In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
The Horn of Africa has become a focal point for global power rivalries, with countries establishing military bases and leveraging economic investments and trade partnerships to secure their interests through soft diplomacy. China, a major power, established a military base in Djibouti in 2017 and continues to expand its influence through economic cooperation. Similarly, the United States operates its largest military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, a key hub for AFRICOM operations. However, the U.S. has been seeking an alternative military post to Djibouti as China expands its influence in the tiny strategic republic. Somaliland became the relevant candidate in this quest.
Somaliland maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan and hosts representative offices of several Western countries as well as Djibouti, Kenya, and the UAE. presents a strategic opportunity for the U.S. to its credit. Somaliland has its military, flag, currency, and functioning institutions, making it a distinctive and stable entity in a region often plagued by instability. Following the November 13, 2024, presidential and political association elections which were widely regarded as free, fair, and peaceful by international observers, Somaliland elected its sixth president and reaffirmed its commitment to democratic governance. This election bolstered hopes for global recognition, a goal that Somalilanders have tirelessly pursued for decades.
Notably, recent developments in the United States suggest a potential shift in policy toward Somaliland. In December 2024, Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania introduced a bill in the House Foreign Affairs committee, advocating for U.S. recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. Additionally, reports indicate that the newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump may be more receptive to this idea, given his administration’s interest in countering China’s growing influence globally.
Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa marked by maritime and border disputes and Somalia’s relentless efforts to obstruct Somaliland’s independence aspirations, recognizing Somaliland could yield significant strategic advantages for the U.S.. Formal recognition would not only solidify security cooperation between Somaliland and the U.S. but also provide a crucial foothold to counter China’s influence in the region. By becoming the first country to recognize Somaliland, the U.S. could reshape the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn of Africa, while advancing its strategic interests. In this regard,
Evolving U.S.- Somaliland Relations: A History of Strategic Collaborations
The relationship between Somaliland and the United States has sparked considerable optimism, driven by shared interests and mutual benefits. While the current ties remain informal, a history of collaboration, particularly in security and democratic governance, underscores the potential for more strategic partnerships.
Somaliland’s first two presidents Abdirahman Aw Ali Farah and Mohamed Haji Egal spent the bulk of their time dealing with internal instability and consolidation of state power. Despite President Egal becoming the first Somaliland leader to visit the U.S. in 1998, nonetheless, relations remained cordial and not significant. Things changed at the start of the U.S. global war on terror where Somaliland under President Rayale presented itself as an ally to the U.S. and Ethiopia in fending off terrorists in Somalia.
A significant milestone in this relationship was achieved in January 2008, when Rayale led a historic high delegation to Washington D.C. This visit marked the first time a Somaliland president engaged directly with senior U.S. officials, including representatives from the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. These discussions explored avenues for cooperation on regional security, economic development, and democracy promotion, key areas of mutual interest.
Somaliland further demonstrated its growing significance to Washington by hosting a high-level Congressional staff delegation, welcomed by President Muse Bihi. The delegation included members from the influential committee, and the House Appropriations and Conservation Committee, along with senior policy advisors from Washington, D.C.Their visit included a tour of the Port of Berbera, a strategically critical infrastructure hub in the region. These engagements highlighted Somaliland’s emerging role as a key partner for the U.S. in advancing regional security and development.
This momentum continued with President Bihi’s visit to Washington where he pitched Somaliland’s strategic importance and democratic credentials to U.S. officials and lawmakers. As a result, lawmakers in Congress proposed a bi-partisan bill called the “Somaliland Partnership Act” which called for the U.S. government to explore ways to engage with Somaliland more directly. Influential names in Washington’s Africa circle including Peter Pham and Tibor Nagy later visited Hargeisa and openly called for the U.S. to deepen ties with Somaliland. Both names are poised to play management while Pham is expected to take the role of assistant secretary of state for African affairs building on his extensive experience in the continent.
This steady increase in high-level exchanges reflects growing recognition of Somaliland’s strategic importance and its potential as a stable partner for advancing U.S. objectives in the region, including countering China’s influence, fostering regional security , and promoting democratic values.
Leveraging Somaliland as a counterbalance to China
Geopolitical competition is a defining force in global affairs, as powerful nations compete to exert political and diplomatic influence over strategically vital regions. The Horn of Africa stands at the heart of this competition, serving as a pivotal geopolitical hub. Positioned at the crossroads of global trade, with 30% of maritime traffic passing through its waters. Over the years, this strategic significance has attracted military bases from global powers, including China, the United States, and Turkey. Somaliland, occupying a key position in this region, is emerging as a natural counterbalance to China’s increasing influence in Africa.
In recent developments, the U.S. House Select Committee has urged the U.S. State Department to open a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, to strategically counter China’s expansionist activities in the Horn of Africa. China does not maintain diplomatic relations with Somaliland as the latter engages in bilateral relations with Taiwan.
Reports have also indicated that the Trump administration recognized the potential of Somaliland’s international recognition as an available strategic partnership. Such a partnership would align with U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa, enabling democratic collaboration that could serve to balance China’s growing presence in the region.
Why is Somaliland so important?
Situated along one of the world’s busiest and most strategically significant maritime trade routes, Somaliland stands as a beacon of stability and peaceful governance in a region historically marked by conflict. Its commitment to free, fair elections based on security, and its peaceful transfer of power, underscores its potential as a reliable partner in regional peacekeeping efforts. Somaliland must forge strong alliances, particularly in the areas of maritime security and counterterrorism, to ensure the continued safety and economic prosperity of the region.
However, the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa have seen significant shifts, especially with the recent maritime agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia, signed on January 1, 2024. This agreement has redefined the foreign policy landscape in the region, sparking tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia’s objections, claiming the infringement of its territorial sovereignty, are noteworthy, yet it remains clear that Somaliland has maintained full administrative independence since its separation from Somalia in 1991. Despite Ethiopia and Somalia recently experiencing a rapprochement potentially shelving the MoU, however, there is an underlying sense that Ethiopia will keep the MoU with Somaliland in its pocket in the event of the detente with Somalia unraveling.
In this context, U.S. recognition of Somaliland could act as a pivotal turning point for both security and diplomatic relations in the Horn of Africa. With recognition, Somaliland would be better positioned to collaborate with the United States and its regional neighbors to bolster security, enhance trade relations, and attract investments, all of which would contribute to the region’s overall stability and cooperation.
