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Key Points
- Somaliland’s biometric registration of security personnel aims to eliminate payroll fraud but raises security concerns
- Kenya-based company Innovii, which has operations in Somalia, reportedly secured the implementation contract
- Multiple sources indicate personal connections between Innovii executives and Minister Khadar Hussein Loge
- No competitive bidding process was conducted despite the system’s national security implications
- National Electoral Commission’s equipment and personnel are being used, but their implementation expertise is being sidelined
- Recent security lapses raise questions about Somaliland’s capacity to protect sensitive military personnel data
Somaliland stands at the threshold of a military transformation that could redefine its security capabilities for decades to come. President Abdirahman M Abdillahi “Cirro”‘s ambitious biometric registration initiative represents the most significant modernization of defense infrastructure in years—a digital evolution that promises to create a more efficient, transparent, and data-driven security apparatus. By eliminating ghost soldiers, optimizing resource allocation, and enabling evidence-based strategic planning, the system holds the potential to make Somaliland’s security forces a model of 21st-century military management in the region. Yet as this transformation unfolds, evidence suggests a rushed implementation approach may inadvertently introduce new vulnerabilities to the very institution it aims to strengthen. The balance between modernization benefits and security considerations will determine whether this initiative ultimately enhances or compromises national security.
Beyond Compensation: The Context and Legitimate Goals
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi commenced his tenure with a bold fiscal initiative, authorizing an immediate 50% increase in security personnel compensation effective January 22nd. This substantial enhancement—the first installment of a promised 250% increase over his administration—addresses longstanding grievances within Somaliland’s security establishment and signals a commitment to military welfare previously absent from governance priorities.
Accompanying these salary reforms is the introduction of the IRIS Biometric Registration System, designed to modernize personnel management and eliminate payroll fraud. The registration process officially launched in March 2025, with Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge speaking at the ceremony. According to Horn Diplomat’s reporting, the initiative has been characterized as a “historic modernization” of Somaliland’s security forces.
The administration’s initiative addresses a recognized problem: ‘ghost soldiers’—non-existent personnel whose salaries are misappropriated, typically by high-ranking officers. These fictitious payroll entries not only drain millions from military resources but create misleading assessments of actual force strength and readiness.
While Somaliland Chronicle has not independently verified the scale of this practice, multiple sources within the security sector characterize the problem as ‘substantial.’ A senior defense ministry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, estimated that addressing this issue could recover ‘millions of dollars annually’ for legitimate operations. “This has been a systemic problem for years,” the official stated. “Accurate personnel records are fundamental to both fiscal responsibility and operational readiness.”
The initiative will likely face resistance from entrenched interests who have benefited from the current system’s lack of transparency. “Any reform that threatens established financial channels will encounter pushback,” noted a former military finance officer. “The administration deserves credit for tackling this issue despite the political risks involved.”
Official Statements vs. Implementation Reality
While the goals of the biometric registration initiative are commendable, an examination of its implementation raises several concerns that merit careful scrutiny.
Somaliland Chronicle has learned that Innovii (also operating as Vivacom), a Kenya-based telecom and digital solutions provider, has reportedly been selected to implement the biometric registration system. The company, headed by Mohamed Barre as Director and co-founder, has limited documented experience with military-grade security systems. Their primary expertise lies in healthcare platforms and telecom solutions, raising questions about their qualifications for handling sensitive security data.
At the March 2025 launch event, Minister Khadar Hussein Loge explicitly stated that “No outsiders are involved in this process,” adding that technical committees consisting of multiple government agencies and military personnel are overseeing the implementation. However, the Minister did not specify which entities are handling which aspects of the system, and notably did not address reports about Innovii’s role or the concerns raised about the company’s Somalia connections.
Sources close to the process indicate that Innovii may have secured this critical security infrastructure project without an open, competitive bidding process. This approach stands in contrast to international best practices for critical security systems, which typically involve rigorous vendor evaluation and competitive selection.
Multiple sources with direct knowledge of the registration initiative have revealed to Somaliland Chronicle that Innovii’s CEO and several senior executives maintain longstanding personal and professional relationships with Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge—a prominent member of the committee overseeing the security personnel registration. With no public procurement process to require disclosure of such connections, these relationships have remained largely unscrutinized.
