 |
The recent collapse of Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia has inadvertently proven the strategic indispensability of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. Ankara’s attempt to resolve the crisis that erupted after the MoU was signed—by exploring alternatives for Ethiopia through Mogadishu—was a critical test of diplomatic and geographic realities and most importantly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s resolve. It was a test that the Somalia option failed spectacularly. This failure has shattered the illusion that a third way exists, paving a direct path back to the only viable solution. Now, amid intensifying speculation of an imminent visit by Somaliland’s President Abdirahman “Cirro” to Addis Ababa, the revival of the January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding has shifted from a possibility to a geopolitical necessity.
The Geographic and Security Imperative
Ethiopia’s strategic vulnerability stems from its landlocked status and overwhelming dependency on a single trade corridor. With 95 percent of its trade flowing through Djibouti, the nation hemorrhages over $1.5 billion annually in port fees while remaining strategically vulnerable. Recent disruptions in Red Sea shipping lanes have further exposed the fragility of this dependency, making alternative access routes existentially necessary. The geographic reality is immutable: Ethiopia’s industrial heartland lies adjacent to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast. The port of Berbera, whose capacity has been significantly expanded under a management deal with the UAE’s DP World, creates the only viable logistical alternative. Somalia’s Indian Ocean ports, by contrast, are a logistical fiction that solves neither the dependency problem nor the strategic vulnerability.
Beyond these logistical absurdities, any Ethiopian route through Somalia presents an insurmountable security risk. Somalia remains a deeply unstable state where vast territories are controlled not by the federal government, but by Al-Shabaab and a multitude of other terror networks. An Ethiopian naval base on its coast or a commercial trade corridor transiting its lands would immediately become a high-value, symbolic target. The constant threat of attacks on Ethiopian goods, infrastructure, and personnel would require a massive and perpetual security commitment, effectively dragging Ethiopia into Somalia’s internal quagmire. No responsible government would stake its national economic lifeline on a route that passes through one of the world’s most complex security emergencies. This stark reality contrasts sharply with Somaliland’s three decades of proven stability and effective internal security, making the choice for Addis Ababa not just one of convenience, but of fundamental risk management.
The Coalition of Containment
This stark geographic and security logic is precisely why the opposition to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is so fierce. The sophisticated containment strategy reveals the high stakes involved, with Somalia serving as the linchpin. Its approach has evolved from diplomatic protest to active warfare, including fueling the Las Anod Crisis in a bid to dismember Somaliland from within. This has been accompanied by a terrifying rhetorical escalation from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who has reportedly taken to mosque pulpits to declare a ‘Jihad’ and threatened to align with Al-Shabaab.
This proxy warfare has attracted broader regional support. Egypt’s backing of Somalia serves as leverage in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Similarly, the February 2024 Turkey-Somalia defense pact establishes a Turkish naval presence as a direct counter to Ethiopian maritime ambitions. More troubling is the emerging China factor, with Beijing making strategic calculations about countering American influence by engaging with anti-recognition forces. The tragic irony is that for Somalia’s government, preventing Somaliland’s recognition has become a higher priority than defeating the terrorists who control its own country.
The Legal Architecture and the Strategic Opportunity
The proposed naval base requires a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)—a binding international treaty that can only be negotiated between sovereign entities. This legal requirement creates a de facto recognition pathway that bypasses traditional diplomatic channels, an approach with precedents ranging from the US lease agreement for Guantanamo Bay to the progressive recognition of Kosovo.
The current alignment of forces creates a historic, but fleeting, window for this pact. The failure of the Turkish-led mediation has provided both nations with the political justification for renewed bilateral engagement. A new US administration guided by transactional realpolitik creates a permissive international environment. However, Ethiopia’s first-mover advantage carries an expiration date. Long-standing US strategic interest in the Berbera airport and port could translate into a direct US military presence, providing Hargeisa an alternative path to security and recognition that would diminish Ethiopia’s unique leverage.
The Inevitable Crystallization of a New Reality
The failure of the Turkish-led mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia was not a crisis for the MoU; it was its ultimate vindication. It removed the final illusion that a viable alternative could be found through Mogadishu. For Ethiopia, the experiment proved that the solution to its vulnerability lies not in placating its adversaries but in an alliance with a reliable partner. For Somaliland, its strategic indispensability has been demonstrated for all to see. The question facing both leaderships is no longer whether to act, but how decisively they can capitalize on this historic alignment of interests. The revival of their MoU represents the crystallization of a new strategic reality in the Horn of Africa—one where geographic logic and mutual security triumph over diplomatic fiction.