While it is acknowledge that U.S. recognition could stir disputes and create new challenges, it is equally compelling to argue that acknowledging a nation that has built peace, democracy, and order in the absence of international recognition is not only a rational decision but one that supports the broader goal of promoting stability and democratic values in the Horn of Africa.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Fathi Jama is a researcher with a Master’s degree in Political Science and International Relations, specializing in the political dynamics of the Horn of Africa and Somaliland. His work explores regional security, peace-building efforts, and the quest for international recognition of Somaliland. You can reach him at fathijamd2087@gmail.com.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Senior U.S. government officials have contradicted Somalia’s claims about coordination with Washington following a U.S. airstrike targeting ISIS operatives in northern Somalia, raising questions about Mogadishu’s reliability as a security partner. Military experts note that operational security protocols would preclude sharing strike details with Somalia, given the documented infiltration of government institutions by militant groups. Past incidents where sensitive operational information leaked through compromised officials have demonstrated the risks of pre-strike coordination in regions with significant extremist penetration of state structures.
Conflicting Claims Over U.S. Airstrike
In a statement, Villa Somalia claimed “President Hassan was informed of the U.S. strike targeting senior ISIS leadership in northern Somalia this evening,” and praised “the continued commitment under the decisive leadership of President Donald Trump.” However, U.S. sources speaking to Somaliland Chronicle directly refuted this account, confirming no such coordination or prior notification took place.
“Coordination with Somalia was on paper, something AFRICOM would generally say as a matter of courtesy, but the United States does not need permission from anyone to neutralize threats anywhere in the world,” a former U.S. military official familiar with operations in the region told Somaliland Chronicle. The official added that operational security considerations would make such coordination unlikely, particularly given Somalia’s own admission of Al-Shabaab infiltration within its security apparatus. This makes Villa Somalia’s false claim of prior coordination not just misleading but potentially dangerous to operational integrity.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed the strikes in a statement, saying the military’s initial assessment was that “multiple operatives” in the remote Golis Mountains were killed. The operation involved Navy and Air Force warplanes, including F/A-18 fighter jets from the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman operating in the Red Sea, according to Defense Department officials. President Trump addressed the operation on social media, stating the strikes had killed a “Senior ISIS Attack Planner and other terrorists he recruited” who were “hiding in caves.”
Patterns in U.S. Military Operations in Somalia
This strike follows a pattern established during Trump’s previous administration, when he significantly expanded military operations in Somalia. In March 2017, Trump designated parts of Somalia as “areas of active hostilities,” granting commanders greater autonomy to conduct strikes. The escalation was dramatic: from just 14 strikes in 2016, operations increased nearly fourfold to 47 strikes in 2018, reaching 63 strikes in 2019. Notable operations included a November 2017 strike that killed over 100 al-Shabaab militants near Mogadishu and March 2019 strikes that eliminated senior al-Shabaab leaders in the Lower Shabelle region. However, despite these sustained efforts, extremist groups continue to maintain a foothold in Somalia.
Aid Suspension and Mogadishu’s Security Narrative
The conflicting narratives over this latest airstrike come as the U.S. has paused 90% of foreign aid spending, with only Israel and Egypt receiving exemptions, according to Reuters. The aid freeze has significant implications for Somalia, which received over $1.5 billion in U.S. foreign assistance between 2019 and 2023, making it one of the largest recipients of American aid in sub-Saharan Africa. A former U.S. State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, described this massive investment as “a cycle of unfulfilled commitments that has cost American taxpayers billions while failing to achieve lasting security improvements.”
Villa Somalia’s statement, which emphasized “the strong security partnership between Somalia and the United States,” and President Hassan Sheikh’s recent Washington Post op-ed positioning Somalia as a crucial ally in counterterrorism efforts, appear part of a broader campaign to preserve U.S. backing.
However, Somalia’s security assertions have faced mounting skepticism. Hassan Sheikh’s approach to Al-Shabaab has been notably contradictory. In November 2023, he declared Somalia had “one year to eliminate Al-Shabaab,” vowing to decisively defeat the militant group by the end of 2024. Yet on the same day, in an interview with The National, he expressed willingness to negotiate with the group, emphasizing that dialogue could be a path to peace. This dual approach of promising military victory while offering negotiations has undermined the government’s credibility in both military and diplomatic spheres, according to regional security analysts.
Puntland’s Role and the Persistence of Extremist Groups
The situation in Puntland, where the U.S. strike occurred, presents additional challenges to Somalia’s counterterrorism narrative. While the semi-autonomous region has maintained relative stability compared to southern Somalia, its mountainous terrain has provided refuge for both Al-Shabaab and ISIS elements.
Security experts have documented instances where captured militants later rejoined extremist ranks, leading to criticism of Puntland’s approach to handling terror suspects. The Golis Mountains, specifically targeted in this strike, have been a persistent safe haven for ISIS operatives despite repeated military operations in the area.
U.S. forces have previously conducted significant operations in Puntland, notably the January 2023 raid that eliminated Bilal al-Sudani, identified by the Pentagon as a key ISIS financier, along with 10 other operatives in the Cal Miskaad Mountains. That operation was particularly significant as U.S. officials confirmed al-Sudani’s influence extended across Africa into Europe and linked him to the ISIS branch in Afghanistan responsible for the August 2021 Kabul airport bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members. Despite such high-profile operations, extremist groups continue to exploit the region’s complex terrain, according to U.S. military assessments.
Shifting U.S. Policy Toward Somalia
As Somalia’s government struggles to establish effective control beyond Mogadishu, skepticism within the U.S. is growing. Newly trained Somali special forces units have been deployed, yet Al-Shabaab continues to carry out attacks in major cities. According to recent U.N. reports, the group maintains its operational capacity in areas the government claims to have secured.
Unlike previous administrations that largely maintained steady support despite Somalia’s security challenges, current U.S. officials appear increasingly willing to question Mogadishu’s narratives and aid utilization. “The era of taking Mogadishu’s claims at face value is over,” said a current U.S. defense official who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive diplomatic matters.
With aid suspended and increasing scrutiny over Somalia’s security claims, Hassan Sheikh’s efforts to maintain U.S. support face significant challenges. The direct contradiction of Villa Somalia’s statements by U.S. officials marks a potential watershed moment in bilateral relations. This incident, combining false claims about military coordination with ongoing concerns about counterterrorism effectiveness, suggests a fundamental reassessment of U.S.-Somalia security cooperation may be underway. The implications could reshape not only the military partnership but also the broader relationship between Washington and Mogadishu in the years ahead.
Set apart by its home-grown democratic governance, coherent foreign policy, great economic potential, and strategic maritime relevance, Somaliland has become a singular and indispensable actor in the Horn of Africa. Somaliland has maintained peace, promoted democracy, and created a strong economic foundation for more than three decades, so defying the volatility that defines most of the region. Its dedication to responsible government and capacity to effectively organise peaceful elections define it as a political mature model in Africa. Unlike many of the surrounding countries, Somaliland regularly holds free and fair elections whereby people choose their leaders and manages power transitions free from conflict. The combination of conventional and modern governance systems has produced a strong and stable political system that guarantees state institutions operate as they should, and people stay involved in the political process. The people of Somaliland define their government’s legitimacy, therefore strengthening a system whereby the state stays answerable to the voters. Driven by a philosophy that gives regional security, mutual economic advantage, and dependable international partnerships first priority, Somaliland’s foreign policy has remained surprisingly constant for the past three decades.
