In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
Between 1987 and 1989, the Somali military in which Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, served as a senior officer executed a brutal and systematic campaign of genocide targeting the Isaaq people of the modern day Republic of Somaliland.
This dark chapter in Africa’s history, which was known as the Isaaq Genocide, was a merciless military campaign that resulted in the killing of over 200,000 Isaaq civilians. It also involved widespread forced displacement, scorched‑earth destruction of the second and third largest cities (Hargeisa and Burao), aerial bombardement of almost every other single city, town and village in Somaliland, and two decades of large‑scale red-terror style tactics against the civilian population of Somaliland.
It was carried out through relentless aerial bombardments – planes repeatedly strafed fleeing refugees – summary executions, burning of entire villages, deportations, land‑mining of water sources and homes, Holodomor style government enforced man-made famines (the Dabadheer Drought) and the use of paramilitary units such as the Somali Armed Forces’ “Dabar Goynta Isaaqa” (The Isaaq Exterminators), composed exclusively of non-ethnically Isaaq soldiers, to enact mass killings under Somalia’s military direction.
Eyewitness testimonies documented “mass executions by firing squad, forced disappearances, looting, mass torture, mass surveillance, rape used as a weapon, curfews and mass killings of civilians even in areas with limited resistance or lawful liberation movement activities, such in Berbera where thousands of government soldiers were stationed. Isaaq civilians across what was then the Somalia Republic, were detained and executed en-mass by Somalia government execution squads led by Colonels like Ilhan Omar’s father.
Across the country civilians were forced from their homes into dehumanising conditions, including many kept in dungeons, underground prisons and pits. Even famous Isaaqs such as Somaliland’s most renowned poet ‘Hadraawi’ did not escape this torture and years of detention under the most brutal and unsanitary conditions imaginable. Even in Mogadishu, deep inside neighbouring Somalia – and almosr 1,500KM from Somaliland’s capital of Hargeisa – Isaaq civilians were being killed in their homes, in the city and on Mogadishu’s beaches. The Jazeera massacre of 1989 is a particularly brutal example that is etched in history.
At the heart of this brutal military regime was Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father. His rank, authority, membership of the regime Daarood clan, and 10+ years of having climbed the hierarchy in Somalia military to the rank of Colonel, placed him squarely in the Somali military’s command hierarchy during and at the height of its Isaaq genocide campaign. Based on his position, loyalty to the regime, and his role in the military, it is virtually certain that he had intimate knowledge of and involvement in the planning, conception, direction and execution of the genocide.
By both legal and historical standards, despite Ilhan Omar’s team’s spin in numerous recent articles which have been placed in left-leaning online publications, the logical conclusion that Ilhan Omar’s father was almost certainly intimately involved in the Isaaq Genocide is unmistakable. It is supported on the balance of probabilities and the totality of circumstantial and inferential evidence available indicates, more critically, that it meets the threshold that this was the case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
What Human Rights Reports Show
Investigations from Africa Watch, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN‑commissioned Mburu Report, articles from the Washington Post and New York Times are clear: the Isaaq Genocide was conceived, planned, and executed using official state machinery. The Somalian military directed attacks such as the scorched‑earth campaign, the mining of grazing areas and waterholes, and mass destruction of homes; entire cities were intentionally razed to eliminate Isaaq presence.
The numerous reports and newspaper articles detail how the military in which Ilhan Omar’s father was a Colonel, based on government directives such as the notorious “Letter of Death” attributed to General Morgan, advocated a campaign of obliteration and extermination of ethnically Isaaq civilians who form the absolute majority of the population in Somaliland – demonstrating that genocide was national policy, not the act of rogue units. The Somalian military deployed the most heinous an inhumane propaganda to justify and enable their genocide. Ilhan Omar’s father was at one point in charge of propaganda and during his 10+ year tenure with Somalia’s military between 1981 and 1991 – a timeline which coincides with the timeline of when Somalia’s military was perpetrating the Isaaq Genocide – would almost certainly have been involved in conceiving and disseminating Isaaq Genocide propaganda. Propaganda which would have got hundreds of thousands of innocent Somalilanders, ethnic Isaaq civilians, killed.
Colonels like Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, would have operated within the command structure of Somalia’s military during the Isaaq Genocide. As a Colonel he would have been overseeing operations in Hargeisa, Oodweyne, Burao, El‑Afweyn, Gebiley, Berbera, Garadag, Erigabo, Sheikh and else where in Somaliland where mass arrests, executions, and infrastructure destruction were used to terrorise, ethnically cleanse and exterminate the Isaaq people of Somaliland.
Taken together, these findings show that it is extremely likely that Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, played a direct or enabling role in the genocide. This conclusion aligns with command responsibility in law and meets the legal standard of being demonstrably proven, both on the balance of probability under civil law, and beyond reasonable doubt under criminal law. The idea that a Colonel in Somalia’s military in a brutal dictatorship did not participate in the pervasive and ubiquitous genocidal activities his military was carry out in every city, town and village in the decade in which he was serving in and leading the military, is implausible, illogical and does not stand up to scrutiny. It is high time that Ilhan Omar comes clean about her father’s role in the Isaaq Genocide.
What the Isaaq Genocide entailed and the role of Colonels in the genocide
Contemporaneous reporting from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Guardian in 1988‑1989 described systematic aerial bombardments, civilian casualties, mass evacuations, and city‑scale destruction. Eyewitnesses at the time compared Hargeisa’s devastation to “the Dresden of Africa,” with over 90 percent of the city destroyed, widespread displacement, and the use of mercenary pilots for bombing runs. These independent accounts support the historical record and reinforce that senior military officers – including Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father – under a strict command and control structure, could not have remained passive much less or uninvolved. Nor is there any evidence of him refusing to carry out or resisting the military orders of genocide which the commander in chief, dictator Siad Barre, had issued. In fact, Ilhan Omar and her family only fled the country when the regime was toppled in January 1991, when his last enclave in the capital of Mogadishu was overrun by the resistance movements. This suggests her Colonel father was loyal to the dictator to the end, and fought alongside him to perpetrate the genocide, only leaving his side when the regime was toppled. A disloyal Colonel also would not have shot up through the ranks, having been promoted in quick succession, having joined as a cadet in 1981 and left as a loyal Colonel by 1991 upon the regime’s fall. This begs the question, why would a brutal dictator elevate and promote a disloyal Colonel? Of course the reality is that he would not have. Therefore her father must have been a loyal and faithful servant, who executed the orders of Genocide to the letter, and was likely handsomely rewarded for this.
While Ilhan Omar’s camp has recently pivoted to portraying her Colonel father as a “teacher trainer”, this kind of fiction and verbal acrobatics is far removed from reality. The hint of the nature of his job and the rank he held is clear from his title: Colonel. He clearly held senior military responsibilities. In the genocide perpetrated by the Somalian military, Colonels oversaw planning, command, logistics, and ideological enforcement and practical execution of the Genocide. Their commands were clear and their role was clear. In one well publicised example of such military orders to commit genocide, issued by General Mohammed Said Hersi aka ‘General Morgan’ to all military units, was caught on video, and was later reported by Al Jazeera in their later documentary about the Isaaq Genocide titled “Kill All But the Crows”. The military orders were as follows: “Attack and eliminate them all. Destroy water sources, reservoirs. Burn villages, pillage, kill residents allow no life no activity. kill even the wounded. Kill all but the crows”. Deserters, defectors and those who went AWOL would be found and summarily executed (yet of course this does not excuse being complicit in a Genocide). It is therefore inconceivable that Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father, did not carry out or did not authorise key military activities that facilitated, enabled or directly executed genocidal acts. His contributions as a high ranking Colonel likely included:
Ideological indoctrination, tactical training and direct military orders aligned with anti‑Isaaq policies.
Coordination of logistics, troop deployment, and use of Somali Airlines and military aircraft.
Enforcement of loyalty and genocide directives among officers and units.
These responsibilities parallel documented roles described in human rights investigations and reports on command operations during the genocide, and are reflected in US case law based on the legal cases against Colonel Tuken and General Samantar in relation crimes against humanity of which they were accused and which were proven after being brought by US citizens who are survivors of the Isaaq Genocide Ilhan Omar’s father’s military committed.
The “Teacher Trainer” Narrative
The portrayal of Ilhan Omar’s father as a mere “teacher trainer” – advanced in diaspora media and sympathetic Western outlets by Ilhan Omar’s PR machine – is contradicted by multiple authoritative obituaries and by Ilhan Omar’s own account referencing his Colonel rank and military service. This narrative serves to minimise his involvement and sanitise the genocide. But the scale, coordination, and leadership structure of the Somali military confirm that officers of his rank—including Colonel Nur Omar Mohamed, Ilhan Omar’s father—were integral to executing genocidal policy.
Legal Responsibility and U.S. Precedent
Under command responsibility, senior officers are liable when atrocities occur under their command and they fail to prevent or punish the perpetrators. U.S. courts have upheld this principle in landmark cases. The two aforementioned cases were one against General Samantar, where a U.S. federal court awarded damages to Isaaq survivor, and recognized top Somali officials as legally responsible for genocide, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In a more recent legal case Colonel Tukeh was investigated as part of deportation case, where a U.S. judge determined in a US court that Colonel Yusuf Abdi Ali’s involvement in the genocide and therefore warranted immediate deportation from the US. These are irrefutable legal judgments, not opinion pieces. They confirm genocide occurred and that Colonels comparable in rank, role and responsibility to during Ilhan Omar’s father’s Nur Omar Mohamed’s activities in the Somalia military were found culpable under US and international law. Since Ilhan Omar’s father is now deceased, the absence of a legal case with his name attached does not prove his innocence. It simply proves that he was never held accountable for his crimes.
Ilhan Omar’s Deafening Silence on the Isaaq Genocide
Despite this overwhelming historical and legal record of the Isaaq Genocide – and the fact that Ilhan Omar will be intimately aware that her father served as a senior Colonel in the military that perpetrated the Isaaq Genocide and everything that entailed – Ilhan Omar has remained silent on this. She has never issued a public condemnation of her father’s actions, nor acknowledged the genocide in any official capacity. In contrast to her vocal advocacy on various other issues of human rights, she has carefully and skilfully avoided addressing grave issue of immense human rights violations by her own father. Her silence on the topic speaks volumes, is deafening, stands in stark contradiction to her professed values. It exposes her real political focus: virtue signalling, race-baiting and political opportunism in the U.S. while lauding praise on Somalia, the world’s most comprehensively failed state, and covering up her father’s role in its destruction.
Ilhan Omar frequently speaks about Gaza and Palestine, championing genocide recognition and accountability daily, presumably to chase headlines and media attention. Yet she has never once acknowledged the genocide associated with the military commanded by her own father. This glaring omission underscores profound hypocrisy – she condemns atrocities abroad but refuses to address atrocities connected to her own family. Her vote against recognition of the Armenian Genocide further suggests a pattern- a reluctance to support formal acknowledgment of genocide, lest it implicate and shed light on her own father’s former regime. If one considers that the genocide her own father’s military was responsible for remains unaddressed, this may explain her opposition to Armenian recognition as part of a broader attempt to quietly and tacitly lend support to broader genocide denial.
