According to multiple sources present at the confirmation hearing of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Essa Kayd Mohamoud, the President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi will visit the United States in the coming weeks.
This news comes shortly after the conclusion of a visit by a US Congressional staff delegation from the Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs, and House Appropriations and Conservation Committees to Somaliland on what was described as a fact-finding mission.
In addition to the Congressional Staff delegation’s visit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Dr. Essa Kayd Mohamoud was in the United States late last year as his first foreign visit where he had met with numerous current and former high ranking government officials and it is unclear if paving the way for President Bihi’s visit is a direct result of the delegation’s visit and meetings in Washington DC.
President Bihi’s visit comes at a time when the United States has shown a heightened interest in Somaliland as of late despite the failure of a monumental amendment in the National Defense Authorization Act requiring the Departments of State and Defense to work directly with Somaliland on matters pertaining to security submitted Senator Risch.
Somaliland’s global stature has been on the rise following a string of diplomatic successes and a boost to its democratic credentials following the successful nationwide one-person-one-vote Parliamentary and local council elections with minimal outside help and for rebuffing Chinese overtures to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
The United States has been in a race to turn the tide of rising Chinese influence in Africa and particularly in the strategically important Horn of Africa where the People’s Republic of China has its first overseas military base in Djibouti.
Officials at Somaliland Presidency and Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Ministry did not respond to questions relating to the President’s visit to the United States.
In recent years, Somaliland recognition has become a hot topic within the circles of US congress, top diplomats, think tanks, and international relations experts. This generated different sets of ideas or roadmaps on how the US should establish formal diplomatic relations with Somaliland.
In this article, I will compare these roadmaps with the hope to identify a WIN-WIN deal. Failing that, I will recommend not to establish any relations between Somaliland and the US until one is found. In the words of Stephen Covey, always strive for a win-win or no deal
The roadmaps towards direct relations between the US and Somaliland are as follows:
Suggested Talks with Somalia (with AU sponsorship)
The UK treatment (de facto recognition)
Direct US recognition
The Abraham Accord
To help compare and contrast, we will look at 5 criteria to assess the practicality and how a roadmap constitutes a WIN-WIN deal.
Capacity for adverse actions by Somalia or any third party
Unwanted side effects
Materialisation of US interests
Materialisation of Somaliland’s interests
Time and effort
Before any comparisons, below is a brief description of each roadmap
Suggested Talks with Somalia (with AU sponsorship)
Advocates: Somalia, Former US ambassador
Similar to South Sudan and Eritrea, this roadmap puts pressure on the so-called parent country (Somalia) to approve the independence of a breakaway region (allegedly Somaliland). Fruitless talks have been going on for a decade between the two countries. What is different in this alternative roadmap is exerting pressure on Somalia by the African Union with the use of tight deadlines and active mediation. This is mainly suggested by former US ambassador Stephen Schwartz
The UK treatment (de facto recognition)
In this roadmap, the immediate resolution of Somaliland’s recognition is deferred and everything that could come after recognition is put forward especially in the area of economic development and limited aid. This is the nature of the relationship between Somaliland and the following countries: Ethiopia, UAE, UK, and Taiwan. Advocates for this roadmap see it as a stepping stone towards full recognition. A military flavor of this roadmap appeared on the floor of the US senate in an NDAA bill amendment by senator James Risch. Although the amendment was withdrawn, it shows the preference for de facto recognition by some.
Direct US recognition
Advocates: AEI Scholar Michael Rubin, Former US assistant secretary of States: Tibor, Frazer, Cohen, The heritage foundation, and The Economist
By far, this is the most popular roadmap by experts and diplomats. This roadmap calls for the immediate and unconditional full diplomatic recognition of Somaliland. The basis behind it is deep knowledge of Somaliland’s history and awareness of how other roadmaps have led to failures. This roadmap sees the AU fact-finding mission inviting for such direct intervention. It underscores how Somaliland does not open a pandora box for any other African movement to declare independence unilaterally. Furthermore, this roadmap argues that Somaliland is setting the bar really high in a way that is impossible for any other future country to pursue the same path. The most comprehensive research on this roadmap is done by The Heritage Foundation’s Senior Policy Analyst Joshua Meservey
The Abraham Accord
Advocates: Dr. Edna Aden, AEI Scholar Michael Rubin, Somaliland and Israeli politicians and activists
Like Taiwan, Israel has a similar profile to Somaliland: a free democratic nation within unstable and unwelcoming neighbours. Despite the mutual interest, a direct diplomatic recognition between Somaliland and the US is similar in magnitude to the lifting of sanctions against Sudan and the Abraham Record. Since no country has recognised Somaliland yet and the significance of a US recognition, Somaliland might need to move out of its comfort zone (is dhigasho) and offer the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in order to secure full recognition. This has been written favourably by senior scholar Michael Rubin
The Win-Win deal
In this section, I will compare these roadmaps. The following can be considered a framework that can be used to evaluate any future roadmap.
