In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
China’s President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan stand for a group photo together with leaders from African countries before a welcome dinner of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, 04 September 2024. ANDRES MARTINEZ CASARES/Pool via REUTERS
Beijing is increasingly assertive in Africa, aiming to expand its influence. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has invested billions of dollars to establish a Chinese-centric trade route in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland, the only country in the region to resist Chinese investments, has instead allowed pro-Western firms to invest in connectivity projects as an alternative to BRI. In 2016, Somaliland struck a landmark deal with DP World, a Dubai-based port operator, to develop and manage Berbera Port. DP World’s investment has been instrumental in transforming Berbera Port into a major trade hub, providing an alternative to Djibouti for accessing the vast hinterland in the region, including Ethiopia. The transformation of Berbera Port is already taking shape, attracting Western firms like the UK investment arm CDC and Trafigura, which won concessions in the port and energy infrastructure. Similar to the Lobito Corridor, Berbera Corridor is a substitute to China-centric trader routes in East Africa.
In January, Rep. John Moolenaar, Chair of the US-China House Select Committee on the CCP, wrote a letter to then Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging the US to establish a representative office in Somaliland. He stressed that this move is vital for advancing US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and countering China’s growing influence. In 2018, China took control of a port terminal in Djibouti, which US lawmakers viewed as a significant gift to China. Sen Chris Coons warned that without US engagement, China could shift Somaliland’s interests in its favour, consolidating its influence in the Red Sea. Then-Sen Marco Rubio also stressed the need to work on “countering Chinese influence in Djibouti”, describing the takeover as “even more alarming.” General Thomas Waldhauser, the then US military commander for Africa, stated in a congressional hearing that the US military could face “significant” consequences if China gains control of the port. In an effort to gain influence in Somaliland, China proposed a tempting conditional development package aimed at persuading Somaliland to expel Taiwan and prevent aligning with the US. However, Somaliland government rejected the offer. A move Rep John Moolenaar had warned.
As Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi group threatens seaborne trade in the Red Sea, forcing shipping companies to reroute their vessels and disrupting the delicate fabric of global commerce. Djibouti has allowed Iranian ships to dock at China’s military base, facilitating the flow of critical intelligence to the Houthis as they mount attacks on maritime trade. Djibouti has also rejected the US request to use its territory for attacks against the Houthis. The Houthi also established implicit cooperation with Djibouti, enabling the country to benefit from the Red Sea conflict for higher port traffic and turn the crisis into a profitable opportunity, in return Djibouti rejects to condemn Houthi attacks in the crucial shipping lines.
Somaliland, a crucial gateway to the Indo-Pacific, overlooking the Gulf of Aden positions a vital conduit for nearly 15% of global seaborne trade. If its quest for international recognition is accommodated, its geographic position offers a distinct advantage to the U.S., Israel, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in securing the security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea while counterbalancing China and Iran in this critical region. The use Berbera military airfield, would strengthen US deterrence against the Houthis and provide crucial operational support to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel in monitoring Houthi activities and Iranian manoeuvres in the Red Sea. It also promote collaborative efforts in combating piracy, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing. In this dynamic partnership, Somaliland is determined to align itself with the US axis in exchange for recognition.
About the Author
Abdinasser Ahmed is a developmental economics practitioner and political commentator based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. He can be reached through Twitter @Abdinasserahm or abdinasserahm[at]gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud spends lavishly on international travel and Washington lobbying firms while soldiers go unpaid
Al-Shabaab now controls more territory than any time since 2011, following Taliban’s successful playbook
African Union peacekeeping mission (AUSSOM) faces financial collapse as donors withdraw support
Trump administration unlikely to continue funding a government with no accountability or results
When Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways suspended flights to Somalia’s capital last week, few outside the region noticed. They should have. This development, alongside American diplomats fleeing Mogadishu’s airport after militant attacks, isn’t just another security hiccup – it’s the beginning of the end for a Western experiment that has swallowed billions with nothing to show for it.
A Corruption Network with a Government Problem
Somalia’s corruption isn’t just bad – it’s historic. Ranking 179th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 index with a pathetic score of 9/100, Somalia has actually managed to get worse, dropping 2 points since 2023. This isn’t corruption within a system; this is corruption as the system.
While Finance Minister Bihi Egeh bemoans the potential loss of $1.5 billion in U.S. aid, he conveniently forgets to mention where previous billions vanished. Military commanders pocket salaries for non-existent “ghost soldiers,” leaving actual units undermanned. Weapons purchased with Western funding routinely disappear from government armories, only to resurface in Al-Shabaab attacks. Intelligence leaks so consistently that security analysts assume Al-Shabaab has penetrated every level of government. Even judicial positions are bought and sold openly, driving desperate citizens to seek justice from Al-Shabaab’s harsh but predictable courts.
Patrons Head for the Exit
The suspension of flights by Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways isn’t merely a business decision – it’s a devastating vote of no confidence from Somalia’s most committed international backers. Unlike Western powers who engage from embassy compounds, Turkey manages Mogadishu’s port and airport while maintaining its largest overseas military base in the country. Qatar has bankrolled government operations during funding gaps, while simultaneously keeping communications open with Al-Shabaab – much as it does with Taliban, Hamas, and other terrorist networks.
Will these patron states simply work with Al-Shabaab if militants eventually take Mogadishu? Their pragmatism knows no bounds, and it’s entirely possible they don’t care who rules Somalia as long as they maintain their prime position in the country’s economy. Turkey’s infrastructure investments and Qatar’s relationships across the political spectrum practically guarantee they’ll be among the first to recognize any new power reality.
“When your closest friends start heading for the exits, it’s time to acknowledge the building is on fire,” notes a Gulf diplomatic source familiar with Qatar’s decision-making.
The $50 Billion Experiment That Failed
Let’s be brutally honest: Somalia has absorbed over $50 billion in international aid since 1991 with minimal sustainable improvements in governance or security. The Danab Brigade – Somalia’s elite U.S.-trained counter-terrorism unit – remains somewhat effective only because Americans bypassed government structures entirely, maintaining direct oversight of recruitment, payment, and operations.
