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For more than three decades, Somaliland has stood out in the Horn of Africa as a rare example of stability, democratic governance, and peace. In a region often defined by fragility and conflict, Somaliland has managed to build functioning institutions, hold credible elections, and maintain internal security. Yet despite this remarkable progress, formal diplomatic recognition continues to be withheld by the international community.
One of the most significant challenges to Somaliland’s diplomatic cause lies not just in international politics, but in the absence of a coherent and credible foreign policy strategy. Rather than pursuing a long-term roadmap for recognition rooted in law, diplomacy, and national interest, successive administrations have defaulted to reactive, short-term tactics. Over the past decade in particular, Somaliland has placed increasing faith in foreign lobbying firms, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom. These firms, while promising access and influence, have delivered little of lasting substance. Draft bills such as H.R.7170, S.3861, H.R.10402, and most recently H.R.3992 have all followed the same pattern: introduced with optimism, briefly mentioned in the press, then quietly forgotten in committee.
It is important to clarify that hiring lobbyists, in itself, is not inherently problematic. In fact, strategic lobbying can serve as a useful complement to official diplomacy especially when seeking to raise awareness, shape narratives, or open doors in foreign policy circles. However, lobbying must be part of a broader, government-led diplomatic strategy. It cannot substitute for statecraft, legal advocacy, or regional engagement. When used in isolation, and without oversight, lobbying risks becoming a costly exercise in symbolism rather than a tool for advancing national interests.
Despite the millions of dollars spent on these lobbying contracts, they have yet to yield binding policies or strategic leverage. What is perhaps more damaging is the way some domestic media outlets amplify these efforts, often portraying them as diplomatic breakthroughs. These narratives, sometimes politically motivated or commercially influenced, give Somalilanders the false impression that international recognition is imminent when in reality, these bills are largely symbolic and rarely lead to substantive engagement. This misrepresentation misleads the public, masks policy failures, and diverts attention from the structural reforms and serious diplomacy Somaliland actually needs.
Contrast this with earlier periods in Somaliland’s political history. The first two administrations, led by Presidents Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and Dahir Riyale Kahin, focused not only on reconciliation and rebuilding, but also on laying the groundwork for responsible foreign policy. Their emphasis on institution-building and quiet diplomacy allowed Somaliland to emerge as a serious actor in regional and international conversations. President Riyale’s 2008 visit to the United States and his meetings with senior officials from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense demonstrated how principled engagement could yield attention and respect, even without formal recognition.
That same year, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer visited Hargeisa and acknowledged Somaliland’s democratic achievements and role in regional security. Although the U.S. stopped short of recognizing Somaliland, the dialogue was based on mutual respect and policy substance. Similarly, the 2005 African Union fact-finding mission, which I personally engaged with as a member of civil society in Burao, offered an important precedent. Led by AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, the mission recognized Somaliland’s case as historically and politically unique. Its final report, though not a declaration of recognition, remains a powerful affirmation of Somaliland’s legitimacy as a self-governing territory.
Unfortunately, this pragmatic diplomacy was later abandoned. The turning point came in 2012 when Somaliland agreed to suspend its international legal campaign and instead pursue direct talks with the Somali government. This decision, while perhaps well-intentioned, weakened Somaliland’s legal posture and allowed the international community to prematurely elevate Somalia’s transitional government to full sovereign status. That recognition has since been used to block Somaliland’s access to diplomatic channels and global forums.
Rather than learning from this experience, subsequent administrations have doubled down on symbolic foreign lobbying while neglecting domestic reforms, legal advocacy, and regional diplomacy. Millions have been spent on contracts with foreign consultants whose interests do not always align with those of the Somaliland people. At the same time, there is still no comprehensive, transparent foreign policy document outlining our recognition strategy. No clearly defined priorities, no phased approach, no measurable diplomatic milestones. Even our strongest legal arguments for recognition remain scattered, inconsistently presented, and largely unpublished in international forums.
A credible and strategic government would make this legal case the foundation of its diplomacy. It would consolidate Somaliland’s legal and historical claim to statehood, publish it as a formal brief, and present it to both African and international bodies. It would not rely solely on emotional appeals or moral persuasion, but instead make the case based on governance, stability, and adherence to international law.
The reality is that recognition will only come when Somaliland becomes too stable, too prosperous, and too strategically valuable to ignore. The Berbera Port agreement with the United Arab Emirates did more to raise Somaliland’s profile than any bill introduced in a foreign parliament. Investors and global partners are drawn to states that offer security, reliable infrastructure, and a favorable business environment. These are the forms of leverage that matter. Instead of allocating millions to opaque lobbying contracts, we should be investing in legal reform, infrastructure, regional integration, and economic competitiveness.
Sadly, recent administrations have often prioritized headlines over substance, and international recognition has become a tool of domestic political theater. Declarations that “recognition is near” serve local audiences but carry little weight abroad. Diplomatic credibility cannot be built on spectacle. It must be earned through consistency, competence, and vision.
Somaliland must break this cycle. The newly elected government has a unique opportunity to reset our foreign policy and reinvest in strategies that produce real, measurable results. This means establishing a clear national recognition strategy, engaging African partners more meaningfully, restoring legal diplomacy, and ensuring that every dollar spent abroad is transparently documented and publicly justified. More importantly, it means aligning our foreign policy with our domestic development priorities building legal institutions, ensuring economic opportunity, and strengthening democratic governance.
The people of Somaliland have sacrificed too much to be shortchanged by empty symbolism. They deserve a recognition campaign that reflects the maturity and resilience of their state. This requires honest dialogue, public accountability, and a shift from outsourced advocacy to homegrown leadership.
Our place among the community of nations will not be handed to us out of sympathy. It will be earned through law, through strength, and through strategy.

About the Author
Mr. Mohamed Aideed, co-founder of the BARWAAQO Party in Somaliland and the founder of Somaliland Youth Development and Voluntary Organization (SOYDAVO). Mr. Aideed holds a Master of Arts degree in Diplomacy and International Relations from Kampala University. Mr. Aideed is a commentator on on East and Horn of Africa politics, he has published notable work on the Somaliland-Somalia Talks.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.

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