Somaliland has developed its ties based on respect, cooperation, and a clear strategic goal unlike many other states in the Horn of Africa that routinely find themselves caught in diplomatic conflicts. Its position as a reliable security partner has been crucial in guaranteeing the stability of the Gulf of Aden and beyond. By combating piracy, stopping illegal cargo, and securing international trade routes, Somaliland has actively contributed to maritime security by means of well-trained security troops and a competent coast guard. Somaliland’s foreign policy is important because it can reconcile national goals with global expectations, therefore rendering it a desirable and dependable ally for security and economic projects. Somaliland has instead promoted trade-driven alliances ensuring mutual development and prosperity by rejecting the conventional reliance on foreign aid that defines most of the African continent. With its rich key mineral deposits, prospective oil and gas reserves, and wide blue economy prospects, Somaliland has great economic potential but mostly untapped capacity.
Significant stocks of vital minerals including lithium, uranium, and rare earth elements—all of which are vital for high-tech sectors, renewable energy development, and worldwide supply chains—have been confirmed by geological studies of Somaliland. Somaliland’s critical importance in the global economy is positioned by the rising demand for these resources from all across the world. Attracting growing interest from investors and energy corporations looking to investigate Somaliland’s petroleum potential, the undeveloped oil and gas reserves also present a transforming economic possibility. Somaliland might become a major energy supplier with the correct infrastructure and investment, therefore lowering regional reliance on imported foreign fuels and greatly increasing its own economic development. Another underused resource is the blue economy; Somaliland’s lengthy coastline along the Gulf of Aden has great possibilities in logistics, marine trade, and fisheries. Although the sector has one of the best fishing zones in the area, infrastructure and little investment keep it mainly underdeveloped. Somaliland may generate jobs, improve food security, and increase exports by releasing this potential, therefore helping to contribute greatly to national economic development.
The strategic maritime location of Somaliland at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden increases its worldwide trade importance. Somaliland, acting as a gateway between Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, has great potential to develop as a significant commerce and logistical centre. Thanks in great part to DP World’s development of the Berbera Port, Somaliland’s position in regional trade has been much enhanced—especially by providing landlocked Ethiopia with a substitute path for imports and exports. Along with diversifying Ethiopia’s trade reliance, this development puts Somaliland as a major East African transit hub. Somaliland’s strategic advantage still mostly consists of maritime security. Its stability in the Gulf of Aden guarantees the secure passage of world energy shipments and international trade, therefore promoting regional and worldwide economic security.
Maintaining a steady, piracy-free coastline helps Somaliland to safeguard one of the busiest maritime routes worldwide, therefore supporting its importance as a global partner. Unlike many African nations dependent mostly on foreign assistance, Somaliland has developed a strong and essentially self-reliant economy. By means of taxes, customs fees, and trade, it creates income guaranteeing financial independence and stability. Although aid reliance sometimes results in foreign political influence and economic vulnerabilities, Somaliland’s model of economic self-sufficiency improves its autonomy and negotiating position in international interactions. With laws that guarantee that investment corresponds with national development goals and helps to create a business-friendly environment, foreign direct investment is increasingly important in Somaliland’s economic plan.
Somaliland promotes long-term national development and progress by giving investment top priority over aid, hence fostering sustainable economic alliances. This realistic economic strategy guarantees that international cooperation stays mutually beneficial, therefore avoiding predatory economic systems that can afflict countries depending on help. Globally trade, security, and development depend on Somaliland’s geopolitical importance, economic potential, and democratic government. Unlike many other African countries, Somaliland has effectively instituted democratic institutions ensuring political stability and peaceful power transitions. Built on reliability and strategic alliances, its foreign strategy guarantees that it stays a trustworthy actor in regional and international events. The undeveloped economic resources of the nation—including important minerals, oil, gas, and maritime sectors—offer investors and worldwide markets a chance to profit from its resources while also helping the nation to grow economically. The strategic location of Somaliland increases its significance as a trade and security centre, therefore guaranteeing effective and safe worldwide trade.
Somaliland presents itself as a viable and self-reliant country able to create fair and profitable international ties by keeping financial independence and following trade-driven economic policies. Somaliland’s global involvement should be deepened, so it is essential that the world community appreciates its sovereignty and contributions. The values of Somaliland—democracy, economic development, and regional stability—align with those of world powers and international organisations. Interacting with Somaliland serves not only a political but also a strategic need for improving security, economic development, and stability in the Horn of Africa. Not only would recognition and integration into the global economic and diplomatic system help Somaliland, but it would also improve the larger geopolitical scene by guaranteeing a trustworthy friend in a territory vital for world trade and security. The moment has arrived for the world to honour Somaliland’s achievements, respect its sovereignty, and include it into the international community as an autonomous and indispensable actor in world events.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mohamed Hagi (PhD) is a diplomat, politician and academic currently serving as the Advisor to the President for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. He was formerly the Somaliland Ambassador to Taiwan. Dr. Mohamed Hagi holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Department of History, Politics and Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
In his first major foreign visit since taking office, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” embarked on a high-stakes trip to the United Arab Emirates—an engagement that, under normal circumstances, would serve as a defining moment for his administration’s diplomatic posture. Instead, the visit has generated more questions than answers, veiled in an unusual level of secrecy that contrasts sharply with Somaliland’s traditionally public approach to foreign relations.
For a leader who campaigned on promises of change, the trip presented an opportunity to showcase a fresh direction for Somaliland’s international engagement. However, the near-total absence of official communication during the visit—coupled with a belated and carefully curated media rollout upon the delegation’s return—has left many Somalilanders wondering: Is this the dawn of a new, results-driven diplomacy, or a worrying shift toward opacity in governance?
The Specter of Past Leadership
The visit’s controversy began a day after the delegation departed, as rumors circulated about the departure of former Presidents Muse Bihi Abdi and Dahir Riyale Kahin to UAE to join the President’s delegation. While further investigation revealed that only Bihi had traveled to the UAE, his concurrent presence and vague social media explanations citing a “personal visit” created an unnecessary political distraction. Sources close to the matter suggest Bihi’s travel timing was coincidental, possibly health-related, though this remains unconfirmed. The overlap, whether intentional or not, cast a shadow over the official proceedings and sparked speculation about potential behind-the-scenes involvement.
A Diplomatic Black Box
The stark contrast between this visit and previous diplomatic engagements couldn’t be more pronounced. Where past administrations maintained—and at times overplayed—their diplomatic engagements, as evidenced by former President Bihi’s controversial visit to Guinea-Conakry, complete with banners of their since-deposed leader Alpha Condé adorning the capital, President Cirro’s three-day UAE stay was marked by an unprecedented information vacuum. The sole official visual documentation emerged not from Somaliland’s government but from the Abu Dhabi Fund, which released a single photograph of its chairman’s meeting with the President.
