precisely because it involved invasion and the use of force to change the political independence of Cyprus, or part of it.

That has no place as a comparison with Somaliland, which achieved state continuity through security, consent, and the dissolution of an illegal union. Israel did not invade Somalia in 2026 and chopped off Somaliland. The two cases are not comparable. One involved military aggression; the other involved the restoration of sovereignty after a failed union and a genocide.

Somaliland Is Not A Secession

Somaliland was an independent country before attempting a union with Somalia. The keyword is attempting, because that union was incomplete legally. In many ways, it was a de facto union that never achieved full legal status. The act of union was never properly ratified, and the referendum on the union law was rejected.

Somaliland is not another South Sudan, Eritrea, or Kosovo. It is comparable to the Syria-Egypt Union and the Baltic states after the Soviet Union collapsed. These are cases of unilateral dissolution of failed or illegal de facto unions. Somaliland exercised its right to withdraw from an arrangement that was never properly constituted in the first place.

How the UN Hijacked International Law

Unfortunately, the United Nations, which is just a structure and a late product of international law practice, has somehow hijacked international law itself through dogmatism. The UN was created to facilitate cooperation between states, not to dictate which states may exist. It should not become a shelter for fraudsters entities that claim union without paperwork and with rejected referendums on claimed unions.

Yet the UN has precedent for shifting its position 180 degrees on major political questions. The recognition of the People’s Republic of China over the Republic of China (Taiwan) demonstrates that the UN can and does change course when political realities demand it. The UN’s current position on Somaliland is not immutable.

State recognition, by definition, is a state prerogative, a right held by each state under international law. It is a democratic system where consensus is built organically and naturally, ideally without coercion, unlike what is happening to Somaliland through Arab and Turkish neo-colonial pressure.

Declarative Versus Constitutive Theory

The declarative theory holds that statehood exists independently of recognition, based on meeting the Montevideo criteria. The constitutive theory holds that recognition by other states creates statehood. In practice, these are not mutually exclusive paths but stages in a process. A state can exist based on the declarative criteria while building toward broader recognition. The constitutive recognition follows naturally when the political will aligns with the factual reality.

Somaliland’s situation demonstrates this progression. It meets the declarative criteria and has done so for over three decades. The constitutive recognition is not a rejection of its statehood but simply the next stage in international acceptance.

No Deadline Means Unsustainable Opposition

There is no deadline for state recognition. This makes the entire campaign against Somaliland a lifetime campaign, where the big guy has to watch what everyone orders forever, everyday. That is not sustainable.

Opponents of Somaliland recognition must maintain their opposition indefinitely, spending diplomatic capital to prevent something that is already a fact on the ground for over three decades. Meanwhile, Somaliland continues to build its case, one bilateral relationship at a time.

Money Versus Credibility

While Saudi Arabia discovers deserts and tiny towns, backing sub-sub-sub-clans that aspire to become a federal state within Somalia, Somaliland has already communicated the national interests of the United States in recognising Somaliland. The contrast is stark.

The Arabs have more money. Somaliland has credible history and the actualisation of democracy, partnership, and coexistence. While Somalia and its patrons isolate themselves in the bubble of Arab nationalism and anti-Semitism, Somaliland has already succeeded in changing the United States position for the first time since the Bush administration, where the US actually tried to push Somaliland recognition behind the scenes.

When it comes to state recognition, what matters is not middle powers but superpowers. Although we are still short of US recognition, defending the right of Israel (and any other nation) to Somaliland recognition it is something Somaliland will never trade for recognition from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Principles matter more than expedient recognition from states that oppose the very values Somaliland represents.

In future articles, I will explain the moral grounds behind Somaliland’s recognition of Israel and provide a deeper understanding of the current Saudi-led opposition.

Conclusion

Somaliland meets the Montevideo Convention criteria: permanent population, defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. It also respects the African Union additional criteria:

  • To have formally gained independence from a colonial power
  • To claim only those colonial boundaries

This separates Somaliland from literally every secessionist movement in Africa, including Western Sahara.

So the short story is that Somaliland ticks all the boxes:

Realism ✅
Somaliland represents a strategic opportunity for states seeking influence in the Horn of Africa, access to the Gulf of Aden, and a stable partner in a volatile region.

Liberalism ✅
Somaliland embodies democratic values, peaceful state-building, and respect for international law. Its recognition would reinforce the liberal principle that self-determination and good governance matter.

The question is not whether Somaliland deserves recognition. The question is how long states will continue ordering the same cold and unhealthy meal simply because the big guy at the table insists on it.

About the Author:

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland

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Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

The State the World Pretends Not to See

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By Shay Gal

From afar, it is easy to lecture Somaliland about patience and realism. Distance makes such advice costless. What is harder is to accept that Somaliland cannot be undone on paper, because it was built in reality. It exists not by permission, but by effort.

Somaliland did not emerge from ideology or rebellion. It emerged from collapse. When the Somali state disintegrated in the early 1990s, Somaliland faced the same ingredients that produced chaos elsewhere: armed factions, clan divisions, destroyed institutions, mass displacement. What followed was not international intervention or donor-driven state building, but an internal political settlement forged through negotiation, restraint and local authority. Elders, community leaders and former combatants negotiated ceasefires, disarmament and power-sharing not in hotels abroad, but on their own soil, with their own legitimacy at stake. That process was imperfect and slow. It worked.

This explains why Somaliland succeeded where others, with more aid, recognition and favourable geography, failed. Somaliland’s institutions were not imported. They were negotiated into being. Authority was earned locally before it was ever codified nationally. The result was a political order that prioritised consent over coercion and compromise over force. When Somaliland later adopted a constitution and submitted it to a public referendum, it did so from a position of social agreement rather than external pressure. Sovereignty followed stability, not the other way around.

The world has struggled to categorise this achievement because it disrupts familiar narratives. Somaliland is not a fragile state in need of rescue, nor a proxy battlefield for larger powers, nor a romantic separatist cause. It is a polity that learned, early on, the cost of violence and the value of restraint. Its democratic record reflects that realism. Elections have been delayed, contested and imperfect, but they have also been meaningful. Governments have lost. Power has changed hands. Defeat has not triggered collapse. In a region where political loss often equals existential threat, that alone sets Somaliland apart.

The message is clear: behaviour matters less than inherited status

Yet Somaliland is still treated as if it were provisional, conditional, negotiable. Recognition is framed as a dangerous precedent rather than an overdue acknowledgment. The contrast is unmistakable. The international system continues to extend automatic legitimacy to states that cannot control their territory, protect their citizens or resolve internal contradictions, while withholding recognition from a polity that has demonstrated all three. The message is clear: behaviour matters less than inherited status.

This is where the case against Somaliland becomes intellectually thin. Somalia’s sovereignty is invoked as an article of faith, even as Somalia itself remains structurally divided, its federal arrangement unresolved, its internal cohesion contested by its own regions. Insisting that Somaliland return to Mogadishu does not solve Somalia’s problems. It merely asks Somaliland to absorb them. Unity imposed from outside, without consent, has already failed once. Repeating that experiment while expecting a different outcome is not principle. It is avoidance.

