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In a carefully orchestrated diplomatic gesture that speaks volumes about shifting alliances in the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates rolled out the red carpet for Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Cirro today, dispatching a private Royal Jet to ferry the newly elected leader to Abu Dhabi for his first overseas visit since taking office. Beyond boilerplate statements about mutual interests from the Presidential spokesman, however, the specific agenda for this high-profile visit remains notably opaque, despite President Cirro’s campaign promises of transparency in foreign dealings.
As Somaliland’s largest direct foreign investor, the UAE’s commitment is most visibly demonstrated through Dubai-based DP World’s $442 million investment in Berbera Port, transforming it into an emerging regional trade hub. In his election campaign, Abdirahman Cirro was an outspoken critic of the DP World agreement, questioning its transparency and terms. His presence in Abu Dhabi now puts him in the delicate position of either maintaining that critical stance or potentially moderating his position to secure UAE support at a crucial moment in regional politics.
The timing of President Abdirahman Cirro’s visit suggests a potential watershed moment in UAE’s Horn of Africa strategy. Following a deadly Al-Shabab attack in February 2024 that killed three Emirati troops and a Bahraini officer, the UAE has largely withdrawn from its engagement with Mogadishu. This tragic incident, coming after years of strained relations marked by Somalia’s 2018 seizure of Emirati funds and pro-Qatar stance, appears to have pushed Abu Dhabi toward a definitive choice. The question now looms: Is the UAE finally abandoning its dual-track approach to embrace Somaliland exclusively, seeing in Berbera’s stability an alternative to Mogadishu’s volatility?
The timing of this diplomatic overture gains added significance amid the recent rapprochement between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somaliland’s diplomatic capital has been tested by Ethiopia’s pivot back toward Somalia, effectively shelving the port access memorandum of understanding and strengthening Somalia’s post-ATMIS security architecture. This shifting landscape might paradoxically strengthen Cirro’s negotiating position with the UAE, as Abu Dhabi’s strategic interests in Berbera intersect with rapidly evolving regional dynamics.
Adding another layer of intrigue to the visit is the presence of Dr. Abdirahman Duale Beileh, Cirro’s newly appointed Economic Advisor. Beileh, Somalia’s former Finance Minister, received a presidential pardon from former President Muse Bihi before joining Cirro’s administration. Current government officials, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of internal arrangements, describe Beileh as operating as a de facto Finance Minister, though his formal appointment to the cabinet was likely avoided due to his recent Somalia government role and potential political sensitivities. The simultaneous presence of both the Finance Minister and Dr. Beileh in the delegation suggests substantive discussions about expanding UAE’s investment portfolio in Somaliland may be on the undisclosed agenda.
Hanging over these discussions is the unresolved status of Berbera Airport. The UAE secured parliamentary approval in 2017 to establish a military base at the facility, but under former President Bihi’s administration, contradictory statements emerged about its intended use – initially announced as a UAE military base, then later described as converted to civilian use after a supposed lease cancellation. Despite significant upgrades, the facility remains largely inactive, its future uncertain. The airport’s strategic significance is underscored by multiple inspection visits from AFRICOM, suggesting broader international interest in its potential military applications.
While the official agenda remains undisclosed, Cirro’s delegation composition hints at the visit’s scope and ambition. The presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Presidency, Minister of Finance and Economic Development, and notably, the Intelligence Chief suggests discussions will extend far beyond ceremonial pleasantries.
The three-day visit also includes scheduled meetings with the substantial Somaliland diaspora community in the UAE, whose remittances form a crucial pillar of Somaliland’s economy. Last year alone, remittances to Somaliland from overseas exceeded $1.3 billion, with a significant portion originating from the Gulf states.
The visit raises questions about the broader geopolitical competition in the Horn of Africa. With China maintaining a military base in neighboring Djibouti, and various Gulf states jockeying for influence across the region, Somaliland’s strategic location and deep-water port have turned it into an increasingly important piece on the regional chessboard. The potential shift in U.S. foreign policy under a returning Trump administration, particularly with a more pragmatic State Department leadership, could present Somaliland with additional strategic options for military cooperation beyond current arrangements.
However, Somaliland’s leverage in these negotiations may depend on its ability to engage directly with potential partners, particularly the United States, rather than relying on intermediaries like the UAE. As regional dynamics shift and multiple powers express interest in Somaliland’s strategic assets, Hargeisa would be well-served to comprehensively evaluate its options before making binding commitments or overextending its strategic partnerships.
As President Abdirahman Cirro settles into his meetings in Abu Dhabi, the key questions remain unanswered, masked by diplomatic protocol and official silence. Will this visit mark the beginning of a deeper strategic partnership? Is the UAE preparing to go all-in on Somaliland? The answers may well shape the future of not just Somaliland, but the entire region.
