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by Shay Gal
On 26 December 2025, Israel did what every capital at the Red Sea’s southern gate had modelled privately and dismissed publicly: it recognised Somaliland.
The backlash was instant and choreographed.
Within hours, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Djibouti, Turkey, Sudan and Somalia signed a rejection citing sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Days later, the European Union extended its naval protection mission until February 2027. Not symbolism. Budgeted. Deployed. An admission: maritime passage remains exposed and contested. When insurers price risk and navies remain deployed, statements do not move cargo. Shorelines do.
Strip the language.
The alignment changes. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Djibouti are structurally invested in a self-governing Somaliland that already operates as one. They may avoid the word recognition, but their planners, port authorities and crisis rooms treat it as separate: a coastline to stabilise, a port to sustain, an airfield to preserve, an administration to trust. Israel did not create this reality. It forced it into daylight.
Turkey’s reaction reveals the stakes. President Erdogan condemned the move as illegal and destabilising, warning against foreign rivalry in the region. The warning would carry more weight had Ankara not spent a decade embedding itself within Somalia’s defence, training and coastal structures. Fighter jets deployed to its base in Mogadishu did not signal neutrality. They signalled control. Somaliland disrupts that structure. A functioning Hargeisa administration, an expanding Berbera port and diversified partnerships reduce Ankara’s leverage as gatekeeper and arbiter.
Turkey fortifies Mogadishu’s security ecosystem, positions itself as mediator and frames Somali unity as non-negotiable. The mediation track that reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity excluded Somaliland by design. Mediation shrinks the table until only the preferred client remains. That is not resolution. It is leverage.
Somaliland’s advantage is operational. The Berbera expansion is capital in place. Containers move. Livestock ships. Supply chains function. Even amid tensions between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, operations held. In a maritime passage where disruption is measured in hours and priced globally, continuity becomes credibility.
Riyadh knows this. For Saudi Arabia, the southern entrance of the Red Sea is the approach to Jeddah, Yanbu and the Kingdom’s western industrial arc. The Houthi campaign has turned the sea route into pressure on global trade. Maritime protection is no longer episodic. It is structural. In that context, a capable administration on the African shore opposite Yemen is strategic depth.
Saudi engagement with Somaliland goes beyond rhetoric. Livestock trade is seasonal, sensitive and politically charged. When Riyadh adjusts import policy, Berbera responds. Quarantine protocols, veterinary certification and shipping schedules form ties that cannot be staged. Saudi commercial interest in mineral exploration reinforces the calculus. Companies do not assume exploration risk in jurisdictions they consider temporary. Internal conviction precedes public caution.
Why sign rejections. Because precedent matters. Riyadh will not appear aligned with a move delivered by Israel, nor hand Ankara or Tehran an easy narrative of fragmentation. It is also balancing competition with the UAE across Yemen and the Horn. Keep Somaliland engaged, economically useful and strategically quiet. Useful in practice. Restrained in public.
Egypt’s calculus is blunt. The canal is lifeline. Disruption south of Suez reverberates through state finances and planning. A governed coastline opposite Yemen reduces arms flows, hostile intelligence activity and smuggling networks that eventually affect canal-bound shipping. Cairo cannot treat Somaliland as a cartographic footnote. It measures risk in control, predictability and capacity. By those metrics, Somaliland is one of the most stable stretches of that shore.
Turkey Egypt rapprochement does not erase this tension. Naval drills, visits and defence co-production are tactical instruments. Hardware sales and coordination address immediate needs, including monitoring Sudan’s war. They do not close the divide over the Muslim Brotherhood. For Cairo, the Brotherhood is existential. Ankara’s record of hosting and amplifying Brotherhood-linked actors is not erased by protocol. The alignment is transactional. It secures time. It does not secure trust.
Sudan distorts every calculation. The war is fragmented and porous. Suppliers circulate drones and ammunition through shifting routes. Borders blur. Ports become prizes. Instability along Sudan’s coastline ripples into maritime passage. For states securing shipping, Sudan multiplies risk. In that landscape, Somaliland’s order is an anchor. Where institutions govern coast and territory, entry points narrow.
For Djibouti, this is leverage. Ethiopia’s dependence sustained its port dominance. Berbera introduces alternatives. Leverage erodes. The reflex to defend status quo is understandable. The strategic interest differs: ensure a rising neighbour coordinates on border control, customs enforcement and maritime oversight. An isolated Somaliland invites penetration. An integrated Somaliland buffers it.
The Houthi supply chain runs through Turkish territory. Sanctions have named Istanbul-based financial conduits linked to Iran’s Quds Force and Houthi networks. Arms shipments routed via Turkish intermediaries have surfaced in repeated enforcement actions. No prosecutions followed. No structural dismantling occurred. The pattern persists.
This is not bureaucratic oversight. It is sustained permissiveness toward networks financing and arming forces attacking commercial shipping. In a chokepoint that carries a significant share of Asia-Europe trade, permissiveness is policy.
Houthi leadership has warned that foreign military presence associated with Somaliland would be targeted. The warning confirms significance. Actors threaten what constrains them. A monitored coastline restricts launch and smuggling freedom. Somaliland’s relevance lies in its ability to close gaps.
For Hargeisa, recognition is exposure. Expectations rise. Scrutiny hardens. Diversify partnerships without surrendering autonomy. Preserve regulatory clarity. Frame security cooperation as protection of trade and coastline, not alignment in distant rivalries. Somaliland’s strength is reliability. It cannot be traded for spectacle.
For Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Djibouti, the window narrows. Recite formulas while depending on Somaliland’s stability, or formalise engagement that matches operational reality. Recognition is procedural. Engagement is strategic. Delay will not freeze the field. Turkey consolidates across Somalia’s defence and energy sectors. External networks probe financial and logistical seams. Maritime passage moves regardless.
The reality is already active. At the southern entrance of the Red Sea, states act as if Somaliland exists, whether they say so or not. Stability on that coastline serves their core interests. Silence may be convenient. It will not endure.
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About the Author
Shay Gal is an Israeli strategic analyst on international security and foreign policy. He advises senior government and defence leadership worldwide on strategy, public diplomacy, and crisis decision-making.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, or viewpoints of Somaliland Chronicle, and its staff.
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