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has become infamous as one of the world’s most frequent-flying heads of state, jetting off to international conferences and photo opportunities nearly weekly while his country burns. As Al-Shabaab consolidates control over increasing territory, Mohamud and his inner circle have funneled millions into glitzy Washington lobbying firms to keep American money flowing. These lavish expenditures – paid for ultimately by American taxpayers – represent the perfect microcosm of Somalia’s dysfunction: U.S. aid creates a bloated class of government kleptocrats whose primary skills lie not in governance or security provision, but in separating gullible Western donors from their money. While Mogadishu’s political elites wine and dine at five-star hotels in Western capitals and maintain luxury residences abroad, soldiers on the front lines go unpaid, and Al-Shabaab’s shadow government expands its reach. American billions haven’t brought stability to Somalia – they’ve created a parasitic political class with no incentive to actually defeat the insurgency that justifies their continued international support.
The evidence is inescapable: Somalia’s problems aren’t about funding levels but legitimacy, accountability, and trust. More money doesn’t build state capacity; it merely enables more sophisticated corruption networks. As one Western official put it, “We’re not funding a government. We’re funding a money laundering operation with a flag.”
Adding to this complex picture, Somalia has increasingly strengthened ties with China, signing onto Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative while accepting infrastructure deals with limited transparency requirements. This diplomatic balancing act raises questions about whether China might become Somalia’s next financial backer as Western donors reconsider their investments. The challenge for Beijing, should it step into this role, would be avoiding the same patterns of ineffective aid that have characterized Western engagement for decades.
Al-Shabaab Executes the Taliban Playbook
For anyone who watched Afghanistan’s collapse, Somalia’s trajectory is disturbingly familiar. Al-Shabaab has methodically followed the Taliban’s successful blueprint: focus on rural control while launching just enough urban attacks to demonstrate government weakness; patiently wait out Western resolve; weaponize public resentment against corruption; infiltrate government security structures; and establish shadow governance that, while brutal, appears more competent than the internationally-backed government.
Intelligence reports confirm Al-Shabaab now controls more territory than at any point since 2011, collects taxes more efficiently than the government, and dispenses predictable justice in areas under its control. “The reality Western policymakers refuse to accept is that insurgencies don’t need to be loved by the population—they just need to be seen as more competent and less predatory than the government,” notes a former Western counterinsurgency advisor with extensive experience in both Afghanistan and Somalia. “By that measure, Al-Shabaab is winning.”
AUSSOM: Peacekeeping Without Peace or Funding
Somalia’s last security bulwark, the newly rebranded African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), teeters on the brink of financial collapse. Despite diplomatic platitudes about “sustainable funding mechanisms,” donor fatigue has set in. The European Union’s willingness to cover troop stipends is waning, while United Nations logistical support grows increasingly tenuous.
This financial uncertainty couldn’t come at a worse moment. Ethiopia – AUSSOM’s backbone – is distracted by internal conflicts and maritime disputes with Somalia. Uganda has made it clear that continued troop contributions depend entirely on reliable international funding that isn’t materializing.
Without a robust AUSSOM presence, intelligence assessments suggest Al-Shabaab would likely expand control to most population centers outside Mogadishu within months. The bitter irony: Western nations, having spent billions on Somalia’s stability, now appear unwilling to fund the one mechanism that has somewhat contained Al-Shabaab.
Trump Administration: No More Blank Checks
The Trump administration represents the final nail in Somalia’s financial coffin. President Trump’s “America First” approach and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s hawkish stance make additional funding for Somalia virtually unthinkable. The White House team sees Somalia’s corruption rankings, territorial losses to Al-Shabaab, and decades of squandered aid as textbook examples of failed investment.
“The days of writing blank checks to failing states are over,” a Republican foreign policy advisor remarked privately. “The President wants concrete returns on American taxpayer dollars, and Somalia has consistently proven it cannot deliver.”
This policy shift comes exactly when Somalia’s government is most desperate for support, creating a perfect storm where years of mismanagement, corruption, and security failures are finally coming due. The chickens, as the saying goes, are coming home to roost.
The Next Kabul Awaits
Somalia’s internationally-backed government is approaching a point of no return. The combination of endemic corruption, resurgent Al-Shabaab, wavering international support, and AUSSOM’s precarious funding creates conditions eerily similar to pre-collapse Afghanistan.
For Western nations that have poured billions into this failed experiment, it’s time to acknowledge reality rather than writing more checks. Additional money without addressing core governance failures will simply disappear into the same corrupt systems that have swallowed previous investments.
The fall of Kabul shocked the world in 2021. The fall of Mogadishu – when it comes – should surprise no one.
HARGEISA—Somaliland government have detained Rashid Nur Absiye, commonly known as Rashid Garuf, without announcing formal charges. Multiple sources confirm that Garuf, who holds U.S. citizenship, remains in custody.
Garuf served as Somaliland’s Ambassador to the United States during President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo’s administration. His time in office was characterized by confrontational social media engagement, including frequent clashes with opposition figures and vigorous responses to Somalia’s political claims. Despite his active online presence, the mission struggled with limited community engagement and failed to advance Somaliland’s interests in the United States, with the office characterized as largely shuttered. In August 2018, President Muse Bihi Abdi replaced him with Bashir Goth as part of a limited reorganization of Somaliland’s foreign missions.
The arrest continues a pattern of detentions that has drawn international criticism. Under the previous government, security forces frequently detained opposition figures and critics without due process, often dropping charges without explanation and rarely taking cases to trial. The practice became particularly pronounced during election periods and times of political tension, when social media activists and opposition supporters faced increased scrutiny. International observers documented dozens of such cases between 2020 and 2023, noting that the pattern of arrest-and-release without judicial process created a chilling effect on political discourse.
The arrest highlights a striking dichotomy within the new administration’s approach to political discourse. While President Cirro has consistently called for restraint and measured debate, his Minister of Presidency, Khadar Hussein Abdi, has adopted an increasingly combative stance on social media, often engaging in aggressive exchanges with critics. This disconnect between the president’s calls for moderation and his senior minister’s confrontational style raises fundamental questions about the administration’s true commitment to political dialogue.