The Somalia Connection: Documented Business Ties
Further investigation reveals that Innovii maintains an extensive operational footprint in Somalia. The company has successfully implemented “Baano,” a healthcare platform in Mogadishu, while simultaneously operating a similar platform called “Shaafi” in Somaliland. This dual presence establishes the company’s business activities in both territories.
Somalia represents a clear and present danger to Somaliland’s security, having repeatedly demonstrated both the will and capability to destabilize the country through military, intelligence, and proxy operations. Beyond its territorial claims, Somalia appears intent on Somaliland’s reincorporation by any means necessary. The Somali government has consistently opposed Somaliland’s independence while seeking to undermine its sovereignty through diplomatic, economic, and occasionally military pressure.
Given this context, entrusting Somaliland’s comprehensive security personnel data to a company with substantial business interests in Somalia raises legitimate national security questions. If compromised, this biometric database would deliver unprecedented strategic intelligence—revealing force distribution, command structures, specialized unit compositions, and individual identities of security personnel.
The vulnerability extends beyond regional threats. International actors with advanced offensive cyber capabilities—particularly China, which has demonstrated sophisticated data exfiltration techniques against military targets worldwide—could potentially access this information through direct intrusion or via partnerships with regional actors. China’s documented interest in Horn of Africa security infrastructure creates an additional layer of risk.
When approached for comment about these business connections, neither Minister Khadar Hussein Loge nor Innovii executives responded to our inquiries.
Security Clearance Gaps and Technical Vulnerabilities
An examination of the implementation process reveals significant structural gaps in security protocols. Unlike established military and intelligence institutions where clearance levels dictate access to classified information, Somaliland has yet to implement a formal vetting framework for individuals involved in key security projects. This absence of a structured security clearance process means that external contractors and government officials—whose ultimate loyalties and interests remain unexamined—are granted access to sensitive military data without the rigorous background scrutiny standard in comparable security environments.
Recent events highlight existing vulnerabilities in Somaliland’s information security practices. A classified document detailing the reassignment of intelligence officers from Somaliland’s National Intelligence Directorate to military units has surfaced in various circles, effectively exposing these operatives. Somaliland Chronicle has not independently authenticated this document, but security experts consulted about its contents expressed alarm.
“This leak compromises these intelligence officers’ operational security,” explained a former intelligence official who reviewed the document. It should be noted that in some political circles, the reassignment and potential “burn notice” of these intelligence operatives has been lauded due to longstanding misgivings about the intelligence agency’s politicized nature and inward-looking focus rather than addressing external threats, particularly under former President Bihi’s administration.
However, security professionals maintain that regardless of the merits of restructuring intelligence services, the public exposure of operative identities through unsecured documents represents a fundamental security lapse that raises broader concerns about information protection capabilities.
The 2018 incident in the Ministry of Finance’s Financial Management Information System provides another example, where sensitive financial data was exposed due to a critical security hole in the system’s architecture. These incidents raise questions about whether Somaliland currently possesses the institutional capacity to secure a comprehensive database of all security personnel.
The Technical Implementation: Questions Without Answers
Sources close to the implementation have indicated that the biometric system will be housed at military headquarters and operate on an offline network—a positive initial security measure. However, security experts caution that this offline status creates a new dimension of concern: ongoing maintenance and system updates. Contractors will almost certainly need to maintain access for maintenance, patches, and technical support, creating what security professionals call a “privileged access dilemma“.
“Military-grade systems require military-grade access protocols,” explained a former cybersecurity officer with experience in defense systems. “Each maintenance session should be supervised, all update code should be scanned for malware, and contractor personnel should never be left alone with the system.”
“Even with proper encryption, the human element remains the greatest vulnerability,” noted a security consultant who requested anonymity due to ongoing work with regional governments. “Without proper clearance protocols and continuous monitoring, systems can be compromised from within.”
Security experts note that modern military biometric systems typically employ advanced encryption standards with sophisticated key management systems. Yet when asked about specific security protocols, government officials provided only general assurances about “taking all necessary precautions,” without detailing specific technical safeguards.