Multiple sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, have confirmed that the delegation engaged in extensive high-level discussions focused primarily on expanding UAE investments in Somaliland. Given the UAE’s position as Somaliland’s premier foreign investor, these talks were expected to strengthen existing economic ties. However, the presence of Somaliland’s intelligence chief in the delegation and reported meetings with UAE security counterparts suggests a broader agenda, potentially encompassing enhanced military cooperation and intelligence sharing arrangements.
The Paradox of Transparency
The administration’s messaging upon return created its own contradictions. The delegation’s return to Egal International Airport finally broke the silence, though the substance remained thin. Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Aden Bakaal detailed meetings with UAE’s top leadership, including the Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, as well as ministers of foreign affairs, economy, and labor. He emphasized the UAE’s unique position as Somaliland’s primary investor, citing DP World as their largest investment project to date.
“We had very productive discussions and achieved tangible outcomes that will bring progress and development to our country,” Minister Bakaal assured the press, though specific details remained notably absent. He outlined broad areas of potential cooperation including livestock, agriculture, natural resources, minerals, and oil exploration, while highlighting discussions about employment opportunities for Somaliland’s youth, who comprise 70% of the population.
The Minister of Presidency, Khadar Hussein Abdi, went further in framing the administration’s new approach: “We want to tell the Somaliland people that this government is working to deliver tangible results for the public, not to show them pictures.” Yet this declaration was immediately undermined by the government’s release of numerous photographs documenting the delegation’s return—a striking contrast to their media blackout during the actual visit.
President Cirro’s notable absence from the public briefing raised additional questions, as his ministers delivered broad assurances without substantial detail. The administration’s selective approach to transparency—extensively documenting the departure while maintaining silence during the visit—has led many to question whether this strategy reflects careful diplomatic maneuvering or masks a lack of concrete achievements.
The False Choice of Secrecy vs Success
Defenders of the administration’s approach, including Presidential Advisor for Foreign Affairs Dr. Mohamed Hagi, Somaliland’s former Representative to Taiwan, have advanced an argument that presents a false dichotomy between diplomatic success and public transparency. Their position—that covert diplomacy is a strategic necessity for unrecognized states—attempts to draw parallels with historical breakthroughs like the Camp David Accords and U.S.-China rapprochement.
However, this comparison fundamentally misunderstands both the nature of those diplomatic achievements and Somaliland’s current context. The Camp David Accords and Nixon’s China opening required initial secrecy precisely because they represented radical departures from established policy between adversaries. The UAE, by contrast, is already Somaliland’s closest ally and premier foreign investor. The argument that standard diplomatic engagement with an existing partner requires the same level of secrecy as historic peace negotiations between adversaries strains credibility.
Transparency vs Opacity: The Somaliland – Ethiopia MoU Lesson
The administration’s secretive approach becomes even more questionable when contrasted with the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia. That agreement, though ultimately unrealized, sent shockwaves through the Horn of Africa and beyond, catapulting Somaliland into an unprecedented international spotlight. Like a diplomatic meteor, the MoU’s announcement transformed Somaliland overnight from a regional actor into a subject of global strategic discourse. Major international media outlets, think tanks, and foreign policy establishments that had long relegated Somaliland to footnotes suddenly found themselves analyzing its strategic significance. The publicity surrounding the MoU, more than its substantive mechanics, achieved what years of quiet diplomacy could not—it forced Somalia and the international community to engage with Somaliland on the diplomatic stage rather than ignore its existence.
In contrast, Cirro’s UAE visit, shrouded in secrecy, has diminished its potential diplomatic impact. For a newly elected president tasked with reinforcing Somaliland’s democratic credentials, this approach risks undermining the very principles that have distinguished Somaliland in its pursuit of international recognition. The suggestion that diplomatic success requires opacity presents a false choice—Somaliland’s most successful international engagements have historically benefited from public scrutiny and debate.
As Somaliland continues its journey toward international recognition, the balance between diplomatic discretion and public accountability becomes increasingly crucial. While every negotiation may have elements that require confidentiality, the wholesale embrace of diplomatic opacity threatens to undermine the democratic transparency that has long set Somaliland apart. The administration’s promise that “details will eventually be disclosed” offers little comfort in a democracy where public oversight should be the foundation, not an afterthought.
Trump’s recognition of Somaliland goes beyond just countering Chinese influence. It reflects a practical need to bring back realism – a foreign policy approach that emphasizes U.S. national interests and addresses the limits of relying too heavily on international institutions through the lens of Liberalism.
The Shortcomings of Liberalism in the Horn of Africa
Liberalism has worked well for Europe with the creation of the EU. It sets a high standard that inspires other regions like Africa with the African Union. However, this worldview has been damaging to both the United States and Somaliland. Globalization has allowed China to use trade as a weapon through pressure tactics, while not living up to the liberal expectation that China would be a fair player globally. Somaliland, with its Berbera port and relatively large population, could have benefited from a decentralized international system driven by shared trade. However, due to the strict application of the liberal theory of international law, their trade is invisibly labelled as Somalia’s, with all the negative failed state connotations that come with it. The focus on cooperation between many parties has also put Somaliland at a disadvantage, leading to its isolation and hindering both its human capital and hard-won sovereignty and freedom.
Supporters of liberalism believe they can change the international system by promoting democracy through engaging non-governmental organizations, the diaspora, and sometimes war. However, this approach has had negative impacts on Somaliland. Somaliland’s homegrown democracy has not only been disregarded but actively undermined by UN agencies directly in the early 1990s and later indirectly by offering weapons and full recognition to Somalia but not to Somaliland. In contrast, realism starts with the view that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no central authority governing relations between states, and that states act mainly in their own national interest. This, for example, better explains Turkish involvement in Somalia; it is not primarily about global collaboration and trade but about securing 30% of Somalia’s resources as a neo-colonial power. The issue is not with liberalism itself but with how it conceals the ongoing geopolitical dynamics.
The rigid application of liberal internationalism in Somalia has produced measurable policy failures. Since 1991, international interventions guided by liberal institutional frameworks have cost tens of billions in US assistance, yet key measures of state functionality have declined. Most of southern Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab terrorists. This is unsurprising as the World Bank’s governance indicators show Somalia’s government effectiveness score has decreased sharply since 2000, while Transparency International consistently ranks it among the world’s most corrupt states. These outcomes reflect a fundamental flaw in the liberal approach: the assumption that external support and institution-building can replace organic state development. This systemic failure demands a recalibration of international engagement strategies in the region.