The detention of Garuf comes just weeks into the new government’s tenure and follows his social media commentary questioning the administration’s response to a senior police official’s death in Hargeisa. Garuf’s posts, which called for public demonstration of disapproval during the president’s planned visit to Gabiley, touched on rather sensitive subject involving the death of a police officer and ongoing investigation. While government officials have historically cited national security concerns or public incitement to justify such detentions, critics argue that using state power against political expression undermines Somaliland’s democratic institutions and reform promises.
Despite multiple inquiries, the Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to obtain official comment from the Ministry of Interior or Police command regarding specific charges against Garuf. The case has reopened debate about the balance between security interests and freedom of speech—a persistent challenge that continues to test Somaliland’s democratic aspirations across successive administrations
In a notable turn of events, the Kulmiye opposition party, whose previous administration oversaw the highest number of such detentions, has condemned Garuf’s arrest. Garuf, a member of Kulmiye’s Executive Committee, now finds his party advocating against the same practices they once employed—highlighting the fluid nature of political principles when parties transition from power to opposition.
The handling of Garuf’s case has broader implications for Somaliland’s political landscape. As the new administration navigates its early months in power, its response to criticism and dissent will likely set the tone for state-society relations in the years ahead. The tension between maintaining security and protecting civil liberties remains a critical challenge for Somaliland’s democracy, particularly as the region continues to seek international recognition and support. Whether this case represents an isolated incident or signals a continuation of previous practices may prove pivotal for the government’s credibility both domestically and abroad.
The January 2024 memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, promising maritime access in exchange for potential recognition, sent shockwaves through the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s response was swift and calculated: rather than acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereign right to make such agreements, Ankara immediately positioned itself to mediate between Somalia and Ethiopia. The resulting Ankara Declaration effectively nullified the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU by promoting direct Ethiopia-Somalia maritime arrangements—a clear demonstration of Turkey’s true agenda.
This calculated intervention fits Turkey’s established playbook. Since appointing former Ambassador Olgan Bekar as Special Envoy for Somaliland-Somalia talks in 2018, Ankara has masqueraded as an impartial broker while methodically reinforcing Somalia’s territorial claims. Each round of Turkish-led dialogue follows the same script: Somaliland receives empty rhetoric while Somalia’s position strengthens.
The charade dropped all pretense in February 2024, when Turkey and Somalia signed a sweeping Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. The deal—inked mere weeks after the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU—granted Turkey a 30% cut of Somalia’s maritime revenues in exchange for naval reconstruction and training. The message wasn’t just clear; it was intentionally brutal: Turkey considers Somaliland’s waters to be Somalia’s property.
Turkey’s footprint in Somalia renders any claim of neutrality absurd. It maintains its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, trains Somalia’s forces, controls 45% of the capital’s port revenues, and runs the airport. Ankara’s largest embassy worldwide isn’t in Washington or Brussels—it’s in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Somaliland receives a pittance: 216 donated medical machines and a portfolio of unfulfilled promises.
By continuing to entertain Turkey’s overtures, Hargeisa is not just repeating past mistakes—it is actively legitimizing a foreign agenda designed to erase its sovereignty. For decades, Somaliland governments have eagerly welcomed foreign emissaries whose primary credentials are their postings to Mogadishu, with “and Somaliland” ceremoniously tacked onto their titles. This persistent acceptance of diplomatic table scraps exposes a fundamental contradiction: while claiming to seek international recognition, Somaliland routinely undermines its own sovereignty by accepting diplomatic arrangements that explicitly deny it.
The Turkey-Qatar alliance has emerged as the primary architect of Somaliland’s diplomatic marginalization. As regional expert Michael Rubin bluntly puts it, “Turkey does not have a track record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan’s ideological agenda does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security.” This agenda was laid bare when Turkey’s latest delegation to Hargeisa included both its Ambassador to Somalia and its intelligence chief—a composition that treats Somaliland not as a sovereign entity, but as a troublesome province to be investigated.
The timing of Turkey’s outreach is calculated to maximize damage. Their delegation arrived shortly after President Cirro’s high-profile second visit to the UAE, where Somaliland was showcased alongside DP World at the World Governments Summit. The contrast is devastating: while Abu Dhabi delivers billion-dollar port investments and strategic partnerships, Turkey dispatches intelligence operatives and diplomatic illusions.
Turkey and Qatar’s aggressive push in Somalia represents a direct challenge to UAE-Saudi influence in the region. Ankara has systematically worked to undermine UAE-backed projects in Berbera, mobilizing Somalia’s opposition while methodically spreading anti-UAE sentiment within Somaliland. More insidiously, Turkish-backed talking points—questioning UAE partnerships and pushing for renewed Somalia talks—have infected Somaliland’s opposition circles and civil society organizations.
For Cirro’s administration, this presents an existential challenge. His Waddani party’s campaign pledge to restart talks with Somalia already left him vulnerable to unionist accusations. Now, entertaining Turkey’s transparent duplicity risks not only validating these concerns but jeopardizing Somaliland’s most crucial economic partnerships. The UAE, as Somalia painfully learned, does not forget betrayal.
Somaliland’s diplomacy isn’t pragmatic—it’s spineless. Instead of shaping its own fate, it passively absorbs the agendas of foreign players who refuse to recognize its independence. While Mogadishu wallows in chronic instability and terrorism, Somaliland’s willingness to accommodate powers that insist on its eventual reintegration with this chaos betrays a devastating lack of conviction in its separate destiny. Perhaps this diplomatic spinelessness reveals an even more troubling reality: Somaliland’s elected officials might be simply waiting for Somalia to stabilize—a delusional strategy that trades real independence for imaginary reconciliation.
The presence of Turkey’s intelligence chief in the recent delegation should have triggered immediate rejection. Instead, Somaliland’s welcome mat response reveals a leadership void at the heart of its independence project. President Bihi’s calls for broader international mediation and balanced Turkish investment acknowledge the problem, but words ring hollow when actions continue to legitimize those who fund Somaliland’s diplomatic suffocation.
