 |
On November 13, 2024, Somaliland’s political landscape shifted dramatically as President Irro claimed victory in a highly contested election, ousting the incumbent President Muse Bihi of the Kulmiye Party, which had dominated Somaliland’s politics since 2010. Irro’s win was nothing short of a landslide, garnering 63% of the vote against his rival. He campaigned on a platform focused on foreign diplomacy, which sharply contrasted with Somaliland’s established foreign policy.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of Irro’s approach was the Wadani Party’s commitment to pursuing dialogue and reconciliation with Somalia. This stance, however, raised eyebrows among many Somalilanders, as it appeared to challenge the region’s sovereignty and aspirations for international recognition. Additionally, Irro criticized the existing Somaliland-Taiwan relations, arguing that they hindered potential ties with China, a country that holds veto power in the UN Security Council and officially considers Somaliland part of Somalia.
The Wadani Party also voiced concerns over a maritime deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, labeling it a bold yet risky diplomatic maneuver. Irro’s electoral success coincided with a turbulent period for Somaliland, as domestic and foreign relations faced severe scrutiny, particularly following the Las Anod debacle and the Somali proxy conflict that had erupted in response to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This turmoil created a disillusioned electorate, evident in the stark decline in voter turnout compared to previous elections.
In the 2017 elections, an impressive 81% of registered voters—620,000 out of 759,000—cast their ballots. Kulmiye emerged victorious, with strong participation from Somaliland citizens. However, by 2024, voter turnout plummeted to just 53%, with only 633,000 out of 1.2 million registered voters participating. This significant decrease highlighted that many Kulmiye supporters chose to abstain, further emphasizing the fractures within Somaliland’s political fabric.
For the first time, the electoral process in Somaliland faced external influence from regional actors, including Djibouti, China, and Somalia, all of whom were rumored to have financially supported the Wadani Party. The Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum, a prominent NGO, underscored the urgent need for legal reforms to prohibit illicit foreign funding of political parties during elections, emphasizing that “Somaliland law currently lacks provisions against foreign financial donations to election campaigns, a pressing issue for constitutional reform.”
Despite his background as a former acting ambassador before the Somali state collapse and a long tenure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the early 1980s, Irro’s new government surprised many with its composition. A notable majority comprised individuals aligned with the Icrisaam wing, and some key ministerial appointments were puzzling, such as a foreign affairs minister whose experience was limited to running a daycare center in the U.S. Expectations were high that Irro’s diplomatic expertise would steer Somaliland in a new and promising direction, yet the unfolding events within the first 100 days of his administration left many questioning the future trajectory of the nation. On that note, let’s take a closer look at Irro’s foreign diplomacy and its influence on Somaliland’s economy and international standing since he assumed office.
Somalia Government Aggression against Somaliland Sovereignty: The bizarre situation involving the Wadani Party and the Irro administration continues as they stubbornly pursue talks between Somalia and Somaliland—a move that serves as a political lever for Somalia against Somaliland’s quest for sovereignty and international recognition. To complicate matters, Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza recently visited Las Anod, a blatant infringement on the sovereignty that Somaliland claims. This visit adds to the backdrop of a two-year proxy war, during which the Las Anod militia and Al-Shabaab have been employed to destabilize Somaliland.
In response, Somaliland issued a statement condemning this act. Somalia, undeterred by Somaliland’s diplomatic outcry, intensified its aggression by unlawfully seizing individuals from the Las Anod militia—innocent Isaaq civilians who were kidnapped and tortured, then labeled as prisoners of war. Instead of processing these captives through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Somalia quietly dispatched them to Hargeisa, where the Irro administration acquiesced without protest.
One might wonder why the Irro administration didn’t reject such an illegal transfer of abducted individuals. From a humanitarian standpoint, one could argue that their decision was the correct one. However, they failed to prepare a report on human rights violations and invite the ICRC to document these abuses, which could serve as a legal liability against the Somali government. Regrettably, the Irro administration opted for a policy of appeasement, choosing not to disrupt relations with Somalia, even in the face of blatant aggression toward Somaliland’s sovereignty.
What’s particularly shocking is that, rather than withdrawing from the talks altogether—a move that might have garnered serious attention from the international community—the Somaliland government chose to suspend the dialogue instead. Furthermore, what will become of the special envoy appointed by the Irro government to facilitate the Somaliland-Somalia discussions? Given his ties to Hassan Sheikh, will they consider dismissing him altogether? The situation remains fraught with uncertainty and potential consequences.