The picture sharpens when external actors are considered. Turkey presents itself as a stabilising force in Somalia, yet it is also a strategic actor with clear interests: military presence, energy ambitions, maritime positioning and regional influence. Its rhetoric of territorial integrity aligns neatly with its expanding footprint. Iran, through its regional proxies, has demonstrated how quickly instability around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden can be weaponised. In this environment, Somaliland’s insistence on internal order, predictable governance and secure coastlines is not parochial. It is strategically relevant.

Israel understood this reality when it chose to recognise Somaliland. Geography alone does not explain the decision, nor does access or transactional convenience. Israel recognised in Somaliland something it understands intimately: a small political community that was forced to build order without permission, to defend legitimacy without applause, and to govern under constant external doubt. Like Israel, Somaliland developed institutions before they were universally accepted, relied on internal consensus rather than imposed guarantees, and learned early that sovereignty is sustained through responsibility, not conferred through approval.

This recognition was not blind to Somaliland’s challenges. Israel knows from experience that living political systems are never seamless: institutions must evolve, elites must resist complacency, younger generations demand reform and inclusion, and internal tensions cannot be wished away. These are not signs of failure; they are the burdens of self-rule. They are the same challenges that recognised states confront openly without having their existence questioned. In this sense, Israel did not see in Somaliland a flawless model, but a familiar one.

That recognition exposed the fragility of the global consensus. Condemnations followed swiftly, not because facts were disputed, but because habits were threatened. The African Union reiterated its reflexive attachment to inherited borders. Western capitals reaffirmed their preference for managed ambiguity. Somalia protested loudly, yet without offering a credible political pathway that addresses Somaliland’s lived reality. None of these responses engaged the substance of Somaliland’s record. They defended a position, not an argument.

What many refuse to admit is that Somaliland overturns a basic assumption: that legitimacy flows from recognition, rather than from consent. Somaliland reversed that order. It built legitimacy first and waited for recognition that never came. The result is a political system that functions without permission, and that reality unsettles an international order built on leverage and delay.

The real question is not whether Somaliland deserves recognition, but what others fear learning from it. Somaliland shows that stability is built, not imported; that legitimacy cannot be outsourced; and that political maturity is earned through responsibility, not dependency.

Ignoring Somaliland has been convenient. But convenience is not strategy. And it is not wisdom.

Somaliland is not asking to be seen. It has already proven that it exists. What remains unresolved is whether the world is ready to admit that legitimacy, once built, does not vanish simply because it is inconvenient to acknowledge.

About the Author

Shay Gal is an Israeli strategic analyst on international security and foreign policy. He advises senior government and defence leadership worldwide on strategy, public diplomacy, and crisis decision-making.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.

Somalia Appeals to Saudi Arabia to Intervene Following Israeli Recognition of Somaliland

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The Federal Government of Somalia has called on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to intervene militarily against Somaliland’s administration following the conclusion of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s official visit to Hargeisa—a diplomatic engagement Mogadishu failed to prevent despite repeated condemnations.

The likelihood of Saudi Arabia heeding Somalia’s appeal remains remote. Riyadh faces its own intractable military challenge in Yemen, where years of airstrikes have failed to dislodge the Iran-backed Houthis who continue threatening Red Sea shipping lanes—the same strategic waterways where Somaliland’s cooperation with Israel now offers potential solutions. Opening a second military front in the Horn of Africa would stretch Saudi resources while potentially antagonizing Israel, a nation with which Riyadh has pursued quiet normalization under the Abraham Accords framework. Moreover, Somaliland’s demonstrated stability and effective governance stand in stark contrast to Somalia’s persistent security failures, raising questions about whether Saudi strategic interests would be better served by engaging Hargeisa rather than attacking it at Mogadishu’s behest.

First Ministerial Visit in Over Three Decades

On January 6, 2026, Foreign Minister Sa’ar arrived in Hargeisa at the invitation of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” for the first official visit by any foreign minister to Somaliland in 34 years. The visit occurred ten days after Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign nation on December 26, 2025.

During meetings at the Presidential Palace, Sa’ar and President Irro finalized agreements to establish mutual embassies and appoint ambassadors. The Israeli delegation, which included representatives from MASHAV (Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation), also discussed development and technical cooperation.

“Israel recognized Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and again on December 26, 2025, and will continue to stand with Somaliland in the future.”

— Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar

Despite Mogadishu’s characterization of the visit as an “unauthorized incursion” and “illegal violation of sovereignty,” the delegation proceeded without obstruction. Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued multiple statements condemning the visit, though these appeared to have no practical effect on the proceedings in Hargeisa.

Chinese Diplomatic Setback Compounds Mogadishu’s Isolation

While Israeli officials conducted high-level meetings in Hargeisa, Mogadishu faced a diplomatic setback when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi abruptly postponed a scheduled visit on January 9, 2026. The trip would have marked the first visit by a Chinese foreign minister to Somalia since the 1980s.

Although the Chinese Embassy officially attributed the delay to “scheduling adjustments,” documents shared by Somaliland officials and regional security sources suggested the cancellation stemmed from security concerns, despite Mogadishu implementing extensive security measures in anticipation of the visit. The contrast between Hargeisa’s successful hosting and Mogadishu’s inability to secure even a postponed ministerial visit underscores the diverging trajectories of the two administrations’ international standing.

The Palestinian Resettlement Fiction

Among Mogadishu’s accusations is the claim that Israel’s recognition was conditioned on accepting forcibly displaced Palestinians from Gaza. Both Israeli Foreign Minister Sa’ar and Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have categorically denied this.

“The forcible displacement of Palestinians to Somaliland was not part of our agreement.”

— Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, Israel’s Channel 14

Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal statement rejecting what it termed “false claims” about Palestinian resettlement or Israeli military bases, describing the allegations as “baseless” and “intended to mislead the international community.”

The resettlement narrative has been amplified by Somalia’s regional allies despite its legal and practical impossibility. The timing is telling: reports of Gaza reconstruction plans predated Israel’s December 26 recognition, allowing Mogadishu to weaponize Palestinian suffering for diplomatic leverage against Somaliland.

The regional hypocrisy is stark. Egypt, which maintains a heavily fortified border wall preventing Palestinians from entering its territory while having normalized relations with Israel since 1979, condemns Somaliland’s engagement. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told TRT Haber that Ankara coordinated with Muslim countries to prevent states from recognizing Somaliland—this from a government maintaining full diplomatic ties with Israel, recording billions in annual exports to Israel, while operating an unaccredited consulate in Hargeisa.

Somaliland-Israel relations are predicated on mutual strategic interests in Red Sea security and technological cooperation, standing independent of the Palestinian issue despite critics’ attempts at conflation.

Defense Minister Invokes Yemen Precedent in Saudi Appeal

Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur "Fiqi"

Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Fiqi” has drawn a direct comparison between President Irro and Aidarus al-Zubaidi, leader of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen—an implicit request for military intervention.

