According to a circular issued by the Somaliland House of Representatives, the first Deputy Chairman of the Parliament Mr. Saeed Farah Mire [Giire], has assigned a committee to amend and update Somaliland’s General Penal Code and the Criminal Code.
Deputy Chairman Giire, as he is widely known, noted in his circular that the laws are outdated which resulted in gaps that that does not cover certain crimes that and that the changes and amendments to the General Penal Code and the Criminal Code must be in accordance with the Islamic Sharia and International Law and Somaliland’s cultural principals.
Although Somaliland regained its independence in 1991, its criminal and penal codes are still based on the draconian laws created in 1960 for Somalia. It is unclear how the proposed amendment to the criminal and penal codes will reconcile Sharia, international and customary laws of Somaliland into cohesive criminal and penal codes.
Upon gaining independence from Britain on June 26, 1960, Somaliland voluntarily merged with Somalia on July 1st, 1960, to create the Republic of Somalia. In the wake of the dissolution of the Central Somali state, Somaliland reinstated its sovereignty on May 18, 1991.While fulfilling all the criteria for statehood, i.e., defined boundaries, a permanent population and a functioning government that routinely engages in relations with other states and international organisations, Somaliland is yet to achieve de jure recognition but continues to function as a de-facto sovereign state.
Somaliland has created an organic and legitimate hybrid state rooted in society by merging Somali institutions of governance with constitutional multi-party democracy. In doing so, the young state has transcended the (semi) Weberian OECD-model of statehood and has given birth to the hybrid turn in the peace and state building literature. The people of Somaliland have demonstrated a genuine and robust will to maintain peace and build a vibrant democracy. Since 1991, Somaliland has experienced five consecutive peaceful transfers of power. Impressed with the successes of Somaliland’s peace and state building trajectory, some scholars and practitioners have gone as far as to suggest that Somaliland offers an alternative model of statehood in Africa.
Making Somaliland a puzzling and fascinating case is that its successes were achieved with virtually no external assistance. Political and social leaders in Somaliland have achieved on their own what the combined capacity and economic means of the international community has failed to achieve in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia. Actors fighting on opposing sides of one of Africa’s bloodiest civil wars voluntarily ceased hostilities, peacefully negotiated and in this way created peace, stability, democracy and built an inclusive state. Why Somaliland has succeeded on its own while numerous other post conflict societies have failed despite foreign intervention and assistance is a question that continues to baffle scholars and policymakers alike.
Somaliland’s road to peace and a functioning democracy was challenging and required concerted effort and leadership steered by prudence and providence. Throughout the 1980s Somalilanders were arbitrarily and indiscriminately persecuted by Maxamed Ziad Barre’s brutal military regime, culminating in 1988 where Somaliland’s two largest cities were razed, killing 50.000 people. Rather than prolonging the war after Barre’s army was ousted from Somaliland in early 1991, leaders of the insurgency (Somali National Movement) that fought Barre and representatives of the communities that had supported the central government voluntarily commenced post war peace and reconciliation efforts. A series of peace conferences took place in different areas of the country from the early 1990s to the mid-1990s. The first grand conference was held in the port city of Berbera in early 1990 with the last being held in the capital of Hargeysa in 1996-1997. It was at these conferences that the different social groupings in Somaliland would meet, each make their case in the spirit of Somali egalitarianism, peacefully negotiate, and solve thorny issues through consensus. This capacity to overcome internal collective action challenges through generalized pro-social behaviour is a key factor in grasping Somaliland’s remarkable success in peace and state building. While Somalilanders were struggling with consolidating peace and building a viable state, the international community, under the guise of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), was going at lengths to disrupt Somaliland’s reconciliation efforts and tried to bring all actors under the framework of UN-led peace and state building in Mogadishu. It is therefore safe to say that Somaliland did not merely make it without external assistance during its formative years (1991-2001), but that it made it despite of the international community.
FILE PHOTO: A Nobel Prize medal replica is on display inside the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway September 19, 2022. REUTERS/Victoria Klesty
Against this backdrop, it appears peculiar that Somaliland has not yet been shortlisted for the Nobel Peace Prize. Since World War II, the Peace Prize has annually been awarded to those who have done outstanding work within the four main areas of: arms control and disarmament, peace negotiation, democracy and human rights and work aimed at creating a better and more peaceful world. With scarce resources and against all odds, Somalilanders succeeded in ending violence, consolidating peace and in building one of the most vibrant and inclusive democratic states in the developing world. That Somaliland did not collapse into a never-ending vicious cycle of endless violence and devastation is, more than any other reason, attributable to the sheer will of the people of Somaliland. It was them who came together voluntarily, negotiated peacefully, and averted a looming catastrophe through concerted effort. It is by attention to this point that it appears rather difficult to advance a tenable line of reasoning against the motion that the people of Somaliland are worthy of at least being considered for the Nobel Peace Prize.
While the Norwegian Nobel Committee is responsible for selecting the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, a nomination may be submitted by any persons who qualify to nominate. University professors are among those are considered ‘qualified nominators’ and there is surely no shortage of senior academics with a Somalilander background in universities around the world. Some of them receive a hero’s welcome upon returning to Somaliland. It is therefore quite puzzling that none of them has hitherto been willing to nominate Somaliland for the Nobel Peace Prize.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Jamal Abdi holds a MSc in International and European Relations. He is currently a PhD candidate in international relations at Keele University. His research focuses on peace and state building in Somaliland.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
De facto states are often marginalized internationally, even in instances where they successfully manage to control their semi-autonomous jurisdictions and provide certain public services to their citizens. Globally, their sovereignty remains unrecognized. This can be attributed in part to the parent state’s reluctance to acknowledge the de facto state’s independence – the declaration of which is often contested – and the international subjectivity on the de facto state’s nationhood. In addition, the institutional capacity of the de facto state’s foreign affairs function and its potential to have international influence are also factors that weigh on recognition as an independent state. This paper assesses the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation’s (MoFA&IC) institutional mechanisms based on the conceptual framework which consists of the foreign policy document, key legislations, lobbying strategy document, and foreign policy evaluation framework. The paper found that the MoFA&IC of Somaliland lacks some key institutional mechanisms including a foreign policy document. Such deficiency at the institutional level negatively affects the institution’s capacity to have impactful influence towards the international system and jeopardizes its ability to effectively seek recognition, or at least affiliation with a patron state which can advance Somaliland’s aspiration for recognition.