For Somaliland to be taken seriously as an independent state, it must abandon its role as a diplomatic doormat. Real sovereignty demands more than declarations—it requires the courage to reject overtures from powers that fundamentally deny its right to exist. The path to international recognition cannot be paved with endless accommodation of those who question its very legitimacy.
If Somaliland’s leaders cannot muster the resolve to reject Turkey’s sham neutrality, they might as well admit it: independence is not a serious pursuit—merely a convenient slogan masking an endless cycle of submission. The time has come to decide: will Somaliland stand firm as a sovereign state, or remain what Turkey already considers it—a provincial afterthought in an international power play?
Somaliland has strategically leveraged infrastructure diplomacy to position Berbera as a pivotal regional logistics hub, enhancing trade and economic growth. A cornerstone of this strategy is the partnership with DP World, which has led to significant developments in Berbera’s port and associated economic zones.
To capitalize on the developments in Berbera and foster Somaliland United States trade relations, the following strategies are suggested.
Promoting the Berbera Economic Zone to US Investors
The Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ) offers a strategic gateway for trade and investment, providing numerous incentives for international businesses. To attack US investors. Somaliland should actively market the BEZ’s advantages, such as its strategic location along vital maritime routes, tax incentives, and well-developed infrastructure. A comprehensive promotional campaign targeting American companies in key industries could highlight these benefits through trade fairs, Business forums, and diplomatic engagements. Additionally, leveraging digital marketing and strategic partnerships with US trade organizations can increase visibility and interest in the BEZ.
A robust legal framework ensuring business security and contract enforcement will further enhance investor confidence. The government should work on improving regulatory transparency, offering clear guidelines on business operations, and ensuring the protection of intellectual property rights. Engaging with US Chambers of Commerce and trade bodies will facilitate direct communication between Somaliland officials and potential investors. The integration of technology-driven business solutions, such as streamlining customs processing and efficient logistics services, will make BEZ an attractive investment destination.
Encouraging Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can also boost investor confidence. Joint ventures between Somaliland and US firms in key sectors like logistics, manufacturing, and services can create a mutually beneficial business environment. Furthermore, the establishment of investment promotion agencies and liaison offices in the US will enable continuous engagement with American business communities. These measures will not only attract investment but also lay the foundation for long-term economic cooperation between Somaliland and the US.
Establishing Bilateral Trade Agreements
To facilitate smooth trade relations, Somaliland must pursue formal trade agreements with the US. Bilateral agreements can help remove trade barriers, reduce tariffs, and establish clear guidelines for commercial exchanges. Engaging in diplomatic negotiations to secure preferential trade agreements will give Somaliland-based businesses easier access to US markets. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) presents an opportunity for Somaliland to gain duty-free access to certain goods, and lobbying for inclusion in AGOA should be a key priority.
A structured dialogue between Somaliland trade representatives and US policymakers can help bridge policy gaps and foster a cooperative trade environment.
Establishing a dedicated task force to focus on US-Somaliland trade relations will provide a clear roadmap for achieving mutually beneficial agreements. Working with US-based think tanks and trade policy experts can help Somaliland navigate complex international trade regulations.
Developing Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with US trade agencies can further strengthen ties and create opportunities for collaboration. These agreements should focus on key industries where both countries can benefit, such as agriculture, livestock, and renewable energy. Through structured negotiations, Somaliland can Position itself as a reliable trade partner, enhancing its economic prospects while fostering stronger diplomatic relations with the US.
Enhancing Connectivity
A well-developed infrastructure network is essential for sustaining trade growth. Somaliland should invest in both digital and physical connectivity to facilitate smooth trade relations with the US. Improving port facilities in Berbera, expanding road networks, and establishing reliable logistics solutions will enhance trade efficiency. Digital infrastructure, including secure e-commerce platforms and electronic customs systems, will further streamline trade operations.
Strengthening telecommunications and internet services will improve communication between Somaliland businesses and their US counterparts. Establishing online trade platforms that connect Somaliland exporters with American buyers can facilitate transactions and foster business relationships. Additionally, adopting smart technologies in logistics. Such as real-time tracking systems and automated warehousing, can optimize supply chain efficiency and reduce trade costs.
Partnerships with international logistics firms can enhance Somaliland’s transportation capabilities. Attracting investment in air freight and shipping services will create direct trade routes between Berbera and key US ports. Furthermore, modernizing financial systems to support secure and swift international transactions will increase trust and encourage more trade between the two Nations. By prioritizing infrastructure development, Somaliland can Position itself as a competitive player in global trade.
Focusing on Niche Markets
To effectively compete in the US market, Somaliland should focus on industries where it holds a unique advantage. Key sectors such as livestock, agriculture, and textiles have significant potential for expansion. Establishing quality control measures and certification processes will ensure that Somaliland’s products meet US import standards, making them more competitive in American markets.
The livestock sector, for example, can benefit from better disease control programs and adherence to international veterinary standards. Somaliland should also invest in sustainable farming practices and value-added agricultural processing to increase product appeal. Developing organic farming initiatives can further differentiate Somaliland’s agriculture Products in Niche US markets.
The textile industry offers another avenue for growth. Somaliland can explore partnerships with US-based apparel brands interested in ethical and sustainable sourcing. Implementing training programs for textile workers and investing in modern production facilities can boost exports. Additionally, promoting Somaliland’s cultural heritage through unique handmade crafts and artisanal goods can attract niche US consumers looking for authentic, high-quality products.
Capacity Building Initiatives
Sustainableeconomic growth requires a skilled workforce capable of meeting international trade demands. Somaliland should invest in education and vocational training programs to equip its workforce with the necessary skills for engaging in global commerce. Collaborations with US universities and trade institutions can provide specialized training in business management, logistics, and technical fields relevant to trade and investment.
Scholarship programs and exchange initiatives will foster knowledge transfer between Somaliland and the US. Establishing trade-focused incubation centers can support local entrepreneurs in developing export-ready businesses. Encouraging innovation and research in key industries will enable Somaliland to maintain a competitive edge in international trade.