A Realistic Alternative for The Horn
From a realist perspective, Somalia’s failed state status stems from its fundamental inability to define and pursue consistent national interests. It does not support the influx of foreign aid and intervention that has created a dependency that erodes both domestic accountability and the state’s capacity for self-governance in Somalia. In a realist view, international relations should prioritize state capacity over external intervention.
A realist foreign policy shift, shown by Trump’s proposed withdrawal from Somalia and recognition of Somaliland, could spark Somalia’s transformation toward genuine self-governance. This dual approach serves multiple strategic interests: it pressures Somalia to establish effective control over its territory while acknowledging Somaliland’s successful state-building model. Somaliland’s economic self-sufficiency and democratic stability align with America’s vision of an Africa built on strategic partnerships rather than aid dependency. This creates a blueprint for U.S. engagement that enhances regional stability while advancing American interests.
Building Consensus Through Strategic Realism
Far from being a spur-of-the-moment decision, the recognition of Somaliland emerges from years of careful policy development within America’s foreign policy establishment. This methodical approach is evidenced by sustained efforts ranging from several bills to recognize Somaliland, to Senator James Risch’s successful incorporation of the Somaliland Partnership Act into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act – marking Somaliland’s first formal recognition in U.S. law. This builds upon the groundwork laid by former Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, whose earlier diplomatic initiatives for Somaliland recognition were constrained primarily by institutional deference to the African Union.
The implementation of this policy represents the culmination of long-term strategic planning rather than a sudden shift in U.S. foreign policy. The Somaliland-US partnership has been developed through extensive consultation with policy institutions, national security experts, and diplomatic professionals, demonstrating how strategic realism can unite different political actors behind well-researched foreign policy objectives.
State Recognition: Restoring Sovereign Prerogative
The recognition of states remains fundamentally a sovereign prerogative, not subject to institutional vetoes. This principle holds particular relevance for Somaliland, whose independence predates both the African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. While multilateral institutions serve valuable purposes, their recent effective monopoly over state recognition has created a rigid international system that fails to address legitimate cases of state formation. This institutional gridlock ignores historical precedent – the emergence of nations like Ireland, Bangladesh, and the United States itself demonstrates that state formation often requires bilateral recognition outside multilateral frameworks. The current system’s rigidity perpetuates regional instability by denying diplomatic solutions to unique cases that fall outside conventional parameters.
Realism provides a more nuanced approach to state recognition that aligns with U.S. strategic interests. It enables the United States to distinguish between unique cases like Somaliland and separatist movements. This secures two national US interests: preserving independence-era borders in Africa and recognizing Somaliland. On the other hand, the vulnerability of liberalism is already evident: China has leveraged institutional frameworks to advance its regional influence, particularly through its growing sway over non-democratic states within the African Union. This reality demonstrates how rigid multilateralism can weaken rather than protect genuine African decision-making.
To illustrate, the United States brings a unique historical perspective and diplomatic expertise in understanding state formation. This expertise stems from both its founding history and its extensive diplomatic record worldwide. U.S. State Department archives document America’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence in 26 June 1960, predating the existence of many modern African states. This historical precedent is particularly significant because it established a clear U.S. position: that the legitimacy of any union between Somaliland and Somalia would depend on the popular consent of both people and not just Mogadishu. While subsequent State Department interpretations have attempted to reframe this history through a liberal institutional lens, the original diplomatic record provides a clear foundation for contemporary U.S. policy considerations.
Numerous historical events and documents demonstrate that Somalilanders have rejected the final Act of Union and that it was never ratified. Academic literature consistently highlights that the union was not legitimately established. The African Union’s own fact-finding mission in 2005 confirmed this assessment, though the organization failed to act—a shortcoming that underscores the limitations of multilateral institutions compared to the institutional memory of sovereign states like the United States.
The U.S. has precedent in addressing forced unions, as seen in its stance on the Baltic states. In such cases, the United States did not view the situation as secession, but as a matter of state continuity. Just as the Baltic states were illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union, Somaliland was similarly incorporated into the now-collapsed Somali Republic. This will not be the first time the U.S. adjusts its diplomatic positions, as evidenced by its previous shift in recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The U.S. experience in navigating complex cases of state formation highlights the soft power that allows it to lead Somaliland’s recognition more effectively than the African Union.
The Horn of Africa in the Indo-Pacific Century
The Horn of Africa stands distinctly apart from the rest of the continent, characterized by its unique geopolitical landscape and openness to external interventions. Recent diplomatic developments, such as Turkey’s mediation of diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, underscore this region’s complex international dynamics. Somaliland’s strategic position becomes even more significant in this context, transcending traditional regional boundaries. Its connections to Taiwan and its location place it at the intersection of African and Indo-Pacific geopolitical interests, as outlined in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The strategic imperative is clear: diversify regional influence and prevent Chinese monopolization. By expanding diplomatic and strategic relationships with Somaliland, and potentially extending similar engagements to Ethiopia and Kenya, the United States can offer African nations a meaningful alternative to China’s growing economic and political influence. This approach empowers African states by providing them with more strategic options and reducing dependency on a single global power.
Strategic Timing and Military Implications
The current global landscape makes this strategic pivot to realism particularly timely. The limitations of liberal internationalism are increasingly evident across multiple strategic theatres: protracted conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine’s complex relationship with international institutions, and the deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea.
The timing for Somaliland recognition is critically opportune. The potential shock of such a move has been minimized by recent diplomatic developments, including Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. This approach naturally aligns with the strategic imperative to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia, positioning Somaliland’s recognition as a signature foreign policy move that reestablishes realism as the cornerstone of future American diplomatic strategy.
Militarily, a presence in Somaliland would provide exceptional strategic value. Its geographic position offers a unique opportunity to reduce U.S. dependence on bases in the Arab Gulf while simultaneously securing American interests across three critical regions: the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea corridor, and the sphere of Iranian influence in these regions.
Conclusion
Recognizing Somaliland presents a defining opportunity to cement a realist approach to foreign policy. The Somaliland case demonstrates how realist foreign policy can achieve what decades of liberal internationalism could not: supporting genuine African democracy without creating aid dependency or requiring military intervention. This strategic realignment would not only reshape the Horn of Africa’s political landscape but also provide an opportunity to reexamine our understanding of the international system.
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About the Author:
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
In a carefully orchestrated diplomatic gesture that speaks volumes about shifting alliances in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates rolled out the red carpet for Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Cirro today, dispatching a private Royal Jet to ferry the newly elected leader to Abu Dhabi for his first overseas visit since taking office. Beyond boilerplate statements about mutual interests from the Presidential spokesman, however, the specific agenda for this high-profile visit remains notably opaque, despite President Cirro’s campaign promises of transparency in foreign dealings.
As Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investor, the UAE’s commitment is most visibly demonstrated through Dubai-based DP World’s $442 million investment in Berbera Port, transforming it into an emerging regional trade hub. In his election campaign, Abdirahman Cirro was an outspoken critic of the DP World agreement, questioning its transparency and terms. His presence in Abu Dhabi now puts him in the delicate position of either maintaining that critical stance or potentially moderating his position to secure UAE support at a crucial moment in regional politics.
The timing of President Abdirahman Cirro’s visit suggests a potential watershed moment in UAE’s Horn of Africa strategy. Following a deadly Al-Shabab attack in February 2024 that killed three Emirati troops and a Bahraini officer, the UAE has largely withdrawn from its engagement with Mogadishu. This tragic incident, coming after years of strained relations marked by Somalia’s 2018 seizure of Emirati funds and pro-Qatar stance, appears to have pushed Abu Dhabi toward a definitive choice. The question now looms: Is the UAE finally abandoning its dual-track approach to embrace Somaliland exclusively, seeing in Berbera’s stability an alternative to Mogadishu’s volatility?
The timing of this diplomatic overture gains added significance amid the recent rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somaliland’s diplomatic capital has been tested by Ethiopia’s pivot back toward Somalia, effectively shelving the port access memorandum of understanding and strengthening Somalia’s post-ATMIS security architecture. This shifting landscape might paradoxically strengthen Cirro’s negotiating position with the UAE, as Abu Dhabi’s strategic interests in Berbera intersect with rapidly evolving regional dynamics.
Adding another layer of intrigue to the visit is the presence of Dr. Abdirahman Duale Beileh, Cirro’s newly appointed Economic Advisor. Beileh, Somalia’s former Finance Minister, received a presidential pardon from former President Muse Bihi before joining Cirro’s administration. Current government officials, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of internal arrangements, describe Beileh as operating as a de facto Finance Minister, though his formal appointment to the cabinet was likely avoided due to his recent Somalia government role and potential political sensitivities. The simultaneous presence of both the Finance Minister and Dr. Beileh in the delegation suggests substantive discussions about expanding UAE’s investment portfolio in Somaliland may be on the undisclosed agenda.
Hanging over these discussions is the unresolved status of Berbera Airport. The UAE secured parliamentary approval in 2017 to establish a military base at the facility, but under former President Bihi’s administration, contradictory statements emerged about its intended use – initially announced as a UAE military base, then later described as converted to civilian use after a supposed lease cancellation. Despite significant upgrades, the facility remains largely inactive, its future uncertain. The airport’s strategic significance is underscored by multiple inspection visits from AFRICOM, suggesting broader international interest in its potential military applications.
While the official agenda remains undisclosed, Cirro’s delegation composition hints at the visit’s scope and ambition. The presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Presidency, Minister of Finance and Economic Development, and notably, the Intelligence Chief suggests discussions will extend far beyond ceremonial pleasantries.
The three-day visit also includes scheduled meetings with the substantial Somaliland diaspora community in the UAE, whose remittances form a crucial pillar of Somaliland’s economy. Last year alone, remittances to Somaliland from overseas exceeded $1.3 billion, with a significant portion originating from the Gulf states.
The visit raises questions about the broader geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa. With China maintaining a military base in neighboring Djibouti, and various Gulf states jockeying for influence across the region, Somaliland’s strategic location and deep-water port have turned it into an increasingly important piece on the regional chessboard. The potential shift in U.S. foreign policy under a returning Trump administration, particularly with a more pragmatic State Department leadership, could present Somaliland with additional strategic options for military cooperation beyond current arrangements.
However, Somaliland’s leverage in these negotiations may depend on its ability to engage directly with potential partners, particularly the United States, rather than relying on intermediaries like the UAE. As regional dynamics shift and multiple powers express interest in Somaliland’s strategic assets, Hargeisa would be well-served to comprehensively evaluate its options before making binding commitments or overextending its strategic partnerships.
As President Abdirahman Cirro settles into his meetings in Abu Dhabi, the key questions remain unanswered, masked by diplomatic protocol and official silence. Will this visit mark the beginning of a deeper strategic partnership? Is the UAE preparing to go all-in on Somaliland? The answers may well shape the future of not just Somaliland, but the entire region.
President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s appointment of Major General Abdurahman Abdullahi Hassan Allale “Abdi Dhere” as Police Commissioner and Lieutenant General Nimcaan Yusuf Osman Gahnug as Army Chief has sent shockwaves through Somaliland’s reform community, coming just 24 hours after launching what he called a transformative initiative to eliminate ghost personnel from security forces’ payrolls through biometric registration.
The timing of these appointments – which maintain military control over civilian law enforcement and place an untested commander at the helm of armed forces engaged in active combat – has raised profound questions about the new administration’s commitment to its campaign promises of institutional reform and professional security services.
“The appointment of a military general to head the Somaliland police is unexpected and sets back any possibility of police reform,” prominent human rights lawyer Guleid Jama told Somaliland Chronicle. “The police is not a military institution. It is currently affected and shaped by the history of the military regime under the brutal dictatorship of Siad Barre. The people of Somaliland decided in 1991 to end military rule over civilian institutions and created a civilian and republican government. It is an affront to democracy to militarize the police.”
While President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s young administration has maintained a commendable record of not detaining journalists or suppressing peaceful protests, the appointment of another military commander to head the police force threatens this brief honeymoon period. Critics argue that militarized policing has historically undermined public trust and accountability, perpetuating practices that the president himself condemned while in opposition.
The appointment of Lieutenant General Nim’an Yusuf Osman Gahnug to lead the National Army raises equally serious concerns about military preparedness. Despite formal military training in Taiwan and Ethiopia and experience commanding both the Presidential Guard Unit and Gamadiid Special Forces units, questions persist about his combat leadership experience at a critical moment in Somaliland’s security landscape.
This appointment comes as Somaliland faces its most serious security challenges in years. The conflict that began in Las Anod has now spread into the Sanaag hinterland, yet the new administration has failed to articulate any concrete strategy to address these expanding security threats. Military observers note that the new army chief faces the daunting task of proving his battlefield credentials while simultaneously implementing reforms to tackle systematic corruption that has drained military resources for years.
Perhaps most revealing of the administration’s priorities is President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s decision to name former Police Commissioner Brigadier General Mohamed Adan Sagadhi (Dabagale) as his advisor on police matters – the same official he repeatedly accused of orchestrating human rights violations while in opposition. “Surprisingly, the president made Dabagale his adviser on police issues,” Jama observed. “The president, when he was the opposition leader, is on the record accusing the police under the leadership of Dabagale of committing human rights violations. Dabagale is not a changed man.”
These appointments reflect deeper structural challenges within Somaliland’s governance system. The presidential decree mandating biometric registration by February 2025 aims to combat a longstanding practice where senior military and police officials allegedly inflate their salaries through non-existent personnel. However, the selection of leaders deeply embedded in this system raises questions about implementation.
