Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Cirro” arrived in Djibouti today, opening a chapter that many in the Republic of Somaliland hope signals a thaw in relations—though few expect one. His visit comes in the shadow of a sustained campaign of political sabotage and economic subversion orchestrated by Djibouti, following the landmark Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, which rattled power centers from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa.
While billed as a diplomatic overture, this visit is under a cloud of public suspicion, with popular sentiment in the Republic of Somaliland hardened against a neighbor many increasingly view as an existential adversary rather than a regional ally.
Djibouti’s Hostility Has Been Deliberate, Not Diplomatic
Djibouti’s antagonism toward the Republic of Somaliland is not a matter of diplomatic disagreement but calculated strategy. In June 2024, Djibouti shuttered Somaliland’s diplomatic mission after fabricating a utility payment dispute as pretext. Somaliland Chronicle previously reported the mission was “billed an exceptionally high amount for water and electricity, totaling tens of thousands of dollars” before services were abruptly disconnected – transparent diplomatic harassment thinly disguised as an administrative matter.
In perhaps his most provocative move, President Guelleh recently hosted SSC Khatumo leader Mr. Firdhiye in Djibouti, a calculated signal of disapproval toward Somaliland’s strategic initiatives. This deliberate engagement with separatist elements from Somaliland’s eastern regions represented a direct violation of diplomatic norms and a challenge to the Republic of Somaliland’s territorial integrity – the very principle Djibouti claims to defend regarding Somalia.
“Djibouti has positioned itself as an active adversary, not merely a neutral neighbor,” noted a senior political analyst in the Republic of Somaliland. “From shuttering our diplomatic mission to hosting separatist leaders and working to undermine the Ethiopia MoU, Djibouti’s hostility has been comprehensive and deliberate. This trip must be seen in the full context of sustained aggression.”
Somaliland Public Sentiment: Mistrust Has Become Policy
Inside the Republic of Somaliland, this visit is deeply unpopular. Social media monitoring shows overwhelming disapproval, with particular anger focused on Guelleh’s reception of SSC Khatumo representatives. Many citizens view Djibouti as having betrayed regional solidarity to protect its economic monopolies.
“Djibouti is not just a competitor. It’s an active saboteur,” said a prominent business leader in Berbera. “They’ve lobbied investors to steer clear of our port and sought to maintain their monopoly at our expense.”
Business leaders have been particularly vocal about Djibouti’s economic warfare tactics, including reports of Djiboutian officials pressuring logistics firms to avoid Berbera and making backchanneled threats to regional investors. This economic sabotage has cemented perception of Djibouti as a hostile competitor rather than a potential partner.
Djibouti: Beijing’s Proxy in the Horn of Africa
Beyond the immediate bilateral tensions lies a deeper, more fundamental incompatibility – Djibouti’s increasingly entrenched role as China’s strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa. What was once a sovereign nation has, according to multiple regional security analysts, effectively transformed into “a wholly-owned subsidiary of the People’s Republic of China.”
China’s military base in Djibouti – its first overseas installation – represents merely the visible component of Beijing’s control. Multiple sources with direct knowledge of Djibouti’s financial operations indicate that China now effectively controls the country’s economic decision-making through a web of strategic debt arrangements.
“When Djiboutian officials meet with their Somaliland counterparts, they’re not representing Djiboutian interests – they’re implementing Chinese foreign policy,” explained a former Western diplomat with extensive regional experience. “Beijing views Somaliland’s growing ties with Taiwan and the United States as a direct challenge to its regional hegemony.”
Somaliland’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in 2020 positioned it in direct opposition to China’s regional ambitions. The formal establishment of Taiwan-Somaliland ties triggered furious diplomatic protests from Beijing, which subsequently intensified its support for Somalia’s territorial claims and pressured Djibouti to adopt an increasingly hostile stance toward Somaliland.
“China sees Somaliland-Taiwan relations as a dangerous precedent that must be crushed,” noted a security analyst specializing in Chinese foreign policy. “Djibouti’s sudden hostility toward Somaliland coincides precisely with Beijing’s escalating campaign against Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.”
Financial records reveal China holds over 70% of Djibouti’s external debt, giving Beijing unprecedented leverage over the country’s policy decisions. This financial control manifests in Djibouti’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Somaliland, particularly following the Taiwan recognition and discussions about potential U.S. military presence in Berbera.
Somalia’s Diplomatic Siege Is Collapsing
While Djibouti’s behavior draws scrutiny, Cirro’s visit is nonetheless a blow to Somalia’s faltering campaign to diplomatically isolate the Republic of Somaliland. Sources within Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm to Somaliland Chronicle that Mogadishu has been aggressively lobbying regional neighbors to sever ties with Somaliland.