Building strong institutions to support business development is also crucial. Establishing trade advisory services, investment support agencies, and financial assistance programs for local entrepreneurs will enhance business readiness. These efforts will create an environment where businesses can thrive and successfully engage in international trade. By prioritizing capacity building, Somaliland can ensure long-term economic resilience and strengthen its trade partnership with the US.
Conclusion
By implementing these strategic recommendations, Somaliland can maximize the potential of the Berbera Economic Zone and solidify its trade relationship with the United States. Targeted efforts in investment promotion, trade agreements, infrastructure development, niche market focus, and capacity building will contribute to sustainable economic growth. As Somaliland Continues to enhance its trade strategies, it will position itself as a key regional logistics hub and a reliable partner for international commerce. Strengthening US-Somaliland trade relations will not only benefit the two nations but also contribute to broader economic development in the Horn of Africa region.
About the Author
Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali is a Somaliland–based Infrastructure Analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa, with a particular Focus on Somaliland’s infrastructure. With over a decade of experience in leading and developing infrastructure projects, he is also a dedicated researcher and senior lecturer. Eng. Mouktar Yusuf holds an MSc in PPM and Construction Management.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Somaliland’s recently elected president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi ‘’Irro’’, made another visit to the United Arab Emirates for the second time in less than a month. His choice of UAE as the first foreign trip signaled the new government’s prioritization of economic development and leveraging existing agreements for deeper economic and strategic collaboration. One of the highlights of yesterday’s visit was his participation in the World Government Summit 2025 held in Dubai, a key global forum attended by world leaders, policymakers, business leaders, and civil society actors. Unlike his previous trip shrouded in controversy and absence of any media coverage, this one was televised from the conference venue where Irro made the case for Somaliland’s strategic and economic potential.
UAE – Somaliland Relations
Relations with the Arab Gulf States, particularly the UAE, have strengthened for the past decade, primarily centered on economic agreements, infrastructure investments, and security cooperation. President Silanyo engaged in high-level discussions with senior leadership of Kuwait and UAE which paved the way for major collaboration in various sectors. Under Bihi’s government, relations grew even stronger with the commencement of the port project. This contrasts with what some officials in Irro’s government termed as Somaliland’s ‘’getting back to global stages’’.
The UAE views Somaliland as a critical actor in its African strategy, particularly in securing trade routes and enhancing its geopolitical influence in the Horn, a region marked by geopolitical contestation by regional and global powers. Somaliland’s geostrategic location makes it an active partner for the UAE particularly in the context of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security architecture. By securing access to Berbera, the UAE ensures a crucial alternative trade route to Djibouti while counterbalancing the influence of Turkey and Qatar which increased their footprint in Somalia. Currently, Turkey maintains a military presence in Somalia and Turkish companies operate the port of Mogadishu and the city’s airport.
Ethiopia is the other main actor in the UAE – Somaliland relations, particularly concerning port infrastructure. As the largest landlocked nation in the world, Ethiopia’s positive relations with Somaliland and its quest for alternative sea access than Djibouti made Berbera a good choice for consideration. Previously, a port development proposal by the French company Bollore considered engaging the Ethiopian government for partnership in the project. Moreover, China expressed interest in developing the port of Berbera and the natural gas pipelines connecting Ethiopia to the Berbera port refinery. The proposal which came in the early days of Silanyo’s administration sought to export Ethiopia’s natural gas through Somaliland.
The rise of Abiy Ahmed as the prime minister of Ethiopia also solidified Addis Ababa’s relations with Abu Dhabi. UAE supported Abiy’s major domestic and foreign policy objectives; rapprochement with Eritrea, Tigray conflict, and saving Ethiopia’s ailing economy. In his book on the Ethiopian premier, The Economist’s Tom Gardener describes the close personal relationship between Abiy Ahmed and Emirati crown prince Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan. In May 2021, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Transport and Dp World signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to develop the Ethiopian side of the Berbera corridor costing around $1 billion in a decade.
New Government, New Momentum
President Bihi’s last two year’s tenure in Somaliland was marked by political deadlock and a slow pace of foreign relations with the UAE and with other states as well. The recent visit by President Irro following an official invitation from Abu Dhabi signals a shift in momentum. Irro has been critical of President Silanyo and Bihi’s handling of agreements with the UAE, particularly concerning transparency and due process. As the speaker of parliament, Irro opposed passing the legislation for the military base. Additionally, he opposed the concession of the port of Berbera citing corruption and lack of transparency in the process. How this vocal opposition to UAE affairs in Somaliland will impact the new relationship is yet to be seen. But one thing is certain; in a region where unpredictability reigns, pragmatism is the preferred course of action.
In this new administration, a couple of areas of mutual interest remain crucial. Berbera port development yielded positive results in terms of operational capacity. However, making sure the bigger client, Ethiopia, effectively utilizes the port remains a challenge. President Irro remarked in Dubai that Somaliland is committed to securing a trade route to Ethiopia. The Berbera Corridor connecting Berbera to mainland Ethiopia is constructed. The new government should speed up the legal framework underpinning these cooperations. These include passing the transporting and logistics laws, insurance laws, banking, and other laws creating a cohesive political and legal environment for future investments to pour in. Last year, unconfirmed reports emerged of Dp World about to inaugurate the second phase of expansion and development of the Berbera port which will double the capacity and the services the port can provide.
Security cooperation remains a key area of UAE-Somaliland relations. Under the Bihi government, reports emerged of UAE training security forces for Somaliland. Although Bihi allegedly turned down this proposal, UAE support for Somaliland’s intelligence existed. During last month’s trip to Abu Dhabi, Somaliland’s head of intelligence accompanied the president. Since the war in Gaza started, maritime security in the Red Sea has become a source of concern. It will be crucial to witness the evolving security partnership between Abu Dhabi and Hargeisa especially since the latter is prioritizing economic growth.