1 Treating Somaliland as a breakaway region not only is against the African Union fact-finding mission report it also gives Somalia unnecessary illegitimate control over the Somaliland case.
2 Most likely, an AU pressure will not work given how ineffective it has been in fighting terrorism in Somalia. Furthermore, the African Union does not have the same level of interest in the region as the US does. The biggest mistake when discussing Somaliland recognition is to treat the African Union as its main and only stakeholder. Somaliland is not only in Africa but also in the Red Sea and the Indo Pacific. This spans five continents and just Africa. The US and other democratic partners such as the Quad must look for their interests; which are not shared with the rest of Africa such as an open and free Indo Pacific. This means when considering allies’ positions, the US should not be limited to nations like Kenya but also Australia, India, and Japan. On the other hand, anchoring on the African Union role will not materialise any US interest.
4 This roadmap has already been going on for 10 years without any progress. During that period, Somaliland has incurred higher unemployment rates and increased chances of War with Somalia. The latter is already preparing for war to annex Somaliland.
5 The current status quo of keeping the talks with Somalia is blocking the US or any other country to recognise Somaliland. For example, if the US recognises Somaliland today, it will be blamed for disrupting the ongoing talks. Somaliland must end the talks immediately, not just because it did not work for a decade, but also to open doors for other nations to engage with better alternatives.
6 Turkey has supplied Somalia with drones capable of attacking Somaliland. Without full diplomatic recognition, even with good intentions, the US cannot help Somaliland to buy arms and be able to defend itself. Unlike Taiwan, which enjoys military support without formal recognition, there is an arms embargo on Somalia by the UN and security council. In other words, a de facto recognition does not address the security interest of Somaliland.
7 A direct US recognition might not be as direct as it sounds. Despite Somaliland being a democracy that ticks all the boxes, not many countries are aware of Somaliland. The shortcomings of effective Somaliland lobbying worldwide put weight and extra effort on US diplomats to not only explain their new position but also convince other nations in Africa, Quad and Europe to follow suit.
8 While there are several politicians and advocates that support forging relations with Israel, there are many conservatives in Somaliland who oppose this move. This is a risk to the ruling party with elections coming soon in Somaliland. However, it is a manageable risk given the rewards in the return which are always guaranteed within the Abraham Accords framework. Needless to say, this roadmap also requires both US and Somaliland to align their interests with Israel. In comparison to the previous roadmap, this requires far less diplomatic work.
Conclusion
Before anything else, ending the talks with Somalia will be the best way to start a new chapter in Somaliland’s engagement with the world. For a win-win deal, Somaliland and the US have to work hard in 2022 towards a direct formal recognition, or a deal within the Abarahm records. This will have a positive influence on the many geopolitical regions that Somaliland belongs to.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdi Daud is an Australian Somalilander and Software Engineer. Works as a principal developer in a fintech company. Melbourne, Australia. Mr. Daud is also a Non-Resident Scholar at Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Hargeysa Somaliland
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
The Ministry of Telecommunication and Technology of Somaliland has outsourced the creation of the Address System for Hargeisa, the capital of the Republic of Somaliland, to a private company called GEOSOL.
GEOSOL is currently managing the land records of Hargeisa Municipality for exuberant fees to the public and Mr. Abdirahman Aideed SOLTELCO, the former mayor of Hargeisa, is reported to be a major stakeholder in GEOSOL.
The Ministry of Telecommunication and Technology has so far paid 400 million Somaliland Shillings or roughly 74,000 US dollars to GEOSOL. Details of the agreement with GEOSOL are scarce and it is unclear what the contract entails and if Hargeisa Municipality is a stakeholder, the project’s price tag, and if GEOSOL will charge the public for the address assignment service or if this engagement will be rolled out nationwide in the future.