1. Introduction
Somaliland gained its independence from Great Britain in June 26, 1960. Only five days later, Somaliland and Somalia voluntarily formed Somali Republic, which lasted thirty years, until 1991 when Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia, and after the collapse of the Somalia’s central authority. After a series of nation-building, state-building, and democratization processes, Somaliland established a relatively functioning constitutional and democratic governance system. This led to the adoption of the constitution, two successful House of Representatives elections through the multiparty political system and also through a public one-person-one-vote process. In the same period, five different presidents have ruled Somaliland where three of whom were directly elected and subsequently made a peaceful transfer of power. The country also established state organisations including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation which manages Somaliland’s foreign affairs on one hand, and expected to realize Somaliland’s recognition as a sovereign state in the international system on the other.
Despite the fact that Somaliland has relatively succeeded in managing its internal sovereignty and undergone a democratization process through the adoption of a multiparty system, it still remains a de facto state, more than thirty years after its declaration of independence. Furthermore, Somaliland is not a member of the global financial institutions which include the Bretton woods system; the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Neither is it a member of regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This raises a pertinent question; why has Somaliland remained a de facto state thirty years after declaring independence; and why hasn’t the country convinced at least one patron state that could recognize its sovereignty and advance its quest for recognition at the regional and international bodies? First and foremost, this question calls for a critical enquiries from different angles in order to identify and define the existing internal and external political, economic and institutional challenges on one hand; and to come up with evidence-based policies and strategies to counter those challenges on the other.
Many papers covering a wide range of Somaliland’s nation-building, state-building, and democratization processes and its de facto status have been published (See Bradbury 2008; Pegg 1998; Berg and Pegg 2016; Jonathan Paquin, 2010; Roland Marchal, 2018; International Crisis Group 2009, 2015, 2019; Smaker and Johnson 2014; Kibble and Walls 2010; Tansey 2011; Rudincova and Hoch 2015; Pegg 2017 etc).
However, based on the literature review conducted, there is a literature gap on the critical institutional assessment of Somaliland’s public institutional mechanisms[1] in general and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in particular.
Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the question, ‘to what extent has the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation demanded the establishment of fundamental institutional mechanisms and to what extent have those mechanisms been operationalized? The study argues that Somaliland’s internationally contested sovereignty and Somalia’s refusal to acknowledge Somaliland’s restored independence are not the only factors that result in Somaliland’s prolonged absence of de jure recognition and exclusion from the international financial institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation’s lack of institutional mechanisms including foreign policy document, which weaken its institutional capacity, is a contributing factor too.
For the methodological perspective, the study is a qualitative one. A comprehensive literature review is undertaken so as to develop a deductive relevant framework for analysis. Regarding the data collection, the primary data is collected through Key Informant Interviews from officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, a desk review on the available relevant documents and platforms is also undertaken in order to generate the other supportive evidences.
The paper is structured as follows: The first section is a brief introduction and background to the study, while the justification for a written foreign policy document is discussed in the second section. The challenges arising from the absence of the Somaliland foreign policy document are analysed in the third section, while the fourth section presents the gaps in the key institutional legislations. The fifth section is a discussion about the absence of a lobbying strategy document. The sixth and seventh sections present the foreign policy evaluation framework and the conclusion of the paper, respectively. Finally, the study makes some recommendations in the last section.
2. Rationale for a Foreign Policy Document
Somaliland is a de facto state. According to Scott Pegg’s, “the de facto state is a secessionist entity that receives popular support and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which it maintains effective control for an extended period of time” (Pegg, 1998). These states, as the literature shows, are peculiar in the way they are perceived on one hand and their interaction with international sovereign states on the other. Although the contested states might achieve relative self-rule and internal sovereignty, they have failed to gain de jure recognition from the other sovereign states or, at best, recognized by some states. As a result, de facto states are either in precise isolation or have a restricted recognition and constrained engagement with the international system (Caspersen, 2010).
From the specific forms of nation-building, state-building and democratization in de facto states, five factors shape the formation and development of the states. First, de facto states are considered the victorious side of the civil war that resulted in their establishment. Second, a de facto state with ethnically homogenized residents is established through forcible population displacement. Third, a prolonged absence of international recognition renders the military victory of the contested state precarious and existentially insecure, even many decades later. Fourth, de facto states are open to international normative pressure to behave in certain ways. Finally, most de facto states (with the exception of Somaliland case) depend significantly on support and assistance from an external patron state (Caspersen, 2008; Kolstø, 2006; Pegg, 2017).
With the exception of the first two factors – the one relating to the historical narrative and the one based on the nation-building process, the other three elements explicitly reflect the extent to which a de facto state needs to have a comprehensive and responsive foreign policy that can effectively and efficiently address its key national interests. The term “national interest” has been basically used by statesmen and scholars to describe the key political, social, security, and economic survival and development goals of the nation-state in the international arena. The exact attributes of national interest and its meaning are discussed differently in academia, military strategies, and foreign ministries. It is therefore ambiguous in the art of diplomacy and the study of international politics. Nevertheless, from general perspective, four fundamental national interests are considered by the sovereign states as follows (Nuechterlein, 1979):
Defence interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state, and/or an externally inspired threat to its system of government.
Economic interests: the enhancement of the nation-state’s economic well-being in relations with other states.
World Order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders;
Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people.
In other words, the national interest components consist of physical survival, economic prosperity and political sovereignty (Roskin, 1994). Contested states are different from recognized states: they lack recognition of their political sovereignty (Pegg, 1998). Therefore, one of the national interest priorities of the de facto states is to obtain external sovereignty from the de jure states in the international system.
From a theoretical perspective, recognition of sovereignty leads to the prioritization of the national interests depending on the way it’s theoretically defined; declaratory or constitutive theory. The declaratory theory posits that, ‘an entity that possesses minimum characteristics of statehood (a territory, population, government and a capacity to maintain relations with other states) is automatically a state and an international subject – recognition can only mark the willingness of other states to have relations with it’. The constitutive theory on the other hand states that, ‘an entity is ‘constituted’ as a state and international subject through the actions of other members of the international community recognizing it as a state’ (Vidmar, 2012). However, the primary national interests of a given de facto state in the international system, and how that state defines the recognition and its meaning to the statehood, constitute and frame its foreign policy, as the sum of external relation, of the state (Hill, 2003). So, a foreign policy document should be developed in order:
To identify and formulate the decision-making guiding principles for Somaliland’s external relations;
To propose the required key institutional mechanisms regarding the foreign service of the state so that the national interests are effectively protected;
To prevent any sort of ambiguity towards the state’s primary national interests that reflect the short and long term development, economic development and political sovereignty of the state;
To provide uniformed familiarization on national interests, foreign policy objectives and strategic direction to the foreign service personnel; and
To systemically and strategically prevent and manage the regional and global threats against the interests of the state.