New Trump administration in the White House is reshaping geopolitical dynamics in the region. Experts have explained that a new Trump administration will likely allow the regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to play a prominent role in the Horn of Africa. Despite growing frustration in Washington in Abu Dhabi’s role in the conflict ravaging Sudan, Somaliland’s Berbera could serve as an alignment in their regional policy. The United States has expressed an interest in utilizing Berbera’s airport as a base, a project started by the UAE before it was abandoned in 2019 as calculations in the Yemen war changed policies. With the Houthi posture increasingly assertive, would Berbera’s airport resurface in Emirati’s interest and what would this mean for Washington’s plans most importantly, how Somaliland would navigate such complex dynamics?
Moving forward, the Somaliland government could build on this growing momentum for its benefit. Foremost, the government could expand its mission in the UAE. Recently, President Irro appointed a new representative to the UAE demonstrating prioritizing relations with the arab state, despite the representative did not serve in any diplomatic role in the past nor the government. This could be bolstered by promoting the office’s network with Somaliland’s business elites and acquiring influential friends in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This week, the foreign ministry launched the Somaliland Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs to train a cadre of diplomats for the country. Forging partnerships and collaboration with leading Emirati diplomatic institutes, such as Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, could be a good start for a small yet tangible collaboration.
Somaliland – UAE relations are entering a new phase under President Irro. With shifting regional dynamics, ongoing security threats, and increasing external interests from global superpowers such as the U.S. and China, Somaliland must strategically position itself to capitalize on emerging opportunities while mitigating potential threats. Irro’s ability to navigate these complexities will define the next chapter of Somaliland’s foreign policy.
About the Author
Moustafa Ahmad is a researcher who writes on the politics and security of Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. Reach him on X (@Mustafe_Ahmad) or moustafa.ahmadn@gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
HARGEISA, Somaliland—Civil servants across Somaliland’s government institutions are facing an increasingly dire financial predicament as salary payments continue to be withheld without explanation. More than six weeks since January’s wages first became due, thousands of government employees remain unpaid, with February’s salaries now 11 days overdue. Despite mounting concerns, the government has yet to provide any official justification for the prolonged delays.
The salary crisis unfolds against the backdrop of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro’s” administration’s ambitious fiscal reforms. On January 25, 2025, the president approved a national budget of 3.89 trillion Somaliland Shillings (approximately $406 million USD) for fiscal year 2025, signaling intentions for comprehensive financial restructuring.
In recent testimony before parliament’s oversight committee, Minister of Finance Abdillahi Hassan Adan revealed that discretionary tax exemptions and forgiveness arrangements granted to major businesses have been costing the treasury approximately $40 million annually—nearly 10% of the newly approved budget. In response, President Cirro has issued an immediate directive to end these preferential tax treatments, marking a fundamental shift in the government’s approach to revenue collection.
On February 1, the administration announced sweeping new taxation measures targeting the country’s digital economy. These measures extend to mobile money transactions, digital banking, telecommunications, and utility payments—sectors that have long operated with minimal taxation but now face increased government scrutiny.
While civilian salaries remain unpaid, the administration has prioritized security sector personnel, ensuring uninterrupted payments to military and police forces. In what appears to be a strategic effort to bolster the security establishment, President Cirro has not only maintained timely salary disbursements for the armed forces but has also announced a substantial 50% immediate increase in their wages, with plans to raise them by up to 250% during his term. The reform package requires all security personnel to complete IRIS Biometric Registration by February 2025. Its unclear how the registration effort is progressing or if the armed forces latest payments include the 50% raise.
“Each passing day without payment deepens our hardships,” a senior civil servant told Somaliland Chronicle on condition of anonymity. “We recognize the government’s need to ensure security forces are well-compensated, but civilian institutions are the backbone of government operations. If we are left unpaid indefinitely, essential services will inevitably suffer.”
Compounding the uncertainty, the Bank of Somaliland issued an unprecedented directive on January 30th, freezing all advance payments until July 31st, 2025. Additionally, internal government documents indicate an ongoing civil service restructuring process, at least within the Ministry of Livestock and Rural Development, in coordination with the Civil Service Commission and a private consulting firm identified as PSG.
The silence from the government on the cause of the payment delays raises further questions. While the financial reforms—including ending preferential tax arrangements and implementing new digital economy taxes—may suggest a broader effort to stabilize Somaliland’s economy, the immediate impact on thousands of unpaid civil servants cannot be ignored. Whether the delays stem from liquidity constraints, bureaucratic inefficiencies, or undisclosed fiscal restructuring efforts remains unclear, as officials have so far refrained from offering any public clarification.
Repeated attempts by Somaliland Chronicle to obtain a response from the Ministry of Finance regarding the timeline for resolving the current salary crisis have gone unanswered. Meanwhile, the absence of government communication continues to fuel speculation and anxiety among public sector employees, many of whom now struggle to meet their financial obligations as they await their long-overdue wages.
HARGEISA, Somaliland—President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” departed yesterday for the World Governments Summit 2025 in Dubai, where Somaliland aims to captivate both diplomatic and business interests. The presidential delegation’s departure from Egal International Airport marks a strategic push to showcase Somaliland’s potential on a global stage.
Tech Titans and Global Luminaries Converge
This year’s summit has evolved into an unprecedented confluence of power brokers, with tech maverick Elon Musk of Tesla and X, and Oracle’s architectural visionary Larry Ellison headlining an assemblage of global business titans. Their presence transforms Dubai into an amphitheater where the future of governance intersects with technological innovation—presenting Somaliland an opportunity to position itself as an emerging hub in the Horn of Africa.
President Cirro’s Key Engagements
President Cirro is scheduled to attend the high-profile session “How Will Strategic Investments Unlock New Frontiers for Economic Growth?”—a pivotal discussion featuring global leaders, policymakers, and top executives. This session, focusing on how governments can leverage investments to drive sustainable development, aligns with Somaliland’s push to attract foreign direct investment, particularly in infrastructure, renewable energy, and port logistics. Cirro’s participation underscores his administration’s commitment to positioning Somaliland as a stable and business-friendly destination in the region.