A Gilded Childhood and Inherited Privilege & Ethnic Hatred
Ilhan Omar’s early life was spent Somalia, in an environment she often remarks about gleefully and with fondness, suggesting a sheltered and privileged upbringing. As the daughter of a Colonel in Siad Barre’s military, she likely benefited from the regime’s elite status. Regime officials included Colonels, and their immediate family members like Ilhan Omar, lived gilded lifestyles and were probably in many ways indirect beneficiaries of the Genocide. It is highly plausible that she, even as a child, benefited materially or socially from the outcomes of the genocide: the seizure of Isaaq assets, the redistribution of power and wealth to regime cronies like her Colonel father, and consolidation of power by non‑Isaaq elites. In fact, Ilhan Omar is named in that context in the Palgrave Handbook on Left Wing Extremism where serious and unanswered questions are raised about her claim to be a valid refugee. It is increasingly becoming apparent that a more accurate reinterpretation of her personal history is the daughter of a Genocidaire and war criminal, who lived a gilded lifestyle as a child of the regime elite who was potentially a beneficiary of Genocide, but once in the west reinvented herself as a liberal refugee victim.
Ilhan Omar presents herself as a champion of justice, minority rights, accountability, and anti-imperialism. Her refusal to recognise or condemn the genocide her father’s military executed is irreconcilable with this public brand. Her silence is not neutral—it is an affront to survivors who endured collective persecution and loss. To inherit privilege built on systemic violence yet actively ignore that historical legacy is an insult to the hundreds of thousands of victims and millions of survivors of the Isaaq Genocide her father’s military committed.
Why Ilhan Omar Must Now Come Clean
Ilhan Omar must publicly acknowledge her father’s role in the Isaaq Genocide, issue a formal condemnation of this atrocity, and actively support international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Only through transparency and public moral accountability and redemption can she reconcile her public advocacy with her personal history. Failing to do so makes her an electoral liability to the Democratic Party, as she continuous to bring them into disrepute and cost them votes.
About the Author
Dr Adali Warsame is a political commentator and public policy professional, who is a long time observer of Somaliland politics. He writing focuses on standing up for the dignity of Somaliland’s citizens, who appear to be forgotten in the melee that is everyday Somaliland and Horn of Africa politics.
Adali is an unapologetic Somalilander. He is passionate about achieving justice for the forgotten Isaaq Genocide victims, stopping the doomed Somaliland-Somalia talks and international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.
The Pact: Somaliland and Taiwan have signed a landmark maritime security pact, deepening their strategic alliance in the Horn of Africa.
Mutual Benefit: The deal enhances Somaliland’s maritime sovereignty while providing Taiwan a key democratic and economic partner in the strategic Red Sea corridor.
The China Angle: The partnership directly challenges China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” and its regional strategy of using Somalia to isolate both nations.
Signal to the West: The alliance serves as a model for the U.S. and other Western powers on how to pragmatically engage Somaliland to counter regional instability.
HARGEISA, SOMALILAND – The deepening strategic partnership between Somaliland and Taiwan has been formalized through a landmark ‘Coast Guard Cooperation Agreement,’ an alliance that signals a decisive policy pivot by the current administration and cements Somaliland’s role as an indispensable security partner in the Horn of Africa. The pact not only enhances national security but moves the bilateral relationship into a new phase of operational cooperation.
The agreement marks a significant policy evolution for President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro)’s government. It moves past the skepticism expressed during his time in opposition, when the value of the relationship was questioned, into a new phase of strategic cooperation. This deepening of ties now serves as a powerful demonstration of both nations proving their mutual value: Somaliland as a steadfast democratic partner in a critical region, and Taiwan as a capable ally that delivers tangible security benefits.
📍Taipei | The Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation of the Republic of #Somaliland, Hon. Abdirahman Dahir Adan Bakal, and his delegation met with H.E. President Lai Ching-te at the Presidential Palace of #Taiwan. 🤝 pic.twitter.com/RDrBJYWJ2E
The historic agreement was signed by Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard Admiral Ahmed Hurre Hariye and Taiwan Coast Guard Administration Director-General Chang Chung-lung during Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Bakal’s visit to Taipei—his first official trip to Taiwan since assuming office in December 2024. The visit was warmly welcomed by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung, who said it “reflects the strength, resilience & shared values of our democratic partnership.”
Minister @chia_lung warmly welcomed #Somaliland FM @min_abdirahman & delegation to #Taiwan. His visit—the first by a cabinet minister since Somaliland’s new government took office—reflects the strength, resilience & shared values of our democratic partnership. pic.twitter.com/YJoyQ3uWQt
— 外交部 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC (Taiwan) 🇹🇼 (@MOFA_Taiwan) July 24, 2025
The agreement itself, according to the official text, aims “to promote cooperation between the coast guard authorities of the Parties” on a range of critical security areas, building upon the formal relationship established when both nations opened mutual representative offices in 2020.
Alliance Anchored in Shared Values and Strategic Gain
The benefits for both nations are substantial. For Somaliland, the pact delivers an immediate and tangible boost to national security. Cooperation on maritime law enforcement and anti-piracy measures will empower the Coast Guard to better protect the nation’s 850-kilometer coastline, safeguarding sovereignty and its burgeoning blue economy.
For Taiwan, the alliance serves as a cornerstone of its global strategy. The agreement gives Taipei a reliable democratic partner situated at the strategic chokepoint of the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which approximately 12% of global trade passes. This positioning provides Taiwan with enhanced influence in one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors.
The strategic calculus for Taipei also extends deep into the economic sphere, positioning Somaliland as a vital beachhead for Taiwanese commercial expansion into Africa. This partnership grants Taiwan a significant first-mover advantage, allowing it to establish a friendly and reliable gateway into the continent’s rapidly growing markets. Through Somaliland’s stability and its strategic Port of Berbera, Taiwanese enterprises can pilot resilient supply chains and investment models for the Horn of Africa. This approach stands in stark contrast to the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ model employed by Beijing across the continent. Monuments to that strategy’s failures are numerous, from Kenya’s costly Standard Gauge Railway, which has struggled with crushing debt and questionable economic returns, to the cautionary tale of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port. Taiwan’s model, by focusing on building genuine local capacity and sustainable commerce, presents a partnership designed to empower, not indebt.
A New Model: From Project Partner to Strategic Ally
This direct state-to-state agreement marks a significant strategic diversification for Somaliland. Historically, the Coast Guard has received support from international missions like EUCAP Somalia. However, engagement with such “Somalia-centric” entities—often focused on administrative workshops rather than operational capability building—has long been a point of political friction, seen by many as inadvertently diluting Somaliland’s case for independence.
The Taiwan agreement operates on a fundamentally different plane, building sovereign capability through a partnership of equals. It focuses on operational cooperation, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer—the hallmarks of a genuine state-to-state partnership. This shift reflects broader changes in Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy, diversifying beyond traditional partners who are constrained by recognition politics.
Challenging Beijing’s Red Sea Ambitions
This agreement arrives at a pivotal moment, directly challenging China’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. Beijing has systematically leveraged its relationship with Somalia to pressure both Somaliland and Taiwan, most notably through Mogadishu’s recent ban on Taiwanese passport holders in April 2025.
The Taiwan-Somaliland coast guard agreement represents a direct counter to this strategy. By deepening practical cooperation between two democratic entities that Beijing seeks to isolate, the pact signals that China’s pressure tactics may be backfiring. More significantly, it establishes a precedent for other partners to accelerate their own bilateral engagement with Somaliland.
Opening Doors for Western Partners
The timing is particularly significant given the growing US-China competition in the Red Sea corridor. This Taiwan partnership essentially provides diplomatic cover for other democratic allies to deepen ties with Hargeisa. This is particularly relevant for the United States, which has shown significant interest in partnering with Somaliland, evidenced by high-level congressional visits and discussions within the Pentagon. Washington is most likely paying close attention to this development, viewing it as a test case for how a robust partnership can flourish and serve as a bulwark against Chinese influence in the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. If Beijing responds aggressively, it may inadvertently demonstrate to Washington and European capitals that engaging Somaliland is not only strategically valuable but also an effective way to counter Chinese influence.
The Next Frontier: A Question for the Skies?
With the maritime domain now on a path to being secured, a crucial question arises for the partnership’s future: what is the next frontier? For a nation hampered by Somalia’s control over its airspace, attention may naturally turn to the skies. The potential for a future agreement focused on Air Traffic Control is significant, leveraging Taiwan’s world-class aviation expertise to help Somaliland develop autonomous management of its Flight Information Region (FIR)—a monumental step in affirming practical statehood.
As Somaliland secures its seas, the foundation is being laid for a comprehensive alliance that could reshape both nations’ strategic positions. This pact proves that in the modern world, practical cooperation and shared values often matter more than formal recognition.
The recent collapse of Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia has inadvertently proven the strategic indispensability of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. Ankara’s attempt to resolve the crisis that erupted after the MoU was signed—by exploring alternatives for Ethiopia through Mogadishu—was a critical test of diplomatic and geographic realities and most importantly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s resolve. It was a test that the Somalia option failed spectacularly. This failure has shattered the illusion that a third way exists, paving a direct path back to the only viable solution. Now, amid intensifying speculation of an imminent visit by Somaliland’s President Abdirahman “Cirro” to Addis Ababa, the revival of the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding has shifted from a possibility to a geopolitical necessity.
The Geographic and Security Imperative
Ethiopia’s strategic vulnerability stems from its landlocked status and overwhelming dependency on a single trade corridor. With 95 percent of its trade flowing through Djibouti, the nation hemorrhages over $1.5 billion annually in port fees while remaining strategically vulnerable. Recent disruptions in Red Sea shipping lanes have further exposed the fragility of this dependency, making alternative access routes existentially necessary. The geographic reality is immutable: Ethiopia’s industrial heartland lies adjacent to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast. The port of Berbera, whose capacity has been significantly expanded under a management deal with the UAE’s DP World, creates the only viable logistical alternative. Somalia’s Indian Ocean ports, by contrast, are a logistical fiction that solves neither the dependency problem nor the strategic vulnerability.
Beyond these logistical absurdities, any Ethiopian route through Somalia presents an insurmountable security risk. Somalia remains a deeply unstable state where vast territories are controlled not by the federal government, but by Al-Shabaab and a multitude of other terror networks. An Ethiopian naval base on its coast or a commercial trade corridor transiting its lands would immediately become a high-value, symbolic target. The constant threat of attacks on Ethiopian goods, infrastructure, and personnel would require a massive and perpetual security commitment, effectively dragging Ethiopia into Somalia’s internal quagmire. No responsible government would stake its national economic lifeline on a route that passes through one of the world’s most complex security emergencies. This stark reality contrasts sharply with Somaliland’s three decades of proven stability and effective internal security, making the choice for Addis Ababa not just one of convenience, but of fundamental risk management.
The Coalition of Containment
This stark geographic and security logic is precisely why the opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is so fierce. The sophisticated containment strategy reveals the high stakes involved, with Somalia serving as the linchpin. Its approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active warfare, including fueling the Las Anod Crisis in a bid to dismember Somaliland from within. This has been accompanied by a terrifying rhetorical escalation from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who has reportedly taken to mosque pulpits to declare a ‘Jihad’ and threatened to align with Al-Shabaab.