“As the president recently admitted, his appointments are mostly driven by tribal quotas and pressure from powerful individuals,” Jama explained. “This negatively affects the appointment of qualified individuals and mostly excludes women. There is clearly a lack of preparation from the president’s side. It seems he was solely focused on getting to power. Now he is in power, and he does not have a plan.”
The implications extend far beyond personnel decisions. Human rights organizations have documented how militarized policing has historically facilitated excessive force during public demonstrations, while mechanisms for investigating and addressing police misconduct remain woefully inadequate. The force’s training continues to emphasize military-style tactics over civilian law enforcement practices, and attempts to establish meaningful civilian oversight have been consistently thwarted.
The success of the biometric registration initiative, which promises a 50% salary increase for security personnel, now rests in the hands of the very officials who have benefited from the system it aims to reform. Sources within the security sector, speaking on condition of anonymity, express skepticism about whether these appointments signal genuine reform or merely a reshuffling of familiar faces.
The Presidency did not respond to detailed questions about the selection criteria for these positions, their alignment with reform goals, or President Abdirahman “Cirro” government’s strategy for addressing mounting security challenges in the east. As Somaliland grapples with its most significant security crisis in years, the contrast between President Abdirahman “Cirro”‘s campaign promises and his early appointments suggests a troubling continuity with the practices he once condemned.
Fulfilling a key campaign pledge, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Cirro” has issued Presidential Decree No. 02/012025, mandating a 50% annual salary increase for Somaliland’s security forces contingent upon successful implementation of IRIS Biometric Registration. The reform package, aimed at modernizing the security sector, requires all personnel to complete biometric enrollment by February 2025.
The decree addresses longstanding concerns about payroll fraud and “ghost personnel” within Somaliland’s armed forces, custodial corps, and police. By linking compensation directly to verified identities, the administration aims to ensure public funds reach only legitimate security personnel. This technological approach mirrors successful implementations in countries like India, Nigeria, and Ghana, where biometric systems have proven effective in reducing payroll irregularities.
However, the administration’s retention of existing security leadership has raised questions about its commitment to comprehensive reform. Major General Nuh Ismail Tani continues as Chief of Staff of the Somaliland Armed Forces, despite criticism over the military’s declining operational capacity during his decade-long tenure. Similarly, Police Commissioner Brigadier General Mohamed Adan Saqadhi (Dabagale) remains in his position, notwithstanding past allegations of civil rights abuses—accusations President Abdirahman “Cirro” himself raised while in opposition.
The reform’s ambitious 30-day implementation timeline faces significant challenges, particularly in registering personnel in remote and conflict-affected areas. Resistance from entrenched interests benefiting from current payroll practices may further complicate the process. Critics point to deteriorating equipment, logistical inefficiencies, and low troop morale as evidence of systemic neglect under the current leadership’s watch.
The phased salary increase over President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s first term marks a significant shift in the management of Somaliland’s security forces. However, without addressing fundamental leadership concerns, these financial incentives and technological reforms risk being undermined by the same institutional weaknesses they aim to correct.
The initiative represents a critical test of President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s governance agenda. While the salary increases acknowledge the security forces’ vital role, the emphasis on biometric registration signals a broader push for institutional modernization. Success will depend on the administration’s ability to overcome logistical hurdles and navigate resistance from within the security establishment.
Somaliland has conducted a successful pilot program in its most recent election that was held in November 2024 but this will be the first time a similar system is being used to ensure integrity and eliminate ghost personnel from the security services.
The retention of controversial leadership figures, however, casts doubt on whether these reforms can achieve their intended impact without addressing deeper institutional challenges. As implementation begins, observers will closely monitor whether the administration can balance its promises of reform with the practical challenges of governance in Somaliland’s complex security landscape.
The success of this initiative will not only determine the effectiveness of the security sector reforms but also shape public perception of President Abdirahman “Cirro”’s broader governance capabilities. As Somaliland strives for increased transparency and accountability, the coming months will reveal whether these reforms represent genuine change or merely surface-level adjustments to long-standing institutional problems.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first remarks in office laid bare the new administration’s litmus test for foreign aid: “Does it make America safer? Does it make America stronger? Or does it make America more prosperous?” By these metrics, U.S. assistance to Somalia represents a catastrophic failure on all three counts. President Trump’s executive order suspending foreign assistance exposes the bankruptcy of America’s most expensive state-building experiment in Africa.
“Does it make America safer?
Does it make America stronger?
Or does it make America more prosperous?”
— Secretary of State Marco Rubio
The scale of American taxpayer exposure in Somalia is staggering. In fiscal year 2023, U.S. aid totaled $1.21 billion, creating an elaborate ecosystem of international organizations, contractors, and NGOs that have transformed aid dependency into an industry. The UN system alone received $897.7 million of these funds, demonstrating how international bureaucracies have positioned themselves as permanent intermediaries between donor funds and Somali recipients.
Somalia exemplifies what Secretary Rubio termed the “dangerous delusion” of post-Cold War foreign policy, where “serving the liberal world order” replaced genuine national interests. The humanitarian aid sector perfectly illustrates this dysfunction. In 2023, International Disaster Assistance consumed $873.3 million, flowing primarily through UN agencies that have perfected the art of transforming emergency assistance into permanent institutional infrastructure, with pristine compounds and luxury vehicles becoming the most visible symbols of aid in Mogadishu.
Want to Explore the Source Data?
All the data in this report comes from ForeignAssistance.gov, the U.S. government’s official foreign aid tracker. You can explore:
Detailed transaction records
Implementing partner information
Project-specific data
Historical aid patterns
The security sector epitomizes this dysfunctional aid architecture. In 2023, U.S. security assistance reached $159.6 million, including $128.2 million for peacekeeping operations, yet produced no discernible improvement in Somalia’s security situation. While the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations absorbed the lion’s share of these funds, actual military training of Somali forces received a mere $349,826. This imbalance has created the perverse outcome where Al-Shabaab demonstrates more effective governance and revenue collection than the government itself in territories under its control.
Food assistance tells an equally troubling story, with $88.8 million allocated through Title II grants. This massive investment flows through a labyrinth of intermediaries: U.S.-based NGOs received $152.5 million in total across all sectors, while multilateral organizations consumed $933.9 million. Private contractors collected $77.4 million, while direct support to Somali government institutions amounted to just $18.3 million – a telling indication of donor trust after decades of “capacity building.”
The aid industry’s entrenchment in Somalia has created a parallel economy that serves international organizations rather than local needs. Mogadishu’s real estate market exemplifies this distortion: neighborhoods surrounding NGO compounds and international organization offices have seen property values skyrocket, while basic services remain nonexistent for most residents. The city has effectively been divided into two economies: the aid economy, characterized by high-end restaurants, luxury SUVs, and expensive housing compounds, and the actual Somali economy, where most citizens struggle to access basic services.
