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The Republic of Somaliland, a sovereign and democratic state that gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, remains unrecognised by the international community. Yet despite its diplomatic limbo—stemming from a void and unratified union with Somalia—Somaliland continues to attract serious interest from global players. Every 2 years or so, international observers monitor its elections to ensure fairness—something Somalia has failed to achieve in decades. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has invested over $442 million in redeveloping the Port of Berbera, transforming it into a rising trade hub. Other countries—including Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and Ethiopia—have established varying levels of engagement with Hargeisa.
In stark contrast, the United States has remained largely absent, despite rising geopolitical stakes in the Horn of Africa. With the return of the Trump administration, there is an opportunity to move beyond the failed “single Somalia” policy long championed by figures such as Hillary Clinton and Ilhan Omar.
According to insider reports, the Biden administration even blocked a proposed military cooperation agreement between Somaliland and Taiwan. Such a position has not only undermined stability in the Horn but also side-lined Somaliland’s democratic credentials and geostrategic value.
The Case for Naval Access: Why Somaliland Matters Now
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are fast becoming chokepoints of chaos. Since late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have surged, causing maritime insurance premiums and freight costs to skyrocket—some by over 300%. Vessels are now rerouting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to delivery times and billions in extra fuel and logistics costs. In early 2024, the Suez Canal saw a 50% drop in trade volume, threatening global supply chains and economic recovery.
Djibouti is already overstretched—hosting seven foreign military bases, including those of the United States, China, and France. Meanwhile, Somaliland’s 850-kilometre coastline offers the next logical site for a network of naval logistics and surveillance bases. Unlike Somalia, which remains plagued by insecurity, Somaliland offers stability, democratic governance, and a deep-water port with room to expand.
For nations whose trade depends on secure Red Sea shipping routes, the need for viable alternatives is no longer theoretical—it’s urgent. The goal isn’t necessarily to wage war against the Houthis, but to fill the growing power vacuum in these waters—one that is consistently exploited by non-state actors such as the Houthis, Somalia piracy, and terrorist organisations.
Hypocrisy at Sea: Double Standards in Media
While Djibouti’s foreign naval presence is praised as prudent statecraft, Somaliland’s similar aspirations are met with condescension and bias. In January 2024, Somaliland and Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would grant Ethiopia naval access via Berbera—a move some media labelled “coercive” or “neo-colonial.”
This is hypocrisy at best.
Berbera has long held geostrategic value, coveted by global powers for its proximity to key shipping routes. It is no more “coercive” than Djibouti leasing land to China or France. No one calls for China’s expulsion from Djibouti on the basis of its ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Uyghurs, for example. The criticism is not rooted in principle—it’s rooted in politics.
A Global Line-Up: Who Will Step Up?
Somaliland is not short on potential partners. With global shipping routes under threat and maritime logistics capacity in high demand, Hargeisa is uniquely positioned to host new regional and international partnerships. Key candidates include:
- Taiwan: With one of the world’s top 15 navies and over 40 warships, Taiwan could share training, weapons systems, and maritime intelligence in exchange for a strategic foothold on the Red Sea. Taiwan, already a diplomatic leader with Somaliland, is best placed to act first. Taiwan’s military presence in Somaliland should be seen as diplomatic security partnership, not a full-scale military base like China’s base in Djibouti. It strengthens Somaliland’s partnership, fosters regional ties, and aligns with Taiwan’s broader strategic interests without shifting focus from its primary defence at home. With such a balanced security architecture, Taiwan will not divert resources or focus from defending its territories across the Taiwan Strait.
- Ethiopia: Landlocked and home to over 120 million people, Ethiopia has already signed an MoU for port access—a vital step for its trade and military mobility. A robust African partner in the Gulf enhances regional balance and strengthens defence ties.
- Indonesia: With a navy of over 200 vessels and 10% of its trade affected by Red Sea disruptions, Jakarta offers a moderate Muslim partner eager to balance power in the Indo-Pacific.
- United States: Although late to the game, Washington still has a chance to counter rising BRICS influence by supporting a democratic, strategically located partner. Recognising Somaliland could reset its credibility in the Horn.
- Australia: With over $80 billion in trade passing through the Suez and Red Sea, and a recent quiet exit from Operation Prosperity Guardian, Canberra has a golden opportunity to reassert its regional leadership by backing Somaliland.
- India: After conducting over 100 anti-piracy missions since 2008, New Delhi would benefit immensely from a logistics base in eastern Somaliland—strengthening its western maritime arc.
- United Kingdom: Spending $100 million annually on base operations in Qatar, Britain could cut costs and gain better strategic reach by shifting to Berbera. The 1990s are over—there’s no war in Iraq or Afghanistan to justify outdated posturing.
- Greece: With 40% of its trade moving through the Red Sea and a top-20 navy, Athens could fill the void left by Turkey’s Somalia-focused policy and bolster its role in maritime security.
- South Korea: With $200 billion in trade with Europe and expanding commercial interests across Africa, Seoul would find both strategic and economic sense in a Somaliland partnership.
The Red Sea Can’t Wait
As shipping lanes turn into battlegrounds and global supply chains unravel, Somaliland offers something rare in the region: predictability. With stable governance, peaceful elections, and geographic centrality, it is more than just a strategic opportunity—it’s a ready-made solution.
The real question is: who will act first?
For Taiwan and other like-minded nations, the time to engage isn’t some future date—it’s now. There’s no need to wait for the United States to lead or for Trump to officially recognise Somaliland. The opportunity already exists—because Trump, unlike Biden, is unlikely to block Somaliland’s rise.
In a world fractured by war, tariffs, and protectionist politics—from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific—the safeguarding of international maritime routes could be the issue that unites instead of divides. Here lies Somaliland: a rare chance to rebuild trust, foster cooperation, and address a shared global challenge head-on.
About the Author:
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