This proxy warfare has attracted broader regional support. Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Similarly, the February 2024 Turkey-Somalia defense pact establishes a Turkish naval presence as a direct counter to Ethiopian maritime ambitions. More troubling is the emerging China factor, with Beijing making strategic calculations about countering American influence by engaging with anti-recognition forces. The tragic irony is that for Somalia’s government, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than defeating the terrorists who control its own country.
The Legal Architecture and the Strategic Opportunity
The current alignment of forces creates a historic, but fleeting, window for this pact. The failure of the Turkish-led mediation has provided both nations with the political justification for renewed bilateral engagement. A new US administration guided by transactional realpolitik creates a permissive international environment. However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage carries an expiration date. Long-standing US strategic interest in the Berbera airport and port could translate into a direct US military presence, providing Hargeisa an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage.
The Inevitable Crystallization of a New Reality
The failure of the Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia was not a crisis for the MoU; it was its ultimate vindication. It removed the final illusion that a viable alternative could be found through Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the experiment proved that the solution to its vulnerability lies not in placating its adversaries but in an alliance with a reliable partner. For Somaliland, its strategic indispensability has been demonstrated for all to see. The question facing both leaderships is no longer whether to act, but how decisively they can capitalize on this historic alignment of interests. The revival of their MoU represents the crystallization of a new strategic reality in the Horn of Africa—one where geographic logic and mutual security triumph over diplomatic fiction.
Berbera, a coastal city located along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, is one of the hottest cities in Somaliland in terms of climate. Economically, Berbera holds immense importance, serving as a critical hub for exports, imports, transportation, and other services. Additionally, the city is a key source of revenue for Somaliland, generating an estimated $120+ million annually with financial supplements of more than $12+ million. Berbera is also home to thousands of workers from diverse regions, making it a growing center for economic development and investment. However, the lack of reliable electricity services has become a significant challenge, hindering the life of its residents and slowing the city’s progress.
An article titled “Somaliland: Solar Power and Microgrid Intelligence for an Urban Power Grid,” published in June 2021, highlighted that; As of April 2021, the citywide power grid supplying Berbera, home to the largest port in the area, is being monitored and controlled using DHYBRID microgrid technology. For this purpose, two solar plants with a total capacity of 8 megawatts, a containerized lithium-ion power storage system with a capacity of 2 megawatt hours, and three modern diesel generators were combined in the Berbera Electricity Company (BEC) utility grid. This has enabled BEC to reduce the electricity tariff in Berbera, which is now the lowest in Somaliland. With the help of its international partners, DHYBRID was able to complete this large expansion, despite the global logistics challenges.
To improve the energy supply, more photovoltaic power plants are being built in Somaliland to supplement the existing generators, in addition to other measures. But this development poses major challenges for power grids. “Various generators within the grid must be continuously coordinated, especially when renewable energies are involved. Otherwise, problems with the grid frequency and voltage will become unavoidable, making it impossible to utilize all the available power,” explains Benedikt Böhm from DHYBRID. “It is simply not enough to just consider the solar capacity available. Effective grid management is essential.”
Challenges in Berbera’s Electricity Service
The hot climate of Berbera, where temperatures often reach an average of 40°C during summer, exacerbates the struggles of residents, especially when electricity is unavailable. The city depends on one main power plant, making the grid vulnerable to breakdowns. No backup energy sources (e.g., solar, wind, or battery storage) to mitigate outages is also something the community sees at lack of care from the service provider. Berbera faces significant challenges in its electricity sector. Access to electricity is limited, with only some percentage of the population really connected and having access to quality electricity, forcing many not to rely on Berbera Electricity Company (BEC).
The high cost of electricity makes it unaffordable for many, particularly among the urban poor, exacerbated by a lack of competition and regulation in the market. Service reliability is another major issue, as frequent power outages disrupt daily life.
Challenges of Berbera Electricity
Electricity is a vital service that supports daily life and economic activities, Berbera faces various challenges in this area. The Somaliland government has repeatedly received concerns regarding electricity issues through community representatives, social media, and direct inquiries to President Muse Bihi. Notably, on August 22, 2023, during his visit to Berbera, there was a significant electricity failure. Additionally, on March 23, 2025, the current president, Mr. Abdirahman Cirro, laid the foundation stone for the Berbera Electricity Expansion Project, signaling a commitment to improving the region’s energy infrastructure.
Several challenges facing the electricity in Berbera include:
Low-quality power lines: Poorly maintained electricity cables lead to accidents such as electrical fires, shocks, and others that endanger people’s lives and property.
Weak poles and infrastructure: The utility poles often collapse or become unstable, causing damage to property and posing risks to public safety.
Technical failures in machinery: The coastal winds affect the operations of the power plant, leading to frequent blackouts in the city.
Insufficient equipment and technicians: The electricity company lacks the necessary tools and a well-trained workforce to efficiently resolve technical issues. Lack of skilled technicians and maintenance capacity are the issues resulting in unannounced power cuts, disrupting businesses and households.
Unnotified power cuts: Electricity is often turned off without prior notice to the public, disrupting daily activities and creating frustration.
Electricity Summer Issues: In Berbera, the electricity supply becomes unreliable during the summer months, particularly when temperatures peak. This seasonal challenge poses significant issues for residents and businesses alike, as the demand for electricity increases due to heightened use of cooling systems and appliances.
Politically motivated power outages: For example, in May 2025, the electricity service was deliberately shut down in the city, allegedly for political reasons, marking the first time such a politically driven power cut had occurred.
Solutions to Berbera’s Electricity Challenges
To address these issues, significant investment in energy infrastructure is essential to enhance generation capacity, transmission, and distribution, ultimately improving access and reliability for all residents of Berbera. Addressing the ongoing electricity problems requires a thorough understanding of the city’s unique circumstances and the needs of its people. While many cities worldwide face electricity outages and quality issues due to technical difficulties or natural disasters, Berbera’s 10+ years of persistent electricity problems highlight systemic failure. Potential solutions can be divided into three approaches:
Solution 1: Reforming the Current Electricity Management with BEC
BEC must take urgent steps to improve its services. Key actions include:
Upgrading and modernizing power lines:
Replace old, faulty cables and enhance functioning ones to reduce accidents and outages.
Underground cables in high-risk zones to prevent wind/heat damage.
Strengthening poles and infrastructure:
Reinforce or replace weak poles to prevent collapses and related damages.
Install automated fault detection systems to reduce outage response times.
Modernizing the power plant:
Invest in new machinery to improve electricity generation and reliability.
Building a second power plant:
Another power plant could reduce the burden on the existing facilities.
Introduce modular gas turbines for rapid deployment during peak demand.
Accountability and responsibility:
The company must prioritize the well-being of the public, ensuring that the electricity fees collected are reinvested in improving the service.
Conduct an independent audit of the current utility company’s performance.
Enforce strict service-level agreements with penalties for non-compliance.
Solution 2: Canceling the Current Contract
If the current electricity management fails to address the problems, the government should terminate its contract with the company, return the electricity services to the government or open a transparent bidding process for new providers. This could involve:
Revoking the current agreements:
If the current provider fails, terminate the contract and launch a competitive bidding process or return the electricity services to the government.
The decision to return electricity services to the government from a BEC stems from the latter’s inability to provide reliable and quality service.
Open Transparent tenders:
Advertise a competitive bidding process to attract capable companies. These companies should be assessed based on the quality of their services, the affordability rates, and ability to address the city’s electricity challenges.
Establishing an oversight committee:
Create a monitoring body consisting of community representatives, the electricity company, LG officials, the Ministry, and other stakeholders. This committee would ensure accountability and maintain service quality.
Solution 3: Promoting Solar Power Usage
If neither the electricity company nor the government takes action to resolve the challenges, the community must seek alternative solutions. One viable option is solar energy:
Adopting solar power systems:
Residents should begin using solar energy to reduce dependence on the unreliable electricity service.
Offer MFI from businesses for households installing solar panels.
Install wind turbines along the coast to capitalize on strong sea breezes.
Encouraging local businesses to sell affordable solar systems:
Entrepreneurs should provide low-cost solar equipment to enable more people to access this renewable energy source.
Encourage pay-as-you-go solar systems for low-income households.
In conclusion, Berbera is a critical city that serves as Somaliland’s economic gateway. Addressing basic services such as electricity is essential to ensuring the well-being of its residents and sustaining the city’s growth. The central government, local authorities, and private companies must work together to respond to the community’s complaints and improve the electricity service. Solving Berbera’s electricity problems will not only enhance the quality of life for its residents but also boost investment opportunities and further establish the city as a hub of economic activity. The people of Berbera deserve better, and best electricity services.
Berbera’s electricity crisis is solvable through a multi-pronged approach combining infrastructure upgrades, policy reforms, and renewable energy expansion. Immediate actions—such as grid modernization and solar adoption—can provide short-term relief, while long-term solutions like wind energy and private sector participation will ensure sustainability.
The Government of Somaliland has received financing from the World Bank toward the cost of Somali Electricity Sector Recovery Project (P173088), and applied part of the proceeds toward payments under the Contract Design, Supply, Installation, Testing, and Commissioning of 12MWp Solar PV Power Plant with 36MWh of Battery Energy Storage System Including a 13.5km of 33kV Evacuation line for BEC, Berbera, Somaliland. The project aims to increase access to lower cost and cleaner electricity services in the project areas and reestablish the electricity supply industry in Somaliland (World Bank).
The implementation of the project would have four main outcomes: A) Institutional, legal & regulatory. B) Integrated Infrastructure for optimized operations. C) Increased electricity access. D) Reduced the cost of electricity and increased reliability of electricity supply.
This project is vital for Berbera residents and the town’s development. By implementing a 12MWp Solar PV Power Plant with a 36MWh Battery Energy Storage System, this significantly enhances access to electricity, ensuring that households and businesses benefit from reliable and affordable power. Transitioning to solar energy will also promote cleaner, more sustainable practices, reducing reliance on fossil fuels and minimizing environmental impact. Overall, the increased and reliable electricity access will attract investments, stimulate economic growth, and improve the quality of life for residents, positioning the town for a prosperous and sustainable future. Finally, President Abdirahman M. Abdillahi Cirro’s government, city local government and members of Parliament representing Sahil region and the city musttake a decisive action now to transform Berbera into a model city for energy resilience, unlocking economic growth and improving quality of life for its residents.
Mukhtar Mahdi is a dedicated humanitarian worker with extensive experience in education and community development. He has committed his career to empowering communities through innovative educational programs and sustainable development initiatives with successful implementation of numerous educational and community projects aimed at providing access to quality learning and community resilience for underserved populations
Mukhtar holds a master’s degree in International Humanitarian Aid and a master’s degree in Internation Relations. Mukhtar is also certified project planning and management. Mukhtar is actively involved in community development projects that foster collaboration and resilience among Somali communities which leads to sustainable improvements in living conditions and economic opportunities.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
While U.S. drones rain fire on Al-Shabaab hideouts, a former U.S. official is lobbying for a peace table instead of a battlefield—offering a diplomatic fantasy that may be destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa.
At a Glance:
Claims by a former U.S. official of secret U.S.-Al Shabaab talks are threatening to fracture the AU peacekeeping mission, with Uganda’s top general, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, citing the rumors as a reason to call for a “total withdrawal.”
The mission, AUSSOM, is already struggling with significant funding gaps and waning commitment from international donors.
