Substandard and counterfeit medicines can be extremely dangerous. They are fraudulently manufactured to deceive buyers about the product’s quality, authenticity and effectiveness. These medicines don’t meet quality and regulatory standards.
Such medicines are usually manufactured by highly organised criminal groups that are often involved in cross-border trafficking. The products can be bought online, in tuck shops or at street markets. Sometimes they find their way into legitimate supply chains, cropping up in registered pharmacies and hospitals.
Commonly referred to as substandard and falsified medicines, they take many forms. These include anything from pills for erectile dysfunction and weight loss to antidepressants, anabolic steroids, antibiotics and pain killers.
These medicines are accessible and affordable. That makes them appealing to consumers – but they can do great harm. Some products may contain the wrong ingredients, others may have no or much lower concentrations of active ingredients. They may also contain toxic substances used as tablet fillers, like rat poison, boric acid, chalk or anti-freeze.
Some researchers suggest that as much as 42% of medicine distributed in African countries is counterfeit. The World Health Organisation estimates that there are over 1 million deaths annually due to substandard and counterfeit medicine. It’s also been reported that about 53% of anti-malarial drug resistance in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa may be linked to the use of substandard and falsified medicines.
There have been attempts to tackle the problem. The WHO, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol have made joint efforts to create policies and implement strategies that member countries can adopt.
We set out to explore how South Africa is managing the problem of counterfeit and substandard medicines. The answer, unfortunately, is “not very well”. There are several reasons for this. Primarily, it’s due to the absence of a specific anti-counterfeit policy for medicines.
This situation must be urgently addressed. People need a constant supply of affordable, safe and efficacious medicine.
Gaps and concerns
South Africa’s pharmaceutical regulatory framework is known to be stringent. It is compatible with international standards and far stronger than those of other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. But this framework is not backed by a strong implementation strategy.
For instance, we identified the lack of specific pharmaceutical crime and anti-counterfeit policies and regulations as a major hindrance to effectively enforcing the law. This kind of legislation would do two things. First, it would deal with intellectual property issues to ensure people can’t copy medicines that are patented. Second, it would provide a clear guide on what areas need policing, which stakeholders are responsible and what action plan is required. This implementation strategy would ensure accountability, enhance collaboration and information sharing, and bolster monitoring and evaluation.
The Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 and the Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997 outline punishments for counterfeiting. These are a fine of between R5,000 (about US$326) and R10,000 or a prison sentence ranging from three to 10 years. These do not seem to be sufficient deterrents.
Political will lacking
There’s also a lack of resources and capacity to implement existing laws.
For instance, South Africa needs a pharmaceutical testing laboratory designated or owned by the national medicines regulator to test for ingredients in suspected substandard and falsified medicines. Such a lab could also randomly test medicinal products on the market.
An overburdened criminal justice system, weak penalties and short prison sentences make for poor prosecution rates.
Respondents in our study suggested that political will to use state resources for such cases is lacking because pharmaceutical crime is perceived as an intellectual property issue rather than one that focuses on public safety.
Another hurdle to effective prosecutions that respondents identified was a lack of regional coordination in the Southern African Development Community. Prosecutors we interviewed told us that most African criminal justice systems struggled with a lack of resources, transparency and regional collaboration. This, in turn, contributed to lack of regional cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including medicine counterfeiting.
There are various relevant government agencies and law enforcement bodies. But they don’t collaborate very well on the issue of counterfeit medicines. This has created gaps in the value chain. It makes it easier for counterfeit and substandard medicines to proliferate.
We identified a number of websites selling medicines without prescriptions. Most were remotely operated; for example, the domain was registered as coming from South Africa but the contact details showed other countries like Denmark and Switzerland. None of these websites had contact details for a responsible pharmacist.
This exposes another gap in legislation: the Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 is the main piece of legislation that regulates the sale of medicines. But it needs to be amended and updated to address the sale of medicines online.
Going forward
The implications of not having a specific pharmaceutical crime and anti-counterfeit legal framework are far-reaching. It impedes the government’s ability to prevent substandard and falsified medicines proliferation and ensure effective law enforcement once counterfeit products have been seized. The implementation of a national anti-counterfeit policy will enforce a legal mandate with objectives and responsibilities so that all relevant authorities can participate effectively.
Another important strategy is for regulators to engage the public through awareness campaigns and education, as seen elsewhere on the continent and internationally.
In other countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom, social media platforms have been used to empower consumers to identify counterfeit products online. This, as well as the use of mobile authentication systems to check product traceability, has greatly reduced counterfeiting.
There’s also room for collaboration between private companies and governments. One example is the partnership between the Center for Safe Internet Pharmacies, internet service providers such as Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, and the United States government to shut down illegal sites and support awareness efforts.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged much of the globe. In mid-May 2021, the Republic of China (Taiwan) saw a sudden rise in case numbers. When Taiwan needed help the most, partners such as the United States, Japan, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, as well as the COVAX Facility, global allocation mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines, immediately pledged to donate or provide vaccines to Taiwan, allowing Taiwan to gradually bring the pandemic back under control. This is a testament to the international joint efforts to tackle the serious challenges brought about by the pandemic. The same joint efforts will be needed to address growing international cybercrimes in the post-pandemic era, and Taiwan is willing to be part of that effort.
