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Somaliland launched a new institute in May 2026 dedicated to advancing international recognition, and it was a step to add expertise and intensify efforts to gain recognition by an institution solely dedicated for that purpose. The question now is whether the institute’s focus matches the political realities that actually decide recognition.
The Somaliland Recognition and Independence Institute was inaugurated by Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi i Hargeisa. The goal is to professionalise and deepen the efforts to gain recognition by launching a dedicated institute for that sole purpose, an institute that brings together the best and brightest from the legal community, academia, diplomats and advocates.
The institute; goals and focus areas
The institute intends to document Somaliland’s history and national struggle, strengthen and present the legal arguments for recognition, and pursue justice and reparations for historical crimes like the Isaaq genocide and injustices committed against Somaliland and its people. It also aims to coordinate and support efforts by a global network of more than two thousand international supporters described as “friends of Somaliland,” bringing together academics, legal experts, diplomats and advocates.
The institute can also play a practical supporting role in advocacy abroad. While the core legal case for recognition is already well researched, it can organise workshops and produce clear materials that equip the network of roughly two thousand friends of Somaliland to present the case more effectively.
The institute represents a clear institutional advance as they enable specialists to dedicate all their time and research to advance recognition to complement the governments efforts. And the involvement of experienced figures such as Sir Gavin Williamson as chairman and Jason McCue as director adds credibility and access through their networks that would otherwise be harder to obtain. To give you an idea, Sir Gavin Williamson is an experienced British politician who has served as Chief Whip of his party, he served as Secretary of State for Defence and Secretary of State for Education, and Jason McCue is an acclaimed British human rights lawyer and international justice campaigner who has previously acted as a Presidential Envoy for Somaliland.
Is the strong legal focus of the institute the right focus to advance recognition?
The case for (re)recognition of Somaliland is from both a legal and historic perspective arguably among the strongest case of any entity seeking (re)recognition today. First of all Somaliland meets the gold standard in international law regarding statehood, the Montevideo convention criteria; It has a permanent population, it has a clear defined territory based on the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, it has a stable and functioning government. And it has the capacity to enter into international relations. It maintains many diplomatic relations Hargeisa is home to many diplomatic liaison offices and it has it’s first official embassy and ambassador in Israel
Furthermore in 1960 Somaliland briefly existed as an independent state recognised by approximately thirty-five countries before entering a union with Somalia that was never properly ratified. As an indigenous people, Somalilanders hold the right to self-determination under the UN Charter. The African Union’s own 2005 Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland described the case as “historically unique” and “self-justified in African political history.”
What sets Somaliland especially apart from every other territory currently seeking diplomatic recognition, including South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Western Sahara, is this combination: a period of internationally recognised independent statehood, followed by a union that the African Union’s own fact-finding mission concluded was never ratified. None of these other cases has ever held recognised independent statehood in the first place, let alone a documented finding that a subsequent union was unratified. The distinction is not one of ordering, but of ingredients: these elements are missing from their cases altogether and make the case for recognition by Somaliland stand out globally.
But diplomatic recognition is not primarily a legal question. It is fundamentally a political decision made by governments based on political arguments mostly. Leaders weigh national interests(it is very much transactional based on what is in it for a country), alliances like ties to Somalia, great-power competition, and domestic political calculations, including the fear of setting precedents in countries that themselves face separatist or secessionist movements. And despite the fact that Somaliland is not a secessionist entity but a restored independent state, those political concerns still influence decision-makers.
A good example of how politics determine recognition , not legal arguments is Kosovo. Kosovo received major-power political backing during and after a war against Serbia, particularly from the United States and much of NATO, and now has upwards of 100 recognitions worldwide, depending on the source. . Kosovo didn’t win those recognitions based on their legal case, but simply cause enough major worldpowers backed its independence.
In contrast, entities such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Western Sahara remain largely unrecognised despite their own claims, because the political calculus has not shifted in their favour. This is because politics dominate decisions about recognition, legal arguments merely are used to support a case; they do not determine the outcome
Given this reality, the institute’s current public heavy emphasis toward strengthening and presenting the legal arguments for recognition seems out of touch with what drives recognition. The political and strategic dimensions that actually move governments remain quite underdeveloped in the publicly described mandate.
A much needed course correction
Because recognition is primarily a political decision, several concrete areas remain underdeveloped and would strengthen the institute’s ability to influence recognition.