”We are introducing a postal addressing system for the first time in Somaliland history. The new addressing system will make it easy for residents should know which district they live in, their street name, door number, and zip code to receive and send national and international parcels and other delivery packages. Furthermore, the service will create new job opportunities for citizens for new services such as deliveries, post services, and E-Commerce.” the Ministry said in a statement published on its website.
Although successive governments have been promising to get postal services up and running, Somaliland does not have a functioning postal service and the public relies on private package couriers for local and international shipments.
In addition, the Ministry of Telecommunication and Technology has spent over 100,000 US dollars in verifying Somaliland’s government social media pages. This is according to anonymous sources with direct knowledge of the project. Verification of social media accounts for public figures and institutions is free but requires a basic understanding of the various platforms to navigate their qualifying requirements.
During his confirmation by Somaliland Parliament, Dr. Abdiweli Abdillahi Soufi has promised that he will work to ensure that Somaliland has its own telephone country code and an internet top-level domain, neither has materialized so far but records examined by Somaliland Chronicle show the Ministry has paid various consultants over 53,000 US dollars in 2021 for telephone country code.
One company tasked with getting Somaliland its own telephone code is Mind Power Consulting a three-person company and seems to have little to do with telecommunications. For the top-level domain, the Minister has asked Sierra Leone if Somaliland can share its top-level domain. Sierra Leone owns the .sl top-level domain.
A source from the Ministry of Telecommunication and Technology, who spoke on condition of anonymity, described how the Minister finds and vets vendors as “nothing more than throwing a rock at google and seeing what comes up”. This is despite lofty goals of establishing an “e-cabinet” system in collaboration with the Presidency, according to the Ministry’s e-government Strategic Plan.
Although the Minister has been promising to deliver an e-government system for years among others including interconnecting various telecom providers, it does not appear that an e-government system would go live soon to enable Somaliland’s highly connected population to consume government services digitally.
Taiwan, a technology powerhouse that has signed an agreement with the government of Somaliland to help with the digitization of citizen services, but it is unclear if Taiwan is offering technical expertise, equipment, or the funding of an e-government system for Somaliland.
Although it is uncommon for governments to elicit help from foreigners including allies for sensitive or classified government systems for national security reasons, many systems currently in use by the Somaliland government have been funded by the World Bank and developed by foreigners with little to no input from the Ministry of Telecommunication and Technology.
Dr. Abdiweli Abdillahi Soufi, the Minister of Telecommunication and Technology did not respond to questions for this report.
Somaliland is on a roll. Early last month, a U.S. Congressional staff delegation visited Hargeisa, the first such trip in more than a decade if not two. In Washington, DC, two former national security advisors, three former assistant secretaries of State for African Affairs, and a previous U.S. ambassador to Somalia have all praised Somaliland if not endorsed formal ties if not independence. Nor is Somaliland’s diplomatic momentum limited to the United States. The establishment of Somaliland-Taiwan ties augmented awareness of Somaliland internationally. Kenyan diplomats will soon arrive to staff an embassy already established near the Ambassador Hotel. European delegations come more frequently and, slowly but surely, Somaliland diplomats make progress in both western and southern Africa. Several airlines are in the final stages of negotiations to serve Berbera’s new international airport.
Contrast that with a decade ago, when an air of diplomatic desperation surrounded Somaliland. Today, diplomatic momentum and expanding ties give Hargeisa leverage. It is against this backdrop that Somaliland’s government should reassess and rebalance the country’s ties with Turkey.
Certainly, Somaliland should value the fact that Turkey has long maintained a consulate in Hargeisa at a time when many countries shunned the nation. Such praise requires an asterisk: While Turkish diplomats may live in Hargeisa, but Turkey accredits them to Mogadishu. That may be standard given Somaliland’s unrecognized status, but what is not are violations of regional sovereignty, for example, distributing aid with Turkish and Somalia’s flag to villages well within Somaliland’s internationally recognized borders.
Over the last several years, Somaliland’s balance of payments and balance of trade have skewed increasingly heavily toward Turkey. Turkish clothes, food, and electronics increasingly fill Somaliland markets, but Somaliland livestock and animal products seldom reach Turkey. As a result, far more money flows from Somaliland to Turkey than vice versa. While that is a testament to the diversity of Turkey’s economy and its manufacturing power, the problem is that Turkey delivers nothing diplomatically to compensate for the imbalance and the tens of millions of dollars it takes from Somaliland.
