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Every month on “Patch Tuesday,” Microsoft issues updates to fix critical vulnerabilities. The number of patches correlate to growing cyber threats to critical systems. In 2024, the patches addressed 1,011 vulnerabilities for the entire year. This increased to 1,128 in 2025. This year, however, the total is already over 5,000. In October 2026 alone, Microsoft had to issue 1,407 patches.
The reason why so Microsoft must now plug so many vulnerabilities is the rise of AI. External intelligence agencies and criminals can use AI to identify and exploit vulnerabilities. Nor are Microsoft systems alone in their growing vulnerability. Simply put, AI shifts the power balance to malign actors and away from those charged with securing critical systems.
Somalilanders should be worried. While the country is ahead of its time—and perhaps even leads the continent—on mobile money, it lags on financial regulation. While 97 percent of Somalilanders have access to a financial institution and 78 percent of Somalilanders use mobile money on a regular if not daily basis, the security of that money relies on Somaliland’s largest companies—TeleSom and Dahabshil. Telesom launched Zaad in 2009; 96.5 percent of Somaliland mobile money users have a Zaad account while 18 percent have e-Dahab.
While Mohamed Said Duale founded Dahabshiil in 1970 as a general trading company, its remittance network dates only to 1988. Telesom dates to 2002. Their growth largely predates the development of relevant Somaliland law and regulation. Herein lies the problem: It is unfair to any company to retroactively apply regulation that did not exist when they built their company. Frankly, Somaliland’s development from the trauma of genocide owes as much if not more to the entrepreneurship both companies represent than to the government itself.
This is one reason why both Telesom and Dahabshiil have lobbied behind-the-scenes to prevent any regulation that threatens their duopoly. This is understandable: No company wants additional hurdles or constraints, especially when commercial professionalism outpaces at times the understanding and capacity of government officials still too often appointed based on patronage rather than ability.
While Telesom is likely worth more than a billion dollars and Dahabshiil’s value is at last $500 million, the true figure is a mystery as both companies are privately held. This opacity is increasingly dangerous given the role both companies play in Somaliland’s economy and commerce.
The People’s Republic of China has made no secret of its animosity toward Somaliland. It has tried subterfuge and bribery, and it has even worked with the Federal Government to sponsor insurgency around Laascaanood. To their credit, both Muuse Biixi Cabdi and Irro understood that Somaliland had no alternative with Beijing. Not only is Taiwan as a democracy a better cultural fit to Somaliland, but Somalilanders also know that if they ever switched allegiance to China, they would cease any importance for Chinese diplomats. In any dispute—with Djibouti, Somalia, or Ethiopia—Beijing would side against Somaliland.
Herein lies the danger: Hargeisa neither should nor can pivot to Beijing and so China will likely seek to undermine if not cause chaos in Somaliland. It is only a matter of time; Beijing will use any tool at its disposal, all the more so if they can strike at Somaliland’s stability while maintaining their own plausible deniability. With the growth of AI, the Zaad and e-Dahab systems are natural targets. If Chinese intelligence manages to penetrate either Telesom or Dahabshiil’s systems, perhaps taking them offline or even wiping them clean, the chaos would be immense. Indeed, if any record of the wealth of 80 percent of Somalilanders disappeared, it is not clear that Somaliland could survive.
It is for this reason, that it is essential that the Somaliland government regulate the big two financial firms now, no matter how furiously they lobby to avoid it. It is in the existential interest of Somaliland authorities to ensure both the financial health of both firms and understand how they keep their records to ensure redundancy and to enable the restoration of records should an AI-enabled worm take their systems or destroy records.
Secrecy matters, and both companies may be wary of ordinary political appointees who may lack the professionalism, expertise, and discretion they expect. But this is where the intelligence service can assist. While here, too, there have been leaks in the past, Irro should decree that all intelligence specialists must subject themselves to a regular polygraph to ensure their trustworthy custodianship of a very narrow financial security portfolio. Somaliland has enough patronage appointments; the intelligence service should be based on merit and professionalism alone.
At the same time, Parliament must pass in conjunction with the Central Bank a regulatory regime to define the standards by which any bank or mobile money operator functions on Somaliland soil and the collateral in gold or foreign currency each must maintain to defend against runs; after all, if there is a collapse of either or both companies, it will be the government left holding the bag.
Somalilanders demand recognition. But Irro must now make hard political choices that will upset key supporters in the business community to ensure that instability and Chinese dirty tricks do not derail Somaliland’s success.
About the Author
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum in Washington, DC, and a distinguished fellow at the Usanas Foundation in Udaipur, India.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