The increasing importance of cybertechnology in the wake of the pandemic
Throughout the pandemic, Taiwan government agencies and private companies have closely followed anti-pandemic policies to prevent cluster infections. People began working from home and schools adopted virtual learning. Consumers turned to e-commerce, and online food ordering and delivery service platforms flourished. The pandemic has led to these changes in our lives, and while it is sure to abate in the foreseeable future, the spread of cyber technology will not. It has fundamentally altered the way we work, live, learn, and relax—resulting in an entirely new lifestyle.
However, our increased reliance on cyber technology has also made it easier than ever for criminals to exploit security vulnerabilities to commit crimes. Thus, cybersecurity will be one of the most important issues in the post-pandemic era as it is essential to maintaining public safety worldwide.
Cybercrime transcends borders; transnational cooperation is the key.
As cybercrime transcends borders, victims, perpetrators, and crime scenes may be located in different countries. The most common cybercrime is telecom fraud, which utilizes the internet and other telecommunications technologies. Transnational cooperation is necessary to bring international crime rings to justice.
In 2020, Taiwan police used big data analytics to identify multiple Taiwan nationals who were suspected of establishing telecom fraud operations in Montenegro. Taiwan contacted Montenegro and proposed mutual legal assistance, enabling the Montenegrin Special State Prosecutor’s Office to move forward with the case. Through joint efforts, Taiwan and the Montenegrin police forces uncovered three telecom fraud operations and arrested 92 suspects accused of impersonating Chinese government officials, police, and prosecutors. It is believed that the suspects scammed more than 2,000 people in China, causing up to US$22.6 million in financial losses. This case highlights the features of transnational crime. The suspects were Taiwan nationals, while the victims were Chinese nationals. The alleged crime occurred in Montenegro and was perpetrated with telecommunications technologies. Thanks to bilateral police cooperation, the suspects were apprehended, preventing other innocent people from falling victim to the scam.
Caption: Montenegrin Special State Prosecutor’s Office transfers proceedings to Taiwan police.
Child and youth sexual exploitation is another internationally condemned crime, with countries worldwide making every effort to prevent it and bring perpetrators to justice. In 2019, Taiwan police received information from the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s virtual private network CyberTipline indicating that a South African citizen in Taiwan was suspected of having uploaded large quantities of child pornography to the internet. Following the lead, Taiwan police quickly located the suspect and searched his residence, seizing evidence of child pornography. Police also found photographs and videos of him sexually assaulting Taiwanese children. The illicit images were stored on servers located in the United States, and the alleged crimes were committed in Taiwan. As the victims, in this case, were underage, they were too young to adequately explain the situation or seek assistance. If Taiwan police had not received the leads, the suspect would likely have continued to assault more children. This case owes its success to transnational cooperation and criminal intelligence sharing, which can effectively curb crime.
Caption: International joint cooperation to combat child pornography
Cybercrime involves cross-border investigations. However, jurisdictions and definitions of crimes vary among law enforcement agencies worldwide. Criminal rings understand this all too well and exploit the resulting information barriers, fleeing to other countries to decrease the likelihood of being caught. Like COVID-19, cyber crime can strike individuals in any country. Therefore, just as the world has joined forces to combat the pandemic, countering cybercrime requires the cooperation of international police forces assisting and sharing information with one another. Only then can more crimes be prevented and more cases be solved efficiently, allowing people worldwide to enjoy a safer life.
Taiwan police authorities have long strived to promote international cooperation in combating cross-border crime. In 2020, there were three prominent cases. Through the joint efforts of Taiwan, Vietnam, and the United States, transnational telecom fraud call centers were raided in January; the following month, a US currency counterfeiting ring was discovered; and 12 individuals suspected of involvement in human trafficking and violation of the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act were arrested in July.
Taiwan police authorities have a specialized High Technology Crime Investigation Unit and professional cybercrime investigators. The Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) under the National Police Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, also established a Digital Forensics Lab that meets international standards. The laboratory was issued the world’s first ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation for Windows Program Analysis by the Taiwan Accreditation Foundation. In 2021, the CIB standardized its malware analysis procedures, in addition to establishing file analysis and network analysis mechanisms. Taiwan’s expertise in combatting cybercrime will benefit global efforts to build safer cyberspace.
Taiwan can help create a safer world.
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the fact that diseases transcend national borders and it can affect anyone—regardless of skin color, ethnicity, language, or gender. Distrust, disagreements, and a lack of transparency between nations accelerated the spread of the virus. Only when international partners provide mutual assistance and share anti-pandemic information, expertise, and vaccines can the world overcome the pandemic faster and successfully.
The Global Policing Goals were endorsed by INTERPOL member countries in 2017, with the stated purpose of creating a safer and more sustainable world. With this mission in mind, we must work together to combat crime—just as we have joined forces to combat the pandemic. No police agency or country should be excluded. To fight cybercrime and bolster global cybersecurity effectively, the world needs to cooperate. Taiwan needs the world’s support and Taiwan is willing and able to help the world by sharing its experience.
As the entire world teams up to combat the pandemic this year, we urge the international community, in the same spirit, to support Taiwan’s bid to attend the INTERPOL’s General Assembly as an observer this year and participate in INTERPOL meetings, mechanisms, and training activities. Taiwan’s pragmatic and meaningful participation would help make the world a safer place for all.
COVID-19 continues to spread globally to threaten people’s lives and cause massive economic losses. In order to assist Somaliland to increase its related capability to combat this pandemic, the Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland once again cooperates with KMUH healthcare system, Taiwanese NGO, and company to donate Taiwanese-made high-quality surgical masks and protective gowns to the Ministry of Health Development of the Republic of Somaliland.