3. Somaliland’s lack of a Foreign Policy Document – Three Decades On
Somaliland’s foreign affairs are institutionalized through obligational approach of institutional legalization (Amenta & Ramsey, 2009). According to article 40 of the Law 71/2015 (Law on delineation of the government organization and independent public bodies[2]), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somaliland was established to administer and lead the Somaliland external relation in the international arena. The law frames the mandate of the ministry and assigns specific institutional duties. When it comes to the foreign policy, more specifically, paragraph 12 of the article 40 of this legislation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has the responsibility to formulate and develop the Somaliland Foreign Policy at regional and international level. Such assertion implies two significant propositions; first, the issue of the foreign policy formulation is obligatory. In this regard, the ministry should design, formulate and develop a foreign policy to act as a basis for decision making on Somaliland’s external relations. Second, having a detailed and structured foreign policy at regional and international levels requires the ministry to have a written foreign policy document.
Somaliland has been going through a nation-building, state-building and democratization process since 1991. Remarkably, five different presidents—Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, Mohamed H. I. Egal, Dahir Riyale Kahin, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo) and Muse Bihi Abdi ruled Somaliland in more than three decades. Regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Ciise Kayd, the current minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, is the 15th minister to lead the ministry since its establishment. However, the Somaliland Ministry of Affairs lacks a finalized foreign policy document that guides the decision-making processes on Somaliland external relations.
“Despite a draft foreign policy document being introduced by the 13th minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Sacad Ali Shire, none of the five different administrations has succeeded in formulating and implementing a finalized written foreign policy document that shapes decision-making on Somaliland’s external relations in the regional and international arena”, MoFA&IC officer stated in an interview.
Similarly, one of the heads of Somaliland representative offices was also asked in a key informant interview if they have a foreign policy document which shapes the decision-making process in the Foreign Service. He states:
“Basically, there is a top-bottom hierarchical decision-making structure which shapes the strategic and policy directions of the ministry. [We] follow and implement those given directions. However, there is no finalized foreign policy document so far”, a diplomat from Somaliland MoFA&IC said in an interview.
The decision-making processes in foreign policy are intricate, with a myriad of short and the long term outcomes (Cimbala, 1973). Such complexity arises from multi-dimensional internal and external factors including the rapid global political, economic, social, geopolitical, and technological transformation and dilemma on one hand, and the ambiguity of the term “national interest” in the art of diplomacy and the study of international politics on the other. National interest thus needs to be clearly defined in a foreign policy document. Furthermore, de facto states which are not officially recognized can arguably suffer more due to the intricacy and unpredictability of the foreign policy decision-making processes (Pegg, 1998). MoFA&IC’s lack of a foreign policy document jeopardizes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ institutional capacity to fulfil its mandate. First, the absence of a foreign policy document implies that there is lack of precisely and scientifically defined and prioritized national interests related to the economic prosperity and political sovereignty of the de facto state. Second, there are different foreign policy models (independent foreign policy, complaint foreign policy (Kosovo) and outsourcing foreign policy) that could be adopted by a given de facto state to secure its fundamental prioritized national interests (Keil and Stahl, 2014). So, Somaliland’s lack of empirical-based foreign policy indicates that such models were not considered, hence the lack of a strategically chosen model that would lead to the realization of to the national interests. Third, it also points to the lack of consistent foreign policy objectives at regional and international level which would ideally shape the Somaliland’s external relations based on the prioritized national interests. Such assertion does not denote an absence of the top-bottom leadership ad hoc decision-making on the foreign relations. Likewise, it does not evaluate the outcomes from the current or the previous decisions made. However, it denotes the lack of systemic institutional design, and the operationalization of a policy-based decision-making approach.
On the other hand, article 40 of the Law 71/2015, the law on delineation of the government organization and independent public bodies is the only parliamentary act which frames the mandates of the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. This article consists of only thirteen paragraphs which illustrate the obligations of the institution. Since Somaliland is a de facto state and still lacks its de jure recognition, seeking the external sovereignty of the state should have been one of the primary responsibilities of the ministry, but none of the thirteen paragraphs of the article state that the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has the legal duty to seek the country’s de jure recognition from the UN Member states of the General Assembly. From a legal perspective, surprisingly, it implies that the recognition issue is not a part of the MoFA&IC’s institutional obligations.
4. Gaps in the Key Institutional Legislations
A State consists of institutions with unique political missions, functions, responsibilities, and roles. These institutions structure relationships between; the government and the citizens or subjects, social relations among different groups of citizens or subjects, and interaction with other states (Amenta & Ramsey, 2009). In accordance with Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal’s theoretical propositions, public institutions of the modern nation-states are established through legalization approaches. These processes ensure that such institutions have uniform sets of characteristics grouped into three qualities; precision, delegation, and obligation. Precision means that rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation refers that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. Obligation denotes that states including its institutions or other actors are legally bound by a law (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal, 2000). Similarly, Max Weber’s theory on legitimization of power in general and the legal rationalization in particular denotes that the institutions are ruled by law, so as to legitimize their exercise of power (Moore & Sterling, 1987).
First, this approach implies that the institutional policies and structures have to be basically rationalized. Second, it proposes the legalization of the rationalized ideas through formal processes of enacting laws so that public institutional interventions are guided by the law. This is where institutional legitimacy in the modern democratic nation-state comes out. In addition, the specifications of the institutional mandate and the scope of work are also framed by its legislations in order to avoid mismanagement, negligence of public duty, and overlap of responsibilities in the public institutions. So, states establish a ministry of foreign affairs to manage its external relations in the international arena based on legislations that frame the institutional mandate to be fulfilled. This ministry handles such duty through diplomatic missions, consular offices, representative offices, liaison offices or cultural offices. Below are the fundamental institutional legislations for a ministry of foreign affair according to Keil and Stahl; and Marleku (Keil and Stahl, 2014; Marleku, 2013):
The law on Foreign Service
The Law on Consular Service of Diplomatic and Consular Missions;
The Law on Governing the Employment of Diplomatic and Consular Personnel;
Regulation on Foreign Service;
Regulation on Consular Service.
4.1. The law on Foreign Service
This law legally shapes the entire foreign service of a given state. It describes the management of the Foreign Service including leadership, regulation of institutional structure, delegation of functions, and the creation of the required board of Foreign Service. It is the one which defines the scope and number of appointments that the president and the minister of foreign affairs are entitled to nominate. It also administers the recall and reemployment of the career members, as well as handling the arrangement of the Foreign Service positions and agencies. Similarly, the law on Foreign Service establishes the career development institutions including training centers for diplomats, and frames the Foreign Service retirement. In fact, this legislation is enormously significant to the establishment of the required institutional mechanisms so as to fulfil the mandate of the ministry of foreign affairs.