First, systematic profiling of countries who could be open to recognition is needed. This should examine not only general friendliness to Somaliland and openness to recognition. but also their alliances, opposing interests, incentives, and the larger regional and global power-competition dynamics in which they operate. This way the institute can determine which countries are most promising when it comes to recognition and which countries are for now not a realistic option. This prevents using resources to court countries that have no intention whatsoever to recognise Somaliland and enables the government to focus on the most promising countries. Profiling, however, is only the starting point; each promising country then needs its own tailored strategy, since no single approach fits all. Some governments may be prepared to move relatively quickly to formal recognition. For most, recognition is more likely to emerge from a gradual process of deepening economic or security ties until the relationship reaches a point where formal recognition becomes the logical next step.
Somaliland’s own experience illustrates the difference. Relations with the United Arab Emirates developed over years: early contacts grew into major investments in Berbera port, now a state of the art deep sea port run by DP World under a long-term concession worth up to $442 million, as reported by Reuters, followed by investment in power, airport upgrades, and a planned railway link to Ethiopia. The UAE now accepts Somaliland passports and its visa system lists Somaliland as a country like any other recognised country, there are direct flights between the UAE and Somaliland , and the UAE maintains a military presence. It is a deep relationship that amounts now to a form of soft recognition, stopping just short of the formal kind. Israel took a shorter path: after a relatively short period of negotiations recognition came first, on 26 December 2025, and after recognition launched cooperation in water, agriculture, healthcare, business and security, including training Somaliland’s special forces, as confirmed by Somaliland’s Defence Minister to Reuters. Two countries who followed two very different pathways. This is where the institute can add real value: profiling candidates, then designing country-specific strategies matched to each partner’s interests and comfortlevel and political sensitivities
Second, the institute and its vast network can organise multi-level engagement with political decision-makers, opinion leaders, media and policy influencers in the most promising countries. This is essential as recognition is advanced by the people who shape policy and influence it. The institute can support their global network with targeted workshops: it can offer media training for advocates in the press, and lobbying and policy-brief drafting for those actively lobbying in political circles. It can also draw on its own profiling work to supply advocates and diaspora professionals with country-specific messaging and briefings.
Third, clear strategies are needed to counter opposing campaigns and even anticipate them so the institute’s network and the government can be prepared for that, particularly those mounted by Somalia, so Somaliland’s narrative isn’t left undefended. Responses can range from media campaigns and lobbying to a deliberate sequencing strategy: prioritising bilateral, country-to-country recognitions first, while avoiding international forums where Somalia and its allies could engineer a visible diplomatic loss. By focusing on bilateral recognitions and building a critical mass of recognitions, Somaliland can accumulate concrete wins; only once that critical mass exists does it become safer to engage multilateral institutions, where existing recognitions outweigh opposition. In parallel, the institute can monitor the arguments used by opposing campaigns and supply rapid-response briefings the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and supporters can deploy.
Fourth, Somaliland should define its own interests and red lines on economic, security and governance questions that may arise in any future recognition-related discussions. Cause recognition usually involves negotiations that touch on both countries interests. Entering such conversations unprepared risks a bad deal.
Fifth, mechanisms to track and convert existing operational and practical relationships into formal political recognition over time would turn day-to-day engagement into lasting results.
Equally important is the question of local ownership. The international leadership brings valuable stature and experience. At the same time, well-intentioned outsiders can miss certain domestic and regional sensitivities, historical nuances and the informal dynamics that shape relations in the Horn of Africa and neighbouring regions. A practical middle path is to preserve the international expertise while pairing it with Somalilanders in co-chair and comparable positions at every level. This ensures that local knowledge and national-interest are integrated and prevents blind spots.
Finally, the institute should be designed to complement, not compete with, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry already carries out important diplomatic work and has been building professional capacity, including through its own diplomatic training programmes. The institute can usefully serve as an advanced expertise and talent centre that develops specialised knowledge on priority regions and aspects of recognition strategy, then feeds that capacity back into the Ministry.
Conclusion
The Somaliland Recognition and Independence Institute is a positive institutional development. Its strengths in documentation, justice work, international networking and the practical equipping of supporters are real. To maximise its contribution, however, its centre of gravity needs to reflect the nature of the decision it seeks to influence.
Recognition is driven primarily by political calculations and political actors. Legal and historical work remain important, but the legal case itself is already well established and researched and misses the fact politics drive recognition. A clearer and greater focus on the political dimensions, combined with structural pairing of international expertise and Somalilander leadership at all levels, and close complementarity with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would better equip the institute better to advance Somaliland’s national interest in a sustained and effective manner.
The foundation has been laid. The real test is whether the institute will now refocus itself toward the political arena where recognition is actually decided.
About the Author
Brian McDonald, a columnist and geopolitical analyst who spent years in the Middle East, Singapore, Eastern and Southern Africa. He posts in various publications on current events. Mr. McDonald holds an MA in global governance, politics and security and is postgrad at the Defense studies department of Kings College London.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
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