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Special Report | AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley acknowledges al-Shabaab resurgence after decades of US investment as Trump cuts Somalia funding. Full analysis.
Key Points
- Policy Reversal: General Langley admits Al-Shabaab is “entrenched, wealthy, and large” after previously claiming US operations were “weakening” the group
- Strategic Defeat: Al-Shabaab overran major US-backed base at Adan Yabal, forcing elite Danab forces to flee and abandon millions in weapons
- Funding Cuts: Trump administration ended $400/month salary supplements and logistical support following audits revealing “padded requisitions”
- China’s Victory: Somalia banned Taiwanese passport holders while receiving US military support, effectively serving Beijing’s regional objectives
- Electoral Charade: Hassan Sheikh promises impossible “one-person, one-vote” elections while two-thirds of country remains under militant control
- Intelligence Failure: President cycles through spy chiefs amid accusations of Al-Shabaab infiltration at highest levels of security apparatus
- Command Uncertainty: Trump administration considers merging AFRICOM with European Command as Langley announces successor nomination pending
General Michael Langley delivered what he called his “last, final Chiefs of Defense Conference as the AFRICOM commander” with a stunning admission: after three decades and tens of billions of dollars in US investment, al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” – a complete reversal from his previous assessments dismissing reports of the group’s resurgence.
The farewell briefing, delivered from Nairobi following the African Chiefs of Defense Conference, came as the Trump administration implements sweeping cuts to Somalia funding and considers merging AFRICOM with European Command. Langley announced that “a nomination for my successor is expected soon,” marking the end of an era that saw America’s most expensive counterterrorism failure in Africa.
The timing of Langley’s admissions couldn’t be more damaging to his legacy. Just days before the briefing, al-Shabaab forces overran the strategic town of Adan Yabal, forcing US-trained Somali National Army troops to flee their largest operational base and abandon millions of dollars in American-supplied weapons.
Al-Shabaab Resurgence: Langley’s Strategic Reversal
Langley’s current assessment stands in stark contrast to his statements just 11 months ago. In June 2024, when the Somaliland Chronicle pressed him about obvious signs of al-Shabaab’s resurgence and territorial gains, Langley expressed “measured optimism about the Somali government’s counterinsurgency efforts” and claimed “joint operations have been instrumental in weakening al-Shabaab’s grip on several regions.”
When confronted about Somalia’s divided focus between fighting terrorism and pursuing regional conflicts against democratic partners, Langley “carefully sidestepped a direct response” and deflected with diplomatic language about “comprehensive approaches.”
The reality was always obvious to regional observers. Al-Shabaab was regrouping, rearming, and preparing for major operations. The group’s February 2025 “Operation Ramadan” saw militants seize “more than 15 towns and villages” in a single day, while the March assassination attempt against Somalia’s president demonstrated their operational reach into the capital itself.
Now, facing the undeniable collapse of Somali security forces and his own imminent departure, Langley finally concedes what critics have long argued: the entire Somalia policy has failed spectacularly.
The Adan Yabal Catastrophe
The collapse that prompted US airstrikes on April 16 wasn’t just another tactical setback – it represented the complete failure of America’s Somalia strategy. Adan Yabal served as “a critical logistical hub” and “an operating base for raids on al-Shabaab,” strategically positioned 245 kilometers north of Mogadishu to project government power into militant-controlled territory.
The base housed not just regular army units but Somalia’s elite Danab special forces – the 2,500-strong unit that traditionally led the fight against al-Shabaab with US training, equipment, and until recently, direct salary support. When militants attacked before dawn, these supposedly elite forces simply fled, abandoning sophisticated weapons systems, vehicles, and communications equipment worth millions.
Al-Shabaab claimed to have “overrun 10 military installations during the fighting,” while government forces retreated so quickly that conflicting accounts emerged about who actually controlled the town. The psychological impact was immediate, with one resident reporting hearing explosions and gunfire as militants attacked “from two directions.”
Trump’s Reality Check
The Adan Yabal debacle coincided perfectly with the Trump administration’s decision to end the decades-long Somalia funding spigot. Since February, the US stopped paying stipends that boosted Danab members’ salaries to $400 per month – double what regular soldiers receive. Food support ended in April 2024, fuel support ceased in March 2025, following US audits that found Somali forces had “padded food and fuel requisitions.”