Somaliland external relations are run without a Foreign Service Act. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been functioning for the last three decades and engaging with other states and non-state actors. It handles the state’s external relations and has established different Representative Offices in a number of countries including the USA, the UK, the UAE, Ethiopia, Taiwan and Sweden. In fact, different personnel, including diplomats, have been working in each Representative Office. Despite the fact that all the laws approved so far by the Somaliland Parliament since the Somaliland declaration of independence have been reviewed[3], the law on Foreign Services has never been drafted and submitted to the parliament for possible approval. This indicates that the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacks a key institutional mechanism which would has been legally managed the institutional leadership, structure, operations, career development and support of the members of the diplomatic service. In fact, this jeopardizes the institution’s capacity to influence the international system.
4.2. The Law on Consular Service of Diplomatic and Consular Missions
Consular personnel perform a variety of functions of principal interest to their respective sending countries including issuance of travel documents, attending to the difficulties of their own nationals who are in the host country, and generally promoting the commerce of the sending country (US State department, 2018). In this regard, the law on Consular Service of Diplomatic and Consular Missions guides the whole consular service undertaken by the consular post or diplomatic mission. Basically, this legislation is in line with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations adopted in 1963 (US State department, 2018). Based on the reviewed laws approved by the Somaliland Parliament, the law on Consular Service of Diplomatic and Consular Missions of Somaliland has neither been drafted and submitted to the parliament nor approved. This denotes, similarly, that the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacks a key institutional mechanism which would legally administer its consular services in diplomatic and consular missions.
4.3. The Law on Governing the Employment of the Diplomatic and Consular Personnel
There is increasing agreement amongst scholars and practitioners that diplomacy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is changing, and changing fast. Such dynamism often centers on shifts in the balance of global powers in geopolitical affects since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the effect of the accelerating globalization and a rise in regionalism on diplomatic practice is also a factor. In addition, the speedy transformation of technology leading to the emergence of digital diplomacy plays its significance role as well (Bjola and Holmes 2015; Kerr and Wiseman 2013). In this regard, diplomacy first entails an engagement with the notion of profession. It also includes an account of the sedimentation of professional claims as to skills exclusivity and expertise on international relations, diplomatic interventions and multiculturalism. So, there is a need for developing new skills, new methods, and new partnerships for the effective working of national and supranational diplomatic services which are tasked with the management of complex regional and global problems.
In such a new context, new skills such as social media and digital literacy, transnational networking beyond traditional coalition building, remote sensing, data-mining, visual translation, Logical Framework Approach (LFA), Results Based Management (RBM), Right Based Programming (RBP), or information gathering through crowdsourcing, amongst other techniques, are becoming increasingly common in diplomatic practice. All over the world, diplomacy is a highly regarded profession, and requirements for admission—frequently included ‘proper’ social origin and qualifications. That process allowed for some minor national differences to survive, primarily in terms of formal conditions for recruitment and career development of professional diplomats (Bagger 2015). Such exclusively required professionalism in the diplomatic sphere demands a law governing the employment of diplomatic and consular personnel so as to train and hire professional diplomats and diplomatic staff that can conduct the complex diplomatic tasks at regional and global levels. More importantly, despite the contested states’ lack of external sovereignty and their keenness to effectively influence the policies of the other recognized states, they have to adopt a professional based recruitment approach guided by specific laws on employment of diplomatic and consular personnel.
In the Somaliland case, the specific law that would manage the staffing process of the diplomatic and consular personnel is not approved by the House of Representatives[4]. As one of the MoFA&IC senior officers stated in an interview, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation employs the Civil Servant Act for the employment of its staff. This law guides the entire employment processes throughout the public institutions in general, but does not specifically regulate the diplomatic and consular personnel so as to hire the right people to the right position in the Foreign Service. In fact, such legislative gaps which damage the institutional capability are not perceived as an isolated issue. This is a consequence of the lack of a foreign policy document which would have outlined the requirements for professional diplomatic and consular personnel and proposed the relevant legislation needed.
5. The Absence of a Lobbying Strategy Document
The de facto states, as they lack their external sovereignty, use lobbying firms and individual lobbyists to influence state policies and advocate for the attainment of the prioritized national interests including survival, political sovereignty including recognition, and economic prosperity (Roskin, 1994). The lobbying interventions sometimes fail to influence the target policy outcomes due to various reasons. In some cases, lobbyists are very active in attempting to influence policymakers and the other influential actors, but their strategies are not comprehensive, consistent, or effective in a way in which they can substantially affect policy outcomes. In contrast, in some other cases, lobbyists are not adequately competent and they exert limited efforts to influence policy outcomes (Bruycker & Beyers, 2000). In both cases, such failure can be strategically prevented through the development of a well-studied, strategically analysed and consistently formulated lobbying strategy document.
Although Somaliland undertakes different lobbying activities through different approaches including hiring lobbyists, the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation still lacks a comprehensive lobbying strategy document that can systemically manage its lobbying interventions in order to primarily seek the external sovereignty and enhance its diplomatic engagement with the hegemonic powers of the world. One of the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials stated in a key informant interview:
“Yes, we use different lobbyists to do various lobbying activities in different platforms, institutions and with officials. Mostly, we deal with them on a contractual basis in order to implement specific issues related to our external relations. Regarding the lobbying strategy document, it is not available yet”, MoFA&IC officer
A national strategy for digital diplomacy, as a lobbying strategy component, becomes a well-known, low-cost and relatively effective approach to globally spread information on the country’s political, cultural and economic developments through online platforms. It promotes the national image and attracts international investors and tourists. Nonetheless, Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own website (https://mfa.govsomaliland.org/). This online platform is still under construction and lacks adequate political, economic, cultural and historical information that can influence foreign audiences. However, the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs should develop a comprehensive, multidimensional, consistent and impact-oriented lobbying strategy document tailored with the defined national interests and foreign policy objectives. First, this document would help the institution to avoid expensive lobbying interventions that might end up with failure or little impact. Second, it would promote the accomplishment of the institution’s foreign policy objectives in a strategically coordinated manner.
6. The Absence of a Foreign Policy Evaluation Framework
Public policies, including foreign policy, are designed, formulated, and implemented to accomplish certain objectives. To objectively evaluate policies and measure their effectiveness and efficiency, there should be a relevant evaluation mechanisms in place, including independent evaluative bodies and policy evaluation frameworks tailored with the key relevant measurable indicators which be able to measure the extent to which a given foreign policy being effective and efficient. The term “effective” denotes the logical framework of the policy which consists of input, activities, expected outputs and outcomes or goals. The term “efficient” is related to the economic cost-benefit analysis (Gasper, 2006). However, the foreign policy evaluation framework is not an independent mechanism which can be separately formulated and operationalized. It is, first and foremost, dependent on the prevailing foreign policy document, the implementation of which is subjected to evaluation. In fact, as long as the foreign policy document is non-existent, the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is consequently lacking the foreign policy evaluation framework, too. This raises this inquiry: how the interventions which have been undertaken by the MoFA&IC of Somaliland are empirically evaluated, and how their effectiveness, efficiency and impact are measured?