Somaliland Foreign Diplomacy toward Türkiye Enframement; Turkey, acting as an imperial mediator, has been actively promoting talks between Somalia and Somaliland. In 2018, Turkey appointed Dr. Onamed as its special envoy for these negotiations and has established a consulate in Hargeisa. Despite the ongoing discussions failing to yield significant results, Turkey has escalated its diplomatic maneuvers concerning Somaliland, subtly undermining its sovereignty. A telling example is the fact that Somaliland citizens are compelled to acquire Somali government passports to travel to Turkey, including politicians from Somaliland holding government positions. In stark contrast, Somaliland residents must visit the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu to secure a Turkish visa, while politicians can obtain a visa in Hargeisa only after securing a Somali passport. This is in direct opposition to the UAE, which recognizes Somaliland passports and issues visas accordingly. Furthermore, the administration of Hassan Sheikh has sought Turkish assistance to facilitate Somalia-Ethiopia maritime talks, culminating in the controversial Ankara Deal. Under this agreement, Somalia has granted 30% of its oil, gas, and fishing revenue rights from its marine resources over the next decade, encroaching upon the maritime claims of Somaliland. Strikingly, no Somaliland politician or government official has raised objections to this blatant violation of sovereignty. While the hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia has been addressed through the Ankara Deal, finalization is still pending due to unresolved technical details. Interestingly, although the specifics of these negotiations have not been officially disclosed, reports from Turkish media indicate that Turkey is further undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty. During the initial round of technical discussions between Ethiopia and Somalia, overseen by Turkey, several critical topics emerged: Somalia aims to control customs revenue from ports in Somaliland that Ethiopia intends to use; the Somali government insists on co-signing port management agreements for any ports in Somaliland utilized by Ethiopia; and Somalia is pushing for the use of Somali passports for Somaliland citizens traveling to Ethiopia, alongside ensuring Ethiopia acquires permits and pays applicable fees for any access to Somali territory and trade via land, sea, and air. One might argue that these agreements would be unacceptable for the Somaliland government under Irro, yet no protests have emerged against the Ankara declaration that undermines the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU. Moreover, in January and March of 2025, the Turkish parliament approved two significant legislations. The January decision extended Turkey’s naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, including Somali waters, which Somaliland is inherently a part of. This allows Turkey to patrol Somaliland’s maritime areas without consent, an action that could infringe on Somaliland’s sovereignty, though its political leaders have shown little concern. In March, Turkey’s parliament controversially ratified a hydrocarbon agreement covering both onshore and offshore territories of Somalia, which included Somaliland. The government of Abdirahman Irro remained silent in the face of this agreement, which clearly violates their claimed sovereignty and rights to resources. At the very least, Abdirahman Irro’s foreign minister should have summoned the Turkish consul in Hargeisa to demand clarification, asserting that Somaliland’s sovereignty is non-negotiable.
Somalia’s Monopoly on Somaliland Livestock Exports; The tug-of-war between Somalia and Somaliland has intensified, particularly in the livestock export sector, which Somalia has weaponized to assert its dominance. This ongoing proxy and diplomatic conflict has evolved into an economic battle, with Somalia pressuring importing countries to obtain livestock exports from its transitional government, sidelining Somaliland’s traders. In December 2024, a significant escalation occurred when Hassan Sheikh Mohamud granted exclusive rights to Abu-Yasir, a foreign businessman, allowing him to export Somalia’s livestock, including that from Somaliland. This decision sparked widespread protests among Somaliland livestock traders, who faced devastating economic consequences.
The disruption affected the entire supply chain, from pastoralists to middlemen and traders, putting a strain on Somaliland’s economy. To put the economic impact into perspective, Somaliland exported a total of 3,802,903 livestock in 2024, averaging about 950,726 per quarter. In stark contrast, during the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), Somaliland managed to export less than 722,000 livestock, marking a staggering 76% drop. If this trend continues, which seems likely, the ramifications will be severe—given that livestock exports constitute 45% to 60% of Somaliland’s GDP, a continued decline could result in a catastrophic 34% drop in GDP, leading to significant economic losses. In response to these challenges, the Somaliland government revoked the operating license of a prominent livestock inspection facility in Berbera, accusing its Arab owner of overstepping boundaries. Unfortunately, the Somaliland government has yet to implement effective economic policies to counter this overt economic assault. There is an urgent need for investment in modernizing the livestock sector, including establishing cold chain facilities and abattoirs for exporting meat to Ethiopia, which has a substantial demand. Such initiatives would help reduce dependency on live livestock exports and preserve the economic value that is currently under threat.
Russia Interest in Somaliland; In February 2025, the diplomatic landscape was jolted by a surprising move from Somaliland President Irro and his administration, who chose to extend a welcome to Russian politician Igor Morozov. This decision raised eyebrows, particularly given Morozov’s US and UK sanctions and his notorious role in destabilizing Ukraine, along with his close ties to Putin. At the same time, legislators in the UK and US were making progress toward recognizing Somaliland, adding a layer of complexity to the situation.