Minister Fiqi’s appeal carries unmistakable military implications. On January 7, 2026, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes against Zubaidi’s positions after accusing him of high treason. By comparing President Irro to the Yemeni separatist leader, Fiqi signals a desire for Saudi Arabia to apply similar coercive pressure in the Horn of Africa—a striking acknowledgment of Mogadishu’s limited capacity to counter Hargeisa’s diplomatic momentum through conventional means.

“Treat President Irro with the same diplomatic and military opposition they apply to Zubaidi… safeguard Somali unity and reject impossible illusions offered by the Israeli government.”

— Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Fiqi,” Al Jazeera interview

In an interview with Al Jazeera, Fiqi drew an explicit parallel between the two leaders, labeling both as “secessionists.” He called on Saudi Arabia and the Arab League to apply the same diplomatic and military opposition to President Irro that they have directed at Zubaidi.

Military Response Threatened

Minister Fiqi issued explicit warnings about potential military action should Israel establish a physical presence in Somaliland. When asked whether Mogadishu had ruled out military options following Israel’s recognition, Fiqi responded that if Israel “sets foot” on any part of Somali territory, the government “will use all available means to respond.”

“If Israel attempts to settle, build camps, or transfer Palestinians to Somaliland, Somalia will not stand idly by.”

— Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Fiqi”

He specifically warned that if Israel attempts to “settle, build camps, or transfer Palestinians” to Somaliland, “Somalia will not stand idly by.” The defense minister cited international and Somali law as granting the government the right to protect the country from what he characterized as external violations.

Fiqi also issued a direct appeal to Israel: “Stop this unilateral recognition and avoid expanding the conflict in the Horn of Africa.”

In a notable rhetorical turn, the defense minister offered what he termed a “sincere apology” to the Palestinian people, declaring that those in Hargeisa seeking ties with Israel are “traitors” who do not represent Somali values or Somalia’s “65-year history of supporting the Palestinian cause.”

Strategic Realignment in the Red Sea

The intensifying Israel-Somaliland partnership centers on securing Red Sea shipping lanes threatened by Houthi attacks on commercial vessels since late 2023. Somaliland’s 850-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of Aden, including the modernized Port of Berbera, positions it as a key partner for nations seeking to maintain maritime security. Israel gains a Red Sea ally at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb strait; Somaliland secures recognition from a UN member state.

Saudi Arabia faces significant economic disruption from these attacks, with reduced traffic at its newly launched Ras Al-Khair port and disrupted shipping routes threatening Vision 2030 initiatives. The Saudi-led coalition’s failure to eliminate the Houthi threat raises questions about Riyadh’s appetite for opening a second front in the Horn of Africa at Mogadishu’s behest. This strategic context complicates Mogadishu’s appeal to Riyadh.

Regional Silence and Speculation

Ethiopia, Somaliland’s largest trade partner and neighbor, has maintained public ambiguity regarding its stance. Diplomatic sources in Addis Ababa suggest internal consultations about potentially recognizing Somaliland, though no official statement has emerged.

The United States has not publicly commented on either Israel’s recognition or Somalia’s appeal to Saudi Arabia despite maintaining significant counterterrorism operations in Somalia and increasing interest in Somaliland’s strategic position. The silence is notable given the 2019 TAIPEI Act, which encourages recognition of states maintaining democratic governance—a description fitting Somaliland more closely than Somalia.

Turkey operates a military base near Mogadishu while China provides extensive diplomatic support. The dual patronage raises questions about whether Mogadishu’s foreign policy serves Somali interests or those of its external backers.

A Question of Leverage

Mogadishu’s reliance on Saudi Arabia for military intervention reflects its limited options for countering Somaliland’s growing international integration. The Federal Government of Somalia exercises no administrative, security, or economic authority over Somaliland’s territory—a reality persisting since 1991 when Somaliland reasserted its independence following the Siad Barre regime’s collapse.

Despite this, Somalia has successfully maintained international support for its territorial claims through decades of diplomatic engagement. The appeal to Saudi Arabia represents a test of whether that diplomatic capital can be converted into concrete action.

Somaliland bases its sovereignty claim on borders inherited from the British Somaliland Protectorate, which gained independence on June 26, 1960—five days before entering a voluntary union with Italian Somalia. That union was dissolved by the 1991 declaration following years of civil war and systematic human rights abuses against populations in the former British protectorate.

As Israel and Somaliland move forward with establishing embassies and deepening their strategic partnership, the question facing Mogadishu is whether international appeals can reverse a diplomatic breakthrough achieved through quiet negotiation. The answer may determine whether Somalia’s territorial claims remain a viable political position or become an increasingly hollow diplomatic fiction.


From Extermination to Erasure: Somalia’s Digital Rebranding of the Isaaq Genocide

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Dr Fundji Benedict-VL
25/01/10
(lvs-foundation.org)

Genocide denial in the Horn of Africa is no longer confined to the familiar repertoire of silence, euphemism, and diplomatic evasion. It has matured into an active technology of power—an attempt to conclude, by informational means, what was begun by kinetic force. What the Siad Barre regime pursued through aerial bombardment, scorched cities, mass graves, and systematic group destruction between 1987 and 1989, the contemporary Federal Government of Somalia and its allied discourse networks increasingly seek to neutralize through semantic downgrading, platform contestation, and symbolic de-nomination. This is not a rupture with the past; it is its mutation. The target is no longer only bodies, but the conditions under which a people can be named, mourned, and politically recognized.

That shift matters because memory is not an epilogue to atrocity—it is one of its terrains. Denial is not simply what happens after violence; it is a method by which violence is domesticated, laundered, and made available for repetition. The Isaaq case exposes this with unusual clarity: a genocide executed within living memory and within the legal universe of the Genocide Convention, yet still subjected to systematic rebranding as “civil war.” The result is a double injury: first, the original destruction; then the later theft of meaning, in which survivors are pressed to accept the annihilation of their dead as merely an unfortunate chapter in a generic national tragedy.


“The result is a double injury: first, the original destruction; then the later theft of meaning, in which survivors are pressed to accept the annihilation of their dead as merely an unfortunate chapter in a generic national tragedy.”

The evidentiary archive, by any serious scholarly standard, is formidable. Yale’s Genocide Studies Program treats the late-1980s campaign against the Isaaq as a genocide case study, describing a deliberate and systematic campaign directed at Somaliland’s majority Isaaq population and noting the alleged existence of an “official genocide document” often cited as “The Final Solution to the Isaaq Problem” (while also signaling disputes over authentication). The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention has likewise issued a formal statement remembering the Isaaq genocide and characterizing patterns consistent with intent to destroy a protected group.  The forensic record sharpens the archive into something harder than interpretation. A UN-linked forensic assessment mission—conducted under the human-rights mandate of the UN system—records that, when mass graves near Hargeisa were exposed by flooding in 1997, “several hundred bodies” were reportedly unearthed and reburied, including men, women, and children “bound by the wrist and roped together” in groups. The same report documents that dozens of features in multiple sites were consistent with mass graves and warranted investigation. This is precisely why euphemism is not merely inaccurate; it is ethically operative. A narrative of symmetric “civil war” cannot easily metabolize wrists tied together in rows. If denial persists despite such an archive, it is not because evidence is absent. It is because evidence is inconvenient. Contemporary denial rarely denies the dead outright; instead, it relocates them—out of law, out of specificity, out of moral clarity. One observes a recurring grammar of rebranding that operates less like argument than like laundering.