Taiwan has been side by side with Somaliland to combat COVID-19 by sharing various Taiwanese-made medical supplies including masks, PPE, antigen rapid tests, PCR machines and reagents and many others since the outbreak of COVID-19. As the weather turns cooler, there are concerns to prepare for the new wave of the pandemic, and since the global vaccine coverage is insufficient and the treatment methods are not yet popular, people still need to take necessary measures to combat COVID-19, including wearing masks and sanitize hands. Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland integrated the resources of the International College of Surgeons Taiwan Section (Taiwan ICS) and ACTife, providing Somaliland Government with high-quality masks and gowns to assist the government in safeguarding her people’s health.
Viruses know no borders and no one is safe until everyone is. No country can remain on the sidelines and should be all integrated to the international community to fight against this pandemic that threatens all mankind. Taiwan is willing and ready to contribute and share more with the international community. The G7 foreign ministers, government leaders or high-level officials of diplomatic allies as well as Japan, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, and the United States have publicly expressed their rock-solid support for Taiwan to participate in the related international activities. Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland would also like to express heartfelt gratitude to Somaliland Government’s continuous support in this regard.
Taiwan will continue to share the medical resources and work together with Somaliland to combat the pandemic. “Taiwan can help” and “Taiwan is helping” are not only slogans, they also show the brotherly friendship between Taiwan and Somaliland. The core principles of the “Taiwan Model” of cooperation are based on “mutual assistance for mutual benefits” (MAMB). Taiwan and Somaliland are together to shape this new “WIN-WIN” cooperation model.
Somaliland is an important partner of Taiwan in East Africa. Both sides share the common core values of freedom and democracy. Taiwan commits to deepen bilateral cooperation with Somaliland Government to benefit the people, as well as together with like-minded countries, in various fields.
The Chairman of the Opposition party of Waddani Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro”, in a speech to the party’s second general assembly questioned the value of Somaliland’s bilateral ties to the quest for international recognition and called for improved ties with the People’s Republic of China instead.
“It is necessary for Somaliland’s recognition to find a government that is a member of the United Nations Security Council with veto power. At this time Somaliland has close allies and it would’ve been nice if our government improved its relationship with China which is bringing vast development to the region and an unrecognized such as Taiwan adds no value for our question for recognition. We must always improve how we deal with important nations.” Said Chairman Cirro.
Chairman Cirro stated that Somaliland’s bilateral ties with neighboring countries have declined under President Muse Bihi Abdi’s leadership and added that Somaliland has not been invited to the inauguration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia’s reelection.
Chairman Cirro who is running for President for the second time has previously questioned Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investment by DP World to develop the Berbera Port and corridor. He has called for the prosecution of President Bihi and his predecessor President Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo for the deal with DP World.
The People’s Republic of China has approached Somaliland following the establishment of bilateral ties with Taiwan and offered a conditional development package which Somaliland has rejected and since China and Somalia have both condemned the newly established bilateral ties.
The People’s Republic of China claims Taiwan as part of its territory much like Somalia claims Somaliland. It is unclear how Chairman Cirro plans to convince the Chinese government and garner support for Somaliland’s case for independence.
Although Mr. Cirro did not explicitly state termination of bilateral ties with Taiwan should he be elected President in 2022, it’s clear that pivot to China is featured prominently in his foreign policy posture.
Efforts to reach Chairman Cirro and other Waddani officials for clarification on the party’s position on Taiwan, potential pivot to China, and how the latter will reconcile its budding relationship with Somalia’s Federal Government and its pledge to respect the territorial integrity of Somalia with the diplomatic ties Chairman Cirro has called for with the People’s Republic of China.
Taiwan’s Representative Ambassador Allen C. Lou did not respond to request for comment on Chairman Cirro’s statement on Somaliland’s bilateral ties with Taiwan.
A decade has passed since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan landed in Mogadishu at the height of one of Somalia’s worst famines, announcing grandiose projects like the launch of Turkish Airlines flights to the Somali capital, the remodeling of a hospital, and the opening of the biggest embassy in Africa, all designed to show that Turkey’s mission goes well beyond aid and that Ankara is an alternative to Somalia’s traditional donors. Erdoğan’s historic visit earned him high praise throughout Somalia. Although his trip appeared to be a heartfelt humanitarian mission, in reality, it was part of a long-term, strategically planned effort. Erdoğan had been scouting out Somalia as early as 2007 when he met the former President of the Transitional Federal Government Abdullahi Yusuf and asked him to provide a list of what Somalia needs. His efforts were fruitless, however, until President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed came to power in 2008. Sharif visited Turkey three times between 2009 and 2011, reluctantly signing a military pact with Turkey, which asked to help Somalia with security.
If Turkey had come to Somalia before 2011, it would have been seen as a foreign occupying force, just like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but in 2011, amid the devastation of one of the worst famines in the country’s history, Turkey’s self-proclaimed humanitarian mission was perceived differently. Erdoğan’s historic visit to Somalia was well-orchestrated and well-timed: It came during the holy month of Ramadan, nine days before the Eid festival, after 250,000 Somalis had starved to death, and during an election year, at a time when Somalia’s donors were scrambling to address a major humanitarian crisis.
