All Roads Lead to Somaliland Guban: What to expect from Ankara’s Declaration

The Ankara Declaration has a primary goal and a secondary, more opportunistic aim. The primary objective is to address the deadline for transitioning from ATMIS to AUSSOM by the end of the year. By signing this declaration without cancelling the MoU, it gives Somalia and Ethiopia a diplomatic ceasefire until the AU mission is resumed.

Our focus, and the secondary aim of the declaration, is to test the waters with the new Somaliland administration to see if they would sign the MoU under Somalia’s sovereignty and drop the recognition condition. This latter goal isn’t far-fetched, considering Waddani Party leader Hersi Ali’s initial reaction to the MoU, where he objected to signing it without first consulting Somalia.

The good news for Somaliland is that, after the aftershocks of the initial MoU and the dozens of counter-MoUs, all parties have arrived at one conclusion: the only feasible access to the sea for Ethiopia is via Somaliland’s Guban (a coastal plain running parallel to the Gulf of Aden). Somalia could theoretically grant Ethiopia access to the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden by traversing 2,078 kilometres of desert land—an utterly impractical proposition. Even the Indian Ocean, at 1,662 kilometres, is closer.

In stark contrast, the Berbera Corridor spans only 950 kilometers and passes through densely populated regions, making it the most practical and efficient route. Ignoring this reality defies fundamental principles of mathematics, geography, economics, social science and history. I say history since the issue of access to the sea was called the Hawd-Zeila exchange and was negotiated between Britain and Ethiopia even before independence.

The bad news is that this declaration, mediated by Turkey, underscores a troubling trend: Somaliland’s strategic assets are repeatedly compromised in international negotiations. Much like the airspace sell-off of 2014, the Ankara process risks repeating history, leveraging Somaliland’s position without guaranteeing recognition or safeguarding sovereignty. The Ankara Declaration reportedly involves leasing Somaliland ports to Ethiopia, echoing past missteps. This article explores how pro-talks politicians surrendered Somaliland’s airspace and examines the implications of the Ankara Declaration for Somaliland’s sovereignty.

The Airspace Sell-Off: A Case Study in Miscalculation

Somaliland’s loss of airspace control didn’t happen through open consensus—Somalilanders would never have allowed it. Instead, it was a case of being outmaneuvered by Somalia.

• Egal and Riyale’s Leadership: Former presidents Egal and Riyale maintained a strict “no talks without mutual recognition” policy, ensuring all negotiations upheld Somaliland’s sovereignty.
• Policy Shift by Pro-Talks Politicians: Leaders like Hersi and Hashi deviated from this policy, engaging in unconditional talks with Somalia.
• The 2014 Agreement: Held in Ankara, Somaliland signed an agreement allowing Somalia to reclaim airspace control from international organizations (INGOs), with a promise that the operational office would be based in Hargeisa.

-Unilateral Action by Somalia: By 2019, Somalia unilaterally relocated airspace control to Mogadishu.

-ICAO’s Response: Somaliland’s protests were met with a definitive statement from the International Civil Aviation Organization: “We only recognize Somalia.”

The outcome: Pro-talks politicians inadvertently ceded control of Somaliland’s airspace to Somalia, proving that without international recognition, any agreements with Somalia inherently undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty. Alarmingly, some factions, like the Waddani Party, seem oblivious to this lesson, clinging to the belief that a Ciro-Hassan Sheikh partnership could succeed where others failed.

Sovereign states possess the ultimate authority over their territories and can withdraw from agreements, especially those made with entities they consider part of themselves. While such actions carry consequences, sovereignty provides the agency to act decisively. Somalia, viewing Somaliland as a “secessionist region,” faces negligible fallout from reneging on agreements.

Yet Somaliland’s pro-talks politicians continue to place faith in external guarantors or vague notions of “Somalinimo” (Somali solidarity). When questioned about these assumptions, Waddani leaders sidestep accountability, proposing national conferences instead of concrete strategies. This evasiveness weakens Somaliland’s position. The foundation of Somaliland’s claims lies in its 1960 independence and legal arguments rooted in state continuity—not in empty rhetoric or misplaced negotiation tactics.

Worse still, some pro-talks figures appear to actively collaborate with Somalian interests advocating unification. Symbolic gestures, such as opening offices in Hargeisa, subtly undermine Somaliland’s independence. The 2014 establishment of the airspace office in Hargeisa exemplifies this, setting the stage for portraying Hargeisa as the capital of a unified Somaliland and Somalia.

Former President Muse Bihi adopted a pragmatic stance on negotiations. While he participated in summits, he firmly insisted that recognition remain the sole agenda item. His unwavering “You shall not pass” approach avoided compromises that could jeopardise Somaliland’s sovereignty. Instead, Bihi emphasised alternative agreements and MoU that bolstered Somaliland’s position.

Putting aside the high possibility of Trump recognizing Somaliland, how can Somalilanders trust pro-talks leaders like Hersi Haji Hassan to manage access to Guban when they handed over our airspace and failed to learn from past mistakes?

For Somaliland to secure its sovereignty and capitalise on its strategic assets, it must prioritise recognition, legal continuity, and strategic foresight over the infamous talks with Somalia.

Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer for a financial technology company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.

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