If such Turkish trade imbalance is to continue, then Ankara should compensate in other ways: First and foremost, the Turkish Foreign Ministry should accept reciprocity for Somalilanders. Rather than condemn Somaliland’s representative to conduct business in Ankara coffee shops, Turkey should allow Somaliland to establish an office and treat it with the same respect that Somaliland treats Ankara’s consulate in Hargeisa. When I visited Ankara two decades ago to meet representatives of Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the Turkish government was hardly on speaking terms with them but still allowed them to maintain official offices. Somaliland deserves no less.
The same holds true for passports and visas. Somaliland officials accept Turkey’s passports and readily provide visas to Turkish businessmen. It is a diplomatic insult that Turkey refuses to recognize Somaliland passports and often treats visa applicants—both businessmen and students studying at Turkish universities—harshly and with disrespect. The issue is not just biometrics; Turkey will accept many other passports that are on par technologically with Somaliland’s.
Reciprocity should extend beyond simple diplomatic protocol: Somaliland does not interfere in Turkey’s security by establishing separate ties, for example, with Kurdish groups whose actions Turkey says undermine its internal security. Yet, Turkey consistently subordinates its relationship with Somaliland to the dictates of Somalia and increasingly provides President Mohamed Farmaajo’s expired presidency and its inner-circle with lethal weaponry which they might use against Somaliland.
That same subordination of interests is also evident in Turkish Airlines. Turkish authorities repeatedly brag about the rapid expansion of Turkey’s national airlines into one of Africa’s major carriers. In 2011, the airline served 14 African destinations; eight years later, it flew to 52 African cities. It should be 53, but out of deference to Farmaajo, Turkish Airlines boycotts Hargeisa even though it could be financially viable.
Turkey’s economy is faltering and, happily, Somaliland today has more friends. Turkey is not in the command position it once was. Rather than let Turkey continue to operate in Somaliland without restriction, it is in the interests of all Somaliland to use Hargeisa’s growing leverage to insist on the reciprocity inherent in normal diplomacy or, alternately, to scale down the opportunities Turkey enjoys in the country.
According to multiple sources, the Director-General of the Ministry of Education and Science Mr. Abdirisaq Jama Nur (Nakhude), has stopped payments on multiple transactions totaling over 64,000. Sources add that the expenditure’s nature was questionable, and the funds were reallocated from accounting sub-heads without the proper procedures that include approval from the Accountant General or the Ministry of Finance.
Sources add that the new Director General who was recently reassigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has been trying to track down multiple stamps that were used to authorize expenditure and together with the Deputy Minister are trying to reign in more than 20 bank accounts in private banks.
Minister Diriye, whose appointment was initially welcomed as a disrupter who has removed layers of entrenched corruption and restructured the ministry operations, is now described by sources as a chaotic and erratic personality leading to even widespread corruption, nepotism, and disfunction at the Ministry of Education and Science.
The Minister of Education and Science Hon. Ahmed Mohamed Diriye Egeh is the co-owner of DARS Research—a private research firm, and although an effort was made to scrub the Minister’s name and all traces of the fact that it operates in Somaliland off the DARS Research website, multiple sources state that Minister Diriye is involved in the day-to-day operations of the firm and in ensuring that DARS receives funding and contracts.
The Ministry of Education and Science which receives millions of dollars in funding from the Global Partnership for Education and Education Cannot Wait has one of the highest turnovers of any ministry and sources from the Ministry and others from international organizations with a direct working relationship with the Ministry describe it as an environment rife with turf wars and corruption.
Many of the donor-funded projects for education in Somaliland are channeled through Safe the Children, Care International, and other international NGOs as implementing partners and do not award funds directly to the Ministry of Education. As a result, tens of millions of dollars from donors to the Ministry of Education and Science are hard to track as funds do not go through the Ministry of Finance Development and Somaliland Central Bank and instead are deposited in multiple accounts in private banks with minimal accountability and oversight.
Efforts to reach the Minister of Education and Science Hon. Ahmed Mohamed Diriye Egeh, the Deputy Minister and the Director General for comments were unsuccessful.
The Minister of Finance Development Dr. Saad Ali Shire has submitted the 2022 budget to the Somaliland Parliament on Monday 27th of December and faced a torrent of questions from the newly elected members of the Parliament regarding the 400 million US dollar budget. This is an increase of roughly 17% or 57 million from the 2021 budget which was 343 million US dollars.