These cuts directly correlate with al-Shabaab’s recent gains. Insurgents have “taken back dozens of villages” and “regained the ability to operate in nearly a third of the territory they lost to federal forces in 2022.” The militants have mortared Mogadishu’s international airport and bombed the president’s motorcade, killing four people while demonstrating their capability to strike anywhere.
Yet despite this obvious correlation between reduced support and military failures, Langley’s briefing still suggested lingering faith in the fundamental Somalia model. His emphasis on “institution building across the Somali National Army” and addressing “root causes of instability” indicates AFRICOM leadership may not fully grasp that they’re advocating for continued investment in a demonstrably failed enterprise.
Somalia’s Strategic Pivot to China
While Somali forces collapsed under reduced US support, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s government aligned itself completely with Chinese strategic objectives. In April 2025, Somalia implemented a comprehensive ban on Taiwanese passport holders, explicitly invoking the “One China” principle in a direct rebuke to democratic Taiwan.
This wasn’t diplomatic neutrality but active support for Beijing’s regional strategy. Somalia serves as China’s proxy in regional conflicts, with key government advisers like Hodan Osman serving as “the main conduit to China” while “heavy weaponry not normally present” floods into contested areas to support Chinese objectives against US partners.
The irony of the situation is stark: America conducted over 25 airstrikes in Somalia in 2025 to support a government that has publicly aligned with Beijing’s strategic objectives. Each precision strike that protects Somali government forces indirectly supports Chinese regional goals, creating an unusual dynamic where US military action serves competitors’ interests.
The Stabilization Industrial Complex
For three decades, Somalia has perfected what analysts describe as the stabilization industrial complex. The country has consumed tens of billions of dollars through various international missions and aid programs while producing what amounts to permanent instability.
Current estimates suggest two-thirds of Somalia remains under direct or indirect Al-Shabaab control, while in government-controlled Mogadishu, the federal government and Al-Shabaab operate parallel taxation systems that extract revenue from the same businesses. This isn’t state failure – it’s a business model that requires ongoing chaos to justify international intervention.
Langley’s warning that funding shortfalls could benefit Al-Shabaab highlights the dependency relationship. The system requires external funding to maintain the appearance of governance while multiple parties benefit from the arrangement.
The Propaganda Counterattack
A Washington Post article published shortly after Langley’s briefing highlighted concerns about Al-Shabaab’s resurgence following US funding cuts. The piece noted that “insurgents have taken back dozens of villages, including the strategic town of Adan Yabaal” and linked this to reduced American support for Somali forces.
Critics argue such reporting follows a predictable pattern: acknowledging military setbacks while suggesting more funding rather than examining why previous investment failed to create sustainable capabilities. The coverage serves various stakeholders who benefit from continued US engagement, including defense contractors, aid organizations, and Somali officials.
Hassan Sheikh’s Political Survival Strategy
As security failures mount and international support evaporates, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud appears to be throwing desperate political Hail Marys that underscore his government’s isolation and weakness.
In a pattern that suggests either panic or political calculation, Hassan Sheikh has embarked on two unrealistic initiatives that critics view as attempts to extend his hold on power. First, he has announced plans for “one-person, one-vote” direct elections scheduled for 2025-2026 – Somalia’s first such polls since 1967. The announcement, made at an April 2025 voter registration campaign in Mogadishu, promises local elections in June 2025 and parliamentary elections in September.
The electoral pledge faces immediate practical obstacles. Opposition leaders, including former presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, have rejected the plan outright, calling it “unilateral” and warning they could organize a parallel vote. Two of Somalia’s federal member states – Puntland and Jubaland – have refused to participate, with Puntland declaring it no longer recognizes federal institutions.
More fundamentally, the promise of nationwide elections appears divorced from security realities. With Al-Shabaab controlling an estimated two-thirds of Somalia’s territory and conducting major operations within 50 kilometers of Mogadishu, the logistics of conducting credible elections across the country seem impossible.
Simultaneously, Hassan Sheikh has engaged in musical chairs with his intelligence leadership, repeatedly firing and rehiring spy chiefs in what appears to be a futile search for competent security management. In May 2022, he appointed Mahad Mohamed Salad as Director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), replacing Fahad Yasin Haji Dahir, who had served under the previous administration.
However, the appointment quickly proved problematic. Former NISA chief Fahad Yasin launched a “blistering attack” on Salad, claiming he was “behind a series of assassinations and bombings in Mogadishu” and describing him as an Al-Shabaab operative who “facilitated their operations.” Yasin alleged that Hassan Sheikh had received warnings about Salad’s background but appointed him anyway.