Ever since Erdoğan declared 2005 “the Year of Africa,” he has pursued every Muslim-majority African country that is widowed by conflict, locked out by the IMF, starved by man-made climate change, and neglected by the West; a fragile Somalia checks all the boxes.
A decade on, Somalis are starting to realize that Turkey has evolved from friend to foe, trade partner to trade protectionist, state builder to outright spoiler. Turkey is an opportunist just like any other country and has its own agenda focused on geoeconomics and geopolitics. Instead of facilitating Somalia’s development, Turkey has used state-sponsored corporations to exploit its assets, all as part of a development trap cloaked in the guise of religion.
The Turkish development trap
Post-2011, Turkey’s humanitarian mission gradually shifted from an emphasis on soft power to a more assertive, politicized state-building effort involving de facto and de jure exploitation of Somalia’s federal government development projects and monopolization of the economy in Mogadishu’s Benadir region. Turkish private companies Albayrak Group and Favori LLC were given lucrative no-bid contracts to run Mogadishu’s port and airport and protected by Ankara. As was documented in a 2016 U.N. monitoring report, these companies have allegedly been engaged in criminal practices ranging from bribery of government ministers to money laundering.
Predatory practices and trade barriers
In 2010, Somalia exported $1.36 million worth of goods to Turkey and imported $4.8 million, which was a manageable trade deficit. After Albayrak Group took over the management of Mogadishu Port, however, Turkish exports to Somalia increased exponentially, growing to $37.5 million in 2011 and reaching $256 million in 2019, even as Somalia’s exports to Turkey rose to just $6.7 million over the same period. By comparison, in 2019 Somalia exported $18 million and $195 million to China and the UAE respectively. Although Somalia has a port revenue-sharing agreement with Albayrak, which receives 45%, this has resulted in one-sided expansion of trade, with Turkish traders importing nearly 50 times as much to Somalia as Somali traders exported to Turkey in 2020.
In 2015, Somalia’s Financial Government Committee (FGC) published a detailed report reviewing public procurement and concessions; among the concessions reviewed in the report were the contracts for Albayrak Group and Favori LLC, which manage two of the largest domestic revenue generators for the Somalia government. The committee found several flaws in the Albayrak concession that resulted in uncompetitive port service costs, reduced revenues, labor disputes, and a lack of clarity on revenue sharing despite a general agreement laying out a 45-55% split. The FGC recommended that “the federal government seek an amicable renegotiation of the contract’s more troubling clauses.”
As with Albayrak’s Mogadishu Port contract, the FGC has also called for amendments to the concession of Favori LLC, a subsidiary of Turkey’s Kozuva Group that manages Mogadishu airport under a 15-year deal signed on June 30, 2013. According to an aviation expert who examined the concession, Favori violated its contractual obligations by collecting illegal fees that should have been passed on to the Somali Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority (SCAMA). Separate from the general revenue sharing, these allegedly include but are not limited to fees for landing, air navigation, parking, passenger safety, freight, and fuel.
According to interviews with local aviation experts and former employees, Favori has also failed to reconstruct the airport’s main runway, hampered the development of local human resources by allocating key positions to non-Somalis, and neglected airport maintenance and safety, as required under its contract. Issues that should have been addressed in 2013 are only now being discussed. In addition, the company illegally built a hotel and shopping mall inside the airport property in a place that was supposed to be a parking lot for airport customers. It’s not clear if the revenue generated from the Decale Hotel, which is a Somalia government asset, is supplemental revenue for the government or for Favori LLC.
Furthermore, according to a 2016 U.N. report, Favori LLC has inflated its expenses to maximize its profits, reporting monthly revenue of $1.16 million and expenses of more than $500,000 in 2016, compared to revenue of an estimated $8 million per month before it took over management of the airport. This reduced the government’s share of the revenue from 45% to just 6%. Favori LLC even went so far as to claim asset depreciation as an expense, despite the fact that the assets in question are the Somalia government’s and not part of the contract. Rather than canceling the Favori LLC contract, the Somalia government re-negotiated terms with the company in May 2019, amid secrecy.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (C), his wife Emine Erdoğan (C-L), and Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud (2nd R) attend the Inauguration of Aden Abdulle International Airport Somalia in Mogadishu on Jan. 25, 2015. Photo by Kayhan Ozer/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Though the government finally inked a 14-year concession to streamline revenue sharing and port development with Albayrak Group in October 2020, this largely reinforced the company’s original concession obligations. In addition, the revised concession has so many ambiguities that it’s not clear if the new 14-year deal is an extension of the previous 20-year lease, if it requires Albayrak Group co-management as part of technical knowledge transfer, or if the Albayrak Group’s exclusive port financing rights provision prohibits using the port of Mogadishu as collateral to access international loans.
According to interviews with former employees, Favori LLC has allegedly repatriated its profits to Turkey in cash without making a transfer through the Somalia Central Bank, as required by Somalia’s finance laws, which would be a violation of the anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism act that was passed in 2016. This would also violate the Somalia government’s compliance with its debt relief obligations with the World Bank and IMF, including revenue mobilization and accountability requirements to reduce corruption and enhance monetary and financial sector governance.
Qatar-Turkey axis and geopolitical influence
Beyond the economic issues, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia has also entangled the African country in the broader regional geopolitical dispute between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE on the other for influence in the Horn of Africa. While this rivalry seems to be easing at present, as Turkey and Qatar are making efforts to mend relations with Gulf countries and their regional allies, it may flare up again in the future, with consequences for Somalia.