The budget includes 6 million dollars to pay down the national debt which is 38% less than previous budget years 10 million dollar allocation for debt repayment. Somaliland’s national debt is opaque and current and former government have both denied the existence of tens of millions of dollars of debt.
Among the many questions the parliament has asked the Minister of Finance Development, Dr. Shire, is the tens of millions of dollars that is directly given to many government entities including the Ministry of Education and Health that is not shown in the national budget and is held in private bank accounts. Minister Shire stated that it has been hard to get aid agencies to divulge budget information for inclusion in the national budget but that the Ministry of Finance Development is working on ensuring that all funds flow through the proper channels to ensure oversight and accountability.
Traditionally, little debate went into approving the national budget with even fewer questions but it is unclear if the new parliament will approve the budget in its current form or make amendments.
The President of the Republic of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi, who has been addressing an accusation from the opposition parties that he is seeking an extension, has stated that “Elections will be held on time”. In addition, he responded to allegations from opposition party leaders that President Bihi may be using the opening of the political parties and association as a pretext for term extension.
Attending the unveiling event of the new Center for Underground Water Management , President Bihi briefly spoke of the fluid situation in Somalia and accused Farmajo of bringing Somalia back to the brink once more but contrasted that situation with the ongoing debate regarding Law Number 14 and the opening of political parties and associations and said “Ours is different in that we are debating which path works” and directly responding to threats from the two chairmen of Waddani and UCID stated that it is impossible for Somaliland to have two Presidents.
Waxaan Shacabka Soomaaliyeed u caddeynayaa in tallaabooyinkii uu qaaday Madaxweynahii hore Maxamed Cabdullaahi Farmaajo ay yihiin isku day bareer ah oo lagu afgambinayo dowladnimada, Dastuurka iyo sharciyada dalka u yaalla. DAAWO👇👇https://t.co/1AirRdnec6
Somalia has entered another tumultuous political state following a statement from the Ex-President Mohamed Abdillahi Farmajo to strip the Prime Minister of his powers over corruption allegation and an attempt this morning to prevent him from accessing his office. As a result, Somalia’s Prime Minister Mr. Mohamed Roble has issuing a decree that all orders from the Ex-President should be ignored.
More political tragicomedy in Somalia as "President" Farmajo suspends PM Roble. I predicted in February when Farmajo's term should have ended that he would play every game to stay in power for another full term, paid by IC. Sadly it's happening. Somalis deserve SO much better!
The United States and other donor countries have issued a barrage of statements regarding the tense political state in Somalia.
The dispute that arouse from Law Number 14 is currently with the constitutional court of Somaliland for interpretation and ensuring that it does not conflict with existing constitutionally mandated Presidential and Senate elections next year.
As reported by Somaliland Chronicle over the weekend, the most high-profile American delegation in over a decade is currently in Hargeisa, capital of the strategically located Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland – a politically isolated democracy in the Horn of Africa – last welcomed an American visit of this magnitude in February of 2008, when former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer paid a brief visit. Control of its extensive coastline along the Gulf of Aden has since increased in value, in an African continent quickly becoming a playground for Chinese influence. Somaliland’s location next to Djibouti, which currently houses both the U.S.’s Africa Command and China’s sole foreign military base, has propelled it to the forefront of American interests in the immediate region.
The United States has been weary of China’s presence in the Horn of Africa and interest in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and has tacitly supported Somaliland’s rejection of Chinese overtures and the establishment diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
The current visit has left analysts and observers hastily studying America’s intentions in the unrecognized nation, which has historically positioned itself as a staunchly democratic ally in alignment with U.S. interests and values in the region. As first reported by Saxafi Media, this alignment recently bore fruit in Washington, where United States Senator James E. Risch from Idaho has proposed an important amendment in the latest National Defense Authorization Act, calling for direct defense and security cooperation between the United States and Somaliland.
The National Defense Authorization Act, which sets the policies for expenditure levels in defense and national security, was passed by the senate and sent to President Biden’s desk who is expected to sign the measure. The current budget of the NDAA is a whopping $768 billion, a small portion of which has been allocated to Section 1264, titled “A Feasibility Study on Security and Defense Partnership with Somaliland.”
The amendment instructs the Department of State (in collaboration with the Department of Defense) to seek and pursue synergies with Somaliland on issues pertaining to national security in order to counter growing Chinese influence in the region, and taps Somaliland to “serve as a maritime gateway in East Africa for the United States and its allies.”