Somalia’s government has perfected the use of international aid narratives, often framing crises as existential threats to global security. A striking example is the defunct Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somalia and Ethiopia, which Somali officials portrayed as energizing Al-Shabaab and terrorist networks—conveniently omitting their own incendiary rhetoric. Notably, Somali government leaders have hinted at waging jihad against Ethiopia and Somaliland, further exposing the contradictions in their narrative. Such strategies ensure the uninterrupted flow of aid while deflecting scrutiny of Somalia’s internal governance failures.
Most troubling is Somalia’s cynical exploitation of Western aid while actively courting China’s strategic ambitions in the Horn of Africa. While absorbing over a billion dollars in U.S. assistance in 2023, Mogadishu simultaneously deepened its engagement with Beijing through the Belt and Road Initiative, granted Chinese vessels privileged fishing rights in its territorial waters, and engaged in preliminary discussions about hosting Chinese military facilities. This diplomatic duplicity epitomizes Secretary Rubio’s warning about how the post-war global order has become “a weapon being used against us.”
Critics warning of Chinese or Russian influence filling any aid vacuum fundamentally misread both history and current realities. Despite its diplomatic overtures, Somalia has failed to secure Chinese commitments matching Western assistance levels. Beijing’s engagement in East Africa focuses on countries with stronger institutions and more valuable resources, preferring transactional relationships that deliver concrete benefits rather than open-ended commitments. Similarly, Russia’s limited presence in Somalia serves primarily to extract diplomatic concessions and expand its influence at minimal cost, with no indication that Moscow would shoulder the massive burden of replacing Western aid.
Somalia has mastered the art of leveraging Western humanitarian concerns while pursuing strategic relationships with rival powers. The current aid model has created not a functional state but a sophisticated mechanism for transforming international assistance into institutional maintenance for an aid industry that measures success by money spent rather than results achieved. The $1.21 billion spent in 2023 represents not investment in Somalia’s future but subsidies for an international aid architecture that perpetuates dependency.
The Trump administration’s aid freeze forces a confrontation with uncomfortable truths about America’s post-Cold War approach to foreign assistance. The fundamental question isn’t whether Somalia will face hardship – it will – but whether this might finally break a cycle of dependency that has made Somalia the world’s most expensive failed state. The coming months will reveal whether Somalia’s political class can develop genuine governance capacity or whether three decades of international assistance have created institutions too hollowed out to survive without constant external life support.
In the end, as Secretary Rubio asked in his first address, “How can America promote the cause of peace on Earth if it is not first safe at home?” Somalia’s aid dependency offers a clear answer: it cannot.
Across Somaliland, a nation with a rich history of resilience and self-sufficiency, 6.2 million citizens celebrate the return of President Trump with enthusiasm. But why is this small, relatively unknown country in East Africa rallying behind Trump’s “America First” agenda?
A History of Struggle and Sovereignty
The Republic of Somaliland is an East African state, roughly the size of Texas which gained its independence from the British on June 26th, 1960, and restored its sovereignty on May 18, 1991, following a 30-year illegal annexation by what many know as Somalia.
Following a brutal genocide perpetrated by Somalia under dictator Siad Barre, Somalilanders managed to not only restore self-rule, but they have built a flourishing democracy with little help from the international community.
Many media outlets have been struggling to pin-down why this east African nation – which most Americans probably know little if anything of – are today celebrating the return of President Trump.
Somaliland’s Alignment with the “America First” Agenda
Many Somalilanders hope that Trump’s “America First” policy will signal a shift in U.S. African policy, moving away from supporting the failed Somalian government in Mogadishu towards building a strategic partnership with Somaliland.
The belief across Somaliland is that this new direction is an opportunity to align U.S. and Somaliland interests more closely, with a focus on mutual benefits such as regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and economic growth.
Like the United States, Somaliland has recently elected a new President, with the month-old administration banking on the countries positive track record translating into a mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S.
Somaliland’s government believes that if America prioritises its national interests, it will recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty and bolster direct engagement.
Somaliland’s Strategic Importance
Somaliland’s “Trump” card is that it offers the U.S. an alternative to the heavily congested tiny African state of Djibouti. Its port at Berbera, located at the mouth of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, is crucial for global trade and security. Additionally, as the regions only functioning democracy, its strategic location and close ties to Taiwan positions Somaliland as a natural strategic ally for the U.S. in countering China’s growing influence in Africa.
Despite tensions with China over its relations with Taiwan, Somaliland continues to stand firm, despite continuous Chinese threats as well as reports suggesting China is actively arming terrorist groups in Somaliland at the behest of Somalia to destabilise the country.
Frustration with the Biden Administration’s Africa Policy
Somalilanders have been left perplexed by the Biden administrations insistence on a ‘One Somalia’ policy, which by any metric, has been a catastrophic failure, resulting in American taxpayers pouring billions into a black whole, leaving Somaliland feeling sidelined despite its stability and democratic progress.
Somalia’s politicians have successfully influenced American policymakers under President Biden, weaponizing the threat of terrorism from Somalia to justify sidelining Somaliland.
By utilising the likes of Congresswomen Ilhan Omar, Somalia has succeeded in doing the unthinkable, persuading America to adopt policies that diverge from its strategic national interests. This divergence appears to be driven by a fear of potential security related reprisals from a country that depends on international donor funding for 70% of its budget, raising questions about the effectiveness of current U.S. policy in the region.
Growing Support for Somaliland in the U.S.
In recent years, many influential Republicans aligned with President Trump have recognised the shortcomings of the current U.S. approach to Africa, frequently highlighting Somaliland’s credentials as a viable, long-term strategic partner. They argue that recognition of Somaliland could better align U.S. interests in the region, offering stability, counterterrorism collaboration, and a reliable ally in the Horn of Africa.
One recent notable example is Congressman John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, who wrote a letter to outgoing Secretary of State Antony Blinken, calling for the U.S. to open a representative office in Somaliland, to counter rising Chinese influence in the region.
Additionally, the potential appointment of pro-Somaliland officials like Ambassadors Tibor Nagy and J. Peter Pham in a second Trump administration could lead to a more sympathetic U.S. policy toward Somaliland, aligning U.S. foreign policy with the realities on the ground.
A Hopeful Future
As President Trump’s second term begins, Somalilanders remain optimistic that the “America First” agenda will lead to a more pragmatic U.S. foreign policy, one that prioritises American interests in a way that aligns closely with Somaliland’s own goals of international recognition.
Somaliland’s enthusiasm for Trump’s return is captured in President Abdirahman Irro’s congratulatory message on X, in which he expressed, “We look forward to aligning our partnership with your great country in achieving our shared values of world peace, democracy, and economic growth.” This statement captures Somaliland’s hope for a strengthened relationship with the U.S., built on mutual aspirations and shared interests.
About the Author:
Sharmake Abyan is a London-based political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