What emerges is a recognizable laundering sequence. The crime is first repositioned as symmetry: “civil war” becomes the master category—elastic enough to absorb state-directed extermination into the moral noise of disorder. Yet genocide is not defined by the existence of insurgency; it is defined by intent to destroy a protected group “as such,” and by the mobilization of organized capacity toward that end. When aerial bombardment levels civilian urban centers and mass-grave landscapes appear as a geographic signature, “civil war” functions less as description than as exculpation. From there, specificity is dissolved. “Isaaq” is displaced by “northerners,” “people of the north,” or “victims of the conflict”—a shift that is not rhetorical hygiene but a legal maneuver, because genocide becomes harder to name once the targeted group is linguistically evacuated. The dilution is then moralized through pan-Somali victimhood: because many communities suffered under Barre, the argument runs, no one may claim a particularized grievance—comparative suffering becomes a solvent that flattens an exterminatory campaign into generic national pain. Finally, remembrance itself is rendered suspect. Exhumations, memorials, and annual commemorations are recast as “separatist propaganda,” as though grief were merely strategy, and as though the insistence on the word genocide were evidence of bad faith. Yet the clearest mark of politicization is often not the refusal of euphemism, but the demand for it. All of this would already be deeply consequential in an analogue public sphere. But we now inhabit an epistemic environment in which truth is mediated by ranking systems, recommendation engines, and platform governance—an environment that permits denial to become not merely a posture but an infrastructure. Here lies what is often missed, and what must be made explicit: algorithmic systems can extend genocide’s effects by extending denial’s reach. They do so not because the platforms “choose sides,” but because attention-based systems reward repetition over rigor, provocation over precision, and mobilization over nuance. In such an environment, denial is not simply expressed; it is trained, amplified, and normalized—until it becomes the default interpretive frame encountered by outsiders, journalists, students, diplomats, and even automated knowledge systems.

“Algorithmic systems can extend genocide’s effects by extending denial’s reach.”

UNESCO has warned—specifically in the context of Holocaust memory—that generative AI and digital systems can distort historical understanding, enabling disinformation and hate-fueled narratives and even inventing false or misleading accounts through “hallucination” dynamics. The point is not to equate cases. It is to recognize a shared structural vulnerability: when atrocity history becomes “content,” it becomes susceptible to the same manipulation techniques that shape elections and conflicts. Denial actors do not need to persuade everyone; they need only to pollute the information environment—so that certainty becomes “controversial,” documentation becomes “disputed,” and the very act of naming becomes framed as “tribalism.” This is the hinge between extermination and erasure. The original violence sought to destroy a population; the informational violence seeks to destroy the conditions of recognizability—to make the genocide difficult to search, awkward to cite, risky to teach, and easy to downgrade. When the “civil war” label is algorithmically rewarded, it does not simply misdescribe the past; it shapes the present by disciplining what can be said without penalty and what is dismissed as partisan noise. In that sense, denial does not merely follow genocide: it can become one of the mechanisms by which genocide’s social and political aims remain live—by keeping survivors trapped in an endless struggle not only for justice, but for legibility.

The Herero–Nama genocide offers a clarifying parallel because denial across cases tends to follow recognizable grammars. Between 1904 and 1908, German colonial forces in German South West Africa (present-day Namibia) executed an exterminatory campaign against the Herero and Nama, an episode widely treated in scholarship as among the twentieth century’s first genocides. For decades, the atrocity was reframed through the idiom of colonial war—language that softened legal and moral consequence. Only much later did official discourse move toward explicit naming. In 2021, Germany’s Foreign Minister publicly stated that Germany would “officially call these events what they are from today’s perspective: a genocide,” and that Germany would ask Namibia and victims’ descendants for forgiveness. Yet the same political settlement became contested precisely because naming arrived in tandem with constraint: the 2021 arrangement centered €1.1 billion in funding framed around “reconstruction and development,” and it drew sustained criticism from affected communities and observers who argued that it avoided the full logic of reparations and marginalized direct descendant participation.  This is the instructive mirror. In both contexts, extermination is recoded as conflict; “unity” narratives are mobilized to silence particular suffering; and acknowledgement is resisted not only out of shame but out of strategic calculation—because full recognition strengthens claims for restitution, autonomy, or separation. Denial is durable because it is not merely psychological; it is institutional.

Where the Isaaq case diverges is technology and tempo. The Herero–Nama genocide occurred before the 1948 Genocide Convention; its reframing was largely conducted through historiography, diplomacy, and state memory projects over a century. The Isaaq genocide occurred within the modern legal order and within living memory—yet denial is now being accelerated through digital systems that compress the timeline of distortion. In this environment, symbolic battles—names in databases, labels on maps, categories in drop-down menus, the phrasing that appears first in search—are not superficial. They are the contemporary infrastructure of political existence. De-nomination is not a clerical error; it is a political act, because to make a polity unnamable is to make it increasingly unthinkable. At this point, Gregory Stanton’s staging model is useful—not as statute, but as diagnostic. The model treats denial not as an afterthought but as a stage that persists, and it explicitly warns that denial is “among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres.” Read in that light, the struggle over terminology (“genocide” versus “civil war”), the struggle over specificity (“Isaaq” versus “northerners”), and the struggle over symbolic presence (“Somaliland” as a legitimate name) are not semantic quarrels. They are contests over whether the moral and legal lessons of the past will be permitted to constrain the politics of the present. This is also why Somaliland’s statehood cannot be treated as a mere diplomatic footnote. A community that has rebuilt institutions after mass violence—and sustained relative stability and repeated electoral practices—does not only claim sovereignty; it performs it. Scholarly analysis of Somaliland’s status has long noted that it meets many functional criteria of statehood even in the absence of broad recognition. Contemporary geopolitical reporting underscores Somaliland’s strategic position at the junction of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and the significance of Berbera near major shipping lanes—facts that make Somaliland persistently relevant to regional security calculus regardless of formal recognition.  That relevance has been sharpened by recent diplomatic shocks. Ethiopia’s 1 January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland—reportedly involving sea access and the prospect of future recognition—generated regional controversy precisely because it challenged the assumption that Somaliland’s diplomatic ceiling is fixed. And Israel’s decision on 26 December 2025 to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state—followed by high-level engagement, including the reported visit of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Hargeisa in early January 2026—has further punctured that assumption, while drawing condemnation from Somalia and critical responses within continental institutions.