Conclusion
Somaliland has relatively succeeded to manage its internal sovereignty and adopted one of the most acknowledged democratic governance systems in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa, a fragile and hostile region, in particular. Similarly, Somaliland has been engaging with the international community in different programs for the last three decades. In contrast, after thirty years from Somaliland’s declaration of independence, Somaliland is still a de facto state and lacks its external recognition of its sovereignty. The reason behind the prolonged lack of recognition can be attributed to many factors with different magnitudes including the way in which Somaliland perceives Somalia when it comes to seeking de jure recognition, and the international subjectivity on Somaliland’s statehood status. However, the study assessed the institutional mechanisms of the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in order to assess the institutional capacity as outlined in the ministry’s foreign policy document, legislations, lobbying strategy document and foreign policy evaluation framework. Based on the indicators of the conceptual framework, the six institutional mechanisms assessed so far are not in place at all. This means the institution has been lacking its backbone for more than thirty years, and, in fact, its institutional capacity has been strongly jeopardized. Isn’t it questionable: how such paralyzed institution can seek and expectably succeed to the realization of Somaliland de jure recognition? The fact is: Somaliland’s thirty years of seeking recognition is now a wasted time and resources. So, the issue related to Somaliland’s contested international subjectivity and Somalia’s refusal to acknowledge Somaliland’s restored independence are not the only factors resulted Somaliland’s prolonged absence of de jure recognition. In accordance with the assessment, the weakened institutional capability is also contributing, too.
Recommendations
There is a direct relation between the institutional mechanisms and the institutional capacity to deliver its mandates while observing legitimacy, professionalism, effectiveness and efficiency. The study recommends that:
A comprehensive foreign policy which guides the decision-making of the Somaliland’s external relation should be developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation;
The law on foreign service, the law on consular service of diplomatic and consular missions and the law on governing the employment of the foreign service personnel should be developed and approved by the Somaliland Parliament;
A well-studied lobbying strategy document should be produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation so as to guide the lobbying interventions to make sure they are effective and efficient;
A precise and detailed foreign policy evaluation framework should be developed by the Ministry through the establishment of an independent body which can conduct such policy evaluation;
A critical institutional assessment should be undertaken by the Somaliland Good Governance and Anti-corruption commission so as to identify and counter such fundamental gaps on the institutional mechanisms;
Adequate financial resources should be allocated to the Ministry so as to deliver its duties in the above-mentioned institutional mechanisms.
About the author
Abdifatah Ahmed Ileeye is researcher and consultant specializing in governance and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa. He has written extensively on a wide range of topics related to governance, public policy, institutional development as well as in the humanitarian and development sector. His research interests emphasize on institutional development in Somaliland. He also studies the effectiveness and efficiency of Somaliland’s local municipalities and governance. Abdifatah received his M.A in Governance and Public Policy from the University of Passau, Germany. He also obtained his B.A in Global Studies and International Relations from New Generation University, Hargeisa, Somaliland. He is currently based in Kassel, Germany. Mr. Ileeye can be reached @ Abdifataax11@live.com
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[1] The term “Institutional mechanisms” refers the policy, legislations, strategy and policy evaluation frameworks of the institution.
The United States Africa Command spent several days in Berbera working with various branches of Somaliland’s armed forces, including the Somaliland Coast Guard. According to Somaliland government officials who spoke on condition of anonymity, Africa Command personnel from Djibouti and Stuttgart were in Berbera for a series of meetings with commanders of various branches of Somaliland’s armed forces to assess areas of cooperation.
Publicly available flight data shows a series of US Military transport planes making multiple trips from Djibouti to Berbera sometimes in the same day from the 4th to the 14th of December 2022.
Welcomed to Somaliland today General Stephen Townsend, Commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Ambassador Larry Andre. Deepening Somaliland-U.S. partnership and security cooperation were among the discussions. pic.twitter.com/WFfGRh5yfh
The latest visit of AFRICOM personnel to Somaliland and Berbera comes as the National Defense Authorization Act is in its final stages of approval. The NDAA contains a historic provision that instructs the United States Departments of Defense, State, and the US government’s aid agency USAID to establish a direct working relationship with Somaliland and report back to congress on progress.
The addition of Somaliland in the National Defense Authorization Act — one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the United States — signals a historic paradigm shift of the United States policy towards Somaliland. In addition, it brings a much-deserved repudiation of the State Department’s skewed view of the region that has clung to a one-Somalia policy for years and kept shuffling billions of tax-payer funds into the most corrupt government in the world as Somalia has spiraled further into chaos and has kept Somaliland essentially isolated.
Although the NDAA provision about Somaliland does not explicitly indicate the positioning of US armed forces or a military base in Somaliland, the United States department of defense, particularly the Africa Command, has shown increased interest in Berbera with high-profile visits that include the May 2022 former Commander General Stephen J. Townsend.
According to diplomatic sources, a delegation from the US Embassy in Somalia led by Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Tim Trenkle, which was scheduled to visit Somaliland during the same period was canceled. It is unclear if the cancellation of the embassy’s mission to Somaliland was related to the Department of Defense personnel in Berbera during the same period.
Prior to being posted to the US Embassy in Somalia two months ago, Mr. Trenkle as served as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA).
US AFRICOM press office did not respond to inquiries regarding the visit to Berbera and attempts to reach officials from the Foreign Affairs and Interior were unsuccessful.
In a ceremony attended by Somaliland government ministers and headlined by the Vice President of the Republic of Somaliland, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals has unveiled a 50 million US dollar World Bank-funded project called the Somaliland Electricity Sector Recovery Project. According to officials who spoke at the event, will substantially lower the price of electricity down and provide stand-alone solar off-grid access to select public educational institutions and healthcare facilities and has a duration of six years.
According to the World Bank documents, there is no such project as the Somaliland Electricity Sector Recovery Project, instead, there is the Somali Electricity Sector Recovery Project which has been ongoing since December of 2021. For this project, the Somali Federal Government is the borrower, and the financing agreement is signed by Somalia’s former Minister of Finance Dr. Abdirahman Duale Beileh.