By 2024, Hassan Sheikh had apparently soured on Salad, with reports indicating the intelligence chief “resigned from his position” after two years in the role. In what appears to be a return to previous arrangements, Hassan Sheikh has reportedly brought back Fahad Yasin to head NISA once again – the same official he had replaced Salad with originally.
The intelligence musical chairs reflects deeper problems with Somalia’s security apparatus. The NISA has been described as “a tool for silencing critics and independent media houses,” while being plagued by accusations of extrajudicial killings, including the high-profile murder of female intelligence officer Ikran Tahlil Farah in 2021.
These moves appear designed more for political survival than effective governance. The electoral promises provide a democratic veneer while the security reshuffles suggest desperate searches for loyalty rather than competence. Both initiatives face immediate obstacles that make success unlikely, suggesting they serve primarily as time-buying exercises for a president running out of options.
AFRICOM’s Uncertain Future
Langley’s farewell comes as the Trump administration considers merging AFRICOM with European Command to “cut bureaucracy.” The general acknowledged this uncertainty, telling reporters that “the United States is assessing the future of its military command for Africa” and calling on African governments to make their views known in Washington.
The potential merger would effectively end AFRICOM as an independent command – a fitting conclusion to an organization that presided over America’s most expensive strategic failure in Africa. Under Langley’s leadership since August 2022, AFRICOM doubled down on the failed Somalia model while losing Niger, seeing Chad expel US forces, and watching China expand its influence across the continent.
As the first Black four-star general in Marine Corps history, Langley’s tenure should have been a historic success. Instead, it concluded with admitting that Somalia’s security situation had deteriorated despite decades of American support, while China expanded its influence across the continent.
The Regional Alternative
While Somalia continues its expensive performance of statehood, genuine alternatives exist in the region. Somaliland has maintained democratic governance and effective counterterrorism capabilities for over three decades without international recognition or significant aid. The territory’s “proven track record in containing terrorist threats, particularly Al-Shabaab” demonstrates what functional governance looks like without the stabilization industrial complex.
Berbera’s strategic port offers “optimal forward operating base” capabilities with “strategic reach extending across multiple areas of operation” – from Al-Shabaab strongholds to Houthi maritime threats. Yet US policy continues supporting Somalia’s fiction while ignoring democratic realities that could actually advance American strategic interests.
Notably, Langley is reportedly planning to visit Somaliland in his final days as AFRICOM commander – perhaps finally acknowledging the democratic partner America should have been working with all along.
The Bottom Line: Horn of Africa Policy Crossroads
General Langley’s farewell briefing represents more than the end of his tenure – it marks the collapse of three decades of American counterterrorism investment in Somalia totaling tens of billions of dollars. His admission that al-Shabaab remains “entrenched, wealthy, and large” after decades of investment should prompt serious questions about every aspect of US Horn of Africa policy.
The Trump administration’s decision to reduce Somalia funding represents a shift from previous policy. Officials argue that continued engagement without measurable progress constitutes poor use of resources. The Somali government’s alignment with Chinese foreign policy objectives, including its ban on Taiwanese passport holders, has further complicated the relationship.
As Langley prepares for retirement and awaits his successor’s nomination, questions remain about the future of US engagement in Somalia. The contradiction between increased airstrikes and reduced institutional support reflects the challenge facing American policymakers: how to address immediate security threats while avoiding long-term dependency relationships that have proven ineffective.
The tragedy isn’t just the wasted resources or strategic humiliation. It’s that every dollar spent propping up Somalia’s elaborate fiction could have been invested in genuine regional partners who actually fight terrorism and support democratic values.
General Langley asked in 2022 why he was excited to lead AFRICOM into the future. Three years later, he leaves having proven exactly why America needs fewer commands chasing failed states and more partnerships with functional democracies.
The question isn’t whether al-Shabaab will exploit funding gaps – as Langley warns – but whether his successor will finally have the courage to admit what everyone except AFRICOM already knows: Somalia’s counterterrorism model is unsalvageable, and it’s time to back functional democracies instead of subsidizing failed states.
Related Coverage: AFRICOM’s Nuanced Response on Somalia’s Anti-Al-Shabaab Commitment | China’s First Proxy War in Africa