For Somaliland’s own historical-legal narrative, the crucial nuance is that Israel’s 2025 recognition is best understood as re-recognition in spirit: Somaliland was recognized as an independent state in 1960 during the brief five-day State of Somaliland period by dozens of states, including Israel, before entering union. Whether external actors accept that framing or not, the analytical point remains: the more Somaliland is treated as a functioning polity, the more denial becomes entangled with a second project—the attempt not only to downgrade past extermination, but to contest present existence. And this returns us to the moral core. The most consequential question is not which capitals recognize whom. It is whether a region can be stabilized on the basis of coerced forgetting. Denial forecloses transitional justice because it refuses the first condition of repair: acknowledgment. It corrodes any possibility of voluntary political union because it asks survivors to treat the destruction of their community as a negotiable narrative. It destabilizes the Horn by inviting external powers to exploit unresolved grievances and unaddressed crimes, converting historical wounds into present-day leverage. And it reproduces the Herero–Nama lesson with cruel fidelity: when states offer ambiguity instead of accountability, they do not close history; they lengthen it.

The conclusion, then, is not merely that denial is wrong. It is that denial is active—an extension of violence into the domain of meaning. Somaliland’s response has been, in the most literal sense, archival resilience: exhume, document, name, commemorate. These are not performative rituals for foreign audiences. They are the civic technologies by which a polity protects itself from the second death—the death that comes when the world is persuaded to forget. Somaliland should therefore insist on a principle that sounds simple but is politically explosive: genocide cannot be administratively reclassified without re-activating the conditions of its recurrence. To downgrade the Isaaq genocide into “civil war” is not to interpret history; it is to license the future by removing the constraints that truth imposes on power. And because the contemporary contest is increasingly algorithmic—fought through attention economies, ranking systems, and the mass production of euphemism—Somaliland’s memory work must also be informational: not only exhuming graves but defending the vocabulary by which those graves can be intelligibly mourned.

Finally, Somaliland’s resilience finds an echo in Israel—not because the histories are identical, but because both cases illuminate the same civilizational refusal: the refusal to let extermination be re-scripted into acceptable noise. Israel is a society shaped, in significant part, by the moral imperative of remembrance after genocide, and it has become a primary target of the digital age’s propaganda ecologies, where disinformation and algorithmic amplification seek to erode legitimacy by eroding truth. UNESCO’s warnings about AI-enabled distortion of Holocaust memory are a reminder that the struggle over genocide is now, unavoidably, a struggle over information systems. In that light, Somalia’s insistence on downgrading genocide into “civil war,” and on pressuring the world to treat Somaliland’s very name as illegitimate, reads not as prudence but as a collapse of political courage—a species of statecraft cowardice: the refusal to face an archive that indicts, and the attempt—through erasure rather than accountability—to escape the moral consequences of history.

About the Author

Dr Fundji Benedict, CEO, lvs-foundation.org

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff. 

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Somaliland Is a Recognized Country. It is Time to Act Like One.

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Recognition demands reciprocity. That means expelling Turkey, regulating banks, and ending corruption.

History remembers bold moments: Anwar Sadat’s 1977 flight to Jerusalem. Nixon’s opening to China. De Klerk releasing Mandela. These weren’t just diplomatic breakthroughs—they were paradigm shifts that changed what seemed possible.

President Abdirahman “Irro” Mohamed Abdullahi just delivered Somaliland’s defining moment.

When he disappeared into Dubai and Tel Aviv for an extended overseas trip marked by complete radio silence, the nation wondered. Last month, when he returned with Israel’s historic recognition of the Republic of Somaliland, it became clear what the silence had been for. In our December 28 editorial, “The Quiet Diplomat Delivers for Somaliland,” we offered a mea culpa for questioning what turned out to be the most important diplomatic mission in Somaliland’s history.

We were right. But we were also only half right.

The bold gesture secured recognition and made the Republic of Somaliland the most strategic country in the region. What comes next determines whether recognition becomes statehood.

Recognition Is Leverage—But Only If Used

Israel’s recognition validates three decades of democratic governance and regional stability. It proves the impossible is merely difficult. But recognition alone builds nothing. It opens a door—Somaliland must walk through it.

The public deserves euphoria. After thirty-four years, they’ve earned the right to celebrate. But while flags wave in the streets, someone must be sweating in government offices—planning how to transform a diplomatic breakthrough into institutional reform, how to convert recognition into leverage, how to dismantle the architecture of dependency that served Somaliland as an unrecognized entity but will cripple it as a recognized state.

More recognition is coming. The dominoes are lined up. The question isn’t whether additional countries will follow Israel’s lead. The question is whether Somaliland will be ready when they do.

Recognition Is Binary, Not Cumulative

Let’s address the inevitable deflection: “It’s only Israel.”

Only?

Israel is a nuclear power. A top-15 global economy. The technological backbone of American defense systems. The state that turned desert into agricultural innovation, isolation into diplomatic leverage, and existential threats into strategic dominance.

Some countries are recognized by 100+ states and remain irrelevant. Others are recognized by a handful and reshape regions. Kosovo has roughly 100 recognitions and no UN seat. Palestine has 140+ and remains contested. Taiwan has fewer than 15 and manufactures the semiconductors that power the world.

Taiwan is the model not just because of its economy, but because it weaponized its indispensability. The world cannot function without Taiwanese chips, so the world ensures Taiwan survives. Somaliland must become equally indispensable to Red Sea security.

Recognition is not a headcount. It’s a threshold. And Israel—with its intelligence apparatus, its military-industrial integration, its diplomatic reach across Washington, Brussels, and beyond—is not “only” anything.

At the UN Security Council emergency session convened to condemn Somaliland’s recognition, US Deputy Ambassador Tammy Bruce cut through the hypocrisy: “Earlier this year, several countries, including members of this Council, made a unilateral decision to recognise a non-existent Palestinian state, and yet no emergency meeting was called to express this Council’s outrage.”

Israel’s Deputy UN Ambassador Jonathan Miller was equally direct: “Some countries are allowed to recognize a state that does not exist. Israel, by contrast, is denied the right to recognize a very real state.”

The Republic of Somaliland is no longer an unrecognized country. That status is binary, not cumulative. One serious recognition beats fifty symbolic ones. And Israel is nothing if not serious.

Readiness requires confronting three uncomfortable truths about how Somaliland has operated for three decades—and making decisions that will anger every entrenched interest that benefits from the status quo.

First Truth: Reciprocity Is Non-Negotiable

Somaliland is now a recognized country. It must behave like one.

Djibouti’s decision to close its Hargeisa office immediately after Israeli recognition was not an insult—it was honesty. Djibouti doesn’t recognize Somaliland, so it removed itself to continue its other subversion activities in the open. Clean. Clear. Reciprocal.

Now consider the others: The “UK Office in Hargeisa”—subsidiary of their Mogadishu embassy. The “Turkish Consulate in Hargeisa.” And many others. Diplomatic facades that maintain presence without granting recognition.

Turkey requires immediate attention.

Last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan gave a revealing interview to TRT Haber in which he openly celebrated Turkey’s multi-year campaign to prevent Somaliland’s international recognition. This wasn’t a leak. This wasn’t speculation. This was the Turkish Foreign Minister publicly boasting about blocking Somaliland recognition as a diplomatic achievement.