High-Stakes Delegation – A Notable Omission
The president leads a delegation comprised of key government officials: Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi Looge, Foreign Affairs Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal, Finance Minister Abdillahi Hassan Adan, Religious Affairs Minister, and the Presidential Chief of Staff. However, the absence of Somaliland’s dynamic private sector leaders—particularly those from the telecommunications, livestock, and energy sectors—stands out as a missed opportunity. Their firsthand experience in operating successful enterprises could have provided potential investors with valuable insights into the country’s business environment.
UAE Engagement Deepens
The visit follows President Cirro’s January trip to the UAE—his first international engagement since taking office. While official channels provided limited detail about the visit’s outcomes, it reinforced the strategic importance of UAE-Somaliland relations.
The presence of DP World Chairman and CEO Sultan Bin Sulayem adds another dimension to ongoing discussions about Berbera Port operations, a cornerstone of UAE-Somaliland economic cooperation. The port’s modernization under DP World’s 30-year concession agreement stands as a powerful example of Somaliland’s capacity to execute major international ventures.
Bridging the Private Sector Gap
While the government delegation brings diplomatic weight to the summit, the lack of private sector representation may limit Somaliland’s ability to tell its full economic story. Successful local companies like Telesom, Dahabshiil, and various renewable energy ventures have demonstrated Somaliland’s potential for profitable enterprise despite the challenges of non-recognition. Their presence could have provided practical testimony to complement the government’s initiatives.
Investment Horizons
The World Governments Summit provides President Cirro a dual platform: to advance Somaliland’s strategic interests while showcasing opportunities in sectors ranging from technology and renewable energy to infrastructure and maritime trade. As global business leaders and government officials converge in Dubai, Somaliland stands poised to demonstrate its advantages—stable governance, strategic location, and untapped market potential.
Somaliland Chronicle will provide comprehensive coverage of the summit’s developments and their implications for national interests. You can also catch a live stream of the events at the summit here.
Multiple sources familiar with the matter have confirmed that President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi “Cirro” will visit Saudi Arabia in the coming days following an official invitation from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The delegation is expected to include senior cabinet members from key ministries, including Foreign Affairs, Presidency, and Livestock, with sources indicating possible participation from Somaliland’s security sector, including intelligence leadership. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the diplomatic engagement. The Presidency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to requests for comment on this article.
Saudi Arabia represents the largest market for Somaliland’s livestock exports, a trade that forms the backbone of the nation’s economy and sustains millions of pastoral households. During the Hajj season alone, the Kingdom imports millions of livestock from the Horn of Africa, representing a critical economic opportunity that Somaliland has historically struggled to fully capitalize on due to political constraints. Economic analysts note that this vital economic lifeline has been consistently strangled by Somalia’s political interference, forcing Somaliland to route its livestock exports through third parties or under Somalia’s certification – a process that has been repeatedly weaponized to devastating effect.
Historical records show that when Somalia has blocked or interfered with livestock certifications, particularly during peak Hajj season exports, the impact cascades through Somaliland’s entire economy, from rural herders to urban merchants. These disruptions have triggered documented currency crises and severe economic downturns. Regional trade experts suggest that securing direct livestock export arrangements with Saudi Arabia would serve as a crucial indicator of the visit’s success.
The timing of President Cirro’s visit carries additional significance as Saudi Arabia recalibrates its Red Sea security strategy. While Operation Prosperity Guardian has enabled some stability in maritime traffic, security analysts point out that the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 economic transformation demands long-term security solutions. Somaliland’s strategic position, controlling 850 kilometers of coastline, coupled with its modernized Berbera Port facilities, presents Saudi Arabia with potential opportunities for regional security cooperation.
President Cirro’s visit to the Kingdom follows his recent, largely unremarkable trip to the United Arab Emirates. Despite Somaliland’s deep economic ties with the UAE—particularly through DP World’s management of Berbera Port—the visit failed to produce any publicly announced agreements or investments. Unlike the UAE, which has tangible investments in Somaliland’s infrastructure, Saudi Arabia’s engagement has been minimal and often entangled with its broader political maneuvering in the Horn of Africa. While Riyadh’s historical preference for dealing with Mogadishu complicates prospects, diplomatic observers note that Saudi Arabia’s increasing focus on securing Red Sea trade routes could make this visit an inflection point—if President Cirro’s administration can present a compelling case for stronger ties.
Western diplomatic sources confirm growing U.S. interest in Somaliland, including potential military and intelligence cooperation centered on Berbera. Security experts suggest that a substantive Saudi-Somaliland partnership could accelerate this trend of international engagement.
While Saudi Arabia has historically preferred engaging with Mogadishu, regional analysts observe that current dynamics – particularly the need to secure maritime corridors and ensure stable food supply chains – may create space for more pragmatic engagement. Maritime security experts highlight Berbera Port’s modern facilities as an attractive alternative to congested regional ports, while international observers note Somaliland’s proven record in counter-piracy operations.
The success of this diplomatic mission will ultimately be measured by concrete outcomes. Trade analysts suggest that direct livestock trade access would provide Saudi Arabia with a stable, reliable supply chain while offering Somaliland protection from external political manipulation of its key economic sector. Regional observers note that anything less would indicate Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to translate Somaliland’s strategic value into meaningful partnership.
This is a developing story and will be be updated as more information becomes available.
The Horn of Africa has become a focal point for global power rivalries, with countries establishing military bases and leveraging economic investments and trade partnerships to secure their interests through soft diplomacy. China, a major power, established a military base in Djibouti in 2017 and continues to expand its influence through economic cooperation. Similarly, the United States operates its largest military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, a key hub for AFRICOM operations. However, the U.S. has been seeking an alternative military post to Djibouti as China expands its influence in the tiny strategic republic. Somaliland became the relevant candidate in this quest.
Somaliland maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan and hosts representative offices of several Western countries as well as Djibouti, Kenya, and the UAE. presents a strategic opportunity for the U.S. to its credit. Somaliland has its military, flag, currency, and functioning institutions, making it a distinctive and stable entity in a region often plagued by instability. Following the November 13, 2024, presidential and political association elections which were widely regarded as free, fair, and peaceful by international observers, Somaliland elected its sixth president and reaffirmed its commitment to democratic governance. This election bolstered hopes for global recognition, a goal that Somalilanders have tirelessly pursued for decades.
