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The Federal Government of Somalia has called on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to intervene militarily against Somaliland’s administration following the conclusion of Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s official visit to Hargeisa—a diplomatic engagement Mogadishu failed to prevent despite repeated condemnations.
The likelihood of Saudi Arabia heeding Somalia’s appeal remains remote. Riyadh faces its own intractable military challenge in Yemen, where years of airstrikes have failed to dislodge the Iran-backed Houthis who continue threatening Red Sea shipping lanes—the same strategic waterways where Somaliland’s cooperation with Israel now offers potential solutions. Opening a second military front in the Horn of Africa would stretch Saudi resources while potentially antagonizing Israel, a nation with which Riyadh has pursued quiet normalization under the Abraham Accords framework. Moreover, Somaliland’s demonstrated stability and effective governance stand in stark contrast to Somalia’s persistent security failures, raising questions about whether Saudi strategic interests would be better served by engaging Hargeisa rather than attacking it at Mogadishu’s behest.
First Ministerial Visit in Over Three Decades
On January 6, 2026, Foreign Minister Sa’ar arrived in Hargeisa at the invitation of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” for the first official visit by any foreign minister to Somaliland in 34 years. The visit occurred ten days after Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign nation on December 26, 2025.
During meetings at the Presidential Palace, Sa’ar and President Irro finalized agreements to establish mutual embassies and appoint ambassadors. The Israeli delegation, which included representatives from MASHAV (Israel’s Agency for International Development Cooperation), also discussed development and technical cooperation.
“Israel recognized Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and again on December 26, 2025, and will continue to stand with Somaliland in the future.”
— Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar
Despite Mogadishu’s characterization of the visit as an “unauthorized incursion” and “illegal violation of sovereignty,” the delegation proceeded without obstruction. Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued multiple statements condemning the visit, though these appeared to have no practical effect on the proceedings in Hargeisa.
Chinese Diplomatic Setback Compounds Mogadishu’s Isolation
While Israeli officials conducted high-level meetings in Hargeisa, Mogadishu faced a diplomatic setback when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi abruptly postponed a scheduled visit on January 9, 2026. The trip would have marked the first visit by a Chinese foreign minister to Somalia since the 1980s.
Although the Chinese Embassy officially attributed the delay to “scheduling adjustments,” documents shared by Somaliland officials and regional security sources suggested the cancellation stemmed from security concerns, despite Mogadishu implementing extensive security measures in anticipation of the visit. The contrast between Hargeisa’s successful hosting and Mogadishu’s inability to secure even a postponed ministerial visit underscores the diverging trajectories of the two administrations’ international standing.
The Palestinian Resettlement Fiction
Among Mogadishu’s accusations is the claim that Israel’s recognition was conditioned on accepting forcibly displaced Palestinians from Gaza. Both Israeli Foreign Minister Sa’ar and Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs have categorically denied this.
“The forcible displacement of Palestinians to Somaliland was not part of our agreement.”
— Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, Israel’s Channel 14
Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal statement rejecting what it termed “false claims” about Palestinian resettlement or Israeli military bases, describing the allegations as “baseless” and “intended to mislead the international community.”
The resettlement narrative has been amplified by Somalia’s regional allies despite its legal and practical impossibility. The timing is telling: reports of Gaza reconstruction plans predated Israel’s December 26 recognition, allowing Mogadishu to weaponize Palestinian suffering for diplomatic leverage against Somaliland.
The regional hypocrisy is stark. Egypt, which maintains a heavily fortified border wall preventing Palestinians from entering its territory while having normalized relations with Israel since 1979, condemns Somaliland’s engagement. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told TRT Haber that Ankara coordinated with Muslim countries to prevent states from recognizing Somaliland—this from a government maintaining full diplomatic ties with Israel, recording billions in annual exports to Israel, while operating an unaccredited consulate in Hargeisa.
Somaliland-Israel relations are predicated on mutual strategic interests in Red Sea security and technological cooperation, standing independent of the Palestinian issue despite critics’ attempts at conflation.
Defense Minister Invokes Yemen Precedent in Saudi Appeal
Somali Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Fiqi” has drawn a direct comparison between President Irro and Aidarus al-Zubaidi, leader of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Yemen—an implicit request for military intervention.
Minister Fiqi’s appeal carries unmistakable military implications. On January 7, 2026, the Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes against Zubaidi’s positions after accusing him of high treason. By comparing President Irro to the Yemeni separatist leader, Fiqi signals a desire for Saudi Arabia to apply similar coercive pressure in the Horn of Africa—a striking acknowledgment of Mogadishu’s limited capacity to counter Hargeisa’s diplomatic momentum through conventional means.