Warfa claims, without evidence, that the Trump administration may already be engaged in talks—an assertion not confirmed by U.S. officials and doubted by regional experts.
The proposal is at odds with current U.S. policy and the military reality of a resurgent Al-Shabaab capable of overrunning army bases.
Warfa’s record raises serious questions about his judgment and potential conflicts between U.S. interests and his own nationalist allegiances.
The long-standing African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), already teetering due to chronic shortfalls in international funding, now faces existential threat. Unverified claims by a former U.S. official that Washington is negotiating with Al-Shabaab risk splintering this fragile mission, potentially accelerating Somalia’s descent into chaos.
The tipping point came when Uganda’s top general, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, publicly declared that he would recommend a “total withdrawal” of Ugandan forces—the backbone of the AU mission. His reasoning? Rumors that the U.S. had opened backchannel talks with Al-Shabaab, rumors traceable directly to former State Department advisor Hamse Warfa. “We even hear that the US has begun secret negotiations with Al-Shabaab in Somalia,” Muhoozi posted on X, before concluding that such betrayal warranted a full Ugandan exit.
The US and the collective West are recognising Al Qaeda in Syria. Even our brothers in Israel seem to be okay with this situation? We even hear that the US has began secret negotiations with Al Shabaab in Somalia. We will implore our great Commander-in-Chief to consider total…
— Muhoozi Kainerugaba Quotes. (@Mkainerugaba_) July 9, 2025
That a senior military official is citing Warfa’s unsupported claims as justification for undermining an entire mission underscores the real-world damage of irresponsible diplomacy. Warfa’s advocacy, once an academic policy pitch, is now a political grenade lobbed into an already volatile region. It has drawn interest from a curious alliance—Al-Shabaab, Qatari intermediaries, Somali nationalists—but little support from Washington. A Somaliland Chronicle investigation into Warfa’s campaign reveals glaring contradictions and a worldview shaped less by strategic clarity than by allegiance to a collapsing Somali nationalism.
Military Reality vs. Diplomatic Fantasy
Warfa’s proposal arrives at the worst possible moment. AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley recently testified before Congress about Al-Shabaab’s resurgence. In response, the U.S. has increased its drone strike tempo throughout 2025, targeting the group’s senior leadership.
Commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Michael Langley attend the Morocco-US military exercise “African Lion 2024” in Agadir on May 30, 2024. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP) (Photo by FADEL SENNA/AFP via Getty Images)
This strategic escalation makes Warfa’s proposal not just mistimed, but deeply unserious. As the International Crisis Group notes, Al-Shabaab’s leadership views negotiations as “more dangerous than weapons of mass destruction.” Why would a group that overran a major army base in April 2025 and just this week captured the strategic town of Moqokori choose diplomacy over domination? It wouldn’t. And it won’t.
The Prophet of American Abandonment
The roots of Warfa’s position lie in a 2024 Heritage Institute conference in Djibouti, where he warned Somalis to prepare for American abandonment. In a twist of irony, his prediction proved partially true—but not because of U.S. fatigue. The Trump administration, under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, recalibrated U.S. foreign policy around a cold-eyed America First doctrine.
Mogadishu’s government, long propped up by U.S. taxpayers, failed every basic test of a reliable partner. Corruption, incompetence, and outright collaboration with terrorist elements turned Somalia into an international welfare state. The Trump team finally called the bluff.
Yet here lies Warfa’s logical collapse. He correctly diagnosed U.S. skepticism but now asks the same administration to double down. He wants Washington to underwrite peace with the very terrorists Mogadishu never had the will to defeat. That’s not strategic recalibration—it’s intellectual incoherence. He’s not resolving a contradiction—he’s laundering it.
A Pattern of Flawed Judgment
This isn’t the first time Warfa has demonstrated poor judgment. In August 2023, as the State Department’s Senior Advisor for Human Rights, he met with Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre to affirm shared values. Two months later, Barre publicly praised Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group.
There are only two explanations. Either Warfa misread Barre so badly it disqualifies his credibility, or his version of human rights diplomacy is politically selective and practically useless.
A Coordinated Political Campaign?
Warfa’s push for negotiations mirrors the long-standing efforts of his political ally and fellow Minnesotan, Rep. Ilhan Omar. For years, Omar has led efforts to curtail the U.S. drone program in Somalia. Now, Warfa surfaces with a diplomatic solution that perfectly complements her agenda.
Whether by coordination or coincidence, the optics are damning. One flank aims to disable the military option, the other steps forward to declare peace talks as the only viable alternative. Together, they form a political pincer movement—one that serves neither U.S. interests nor regional stability.
Hijacking U.S. Policy: The ‘Somalia-First’ Agenda
The clearest insight into Warfa’s worldview comes from his vocal opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. His position aligned with Biden-era policy—itself strongly shaped by Rep. Omar—that prioritized Somali territorial claims over evolving strategic partnerships.
This reveals a deeper agenda. Far from being a neutral bureaucrat, Warfa was a key proponent of a Somalia-first doctrine that worked against growing Congressional consensus in favor of Somaliland. It was a policy shaped more by clan allegiance than strategic reality.
The facts on the ground offer no comfort to his thesis. Somalia’s military is compromised by Al-Shabaab infiltration. Its government openly collaborates with Communist China, recently banning Taiwanese nationals to placate Beijing. Senator Ted Cruz called Somalia a “wholly owned subsidiary of Communist China.”
And yet Warfa—who once used Trump as an example of democratic decay—now claims he’s the president best suited to bring peace to Somalia. The moral gymnastics are staggering.
Serving Different Masters
Warfa’s proposal, stripped of its diplomatic varnish, serves interests far removed from Washington’s. For Al-Shabaab, negotiations legitimize their movement. For Qatar, they offer leverage. For Somali nationalists, they sustain the illusion of a unified state. None of these actors advance U.S. interests. Nor do they promote stability.
The question isn’t whether this strategy will work. It won’t. The real question is whether American policymakers will squander decades of investment for a fantasy that flatters terrorists and undermines allies. In an era of strategic realignment, the cost of getting it wrong has never been higher.
In my recent article about Somali-Weyn and Islam-Weyn, I examined how these two ideologies, rooted in ethnonationalism and belief orientation, have been politicized in a way defying the geographic boundaries that define the modern territorial state. The article traced the historical and contextual evolution of both Pan-Somalism and political Islamic movements in 20th century as being shaped by, or reacting to, the colonial and postcolonial political dynamics. Both Somali-weyn ideology and Islamic movements were parts of broader anticolonial, revivalist and respectively Pan-Somali unity and Caliphate restoration ambitions organically connected with African liberation movements, Arab nationalism, and subsequent Islamic revivalism.
The article generated considerable feedback in different platforms, but most notably from Ibrahim Hirsi, whose response was both thoughtful insights and significant misinterpretations. His central critique was that I had reduced Somali-weyn and Islam-weyn to mere colonial byproducts and I had downplayed the grievous impacts of the colonial history on Somalis which led to their lands’ partition and territorial dismemberment. Ibrahim argued that Somalinimo, as a political ethnonationalist sentiment, existed for centuries, and that the states historically evolved through shared identities of culture, language and religion. He implied that geographical borders were not central in the history of state formation.
I acknowledge Ibrahim’s points about the colonial grave legacy on Somalis and on all other colonized nations, and the idea that European colonialism divided Somalis into pieces of land and how impactful this legacy was on their land and psyche is undeniable, as documented by Dr. Bulhan in his great book – Politics of Cain; One Hundred Years of Crisis in Somali Politics and Society. Yet, this history needs to be thoroughly examined without succumbing to anticolonial narratives, particularly because defining nationalism solely through the lens of anti-colonialism can be deeply problematic. Such an approach risks reproducing the colonial logic it seeks to oppose- reifying boundaries and identities forged by external domination rather than reimagining them beyond it. According to Achille Mbembe critiques, in (On the Postcolony) the way postcolonial regimes have instrumentalized anti-colonial rhetoric while mimicking colonial authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and pluralism in the name of national unity.
In fact, precolonial Somalis, as most of other African nations, were organized in lineage-based clan structure, without any central authority based on Somali ethnicity, or nation state. The kinship organization of the clans developed as clan identity domination and sense of ‘tolnimo – clan loyalty’ over any ethnocentric loyalties related to ‘being Somalis’. In truth, the outsiders commonly used the term ‘Somali’ to describe Somalis, while pastoral populations within these societies used to identify themselves by their clan names or ancestral legend. Thus, and to Somali perspective, the colonial powers divided the territory and the people of individual clans among Somalis. The Somali pastoralists resented more to the lineage division and pastoral land limitations imposed by the colonial rule, than resentment to tearing Somali territorial land mass in an ethnocentric consciousness.
The rise of Somali nationalism was largely the result of political awakening of Somali elites and urbanized communities who were educated and exposed to global and regional ideologies, particularly after World War II and associated geopolitical and world view changes. Many of these elite figures, including veterans returned from colonial military service and those educated and lived in Aden and other overseas capitals, were influenced by liberation currents and the wave of nationalism in Africa and the Arab world. Mover over in the Somali context, a Pan-Somali loose movement was pushed by different actors in different circumstance; the role of the British rule in four Somali territories in 1940s in promoting Pan-Somali unity, both locally and internationally, is well documented and founded. Ernest Bevin, the then British Foreign Secretary (1945- 1951), campaigned among the great powers for Pan-Somali Unity and ethnic state formation. One may wonder what could justify that intellectually Italian-Speaking elites in Somalia had self-styled as Somali Youth League – SYL (founded in 1943), without British fingerprints in the league’s emergence during the British Military Administration of Somalia in 1941 – 1949.
Ibrahim rightly asserted that state formation historically stemmed from, and evolved through, tribal organization and religious societies, and that is partially true. However, that is the history of state formation, but for modern state, the concept is shifting from ethnicity to citizenship promoting inclusivity, rule of law and civic consciousness in nationality. Ethnocentric states in the contemporary era face challenges and mostly handle brutal politics of suppression and ethnic cleansing. As the recent history demonstrates, almost all racial and ethnocentric states were both genocidal and failure. Nazism and Italian Fascism, in modern European nation states, ultimately collapsed after years of brutality and failure to achieve racial supremacy, and they are now remembered as despised figures and history by the same races they fought for. Likewise, while Europe was shifting from nation states to citizen states, vast territories of the world, including Africa and the Arab world, were vigorously campaigning for nationalism and ethnic politics. In the Somali context, as an example of other nationalist race-based states and political movements, Pan-Somalism failed to translate into viable statehood but unleashed significant levels of violence, wars and lasting instability. Some may argue that the concept was not the culprit, but how it was implemented or employed. This argument may have some merit, but how the Somali-weyn rhetoric was politically initiated would have the brutal end of what Dr. Hussein A. Bulhan eloquently described as a ‘Fratricidal state’.
Political Somali-weyn proponents defamed the civilian Somali governments and condemned how they handled the Somali territories under Ethiopian and Kenyan sovereignties and paved the way for Siad Barre’s rise to power in 1969 with tactical visions aligned with the Somali-weyn rhetoric and aspirations. Siad Barre, with the political ingredients of racial supremacy and salvation, readily took the path of Hitler and Mussolini to conduct repressive campaign of silencing all voices of opposition either forever or for unspecified durations of solitary confinements by labeling them with dabadhilif and anti-Somali.