Notably, recent developments in the United States suggest a potential shift in policy toward Somaliland. In December 2024, Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania introduced a bill in the House Foreign Affairs committee, advocating for U.S. recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Additionally, reports indicate that the newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump may be more receptive to this idea, given his administration’s interest in countering China’s growing influence globally.
Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa marked by maritime and border disputes and Somalia’s relentless efforts to obstruct Somaliland’s independence aspirations, recognizing Somaliland could yield significant strategic advantages for the U.S.. Formal recognition would not only solidify security cooperation between Somaliland and the U.S. but also provide a crucial foothold to counter China’s influence in the region. By becoming the first country to recognize Somaliland, the U.S. could reshape the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa, while advancing its strategic interests. In this regard,
Evolving U.S.- Somaliland Relations: A History of Strategic Collaborations
The relationship between Somaliland and the United States has sparked considerable optimism, driven by shared interests and mutual benefits. While the current ties remain informal, a history of collaboration, particularly in security and democratic governance, underscores the potential for more strategic partnerships.
Somaliland’s first two presidents Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah and Mohamed Haji Egal spent the bulk of their time dealing with internal instability and consolidation of state power. Despite President Egal becoming the first Somaliland leader to visit the U.S. in 1998, nonetheless, relations remained cordial and not significant. Things changed at the start of the U.S. global war on terror where Somaliland under President Rayale presented itself as an ally to the U.S. and Ethiopia in fending off terrorists in Somalia.
A significant milestone in this relationship was achieved in January 2008, when Rayale led a historic high delegation to Washington D.C. This visit marked the first time a Somaliland president engaged directly with senior U.S. officials, including representatives from the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. These discussions explored avenues for cooperation on regional security, economic development, and democracy promotion, key areas of mutual interest.
Somaliland further demonstrated its growing significance to Washington by hosting a high-level Congressional staff delegation, welcomed by President Muse Bihi. The delegation included members from the influential committee, and the House Appropriations and Conservation Committee, along with senior policy advisors from Washington, D.C.Their visit included a tour of the Port of Berbera, a strategically critical infrastructure hub in the region. These engagements highlighted Somaliland’s emerging role as a key partner for the U.S. in advancing regional security and development.
This momentum continued with President Bihi’s visit to Washington where he pitched Somaliland’s strategic importance and democratic credentials to U.S. officials and lawmakers. As a result, lawmakers in Congress proposed a bi-partisan bill called the “Somaliland Partnership Act” which called for the U.S. government to explore ways to engage with Somaliland more directly. Influential names in Washington’s Africa circle including Peter Pham and Tibor Nagy later visited Hargeisa and openly called for the U.S. to deepen ties with Somaliland. Both names are poised to play management while Pham is expected to take the role of assistant secretary of state for African affairs building on his extensive experience in the continent.
This steady increase in high-level exchanges reflects growing recognition of Somaliland’s strategic importance and its potential as a stable partner for advancing U.S. objectives in the region, including countering China’s influence, fostering regional security , and promoting democratic values.
Leveraging Somaliland as a counterbalance to China
Geopolitical competition is a defining force in global affairs, as powerful nations compete to exert political and diplomatic influence over strategically vital regions. The Horn of Africa stands at the heart of this competition, serving as a pivotal geopolitical hub. Positioned at the crossroads of global trade, with 30% of maritime traffic passing through its waters. Over the years, this strategic significance has attracted military bases from global powers, including China, the United States, and Turkey. Somaliland, occupying a key position in this region, is emerging as a natural counterbalance to China’s increasing influence in Africa.
In recent developments, the U.S. House Select Committee has urged the U.S. State Department to open a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, to strategically counter China’s expansionist activities in the Horn of Africa. China does not maintain diplomatic relations with Somaliland as the latter engages in bilateral relations with Taiwan.
Reports have also indicated that the Trump administration recognized the potential of Somaliland’s international recognition as an available strategic partnership. Such a partnership would align with U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa, enabling democratic collaboration that could serve to balance China’s growing presence in the region.
Why is Somaliland so important?
Situated along one of the world’s busiest and most strategically significant maritime trade routes, Somaliland stands as a beacon of stability and peaceful governance in a region historically marked by conflict. Its commitment to free, fair elections based on security, and its peaceful transfer of power, underscores its potential as a reliable partner in regional peacekeeping efforts. Somaliland must forge strong alliances, particularly in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, to ensure the continued safety and economic prosperity of the region.
However, the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa have seen significant shifts, especially with the recent maritime agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia, signed on January 1, 2024. This agreement has redefined the foreign policy landscape in the region, sparking tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia’s objections, claiming the infringement of its territorial sovereignty, are noteworthy, yet it remains clear that Somaliland has maintained full administrative independence since its separation from Somalia in 1991. Despite Ethiopia and Somalia recently experiencing a rapprochement potentially shelving the MoU, however, there is an underlying sense that Ethiopia will keep the MoU with Somaliland in its pocket in the event of the detente with Somalia unraveling.
In this context, U.S. recognition of Somaliland could act as a pivotal turning point for both security and diplomatic relations in the Horn of Africa. With recognition, Somaliland would be better positioned to collaborate with the United States and its regional neighbors to bolster security, enhance trade relations, and attract investments, all of which would contribute to the region’s overall stability and cooperation.
While it is acknowledge that U.S. recognition could stir disputes and create new challenges, it is equally compelling to argue that acknowledging a nation that has built peace, democracy, and order in the absence of international recognition is not only a rational decision but one that supports the broader goal of promoting stability and democratic values in the Horn of Africa.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Fathi Jama is a researcher with a Master’s degree in Political Science and International Relations, specializing in the political dynamics of the Horn of Africa and Somaliland. His work explores regional security, peace-building efforts, and the quest for international recognition of Somaliland. You can reach him at fathijamd2087@gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