Turkey and Qatar are brothers in arms with joint ventures ranging from support for the Muslim Brotherhood to financing Islamists and proxy wars in fragile countries all over the Middle East. Their bond grew stronger during the 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis, which pushed them into a geopolitical and geoeconomic alliance. The GCC crisis also spilled over into Somalia, when the new government led by Mohammed Abdullahi (known as Farmaajo), whose election was financed by Qatar, confiscated $9 million from an Emirati plane at Mogadishu airport. In retaliation, the UAE cut off support for the Somalia government, including military training, a devastating blow for the newly elected government and for a fragile state still recovering from one of its worst famines.
Though Turkey steered clear of the bickering between the Gulf countries in Somalia at the time, it had earlier pursued a covert plan with Qatar, in 2011 during the post-Arab Spring era, to sway Somalia’s foreign policy away from the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union and align it with Egypt’s then-President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. This effort failed as Morsi was overthrown by the Egyptian military in 2013.
Turkey has also repeatedly tried to serve as an arbiter in Somalia-Somaliland talks, sending its ambassador Elgon Beker from Mogadishu to Somaliland in 2019. The ambassador’s efforts were dead on arrival. Somaliland does not see Turkey as an impartial and fair arbiter, but rather as a dishonest broker since Ankara believes in the preservation of Somalia’s territorial integrity based on the illegal union of 1960 between the two. Moreover, Somaliland is extremely wary of Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu, as the Somaliland government believes Farmaajo, who openly denied the Hargeisa genocide committed by former Somali dictator Siad Barre in his post-graduate thesis and has already waged an economic war against Somaliland, could use military forces trained by Turkey to invade Somaliland in an effort to bring about forceful reunification.
Turkey and militarization
To capitalize on Somalia’s geostrategic position in the Indian Ocean, Turkey signed multiple military pacts with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in 2009 and 2010 and continued to sign new agreements with Somalia’s federal government in 2012 and 2015. These pacts covered areas ranging from military training to defense industry cooperation and are aimed at gaining a foothold in the Indian Ocean.
The Turkish government invested $50 million to build the largest overseas Turkish military base with the goal of training 10,000 members of the Somali National Army (SNA), although Turkey officially refers to it as the largest embassy in the world. The Turkish “embassy” in Mogadishu, which is perhaps the only diplomatic compound where military training and exercises are held, sits on a vast, 400-hectare swath of prime beach-front real estate worth an estimated $1.5 billion based on local property prices. It is almost twice the size of the U.S. military base in Djibouti. But Turkey did not pay for the land and there is no sign that the military pact contained any stipulation for lease payment to the Somali people. In comparison, France not only provides military protection to Djibouti in exchange for hosting its military base, but it also pays annual rent of $70 million and offers budgetary support.
Somali soldiers are seen marching during training held by the Turkish Armed Forces at the Turkish Military Training Center in Mogadishu, Somalia on Jan. 15, 2018. Photo by Volkan Furuncu/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.
The Somali Ministry of Defense does not exercise any oversight, is not part of the training, and is oblivious to what the troops are learning. Worse still, it does not seem to understand the challenges of integrating the Turkish-trained units with the larger SNA. There are further concerns over the role played by SADAT, a notorious Turkish private military contractor, which has been confirmed to be involved in training Somali troops. Founded by an Erdoğan ally, SADAT has been heavily involved in conflicts in Syria and Libya and has been accused of providing training and weapons to the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.
(Dis)integration with the SNA
Turkey is equipping the SNA units it trains with Turkish-made weapons such as the MPT-76 and other HK G3 variants made by MKEK with 7.62×51 NATO ammunition. This creates a dangerous incompatibility that prevents these units from being integrated into the larger SNA. In addition, there are also signs of a disconnect from command and control that may stem from Turkish-provided communications equipment, according to members of the SNA. By contrast, the U.S. and the U.K., which have trained and equipped effective units, opt to retrofit Kalashnikovs and other weapons widely available in Somalia to outfit the units they train, instead of the M4s or Enfields used by their armies. Turkey is thereby creating a market for its weapons manufacturers such as MKEK at the expense of building a cohesive army that is capable of carrying out joint operations between various branches and units.
This was a turning point that changed how many Somalis perceived Turkey, especially the residents of Mogadishu. Having welcomed Turkey with open arms in 2011 as a peacemaker and state builder, they were now shocked by its indifference to their plight, as Turkey openly took Farmaajo’s side and the troops it trained turned their guns on local residents instead of fighting al-Shabab. The U.N. Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG) has repeatedly warned Turkey for violating the U.N. arms embargo by equipping Somali police forces without notifying and getting approval from SMEG.
Erdoğan’s “neo-Ottoman” threat to Somalia
Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia in 2011 and the provision of assistance by multiple Turkish aid agencies at the height of the famine made Turkey a godsend in the eyes of many Somalis, who were yearning for an alternative to the failed Western-backed Somalia government. These overtures served as a litmus test of Erdoğan’s soft power, putting Turkey on the map as a humanitarian actor and an emerging donor.