“Treat President Irro with the same diplomatic and military opposition they apply to Zubaidi… safeguard Somali unity and reject impossible illusions offered by the Israeli government.”
— Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Fiqi,” Al Jazeera interview
In an interview with Al Jazeera, Fiqi drew an explicit parallel between the two leaders, labeling both as “secessionists.” He called on Saudi Arabia and the Arab League to apply the same diplomatic and military opposition to President Irro that they have directed at Zubaidi.
Military Response Threatened
Minister Fiqi issued explicit warnings about potential military action should Israel establish a physical presence in Somaliland. When asked whether Mogadishu had ruled out military options following Israel’s recognition, Fiqi responded that if Israel “sets foot” on any part of Somali territory, the government “will use all available means to respond.”
“If Israel attempts to settle, build camps, or transfer Palestinians to Somaliland, Somalia will not stand idly by.”
— Defense Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Fiqi”
He specifically warned that if Israel attempts to “settle, build camps, or transfer Palestinians” to Somaliland, “Somalia will not stand idly by.” The defense minister cited international and Somali law as granting the government the right to protect the country from what he characterized as external violations.
Fiqi also issued a direct appeal to Israel: “Stop this unilateral recognition and avoid expanding the conflict in the Horn of Africa.”
In a notable rhetorical turn, the defense minister offered what he termed a “sincere apology” to the Palestinian people, declaring that those in Hargeisa seeking ties with Israel are “traitors” who do not represent Somali values or Somalia’s “65-year history of supporting the Palestinian cause.”
Strategic Realignment in the Red Sea
The intensifying Israel-Somaliland partnership centers on securing Red Sea shipping lanes threatened by Houthi attacks on commercial vessels since late 2023. Somaliland’s 850-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of Aden, including the modernized Port of Berbera, positions it as a key partner for nations seeking to maintain maritime security. Israel gains a Red Sea ally at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb strait; Somaliland secures recognition from a UN member state.
Saudi Arabia faces significant economic disruption from these attacks, with reduced traffic at its newly launched Ras Al-Khair port and disrupted shipping routes threatening Vision 2030 initiatives. The Saudi-led coalition’s failure to eliminate the Houthi threat raises questions about Riyadh’s appetite for opening a second front in the Horn of Africa at Mogadishu’s behest. This strategic context complicates Mogadishu’s appeal to Riyadh.
Regional Silence and Speculation
Ethiopia, Somaliland’s largest trade partner and neighbor, has maintained public ambiguity regarding its stance. Diplomatic sources in Addis Ababa suggest internal consultations about potentially recognizing Somaliland, though no official statement has emerged.
The United States has not publicly commented on either Israel’s recognition or Somalia’s appeal to Saudi Arabia despite maintaining significant counterterrorism operations in Somalia and increasing interest in Somaliland’s strategic position. The silence is notable given the 2019 TAIPEI Act, which encourages recognition of states maintaining democratic governance—a description fitting Somaliland more closely than Somalia.
Turkey operates a military base near Mogadishu while China provides extensive diplomatic support. The dual patronage raises questions about whether Mogadishu’s foreign policy serves Somali interests or those of its external backers.
A Question of Leverage
Mogadishu’s reliance on Saudi Arabia for military intervention reflects its limited options for countering Somaliland’s growing international integration. The Federal Government of Somalia exercises no administrative, security, or economic authority over Somaliland’s territory—a reality persisting since 1991 when Somaliland reasserted its independence following the Siad Barre regime’s collapse.
Despite this, Somalia has successfully maintained international support for its territorial claims through decades of diplomatic engagement. The appeal to Saudi Arabia represents a test of whether that diplomatic capital can be converted into concrete action.
Somaliland bases its sovereignty claim on borders inherited from the British Somaliland Protectorate, which gained independence on June 26, 1960—five days before entering a voluntary union with Italian Somalia. That union was dissolved by the 1991 declaration following years of civil war and systematic human rights abuses against populations in the former British protectorate.
As Israel and Somaliland move forward with establishing embassies and deepening their strategic partnership, the question facing Mogadishu is whether international appeals can reverse a diplomatic breakthrough achieved through quiet negotiation. The answer may determine whether Somalia’s territorial claims remain a viable political position or become an increasingly hollow diplomatic fiction.