His exact words: “We have negotiated extensively with the West and made a serious effort to prevent any other country from recognizing [Somaliland]. Thankfully, none of the countries that were initially expected to recognize the entity did so.”

Fidan went further. He revealed that Turkey killed what he called the “Somaliland project” two years ago—preventing Ethiopia from recognizing Somaliland by mediating between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. He described Turkish diplomats working “behind the scenes to lock in commitments” from fence-sitting countries, framing recognition-prevention as “high-stakes diplomatic containment” necessary for “regional survival.”

He called Israeli recognition “the gravest setback” Somaliland could face and described it as “serious humiliation” and “punishment” for a Muslim society.

Now here’s the punchline: Turkey said all of this while operating a consulate in Hargeisa.

Think about that. Turkey maintains diplomatic presence on Somaliland soil—enjoying Somaliland’s stability, benefiting from Somaliland’s security, accessing Somaliland’s territory—while simultaneously:

  • Lobbying Western capitals to deny Somaliland recognition
  • Boasting about successfully preventing recognition “two years ago”
  • Describing recognition-prevention as a matter of “regional survival”
  • Calling Israeli recognition a form of “punishment” and “humiliation”

This is not diplomacy. This is hostile intelligence operations disguised as consular services. Turkey’s “consulate” exists to monitor Somaliland, influence Somaliland’s politics, and undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty—all while denying Somaliland the very legitimacy that consular presence implies.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must act. Issue a clear directive: any foreign mission in Hargeisa not accredited to the Republic of Somaliland has 72 hours to regularize their status or be declared persona non grata. Turkey has publicly declared itself hostile to Somaliland’s recognition. They’ve admitted to actively working against Somaliland’s sovereignty. They’ve celebrated blocking recognition as a diplomatic victory.

Why would Somaliland allow a foreign power that views its recognition as an existential threat to maintain operations on its territory?

Your business is 800 kilometers south, Minister Fidan. Pack your bags.

Somaliland tolerated this because unrecognized entities take what they can get. But that calculus just changed.

Recognized countries operate on reciprocity. You want an embassy in Hargeisa? Recognize Somaliland and we’ll open one in your capital. You want intelligence sharing, security cooperation, trade agreements? Excellent—let’s negotiate nation-to-nation, not patron-to-client.

Countries maintaining “offices” in Hargeisa while operating embassies in Mogadishu face an uncomfortable legal reality: they’re in the wrong country.

Their diplomatic credentials come from Somalia. Their immunity—if it exists—is granted by a government with no jurisdiction in Somaliland. They are foreign nationals conducting activities in a recognized sovereign state without accreditation from that state.

The implications are severe. No diplomatic immunity. No Vienna Convention protections. No special status under international law. Just foreign nationals operating without authorization on sovereign territory.

Want to operate here? Recognize Somaliland and obtain proper accreditation from Hargeisa. Don’t want to recognize? Your business is 800 kilometers south.

The diplomatic fiction they’ve enjoyed for three decades ended with Israeli recognition. Time to pick: accreditation or departure.

Every foreign office that refuses recognition while maintaining operations sends a message to potential recognizing states: “We don’t actually believe Somaliland is a country—we’re just here for access.” That undermines legitimacy with every nation calculating whether to follow Israel’s lead.

The era of diplomatic ambiguity is over. Recognize us, or leave. The status quo is no longer acceptable.

Second Truth: Developmental Colonialism Must End

The UN and its agencies have captured Somaliland’s government institutions—and they operate under the fiction that Somaliland is “Somalia.”

Walk into the Ministry of Education. The de facto authority isn’t the minister—it’s UNICEF. Health policy? WHO Somalia. Agriculture? FAO Somalia. They all brand themselves as operating in “Somalia,” coordinating through Mogadishu, treating Somaliland as a regional field office.

The results speak for themselves: dry pit latrines emblazoned with a dozen NGO logos. World Handwashing Day celebrations while schools crumble. Workshops on “capacity building” that build nothing but PowerPoint presentations. Meanwhile, the underlying systems remain weak, dependent, and incapable of functioning without external life support.

This is not development. This is developmental colonialism—foreign agencies making decisions, setting priorities, controlling budgets while Somaliland’s institutions become bureaucratic appendages incapable of functioning independently.

The “Somaliland Special Arrangement”

The World Bank and EU operate through what’s formally known as the “Somaliland Special Arrangement”: funds allocated to Mogadishu, a fraction earmarked for Somaliland, disbursement controlled by Somalia’s federal government.

Somaliland gets scraps. Somalia gets control.

For years, projects like the “Somali Electricity Sector Recovery Project” operated in Hargeisa under Somalia branding. Somaliland would swap “Somali” for “Somaliland” on local signs—same funding, same Mogadishu coordination, different billboard.

The same cringe-worthy gymnastics applied to foreign diplomats. Ambassadors to Somalia would arrive in Hargeisa, and Somaliland would quietly omit “Somalia” from their titles for local consumption. A face-saving exercise that fooled no one but avoided the contradiction.

Thank God that practice has largely stopped. But the World Bank and EU? Still playing pretend through the Special Arrangement.

The EU maintains significant presence here while actively opposing Israeli recognition. If the EU doesn’t recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty—and opposes those who do—what exactly is it doing here?

The answer: renegotiate or withdraw. Somaliland should demand direct bilateral programming outside Mogadishu frameworks, Somaliland-branded projects with Somaliland-controlled implementation, 24-month transition timelines for all “Special Arrangement” structures, and recognition of sovereignty as prerequisite for continued operations.

Will this be painful? Yes. Will donors complain? Loudly.

But here’s the secret the development industry doesn’t want you to know: Nations are not built by NGOs and UN agencies. The proof? Taiwan. Taiwan was isolated, unrecognized, left to fend for itself—and it built world-class institutions, a thriving economy, and a technological sector that manufactures the chips powering half the world’s electronics.

Somaliland has spent thirty-three years praised for “managing its affairs” while simultaneously having those affairs managed for it by foreign agencies that don’t recognize its existence.

The training wheels must come off.

Third Truth: Institutional Rot Will Kill Recognition’s Promise

Somaliland’s internal house is catastrophically disordered. The international community praised Somaliland’s governance compared to regional chaos, but the bar was so low it’s practically subterranean. Israeli recognition changes the equation—Somaliland now faces standards of statehood, not the patronizing soft bigotry of low expectations.

Those standards reveal uncomfortable realities.

The Corruption Cartel

As previously documented by this paper: Central Bank governors with diploma mill degrees. Presidential directors general holding fake credentials. Credible allegations of rigged World Bank procurement. Ministry budgets routed through private accounts with minimal oversight.

This is not incompetence. This is greed on wheels—public officials whose primary focus is ensuring they get their fill before they’re sacked. Two houses. A few SUVs. Perhaps a villa in Turkey. That’s the endgame. Not national development. Not institutional capacity building. Personal enrichment.

