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Yesterday, in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing for Devin Kennington, President Trump’s nominee to be U.S. ambassador to Somalia, Senator Ted Cruz of Texas put Somaliland’s distinct status on the formal record. Cruz established, under questioning, that Somaliland has governed itself since 1991, has held multiple democratic elections with peaceful transfers of power (including after the November 2024 presidential election), maintains close ties with Taiwan, faces public opposition to its independence from the government of China, was formally recognized by Israel in December 2025, and has offered the United States favorable diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships. He then quoted President Trump’s own characterization of Somaliland as “a totally different country” and stated: “I think President Trump is exactly right. Somaliland is not Somalia. The President has made his position clear and I believe it is time for the United States to formally recognize Somaliland.”
Cruz went further. He asked, in effect, why the State Department (Foggy Bottom) has not aligned its official position with the President’s clear guidance, as it is supposed to do. “Despite the President’s clear position,” Cruz said, “somehow at Foggy Bottom the State Department has not moved forward with recognition. What specifically is preventing the State Department from doing so?” He pressed the nominee on remaining obstacles and stated that the State Department should follow the President’s guidance, adding that his confirmation itself depends on it doing so. The exchange keeps Somaliland distinct from Somalia in the Senate record and continues Cruz’s consistent advocacy.
The hearing is significant precisely because it occurred after the midterms. Democrats are projected to control both the House and the Senate when the new Congress convenes in January. The Republic of Somaliland Independence Act (H.R. 3992), sponsored by Congressman Scott Perry of Pennsylvania, has lost its principal champion and any realistic path to a floor vote. Other Republican cosponsors have been defeated or returned in weaker positions. Surviving supporters can still write letters and speak inside the Republican caucus. They cannot compel a legislative outcome. Congressional outreach may continue at a modest level. It can no longer be the center of the recognition effort.
Recognition of foreign states is an exclusive presidential power. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015), the Supreme Court held that Congress may encourage, study, or fund engagement, but it cannot substitute its own recognition decision for the President’s. The United States is not the United Kingdom, where recognition falls under the Royal Prerogative and is exercised on the advice of ministers after cabinet and parliamentary consideration. In the American system, only the President decides. No committee hearing, no cosponsor list, and no All-Party Parliamentary Group equivalent can replace that authority. Cruz’s pointed questions about Foggy Bottom’s lag simply underscore that reality: the State Department is expected to follow the President’s direction, not set its own recognition policy. The current official posture still reflects the approach set under Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the Obama administration, a policy that has remained essentially unchanged more than thirteen years after Clinton left the State Department and nearly a decade after the Obama presidency ended.
President Trump has already described Somaliland as “a totally different country.” The remarks were not a recognition announcement and included a suggestion that Somaliland change its name, yet they demonstrate presidential attention to Somaliland as distinct from the Somalian administration he has long criticized. Both Trump and Vice President JD Vance have publicly linked the war with Iran to Republican midterm losses. Vance specifically cited the United States relationship with Israel among the factors that cost support. Israel remains the only UN member state to have recognized Somaliland. On 26 December 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar signed the mutual recognition declaration with Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. The relationship has since moved beyond symbolism: Sa’ar visited Hargeisa in January 2026, Somaliland opened an embassy in Jerusalem during the President’s June visit, and in early November 2026 Israel’s first ambassador, Michael Lotem, presented credentials in Hargeisa while the cornerstone was laid for an Israeli embassy.
Israel’s own political future is unsettled. The 27 October 2026 election produced no clear majority. Netanyahu’s right-wing, far-right, and ultra-Orthodox bloc secured roughly 53 seats in the 120-seat Knesset; the opposition bloc led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot took about 48; Arab parties won a record approximately 19. Neither Jewish bloc reaches the 61 seats required to form a government. Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister while President Isaac Herzog conducts consultations. His personal fate (whether he forms a new coalition, enters a unity arrangement, or faces another election in 2027) is unresolved. The recognition decision itself, however, has already been executed and is being institutionalized through the exchange of ambassadors and concrete cooperation. That fact stands independently of the current coalition arithmetic in Jerusalem.
Cruz’s hearing intervention shows that the argument continues to be made in Washington even after the midterms, and that he is directly challenging the gap between the President’s stated position and Foggy Bottom’s continued reluctance. His role is now almost entirely informal: an advocate and a bridge to the administration rather than a source of institutional leverage inside a Democratic Senate. That is still useful. It is not a substitute for a presidential decision.
The instruction for the government in Hargeisa is therefore unambiguous. Hope is not lost, but neither is the outcome automatic. The decisive path runs through direct, sustained, high-level engagement with the Trump White House. This cannot be a continuation of previous lobbying under a different address. It must be narrower, more concrete, and organized around a decision the President can make. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro should not delegate the next step. He should follow up personally with Eric Trump after their meeting in Davos, treating it as a working channel rather than a ceremonial exchange. Premature publicity around that brief encounter, without first advancing substance, backfired and forced a clarifying public statement from Eric Trump’s team. The same discipline must apply now.
Democratic legitimacy and historical justice establish Somaliland’s case. A concrete American-interest proposition must make it actionable for this White House. The government should seek a direct discussion around a limited package of security and commercial cooperation, with recognition as the explicit objective. The proposal should identify what Somaliland is prepared to offer, what it seeks in return, and what each side would need to do next. Those terms should be developed privately before any public announcement. Prospective support is not a secured commitment. Publicity that exposes an unfinished negotiation can create opposition before it produces leverage. Announce results. Do not advertise every conversation intended to achieve them.
Practical measures (financial access, differentiated travel guidance, continued quiet work with Cruz and other remaining allies) remain worth pursuing on their own merits. They support the recognition campaign. They do not replace it. The midterms clarified where the authority lies. Cruz’s hearing yesterday confirmed that the case is still being advanced in Washington, and that the State Department’s lag behind the President’s position is now a matter of public Senate record. Israel’s recognition and the ongoing institutionalization of that relationship demonstrate that progress is possible. Netanyahu’s uncertain political future is a variable, not a reason to pause. The only institution that can decide for the United States is the White House. The government in Hargeisa cannot fall asleep at the wheel. It must organize accordingly: build a concrete proposition and place it before the person who can act on it. The task now is to turn presidential attention into a decision.
About the Author
Mr. Aar Kaiser is an Associate Editor at Somaliland Chronicle.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
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