The World Bank document breaks down the project into four major components
Component 1 –Subtransmission and distribution network reconstruction, reinforcement and operations efficiency in the major load centers of Mogadishu and Hargeisa
Component 2 –Hybridization and battery storage systems for minigrids
Component 3 – Stand-alone solar off-grid access to public institutions (health and education)
Component 4 -Institutional development and capacity building
There is no indication that the government of Somaliland has entered any sort of agreement with the World Bank as a direct recipient of funds, instead, the financing agreement signed by Somalia’s former Minister of Finance Dr. Beileh with the World Bank points to a separate agreement called Somaliland Subsidiary Agreement that Somaliland has signed with Somalia as an implementing partner. In addition, the financing agreement’s definitions sections describe Somaliland as a Federal Member State.
Another curious document is the Stakeholder Engagement Plan – SEP submitted to the World Bank by Somalia’s Ministry of Energy and Water Resources (MoEWR) which has an entire section on titled Public Consultation Meeting in Somaliland held by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals in Hargeisa on April 2021. It is unclear if this detailed information was summitted to Somalia’s Federal Government or the World Bank as part of the Somaliland Subsidiary Agreement.
It is unclear what compelled Somaliland to accept this project in its current form, where it is openly considered a Member State of Somalia and entering an agreement with Somalia as an implementing partner when in the past, it has signed directly engaged with the World Bank without Somalia as an intermediary. The Civil Service Strengthening project funded by the World Bank was signed by Dr. Sa’ad Ali Shire, who at the time was Somaliland’s Foreign Minister.
Despite being an independent nation and seeking international recognition, the government of Somaliland routinely sends conflicting signals to the world about the level of seriousness in its case for independence and undermines its sovereignty.
The World Bank did not respond to our request seeking the Somaliland Subsidiary Agreement, and our efforts to reach officials from the Ministry of Energy and Minerals for clarification on the project were unsuccessful.
The Human Rights Centre condemns the arbitrary detention of Ahmed Mohamed Abdi Daud. Ahmed was arrested and accosted at the Kaah Political Organization office on November 24, 2022. Ahmed is a dedicated political activist who actively posts satire commentary on Facebook and a member of Central Council of Kaah political party.
He was arrested for making a series of Facebook posts concerning the President’s alleged involvement in the Khat business. Ahmed was followed by a pickup car while entering the premises of Kaah Political Organization office when men wearing civilian clothes who are notorious intelligence officers and a presidential guard forcefully entered the premises, while jumping over the gate.
The men did not identify themselves nor did they show their identification to Ahmed Mohamed Abdi Daud. Ahmed Abdi asked them for a warrant for his arrest, to which they replied in an accusatory manner “why did you insult the president”. In the process of apprehending Ahmed Abdi, he sustained injuries to his left hand and bruises around his mouth while defending himself in the attack by the plain-dressed men. Video taken of the attack shows the plain clothed men yielding a pistol. Shortly after, three police cars with over a dozen police officers came and took Ahmed Abdi to Ibrahim Koodbur police station. Ahmed Abdi Daud posted bail on November 27,2022, where the police demanded from the courts to hold him further, despite failing to prove or present reasonable grounds to hold or charge him with an offense only to be re-arrested on November 28, 2022. He is in custody and remanded as of December 5, 2022.
We have seen an increasing trajectory of arrests by an informal intelligence unit in a coordinated efforts to silence critics of the President. The Human Rights Centre believes this is a complete abuse of power, as Ahmed Mohamed Abdi has not been charged with a crime or offense, creating a system that violates and abuses Ahmed’s constitutional and human rights such as the inability to have a fair trial. Allegations of impropriety by the President’s son has been catalogued in mass arrests, as recently as the June and August political protests that took place across the region in Somaliland, along with other crimes coordinated by the informal unit, including but not limited to arrests, pro-longed detention, beatings, and torture, according to family members and eyewitnesses.
The Human Rights Centre urges for his immediate release and demands an investigation on the condition of Ahmed Abdi Daud and others detained arbitrarily, and in order to assure fair judicial process exists is to guarantee respect for periods of detention as prescribed by Somaliland constitution Article 27 subsection 2 and set by international human rights standards.
Yasmin Omar H. Mohamoud Chairperson of the Human Rights Center
In a ceremony held today at Taiwan’s Representative Office in Somaliland, the Cheetah Conservation Fund in Somaliland and Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) signed an agreement to dispatch volunteers with the Cheetah Conservation Fund in Somaliland. The agreement between ICDF and Cheetah Conservation Fund in Somaliland comes on the 13th annual International Cheetah Day.
The Cheetah Conservation Fund in Somaliland in close partnership with the Ministry of of Environment and Climate Change runs a cheetah rehabilitation center in Somaliland, one of the biggest such centers of its kind in the world and the new agreement with Taiwan’s ICDF is expected to boost the conservation effort of these critically endangered species.
The signing ceremony was held at the Taiwan Representative office in Somaliland, and the Ambassador Allen LOU of the office along with Minister of Environment and Climate Change Shukri H. Ismail Mohamoud (Bandare) and other ministers witnessed the signing of the said Agreement.
According to a statement released by Taiwan’s Representative Office in Somaliland, the signing of this agreement aims to lay the institutional foundation for dispatching volunteers to promote cheetah conservation to raise awareness for the plight of the cheetah and rallies people from all nations to join in the efforts to conserve the species and to contribute to the protection of global biodiversity.
Formosan Black BearLeopard Cat
Taiwan, which has been sharing its expertise with Somaliland on many fronts such as agriculture, healthcare, and technology since the two nations established bilateral ties in July 2020, is home to the endangered Formosan black bear, and the leopard cat complies with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
According to the Cheetah Conservation Fund, around 40 cubs are rescued each year from smugglers by Somaliland law enforcement, where an estimate in 2019 by CCF put the number of cheetah cubs successfully smuggled from Somaliland at around 300. The exotic pet trade has fueled the smuggling of cheetah cubs from Somaliland to Gulf states, where affluent patrons pay exuberant amounts for the cheetah and other exotic wildlife.
DP World’s Chief Executive Officer & Managing Director of Middle East & Africa, Mr. Suhail Al-Banna, who is on a working visit to the Republic of Somaliland, has signed an agreement with the management of Sheikh University of Science and Technology to fund a state-of-the-art laboratory for the university at the price tag of a quarter of a million US dollars.
DP World is currently Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investment partner and manages the Berbera Port and Free Trade Zone through 30-year concession signed in 2017
The Sheikh University of Science and Technology is community owned public university is located in the picturesque mountain-top town of Sheikh in the Sahil region and is home to the legendary Sheikh High School that counts many of Somaliland’s intelligentsia as its alum. Its Board of Trustees include the Minister of Finance Dr. Sa’ad Ali Shire and the Director of Hargeisa Cultural Center Dr. Jama Musse Jama.