In recognition of Somaliland’s stability and democratic credentials, the amendment also suggests Somaliland can act as a “democratic counterweight to destabilizing and anti-democratic forces in Somalia and the wider East Africa.” Somaliland finds itself betwixt Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia in a region where democratic values are scarce, and free and fair elections have become an anomaly if even held. Recent joint parliamentary and municipal elections held in Somaliland received international praise, as opposed to customary congratulatory messages accorded to winners in the democratic world, presumably because of the neighborhood they were held in.
While the amendment’s language still refers to Somaliland as a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, its addition to the National Defense Authorization Act may be the start of a sharp U.S. pivot to Somaliland, in view of the language used.
The amendment explicitly requires the Departments of State and Defense to treat cooperation and partnership with Somaliland as “separate and distinct from any security and defense partnership with the Federal Republic of Somalia,” and while the amendment later concludes with “nothing in this section… may be construed to convey United States recognition of Somaliland as an independent state;” this is a run of the mill clarification as the amendment only serves as a preamble to future discussions of that nature once the feasibility study has concluded.
The most recent American efforts to stabilize Somalia, through the training of its security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab, ended in the pull out of its troops from Somalia. Somalia has long benefited from U.S. stabilization efforts, but failed to deliver results which has frustrated many current and former American officials.
Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute, who we reached out to for comment opined “Policy in Washington moves at a glacial pace but as momentum builds, it also become a freight train impossible to stop. The Risch provision might not make it into law this year, but the stigma is broken and the discussion in the Senate has been started. The question for Somaliland is not if there will be more official ties to the US but rather when and what shape. What Mogadishu doesn’t understand is that Somaliland is gaining not because of lobbying but rather because the merits of Somaliland and the facts of its case don’t need lobbyists who promise to trade influence for cash. Farmaajo can dump millions into lobbying, and it won’t make his tenure in Somalia look any less like a failure,” in relation to the amendment by Senator Risch and its implication for Somaliland.
Cameron Hudson, Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, who we also reached out to posited “Sen Risch’s amendment is a smart approach to advancing US interests in perhaps the most strategic and challenging region of the African continent. I think its [sic] entirely fair and appropriate to recognize and engage with reliable and responsible partners to advance our interests regardless of their rank or status. There is nothing new to that as we see our government engaging at sub-national, state and local levels across the continent. Indeed, this should be done wherever it makes sense as part of a strategy to strengthen and recognize those places where governance is strong,” when asked for comment on Senator Risch’s amendment.
Mr. Hudson continued his remarks on the National Defense Authorization Act amendment with “that said, in the case of Somaliland, which has made very clear that its ultimate goal is diplomatic recognition and independence, I remain concerned that authorities there see partnership agreements like the one being proposed by Sen Risch as a means of doing an end-run around regional and continental organizations in Africa which have not advanced Somaliland’s independence aims. I continue to believe that Washington should not be out ahead of the AU on the issue of independence and should be wary of being used by Hargeisa as leverage in its political negotiations in Addis,” echoing Jendayi Frazer’s position in 2008.
These views do little to clarify whether the NDAA amendment – which was passed with bipartisan support – is related to the current visit of Congressional staffers to Somaliland. The timing of the amendment and the delegation’s visit couldn’t be more opportune; however, Somaliland Chronicle was unable to confirm from government officials whether the two are related. An official who spoke on condition of anonymity called the visit a “fact-finding mission,” but declined to comment on whether defense and security were on the agenda.
Ultimately, Senator Risch’s amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act represents a monumental opportunity for Somaliland to work directly with the United States in defense and security matters, albeit with pre-conditions. These conditions include upholding the rule of law and civil-liberties in Somaliland, which the amendment instructs the Departments of State and Defense to assess. The amendment specifically makes whether “Somaliland’s security forces have been implicated in gross violations of human rights during the 3-year period immediately preceding the date of the enactment of this Act” a requisite.
Another important aspect of the Risch amendment to the NDAA, is that it forms an axis by closing the loop between Somaliland, Taiwan, the U.S. and its TAIPEI Act. The amendment encourages Taiwan and Somaliland to “bolster security and defense cooperation and capabilities,” providing new motivation to take bolder steps, and substantially upgrade existing cooperation from its current level.
The National Defense Authorization Act once signed by the President of the United States into law, will require the Secretary of State to submit a classified report to congress within 180 days. It removes decision making from the U.S. embassy in Somalia, who have traditionally favoured a one Somalia policy, and under whose watch Somalia has fallen under the Chinese sphere of influence.