Finally, he ended up genocide, ethnic cleansing and national fragmentation, in total contradiction of all ambitious components of the less-defined Somali-weyn ideology. Almost all autocratic tyrants led destructive policies through ethnocentric statecrafts and pretexts of racial supremacy, unity and salvation, and the Somalian autocratic Kacaan, in the guise of Somali-weyn ideology, did little to alleviate the suffering of Somalis living in the peripheral territories annexed to Ethiopia, Kenya, and then France-colonized Djibouti. These populations paid a heavy price for a dream that never materialized. In addition, the counterproductive pursuit of Pan-Somali state led to inevitable conflicts with the neighboring countries, like Ethiopia and Kenya, with its dire consequences on the Somalis living in these countries. Ironically, even the hastily achieved unification between Somaliland and Somalia, intended to anchor the pan-Somali unity, resulted in decades of instability, civil war and self-destruction.
Another critical misrepresentation of Somali-weyn political ideology lies in its assumption of ethnic and cultural homogeneity, and even restoring a pre-existed unity. This ideology gravely failed to accept the ethnic diversity in Somalia itself, as significant populations including Bantu tribes, and many other ethnicities of the coastal residents, were systematically assimilated and culturally eliminated by the state institutions. The whole concepts were not founded as the Somalis were never united in a central administration before the colonial era, and that those living in some of the colonies have never been a pure nation. Somalia, the largest of the five territories, was not, and is not yet, ethnically homogeneous population. From Mogadishu to Kismayo and beyond, the Bantu tribes and other nationalities were, unfortunately, suppressed in culture, language and even lineages, and were pushed into demise to force them into somalization through somali-weyn ideology using the state tools. Somali nationalism adopted the European nation-state ideals without accounting for the country’s clan-based social order and promoted ethnic unity and centralization while ignoring internal diversity to reproduce colonial frameworks which contributed to later state collapse.
Re-Imagining Somalinimo and Islam in Somali Political Life
In his response, Ibrahim articulated his views under the above title, a concept that resonates with my central argument about Somali political future. Indeed, Somalis share deep cultural bonds, linguistic commonalities and some degree of collective memory about their history that can serve as a foundation for cooperation and broader unity, but these should not be premises for resurrecting failed ideologies, ethnic misrepresentation and misuse, as these commonalities do not still grantee a nation state. Considering these commonalities, Somali state should be re-imagined based on citizenship, collective interest and civic principles, but not on bloodline, belief and ethnic exclusivity. The shared heritage and identity of Somalinimo will naturally feed cooperation, togetherness and formulate future collective and voluntary shared interests, without consuming it for political agendas and group interests, or distorting it with constitutionally or forcefully forged state apparatuses.
Similarly, Islam is an integral to Somali culture, social identity and sacred values. Islam necessarily guided considerable aspects of Somalis’ world view, their life and social relations for centuries, and still does. However, transforming Islam into a political ideology of parts or movements and being re-evangelized in the Somali community has often led to radicalization, infighting and belief distortion. In fact, and contrary to Ibrahim’s assertion, the internal dynamics of Somali state including corruption, moral vacuum and clan-based politics could only be justifications used as a motive for proselytizing the Islamist ideology and to propagate their political agenda. But the truth is that all the Somali Islamists were not more than franchise of other movements in the Arab world. They were all either of Muslim Brotherhood or Wahabi Salafists. Even in case of further proliferation of a group in its original country, that division reflects in the Somali groups indicating how any change in the idea, attitude and interpretations of a mother group in one of the Arab states, would rapidly echo in the Somali groups. For instance, the takfīr doctrine—originally propagated by radical Egyptian group of jama Islamiyah —rapidly found its way into Somali Islamist discourse and contributed to organizational division of al-Ahli group – Somali Jama Islamiyah. This pattern reveals that Somali Islamism was more externally influenced than organically developed from home-grown idea.
In conclusion, the Somali identity and Islam remain integral to the social fabric of the people, but their politicization has led to clan and ideological conflicts, political crisis, belief confusions and radicalization. So, we must re-imagine them as cultural fabric that can inspire collaboration, mutual respect, and coexistence instead of forcing homogeniety, domintaion in ethnoccentric statehood, racial chauvinism, and religious extremism at the expense of civic rights and embraced diversity within all other similirities. Somali statehood should move beyond ideology of uniformity and embrace free will, historical differences, and somali political imagination should be reclaimed towards peaceful coexistance and future prosperity without persuing delusional racial hegemony that transcends geographical borders.
About the Author
Dr. Mohamed Hirsi is a health professional, university lecturer, and writer specializing in political history and philosophy. He holds an MBBS in Medicine and Surgery and a Master’s in Public Health Epidemiology. Dr. Hirsi is the author of the Somali novel Dabinkii Jiraalka – Diiriye-Maarkoos and has translated several significant works into Somali, including Bamboo Stalk by Sanusi and Politics of Cain; One Hundred Years of Crisis in Somali Politics and Society by Bulhan. His multidisciplinary background spans healthcare, academia, and literary contributions to Somali culture and political discourse.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
For the past three decades Somaliland’s political leadership has been dominated by a small opportunistic and parasitic cabal of elderly men – and increasingly a group of younger tribal and ideological followers and enablers, who appear intent to take over from them and continue in the same vein. These two groups who continue to rotate between public offices, ministries, and political parties, going unchecked and unchallenged, with absolutely devastating consequences for the Republic of Somaliland and its 6.7 million citizens.
Despite citizens and Somaliland’s political elite’s extraordinary sacrifices in previous decades, to liberate Somaliland from Somalia’s tyranny, terror and genocide, Somaliland’s youthful citizens are now demanding more from Somaliland’s government. The population is demanding reliable healthcare, decent infrastructure, economic opportunities, high standards of living, and world leading public institutions. The stagnation of recent years, which has been the product of a rotten political culture that prioritises loyalty, kinship, and nepotism over merit, capability, and suitability – will no longer be tolerated.
When President Abdirahman Irro and the Wadanni party were elected, the people of Somaliland exhibited scenes of jubilation and euphoria, for they had high hopes for the new administration. Yet, a mere six months later, the country faces a moral, political and national crisis, and apparent absence or inadequacy of leadership at the top political offices – including the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Finance, to name only a few.
The cumulative effect of months of mismanagement on top of the previous Kulmiye’s administration mismangement, neglect, and willful inaction is now visible in real human suffering: excess deaths in hospitals, chronic poverty, mass unemployment, and a broken state. What makes this crisis all the more devastating is the silence of those who know better.
Because these failings are no longer just slowing progress, but they are in fact costing lives, it is now more imperative than ever that those with skepticism and critical thinking speak up. And, to quote a book title, with “Barbarians at the Gate” in the form of Somalia’s invading militias and their ongoing invasion of and excursions deep into Eastern Somaliland, time is of the essence like never before.
In this context, where are the voices of Somaliland’s intelligentsia, its technical experts, its educated class and young professionals — both at home and abroad? Where are the public thinkers, the civil servants, the reformers, the diaspora specialists, the former campaigners?
Where are the voices of sanity, of clarity, of honesty and integrity? Many have retreated into private disillusionment or quiet resignation.
Some have chosen cushy careers, diaspora comforts, or contented themselves with online commentary or debates in cafés. Yet the majority have remained silent in the face of a callous political cabal they know to not only be unfit but also deeply damaging to the country and costing countless Somalilanders lives.
This silence is no longer an option. It is time to speak up. It is time for action.
It is time to speak up. Clearly. Consistently. Collectively. Not for symbolism, but for the survival of a republic that many fought to build — and which is now under real threat, not just from outside, but even moreso from within.
A New Government, But with the Same Old Approach
When Abdirahman Irro and the Waddani Party won the presidency, many young Somalilanders – especially professionals at home and abroad – supported the movement with the belief that it would usher in a new, capable administration. That hope is now being replaced with complete disappointment, disillusionment and abhorrence.
Instead of merit-based appointments, the Irro administration has continued the same practices: prioritising political loyalty, clan appeasement, and patronage over competence. Critical positions are not filled by the most suitably qualified and appropriate, but rather through nepotism, clan appeasement, rewarding party loyalists Rather than promoting excellence and progress, President Irro appears to be reinforcing and rewarding the culture of incompetence, treason and impunity.
Even the few young professionals included in this administration are largely tokenistic in nature. These individuals do not appear to have been selected not for their skills, experience, qualificarions or ideas, but because they pose no threat to the existing order. Many gained their positions through clan quotas, party connections, or NGO backgrounds, and most subscribe to the same core assumption as their elders: that public office is a pathway to personal advancement, that roles in government are handed out based on clan quotas, and that the best way is to maintain the status quo, do as little as possible while in post, and amass personal wealth and profile.
Many do not even sincerely believe they have the capacity, capability or ability to change the status quo. Even before taking on their roles, they indicated privately that they expected to change or achieve very little while in those roles. Their intention would be to hold the role as a means to an end, not to deliver transformation of the offices which would be under their purview.
Some view governance as a scaled-up NGO project — mistaking the prior small scale local NGOs with which they were involved as being adequate preparation to wield the serious statecraft which comes with the great offices of State of Somaliland’s government. This is not a slight or an insult on their experiences, but a sober reflection of their limitations and lack of real world experiences. Managing an NGO workshop or an awareness campaign, or writing a theoretical masters dissertation or PHD thesis is not the same as executing large scale government programmes. And without the right vision, moral compass, and real world experience, their education and youth become mere tools to be exploited by more experienced unseen hands of dysfunction, mismanagement and corruption. Also without the right moral training and guidance, an educated man in public office becomes a menace to society.
Somaliland cannot afford on-the-job training. It needs leaders who can execute with discipline, clarity, and urgency — because citizens’ lives depend on it. President Abdirahman Irro has fallen short of citizens expectations with the esceptionally poor quality of people he has appointed into critical positions. Unless he changes course, his government seems on track to facilitate failure, mismanagement and corruption. I wonder, does he want that to be his legacy?
Ideological Contradictions: Appointing the Treacherous & Rewarding the Treasonous
Recycling failed old politicians like Abdirahman Beyle, Somalia’s former Minister of Finance & Minister Foreign Affairs, or Mohammad Abdulahi Omar from the Silanyo era, who presided over the disasterous 2012 conference (which reinstated international recognition to Somalia’s hitherto internationally unrecognised failed government) has been shockingly tin-eared and lacking in self awareness. Whatever vestiges of respect the Abdirahman Irro Presidency may have expressed for the sanctity of Somaliland’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the appointment of these highly disloyal, disingenuous and duplicitous two men has done irreparable damage to his credibility. It has conveyed a message that the Abdirahman Irro Presidency is perhaps just not serious, genuine or sincere about protecting and defending Somaliland’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
Worse still, several senior figures in Irro’s administration like Abdulqadir Jirde have disappointingly, regrettably, yet unashamedly, expressed sympathy for the Greater Somalia ideology. This has compounded the contradictions, illogicality and incoherence of appointing people like Beyle who have previously held positions within Somalia’s federal government — raising serious questions about the Irro Presidency and Wadanni’s Party’s leadership’s ideological coherence and sincerety about Somaliland’s sovereignty, even amongst party loyalists and amongst party members.
