Questions mount as André partners with Somali MP who concealed government role in foreign agent filing
In a move that raises significant concerns about diplomatic integrity and national security, former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Larry André Jr. Jr. registered as a foreign agent (Registration Number: 7468) on September 25, 2024, for Hormuud Telecom. According to UN Security Council documents, this company emerged from the remnants of Al-Barakaat, a network previously dismantled by U.S. authorities for terrorist financing. André now serves as Strategic Advisor, with an explicit mission to correct what they term “unfair, inaccurate, and outdated perceptions or libelous accusations” about Hormuud.
Timeline of Key Events
- 2001 (November 7): U.S. authorities raid Al-Barakaat offices across eight states
- 2002: Formation of Hormuud Telecommunications by former Al-Barakaat leaders
- 2017 (October): Two Hormuud employees prosecuted for role in Somalia’s deadliest terror attack
- 2018: UN Security Council report details Hormuud employee dismissals for terror links
- 2019: Hormuud infrastructure allegedly linked to Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi
- 2023 (June): Larry André Jr.’s premature departure from ambassadorial post
- 2024 (September 25): André and Malik Abdalla register as foreign agents for Hormuud
The Al-Barakaat Legacy: Resurrecting a Terrorist Financial Network
Understanding André’s new role requires examining Hormuud’s documented emergence from Al-Barakaat, once among Al-Qaeda’s most sophisticated financial operations. By 2001, Al-Barakaat had built a global empire spanning 40 countries, moving approximately $140 million annually through its hawala network while operating telecommunications and internet services throughout Somalia. This integrated model – combining financial services with telecommunications infrastructure – proved invaluable for terrorist operations, allowing seamless communication and money movement across borders.
The UN Security Council Report S/2002/1209 highlights Al-Barakaat’s sophisticated and far-reaching involvement in financing terrorism. The organization skimmed percentages from legitimate remittances sent by the Somali diaspora, creating an informal and virtually untraceable value transfer system. The telecommunications infrastructure provided by Al-Barakaat facilitated real-time coordination of financial movements and enabled terrorist communications.
The operation’s sophistication became clear on November 7, 2001, when U.S. authorities launched coordinated raids across eight states, targeting Al-Barakaat’s American offices. Yet the 2001 crackdown, rather than dismantling the network, prompted its evolution. In 2002, just months after Al-Barakaat’s designation as a terrorist entity, key figures from the organization emerged behind a new venture: Hormuud Telecommunications. According to UN Security Council documents, “Hormuud Telecommunications was created by former leaders of Al-Barakaat in an attempt to reestablish themselves as a dominant telecom provider in Somalia.”
Terror Links and Banking Ambitions
Hormuud’s operational history, marked by security breaches and financial irregularities, is particularly concerning. According to UN Security Council report S/2018/1002, in October 2017, two Hormuud employees were prosecuted for their role in facilitating what became Somalia’s deadliest terrorist attack, with prosecutors presenting evidence that the employees allowed bomb-laden vehicles through checkpoints. Intelligence reports subsequently linked the company to the 2019 Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi, where Hormuud’s office infrastructure allegedly provided logistical support to the attackers.
The attack involved a large VBIED, with an estimated TNT equivalence of over 1,200 kg, making it one of the largest explosive devices in Al-Shabaab’s history.
It is against this backdrop that André’s primary mission, according to FARA filings, becomes particularly alarming: gaining U.S. regulatory recognition for Hormuud’s subsidiary, Salaam Somali Bank. The scope of potential risk becomes clear when considering Al-Barakaat’s historical operations: a $140 million annual operation spanning 40 countries, demonstrating how quickly such networks can achieve global scale. While Hormuud seeks access to today’s more regulated financial infrastructure – including U.S. dollar clearing operations, correspondent banking relationships, and direct interface with SWIFT and ACH systems – the fundamental vulnerabilities remain.
Somalia’s limited regulatory capacity creates particular challenges. Even with U.S. regulatory frameworks like the Bank Secrecy Act and OFAC oversight, the integration of telecommunications and banking services poses unique monitoring challenges. Modern financial controls, designed for traditional banking operations, may struggle to effectively oversee a system where telecommunications, mobile money, and banking services blur traditional regulatory boundaries. The complex corporate structures and Somalia’s informal financial sector create opacity that could shield questionable transactions from scrutiny.