“We were told explicitly that Mogadishu demanded Djibouti refuse any presidential-level meetings,” confirmed a Somali diplomat under condition of anonymity. “Today’s visit represents a significant failure of this strategy.”
This diplomatic offensive has taken increasingly desperate forms. Just last week, Somalia banned entry of Taiwanese passport holders, citing “national sovereignty concerns” – a transparent attempt to punish the Republic of Somaliland for its growing relationship with Taiwan. As Somalia doubles down on isolation tactics, Somaliland has managed to breach the blockade, turning diplomatic endurance into quiet success.
A Clash of Ports: Berbera vs. Djibouti
At the heart of Somaliland-Djibouti tensions lies a stark economic reality: Berbera Port is rising, and Djibouti’s monopoly is fading.
World Bank data starkly illustrates this competitive dynamic: Berbera Port ranks 82nd globally in performance while Djibouti languishes at position 382 out of 385 ports worldwide. The $442 million DP World investment in Berbera threatens to redirect Ethiopian trade away from Djibouti’s ports, which currently handle approximately 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime commerce.
A World Bank “Djibouti Country Economic Memorandum” explicitly warned that Djibouti’s economic model – dependent on a single sector (ports) and single client (Ethiopia) – has become fundamentally “unsustainable,” with Berbera Port identified as the primary competitive threat.
“These aren’t conditions for partnership,” remarked an international trade analyst. “Djibouti sees every shipment that enters Berbera as a strategic loss.”
Cirro’s Priorities Questioned: Why Not Addis First?
Curiously, President Cirro chose Djibouti as his first regional destination rather than Addis Ababa—despite the historic MoU with Ethiopia signed earlier this year. That deal promised Ethiopia naval access via Somaliland, and in exchange, informal diplomatic recognition—though Ethiopia has recently shown signs of retreat under pressure from Mogadishu and Ankara.
“The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU is the crown jewel of Somaliland diplomacy,” said a former envoy to Addis. “Why would Cirro start his tour in the capital of the country that has worked hardest to destroy that agreement?”
Multiple sources inside Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry told Somaliland Chronicle there has been no scheduled visit by Cirro to Addis, despite growing concern that Ethiopia may be quietly backpedaling under Somali-Turkish pressure.
Strategic Real Estate: The Battle Over U.S. Military Presence
Adding another layer of complexity is the Republic of Somaliland’s open courtship of American military presence in Berbera – directly challenging another lucrative Djiboutian monopoly on foreign military bases. While Djibouti hosts installations for the United States, China, France, Italy, Japan and Saudi Arabia, collecting billions in lease revenue, Somaliland has positioned Berbera as an alternative strategic location.
US Africa Command has conducted multiple high-profile visits to Berbera, with flight tracking data showing U.S. military transport planes making numerous trips between Djibouti and Berbera in recent months. These movements strongly suggest serious American consideration of establishing a presence that would directly compete with Djibouti’s AFRICOM base.
“Their entire rental economy depends on monopoly,” said a regional defense expert. “A U.S. base in Berbera would collapse the market value of Djibouti’s foreign presence overnight.”
Breaking the Blockade: Cirro’s Second Destination Looms
In a further challenge to Somalia’s isolation strategy, Somaliland Chronicle has learned President Cirro is set to undertake another significant foreign visit immediately following his Djibouti trip. Multiple sources in the Republic of Somaliland confirm the President will travel to another regional neighbor later this week, though the exact destination remains closely guarded for security reasons.
“Somalia has been frantically lobbying this country as well to refuse President Cirro’s visit,” revealed a senior official from Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry. “Their diplomatic corps has been throwing everything at the wall, but it’s not sticking.”
Diplomatic sources indicate Somalia dispatched a high-level delegation to this unnamed country last week specifically to undermine Cirro’s planned visit, offering unspecified concessions in exchange for rebuffing Somaliland’s president. This upcoming visit, if successful, will mark Somalia’s second consecutive diplomatic defeat in a single week, further eroding Mogadishu’s influence in the region.
Can Djibouti Be Trusted?
As President Cirro walks Djibouti’s red carpets today, fundamental questions persist about whether a genuine reset is possible with a neighbor that has systematically worked to undermine the Republic of Somaliland’s core interests. Symbolism alone won’t move the needle in the Republic of Somaliland.
To reset relations, Djibouti must reopen Somaliland’s consulate, end support for separatists, and cease obstructing economic and military cooperation—especially concerning Berbera Port and the potential U.S. presence. Otherwise, this visit risks becoming little more than a photo op in hostile territory.
“Cirro must return with more than diplomatic smiles,” said a veteran Somaliland statesman. “He must bring results. Otherwise, Djibouti’s leopard has not changed its spots—it’s simply hiding them better.”