These appointments not only betray the principles on which Somaliland was founded, but they also undermine the Republic of Somaliland claim to recognition and sovereignty. How can the government advocate for international recognition when it promotes officials who previously worked against it? How can citizens be asked to sacrifice for a cause when their own government rewards people who worked against it?
This is not ideological diversity — it is political recklessness, negligence and a dangerous and offensive disregard for the common sense sensibilities which hold the loyal people of this country together. It marks a dangerous and deliberate appointment of pro Greater Somalia proponents at the heart of Somaliland’s government institutions.
Non-Recognition as Excuse and Shield
A persistent myth used to justify governance failure in Somaliland is that everything can be blamed on the country’s lack of international recognition. This is a misleading narrative that masks deeper problems.
Non-recognition does not explain the appointment of unqualified officials, the absence of policy reform, or the looting of public funds. It does not prevent long-term planning, institutional development, or infrastructure delivery. These are internal failures — and they must be owned as such.
Yet Somaliland’s political class repeatedly uses non-recognition as a shield — feigning helplessness and pretending that nothing can be done until foreign governments say otherwise. This learned helplessness has become a national affliction — a convenient way to avoid accountability and delay difficult decisions.
Meanwhile, the rhetoric of recognition continues, but without matching action. There is no coherent foreign policy strategy, no professional diplomatic corps, and no meaningful attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of Somaliland’s institutions in the eyes of the world. Recognition is invoked rhetorically, but abandoned operationally.
Wasted Opportunities: The Ministry of Finance, The Central Bank, Foreign Affairs & Missions, and International Trade
Somaliland’s Ministry of Finance should be the beating heart which leads Somaliland’s national transformation during the Irro Presidency. So should the central bank, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Representative Offices abroad. Yet these have been reduced to be tools of patronage, kleptocracy and nepotism. Instead of appointing seasoned experts in public finance, macroeconomics, or fiscal policy, appointments and skilled communicators who can communicate with and advocate on Somaliland’s behalf with the world, the offices are filled with unqualified people appointed based on clan, party loyalty or nepotism. The result: stagnant growth, outdated revenue models, a state without a coherent economic plan, lack of foreign policy, and a virtyally absence Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
When it comes to thr Ministry of Health, maternal and infant mortality remain high. Basic medications are unavailable, and rural communities remain cut off. Health policy is rudderless, feckless, hapless and systems are collapsing. Thousands of deaths occur each year not because of a lack of resources alone, but because of neglect, incompetence, and wilful mismanagement and neglect of the healthcare system. Under the Irro Administration, expect little to no improvement.
What Somaliland Needs Now
What Somaliland lacks is it is professionalism, accountability, and moral seriousness. It needs:
Public servants chosen for merit and capability
Institutions shielded from tribal nepotism and political interference
A clear national strategy rooted in long-term development
A leadership that understands public service, not entitlement and self enrichment
There is no shortage of capable Somalilanders. Across the globe, there are professionals who have delivered world leading public, professional and financial services, worked in some of the largest governments in the world, and led serious private & public institutions. But the Irro Presidency and Wadanni Party appear to be actively and deliberately excluding them, fearing their independence, their integrity, and their refusal to serve narrow personal and Party interest, instead of the public and national interest.
To the Intelligentsia and Young Professionals: Speak Up
This is not a symbolic appeal. It is a national call to action.
To the thinkers, professionals, researchers, policy experts, activists, and youth — inside and outside the country — you must speak up. You must challenge this decline. You must refuse to participate in the culture of nepotism and corruption that has consumed Somaliland’s politics and appears to be consuming the Irro and Wadanni Presidency.
Remaining silent in the face of mismanagement, corruption, neglect, negligence, malfeasance in public office is not neutrality, is not civility, is not patriotic. It is being complicit in the destruction of the Republic of Somaliland which we all so dearly love.
Stop waiting for permission from the very people who fear your voice.
Stop assuming that change will emerge from inside the same elite circles.
Stop remaining silent, speaking in private circles, or adopting a wait and see mode
If you as Somaliland’s capable class remains passive, the outcome is predictable: further decline, growing hopelessness, and preventable suffering of Somaliland’s citizens. This is not about political rivalry. It is about Sonaliland’s survival — and the human cost of our continued inaction.
So speak up. Speak up loudly, clearly and forcefully. Speak up unequivocally. Claim your space. Play your role. Demand better. Because Somalilanders’ lives — and the future of the Republic of Somaliland — are on the line.
About the Author
Dr Adali Warsame is a political commentator and public policy professional, who is a long time observer of Somaliland politics. He writing focuses on standing up for the dignity of Somaliland’s citizens, who appear to be forgotten in the melee that is everyday Somaliland and Horn of Africa politics.
Adali is an unapologetic Somalilander. He is passionate about achieving justice for the forgotten Isaaq Genocide victims, stopping the doomed Somaliland-Somalia talks and international recognition of the Republic of Somaliland.
The recent interview between Somaliland politician Abdulqaadir Jirde and Abdijaliil—a known advocate for the Somalia-Weyn narrative—was more than just a political exchange. It offered a revealing glimpse into a persistent ideological current: a nostalgic vision of Somali unity rooted in the legacy of the Kacaan regime. Spanning over an hour, the conversation was framed as an open dialogue, yet in substance, it unfolded as a revisionist account of a political experiment long regarded as untenable.
Rather than offering critical self-reflection, Jirde’s remarks demonstrated the enduring influence of a narrative forged during a time of centralized authoritarianism and ideological conformity. His interview served less as a platform for political clarity and more as a reaffirmation of a discredited ideal.
Early Indoctrination and Unquestioned Loyalties
Jirde openly reflects on being raised within the ideological framework of the Kacaan regime. In a telling metaphor, he likens his exposure to the Somalia-Weyn ideal to receiving it “like breast milk”—a phrase that underscores how deeply embedded and emotionally internalized the narrative became during his formative years.
The proverb, ”العلم في الصغر كالنقش على الحجر“ (“Knowledge acquired in youth is like engraving on stone”), captures the essence of his political formation—not as the result of inquiry, but of early and lasting imprint. The danger, however, lies in mistaking ideological familiarity for historical truth. Jirde’s commentary reveals a political worldview shaped not by critical evaluation of the past but by inherited loyalty to a vision that no longer holds empirical or moral coherence.
The Ogaden War: Between National Myth and Historical Record
A striking moment in the interview arises when Jirde defends Siyad Barre’s 1977 invasion of Ethiopia. He presents the conflict as a principled decision to reject a federation proposed in Yemen and instead defend Somali territorial integrity. This narrative, however, selectively omits critical context and evidence.
Major General Mohamed Nur Galaal, a senior commander during the conflict, has provided a markedly different account. In his detailed interviews on Xasuus Reeb (HCTV, Vol. 2, 3 & 4), Galaal describes how the war was engineered under Soviet influence following the USSR’s expulsion from Egypt. He further alleges that Barre had acted as an informant for Ethiopian intelligence prior to taking power.
Of particular concern is Galaal’s claim that Isaaq soldiers were disproportionately deployed and used as de facto human shields. Their units—and in some cases, even their personal vehicles—were sent to the front lines, suffering disproportionately high casualties. These accounts challenge the idea of a unified national struggle and instead point to a war shaped by ethnic stratification and Cold War geopolitics. Jirde’s failure to address this context—despite his awareness of such testimony—reflects a selective historical memory that serves political nostalgia more than factual accuracy.
Structural Imbalances and Symbolic Inclusion
Jirde briefly concedes that during the Somali Republic era, power and resources were heavily centralized in Mogadishu. Northerners, particularly those from present-day Somaliland, were often placed in visible but secondary roles—what could be termed symbolic inclusion rather than substantive representation.
Yet even this acknowledgment is presented without critical interrogation. Jirde offers no meaningful reflection on how such structural imbalances contributed to the collapse of the union or the sense of alienation felt in Somaliland. Instead, he maintains a romantic attachment to the idea of unity, even as he admits the union functioned on unequal terms. This contradiction speaks to the depth of ideological conditioning and the reluctance among some former elites to fully reckon with the past.
Silencing Critical Inquiry: A Fragile Narrative
At one point in the interview, Jirde begins to question whether Somali unity ever truly existed in any functional or inclusive form. Before he can expand on this thought, the interviewer abruptly changes the subject. Whether intentional or not, this editorial redirection reflects an underlying fragility: the Somalia-Weyn narrative cannot withstand sustained scrutiny.
The brief historical clarity offered—where Jirde acknowledges Somaliland’s distinct colonial experience and independent statehood in 1960—is quickly overshadowed by a return to the unexamined ideal of unity. This evasiveness not only undermines the credibility of the interview but also illustrates the lengths to which some narratives rely on omission and selective framing to preserve ideological coherence.
Political Rhetoric and the Youth: A Crisis of Critical Engagement
Perhaps the most concerning dimension of Jirde’s public role is the influence he continues to exert on Somaliland’s youth. During the most recent election cycle, he appeared on MM Somali TV and claimed that Somaliland is inherently tribal, asserting that no single clan could “rule” over others. On its surface, this might appear to promote inclusivity. However, in context, it read more as a warning: if political outcomes do not align with specific interests, their legitimacy will be challenged.
This form of rhetoric does not foster democratic engagement—it encourages political brinkmanship. It reinforces a worldview in which clan loyalty trumps civic responsibility and in which historical accountability is subordinated to factional loyalty.
That such views continue to resonate among segments of the youth reflects a larger failure in political education. It suggests a need for alternative intellectual leadership—voices that prioritize evidence-based reasoning, democratic values, and historical integrity over recycled ideologies and partisan mythmaking.
The Cost of Unexamined Nostalgia
Abdulqaadir Jirde’s continued advocacy for Somalia-Weyn is not merely a personal conviction; it is symptomatic of a broader intellectual inertia among political elites who have not come to terms with the structural and historical failures of the past. To equate the unrealized vision of Somalia-Weyn—and to assert its inevitable resurgence—with historically grounded political formations such as the Ottoman Empire is not only analytically unsound, but also historically indefensible.
The repeated invocation of Somalia-Weyn as an enduring ideal does more than ignore reality—it actively undermines Somaliland’s sovereign identity, its political development, and its post-conflict reconciliation efforts. Nostalgia, in this context, becomes not just unproductive but obstructive.
The lesson here extends beyond Jirde as an individual. It speaks to the importance of cultivating a political culture that values historical truth, critical inquiry, and democratic accountability. Somaliland’s youth—and indeed its future—deserve leadership grounded in reality, not in the sentimental retelling of failed projects.
Author’s Note:This article is intended to encourage informed and respectful dialogue about the legacy of political ideologies in the Somali context. It does not seek to vilify individuals but to promote a critical re-engagement with historical narratives as Somaliland continues its path toward sustainable sovereignty and democratic maturity.
About the Author
Nasir Xuseen is a Somaliland activist and analyst with a background in accounting, finance, and international relations. A member of the UK Somaliland Alliance, he focuses on sovereignty, post-conflict governance, and political analysis of the Horn of Africa.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
For more than three decades, Somaliland has stood out in the Horn of Africa as a rare example of stability, democratic governance, and peace. In a region often defined by fragility and conflict, Somaliland has managed to build functioning institutions, hold credible elections, and maintain internal security. Yet despite this remarkable progress, formal diplomatic recognition continues to be withheld by the international community.