The University’s current course offering includes natural sciences such petroleum and mining engineering, hydrology, environmental sciences and information and communication technology.
The signing ceremony was attended by Mr. Al-Banna and his delegation as well as many government officials and community leaders including the Mayor of Berbera Abdishakur Mohamoud Hassan Iddin and teh Berbera Port Manager Mr. Saeed Hassan Abdillahi.
DP World collaborates with other educational institutions in Somaliland such Abaarso and Barwaqo University and has funded other small-scale projects in and around Berbera.
The newly liberated state of Somaliland has chosen to experiment conflation of modern representative democracy with its long-standing traditional tribal customs for 30-plus years. The new republic practiced a unique hybrid governing system.
This new system resulted in the most prolonged peace and stability. If conflicts flare up, this new governing system effectively deals with any issue before it gets out of hand. So, this period of tranquility continued for generations. Have you ever heard of the “Oasis of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa”?
This hybrid democracy weathered economic turmoil, social unrest, and terrorism. It withstood multi-dimensional social ills, including unemployment, global pandemic, literacy, Lack of skill training or quality education, and poor infrastructure. Most of these issues require massive social investment. Resources that are currently unavailable. But could have been obtainable with the right, visionary and exemplary leadership. After all, this country is rich in natural resources.
Nevertheless, this Hybrid democracy experiment has always been susceptible to one thing; tribal rivalry. Since perceived unequal access to the country’s meager resources created resentment, it is sometimes easy for politicians to exploit the inter-clan grievances.
The perception is that some clans take advantage of their geographic proximity to the seat of power, fleece the treasury, and dominate civil service jobs. Whether correct or not, the feeling is that certain clans depend on the government, become entitled, and feel more important or superior than other citizens.
Until this period, however, politicians rarely attempted to exploit this inequality. If they did, it would have horrified the collective sanity of the people. Yes, the clan is part of daily life. But, given the joint pain Somilanders endured in the hands of the last dictatorship government, anything undermining their commitment to each other was considered a blatant attempt to destroy the nation.
The bitter election campaign of 2017 changed that common belief. It was the catalyst that sparked today’s political reality. The slow succession buildup of this tribal inequality and resentment fueled by media provocation from unhappy politicians cracked the common thread Somalilanders share. It reached almost a point that weakened the fragile nation-state and threatened the sole of the country itself.
Who took the wrecking ball and cracked the unity of the people, you asked? Politicians, all of them, period!
In a democracy, opposition parties have the right to hold any governing party accountable. They can criticize any unsound decision that affects the public. And most importantly, be the safeguard against any mismanagement of the limited resources this emerging nation scrapes together to provide essential public services and security.
They also have a more significant responsibility; to defend the country from enemies, domestic and foreign. One of their primary responsibilities is to know where to draw the line or at least keep the fine line between criticizing the government and undermining their country’s sovereignty by avoiding the use of poisonous clan tropes. Both opposition parties of Wadani and UCID failed here to uphold their sacred responsibility.
For instance, contrary to Somaliland’s old customs and tolerant traditions, the opposition parties’ willingness to seed clan hatred to motivate their base supporters divided communities. Disrupting the daily lives of poor laborers was an intolerable and cruel act. Calling for violent demonstrations is another madness that shows their natural pugnacity.
Both opposition parties don’t share the fault on the same level. Wadani should have been more measured, reasonable, and self-controlled as it enjoyed the support of many communities around the country in the last presidential election.
That support didn’t come from only one clan base but was diverse. It would have propelled Wadani to win the upcoming elections if it had cultivated it right. They needed to behave as if they were ready to lead the nation. To be presidential!
The mild-mannered ex-chairman was the party’s standard-bearer with a gift to display a welcoming demeanor that is always smiling, soft-spoken, and experienced. The former chairman has tirelessly transformed the party from a new political organization to a national party with a popular following that came very close to winning the presidency.
The dream to reach that office was reasonably closer before he yielded his responsibility to a bunch of disruptors that seemed to be savoring constant chaos.
Things fell apart after the election. Wadani didn’t gracefully accept the outcome of that election, congratulate the winner, move on to reassess their shortcomings, and plan to attract more supporters. But the party has been stuck in this election denial loop for almost two years. They forced the new President to defend himself constantly and crippled any chances for him to govern the nation effectively.
This Wadani strategy to solely focus on the last election has continued to energize its base supporters. But in the long run, it has alienated the coalition of communities that initially supported the party. The same communities are necessary for any party to win nationwide elections.
Worst of all, Wadani incorporated former government officials led by Hersi Ali Haji Hassan into its leadership. Hersi and his team abandoned earlier their lucrative government positions. They tried in vain to destroy their own Kulmiye ruling party; just because Muse Biihi became their nominee. as they have indicated numerous times, this group will not allow him to govern effectively now that he is the President.
They found the platform they were looking for in which they could quickly attack him, undermine his rule, and frustrate his supporters.
Bringing this bloodthirsty team to the party was the first unforgiven mischief that cost Wadani its popularity and helped it lose credibility with its long-term supporters.
To make the matter worst, Wadani appointed a fire-breathing, Somalia apologist, inexperienced general secretary for their party. The new secretary, with no guardrails and self-censorship capacity, was defiant and hellbent on destroying the nation’s soul. He constantly propagated violence that dominated the airwaves.
His Trump-style take no prisoners attack exacerbated the reputation of an already declining party. Common sense electors ditch the party even further—Wadani’s national standing diminished rapidly in the public’s eyes.
The new scorch of the political earth strike championed by this Kulmiye renegade group has become a daily reality. With its fake news and foul language, this normalized disruption has gained some traction among the party’s most extreme factions.
These supporters repeat emotional, provocative, offensive, divisive, damaging, unpatriotic, and violent messages tenfold in social media. Anti-Somaliland elements then pick up from here to amplify with more made-up harmful content with the sole intent of showing the world exaggerated bad images of Somaliland.
This once promising party that honestly had the potential to be a better alternative to the ruling Kulmiye party diminished its stature. Wadani may never recover from their self-inflicted killer wounds. Could it or would it participate in the upcoming race to become one of the three national constitutional parties again? If it does, would it gain the ground it lost? Time will tell.
In contrast, Muse Biihi dismissed the daily barrage of media assaults initially. As time passed, he became irritated by what he had considered a sore-loser reaction to the election. It ultimately has managed to get under his skin. He saw this assault as an attempt to delegitimize him and his presidency.
Despite the constant advice from his advisors urging him to ignore the noises, he became defensive. He started to counterattack blindly without any political strategy.