What these developments mean for future U.S.-Somaliland relations remains uncertain, but it’s clear that the United States has found that exploring a partnership with Somaliland is in its national security interest. With their mutual interests in alignment, it appears Somaliland has managed to find an ally in the most powerful nation on earth.
Update: As of Friday December 17th, 2021 Senator Risch’s amendment did not make it to the final bill.
A delegation of United States Congressional Staff is slated to visit Republic of Somaliland on Monday December 13, 2021, in what will be the highest-level American delegation to visit to the Horn of Africa nation in well over a decade. Members of the delegation comprise of staff representing the Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs and House Appropriations and Conservation Committees, along with various senior policy advisors from Washington.
The delegation is scheduled to meet with members of Somaliland’s government, along with a bevy of Somaliland’s civil societies, education, health, and conservation institutions. The planned itinerary for the trip includes a visit to Berbera’s port and recently renovated airport, amongst other strategic locations Somaliland Chronicle has opted not to disclose.
Congressional staffers, generally responsible for working with the individual members of Congress or committees they are assigned to, are also charged with formulating major policy positions at the technical level. Their reports and due diligence are used as the evidence which informs and drives the U.S. government’s posture and policies on global issues. Their visit to Somaliland may mark another turning point in the U.S. government’s engagement with Somaliland, and signal American interest in reassessing their interests in the Horn region.
There’s been a surge of interest in Washington for Somaliland’s case, which has regained the traction it lost to Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State. Secretary Clinton, who was responsible for the reversal of U.S. policy towards supporting and fostering democracy in the Horn, dismantled America’s dual-track policy towards Somaliland. Despite the minimal direct diplomatic relations, many current (and former) American officials have openly supported Somaliland, and called for the U.S. government to engage directly with its government. These calls have only increased in frequency since Somaliland established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in July of 2020.
Turmoil in the Horn of Africa region, along with increased Chinese influence on the African continent coupled with Somaliland’s strategic location in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is attracting global attention including from the United States. It was only recently that a U.S. Air Force C-130J-30 Super Hercules transport plane landed in Berbera airport on an undisclosed mission. When contacted by Somaliland Chronicle, both the Somaliland government and U.S. Africom Command did not respond to requests for particulars on the flight to Berbera.
It was also only recently that Uganda lost its famed Entebbe Airport to China’s debt-trap diplomacy, and Taiwan lost yet another ally in Nicaragua to Chinese influence despite Congress’ Taipei Act. In stark contrast, Somaliland has been an unwavering ally to Taiwan in the face of Chinese overtures, and has offered its real-estate to the global fight against terrorism. It is yet to be determined if Somaliland’s positions on these issues have garnered them goodwill in Washington.
This is a developing story, and Somaliland Chronicle will continue to provide updates as we learn more about the delegation and their visit to Somaliland.
Gerard Prunier (2021). The Country That Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. London: Hurst. 279 pages.
The country that does not exist: a history of Somaliland is a lucid, compelling, and instructive book that proffers a distinctive account of the history of Somaliland – an unrecognized state in the Horn of Africa that has been de facto independent and separate from Somalia since 1991. The author of the book, prof. Gerard Prunier, an illustrious French historian, is by himself a revered authority in the history of the Horn of Africa and does not exclusively rely on external observations but, sometimes, offers a first-hand account of the events in the book. The book does not confine its analysis into the last thirty years of Somaliland’s ‘non-existence existence’ but covers pre-colonial and colonial periods, the 1960 merger of Somaliland and Somalia and its aftermath, the history of the Somali National Movement (SNM), and its decade-long war with the Barre regime, and the rebirth and progression of today’s Somaliland.
The book is organized into eleven chapters. Chapter 1 examines the pre-colonial history of Somalis, the clan system, the arrival of the colonial powers, and the genesis of the greater Somali nation-state dream. Prunier argues that Somali nationalism was based on cultural homogeneity with (overlooked) underlying differences: “The Somali not only invented their nationalism but they inflated it, calling for the ‘reunification of all Somali territories’ (which had never been unified) and the ultimate creation of a ‘Greater Somalia’” (p. 8). This chapter also provides a brief history of each of the five Somali territories that existed in the colonial era.
