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Hargeisa, Somaliland – President of the Republic of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” announced Wednesday that “many countries will soon recognize the Republic of Somaliland,” signaling confidence that Israel’s historic December 26 recognition marks the beginning of a cascade that could fundamentally reshape the Horn of Africa.
The announcement came during an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting, where President Cirro urged citizens to uphold national unity as the republic enters what may be the most consequential period in its 34-year quest for international legitimacy. U.S. Deputy Ambassador Dorothy Camille Shea acknowledged the move at the UN Security Council, stressing Israel’s right to establish diplomatic relations as any sovereign state. This defense signals potential American openness and delivered a significant blow to opponents’ arguments.
Ethiopia’s Strategic Calculation
While Israel’s decision has drawn condemnations from predictable quarters, the most significant response may be what has not been said. Ethiopia, Somaliland’s neighbor and longstanding strategic partner, has exercised studied silence that diplomatic sources interpret as strategic ambiguity preceding potential recognition.
According to multiple diplomatic sources, Ethiopia is now internally consulting and contemplating becoming the second country after Israel to recognize Somaliland. Israel’s recognition fundamentally alters the calculus. Rather than merely reinstating the original January 2024 memorandum, Addis Ababa now has the opportunity to negotiate what diplomatic sources describe as an MoU 2.0. This would represent a far more advantageous arrangement with a recognized state, granting Ethiopia the Red Sea access it has sought since losing its coastline with Eritrean independence in 1993, but under terms that reflect Somaliland’s enhanced international standing and bargaining position.
Ethiopia’s calculation is being driven by escalating security concerns. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation highlights Addis Ababa’s growing alarm over security cooperation between Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea. Ethiopia views this triangle as designed to undermine its efforts to secure maritime access and encircle the country strategically. These anxieties are compounded by the long-standing Nile River dispute with Egypt and recent rapprochement between Mogadishu and Cairo, where Somalia reportedly requested Egyptian military assistance in “safeguarding its maritime waters.” The request represents transparent code for blocking Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somaliland.
One Ethiopian state minister broke the government’s official silence. Tarekegn Bululta Godana described Israel’s recognition as “a notable diplomatic move that could shape the future trajectory of the Horn of Africa.” The comment, though unofficial, signals internal debates within Ethiopia’s government about seizing the diplomatic opening Israel has created.
Ethiopian recognition would carry seismic implications. As a major regional power and African Union member state, such a move would shatter the pretense that Somaliland’s status is settled. It would validate the 2005 AU fact-finding mission’s conclusions that Somaliland’s case is “historically unique and self-justified.” Most importantly, it would trigger economic and security cooperation serving both countries’ core interests while fundamentally undermining Djibouti’s economic stranglehold on Ethiopian trade.
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has amplified this contradiction by sharing the AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission report, which concluded that “the fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history.” The Israeli government’s decision to publicize the AU’s institutional findings underscores the hypocrisy of current AU opposition to recognition when the organization’s own experts validated Somaliland’s case two decades ago.
The UAE, as both Ethiopia and Somaliland’s largest investor, has maintained strategic silence. When Arab League members convened an emergency session chaired by UAE Ambassador Hamad Obaid Al Zaabi to condemn Israel’s recognition, the UAE government issued no independent statement. This ambiguity allows Abu Dhabi to preserve its $442 million Berbera Port investment through DP World while assessing how the recognition cascade unfolds. As an Abraham Accords signatory, the UAE may find Israel’s recognition provides diplomatic cover for its own eventual acknowledgment of Somaliland.
The Recognition Cascade
Beyond Ethiopia and the UAE, speculation has reached fever pitch. South Sudan, which achieved independence in 2011, is mentioned frequently as a likely early adopter. Kenya faces growing domestic pressure to formalize ties given Berbera’s potential to compete with Mombasa. Taiwan could convert its representative office into a full embassy.
The United States represents the most consequential potential domino. Republican control of Congress and bipartisan support for countering Chinese influence create favorable conditions. Recent satellite imagery shows major upgrades to Berbera Airport, suggesting Washington may be establishing facts on the ground ahead of policy shifts. General Michael Langley’s reported AFRICOM visit to Somaliland in December 2024, along with multiple U.S. military delegations evaluating Berbera’s capabilities, indicate Pentagon planning increasingly assumes Somaliland recognition as inevitable. With Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti facing operational constraints from Chinese military proximity, Berbera offers strategic alternatives.