Muse was known not to have the basic essential abilities to unify people. Or the capacity to reach out to his rivals to build national consensus. The main ingredients are necessary to govern comprehensively diverse and polarized communities.
So, his natural tendency to fight back with fire kicked in. Since he had never possessed any quality to calm things down, he shut all the back door communications. Using the state’s power and weight, he has done more damage than the opposition.
Historically, the back channels have always protected Somaliland from overzealous politicians. Self-appointed mediators, traditional elders, members of the business community, and various stakeholders would usually become the envoys at the 11th hour and go between political rivals. This tradition has continuously strengthened Somaliland’s democracy and made her distinct from others in the region. But angry Muse wouldn’t have it.
The Lack of communication has fostered a culture of mistrust. Muse Biihi further isolated and surrounded himself with loyal individuals. He lost interest in broadening his appeal and forgot that he was duly elected, the President for the whole people, not only for the people on his side.
He boxed himself in his villa and couldn’t see anything beyond Hargeisa. He earned the nickname “Muse local.” This name carried dual characteristics of Muse’s arrogant personality and Lack of vision to achieve any meaningful national reconciliation.
Consequently, the nation suffered. The gap between political camps widened and, as a result, allowed Somaliland’s enemies to exploit these differences.
Luckily, Muse Biihi came to his senses to finally heed the warning that the current political discourse would disintegrate the country. The signs were on the wall that he would be known to be the man whose leadership dismantled the nation until his government took drastic measures to change course.
So, to change the trajectory, Muse announced opening new political organizations. To pave the way for citizens to have the opportunity to choose their leaders, perhaps new blood in the country’s future political leadership.
Allowing other aspiring politicians to enter the political field has also somewhat broken the gridlock and the never-ending impasse.
This action was supposed to break the fever, except the opposition parties still refused to come to terms. As expected, this has made them even mad. Why wouldn’t it? Their job is no longer safe. However, the public seems overwhelmingly supportive of the President’s decision.
Here we are today! Ten new, fresh, vibrant organizations are roaring in the race to become official national parties. The existing trio should have seen their waning influence as we approach December 26, 2022, the deadline to dissolve their current national party status. Their relevance will even be less after that date.
We are all aware that democracy is a messy business everywhere. It is uncomfortable because of it is nature of belonging to the masses. In the Somaliland version, it is loud, very unknown, scary, developing, and unstable. It is also delicate because it is in the middle of a region ruled by tyrants, demagogues, dictators, and the worst ones selected by corruption in tents.
So, let us sigh a collective relief now that the country has emerged from another deliberately made political crisis.
There is no doubt greedy politicians will push the limit. Perhaps even take us to the brink. Bravely, Somaliland citizens will continue to stand up for any political tyranny.
So, what is the lesson learned? Make sure the citizens eliminate career politicians. Don’t allow a single one or group of politicians to gamble the lives of innocent, struggling laborers and the dreams of millions.
It is time to rebuild the country and protect the hard-earned freedom, peace, and stability. It is high time to reenergize our goal to have the Somaliland flag among other nations of this planet.
About the Author
Magan ibrahim is a Somaliland political analyst. He is available on Twitter (@magannews).
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
According to government records seen by Somaliland Chronicle, the Ministry of Health Development has spent 422,000 US dollars on COVID-19 supplies, reagents, and information technology infrastructure, including a new mobile application and equipment such as passport readers.
The Ministry of Health Development spent 193,589.65 US dollars on 20,000 security letterheads, a mobile application for COVID-19 vaccination, passport readers, and assorted information technology-related items for the Ministry of Health Development.
Date
Purpose
Company
Amount (US$)
Oct-22
Letter Heads with Security Features
GTS (Global Tech Solutions) LTD
$90,260.00
Oct-22
Mobile application for authentication of COVID-19 certificate
GTS (Global Tech Solutions) LTD
$50,527.55
Oct-22
Passport Reader
GTS (Global Tech Solutions) LTD
$26,401.05
Oct-22
Passport Reader
GTS (Global Tech Solutions) LTD
$26,401.05
Total
$193,589.65
While Somaliland continues to invest heavily and even build out a new infrastructure to manage the requirement of COVID-19 negative PCR tests for travelers, many countries in the region and around the world have eliminated such requirements. Currently, travelers cannot board flights out of Egal International Airport without a negative COVID-19 PCR test certificate issued by the Ministry of Health Development in Hargeisa Group Hospital at the cost of 45 US dollars per person.
It is unclear why the Ministry of Health Development would need passport readers and spend over 90,000 US dollars on documents with security features for the negative test of COVID-19 and if passport readers will be deployed at Egal International, and if these additional checks resulted from a security breach of their existing procedures.
In addition to the 193,590.65 US dollars the Ministry of Health Development spent on the IT infrastructure in October 2022, it has spent an additional 228,520.27 US dollars on COVID-19 reagents from Modern Medical Laboratory since August 2022.
Date
Purpose
Company
Amount (US$)
Aug-22
COVID-19 reagents
Modern Medical Laboratory
$52,802.10
Sep-22
COVID-19 reagents
Modern Medical Laboratory
$52,802.10
Oct-22
COVID-19 reagents
Modern Medical Laboratory
$17,311.87
Oct-22
COVID-19 reagents
Modern Medical Laboratory
$52,802.10
Nov-22
COVID-19 reagents
Modern Medical Laboratory
$52,802.10
Total
$228,520.27
We have previously reported that Modern Medical Laboratory which has sold $766,369.69 worth of COVID-19 reagents between March 2021 and June 2022 and it is run by Mr. Mr. Abdirahman Hassan Derie, a Presidential appointee to represent Somaliland on the DP World Berbera venture since former President Ahmed Mohamoud Siilanyo’s government.
BIOSOM, another company that has been selling the Ministry of Health COVID-19 reagents, has had no business dealings with the Ministry since our reporting on the subject.
BIOSOM is owned and operated by government employees who work at the COVID-19 testing facility at the Hargeisa Group Hospital. These employees include the Deputy Head of the testing facility, Mr. Hassan Mohamed Abdi, and Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Hergeye, the brother of the Ministry of Health Development’s Director General Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hergeye.
The Ministry of Health’s generous expenditure on COVID-19 stands in stark contrast to its non-existent efforts to combat the Dengue fever that has been ravaging Somaliland in the past few months. So far, the ministry’s financial records do not show any expenditure on Dengue fever.
Our efforts to reach the Minister of Health, Mr. Hasan Mohamed Ali Gafadhi, the Deputy Minister Mr. Liban Yusuf Osman, and the Director General Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Hergeye to ask how much was being spent on Dengue fever compared to COVID-19 were unsuccessful.