Chapter 2 focuses on the 1960 merger of Somaliland and Somalia and how it failed and led to a military coup and later civil war. Prunier contends that the 1960 union had no legal basis – “So, even though nobody had refused any unification document, nobody had signed one either (or either of the two prepared), leaving the merging of the two colonies as a de facto move, without international or constitutional basis” (p. 21). In this chapter, the author also underscores that the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia War had a momentous impact on Somalis in the sense that it not only shaped the future of Somalia but also that of the Greater Somali Nation-State dream; Prunier writes, in a subsequent chapter, that “1978 had been a reality check for the pan-Somali worldview. But the worst was not the military defeat, but the dream’s ideological collapse” (p. 115).
Chapter 3 through Chapter 7 explore the history of the Somali National Movement (SNM); SNM’s decade-long war with the Siad Barre regime in the Cold War context, and the 1988 atrocities committed by the regime in the Northern Regions (Somaliland). Prunier details how SNM poorly fit in the Cold War context referring to it as the “odd man out” (p. 58); and maintains that it stood out, survived, and eventually won the war because of these reasons: it enjoyed the support of the Isaaq clan family and underpinned by the “‘Anglo-Somali’ political culture of former colonial Somaliland” (p. 62); “It was supported by a Marxist power but never turned ‘communist’” (p. 62); “it fought a Western-supported dictatorship but without turning anti-Western” (p. 62). As far as the Anglo-Somali political culture is concerned, Prunier writes that “In many ways – politically, legally, philosophically – the SNM had a (partly) British history” (p. 81). Revisiting the crimes against humanity committed by the regime in Somaliland in the late 1980s, the author contends that it is difficult to escape referring to these crimes as genocide and cites a source that stressed that “Genocide is the only word for it” (p. 103).
Chapter 8 through Chapter 10 investigate the collapse of the Somali State, the breakup of the North and South, the rebirth of Somaliland and the aftermath – internal fighting in both sides, the humanitarian crises and the invasion and intervention of foreign countries, and the UN efforts in Somalia, and peace-building and state-building in Somaliland.
Chapter 11 probes how Somaliland survived in the late 2000s and throughout the 2010s primarily from “a centralist threat from whoever was in control of Mogadishu and internal Islamist subversion” (p. 195) as well as from “stagnation and decay” (p. 196). Due to the absence of international recognition for three decades, the author speculates what the future holds for Somaliland and in light of the recent UAE investments and economic cooperation highlights that “Strangely enough, having now become a satellite of the United Arab Emirates might provide a way out of this quandary” (p. 213).
The book has a number of exceptional merits. To start with, the way it analyzes Somali nationalism and the Great Somali Nation-State dream is uniquely spectacular – here the reader will find a very critical interpretation and narrative that is not so common in the literature on Somalis. Secondly, the author examines the nature and history of SNM in a way that Somalilanders (including the movement’s founders and leaders) can hardly do – impartial, comprehensive, detail-oriented, and broader in the sense of taking the regional politics and the Cold War, among other things, into account.
The book is nearly impeccable in spite of otherwise corrigible mistakes. For instance, the author writes: “Since the SYL [Somali Youth League] was largely ‘southern’, it created a British Somaliland branch called the Somali National League (SNL) in Hargeisa” (p. 10). Well, while SYL had once a branch in British Somaliland, SNL had never been a branch of SYL but was a separate organization, which was the largest and most powerful party in British Somaliland. When discussing the foundation of SNM and the early activities in the Gulf countries, Prunier rights, “The man who brought all of them together was Engineer (later Colonel) Mohamed Hashi” (p. 44). Here, the author confuses one man with another: two men who were both involved in the early days of SNM: Eng. Mohamed Hashi Elmi who later became the Mayor of Hargeisa and the Minister of Finance (he is still alive) and Col. Mohamed Hashi Dirie “Lixle”, a military colonel who was later killed in the war. The remaining few errors are related to the Somali clans – listing a clan and one of its sub-clans as equal or getting someone’s sub-clan wrong – which there is no reason, whatsoever, to blame the author.
About the Author
Muhumed M. Muhumed (Khadar) is the author of two books: “Kala-Maan: Bilowgii iyo Burburkii Wadahadallada Soomaalilaand iyo Soomaaliya” in 2018 and “Dhaqaalihii Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliyeed, 1960-1991” in 2022, and a number of scholarly articles. He is a researcher based in Hargeisa, Somaliland and he can be reached at: baadilmm@gmail.com
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of the Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