To complicate matters further, the Russian ambassador to Somalia and Djibouti submitted a request for a visit from the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, seeking to strengthen ties with Somaliland. However, the Foreign Ministry of Somaliland subtly declined the invitation, offering a vague excuse that only deepened the uncertainty surrounding the nation’s foreign diplomacy. This sequence of events—going from inviting a sanctioned Russian politician to dodging a meeting with a high-ranking Russian official—underscores the urgent need for a clearer strategy and more cohesive direction in Somaliland’s foreign relations.
China’s Diplomatic Aggression Towards Somaliland and Taiwan: Despite its minimal contributions of trivial food aid to Somalia, which pale in comparison to the billions provided by the UK, EU, and US for sustainable peace and development, China seems to enjoy preferential treatment in Somalia’s foreign policy. Alarmingly, China is reportedly funding the Las Anod militia in Somaliland, which threatens to destabilize its state-building efforts and undermines Somaliland’s commitment to maintaining its diplomatic and trade relations with Taiwan. On April 29th, China pressured Somalia to refuse entry or transit for Taiwanese citizens through their territory and to halt any Taiwanese aviation’s over Somaliland airspace. This maneuver followed China’s discovery of a planned visit by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister to Somaliland, prompting Beijing to coerce Somaliland into issuing a ban on Taiwanese passports. This situation serves as a litmus test not only for the Somaliland-Taiwan relationship but also for their sovereignty and the freedom of movement. In response, Taiwan has vehemently protested and is taking steps to counter China’s encroachments, highlighting its determination to uphold its rights.
Furthermore, the situation raises concerns about Somaliland’s earlier decision to allow Somalia to manage its airspace—a strategic blunder that dates back to 2012 when the International Air Transport Association (IATA) granted Somalia control over it. This move has been criticized as the most significant political misstep Somaliland has made since 1960, essentially handing over its aviation sovereignty to a rival without guarantees.
Now, the consequences of that decision are becoming apparent. President Irro, who has previously criticized the Somaliland-Taiwan dynamic, will face critical challenges in his tenure. To demonstrate his commitment to sovereignty and solidarity with Taiwan, he must take decisive diplomatic action: 1. Jointly issue a protest letter with Taiwan against China’s encroachment on their sovereignty and freedom of movement. 2. Expel illegal Chinese companies and traders operating in Somaliland. 3. File a formal complaint with IATA, providing evidence of Somalia’s violation of aviation agreements from the 2012 London talks. Failure to act could not only jeopardize the relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan but could also label him as a puppet of Chinese interests. The time for decisive leadership is now; the future of Somaliland and Taiwan’s partnership hangs in the balance, and the world is watching closely.
Finaly, in his first 100 days in office, Irro faced significant challenges in Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy, falling short of major expectations set by his government, which might just earn a grade of D. However, this early phase marks a crucial turning point; he has the opportunity and room to improve his diplomatic efforts. A critical starting point would be reforming the foreign ministry, which is currently run from his office due to the appointment of an inept minister. Securing a competent foreign minister is vital at this juncture and for the future.
Furthermore, Irro could strengthen relations with Taiwan, especially as Somaliland finds itself under China threat. A visit to Taiwan could pave the way for tangible bilateral trade, focusing on sectors like aviation finance, security, and mineral development. This scenario presents a golden opportunity to lobby with Taiwan in the USA, promoting Somaliland’s deep-sea critical minerals through a partnership with Taiwan. Tying this into U.S. legislation, such as the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, could lead to a trilateral partnership between the USA, Taiwan, and Somaliland. With the Trump administration positioning itself as a global leader in critical minerals amidst the rising challenges of artificial intelligence and chip technology, this could strengthen Somaliland-Taiwan relations under U.S. protection against Chinese aggression and Turkish illegal hydrocarbon deal with Somalia.
Such a trilateral deal would bolster Somaliland’s aspirations for international recognition while safeguarding its sovereignty against Somalia’s aggressive posturing. Irro has the chance to lift Somaliland out of the dreamland bubble it has been trapped in for the past 30 years, a mindset that has normalized the idea that Somalia poses no threat to Somaliland’s sovereignty and prosperity. In reality, Somalia declared war on Somaliland long ago, and its aggression has only intensified, raising fears of a second iteration of the Isaaq genocide, with the use of Turkish drones, Al-Shabaab, and foreign mercenaries reminiscent of Siad Barre’s regime.
If Irro’s government fails to enhance Somaliland’s foreign diplomacy both geopolitically and geoeconomically, it would only reinforce the perception that the Wadani Party has always leaned toward unionism, desperately waiting for a call from the Mogadishu mayor, run by Ugandan overlordship sitting in Kampala. The time is now for Irro to seize the moment and chart a new course for Somaliland on the global stage.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Guled Ahmed is a Resident Scholar with the Middle East Institute and an expert in Horn of Africa Security and Development.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
Notice: This article by Somaliland Chronicle is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work are permitted.