One of the most significant challenges to Somaliland’s diplomatic cause lies not just in international politics, but in the absence of a coherent and credible foreign policy strategy. Rather than pursuing a long-term roadmap for recognition rooted in law, diplomacy, and national interest, successive administrations have defaulted to reactive, short-term tactics. Over the past decade in particular, Somaliland has placed increasing faith in foreign lobbying firms, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. These firms, while promising access and influence, have delivered little of lasting substance. Draft bills such as H.R.7170, S.3861, H.R.10402, and most recently H.R.3992 have all followed the same pattern: introduced with optimism, briefly mentioned in the press, then quietly forgotten in committee.
It is important to clarify that hiring lobbyists, in itself, is not inherently problematic. In fact, strategic lobbying can serve as a useful complement to official diplomacy especially when seeking to raise awareness, shape narratives, or open doors in foreign policy circles. However, lobbying must be part of a broader, government-led diplomatic strategy. It cannot substitute for statecraft, legal advocacy, or regional engagement. When used in isolation, and without oversight, lobbying risks becoming a costly exercise in symbolism rather than a tool for advancing national interests.
Despite the millions of dollars spent on these lobbying contracts, they have yet to yield binding policies or strategic leverage. What is perhaps more damaging is the way some domestic media outlets amplify these efforts, often portraying them as diplomatic breakthroughs. These narratives, sometimes politically motivated or commercially influenced, give Somalilanders the false impression that international recognition is imminent when in reality, these bills are largely symbolic and rarely lead to substantive engagement. This misrepresentation misleads the public, masks policy failures, and diverts attention from the structural reforms and serious diplomacy Somaliland actually needs.
Contrast this with earlier periods in Somaliland’s political history. The first two administrations, led by Presidents Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and Dahir Riyale Kahin, focused not only on reconciliation and rebuilding, but also on laying the groundwork for responsible foreign policy. Their emphasis on institution-building and quiet diplomacy allowed Somaliland to emerge as a serious actor in regional and international conversations. President Riyale’s 2008 visit to the United States and his meetings with senior officials from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense demonstrated how principled engagement could yield attention and respect, even without formal recognition.
That same year, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer visited Hargeisa and acknowledged Somaliland’s democratic achievements and role in regional security. Although the U.S. stopped short of recognizing Somaliland, the dialogue was based on mutual respect and policy substance. Similarly, the 2005 African Union fact-finding mission, which I personally engaged with as a member of civil society in Burao, offered an important precedent. Led by AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, the mission recognized Somaliland’s case as historically and politically unique. Its final report, though not a declaration of recognition, remains a powerful affirmation of Somaliland’s legitimacy as a self-governing territory.
Unfortunately, this pragmatic diplomacy was later abandoned. The turning point came in 2012 when Somaliland agreed to suspend its international legal campaign and instead pursue direct talks with the Somali government. This decision, while perhaps well-intentioned, weakened Somaliland’s legal posture and allowed the international community to prematurely elevate Somalia’s transitional government to full sovereign status. That recognition has since been used to block Somaliland’s access to diplomatic channels and global forums.
Rather than learning from this experience, subsequent administrations have doubled down on symbolic foreign lobbying while neglecting domestic reforms, legal advocacy, and regional diplomacy. Millions have been spent on contracts with foreign consultants whose interests do not always align with those of the Somaliland people. At the same time, there is still no comprehensive, transparent foreign policy document outlining our recognition strategy. No clearly defined priorities, no phased approach, no measurable diplomatic milestones. Even our strongest legal arguments for recognition remain scattered, inconsistently presented, and largely unpublished in international forums.
A credible and strategic government would make this legal case the foundation of its diplomacy. It would consolidate Somaliland’s legal and historical claim to statehood, publish it as a formal brief, and present it to both African and international bodies. It would not rely solely on emotional appeals or moral persuasion, but instead make the case based on governance, stability, and adherence to international law.
The reality is that recognition will only come when Somaliland becomes too stable, too prosperous, and too strategically valuable to ignore. The Berbera Port agreement with the United Arab Emirates did more to raise Somaliland’s profile than any bill introduced in a foreign parliament. Investors and global partners are drawn to states that offer security, reliable infrastructure, and a favorable business environment. These are the forms of leverage that matter. Instead of allocating millions to opaque lobbying contracts, we should be investing in legal reform, infrastructure, regional integration, and economic competitiveness.
Sadly, recent administrations have often prioritized headlines over substance, and international recognition has become a tool of domestic political theater. Declarations that “recognition is near” serve local audiences but carry little weight abroad. Diplomatic credibility cannot be built on spectacle. It must be earned through consistency, competence, and vision.
Somaliland must break this cycle. The newly elected government has a unique opportunity to reset our foreign policy and reinvest in strategies that produce real, measurable results. This means establishing a clear national recognition strategy, engaging African partners more meaningfully, restoring legal diplomacy, and ensuring that every dollar spent abroad is transparently documented and publicly justified. More importantly, it means aligning our foreign policy with our domestic development priorities building legal institutions, ensuring economic opportunity, and strengthening democratic governance.
The people of Somaliland have sacrificed too much to be shortchanged by empty symbolism. They deserve a recognition campaign that reflects the maturity and resilience of their state. This requires honest dialogue, public accountability, and a shift from outsourced advocacy to homegrown leadership.
Our place among the community of nations will not be handed to us out of sympathy. It will be earned through law, through strength, and through strategy.
About the Author
Mr. Mohamed Aideed, co-founder of the BARWAAQO Party in Somaliland and the founder of Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organization (SOYDAVO). Mr. Aideed holds a Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from Kampala University. Mr. Aideed is a commentator on on East and Horn of Africa politics, he has published notable work on the Somaliland-Somalia Talks.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Since its self-declared independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has pursued a relatively peaceful and stable trajectory compared to other parts of the region. It has built nascent democratic institutions, held multiple elections, and maintained security through hybrid governance mechanisms that combine modern state structures with traditional clan-based systems (Bradbury, 2008). However, despite these achievements, Somaliland’s public administration continues to face structural challenges, particularly regarding institutional capacity, rule of law, and public sector efficiency.
Public service delivery in Somaliland is largely managed through ministries and local government authorities, yet the sector is severely underfunded, understaffed, and lacks standardized human resource systems. Recruitment processes remain largely opaque and informal, heavily influenced by political, clan, and personal connections rather than qualifications or merit (Abokor et al., 2010). This undermines the development of a professional and accountable civil service essential for the effective delivery of services and implementation of public policies. Since its self-declared independence in 1991, Somaliland has established a unique hybrid political system that blends traditional authority with modern democratic structures. Its governance system is founded on a combination of formal institutions such as an elected president, bicameral legislature, and judiciary and customary clan-based mechanisms of conflict resolution and power distribution (Bradbury, 2008). This hybrid model was critical in maintaining peace, rebuilding after civil war, and laying the foundation for stability in a region marked by turmoil.
The Somaliland government is organized into three branches: the executive, led by the President and a cabinet of ministers; the legislature, consisting of the House of Representatives and the House of Elders (Guurti); and the judiciary, with courts operating at district, regional, and national levels. Local governments also play a key role in service delivery and community administration, though their capacity is often constrained by financial and technical limitations (Eubank, 2012).
However, while democratic elections have been held regularly, the system still heavily relies on informal practices—especially in public appointments. Ministries and local authorities are often staffed not through transparent recruitment but via appointments made at the discretion of political elites, often without adherence to clear professional standards or job requirements (Renders & Terlinden, 2010).
What Constitutes “Unqualified Appointments”?
Unqualified appointments refer to the practice of assigning individuals to public positions for which they lack the minimum academic qualifications, professional experience, or technical competencies required to perform the role effectively. These individuals may be appointed based on familial, political, or clan affiliations rather than objective criteria (OECD, 2017).
In Somaliland’s case, appointments are often made without transparent recruitment procedures, job descriptions, or performance evaluations. The absence of a formalized civil service commission with regulatory power exacerbates this issue, as does limited oversight by the legislative and judicial branches. Consequently, individuals with limited or no experience in governance, finance, project management, or public policy are often entrusted with leading key government institutions or managing significant budgets.
This practice not only weakens administrative competence but also fuels resentment among educated and qualified youth who are excluded from opportunities based on merit, further eroding public trust in state institutions (Harper, 2022).
How Incompetence Appointments Affect Somaliland’s State-Building
The reliance on nepotism and favoritism in public appointments has serious implications for Somaliland’s state-building process. At its core, state-building requires the creation of effective, inclusive, and legitimate institutions that can provide services, enforce the rule of law, and promote citizen participation. However, the appointment of unqualified individuals undermines each of these pillars in several key ways:
Institutional Weakness and Inefficiency: Incompetent leadership at the helm of ministries or departments results in poor planning, implementation failures, and mismanagement of public funds. This weakens state institutions and impedes the provision of critical services such as health, education, and infrastructure (World Bank, 2020).
Corruption and Patronage Networks: Nepotism often leads to the establishment of patron-client networks that prioritize personal and clan interests over the national good. This fosters corruption and reduces transparency, particularly in procurement, hiring, and budgeting processes (Transparency International, 2023).
Erosion of Public Trust and Legitimacy: When citizens see public offices occupied by unqualified individuals with poor performance records, trust in government erodes. This loss of confidence can lead to political apathy, decreased civic engagement, and resistance to tax compliance or rule of law (Grindle, 2012).
Marginalization of Women and Minorities: Nepotistic systems often perpetuate gender and social exclusion. Qualified women and members of minority clans are frequently overlooked, further marginalizing them from decision-making processes (Ahmed, 2019).
Brain Drain and Youth Disengagement: Educated youth who feel blocked by unfair hiring practices are more likely to migrate or disengage from public life. This drains the country of human capital that is essential for long-term development and reform.
Role of Clan-Based Politics and Power-Sharing
Clan identity plays a central role in Somaliland’s political life. The clan system has historically been both a source of resilience and a barrier to institutional development. On one hand, clan-based negotiations were crucial in mediating peace and establishing a national charter after the collapse of the Somali state. On the other, it has entrenched a quota-based approach to public power, where representation and appointments are distributed across major clans to maintain balance and avoid conflict (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007).
This system of clan power-sharing has led to an informal but deeply rooted expectation that all major clans should be proportionally represented in state institutions. While this has prevented large-scale political violence, it has also compromised meritocratic principles. As a result, public positions particularly at the ministerial and managerial levels—are often filled based on clan affiliation rather than competence. Appointees are expected to serve the interests of their sub-clans, which can create conflicting loyalties and reduce institutional neutrality (Walls & Kibble, 2011).
The politicization of clan identity in appointments has further entrenched patronage networks, creating a “jobs for the boys” culture that prioritizes loyalty and kinship ties over qualifications and performance (Grindle, 2012). This not only affects efficiency but also limits inclusivity, as women and marginalized clans are often left out of the power-sharing equation.
Challenges in Institutionalizing a Merit-Based Public Service System
Somaliland faces several structural and political challenges in building a merit-based public service. One major issue is the absence of a strong, independent civil service commission with the authority to standardize recruitment, enforce job qualifications, and oversee career progression. In practice, most appointments especially in the civil service and public enterprises are made directly by the President, ministers, or regional governors, often without competitive processes or public advertisement (Abokor et al., 2010).