In reality, however, the Turkish model has been a form of humanitarian enterprise diplomacy aimed at winning destitute Somali hearts and the backing of corrupt political elites who benefit from aid dependency on the West. However, the branding of Turkish aid has had a damaging impact on public perception, creating high expectations that the Turkish government would invest in state-building and provide protection. This perception is predictable when political elites have oversold expectations of the Turkish government and its economic strength. These elites are not happy with the EU and U.S.; even though they provide the majority of Somalia’s budget support and developmental aid, this comes with rules, regulations, and bureaucratic accountability, while the Turkish government has a different approach that meets their long-standing principal demand of “what’s in it for me.”
Erdoğan has said he believes Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was a good omen for the African country, writing in a piece published in Foreign Policy in October 2011, “In Turkish culture, it is believed that something good will come out of all bad experiences.” A decade later the only thing Somalia has gained from the Turkish model is costly bad experience stemming from imported autocracy, democratic backsliding, and a development trap.
Turkish state-sponsored private companies Albayrak and Favori resemble the Italian colonial enterprise Benadir Company, and over the past 10 years they have benefitted from illegal long-term concessions and political impunity that has cost Somalia’s government and investors as much as $5 billion in lost revenue due to trade barriers and exploitation of state resources, according to estimates from the author confirmed by former government finance officials. Turkey’s bilateral trade relationship with Somalia has put its economy in a stranglehold, turning Somalia’s assets into dead capital that has weakened the government and private sector’s financial footing and ability to attract foreign direct investment, limiting its sovereignty, and creating an addiction to Turkey’s artificial aid and its development trap.
Turkey has used Somalia to incubate its private sector companies and build a portfolio and track record it can pitch to other African or low-income countries with the deceptive marketing that “if it works in Somalia, it can work in your country too.” An African country that cannot access stringent World Bank loans or Chinese soft loans could easily be tempted to accept such an offer and risk falling into a development trap. This is especially true for countries with authoritarian regimes, fragile states, and weak government institutions, like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya.
Rather than reforming and strengthening Somalia’s weak government institutions to reduce corruption, the Turkish government chose to corrupt Somalia government ministries to reap the benefits of lucrative concessions in an effort to maintain its prestige at home and polish its credentials as an international actor abroad, all at the expense of Mogadishu’s taxpayers.
If future Somalia leaders do not hedge against Erdoğan’s irredentism and neo-Ottoman expansionism by taking a page from Tunisia, which imposed a 27% tariff on Turkish goods to reduce the trade deficit, in the next 10 years Turkey may expand its hold on the economy and take over Somalia’s agricultural sector as well, just like the Italian colonialists did when they realized that the Benadir coastal ports and towns depend on a hinterland (Shabelle River belt) supply chain.
Turkey is using its military base in Somalia to expand its influence and gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa, all without paying a cent in rent, and it has become clear that the government’s goal is not to protect Somalia from the scourge of al-Shabab or provide any meaningful security assistance.
Perhaps Erdoğan has no interest in seeing a secure and peaceful Somalia and the units that Turkey is training, whose record in combat against al-Shabab is dismal compared to the other units like the Danab (“Lightning Brigade”), may instead be a backstop to ensure that any future occupant of Villa Somalia does not go against Ankara’s interests. If so, Erdoğan could be providing the kindling for future conflicts in Somalia.
Erdoğan has exploited Somalia’s fragility to pursue his ambition of making Turkey an international power and furthering his “neo-Ottoman” aspirations. Erdoğan’s new empire is a thinly veiled feudal system that depends on militarism and economic exploitation for its survival. It is a threat to Somalia’s stability and prosperity, and if replicated elsewhere, it could destabilize other countries too.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Guled Ahmed is a non-resident scholar at MEI, renewable energy and water infrastructure expert, and an entrepreneur. The views expressed in this piece are his own.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
A delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Dr. Essa Kayd has arrived in the United States on an official visit. According to a statement by the Ministry and Somaliland’s Representative Office, Dr. Kayd is accompanied by Dr. Edna Adan and will meet with various United States government officials.
Wasiirka Arima dibedda ee Somaliland Mudane Dr. Ciise Kayd oo maanta soo gaadhey Washington D.C. lana kulmi doona masuuliyiin kala duwan oo ka tirsan dawlada Maraykanka pic.twitter.com/SMldnAI3in
Under President Bihi, Somaliland has been on overdrive in its quest for international recognition and its profile has been on the rise internationally and in the United States following its successful parliamentary and local elections and has received tacit support for its case for recognition from current and former government officials.
Dr. Kayd, a US-educated neurologist has been appointed to the post of Foreign Minister by President Bihi on September 2nd, is on his first official visit to the United States.
According to Somaliland government records examined by the Somaliland Chronicle, President Bihi’s government has inherited a sizeable debt from the previous administration of President Ahmed Mohamoud Silanyo and that officials from both administrations have publicly sought to downplay and at times outright lie about the size and gravity of the national debt.
Records show that some of the debt was incurred at the tail end of President Siilanyo’s term with a Presidential decree signed by the former President instructing the Minister of Finance at the time Ms. Samsam Abdi to include the borrowed funds in the 2018 budget. Some of the debt holders are banking and telecom giants of Dahabshiil, Telesom, and the parent company of Somcable MSG.
Publicly, however, the current Minister of Finance Development, Dr. Saad Ali Shire, and his predecessor Ms. Samsam Abdi have vehemently disputed the facts surrounding the debt President Bihi’s government has inherited.
In addition to the debt inherited from President Silanyo’s government, records show that President Bihi has borrowed millions from MSG owned by Mr. Mohamed Said Guedi.