Here’s why this matters internationally: The United States has the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Israel—Somaliland’s newest partner—has Section 291A of the Penal Law criminalizing foreign bribery with seven-year prison terms. When Israeli and American businesses look at Somaliland and see systemic corruption, they cannot engage without legal liability.

Recognition opens doors. But those doors lead nowhere if corruption greets them on the other side.

The Extractive Bureaucracy

And it’s not just corruption. It’s the bureaucratic nightmare designed to vacuum money from the public’s pockets.

Try obtaining a business license in Somaliland. The process includes a mandatory step through the Attorney General’s office—a requirement so convoluted it almost seems the government is anti-business, intentionally placing hurdles to discourage entrepreneurship. But the unfortunate truth is simpler and more sinister: many processes are designed to ensure as many hands touch the process and assess a fee—legitimate or plain graft—to expedite things for you.

Getting a driver’s license? Nightmare. Registering a vehicle? Nightmare. Starting a business? Nightmare. Every single workflow is structured to maximize touchpoints, maximize fees, maximize opportunities for someone to demand a bribe.

This isn’t governance. This is extractive bureaucracy—a system designed not to deliver services but to extract rents.

Governments worldwide have streamlined these processes. Somaliland must do the same: digitize, simplify, eliminate corruption vectors. No serious investor tolerates systems where starting a business requires paying off half a dozen officials for paperwork stamps.

The Unregulated Financial Cartel

And then there are the business conglomerates that have grown so fat the government is indebted to them.

Let’s talk about Dahabshiil and Salama Bank—the twin pillars of Somaliland’s unregulated financial sector.

These are not banks in the traditional sense. They operate as monopolistic conglomerates that forced Islamic banking into the constitution only to charge exorbitant “halal” fees on collateralized loans. They act as the bank, the mortgage company, the builder that built the house. They’ll even finance your vehicle and your cellphone.

They’ve created digital payment systems operating in regulatory gray zones, without clear statutory oversight or independent supervision—free to move money and customer information between Somalia and Somaliland without meaningful accountability.

Let that sink in. Customer data—including financial records, transaction histories, and personal information—flows freely between Somaliland and Somalia with zero regulatory oversight.

For a nation asserting sovereignty, this is a catastrophic vulnerability. Somalia is, at best, indifferent to Somaliland’s sovereignty and, at worst, actively hostile. Allowing Somaliland’s financial data to be exfiltrated and potentially used by a hostile state is a national security disaster.

But more importantly, it makes Somaliland economically radioactive. Do you think Israeli banks will clear transactions with Dahabshiil or Salama if they cannot see who the end beneficiary is? Recognition brings Somaliland into the global financial grid—and the global grid has rules. AML/CFT compliance isn’t optional. Somaliland’s banks are currently unplayable. If we want to trade with Tel Aviv, New York, and London, the era of the unregulated hawala conglomerate must end.

This is not an indictment of individuals—it’s a regulatory failure. Somaliland has operated with extreme deregulation, abdicating governing responsibility. That must end.

Required reforms: AML/CFT compliance frameworks, data localization mandating Somaliland-only storage, independent financial sector supervision, and consumer protection against predatory practices.

Will this anger powerful business interests? Absolutely. Will Dahabshiil and Salama Bank push back? Guaranteed. But here’s the reality: recognized countries regulate their financial sectors. Countries that let foreign companies and local cartels operate without constraint remain perpetually vulnerable.

The Talent Hemorrhage

Somaliland has extraordinary human capital—diaspora professionals and domestic NGO veterans who manage complex donor-funded programs, coordinate multi-stakeholder initiatives, execute procurement processes, and deliver measurable development outcomes for foreign agencies.

These are people who have learned to navigate bureaucracies, manage budgets, implement programs, and deliver results. They’ve done it for UNICEF, for the World Bank, for Save the Children. They’ve built skills and expertise that Somaliland desperately needs.

It’s time to repurpose these professionals to work for God and country.

But let’s be clear: not all NGO experience is created equal. Some professionals need a metaphorical reeducation camp—meaning a hard reset away from jargon and toward measurable outcomes. “Monitoring and Evaluation” and “Cross-Cutting” vernaculars alone won’t cut it. The government must demand results, not jargon. Get a low performance rating in your own evaluation? You’ll be looking for work somewhere else.

The goal is to make public service so attractive that it becomes the place where talent wants to come. Competitive salaries. Merit-based advancement. Real responsibility. Meaningful work.

Stop building someone else’s portfolio. Start building Somaliland’s institutions. Stop implementing projects designed in New York or Geneva. Start designing policies for Hargeisa, Borama, Burao, and Erigavo—for Somaliland.

But here’s the problem: Why would competent people—diaspora or domestic—want to work for a government defined by patronage rather than performance? Why would a talented professional leave a well-paying NGO job to join a ministry where competence is secondary to clan affiliation? Where the best ideas die in bureaucratic limbo while the worst ideas flourish under political protection? Where corruption is rewarded and integrity is punished?

The Bloated Apparatus

Credible reports and internal audits suggest Somaliland’s 18,000-person civil service suffers from widespread ghost workers and absenteeism, with a substantial portion of payroll supporting non-performers. This isn’t governance—it’s patronage masquerading as administration.

President Irro must act decisively: eliminate ghost positions, slash non-performers, redirect Somaliland’s limited budget toward development rather than subsidizing political debts.

Brutal? Yes. Necessary? Absolutely. The alternative is institutional bankruptcy—not just financial, but institutional. A government that cannot afford to pay competent people competitive salaries because it’s subsidizing an army of non-performers is a government destined to fail.

The Herculean Task

None of this rot is President Irro’s creation. The corruption, bloated bureaucracy, extractive systems, financial cartels, UN dependency—all predate his presidency. These are institutional failures calcified over three decades into accepted practice, becoming the infrastructure of governance itself.

President Irro showed iron resolve securing Israeli recognition—doing what predecessors couldn’t or wouldn’t. He took the risk. He delivered the result.

But cleaning house is a far more monumental and Herculean task than securing recognition. Recognition required secrecy, diplomacy, and strategic patience. Reform requires something harder: sustained political courage under relentless scrutiny.

It means making enemies of powerful people. Breaking patronage networks that span clans and families. Telling hard truths to allies who expect favors. Regulatory confrontation with business interests that can mobilize resources against reform.

He cannot do it alone. President Irro needs the right team—not the politically convenient team, not the clan-balancing team, but the competent team. Professionals who will implement painful reforms, resist regulatory capture, prioritize national development over personal gain.

The defining questions of his presidency are whether he can demand reciprocity from partners treating Somaliland as convenient fiction, whether he can renegotiate UN mandates and World Bank arrangements requiring recognition as the price of operation, whether he can regulate the financial sector with international AML/CFT standards against the will of powerful oligarchs, whether he can dismantle extractive bureaucracy, whether he can build a merit-based civil service, and whether he can transform Somaliland from aid-dependent entity into recognized nation prepared for equal partnership.

These questions determine whether he’s remembered as the president who secured recognition—or the president who made recognition matter.