A Web of Political Connections
This banking initiative, advanced through a complex web of political connections, raises serious concerns. FARA registrations reveal that Malik Abdalla, a current member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, registered as a foreign agent alongside André. Before entering parliament in March 2022, Abdalla served as CEO of White Star Business Group from 2017 to 2022. His previous roles as Director of the Disengaged Combatants Program at the Ministry of Internal Security (2015-2017) and Senior Political Advisor to the Ministry of Defense (2011-2012) point to deep connections within Somalia’s intelligence apparatus, particularly with intelligence chief Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbalolshe”.
The structure of White Star Business Group itself presents red flags. CEO Amira Elmi’s rapid transition from corporate planning at Canada’s Meteorological Service to running a complex security and diplomatic consulting operation in Somalia strains credibility. White Star’s consulting agreement reveals a broader strategy targeting “regional and global capitals in priority countries,” suggesting this Washington lobbying effort is part of a larger campaign to expand Hormuud’s influence internationally.
Hidden Parliamentary Role Raises Legal Red Flags
Malik Abdalla’s involvement adds further layers of concern beyond political connections. FARA registration documents reveal that Abdalla, while serving as a member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament, failed to disclose this role as a foreign government official when registering as a foreign agent (Registration Number: 7468) on September 25, 2024. The filings show Abdalla, who acquired U.S. citizenship through asylum in 2011, describing himself merely as a “Businessperson” and “Member” of White Star Business Group LLC – a company he wholly owns.
This omission becomes more significant given Abdalla’s U.S. citizenship status. His service in a foreign parliament while maintaining U.S. citizenship potentially violates 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(4)(A), which addresses loss of nationality through foreign government service. That he now operates as an undisclosed foreign government official while lobbying U.S. authorities raises serious national security concerns and appears to violate FARA’s explicit requirement to disclose all positions held with foreign governments.
Problematic Pattern of Diplomatic Service
In light of Mr. Abdalla’s undisclosed role as a current member of Somalia’s Parliament and possible intelligence connections, a critical question emerges: Given his position and access to classified intelligence, did André know that Malik Abdalla, his current employer, was a member of Somalia’s Parliament with extensive connections to Somalia’s intelligence services and its chief Mr. Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbalolshe”? The implications of this question reach beyond mere ethical concerns into the realm of potential security compromise.
The timing raises particular red flags. André’s premature departure from his ambassadorial post coincided with a period of intense scrutiny of Somalia’s financial networks. His immediate transition to representing interests he would have received classified briefings about – particularly through a firm run by a parliamentary figure with deep intelligence connections – suggests either a troubling lack of judgment or more concerning possibilities.
Throughout his diplomatic tenure, André faced criticism for appearing to act more as an advocate for Somali government interests than a representative of the United States. His unusually supportive stance toward Mogadishu, sometimes appearing to serve as an unofficial spokesperson for the administration, takes on new significance given this rapid transition to representing major Somali business interests.
The FARA filing’s deliberate omission of André’s specific salary details, while acknowledging his compensation is “not based solely on services rendered to the foreign principal,” adds another layer of opacity. This arrangement, combined with his abrupt departure and immediate alignment with figures of intelligence interest, raises profound questions about potential compromise.
National Security Implications
The gravity of this situation extends beyond typical concerns about the revolving door between diplomatic service and private consulting. André’s role represents a potential compromise of national security interests in the Horn of Africa, particularly given his access to classified intelligence about the very networks he now represents.
The precedent this sets is deeply troubling: a former U.S. Ambassador, having had access to classified intelligence about regional financial networks and their security implications, now works to integrate those same networks into the U.S. financial system. The implications for U.S. national security and regional stability could be severe if these efforts succeed in providing access to the American banking system without proper scrutiny of historical connections and current operations.
Hormuud’s ambitious strategy to expand its influence through “regional and global capitals in priority countries” suggests this Washington lobbying effort is part of a broader campaign to legitimize its operations internationally. Given the documented history of how such networks can rapidly achieve global scale and the challenges of effective oversight, the potential risks to U.S. financial security cannot be overstated.
Repeated attempts to reach Mr. Andre for comment on his transition from Ambassador to foreign agent were unsuccessful. Mr. Abdalla did not respond to detailed questions about his parliamentary role, U.S. citizenship status, and FARA filing omissions. White Star Business Group’s office in Washington declined to address questions about its broader lobbying strategy or the nature of Mr. Andre’s compensation arrangement.