Mr. Mohamed Said Guedi
Although records do not have enough detail to determine the nature of the debt and how it was used, it includes a massive 90,000 US dollar electric bill by the Ministry of Interior. The Minister of Interior has pleaded with the Finance Ministry for swift settlement of the bill to avoid disruption of service to the nation’s vital records systems housed at the Ministry of Interior.
Soon after taking the helm, President Bihi has re-nationalized and withdrew from multiple lucrative contracts that have been awarded by his predecessor to well-connected private parties to operate public services including managing the Berbera Oil Terminal and motor vehicle records administration. Records show that negotiated settlements with these private operators have added to the already burgeoning national debt.
It is unclear if the debt passed on by the previous government of President Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo and the subsequent borrowing of President Bihi has gone through the proper legal channels, if the newly elected parliament will look into it or how it affects the government’s ability to regulate Dahabshil and Telesom—Somaliland’s largest banks and telecom operators—while it owes them huge sums of money.
Government officials did not respond to repeated requests for clarification on the size and nature of the national debt passed on by the previous government or how much exactly President Bihi’s government has borrowed since taking office.
Thirty years after declaring its independence from Somalia, the Republic of Somaliland seems to be strategically positioning itself to make a strong push for international recognition. Though it checks nearly every box for statehood, its pursuit of independence has been largely ignored, leaving the region stable, but isolated and without a voice in international forums and debates. Now, it is combining its track record of self-governance and democratic consolidation with a more shrewd and strategic foreign policy that capitalizes on the geopolitical rivalries that are roiling the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. Whether it will ultimately be successful yet to be seen, but with a strong case, powerful new friends, and a neighborhood in turmoil, its chances appear to be improving significantly.
Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in May 1991, and has now existed as a self-declared independent state for longer than its opted union with Somalia. Multiple generations of Somalilanders now know nothing different than an independent Somaliland. Their sense of national identity is steadfast and deep-seated and the goal of realizing de jure sovereignty is stronger than ever. Even if independence remains unrecognized, the possibility of reunification with Somalia is extremely unlikely. Thus, this year’s May anniversary of the dissolution of the union with Somalia serves as an important moment that reignites Somaliland’s independence struggle, and the validity of its cause, on an international level.
Flag of the Republic of Somaliland, which remains largely unrecognized despite its relative stability.
Somalilanders also point to their record of democratic progress as further basis for separation from politically unstable Somalia. Since the ratification of Somaliland’s constitution in 2001, there have been eight successful elections ranging from the municipal level to the presidential level. Parliamentary elections have been more problematic, with polls in the Lower House postponed for over a decade because of disagreements over the composition of the electoral commission. After years of delays, Somaliland’s democracy was in need of a reboot— something to reinvigorate its young population and political systems. This year, Somalilanders did just that, restoring credibility to democratic institutions and bringing in a new generation of Somaliland leaders. Not long after independence day celebrations, long-delayed parliamentary elections were held, in a process widely praised by African and other international observers as free, fair, and credible. Moreover, the two opposition parties, Waddani and UCID, together won the majority of seats, marking a power shift away from the ruling Kulmiye party. While a political shift of this character might have sparked conflict in some of Somaliland’s neighbors, this development was marked by peace and calm as the new government assumes power. The success of the recent election sits in stark contrast to Somalia, which has found itself in the midst of an election crisis in recent months that ultimately led to violent clashes between clan militias and security forces in the streets of Mogadishu.
Map of the political situation in Somalia and Somaliland.
Alongside these internal political developments, Somaliland is pursuing a more strategic foreign policy, building economic and political alliances with more powerful players that may eventually support its case for international recognition. Over the past several years, Somaliland has found itself in the midst of a whirlwind of geopolitical activity that has brought it into contact with both regional and great powers. Its relative stability and physical location at the epicenter of the greater Red Sea arena has made it an asset to many. It has found itself strategically placed in the middle of major international rivalries–such as the Persian Gulf conflict, the rivalry between China and Taiwan, and regional conflicts between Kenya and Somalia and Ethiopia and Egypt—and it has used those rivalries to further its own foreign policy agenda. Somaliland has seen unparalleled economic engagement from the UAE, with Dubai-based developer DP World investing $442 million into the port of Berbera, Somaliland’s commercial center on the Gulf of Aden.
Chairman and CEO of DP World Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem (right) shakes hands to finalize the investment of $442 million into developing the port of Berbera. Source: The National
Militarily, Somaliland has been approached by former adversaries, such as Egypt, and global powerhouses, such as Russia and China, about the establishment of bases along its coastline. Diplomatically, Somaliland has established formal relations with Taiwan, which only has one other friend in Africa (Eswatini), while rejecting support for China, a bold move for an unrecognized entity seeking support in the international community. Somaliland has also strengthened relations with Kenya, and aggressively expanded its ties with other nations across sub-Saharan Africa. While doing all of this, Somaliland has demonstrated a degree of agency never seen before in its foreign policy, leveraging the power it poses to make meaningful strides towards its goal of recognition and independence. Somaliland’s choices indicate strategic depth and maturity in its foreign policy. For a polity of its status, Somaliland has become a player in regional developments.