This Is Mobilization, Not Celebration

President Irro delivered what was thought unattainable. He made his people proud. He gave Somaliland something its detractors said would never come: proof that perseverance matters, that democracy counts, that a small nation with the courage of giants can bend the arc of history.

But history doesn’t stop bending just because you’ve moved it once.

The quiet diplomat won the war. Now Somaliland must win the peace through uncomfortable, disruptive, necessary choices.

Tell diplomatic partners: recognize us, or leave. Tell the UN, World Bank, EU: we govern ourselves now—partnership requires recognizing that sovereignty. Tell financial conglomerates: international regulatory standards apply, or operations cease. Tell civil servants: perform, or vacate positions for those who will. Tell political allies: competence precedes loyalty.

These decisions separate nations from aspirations. More recognition is coming—but Somaliland must deserve it, not just celebrate it.

Sun Tzu wrote: “Every battle is won before it is fought.” Somaliland won first. The war—the real war, the war of implementation, execution, and nation-building—begins now.

And unlike recognition—secured in silence—this war cannot be fought in silence or secured through secrecy. This war requires all of us.

The hard work begins now. And it begins with honesty: Somaliland has been running itself like a well-meaning refugee camp managed by foreign do-gooders and sustained by patronage, corruption, and unregulated cartels. That ends today.

Recognition is not the reward. It is the responsibility.

Let’s get to work.


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Israeli Foreign Minister Makes Historic Visit to Somaliland

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HARGEISA, SOMALILAND — Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar concluded a historic visit to Hargeisa on Tuesday, becoming the first foreign minister to visit Somaliland since the Republic regained its independence in 1991. Sa’ar’s delegation was received at the Presidential Palace by President Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro,” following Israel’s formal recognition of the Republic of Somaliland on December 26—a decision that has reshaped diplomatic calculations across the Horn of Africa.

Security across the capital was visibly heightened throughout the visit, with access restricted around key government installations.

In his remarks, President Abdirahman Irro thanked the government and people of Israel for the courageous decision to recognize the Republic of Somaliland, describing it as having profound diplomatic, economic, and developmental impact on the Republic of Somaliland, the Horn of Africa region, and the world. The President emphasized that today marks a significant day for Somaliland, noting that Israel’s recognition strengthens Somaliland’s role in maintaining peace, stability, democracy, and freedom of expression.

Foreign Minister Sa’ar affirmed that Israel’s recognition is based on the right of self-determination of the Somaliland people and the interests of long-term security and stability in the Horn of Africa. He praised Somaliland’s functioning democracy, internal peace and security, and its role in regional stability. Sa’ar stated clearly that Israel recognized Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and again on December 26, 2025, and will continue to stand with the Republic of Somaliland in the future.

Topics discussed included the opening of embassies in Hargeisa and Jerusalem, preparations for Dr. Irro’s official visit to Israel, and cooperation in investment, trade, technology, energy, water, minerals, agriculture, and economic infrastructure development. Representatives from MASHAV—Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation—were part of Minister Sa’ar’s delegation.

Although not explicitly discussed during the visit, the security and defense dimensions of the partnership carry profound implications. Israel’s expertise in counterterrorism, intelligence gathering, and maritime security aligns directly with Somaliland’s strategic imperatives in a region facing piracy and extremist threats. Somaliland’s coastline offers critical positioning for Red Sea monitoring, while Israeli capabilities in surveillance, cybersecurity, and border control could significantly enhance Somaliland’s defensive posture. The potential for intelligence sharing and maritime coordination represents a strategic asset for regional stability.

Recognition That Broke the Mold

Israel’s recognition landed with unusual force, stunning regional capitals while igniting public celebrations across Somaliland. Streets in Hargeisa and Berbera filled with spontaneous rallies, as citizens marked what many view as the first irreversible breach in a three-decade wall of diplomatic denial.

While the announcement appeared sudden, it was not improvised. The agreement was finalized during a video call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Irro, but multiple indicators suggest the groundwork was laid quietly over an extended period, beyond the scrutiny of regional and multilateral forums.

Israeli media outlets traveled to Somaliland in force following the announcement, documenting the public reaction and reporting from both the capital and the strategic port city of Berbera—coverage that further underscored the moment’s significance.

During their call, Netanyahu and Dr. Irro discussed a prospective presidential visit to Israel. No date has been confirmed.

Somaliland’s Legal Case, Long Settled

Somaliland’s claim to statehood is not novel, nor is it legally ambiguous. The Republic satisfies all four criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to conduct foreign relations. South Africa has gone further, formally acknowledging that Somaliland meets these international law standards.

The obstacle to recognition has never been juridical. It has been political—rooted in the African Union’s fixation on inherited colonial borders and reinforced by the preferences of external actors invested in maintaining the fiction of Somali unity. Israel’s decision punctures that consensus by treating Somaliland not as an exception to be managed, but as a reality to be acknowledged.

Strategic Weight Beyond Symbolism

Israel’s recognition is not merely declaratory. Somaliland occupies a commanding position along the Gulf of Aden, directly facing Yemen and overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb Strait—one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, through which a significant share of global trade transits.

For Israel, engagement with Somaliland offers strategic depth in the Red Sea basin, with clear implications for maritime security and intelligence cooperation, particularly amid persistent Houthi threats. For Somaliland, the move confers long-sought validation of its governance record and strengthens its hand in courting further recognition.

Dr. Irro concluded the meeting by assuring Minister Sa’ar that Somaliland is a reliable partner located in a strategic position important for the future peace and security of the Horn of Africa and the world.

Diplomatic Shockwaves

The fallout was immediate. Relations with Djibouti deteriorated sharply in the days following the announcement. Both governments recalled diplomatic representatives, and Somaliland authorities suspended Air Djibouti flights effective Wednesday.

Elsewhere, reaction has taken the form of studied silence. Ethiopia—Somaliland’s principal trading partner and a pivotal regional power—has issued no public statement. Kenya and the United Arab Emirates have likewise refrained from comment, prompting speculation that internal consultations are underway, particularly in Addis Ababa, where the strategic implications of recognition are impossible to ignore.

Mogadishu, by contrast, moved swiftly to externalize its objections. Somalia’s foreign minister, Abdisalam Abdi Ali, traveled to Riyadh to meet Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud. Several Saudi-linked social media accounts echoed Mogadishu’s position, though no formal Saudi government statement has followed.

Mogadishu’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning what it termed an “unauthorized incursion,” deploying language reminiscent of Beijing’s rhetoric on Taiwan, including references to Hargeisa as an “inalienable” part of Somalia. The statement, like those before it, offers no mechanism to reverse developments on the ground. Somalia, which has exercised no authority over Somaliland since 1991, continues to rely on diplomatic theater to mask that reality.

What Comes Next

Israel’s move has reopened a question long deferred by international actors: whether continued non-recognition of Somaliland remains defensible, or merely habitual. Somaliland grounds its sovereignty claim in the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which gained independence in 1960 before entering a failed union with Somalia.

Foreign Minister Sa’ar’s visit to Somaliland sends a clear signal that Israel and Somaliland are moving ahead with their historic bilateral ties.