Djibouti’s Predictable Response
Djibouti has responded with characteristic hostility. On December 29, Djibouti unilaterally closed its land border with Somaliland and began refusing Somaliland passports. In response, Somaliland recalled its representative, Abdillahi Mohamed Dahir (Cukuse), for consultations. Djibouti’s representative, Ambassador Hussein Omar Kawaliyeh, has also departed Hargeisa.
The pattern is familiar. When Somaliland and Ethiopia signed their January 2024 MoU, Djibouti shuttered Somaliland’s diplomatic mission under the pretext of unpaid utility bills, armed border communities, and supported separatist movements within Somaliland. The World Bank’s 2023 Container Port Performance Index ranked Berbera 103rd globally while Djibouti plummeted to 379th out of 405 ports, exposing the economic desperation driving Djiboutian aggression.
Questions about reciprocity are emerging. Sources indicate discussions about implementing reciprocal measures, including whether Turkey’s substantial presence in Somaliland should face consequences given Ankara’s strident opposition to recognition and military support for Somalia.
The Armageddon Myth
The chorus of condemnations invariably invokes apocalyptic language: threats to “regional stability,” risks of “continental fragmentation.” The argument is propaganda, not analysis.
Somaliland’s recognition threatens no continent-wide catastrophe. It threatens specific economic interests: Djibouti’s port monopoly, Somalia’s territorial pretensions, Egypt’s leverage against Ethiopia, Turkey’s military positioning. The manufactured hysteria serves one purpose: maintaining a status quo that benefits those making the arguments while condemning Somaliland’s population to indefinite statelessness.
Somaliland has governed itself successfully for 34 years, held multiple democratic elections certified as free and fair, and demonstrated state capacity exceeding many recognized African nations. The 2005 AU fact-finding mission confirmed Somaliland’s case is historically unique because it is not creating new borders but restoring the boundaries of a state that achieved independence on June 26, 1960, five days before joining Somalia in a voluntary union that was never legally ratified.
The truth is simpler. Somaliland’s 6 million people are being held hostage, not to principle, but to economics. Djibouti needs them unrecognized to preserve port monopoly. Somalia needs them unrecognized to maintain territorial claims over resources and coastline it cannot control. Egypt needs them unrecognized to maintain leverage against Ethiopia. Turkey needs them unrecognized to justify its military expansion in Somalia.
The African Union’s position cannot be considered objective when articulated by a Djiboutian chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, whose country has billions of dollars at stake in maintaining the status quo. Under Djiboutian chairmanship, the AU has rejected any reconsideration of Somaliland’s status despite its own 2005 findings, protecting Djibouti’s economic interests while abandoning institutional integrity.
What Lies Ahead
President Cirro’s announcement that “many countries will soon recognize the Republic of Somaliland” reflects informed confidence. The strategic pieces are aligning in ways that make a recognition cascade increasingly probable.
Ethiopia faces the clearest calculation. Israel’s recognition provides Ethiopia the diplomatic cover to negotiate an MoU 2.0. If Addis Ababa becomes the second country to recognize Somaliland (and the first African nation to do so), it would fundamentally alter the diplomatic landscape. Other African states would face pressure to reconsider positions based on reflexive support for “territorial integrity” rather than actual strategic interests.
For the United States, the question is not if but when. Pentagon planners have already concluded that Berbera offers strategic advantages that Camp Lemonnier cannot match. Congressional support exists. The renovations at Berbera facilities suggest preparations are underway.
The Djibouti border closure, while significant, represents a sideshow to the larger drama. President Guelleh’s regime can close borders, pressure clans, and condemn Israel’s recognition at the UN. None of it addresses the fundamental reality: Djibouti’s economic model is unsustainable, its port performance is catastrophic, and its leverage over Ethiopia is eroding.
Somaliland’s path forward demands precisely what President Cirro emphasized: vigilance, unity, and resilience. The recognition cascade will unfold over weeks and months, not days. Each country will calculate its own interests and timeline. But the momentum is building in ways that opponents cannot reverse through condemnations or border closures.
The question facing the Horn of Africa is no longer whether Somaliland’s 34-year quest for recognition will succeed. Israel has answered that question. The question now is how many nations recognize the strategic logic, how quickly they move, and how the regional order adapts.
Will Ethiopia be next? The world is watching. Addis Ababa’s decision may come within weeks. When it does, the recognition cascade will become unstoppable. For Somaliland, the new chapter in its diplomatic journey has begun. For Djibouti, the reckoning for decades of sabotage is at hand. For the Horn of Africa, the future is being written in Hargeisa, not Mogadishu or Djibouti City.