Foreign ministers of Taiwan and Somaliland met to establish representative offices in Taipei and Hargeisa. Source: Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
These positive developments are not to say that Somaliland is without problems. There are currently no women in the parliament, freedom of speech and freedom of the press have seen significant setbacks, and minorities still struggle for proper representation. Furthermore, there is a long-standing border dispute with the neighboring Puntland region of Somalia, drought and locusts have plagued the countryside, and Somaliland remains very poor and underdeveloped. Somalia is unlikely to agree to a full split, and the African Union and broader international community are still hesitant to fully engage with the question of Somaliland independence. The sanctity of established borders and the fear of a proliferation of secession demands by aggrieved regions and communities remain formidable obstacles to Somaliland’s ambitions for full sovereignty.
Map of Somaliland’s Foreign Relations. Source: Onero Institute, based on a map by Siirski
Nevertheless, Somaliland’s recent democratic successes, significant independence milestones, and dramatically increased international presence mark a paradigm shift for the proto-state as it seeks to gain attention for its independence cause around the world. In a region marred by conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, Somaliland stands out as a relatively peaceful and stable country, whose cause it is hard not to be sympathetic to. From the countless conversations I have had with Somaliland citizens and officials, this air of optimism for their future is alive and well. Somaliland is no longer just a blip on the radar of the international community, but rather a geopolitical vessel, growing in might, and making waves in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea arenas. Change is afoot for this self-declared republic; keep your eye on Somaliland.
The DP World Berbera New Port will serve as a cornerstone of Somaliland’s economic growth and is symbolic of the cautious optimism of things to come. Source DP World
Acknowledgments
So many people were critical to my research on Somaliland this year. I’d like to specifically thank the Honorable Bashir Goth, the Honorable Mohammed Yonis, and Mr. Nicholas Hasko for their guidance, support, and regional insight as I dove into the depths of Somaliland politics. I’d also like to thank Jennifer Cooke, Director of the Institute for African Studies at GW and my thesis mentor, for her hands-on and personal mentorship, guidance, support, and friendship as I conducted my thesis research. She was critical in helping me complete my research, and I am very thankful for her.
About the Author
Originally from Dallas, Max Webb graduated from The George Washington University in May of 2021 with a BA in International Affairs with a dual concentration in Conflict Resolution and International Development as well as a regional focus on the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. During his time in college, Max studied and wrote extensively on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as conflict in the greater Somali region of the Horn. He has previously served as an intern for the project on Arab-Israeli relations at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the diplomatic intern for the Kurdistan Regional Government representative office in DC, a research intern at Antioquia Presente in Medellín, Colombia, and a research aid at Reut in Tel Aviv. Currently, Max serves as the National Organizing Fellow for New York based policy group, Israel Policy Forum.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
His Excellency Ambassador Allen Chenhwa Lou, Taiwan Representative in the Republic of Somaliland, and Hon. Mohamed Haji Osman, Minister of Agricultural Development of the Republic of Somaliland, co-hosts the opening ceremony of the Demonstration Farm in Agamse, Arabsiyo on 4th October 2021.
The Demonstration Farm is the “fruit” of the joint efforts of the Taiwan Technical Mission and Ministry of Agricultural Development for the Improving Production and Quality of Vegetables and Fruits Project.
The demonstration farm was assigned to the Taiwan Technical Mission to use in April this year. After 6 months’ hard work, the farm has reached a functional status and is ready to do the extension work with local farmers. This farm is designed to be a technique exchange platform. Techniques and know-how related will be tested in the farm and will be extended to local farmers if it is applicable.
Considering the constraints of farming resources of Somaliland, such as water availability, soil fertility, high evaporation, and lack of diversity of products. Some tactics such as protection farming, dripping irrigation, mulching, varieties introduction, soil-improving will be introduced in the demonstration farm.
The Demonstration Farm is a venue for training and extensions work. The Demonstration Farm is the benchmark of the Improving Production and Quality of Vegetables and Fruits Project. Many elements such as capacity-building and value-chain facilitation are to be channeled to the Demonstration Farm and to be implemented together by the Ministry of Agricultural Development and Taiwan Technical Mission.
Moreover, the Demonstration Farm is showcasing the vision of the Taiwan Model of agriculture cooperation in Africa to benefit local farmers directly.
COVID-19 continues to spread globally to threaten people’s lives and cause massive economic losses. In order to assist Somaliland to increase its related capability to combat this pandemic, the Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland represents the Taiwan Government to donate Taiwanese-made oxygen generators to the Ministry of Health Development of the Republic of Somaliland on 3rd October 2021.
Taiwan has been side by side with Somaliland to combat COVID-19 by sharing various Taiwanese-made high-quality medical supplies including masks, PPE, antigen rapid tests, PCR machines and reagents, and many others since the outbreak of COVID-19. Taiwan will continue to share the medical resources and work together with Somaliland to combat COVID-19. “Taiwan can help” and “Taiwan is helping” are not only slogans, they also show the brotherly friendship between Taiwan and Somaliland.
Viruses know no borders and no one is safe until everyone is. No country can remain on the sidelines and should be all integrated into the international community to fight against this pandemic that threatens all mankind. Taiwan is willing and ready to contribute and share more with the international community. The G7 foreign ministers, government leaders, or high-level officials of diplomatic allies as well as Japan, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, and the United States have publicly expressed their rock-solid support for Taiwan to participate in the related international activities. Taiwan Representative Office in the Republic of Somaliland would also like to express heartfelt gratitude to Somaliland Government’s support in this regard.
The core principles of the “Taiwan Model” of cooperation are based on “mutual assistance and mutual benefits” (MAMB). Taiwan and Somaliland are together to shape this new WIN-WIN cooperation model.