Another challenge is the weak enforcement of rules and regulations related to public service conduct. Although there are frameworks such as the Somaliland Civil Service Law (Law No. 31/2004), implementation is inconsistent, and oversight bodies such as the Auditor General’s Office lack autonomy and resources. The politicization of civil service positions undermines impartiality, accountability, and performance-based evaluation (Harper, 2022).
Moreover, the culture of patronage and informality remains pervasive. Appointments are frequently used as political rewards or tools for maintaining clan alliances. This undermines institutional development and leads to high turnover, as appointees are replaced following political changes rather than performance reviews. In addition, budget constraints and donor dependence affect the government’s ability to recruit and retain qualified professionals. Many skilled Somalilanders emigrate or work for international NGOs where salaries and working conditions are better, resulting in a capacity vacuum in key sectors such as education, health, and finance (World Bank, 2020).
Ultimately, while Somaliland has made notable strides in self-governance, the entrenchment of clan-based power-sharing and weak institutional frameworks continue to obstruct the creation of a transparent and meritocratic public service—one that is vital for sustainable state-building, inclusive development, and democratic consolidation.
The Nature and Drivers of Unqualified Appointments in Somaliland
The appointment of unqualified individuals to public positions in Somaliland is a reflection of deeper structural and socio-political challenges. This trend undermines institutional effectiveness, service delivery, and public trust, and is largely driven by clan-based patronage, and the absence of strong human resource governance frameworks.
Influence of Clan Affiliation, Political Patronage, and Personal Loyalty
In Somaliland’s post-conflict political landscape, clan identity continues to shape access to power and public resources. Ministries and state institutions are often treated as extensions of clan influence, with leaders pressured to “balance” appointments across dominant clans to maintain political harmony (Renders & Terlinden, 2010). While this system has helped maintain peace, it has also entrenched a system where competence is secondary to representation and loyalty. Furthermore, individuals appointed through political patronage often feel more accountable to their political sponsors or clans than to the institution or the public they serve (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007).
This dynamic not only limits performance-based accountability but also creates fragile institutions where leadership changes result in high staff turnover and policy discontinuity. It also deepens social exclusion, as minority clans and women—who lack strong patronage networks—are disproportionately affected by favoritism in recruitment.
Lack of Clear Human Resource Policies and Weak Oversight Institutions
The absence of standardized recruitment and promotion mechanisms has allowed informal practices to dominate public sector hiring. Although Somaliland has a Civil Service Law (Law No. 31/2004), it is rarely enforced in practice, and many institutions operate without job descriptions, performance evaluation criteria, or open competition for posts (Harper, 2022). Moreover, oversight bodies such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Civil Service Commission lack the authority, independence, and resources to enforce compliance.
These institutional gaps create a fertile environment for non-merit-based hiring and limit the ability of the government to attract, retain, and promote qualified personnel. The result is a civil service that is not only understaffed but often misaligned with national development goals.
Consequences of Appointing Unqualified Individuals
a) Increased Corruption and Mismanagement
One of the most visible consequences of appointing unqualified individuals to public positions is the rise in corruption and financial mismanagement. When those in charge of public funds lack the necessary skills and ethical grounding, they are more likely to engage in corrupt practices or fail to prevent them. In Somaliland, ministries often suffer from poor financial oversight, which leads to the misallocation or embezzlement of public resources (Transparency International, 2023).
For example, procurement processes in several key sectors are often manipulated due to weak controls and lack of technical know-how among senior officials. Without training in budgeting, accounting, or procurement compliance, unqualified leaders are unable to establish proper internal controls, leaving public institutions vulnerable to theft and inefficiency (World Bank, 2020).
In many cases, audits and reviews—if they occur at all—are ignored or lack enforcement mechanisms. Institutions such as the Office of the Auditor General and Anti-Corruption Commission are under-resourced and lack independence, making it difficult to hold high-level appointees accountable (Harper, 2022).
b) Poor Public Service Delivery
Another consequence is the deterioration of service delivery in critical sectors such as education, health, water, and infrastructure. When public offices are led by individuals without technical or administrative qualifications, project planning, implementation, and monitoring are severely compromised.
For instance, the education sector in Somaliland has suffered from inconsistent policy reforms and poor resource allocation, partially due to leadership gaps at the ministerial and regional levels. Schools remain underfunded and teachers unpaid because unqualified administrators are unable to plan budgets effectively or advocate for sustainable funding (Ahmed, 2019).
Similarly, in the health sector, hospitals face a chronic shortage of medical supplies, delayed salaries, and weak referral systems. Reports from civil society indicate that health department heads often lack health administration backgrounds, leading to poor coordination and inefficient service delivery (Abokor et al., 2010). Infrastructure projects, such as road or water development, are frequently delayed or fail entirely due to poor contract management and lack of engineering expertise among leadership.The long-term impact is public dissatisfaction, inequality in access to basic services, and failure to meet development goals.
c) Erosion of Institutional Trust and Legitimacy
Perhaps the most damaging impact of unqualified appointments is the erosion of public trust in government institutions. Citizens become disillusioned when they see individuals rewarded with public office not for their ability but for their connections. This undermines the credibility of state institutions and weakens their legitimacy.
In Somaliland, youth in particular express growing frustration at the lack of opportunities and fairness in the job market. Educated young people who invest in degrees and technical training often find themselves locked out of government employment due to nepotism and patronage networks (Hansen & Bradbury, 2007). This drives brain drain, as qualified professionals emigrate or shift to the NGO sector, leaving government institutions further weakened.
Furthermore, the lack of institutional meritocracy diminishes the will of citizens to engage with the state, pay taxes, or participate in democratic processes. When citizens lose faith in the system, democratic consolidation and peacebuilding efforts are put at risk (Eubank, 2012).
5. Voices from the Field: Local Examples and Testimonies
To understand the human impact of unqualified appointments, it is essential to listen to local actors on the ground. Civil society leaders, journalists, and professionals in Somaliland consistently point to public frustration over appointment practices that prioritize loyalty over merit.
A civil society organizer in Hargeisa stated during a public policy dialogue in 2023:
“Many ministers are replaced every year, and each time they come with their relatives or clan members. Policies change, priorities change, and public servants are demoralized.”
In 2022, the controversial appointment of a regional education director with no teaching experience triggered backlash from teachers’ unions, who protested that classroom performance and examination standards were declining due to leadership failures.
Journalists from Horn Diplomat and Somaliland Chronicle have also reported on instances where politically connected individuals secured high-level posts despite lacking basic credentials, often after electoral periods when power-sharing deals are renegotiated.
Grassroots youth groups in Burao and Berbera have highlighted how clan affiliation trumps competence, particularly in government scholarships, internships, and entry-level civil service roles. One youth leader remarked:
“If you’re not connected, you’re not considered. Even with a Master’s degree, you sit at home while someone with high school gets a director’s job.”
These testimonies underscore the need for institutional reform that prioritizes fairness, transparency, and merit in public appointments.
6. Pathways to Reform and Merit-Based Governance
Despite these challenges, there are clear pathways Somaliland can pursue to build a more competent and accountable public administration.
a) Establishment of a Professional Civil Service Commission
A key reform priority is the creation and empowerment of a Civil Service Commission with full independence and legal authority to oversee recruitment, promotion, and discipline across the public sector. The commission should ensure job advertisements are open, qualifications are enforced, and interviews are competency-based. It must also be gender-inclusive and regionally balanced to build trust among all communities.
b) Transparency in Recruitment and Promotion
To rebuild public trust, recruitment processes must be publicly advertised, with clear criteria for selection and objective evaluation tools. Performance-based promotion and demotion mechanisms should be institutionalized. This includes regular performance appraisals, leadership assessments, and audit reports that are made publicly available.
Digital platforms can also be leveraged to improve access to job opportunities and monitor recruitment integrity, reducing opportunities for corruption and favoritism (OECD, 2017).
c) Role of Civil Society, Media, and Youth
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media play a critical watchdog role. They must be supported to investigate and expose corrupt practices in hiring, advocate for transparency, and conduct civic education campaigns on meritocracy.
Youth-led movements, such as university alumni networks and job seekers’ associations, should be encouraged to demand reform and monitor appointment processes at local and national levels.
Donors and development partners can support these efforts through technical assistance, training, and funding to build capacity and accountability tools.
d) Regional and International Best Practices
Somaliland can draw lessons from other African countries that have transitioned toward more merit-based systems. For example, Rwanda has implemented public service reforms that require all senior civil servants to pass through competency-based interviews and performance contracts.
In Ghana and Botswana, independent civil service commissions oversee recruitment and promotion, reducing political interference. These models demonstrate that institutional meritocracy is achievable, even in resource-constrained contexts, when political will and legal enforcement are present (Grindle, 2012).
Conclusion
The appointment of unqualified individuals to public office is not a minor issue it is a systemic threat to governance, service delivery, and the future of Somaliland’s state-building. From increased corruption to weakened institutions and public disillusionment, the costs are high and long-term.To move forward, Somaliland must prioritize institutional reform. A transparent and merit-based public administration is not only more efficient it is more just, inclusive, and responsive to the needs of its people. Reform will require strong leadership, active civil society engagement, and regional cooperation but the benefits for peace, development, and legitimacy are well worth the investment.
References
Abokor, A. Y., Bradbury, M., Yusuf, H. A., & Harper, M. (2010). Somaliland: Choosing politics over violence. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, (21).
Ahmed, I. I. (2019). Gender and governance in Somaliland: Barriers and opportunities. Rift Valley Institute.
Bradbury, M. (2008). Becoming Somaliland. James Currey.
Eubank, N. (2012). Taxation, political accountability and foreign aid: Lessons from Somaliland. Journal of Development Studies, 48(4), 465–480. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2011.598510
Grindle, M. S. (2012). Jobs for the boys: Patronage and the state in comparative perspective. Harvard University Press.
Hansen, S. J., & Bradbury, M. (2007). Somaliland: A new democracy in the Horn of Africa? Review of African Political Economy, 34(113), 461–476. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240701672595
Harper, M. (2022). The fragility of unrecognized states: Lessons from Somaliland. African Affairs, 121(482), 102–123. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adab038
OECD. (2017). Preventing policy capture: Integrity in public decision making. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264065239-en
Renders, M., & Terlinden, U. (2010). Negotiating statehood in a hybrid political order: The case of Somaliland. Development and Change, 41(4), 723–746. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01661.x
Transparency International. (2023). Corruption perceptions index 2022. https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Walls, M., & Kibble, S. (2011). Somaliland: Progress, state and outsiders. Progressio.
Kaltun Osman is a humanitarian worker and gender activist who has dedicated her career to advancing women’s rights, political participation, and governance across the Horn of Africa. She brings a unique perspective that bridges grassroots activism with policy advocacy, focusing on inclusive governance and the strategic use of digital tools to empower women in their communities.
Kaltun holds Master’s degrees in Governance and Regional Integration, and Project Planning and Management. As a 2025 I AM NALA Fellow, she has been recognized as one of Africa’s emerging women leaders in peace and security. Her work spans from community-level organizing to policy development, consistently advocating for systems that ensure women’s voices are heard in decision-making processes that affect their lives.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted, provided proper attribution is given.