A robust approach to mitigating these risks would involve adopting a Zero-Trust Security Model, a framework widely used in sensitive military and governmental systems. This model operates on the principle of “never trust, always verify,” ensuring that no user, system, or network is inherently trusted—whether inside or outside the organization.
The NEC Paradox: A Positive but Partial Engagement
The involvement of Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) represents one of the few positive aspects of the implementation process. The NEC has demonstrated impressive technical capability by successfully deploying biometric systems during recent elections—establishing a proven track record of managing sensitive data securely within Somaliland’s specific context.
President Cirro’s formal request for the NEC to transfer 50 complete IRIS Biometric registration kits and 50 of their highest-level trainers shows recognition of this indigenous expertise. However, this engagement appears to be only a half-measure. While leveraging the NEC’s equipment and trained operators, the administration has inexplicably stopped short of consulting the Commission on implementation strategy and security architecture—areas where the NEC has demonstrated considerable competence.
Instead, the central implementation role has apparently been given to Innovii, despite the NEC’s proven experience with these exact systems in Somaliland. This partial engagement creates a puzzling situation: Why tap the NEC for hardware and personnel but not their implementation expertise?
The decision to utilize NEC resources while apparently sidelining them from the overall security design and implementation strategy represents a missed opportunity to fully leverage Somaliland’s own proven capabilities. Given the previously noted personal relationships between Minister Khadar Hussein Loge and senior Innovii executives, one must question whether these connections, rather than technical merit, are influencing the implementation approach.
International Lessons: Learning from Others’ Mistakes
The risks associated with compromised biometric systems are not theoretical. When Taliban forces captured biometric devices containing Afghan security personnel data in 2021, the information enabled systematic identification and targeting of former government employees—many of whom faced brutal retribution. As documented by Human Rights Watch and the MIT Technology Review, these captured databases contained detailed personal and occupational information that put thousands of lives at risk.
Somalia’s own biometric infrastructure has become a cautionary tale. Despite international oversight and claimed safeguards, Somalia’s government has admitted Al-Shabaab has infiltrated its institutions at virtually every level, likely giving terrorists access to sensitive personnel data. Somalia’s military systems—built with millions from US, EU, and UK taxpayers—have become a security liability rather than an asset. Somaliland should carefully consider these precedents as it implements its own system.
The Path Forward: Differing Perspectives on Security and Reform
The government’s initiative to modernize security personnel records and eliminate payroll fraud represents a significant shift in Somaliland’s approach to security management. Various security experts and defense analysts consulted by Somaliland Chronicle offered divergent perspectives on how such systems might be implemented.
Some security professionals emphasized the importance of independent security audits, noting that in other contexts, such assessments have helped identify vulnerabilities before they could be exploited. Others pointed to clearance frameworks as an established practice in military contexts worldwide, with proponents arguing they create necessary accountability for those accessing sensitive data.
“The biometric system presents both opportunities and challenges,” observed a retired senior military commander. “While eliminating ghost soldiers addresses a legitimate administrative problem, the handling of personnel data has broader implications for national security. These considerations will need to be balanced carefully as the process unfolds.”
Military technology experts noted that the specific technical approaches adopted in similar systems internationally vary widely. In some countries, heightened security measures prioritize compartmentalized access, while others focus on system hardening and encryption. The specific balance Somaliland strikes between administrative efficiency and security protocols will likely emerge as implementation progresses.
The military biometric registration initiative undoubtedly represents a significant change in Somaliland’s security administration. Stakeholders across the security establishment will continue to debate the merits of different implementation approaches as the system develops. The ultimate impact on both administrative efficiency and national security will only become clear as the initiative moves forward in the coming months.## Security Reform vs. Security Risk: Weighing the Implications of Somaliland’s Military Biometric System
We reached out to key figures involved in the biometric registration implementation for responses. Questions were sent to Presidential Affairs Minister Khadar Hussein Loge regarding the procurement process, his alleged personal connections to Innovii executives, security vetting procedures, and technical safeguards for the system. Similar inquiries were directed to Innovii CEO Mohamed Barre concerning his company’s qualifications for handling sensitive military data and its extensive operations in Somalia. However, neither the Minister nor Innovii’s executives responded to our inquiries.
Notice: This is an article by Somaliland Chronicle. It is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. Under this license, all reprints and non-commercial distribution of this work is permitted.
