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Before the beginning of the U.S. and Israel war with Iran in December 2025, former Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi was in a strong position. He was popular in both Washington and, more importantly, among Iranians themselves. As regime change appeared imminent, Reza Pahlavi’s anointment once again as heir apparent seemed a sure thing. At the very least, his position atop the aspirants shaping the future of Iran was his alone to lose.
And, yet, through his own mismanagement, inability to be decisive, and unwillingness to take on his own advisors, many of whom acted without skill and nuance, Pahlavi ended up killing his own ambitions. Appearances matter, and Pahlavi convinced not only his detractors but many of his friends that he was not ready for prime time.
Unfortunately, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi“Irro” appears to follow the same trajectory as he prepares for his first visit to Washington as president.
Somaliland has made great strides toward recognition of its independence over the past decade. Credit is broad and across the partisan spectrum in Somaliland.
What Mogadishu and Somalia’s various lobbyists never understood is that Somaliland’s growing prestige in Washington has nothing to do with money or contracts, but rather its own reality. No amount of lobbyist money can change the fact that Somalia is corrupt, pro-China, and increasingly a vassal of Turkey. Al-Shabaab controls Mogadishu’s functioning more than the federal government. Neither President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, cabinet minister or foreign diplomats can walk three blocks from Villa Somalia and survive without massive security. Somaliland, meanwhile, is democratic, secure, and pro-Western.
Somaliland also has international law and precedent on its side. If the United Arab Republic, Senegambia, and Czechoslovakia can dissolve unpopular federations, why should Somaliland and Somalia not go their separate ways, all the more so since there was no formal ratification of their federation. What hampers the international community today is not law or precedent, but rather ignorance and Turkish, Qatari, Saudi, and Chinese money.
Irro’s personality also works in his favor. He is affable and engaging. In one-on-one meetings in Washington, he should do well.
All this, however, may soon be lost should the Somaliland delegation project a reputation of incompetence and amateurishness.
Success in Washington requires small delegations and a laser focus. Beyond the president, the Somaliland delegation should consist of one or two intelligence professionals, the foreign minister, and one or two defense specialists. To have more than a dozen—almost 20 officials by some accounts—in the delegation suggests a level of amateurishness that will soil Somaliland’s image among the serious policymakers it needs to win over. Part of Somaliland’s case is its efficiency with a limit budget; a 19-man delegation projects an image of South Sudan, not success.
Nor is image the only problem. No senior meeting will occur with more than Irro and one or two other Somaliland officials in the room, which raises the question of why such a large delegation is necessary.
A large delegation is bad enough, but disorganization within it will be worse. Washington seeks serious negotiations over mutual concerns, first and foremost of which is regional insecurity. Somaliland can make its case that it offers a symbiotic solution. For ministers and officials from every portfolio to come suggests a lack of focus and risks a repeat of earlier Somaliland mistakes in which Somaliland officials sought funding prematurely for ad hoc projects that never should have been a priority.
Governance must be about advancing Somaliland’s case, not about winning slots on a government-financed junket. Irro has a choice. He can either advance Somaliland’s case in Washington, or he can assuage clan and political allies in the short term. He should choose wisely. State leadership will require telling clan and political allies no. He must tell close friends and aides to stay home and do their jobs inside Somaliland.
Somaliland needs to trim its delegation to five people. If Somaliland succeeds in upgrading U.S. representation in Hargeisa or Somaliland’s office in Washington, DC, then other cabinet officials can come in future visits.
About the Author
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units.
Dr. Rubin is the author, coauthor, and coeditor of several books exploring diplomacy, Iranian history, Arab culture, Kurdish studies, and Shi’ite politics, including “Seven Pillars: What Really Causes Instability in the Middle East?” (AEI Press, 2019); “Kurdistan Rising” (AEI Press, 2016); “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter Books, 2014); and “Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos” (Palgrave, 2005).
Dr. Rubin has a PhD and an MA in history from Yale University, where he also obtained a BS in biology.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions or perspectives of Somaliland Chronicle and its staff.
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